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Market competitiveness and Big 5 pricing: Evidence
from China's binary market
a,* v: \\r,. bCharles J.P. Chen a , Xijia Su '*, Xi Wu
Department ofAccountancy, City University ofHong Kong, Hong Kong
School ofAccountancy, Central University ofFinance and Economics, Beijing, China
Abstract
Big 5 auditors enjoy a worldwide audit fee premium that is believed to be attributable primarily to
their reputation for providing high-quality services to clients. This study finds that the fee premium is
also attributable to a lack of competition in the market. Taking advantage of the binary structure of
the audit market in China, we compare the pricing practices of the Big 5 in the competitive statutory
market and the less competitive supplementary market. Although the Big 5 have a reputation for
high-quality audits in both markets, the degree of competition in the two markets is very different.
Using audit fee data from the period 2000 to 2003, we find that the Big 5 earn a significant fee
premium in the less competitive supplementary market, but not in the competitive statutory market.
Although our results do not completely rule out reputation as an explanation, they are consistent with
the notion that the audit fee premium that is earned by the Big 5 is more likely to be attributable to
their dominant market position than to their reputation in the emerging Chinese markets, in which the
usual audit-quality benefits for investors and managers are either absent or minimal.
© 2007 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords Big 5, Audit pricing; Binary market structure
1. Introduction
The relation between audit pricing and auditor concentration is of primary interest to
regulators and users of financial statements. The demise of Arthur Andersen and the
ensuing shrinkage of the Big 5 to the Big 4 has added to regulators' concerns about the lack
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of competition in the audit market brought on by increased concentration. It is not clear,
however, that market concentration has indeed led to reduced competition among certified
public accountant (CPA) firms. While the existence of fewer audit firms may give those
remaining firms more market power in recruiting and retaining clients, there are also
concerns that audit firms compete too aggressively when they become very large. 1 In
response to those concerns, the General Accountability Office (GAO) in the United States
prepared a report in July 2003 on the potential efforts of consolidation of public accounting
firms on competition. By employing a simple model of pure price competition, the GAO
observed that a high degree of concentration is not necessarily inconsistent with a price-
competitive environment. However, although it found no evidence that the consolidation of
the largest audit firms from eight to four was associated with "impaired competition", the
GAO concluded that existing research on the impact of consolidation on audit quality,
auditor independence, and pricing is "inconclusive". Similarly, the U.K. Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) found no evidence of uncompetitive behavior in the U.K. audit market
(Beattie, Gooddacre, & Feamley, 2004).
Extant empirical studies focus mainly on the existence of a fee premium for large audit
firms and whether this fee premium is due to the reputation of the auditors or their dominant
position in the market. The results are inconclusive at best. Whereas some studies (Baber,
Brooks, & Ricks. 1987; Pearson & Trompeter, 1994) have failed to find the existence of a
significant fee premium for Big 8 (or Big 6) auditors, others have found the opposite
(Bandyopadhyay & Kao, 2001; Ward, Elder, & Kattelus, 1994). Research results are also
inconsistent on the underlying reasons for the fee premium that is earned by large firms, if it
exists. Earlier studies (for example, Simunic, 1980) suggest that relative market power is
the reason for the fee premium, whereas more recent studies (Francis, 1984; Francis &
Simon, 1987; Palmrose, 1986) have tended to attribute this premium to product
differentiation, reputation, and industry specialization of large firms. These inconsistent
results may reflect the lack of a research setting in which the impact of the brand name
reputation of auditors on audit pricing can be isolated from their dominant position in the
market (Thornton, 2001).
We argue that, in the long run, the reputation and market power of the large public
accounting firms are not mutually exclusive in their influence. A powerful market position
without quality services is not sustainable, as the market will soon come to detect the false
reputation (if priced) and penalize the auditor that has cheated. Furthermore, independent
audits are often used as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate the agency problem by
attesting to the GAAP conformity of financial statements. Companies with high agency
costs are more likely to hire quality auditors to signal to the market that their managers are
not expropriating from outside shareholders. The motivation for corporate management to
signal the high quality of a firm's financial reporting creates a demand for quality audits,
which sustains the market concentration of quality auditors. The large market share of
quality auditors can be maintained only if auditors continue to provide the expected high-
quality sen ices, otherwise the signaling effect of quality audits would diminish and the
market share of quality auditors dwindle. The loss of clients that was experienced by Arthur
Andersen immediately after the Enron scandal was clear evidence of the interdependence
1
Financial Reporting Council (1441 ), "The State of Financial Reporting: A Review.'
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between audit quality or reputation and audit market share. As quality audits require more
work to complete, auditors that provide a greater degree of assurance of quality through
their reputation will charge an additional fee to cover their incremental costs. In this regard,
reputation and market power are joint determinants of the fee premium. Attributing the fee
premium to reputation or market power alone is, at best, an incomplete explanation.
However, the joint nature of the effects of reputation and market power on the fee premium
does not necessarily mean that they cany equal weight in determining audit fees. It is likely
that one dominates the other in specific markets and specific periods, which would explain
why many previous studies have concentrated on determining whether the fee premium in
their sample was caused by reputation or market power (Francis, 1984; Francis & Simon,
1987; Palmrose, 1986; among others).
Moreover, in the short run. and especially in transitional economies where the detection
of the mispricing of reputation by market participants may take longer than in developed
markets, it is possible that either reputation or market power alone is sufficient to allow
auditors to earn a fee premium. In such cases, the audit fee premium is more likely to be
attributable to the lack of competition in a market where the demand for quality auditing is
low and the dynamics of audit supply and demand have not reached equilibrium. The
Chinese stock market seems to be a promising testing ground for such a hypothesis, as the
Chinese government advocates the use of Big 5 auditors for supplementary audits, whereas
the managers and controlling shareholders offirms do not see the benefit of seeking a high-
quality audit because the usual economic gains that such audits bring are not available in
China. As is discussed in detail later, raising additional capital from foreign investors after
an initial public offering (IPO) is virtually impossible, and lending rates for bank loans are
so tightly controlled by the government that the difference in interest rates is negligible.
Therefore, the often-cited benefit of quality audits in lowering financing costs cannot justify
the fee premium in China.
In addition to a statutory audit, Chinese companies with foreign investments are required
to undergo a supplementary audit. The statutory audit market has a low entrance barrier and
is highly competitive, but the supplementary market is dominated by the Big 5 because of
China's regulatory preference for large foreign auditors. This binary market setting
provides a quasi-experimental opportunity to test whether the Big 5 charge a fee premium,
and, if so, whether this premium is more likely to be attributable to their brand name
reputation or their relative market dominance. Using 434 observations (217 supplementary
and 217 statutory audits) from 2000 to 2003, we find that the Big 5 charge significantly
higher audit fees in the supplementary auditing market, which they dominate. However,
their fees are not significantly higher than those of local firms in the competitive staUitory
market, in which the Big 5 may take advantage of their brand name reputation but do not
enjoy oligopolistic power. Sensitivity tests show that these results are robust to variations in
model specifications, control variable definitions, and possible self-selection bias. Our
findings suggest that the Big 5 may adopt different pricing strategies in accordance with
their power in a particular market. These findings support the notion that the audit fee
premium is partially attributable to a lack of competition in the auditing market.
We contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on this issue through a
direct comparison of two audit markets in which the Big 5 have different levels of market
dominance. Our test setting consists of two sub-markets in which the Big 5 enjoy a brand
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name reputation, but they dominate only one. We also interview auditors from the Big 5 and
find that their audits of financial reports in the two markets are very similar in terms of
coverage, procedures, and standards. This indicates that the difference in the fees charged to
clients in different markets is more likely to be attributable to a difference in pricing
strategies, rather than cost differences. The special setting allows us to make a contribution
to the understanding of audit pricing. However, we accept that the emerging and transitional
nature of this market may reduce the power of our analysis because the pricing mechanism
and determinants of audit fees may be noisier than those of mature markets, and we take this
into consideration in our empirical analyses.
The next two sections provide background information and develop the research
hypotheses, respectively. They are followed by a discussion of the research methodology,
including the research design, sample selection, and descriptive statistics. The subsequent
sections present the main and additional test results, and the last section concludes the
paper.
2. Background
Classic economic theory suggests that the prices of goods are positively associated with
supplier concentration in the market (Weiss, 1989). However, empirical evidence on the
association between audit fee and auditor concentration is inconsistent. Whereas Baber et
al. (1987) failed to find any Big 8 audit fee premiums in a study of 100 North Carolina
county governments, Ward et al. (1994) found evidence of such premiums in their sub-
sample of Michigan municipalities. Using observations from the insurance industry,
Pearson and Trompeter (1994) found market concentration to be negatively associated with
audit fees, and suggested that higher levels of concentration are related to higher levels of
price competition. Taking advantage of a change in professional rales in Australia that
occurred between 1982 and 1987, Craswell, Francis, and Taylor (1996) showed that Big
8 fee premiums declined over a six-year period, and rejected allegations that fee premiums
result from the relative lack of competition in the audit market. Bandyopadhyay and Kao
(2001) found that Big 6 firms command audit fee premiums even after the removal of
certain market barriers, which suggests that such fee premiums reflect brand name
reputation, rather than oligopoly rents. In a local analysis, Bandyopadhyay and Kao (2004)
obtained mixed results on the relation between market structure and audit fees, showing that
the concentration of the audit market is positively associated with non-Big 6 audit fees but
is unrelated to Big 6 audit fees. The question of whether the audit fee premium of the Big 5
is a result of oligopoly rents or brand name reputation remains unanswered, and it is likely
that the answer will only become apparent when the impact of brand name or quality on
audit pricing can be reliably separated from the effect of market dominance. Unfortunately,
such a test setting has been hardly available to researchers. The test settings in the
aforementioned studies, for example, do not allow us to directly compare Big 5 pricing in
an uncompetitive market versus a competitive market. The change in competitive
conditions caused by new regulations and examined by Bandyopadhyay and Kao (2001).
for example, is unlikely to reflect a real change in the audit market (Thornton. 200 1 ). As the
Big 5 dominate the audit market in all of the settings that are examined by these studies, it is
difficult to test whether the auditor-fee premium is caused by this dominance. Lee (1996)
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Tabic I
Big 5 auditors market statistics
Year Number of Statutory audit market Supplementary audit market
B-share firms
Market share based on Market share based on
# # of clients Client assets it it of clients Client assets
1995 70 15 21.40% 14 70",, 56 SO 00% 80.30%
1996 85 20 23 50% 18.30% 68 SO Oil",, 80.70%
1997 102 28 27 50% 23.00% 91 SO 20",, 92 70",,
1998 102 27 26.50% 21.20% 85 83.30% 89.60%
1999 10S 25 23.20% 21 III",, 82 75.90% so 20",,
2000 114 28 24.60% 22.00% 80 70.20",, 77 10%
2001 112 37 3300% 34 so 11 ,, 77 6X SO",, 76.80%
2002 III 31 27.90% 34.10% 68 61.80% "4 20",,
2003 109 30 2^ 50% 36.40" „ S7 52 30% 00 Ml",,
1995-2003 913 241 26.40% 26.80% 664 72.70% 79 70%
reviewed the extant audit-pricing literature and pointed out that even though the Big 5
possess less market share in the small-client market than in the large-client market, their
total market share is still far higher than that of non-Big 5 auditors. Lee concluded that there
is no effective way to separate oligopoly pricing power from the service quality or
reputation premium. The validity of previous findings is further weakened by the
simultaneous provision of auditing and consulting services to the same client, because joint
fee decisions and possible cross-subsidization could severely reduce the reliability of the
audit fee data that are used.
Our test setting provides an opportunity to study audit pricing of the Big 5 in two
markets in which the effect of market power and reputation can be reasonably separated.
Most listed companies in China issue only A-shares to domestic investors, but some (about
10%) also issue B-shares to overseas investors. According to Chinese stock market
regulations, companies that issue both A- and B-shares" are required to publish two sets of
financial statements in accordance with Chinese GAAP and international accounting
standards (IAS and now IFRS). These companies are subject to dual audits, the second of
which is performed either by a local auditor or an international CPA firm. As lAS-based
statements must be published in Hong Kong for overseas investors that are from areas
where the Big 5 are major market players, the auditing of B-share financial statements has
become one of the main business areas of the Big 5 in China. Although non-Big 5 overseas
firms and local firms are allowed to practice in the Chinese B-share audit market, they do
not pose a competitive threat, as regulators prefer the Big 5/ The Big 5 auditors' market
" Few companies issue only B-shares.
The preference of the regulators for international firms is specified in many official regulations,
announcements, and interpretations. One of the earliest regulations was promulgated by the Security Committee
of State Council in 1996 as a Practice Guide to listed companies. Later, the Chinese Securities Regulator}
Commission (CSRC) stipulated in 1999 that all banks and companies in the financial sector were subject to a
supplementary audit by "recognized international CPA funis". The regulations for non-financial companies were
less restrictive, but the preference for well-known international accounting firms was made very clear by the
CSRC in an official document that was issued at the end of 2001
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statistics that are presented in Table 1 show the degree of concentration in the statutory and
supplementary markets between 1995 and 2003. It can be seen that the degree of
concentration is consistently different in the statutory and supplementary markets. When
we use the number of clients to measure market share, we find that the Big 5 possess a share
of 26.4% of the statutory market and 72.7% of the supplementary market. However, when
market share is measured by the total amount of client assets, the Big 5 hold 26.8% and
79.7% of the statutory and supplementary market share, respectively. This indicates that the
Big 5 have focused on large clients in recent years.
Ideally, the audit-pricing practices that we are dealing with in this study should be assessed
by comparing two markets (sub-markets), only one of which is concentrated and has entry
barriers, to verify whether the fee premium is associated with market competitiveness. The
binary market structure in China provides just such a testing opportunity. Its two markets are
significantly different both in terms of market concentration
4
and barriers to entry (the
regulatory preference for internationally recognized firms applies only in the supplementary
market), but auditors in both markets must follow the same standards and are subject to similar
regulatory monitoring. Consequently, we find from our interviews with auditors that firms that
audit both A- and B-share statements usually follow the same procedure and have a similar
cost function for the two audits.
The Chinese auditing market also possesses other features that make it a valuable setting
in which to test audit pricing. First, as they are restricted by an earlier regulation that banned
CPA firms from setting up offices in other cities, Chinese auditors usually operate only in
the local market. Thus, we do not need to rely on the unsupported premise that audit firms
that dominate nationally are major players in a particular local market. Previous studies
have often encountered problems with this premise, as it does not hold when there is
regional heterogeneity (Bandyopadhyay & Kao, 2004). Second, consulting is not a major
business for Chinese firms, which makes audit fee data from China more reliable than data
from markets in which auditing and consulting fees may be jointly determined. Third,
because Chinese CPA firms have not developed any clear industry specialization, the test
setting is cleaner than the settings that are used in other studies in which the effect of
industry specialization mingles with that of pricing strategies.
3. Research hypotheses
3. 1. Statutory auditing market
China is potentially one of the world's largest auditing markets. However, when the
country opened its doors to the then Big 8 firms in the early 1 980s, these firms were only
allowed to set up representative resident offices, rather than branches, which is the normal
arrangement in other markets. The Big 8 were not allowed to fully enter the auditing market
until the mid-1980s through the formation of cooperative firms (a type of joint venture)
with local partners. The Big 8 firms started their business in China with a very high profile
and a reputation that could not be matched by local firms. For example, the top managers
On average, it is less than 30% in the statutory market and more than 70% in the supplementary market for the
Bis; 5 auditors.
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from the big auditing firms had the opportunity to meet with China's Premier during their
visits to China, which is a great honor in Chinese culture, whereas their local counterparts
had no chance of even meeting a minister. The support of top government officials
effectively endorsed the reputation of the big firms for high-quality auditing, but in the
statutory audit market local firms had the advantage of a wide network that could not be
immediately established by the newcomers. In this regard, the late entrance of the (now) Big
5 into the market has forced them to operate from a relatively disadvantageous position
compared to local firms, and although they enjoy a brand name reputation that has
overshadowed local firms from the start." their ability to earn a fee premium is limited by
several institutional constraints.
One of these constraints is that auditing services are treated as classical experience
goods, as it is difficult to evaluate the quality of a service before using it (Craswell &
Francis, 1999). Attracting potential customers when the quality of a good is unknown is
challenging for suppliers of high-quality and high-priced experience goods. To overcome
this problem, suppliers in mature markets usually build a clientele over a long period by
developing a reputation for providing high-quality services and expertise in particular areas.
However, in the emerging audit market of China, reputation for high quality is recognized
mainly through regulatory requirements, rather than market competition. The requirement
of a supplementary audit for overseas investors, which regulators expect one of the big
firms to perform, is an effective endorsement of the reputation of those firms, but no similar
preference is given in the statutory market. In terms of regulations, therefore, the statutory
audit market is equally open to the Big 5 and local firms.
In the emerging market of China, competition is mainly focused on price, rather than on
quality or specialization (Li & Wu, 2004). During the 1990s, there were about 100 local CPA
firms that were authorized to audit listed companies, but none of them established a leading
position in the market. Competition in the marketplace is fierce, as is indicated by the fact that
the top ten firms account for less than 35% of the statutory audit market. Companies that are
required to undergo statutory audits have little incentive to seek high-quality audits, since this
may lead to unfavorable audit opinions (DeFond, Wong. & Li. 2000). Thus, the Big 5 must
compete with local firms for clients not only on reputation and audit quality, but also on price.
As recent arrivals in the competitive and price-sensitive statutory market, the Big 5 are
unlikely to charge a premium. This leads to our first hypothesis.
HI. Ceteris paribus, the pricing of the Big 5 is not significantly higher than that of the non-
Big 5 auditors in China's statutory auditing market.
3.2. Supplementary auditing market
Whether the audit fee premium that is enjoyed by the Big 5 results from their brand name
reputation or represents oligopoly rents is a key issue in many audit fee studies. Previous
studies (for example, Bandyopadhyay & Kao, 2001 ; Francis & Simon, 1987) examined the
The big firms made significant efforts to enhance their reputation long before China opened its doors to
outside suppliers of audit services. In 1981 for example, with assistance from the Shanghai Institute of Finance
and Economics. Coopers & Lybrand offered several accounting courses to CFOs. even though no international
firms were allowed to practice in China.
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pricing of the Big 6 before and after changes in the degree of competition, and, observing a
continued fee premium, concluded that the premium is associated with brand name
reputation because oligopoly rents would have dissipated in the face of heightened
competition. The test setting that is used in these studies, however, suffers from the
limitation that the dominant power of the Big 6 might not have experienced a substantial
change in the period immediately following the research event.
However, China's supplementary audit market is a reliable sub-sample as a contrast to the
statutory market, in which the Big 5 may enjoy the benefits of brand name reputation but not
dominant market power. Supplementary audits are usually performed by recognized in-
ternational firms, mainly the Big 5 or their joint ventures. Although local firms are not legally
banned from recruiting clients in this market, their lack of overseas recognition makes it
difficult for them to compete with the Big 5. In addition, influential regulators and government
officials prefer Big 5 auditors in this market, and emphasize that recruiting Big 5 auditors helps
the country to adopt "internationally accepted practices". ^ Although the Big 5 face some
competition from local firms, their comparative advantage as suppliers of internationally
recognized services is not likely to wane because oflow-pnce competitors. This barrier to entry
is different from the barriers that are found in other markets, which are usually enforced by the
market itself, rather than the regulators, but the economic consequences are similar. In light of
this fact, we anticipate that the Big 5 earn a significant auditor fee premium in the supple-
mentary audit market in which, on average, they hold over 70% of the market share.
H2. Ceteris paribus, the Big 5 earn a significant audit fee premium in the supplementary
auditing market compared with the non-Big 5 auditors.
Note that H2 does not rule out the possibility that B-share investors have a different level
of demand for quality audits than A-share investors. If this is the case, then the fee premium
that is charged by the Big 5 in the supplementary market can also be attributed to their
reputation (a detailed discussion and analysis of this issue is provided later). Following our
earlier argument, we believe that in the long run the market power and quality of auditors
are interdependent. However, it is likely, especially in emerging markets such as China, that
either market power or reputation alone is sufficient to earn a fee premium in the short run.
Our understanding of the institutional arrangements of the Chinese auditing market is that
managers in the B-share market have little incentive to hire quality auditors for three
reasons. First, raising additional capital after the IPO is effectively impossible in the B-
share market. One of the major Chinese financial newspapers. Securities Time, concluded
in a review of share-issuing status that the B-share market had lost its attraction among both
institutional and individual investors, which explains why no B-share companies have
issued any additional shares in recent years (May 31. 2002). Consequently, managers have
little incentive to signal to the market the accuracy of their financial statements through
quality audits. Second, B-share companies raise debt capital mainly from domestic banks
(overseas borrowing is strictly controlled by the central bank). Due to the tight control of
the central government, domestic banks have very little power to change interest rates. This
means that all companies borrow funds at a similar cost, and the only differential is that
"Adopting internationally accepted practices" was the slogan that was used by the Chinese government in its
accounting reform campaign of 1993
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risky companies may need to pledge more assets to guarantee their borrowing. Again, the
effect of audit quality on reducing borrowing costs is practically negligible. Third,
corporate control in the B-share companies is mainly determined by the government or its
representative organizations (business groups). Holders of B-shares have virtually no
influence over the appointment or removal of managers, and thus managers are not likely to
employ quality auditors even if their foreign shareholders demand it.
Note also that confirmation of H2 alone will not provide sufficient evidence that the Big 5
enjoy high audit fees primarily because of their dominant position in the market. To
understand the underlying reasons for the pricing strategy of the Big 5, we must analyze H
1
and H2 together. As the Big 5 use similar auditing procedures and cost functions in both the
statutory and supplementary markets, the simultaneous confirmation of HI and H2 will
suggest that the Big 5 do not earn an audit fee premium in a competitive market, but do earn
such a fee when they face less competition.
4. Research methodology
4.1. Research design
Our hypotheses are tested using ordinary-least-squares (OLS) models with audit fees as the
dependent variable and whether or not a firm is a Big 5 auditee as the experimental variable.
Based on previous research (for example, Craswell & Francis, 1999; Simunic, 1980) and the
characteristics of the B-share market, we identify the following control variables. ( 1 ) The size
of client assets and the number of consolidated subsidiaries, which control for differences in
audit workload and complexity, respectively; (2) audit risk proxies, including the ratio of
accounts receivable to total assets, the ratio of inventory to total assets, loss-reporting status,
leverage ratio, the ratio of non-operating profit to net profit, and audit opinion; (3) auditor
change from Big 5 to non-Big 5 (B5TNB5); (4) the geographical region in which the company
operates, which controls for the impact of differences in economic development level on
auditor fees; and (5) a year dummy variable to control for changes in the auditing environment
over our testing period.
It is possible that the audit quality that is demanded by local investors (holders ofA-shares)
is systematically lower than that which is expected by foreign investors that hold B-shares. If
this is the case, then Chinese companies may be willing to pay a higher fee for B-share
(supplementary) audits to meet investor expectations. Although our earlier discussion
indicates that foreign investors cannot effectively influence management, as part ofour control
for this demand-induced pricing difference we introduce two additional control variables. The
first is the percentage of foreign shares (tradable B-shares and non-tradable initial foreign
shares) to total outstanding shares (FLTOTAL), and the second is the ratio of total shares that
are held by foreign shareholders (tradable B-shares and non-tradable initial shares) that rank
among the top 10 shareholders to shares that are held by the largest shareholder (FLCTRL).
The first variable controls for the possibility that foreign investors may have a greater demand
for quality audits, and the second controls for differences in agency costs in terms of the
relative monitoring power of foreign investors over the largest shareholder that could affect the
audit fee. Increased monitoring power on the part of foreign investors is expected to reduce
agency costs (Gul, Chen, & Tsui, 2003).
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4.2. Model
We estimate the following linear model.
LAF, = b + Z?,LTA + />:SQSUBS + 63RECV + 64INV + 65LEV + 66LOSS
+ 67EXTRGAIN + 68OP + Z>9B5TNB5 + 610AREA + 6 n FLTOTAL
+ 612FLCTRL + Zj 13Y01_03 + 6| 4BIG5, + e.
This model is estimated for statutory audits (Model 1 ) and for supplementary audits
(Model 2).
where the following notation applies.
i statutory (statu) in model ( 1 ) for sample firms in the statutory auditing market,
and supplementary (suppl) in model (2) for firms in the supplementary auditing
market.
LAF the natural log of audit fees that are disclosed in the annual report.
LTA the natural log of total assets at the end of period t.
SQSUBS the square root of the number of subsidiaries consolidated.
RECV the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets at the end of period t.
INV the ratio of inventory to total assets at the end of period t.
LEV the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of period I.
LOSS one if the reported net income for period / is negative, and zero otherwise.
EXTRGAIN non-operating income/absolute value of net income.
OP one for a modified audit opinion, and zero otherwise.
B5TNB5 one if the auditor changes from a Big 5 to a non-Big 5 firm during the period,
and zero otherwise.
AREA one if the company is based in one of the four more developed Chinese cities
(Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, or Guangzhou), and zero otherwise.
FL.TOTAL (total B-shares + initial non-tradable foreign shares)/total shares.
FLCTRL the shares that are held by (a) holders of B-shares and (b) holders of non-
tradable foreign initial shares that rank among the top- 10 shareholders/number
of shares held by the largest shareholder.
Y01_03 one if the observation falls within the period 2001 and 2003, and zero if the
observation falls in 2000.
BIG5 one if a firm is a Big 5 auditor or one of their joint ventures, and zero
otherwise.
Based on regression models (1) and (2), we estimate the coefficient b [4 for the main
explanatory variable BIG5 for the statutory and supplementary audit markets, respectively.
4.3. Sample selection
In 2001, Chinese listed companies were required to disclose audit fees for the current
and previous years in their annual reports for the first time. This allows us to obtain the data
C.J.P. Chen el ai The International Journal oj Accounting 42 (2007) 1-24 1
1
that we need for this study. To test our hypotheses, we hand-collected statutory and
supplementary audit fees from the 2000 to 2003 annual reports of B-share companies.
Companies were excluded from the sample if their statutory and supplementary audit fees
were not disclosed separately, or if fees for other services could not be identified separately.
Following the procedure that is described in Panel A of Table 2 we obtained a paired sample
with 217 observations in each market. Details of the composition of the sample are
presented in Panels B and C. Panel B shows that the Big 5 auditors account for only 12.4%
(27/217) of the statutory market sub-sample, which is substantially lower than their actual
market share of about 26%. Since about half of the Big 5 auditors do not separately disclose
the audit fees they collect from single clients for both the statutory and supplementary
audits, they are excluded from our sample. As is shown in Panel C of Table 2, in the
supplementary audit sub-sample the Big 5 auditors account for 70.5% (153/217) of the
Table 2
Sample selection procedure and sample composition
Panel A: sample selection procedure
Year 2(10(1 2001 2002 2003 Total
Total B-share companies 114 112 III 109 446
Companies that disclosed an audit fee'' 58 95 100 100 353
Less: Lack of separate disclosure 17 33 39 40 129
Partial disclosure onlv 1 2 2 2 7
Total sample observations 40 60 59 58 217
The difference between the total B-share companies and companies that disclosed an audit fee is caused by several
factors: failure to disclose relevant information; uncertainty about the disclose period, or inability to reasonably
identify and separate the non-annual-audit component from the total audit fee.
Panel B: sample composition of the statutory audit market
Year Big 5 Non-B ig5 Total
AA DTT EY KPMG PWC Total
2000 1 1 2 38 40
2001 2 2 1 3 8 52 60
2002 3 1 4 8 51 59
2003 - 3 1 5 9 49 58
Total 2 9 3 13 27 190 217
Panel C: sample composition of the suppleme ntary audit market
Year
Bi;i 5
Non-Big 5 Total
Big 3
BDO Horwath Grant
Other
non-local
Local Non-Big
5 totalAA DTT EY KPMG PWC Total
Thornton
2000 8 3 7 3 13 34 2 2 2 6 40
2001 11 3 8 5 19 46 2 4 1 6 1 14 60
2002 - 3 5 5 29 42 1 7 1 7 1 17 59
2003 - 3 3 4 21 31 6 8 1 12 27 58
Total 19 12 23 17 S2 153 1! 21 3 27 2 64 217
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observations, which closely corresponds to their actual market share. Panel C also shows
that two U.S. -based firms (BDO and Horwath) have begun to pick up market share in recent
years.
4.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the total sample, the Big 5 sub-sample, and
the non-Big 5 sub-sample for statutory and supplementary markets, respectively.
In the statutory market, the Big 5 charge an average audit fee of RMB 481,230 and the
non-Big 5 auditors charge RMB 416,260, which is not statistically different from the price
that the Big 5 charge. However, in the supplementary market, the Big 5 earn an average of
RMB 771,710, which is significantly higher than the fee of RMB 405,710 that is charged
by the non-Big 5 firms (/-value = 10.407, />-value = 0. 000). A Mann- Whitney test indicates
a significant difference in audit fee distribution in the supplementary market, but no such
difference in the statutory market. These results from the univariate comparisons are
consistent with our hypotheses.
Table 3 also indicates that there is no significant difference in the statutory market between
the clients of the Big 5 and the clients of the non-Big 5 auditors in terms of size, risk, and
profitability. However, Big 5 clients in the supplementary market are larger, less complex, less
risky, and may have fewer managed components in their reported prollt than the clients of the
non-Big 5 auditors. This suggests that the Big 5 have better clients and charge more, which
indicates that they enjoy a market power that is unmatched by local auditors.
5. Empirical results of models (I) and (2)
Table 4 shows that our models have significant explanatory power, as indicated by a
significant /-'-statistic and adjusted R of 0.495 and 0.672 for models (1) and (2), respec-
tively. The Durbin-Watson test shows that neither model is auto-correlated. Collinearity test
results for the variance inflation factor (VIF) show that none of the dependent variables have
a Vll ; of greater than 2.0. Therefore, multicollinearity is not considered to be a problem for
either model
Table 4 reports the regression results of models (1) and (2). In model (I) (statutory
market), the coefficient on the experimental variable Big 5 is -0.018 (/-value = -0.2 12),
which indicates that the Big 5 do not earn a significant audit fee premium compared to the
non-Big 5 auditors when all other variables are controlled. In model (2) (supplementary
market), the Big 5 variable has a coefficient of 0.535 that is significant at the 0.001 level,
which indicates that, on average, the audit price charged by the Big 5 is significantly higher
than that charged by the non-Big 5 auditors in the supplementary market.
The results show that client asset size (LTA) and audit complexity (SQSUBS) are
significantly positive, which suggests that audit fees increase with client size and audit
complexity. LEV is significant and positive, which indicates that auditors tend to charge
more if their clients rely more on debt financing. Another variable that is significantly
negative for both markets is the relative control of foreign investors over the largest
shareholder (II CTRL), which suggests that agency costs are relatively low when foreign
investors have more control. This result can be explained by the fact that foreign investors
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are more likely to pursue firms with low agency costs in forming a portfolio, as foreign
m\ estors in China cannot effectively influence the management of the firms in which they
invest. Some of the variables are significant only for the supplementary market. Companies
with more receivables and loss-making companies pay higher fees to auditors, which
indicates that risk in this market carries a price. CPA firms in major cities are more likely to
compete on price because they face more competition, and clients with more foreign
investors tend to pay more, probably because they can afford to do so. These results suggest
that audit pricing in the supplementary market is more consistent with the findings of
previous studies that use data from developed markets. The negatively significant
coefficient on audit opinion (OP) is difficult to interpret, but a further comparison of
companies with modified opinions and those with clean opinions reveals that companies
receiving modified opinions tend to be smaller, poor financial performers, and unable to
pay high fees. This may explain to an extent why audit opinion is negatively associated with
audit fees in our sample. Overall, these results support both hypotheses 1 and 2.
6. Further tests
6.1. Differentiation oj client asset size
Previous research (Chancy. Jeter. & Shivakumar. 2004; Francis & Simon. 1987; Francis
& Stokes. 1986; Lee, 19%) documents that client si/e is positive!) associated with Big 5
Table 4
Regression results for models ( 1 1 and (2
1
Dependeni variable: Model lilt; statutory audit) Model (2) (i
Coefficient
= supplementary audit)
LAF
Coefficient (-value /-value
Intercept -1.156 -2.596*** -1.267 -3.319***
Control variable
LTA 0.363 11.079*** 0.369 12.886***
SQSUBS 0.081 3.938*** (MISS 3.352***
RE< \ 0.214 1.048 0.706 4 025***
INV (1344 : 131** li 110 .766
1 1 \ 0.127 2.514** 0.073 1.654*
LOSS - 059 -0.725 (i 1 52 1 S66*
EXTRGAIN 0.009 II -4H 0.013 1.274
OP 0.055 -0.654 -0.139 -1.946*
B5TNB5 0.001 -0.006 0.076 .758
AREA (MH(< 256 -0.202 j 747***
FLTOTAL 0.029 0.108 0.671 2.899***
FL-CTRL u 127 -1.683" -0.108 -1.726*
Y01_03 0.101 1 4X4 0.004 .072
Experimental variable
BIG? mux -0.212 0.535 8 252***
Sample size 217 217
/•'-statistic 16.146*** 32 666***
Adj. if 0.495 0.672
***. **. * indicate significance at the 0.01. 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
All of the variables are as defined in Table 3
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audit pricing. The large-client market does not leave much room for small audit firms to
compete, as they usually do not have the expertise or resources to meet the demands of large
clients. As the Big 5 often compete with each other in this market, they are less likely to
earn a significant fee premium, but in the more competitive small-client market the Big 5
compete both with each other and with smaller firms with lesser reputations and audit
quality. This advantage allows the Big 5 to earn a significant fee premium. To control for
the difference in pricing strategies that results from market differentiation, we separate the
statutory and supplementary auditing markets further by the median of total client assets,
which is RMB 2,029,330,000, following Craswell, Francis, and Taylor (1995).
We re-estimate models (1) and (2) with the sample thus separated, and the results (not
tabulated) indicate that in the statutory auditing market the Big 5 do not earn a premium
from either large clients or small clients. However, in the supplementary auditing market
(model (2)), the Big 5 earn a significant fee premium from both small and large clients. This
premium is more significant in the large firm sub-sample, which supports the notion that the
Big 5's premium is less likely to be determined by client size than by market competition.
6.2. Pricing of the Big 5 anil non-Big 5 auditors in the statutory and supplementary
markets
Models ( 1 ) and (2) are designed to compare the pricing strategies of auditors in the same
market (either statutory or supplementary). To compare the same auditor's pricing in different
markets, we re-estimate models ( 1 ) and (2) by changing the experimental variables from Big 5
to BIG5supp i in model (1) and NONBIG5supp i in model (2) to verify whether non-Big 5
auditors also have different pricing strategies in the statutory and supplementary markets. If
non-Big 5 auditors expect more from their clients in the supplementary market, as is the case
with the Big 5, then we may conclude that the premium that is earned in this market is related to
higher labor costs or return on investment requirements. However, if non-Big 5 auditors use
similar pricing strategies in the two sub-markets and earn no premium in the supplementary
market, then this would provide evidence for attributing the premium of the Big 5 to their
dominant market position. The revised model (1) is tested on a sample of 180 Big 5
observations, including 27 from the statutory market and 1 53 from the supplementary market.
Revised model (2) is tested on a sample of254 non-Big 5 observations, ofwhich 190 are from
the statutory market and 64 from the supplementary market.
The results of this test (not tabulated) show that the mam explanatory variable BIG5supp i
is positively related to audit pricing at the 0.001 significance level, whereas NONBIG5supp |
is not significantly associated with audit pricing. This suggests that the audit pricing of the
Big 5 in the supplementary market is significantly higher than it is in the statutory market;
however, the audit fees of the non-Big 5 auditors are not significantly different in the
statutory and supplementary markets. Combining this finding with the earlier results, we
find that not every audit firm can earn a fee premium in the supplementary market, and that
the Big 5 earn a premium only in the supplementary audit market, in which they have strong
market power. We cannot completely rule out the possibility that this strong market power
is based on the quality of the audits that are provided by the Big 5 or their brand name
reputation, but our findings tend to support the notion that the Big 5 are more likely to earn a
fee premium when they have strong market power.
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Table 5
Regression results for models (3) and (4)
Dependent variable: LAF Model (3): all
auditors
supplementary Model (4): Big 5
auditors
supplementary
Coefficient /-value Coefficient /-value
Intercept -1.285 -3.363*** o 899 - 1 .540
Control variable
LTA 0.371 I2»26*** 378 9.106***
SQSUBS 0.060 3.410*** 0.052 2.350**
RECV 0.724 4 105*** 0.694 2 X28***
INV ii 106 0.744 0.043 0.257
LEV (1071 1 ,608 0.288 2336**
LOSS 128 1.794* 046 0.446
EXTRGAIN 0.013 1.284 0.009 374
OP -0.137 -1.916* 0.098 - 1.001
B5TNB5 0.080 0.794 N/A
AREA -0.194 3 552*** I4S -2.210**
FLTOTAL 0.614 2 579** 0.587 1 74X*
FLCTRL -0.097 -1.514 -0.045 -0574
Y01_03 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.160
Experimental variable
BIG5_HK 0.510 7 391*** -0.062 -1.026
BIG5_ML (l 567 7 858***
Sample size 217 153
F-statistic 30.561*** 14 044***
Adj. IC 0.672 0.527
*** ** * indicate significance at the 0.01. 0.05. and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Results are obtained from models (3) (4
1
LAF = ft,, + ftiLTA + ft :SQSUBS + ft,RECV + ft4INV + ft 5LEV + ft„LOSS + ft 7EXTRGAIN + ft sOP
t ft„B5TNB5 + ft|„AREA + ft,, FLTOTAL + 6 12FLCTRL + ft,,Y0L03 + ft l4BIG5_HK
-I- 6i 5BIG5.ML + e.
LAF = ft,, + ftiLTA + ft:SQSUBS + ft 3RECV + ftjlNV + ft,LEV + ft„LOSS + ft?EXTRGAIN + ft xOP
+ ft.AREA + ft,„FLTOTAL + ft M FLCTRL + fe 12Y01.03 + 6| 3BIG5_HK + e.
B1G5_HK = one if the supplementary auditor is the Hong Kong representative of a Big5 auditor, and zero
otherwise.
BIG5_ML = one if the supplementary auditor is the mainland Chinese joint venture of a Big 5 auditor, and zero
otherwise.
All of the variables are as defined in Table 3.
6.3. Die difference between local joint venture Big 5 unci Hong Kong Big 5 in the
supplementary market
In the statutory market the Big 5 are usually represented by their mainland Chinese joint
ventures, whereas in the supplementary market they are mainly represented by their Hong Kong
office. However, according to Li and Wu (2003), ofthe financial statements that were audited by
the Big 5 in the supplementary market from 1999 to 2001, 59% were disclosed as having been
audited by the Hong Kong office and 41% by the local joint venture, fhe number of local joint
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venture Big 5 auditors in the supplementary market increased to 69% in 2002 and 2003. The
availability of data on local joint venture Big 5 versus Hong Kong Big 5 in the same market
allows us to compare their pricing practices. It is possible that the local joint venture Big 5 have a
poorer reputation and lower labor costs than the Hong Kong Big 5 . Ifthis is so, then it may be the
cause of the pricing difference between the two markets. If local joint venture Big 5 and Hong
Kong Big 5 charge a similar fee in the same supplementary market, then we can conclude that the
difference in the fees charged by the Big 5 in the two markets cannot be explained by a difference
between the reputation or labor costs of the joint venture Big 5 and Hong Kong Big 5.
We modify model (2) to construct models (3) and (4) by introducing two new dummy
variables (BIG5_HK and BIG5_ML) that are assigned a value of one if an auditor is a Hong
Kong-based Big 5 or local joint venture Big 5 firm, and zero otherwise. Model (3) is
estimated with the supplementary market sub-sample, which includes clients that are
audited by Big 5 and non-Big 5 auditors. Our objective is to examine whether Hong Kong
Big 5 and local joint venture Big 5 use different pricing strategies from non-Big 5 auditors.
Model (4) is estimated only with Big 5 clients in the supplementary market sub-sample.
Table 5 lists the regression results for models (3) and (4), which have significant F-
statistics at the 0.001 level and an adjusted R~ of 0.672 and 0.527, respectively. Significant
positive coefficients on BIG5_HK and BIG5_ML for model (3) indicate that both Hong
Kong Big 5 and local joint venture Big 5 charge a significantly higher fee than non-Big 5
auditors. The results for model (4) show that the coefficient on BIG5_HK is not
significantly different from zero, which suggests that there is no significant difference
between the Hong Kong Big 5 and the local joint venture Big 5 in their pricing of
supplementary audits. This finding minimizes the probability that the results that we report
in Table 4 are subject to the alternative explanation that the employment of different pricing
strategies by the Big 5 in the statutory and supplementary markets is caused by differences
between the reputation or cost function of the local joint venture and Hong Kong offices.
6.4. Self-selection huts
Concerns may be raised about the validity of our research design because of possible self-
selection bias (Chaney et al., 2004; Copley, Gaver, & Gaver, 1995; Ireland & Lennox, 2002).
The self-selection problem derives from the possibility that companies that select Big 5
auditors are systematically different from the clients of local auditors, and, more importantly,
that the difference between Big 5 and non-Big 5 clients in the supplementary market is different
from that in the statutory market. If this is the case, then it is possible that the clients of the Big 5
are not significantly different from the clients of the non-Big 5 auditors in the statutory market,
which might explain why no fee premium is found. Conversely, if the clients of the Big 5 are
significantly different from the non-Big 5 clients in the supplementary market, then it could be
suggested that these clients have an inherent demand for Big 5 auditors even ifa fee premium is
charged.
The self-selection problem is usually addressed using the Heckman (1976) method.
However, the regular Heckman method deals with self-selection between two choices,
whereas our test setting is more complicated because it involves two parallel choices that are
made for different reporting purposes (A- and B-share reporting) in different settings (the
statutory and supplementary markets). Given that the Heckman method is not readily applicable
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to our overall sample, we apply it in the statutory and supplementary markets separately to
control for self-selection bias in each market. First, we build a probit model with variables that
are identified as being associated with the selection of a Big 5 auditor. We compute the Inverse
Mills Ratio (IMR) from the probit model based on Heckman (1976), and use it as an additional
control variable in the subsequent comparison of the difference in audit fees between the Big 5
and non-Big 5 auditors to correct for any bias that is caused by self-selection into the Big 5 sub-
sample by certain firms (Heckman, 1976; Johnston & DiNardo, 1997).
Our choice of variables for the probit models is based on previous studies that examined
the choice between Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors in the U.S. (Francis, Maydew, & Sparks,
1999), the literature about auditing in China (for example, Chen, Chen, & Su, 2001), and
the interviews that we conducted with Big 5 and local auditors. The probit model is as
follows:
Pr(BIG5„ = 1) = c + c,BETA„_i -I- c2CPINT„ , + c3OPCYCLEi7_i
+ c4LOSS,-,_ 1 +c5ROA„_, +c6SALESGRWTH„_i
+ c7LTA„_i + csSQSUBS„_ , + c9RECV;,_i
+ cu,EXTRGAIN,-,_i + c,, AREA„_, + c 12FLTOTAL„_i
+ c, 3FI_CTRL„_i +C| 4NONTRADE„_ l +c 15Y2001„
+ c lhY2002„ + c, 7Y2003„ + /<,
where the following notation is used.
BIG5
BETA
CPINT
OPCYCLE
LOSS
ROA
SALESGRWTH
LTA
SQSUBS
RECV
EXTRGAIN
AREA
FLTOTAL
FL.CTRL
NONTRADE
Y2001, Y2002, Y2003
Big 5 Auditor, which takes the value one if an auditor is one of the
Big 5, and zero otherwise.
The beta that is estimated by the market model.
Capital Intensity: Gross fixed assets/sales
Operating Cycle: [365*(average inventory /cost of goods sold) +
365*(average accounts receivable/sales)]/30.
one for net income that is negative, and zero otherwise.
annual net income over initial total assets.
Sales growth: (sales in year?- sales in year?- l)/sales in year/- 1.
the natural logarithm of total assets.
the square root of the number of consolidated subsidiaries.
the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets.
non-operating income/absolute value of net income.
one if the company is based in one of the four more developed
Chinese cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, or Guangzhou), and
zero otherwise.
(total B-shares + initial non-tradable foreign shares (/total shares.
the shares that are held by (a) holders of B-shares and (b) holders
of non-tradable foreign initial shares that rank among the top- 10
shareholders/number of shares held by the largest shareholder.
The percentage of non-tradable shares outstanding.
indicator variables for the years 200 1 , 2002, and 2003, respectively. i
and t denote the company and period, respectively.
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The selection of the variables CPINT, OPCYCLE, and LTA, is based on the study of
Francis et al. (1999). The adoption of the variables LOSS, SQSUBS, RECV, EXTRGAIN,
AREA, FLTOTAL, and FLCTRL is based on our understanding of the institutional
background in China and their use in models (1) and (2). The selection of the other
variables, namely, BETA, ROA, NONTRADE, and SALESGRWTH, are based on
knowledge that was obtained through our interviews with the partners of audit firms and
managers of listed companies. BETA measures risk, because riskier firms may attract
increased scrutiny from auditors and will therefore show less interest in selecting a Big 5
auditor. ROA is the ratio of annual net income over total assets at the previous year-end.
Companies with a good performance are more likely to employ a Big 5 auditor to increase
the credibility of their reported earnings. Non-tradable shares are shares that are not allowed
to be traded in the market. These shares are usually held by, and transferred between, large-
block shareholders that are often either government-controlled entities or large state-owned
enterprises. On average, over 60% of the shares during our testing period were non-
tradable. The percentage of outstanding non-tradable shares proxies for government control
of a firm. Usually, managers in government-controlled firms have less need to communicate
with investors, as these firms depend less on the market for finance and receive government
protection from regulators and investors. We therefore expect the managers of firms with
more non-tradable shares to show a lower propensity to select high-quality auditors. Firms
that have not achieved any growth in sales have more incentive to inflate their performance
to meet the profit target that is set by the regulator (Chen et al., 200 1 ) and, accordingly, have
little incentive to be audited by one of the Big 5. In our model, we employ an indicator
variable for each year to control for the year effects.
In the interests of space, the results from the probit models are not tabulated, but they are
generally consistent with our expectations. The likelihood ratio is significant (-74 for the
supplementary market and - 60 for the statutory market), which indicates that the probit models
effectively differentiate between Big 5 and non-Big 5 auditors. In the next stage, we re-estimate
models ( 1 ) and (2) with the addition of the IMR as a variable to control for sample-truncation
bias. The results are summarized in Table 6 and are qualitatively similar to those that are reported
in Table 4, which suggests that our results are not driven by biased demand in auditor selection.
In addition to employing the Heckman approach, we re-test models ( 1 ) and (2) excluding
observations of companies with A-share and B-share financial statements that are not
audited by auditors from the same groups. There is no difference in auditor selection
between the statutory and supplementary markets for the same auditor group, because all
of the underlying firm characteristics and actual use of auditors are identical for all of the
firms in this sub-sample. Thus, the observation of a fee premium in the supplementary
market but not in the statutory market cannot be attributed to a difference between domestic
and foreign investors in the quality of audits that are demanded. There are 26 Big 5 and 28
non-Big 5 auditor groups among 217 pairs of dual audits. Thus we use 54 observations in
each market for the test. The results (not tabulated) show that the coefficient on the Big 5
variable is positive but not significant in the statutory market (<-value = 0.83), and positive
For example, the representative Hong Kong office of a Big 5 auditor such as PWC and its local member firm
PWC Zhongtian are deemed to be in the same auditor group Similarly, a non-Big 5 auditor such as the Hong
Kong-based Horwatb and its local member firm in Shanghai are also viewed as being in the same auditor group.
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Table 6
Regression results with control for self-selection bias
Dependent v:iriable: i = statutory audit i = supplementary audit
LAF,
Coefficient f-value Coefficient / -value
Intercept -1.134 -2 41*** 1 )08 -3.37***
Control variable
LTA ii 363 10.68*** 362 12.17***
SQSUBS 0.090 3.25*** 0.065 T, S4***
RECV II IN') 0.88 0.762 4 ()')***
INV -0.361 -2.18** 0.068 046
LEV ii 127 2.46*** 0.082 1 85*
LOSS 0.060 -0.73 150 2.05**
EXTRGAIN 0.007 0.58 0.019 1.62
OP 0.056 -0.66 142 -1.97**
B5TNB5 -0.015 0.06 0.054 II so
AREA -0.001 0.02 175 2.90***
FLTOTAL -0.017 -0.06 589 244**
FLCTRL (1 114 1 14 -0 116 1 xo*
Y01_03 0.107 1.50 02" (144
1MR 0.077 0.48 0.098 -1.18
Experimental variable
Big5 -0.143 -0.50 0.661 5.26***
Sample size 217 217
/•"-statistic 14X6*** 24 68***
Adj. R- 0.494 669
***• ** * indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 05, and o 10 levels, respectively.
IMR = Inverse Mill's ratio as estimated using lleckman's approach
All of the other variables are as defined in Table 3.
and significant in the supplementary market (r-value = 2.10), which corroborates our
findings from models (1) and (2). These results lend more support to our argument that the
fee premium is more likely to be attributable to the difference in the market concentration of
the two audit markets, rather than a difference in the characteristics of the audit clients.
The selection ofan auditor is jointly determined by the forces ofsupply and demand, and as
these forces are interrelated it is difficult to completely disentangle them. In this regard, our
efforts to address the selection-bias problem cannot completely rule out the possibility that the
forces ofdemand also affect auditor selection. However, as is stated in our earlier analysis, the
usual benefits for investors and managers of selecting a Big 5 auditor in developed markets are
either absent or minimal in China. Our results, therefore, are more likely to be attributable to
the effects of supply, rather than those of demand, in the Chinese audit market.
6.5. Additional robustness tests
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our findings in relation to variation in
research design or variable definition. First, we re-estimate our main models with the first-
year audit observations deleted to control for the possibility that first-year pricing is biased
because of a low-balling strategy. The results (not tabulated) of 193 observations from the
statutory' and 191 observations from the supplementary markets are qualitatively similar to
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those in Table 4. Therefore, we conclude that our results are not caused by the low-balling
of new auditors.
Second, we reconstruct our sample by excluding the same auditor group observations which
engage in statutory and supplementary audits for the same client.* Auditors that belong to the
same group may coordinate with each other to determine the fees that are charged to shared
clients. We conduct this additional test to see whether our findings hold for audits that were
carried out by two completely unaffiliated auditors. When CPA firms from the same group
are eliminated, only one Big 5 observation and 162 non-Big 5 observations remain from
the statutory market, whereas 127 Big 5 observations and 36 non-Big 5 remain from the
supplementary market. Since it is difficult to conduct a meaningful test in the statutory market,
9
we therefore focus on the 1 63 remaining observations from the supplementary market to verify
whether the Big 5 still earn a fee premium in this market compared to non-Big 5 auditors. The
coefficient (not tabulated) on the experimental variable (BIG 5) remains significantly positive
at the 0.001 level. This suggests that the Big 5 still earn a fee premium in the supplementary
market where they enjoy strong market power, which corroborates our main findings.
Third, we conduct a year-by-year analysis of models ( 1 ) and (2) to rule out the possibility
that repeated observations in our sample have inflated the significance of the coefficients.
The results (not tabulated) are consistent with the findings that are reported in Table 4: the
Big 5 earn a significant fee premium only in the supplementary market for each year in our
testing period.
7. Conclusion
China's emerging capital market consists of the A- and B-share segments. Companies
that issue B-shares must prepare two sets of financial statements and are subject to both
statutory and supplementary audits. The statutory and supplementary audit markets are
significantly different in the degree of market concentration. In the competitive statutory
market, the Big 5 auditors hold only about 26% of the market share, but in the
supplementary market they boast a market share of over 70%. This domination of the
supplementary market by the Big 5 is echoed in most developed markets. Using audit fee
data from 2000 to 2003, we find that in the competitive statutory market the Big 5 do not
earn a significant audit fee premium, but they do earn a significant audit fee premium in the
supplementary market. This finding is robust to different model specifications and variable
definitions. Our results suggest that the audit fee premium that is earned by the Big 5 is
more likely to be due to their dominant position in the market than their reputation or cost.
This study benefits from the binary structure of the audit market in China, which
provides an interesting test setting. However, this distinct setting may also limit the
generalizability of our results. It is possible that the Big 5 have developed a pricing strategy
that is applicable only to the binary Chinese market. Our results are also subject to the
alternative explanation that the discounts that are offered by the Big 5 in the statutory
market are part of their efforts to procure clients in the more profitable supplementary
See footnote 7 for the definition of "same auditor group".
Due to this sample limitation, we cannot test the possibility that our main results may be biased because of
possible joint-pricing decisions that are made by affiliated auditors from the same group in the statutory market.
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market. In other words, the low audit fees that are charged in the statutory market are
compensated by the high audit fees that are generated in the supplementary market. As the
data are limited, we cannot determine whether and how a firm decides its pricing strategy
for the two markets, and additional research is needed in this area.
Our interpretation of the main results is constrained by the assumption that the efforts of
auditors in statutory and supplementary audits are not significantly different from each other,
which is a necessary assumption if the audit fees that are charged in the two markets are to be
compared. Although we cannot validate this assumption, anecdotal evidence suggests that
auditors in the statutory market are more cautious than auditors in the supplementary market,
because the former are responsible for reporting and disclosing scandals that can result in
litigation. The possibility that auditors make more effort in the statutory market works against
finding significant results that are in line with our hypotheses, and thus in this regard our
findings are robust.
Another limitation, which is difficult to overcome, is that the statutory and supplementary
auditors of many of our observations from the two markets are affiliated. Although we
introduce some robustness tests, it is still possible that the fee premium of the Big 5 has been
distorted in the Chinese B-share binary auditing market. For this reason, our results should be
interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, this study contributes to the literature by shedding light
on the audit-pricing strategies of the Big 5 auditors and on the underlying reasons for the fee
premium that they enjoy.
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This paper studies the determinants of disclosure level in the accounting for financial instruments
of Portuguese listed companies. An index of disclosure based on IAS 32 and IAS 39 requirements is
computed for each company. The analysis includes variables that capture intrinsic features of
Portuguese companies and institutional regulatory context, such as capital structure and
characteristics of the corporate governance structure, within contingency theory. We could not
find any significant influence of corporate governance structure or of financing structure. We
conclude that the disclosure degree is significantly related to size, type of auditor, listing status and
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context of mandatory IAS after 2005.
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1. Introduction
This paper studies the determinants of disclosure practices in the accounting for financial
instruments by Portuguese listed companies. Considering the mandatory adoption of
International Accounting Standards after 2005 by listed companies, our goal is to study the
characteristics ofcompanies that are closest to the disclosure requirements of the International
Accounting Standards (IAS) 1 related to financial instruments — IAS 32 and IAS 39.
There are several theories that help us develop hypotheses about the determinants of
accounting practices: the positive accounting theory (Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman,
1981; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978), the signalling theory (Ross, 1977), and legitimacy and
institutional theory. These theories have been the background of several accounting studies
on determinants of accounting choice and disclosure in a wide range of countries. This
paper is based on the idea that those theories, originated in developed capital markets, may
not fully explain accounting and disclosure practices in Portugal, where the degree of
family ownership is significant and financing policies are bank-oriented. Therefore, we
consider variables that capture intrinsic features of Portuguese companies, such as capital
structure and characteristics of the corporate governance model, and use these
characteristics to rationalize our hypothesis testing results, within other theoretical
frameworks, namely, contingency theory and to derive policy implications.
Our main research questions are:
- Do theories on disclosure and accounting choice apply to Portuguese listed companies'?
- What are the factors that influence disclosure practices in Portuguese companies?
- What will 2005 really mean for Portuguese companies?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents previous literature
related to the determinants of disclosure. Section 3 provides a brief institutional and
regulatory background. Section 4 describes the development of the hypotheses. In Section 5
the research design is explained, including a description of the dependent and the indepen-
dent variables, the sample selection process and its characteristics. Section 6 presents the
main statistical results while Section 7 discusses the results and draws some conclusions.
2. Previous literature
Healy and Palepu (2001) describe the theoretical background of the demand for
disclosure (agency conflicts and information asymmetry) and review the empirical
disclosure literature. They divide the literature into four categories: the role of disclosure
regulation in reducing information and agency problems; the effectiveness of auditors and
information intermediaries; factors affecting decisions by managers on financial reporting
and disclosures; and the economic consequences of disclosures. The most relevant category
to our study is the one that tries to explain managers' decisions, which has two main areas:
(1) focusing on managers' accounting decisions based on the positive theory of accounting
IAS stands tor all the standards issued by IASB including International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSl
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and (2) focusing on management disclosure decisions (voluntary disclosure literature,
which is complementary to the first one).
Accounting research on the determinants of disclosure practices and other accounting
choices based on company's characteristics is a very extensive field. In this literature
review, we concentrate on studies that address IAS adoption or financial instruments
accounting. 2 We divide these studies into two types, based on how the adoption of the
standards (dependent variable) is measured. In one group, the dependent variable is a
dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the company claims to adopt IAS, and
otherwise. These studies do not take into account the fact that some companies claim to
comply with IAS but fail to do so with many IAS requirements (Cairns, 1998, 1999).
Consequently, another type of studies that quantify the extent of compliance with a single
(or a group of) standard(s) using disclosure indices began to appear. These studies examine
annual reports of companies that claim to comply with IAS in order to measure the degree
of compliance. This paper belongs to this second group, since we develop a disclosure
index based on the requirements of IAS 32 and IAS 39.
The first group includes Tarca (2004), Cuijpers and Buijink (2005), Ashbaugh (2001),
Murphy (1999), El-Gazzar, Finn, and Jacob (1999) and Dumontierand Raffoumier (1998).
The second group includes Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), Glaum and Street (2003), Street
and Bryant (2000), Street and Gray (2001 ), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) and Tower,
Hancock, and Taplin ( 1999).
Table 1 summarizes these studies, showing the type of statistical analysis conducted, the
explanatory variables adopted and the empirical results.
3. Institutional and regulatory background
In this section we describe the Portuguese companies' institutional environment, namely
regarding capital financing and corporate governance systems, highlighting the Portuguese
unique features compared to other contexts where determinants of disclosure policies have
been studied before. Additionally, we briefly describe the financial instruments accounting
Riles in Portugal, focusing in the main differences relative to IAS 32 and IAS 39.
There are several studies that, in spite of having addressed the determinants of disclosure in general (not
specifically related to IAS or financial instruments), bring insights to our research regarding the choice and
measurement of explicative and dependent variables: Chen and Jaggi (2000) - Hong Kong; Eng and Mak
(2003) — Singapore; Cooke (1989) - Sweden. Cooke (1993) — Japan; Hossain. Tan. and Adams ( 19941
Malaysia; Wallace. Naser. and Mora ( 1944) Spain; Wallace and Naser (1995) — Hong Kong; Gibbins.
Richardson, and Waterhouse (1990); Frost and Pownall (1994); Gray, Meek, and Roberts ( 1995) — US and UK;
Meek and Roberts (1995 ) — US. UK and Continental Europe. Inchausti ( 1997) — Spam; Raffoumier (1995 ) —
Switzerland; Watson. Shrives, and Maislon (2002) — UK; Tai. Au—Yeung. Kwok. and Lau (1990) — Hong
Kong; Ahmed and Nicholls (1994); Akhlaruddin (2005) — Bangladesh; Ali. Ahmed, and Henry (2004) —
South Asia (India. Pakistan. Bangladesh). Ahmed and Courtis (1999) has an extensive literature review that
includes several early accounting studies on the determinants (company's characteristics) of disclosure. It gives
a thorough description of each study with respect to sample country, companies and time period, dependent
variable(s). independent variables and results.
We have followed the 2000 versions of IAS 32 and IAS 39 because these were the versions operating for
financial statements in 2001 (the year of our empirical study)
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Portugal is a continental western European country. It is a developed country, member of
the euro-area but, in the context of the European Union, to which it belongs since 1986, it is
a small and peripheral economy. It is also one of the least developed country in the OECD.
Regarding the level of institutional development in the legal, corporate governance and
financial systems. Portuguese institutions are less developed than their European Union and
East Asia counterparts, more developed than Greek institutions and on a level similar to that
of Spanish institutions (Tavares. 2004). Portugal is a bank-oriented country with a
universal bank system, strongly concentrated in a few financial groups and with very small
influence of foreign banks (Bartholdy & Mateus, 2006)). Regarding corporate governance
structure, the corporate board structure m Portugal is very different from the USA. but
similar to most European countries (Fernandes. 2005: Barrocas. 2003). Companies'
boards are mainly organized in a single-tier system, without a separate supervising board
(Fernandes. 2005). The single board comprises the CEO, other executive managers and
non-executive directors (independent members). The non-executive role is to protect
shareholders interests, filling the gap between uninformed shareholders and informed
executive managers.
Several studies have examined comparative characteristics of countries regarding
financial, legal and corporate governance systems. Though not so many as we would like,
some of them include Portugal in their analyses.
Portugal is included in the group of code law countries, specifically m the French family,
together with France, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). The literature (Meek & Thomas, 2004. p. 29) has characterized
code law accounting as oriented toward "legal compliance", w ith low disclosure and an
alignment between financial and tax accounting. Banks or governments dominate as a
source of finance and financial reporting is aimed at creditor protection. Accounting
standard setting tends to be a public sector activity. These characteristics contrast with
common law accounting that is oriented toward "fair presentation", transparency and full
disclosure, and a separation between financial and tax accounting. Stock markets dominate
as a source of finance and financial reporting is aimed at the information needs of outside
investors. Accounting standard setting tends to be a private sector activity.
In an alternative classification scheme that has arose m international literature, which
divides financial systems into two main groups on the basis of their orientation or the
weight of financial intermediation, Portugal is included in the group of bank-oriented
systems (Allen & Gale, 2000). In this type of systems, also known as continental system
since it is the system of the majority of continental European countries, money flows
through financial institutions. This system contrasts with the Anglo-Saxon or market-
oriented system in which money is directly channeled through capital markets. Portugal has
a very small capital market. According to the World Development Indicators database
(World Bank Group), the ratio of stock market capitalization of listed companies to GDP of
Portugal in 2000 was 57% compared to 154% and 179% in USA, and the UK, respectively.
It has been shown that the capital structure of companies reflect the differences in financial
systems (Rajan & Zingales, 2003), meaning that the financing policies of Portuguese
companies are mainly bank-oriented.
Regarding corporate ownership concentration. La Porta. Lopez-de-Silanes. and Shleifer
(1999) show that, using the 20% definition of control, there are hardly any widely held
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company in Portugal. 4 On the other side, all firms from the UK, Japan and USA fit the
widely held description. Faccio and Lang (2002) reach to much the same conclusion in
what concerns to Portuguese companies. In a study of western European companies, they
show that there is a sharp separation between ownership patterns in continental Europe and
in the UK and Ireland: widely held firms are especially important in the UK and Ireland,
while family control is more important in Continental Europe. Portugal shows a percentage
of 21% of widely held companies, one of the lowest percentages together with Germany,
Austria, and Italy, comparing to 63.08% in UK companies and 62.32% in Irish companies.
In contrast, in continental Europe, families are by far the most frequent largest shareholder.
The highest percentages of family control are in Portugal, France and Germany. The lowest
percentages are in the UK and Ireland. Additionally, regarding the percentage of total
market capitalization controlled by the top families in each country, in Portugal the top 15
families control 36.77% of total market capitalization, the highest percentage found in all
sample. This number compares to only 6.55% in the UK, and 15.38% in Ireland.
Several research state that countries with better developed capital markets have stronger
investor protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Investor
protection fosters good corporate governance, which enhances investors confidence. La
Porta et al. (2000) show that common law countries have the strongest protection of outside
investors whereas French code law countries, where Portugal is included, the weakest
protection. Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue that shareholder protection is negatively
correlated with proportionality of votes (political factors) and positively correlated with
English legal origin. Their empirical results, based on a sample of 21 OECD countries
including Portugal, show that continental European countries and Japan, which tend to have
proportional voting systems, have weak investor protection and strong employment pro-
tection. In contrast, Anglo-Saxon countries, whose political systems tend to be majoritarian,
have the reverse. In the study of Defond and Hung (2004), Portugal shows scores for investor
protection laws and law enforcement institutions lower than the median scores in the all
sample countries, while the UK and the USA have extensive investor protection laws and
strong law enforcement institutions, showing higher than the median scores of the respective
indexes. A survey on coiporate governance in Europe (Heidrick & Struggles, 2003) ranks
Portugal in last place in a composite measure ofcorporate governance. This study concludes
that (p. 28) "Coiporate governance practice m Portugal remains far behind accepted
European standards... in most cases, local firms continue to have their executive directors
participating actively on coiporate boards, which arc viewed as lacking independence".
Concluding, Portugal is one of the least developed country in the euro-area and a small
OECD country. It has specific features regarding its capital market, companies' financing
structure and coiporate governance systems, providing for a different institutional
setting from most developed and capital market-oriented countries, such as the UK and
USA, where most of the previous disclosure and accounting choice theories have been
applied.
For a description of the historical roots of the Portuguese companies ownership structure, please see Mota
(2003).
This survey includes 1(1 countries, namely. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands. Portugal, Spam.
Sweden. Switzerland and the UK.
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Concerning the accounting regulatory background for financial instruments, we begin
by analysing accounting rules for non-financial companies and then for financial
companies. In non-financial companies, on-balance sheet financial instruments should be
measured at cost (or market value, if it is lower). Future contracts used in trading operations
are measured at fair value. The other off-balance sheet financial instruments are not covered
by specific accounting rules. This gap is covered by Portuguese Accounting Directive 18
(CNC, 1996), which establishes compliance with IAS whenever Portuguese standards are
not available. So, it may be expected that companies are already adopting some IAS
requirements in their accounting for financial instruments.
In financial companies, fair value should be applied to trading securities and to FRAs,
futures, options and swaps when used in trading operations. Changes in fair value should be
registered in profits and losses in the period in which they occur. For operations that qualify
for hedge accounting, profits and losses of the hedging instruments and the hedged
instruments are registered simultaneously, and the measurement criterion of the hedged
position prevails. Regarding disclosure, the list of requirements is already quite demanding,
particularly regarding derivative adoption.
4. Theoretical background and hypotheses development
Given the Portuguese regulatory background presented above, and considering that
the European Union has been stating the goal of accounting harmonization since 2000
(through the proposal of Regulation 1606/2002 requiring all listed companies to prepare
their consolidated financial statements based on IAS), it is interesting to analyze which
companies were already anticipating IAS requirements, especially with respect to
financial instruments' disclosure. Since the adoption of IAS means an increase in
disclosure requirements, the theoretical background is provided by disclosure theories.
Verrecchia (2001) extensively reviews and categorises accounting literature on
disclosure in order to develop a theory of disclosure by companies. He concludes that
asymmetry reduction is one potential starting point for a comprehensive theory of
disclosure.
It has been shown empirically that disclosure is a complex function of several factors: it
depends on both company-specific (internal) factors and external factors related to the
environmental context of the company, which include, among others, culture, legal system,
and institutional background. There are several theories that explain disclosure practices
by companies: agency and political costs theories (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1990),
signalling theory (Ross, 1977; Morris, 1987), legitimacy and institutional theory
(Carpenter & Feroz, 1992, 2001; Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Mezias, 1990), proprietary
costs theory (Dye, 1985; Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer,
1990), and contingency theory (Doupnik & Salter, 1995; Fechner & Kilgore, 1994; Gray,
1988).
The argument for this paper is that the agency, the political costs and the signalling
theories, widely applied to developed capital markets, may not fully explain accounting and
disclosure practices in Portugal, given the specific institutional features of Portuguese
companies (high degree of family ownership, few independent board members, and bank-
oriented financing policies).
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Nobes (1998) describes a model of international differences in financial reporting based
on the different purposes of reporting in each country, which are determined by the financial
system. Disclosure items are determined by the relative importance of outsiders (financiers
who do not belong to the board of directors, including individual shareholders) compared
with insiders (financiers such as governments, families and banks). In countries where
outsiders are important, there is a demand for more disclosure. Models that incorporate
cultural and other environmental factors have been empirically tested by several
researchers in either multi-country studies (Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Hussein,
1996; Jaggi & Low. 2000; Salter, 1998; Williams, 2004; Zarzeski, 1996) or single-country
studies (Akhtaruddin, 2005; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Chen and Jaggi
(2000) study the influence of specific corporate governance factors present in East Asian
companies (proportion of independent directors in the corporate board and family
ownership) on disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) include corporate governance,
cultural and company-specific factors as determinants of disclosure, arguing that (p. 317)
"disclosure practice does not develop in a vacuum, but rather reflects the underlying
environmental influences that affect managers and companies in different countries".
4. 1. The hypotheses and the independent variables
Based on the theoretical considerations and on the empirical research previously
described, we have developed several hypotheses that relate company-specific character-
istics to disclosure practices in Portugal. All hypotheses are stated in alternative form,
indicating the expected sign of the relationship.
4.1.1. Size
There are several arguments that can be used to link size to disclosure. As Watts and
Zimmerman (1990) argue, political costs are higher in larger companies, and so larger
companies are more likely to show higher levels of disclosure since it improves confidence
and reduces political costs. Also, larger companies are supposed to have superior infor-
mation systems, so additional disclosure is supposedly less costly in larger companies than
in smaller ones. Moreover, proprietary costs related to competitive disadvantages of
additional disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983) are smaller as company size increases.
HI. Larger companies are expected to have higher levels of disclosure than smaller
companies.
4.1.2. Industry
The relationship between industry and disclosure can be explained by the political costs
theory. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that industry membership (being related to
size) is related to political costs. Proprietary costs also vary according to industry.
Additionally, companies in the same industry are interested in having the same level of
disclosure in order to avoid negative appreciation by the market (competitive pressures).
This argument is in line with signalling theory.
Legitimacy and institutional theory also support this hypothesis, because some in-
dustries have higher institutional pressures than others.
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These theoretical considerations do not clearly define the direction of the relationship
between disclosure and industry. Therefore, our hypothesis does not indicate an expected
sign for the relationship.
H2. Disclosure practices are predicted to be related to the industry in which the company
operates.
4.1.3. Auditor type
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) argue that, to maintain then reputation and avoid reputation
costs, high profile auditing companies are more likely to demand high levels of disclosure.
Dumontier and Raffournier ( 1998) observe that, in their own interest and for the sake of their
reputation, auditors want their clients to comply with complex accounting standards.
This is also linked to the fact that major international auditing companies have greater
knowledge about IAS, and so the costs of implementing and auditing them in their clients is
lower than for smaller auditing companies.
Auditing is argued to be a way of reducing agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Watts & Zimmerman, 1983), and so companies that have high agency costs tend to contract
high quality auditing companies.
H3. The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in companies audited by the Big 5
auditors than in companies with non-Big 5 auditors.
4.1.4. Listing status
The relationship between the company listing status and disclosure practices is based on
agency cost and the signalling arguments. Companies listed on multiple or foreign stock
exchanges have greater agency problems. Higher disclosure reduces shareholders'
monitoring costs. Additionally, foreign investors are unfamiliar with national standards,
and so internationally listed companies tend to comply with international standards so that
their accounts are understood by potential investors.'1
Companies expect that compliance with IAS and high disclosure levels are interpreted as
good signals by the market, therefore being a means of obtaining cheaper capital. This
argument is even stronger if the company wants to raise its capital in foreign markets
(capital-need hypothesis, Cooke, 1989).
H4. The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in companies listed on foreign
exchanges than in companies listed on only one (the national) stock exchange.
4.1.5. Multinationality
This hypothesis is linked to the previous one. The more internationalised a company is
the more it has to show its stakeholders (customers, suppliers, government) that it is a good
company. Even a company that is not internationally listed may have an interest in
showing good levels of disclosure if it has international operations.
Many stock exchanges around the world allow foreign companies to prepare their financial statements
according to IAS (see IASB site).
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Cooke ( 1 989) also argues that companies operating in more than one geographical area
tend to have better managerial control systems because of the greater complexity of their
operations. Better and more sophisticated management control and reporting systems
produce information that can be easily disclosed without additional costs. So, they are
expected to have higher levels of disclosure.
H5. The degree of disclosure is predicted to increase with the internationalisation degree
of the company.
4.1.6. Capital structure
4.1.6.1. Shareholder/creditor relationship. As higher leverage levels suggest higher
agency costs (potential wealth transfers from debtholders to shareholders and managers),
compliance with IAS and good disclosure levels can be used to reduce agency costs and
information asymmetries. There are authors, however, that support a negative relation
between leverage and disclosure (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Zarzeski, 1996). The
argument is based on signalling factors and relies on the fact that companies with high
leverage ratios belong to bank-oriented financial systems where capital markets are not
seen as a primary source of capital, and information about companies is more private. This
argument, however, does not take into account public debt. These arguments show the
inability of leverage alone to be a good proxy for the capital structure of a company in
terms of its relation to disclosure degree, because debt may be inside or outside debt.
Tarca, Moy, and Morris (2005), based on Nobes (1998), argue that companies with
relatively more outside debt are more likely to use IAS. They define outside debt as the
amount of long term debt that is sourced from the public capital market. Based on
theoretical considerations and on previous empirical studies, we argue that the degree of
disclosure is related to leverage, without specifying a direction for the relationship.
H6. The degree of disclosure is predicted to be related to leverage.
4.1.6.2. Importance of shareholders. The greater the importance of equity the greater
the information shareholders need and the monitoring costs. The argument is the same as
the one for the agency costs reduction. However, the same problem regarding outside
versus inside equity exists. Equity may be inside, in which case shareholders have access
to inside information, meaning that disclosure is less important. Tarca et al. (2005) define
outside equity as the proportion of equity held by outsiders, based on information about
shareholder structure. Based on the theoretical considerations and on previous empirical
studies we argue that:
H7. The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher the more the company relies on
equity markets.
4. 1. 7. Corporate governance
Both agency and contingency theories lead us to think that the corporate governance
structure of the company may be related to reporting practices, specifically to disclosure
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practices. The premise of agency theory is that independent directors are needed on the
boards to monitor and control the actions of the other executive managers (Haniffa &
Cooke, 2002). So, board composition may be an interesting variable to consider because
it will reflect the role of independent directors. More disclosure can be expected from
companies with a higher proportion of independent directors. On the other hand, if the
board has a high proportion of non-independent directors, less disclosure can be expected
since they have access to inside information. Portuguese companies, as shown in Section
3, are family managed, and have scarce separation between ownership and management.
As such, if the board includes representatives of shareholders, they do not have to rely
extensively on public disclosure since they have access to internal information.
H8. The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher the greater the proportion of
independent directors on the board.
5. Research design
This study has three main research questions:
- Do theories on disclosure and accounting choice apply to Portuguese listed companies?
- Which are the most important factors that influence disclosure practices by Portuguese
companies?
- What will 2005 really mean for Portuguese companies?
Based on these broad questions, our immediate research goals are:
- to identify the most important factors associated with the level of financial instruments
disclosure and,
- to identify the characteristics of the companies that are closest to IAS 32 and IAS 39
requirements.
Next we describe how we constructed a disclosure index to measure the dependent
variable, the proxies for the independent variables, the sample collecting process and the
sample's main characteristics.
5.1. The dependent variable
With the objective of identifying disclosure practices concerning financial instruments
we applied the content analysis technique to listed companies' annual reports, which were
comprehensively analyzed. This analysis is based on a list of categories, covering all the
items that allow us to identify the existence of disclosures required by IAS 32 and IAS 39.
Based on that list of categories a disclosure index was constructed. This index has the
following eleven main categories of information, which are then subdivided into 54 items:
(1) Accounting policies (7 items)
(2) Fair values and market values (9 items)
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(3) Securitisation and repurchase agreements (5 items)
(4) Derivatives: Accounting policies (5 items)
(5) Derivatives: Risks (4 items)
(6) Derivatives: Hedging (10 items)
(7) Derivatives: Fair value (4 items)
(8) Interest rate risk (2 items)
(9) Credit risk (3 items)
(10) Collateral (2 items)
(11) Other (3 items)
The detailed components of this index are described in Appendix A.
The index was constructed according to the literature on related areas, and has three
main characteristics: it is (1) dichotomous, (2) unweighted, and (3) adjusted for non-
applicable items.
5.1. 1 . Dichotomous
A score of 1 is assigned to an item if it is disclosed (disclosure index), and a score of
otherwise.
The total score for a company is:
£4
1=1
where </, is 1 if item / is disclosed, and otherwise; m is the maximum number of items
(wj = 54).
5.1.2. Unweighted
The total score is computed as the unweighted sum of the scores of each item. The
implied assumption is that each item is equally important for all user groups. This
assumption may not be realistic, but we think that the resulting bias is smaller than the
one that would result from assigning subjective weights to the items. The majority of
disclosure studies use unweighted indices: Cooke (1989), Cooke (1993), Meek and
Roberts (1995), Raffoumier (1995), Inchausti (1997) and Chalmers and Godfrey
(2004). Some of the disclosure literature supports unweighted indices. Robbins and
Austin (1986) found that (p. 412-413) "the independent variables, which were
significantly associated with the simple index of disclosure (consists only of the extent
of disclosure) quality, were also significantly associated with the compound index (the
product of the extent and relative importance of financial disclosure index)"'. Spero
( 1979), as cited by Hodgdon (2004), argues that attaching weights to disclosure items is
irrelevant because companies that tend to be nunc forthcoming with less important
information also tend to be more forthcoming with more important information. Firth
(l l)S0) and Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) found the same results for weighted and
unweighted indices.
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5.1.3. Adjusted for non-applicable items
The applicability of any item to each company was taken into account, that is, we
considered that a company should not be penalized if an item were not relevant. We read
the entire annual report, and if a specific item is not mentioned we assume that it is not
relevant. So the maximum score for each company is computed as follows:
n
M = ^ d,
i=\
where d, is the disclosure item, and /; is the number of items applicable to that company
(n<54).
Then an adjusted index is calculated as TIM. This adjustment procedure for non-
applicable items is found in most of the empirical studies reviewed (Cooke, 1989. 1993;
Inchausti, 1997; Meek & Roberts, 1995; Raffournier, 1995).
5.2. The independent variables
According to our hypotheses, the determinants of disclosure to be tested are size,
industry, auditor type, listing status, multmationality, capital structure and corporate
governance characteristics.
Although size can be measured in several different ways, we consider the following:
total assets (Tassets) and total sales (Tsales), measured in million euros. These measures of
size are used in many studies.
From prior research and theoretical considerations, there is no consistent approach to
classify companies by industry. We adopt the classification of financial and non-financial
companies using a dummy variable (indl ).
Auditor type is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is audited by a Big
5, and otherwise. In 2001, the Big 5 auditors were Arthur Andersen, Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and Young and K.PMG.
Listing status is another dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is
listed in the stock exchange of the country of origin, and otherwise. That is, for a
company that is listed or cross-listed in foreign stock exchanges this variable takes the
value 0.
The degree of multinationality is measured by the percentage of foreign sales (foreign
sales divided by total sales).
Regarding capital structure, we identified three relevant variables: leverage, importance
of equity, and ownership diffusion. The degree of leverage is measured by the debt to equity
ratio. It would be important to distinguish between inside and outside debt (Tarca et al..
We are aware of the subjectivity that can be introduced by this procedure. Regarding the type of instruments
and transactions, which are quite new and unknown for some of the sample companies, we believe that by not
adjusting for non-applicable items we would introduce a significant bias. This situation is the opposite of what we
find in Chalmers and Godfrey (2004). where companies not using derivatives and making no disclosure were
considered as non-disclosing companies. The reason is that it is assumed that the majority of companies would be
using derivative instruments based on a previous survey.
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2005) since agency theory predicts more disclosure in case of public debt. Unfortunately,
we were unable to distinguish between public and private debt based on the information
disclosed by companies, meaning that if this distinction were considered, many obser-
vations from an already small number of companies would have to be excluded.
The importance of equity is measured by the ratio market value to total assets. Equity
investors are usually outsiders to a company. But this is not always true, especially in Portugal
where companies, even public companies, are family owned and capital is concentrated in a
small number of shareholders. If a shareholder owns a large stake in a company, the
dependence on public disclosure is likely to be smaller, because he can directly monitor
management. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse stock ownership. Article 448° of
Commercial Law (Codigo das Sociedades Comerciais) obliges companies to disclose the
name of the shareholders that hold more than 1/10, 1/3 and 1/2 of the capital. Article 6° of
Regulation no. 1 1 /2000 (CMVM, 2000), revised by Regulation no. 4/2004 (CMVM, 2004). of
the Portuguese Securities Market Regulator (CMVM — Comissao do Mercado de Valores
Mobiliarios) obliges the disclosure of qualified holdings (5%, 1 0% or 20% of the capital as set
forth in the Portuguese Securities Code). This means that even if companies disclosed the
information required by law, it would not be possible to construct a coherent variable for every
company (such as the proportion of shares owned by the five largest shareholders or the
percentage ofshares held by institutional shareholders) because companies only disclose some
of their shareholders.
s
In order to include this variable in the econometric analysis, several
observations would have to be deleted, and so, we decided not to include it. Instead, the
information obtained is used to explain and rationalize results obtained in the hypothesis
testing. A descriptive analysis of the ownership diffusion of Portuguese companies based on
the publicly available data is presented on the section of the sample description below.
For the purpose of including the characteristics of corporate governance structure as a
determinant of disclosure, and driven by agency and contingency theories, we defined a
variable for the proportion of independent directors on the board.
In Portugal, the regulation of corporate governance practices and disclosure is under the
responsibility of the Portuguese Securities Market Regulator (CMVM). In 1999. CMVM
approved the first "Recommendations on Corporate Governance", which included a set of
non-mandatory rules that should be complied with by companies. According to
Recommendation no. 15 (CMVM, 1999) "the board of directors should be comprised in
such a way as to ensure that the management of the company is not only geared towards the
protection of the interests of the majority of stakeholders. It is therefore recommended that
independent members exercise significant influence on collective decision-making and that
they contribute to the development of the strategies of the company, thereby acting in the
interests of the company as a whole". This Recommendation, however, did not produce fair
disclosures for investors. This was recognized by CMVM itself, which published a first
mandatory set of rules — Regulation no. 7/2001 (CMVM, 2001a). In this Regulation,
CMVM recognizes that the disclosure of the extent to which the Recommendations on
We tried to overcome this problem by asking the Portuguese stock exchange (Euronext Lisbon) for this
information, which sent us a database for the year 2000 (the latest year for which it was available). We could have
used the information for the year 2000, but this database revealed to be very incomplete and did not have the five
biggest shareholders for all quoted companies
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Corporate Governance were observed is being complied increasingly by companies, but "...
it is not unusual to find that disclosure is uneven and insufficient". Regulation no. 07/2001
obliges listed companies to disclose annual information on various aspects of corporate
governance in an appendix or chapter of their annual report. This is the reason why the
construction ofour variable of percentage of independent directors is based on the corporate
governance reports (or chapters of annual reports) of the year 2002. The variable obtained is
not exempt from limitations. Indeed, independence is a concept defined by each company.
This means that we register what companies disclose in their reports as independent
directors in the board, since there is not a definition of independence imposed by law and
applied to every company.
Besides the proportion of independent directors in the board, we define two alternative
measures for corporate governance characteristics of Portuguese companies. A first measure
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company complies with Recommendation
9 (CMVM, 2001b), and zero otherwise. This recommendation encourages the inclusion of
one or more independent directors (regarding major shareholders) in the board and a clear
definition of independence by the company. The other proxy is the percentage ofcompliance
with all the CMVM's "Recommendations on Coiporate Governance" (CMVM, 2001b).
These two measures are based on the answers, by listed companies, to the 4th survey on the
practices regarding corporate governance (CMVM, 2002).
Table 2 sums up the hypotheses, the proxies for measuring the independent variables and
the predicted relationships with the dependent variable.
5.3. Sample selection and characteristics
All listed companies at Euronext Lisbon on 31st December 2001 were selected for this
study. At the end of 2001, there were 56 quoted companies in Portugal, listed in Appendix
B. One company (PT Multimedia.com) did not publish the annual report and financial
statements in 2001 and was excluded from the analysis. Hence, the final sample includes 55
companies, with 29% from the industrial sector and 20% from the financial sector (Table 3).
CMVM felt, afterwards, the need for defining a clear and objective concept for independent director and in its
Regulation no. 1 1/2003 (CMVM, 2003). article 1. it states that "administrators associated with specific interest
groups in the company shall not be considered independent officers, namely:
a) Members of the board of directors who are also members of the board of directors of the controlling company,
as set forth in the Portuguese Securities Code.
b) Members of the board of directors who are holders of qualified holdings in an amount equal to or larger than
10°o of the share capital or of the voting rights in the company, or an identical percentage in a controlling
company, as set forth in the Portuguese Securities Code,
c) Members of the board of directors who hold management position or have contractual ties with a competing
company;
d) Members of the board of directors who receive compensation from the company, or from any parent company
or affiliates within the same group other than in the form of compensation for their role as corporate officers;
e) Members of the board of directors who are spouses, family or direct kin through third lineage, including those
persons referred to in the paragraphs above.
In addition to checking the circumstances described above, the board must ensure, in a well founded manner, the
independence of the directors in light of other pertinent circumstances
"
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Table 2
Hypotheses, variables' proxies and expected relationship
Hypothesis Variables proxies Expected relationship
Size Total assets
Natural log of
total assets
Total sales
Industry
Auditor type
Listing status
Multinationality
Capital (finance) structure
Shareholders/creditors
Ownership diffusion
(not included in model
for econometric analysis]
Shareholders
Coporate governance
Board composition
Compliance with CMVM
recommendation regarding
independent directors
Compliance with all C M\ \1
corporate governance
recommendations
Tassets
Lassets
Tsales
Natural log of total Lsales
sales
1 dummy variable
1 dummy variable
1 dummy variable
Sales foreign
countries. Total sales
indl: Financial
(l=yes; 0=no)
d_aud: Big 5/Non Big 5
(1 = yes; = no)
d list: Country of origin'
Foreign country
( listed on one foreign
stock exchange or multilisting)
(1 = yes; = no)
Mult
Debt/Equity DE
Percentage of shares Own_conc
owned by the top
five shareholders
Market value/ Total MV
assets
Proportion of
independent
directors
1 Durnmv variable
Degree of
compliance
(in percentage)
IncLdir
D_ind_dir: 1= complies;
0=does not comply
Corp_gov
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
No prediction
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
Negative association with
the disclosure degree
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
No prediction
Negative association with
the disclosure degree
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
Positive association with
the disclosure degree
Most companies (90%) are quoted in the Portuguese stock exchange only. Additionally,
there are five companies that are cross-listed in the USA. Regarding the auditor company,
the majority (76%) is audited by a Big 5 company. This information was obtained from the
companies' annual reports and websites (Table 4).
Regarding capital structure, we analyze companies' debt to equity ratio, market
capitalization to total assets ratio and ownership diffusion. The source for the first two
variables is the annual reports, and for the ownership diffusion variable is a database provided
by Euronext Lisbon (CD-ROM of quoted companies for the year 2000) (Table 5).
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Table 3
Sample sectoral distribution
Economic sector
Basic materials 12.7%
Consumer, cyclical 4 16.4%
Consumer, non-cyclical 4 7.3%
Financial II 20.0%
Industrial 16 29.1°,,
Technology 4 7.3%
Telecommunications 3 5.5%
Utilities I I 8%
Total 55 100.0%
Regarding corporate governance variables, we computed the percentage of independent
directors in the board of directors, based on the 2002 reports published by companies. 1 "
Analysing the proportion of independent directors (Table 6, panel A), we conclude that
in almost 50% of companies less than half of the directors are independent. Almost 30% of
companies claim to have between 90 to 100% of independent directors in their Board. As
previously mentioned, in 2002 the definition of independence was not set forth by any
regulation; each company defined what it considered to be independent directors and the
disclosure was based on this self-constructed concept of independence. This means that it
may have happened that some directors, considered independent, were not independent in
the light of the subsequent regulations on corporate governance. ' ' Consequently, the results
for this variable must be interpreted with caution.
In order to mitigate the disadvantages of the previous measure, two additional measures
based on alternative sources of information are considered. The first is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the company complies with CMVM's recommendation regarding the
existence of at least one independent director and the existence of a definition of independence,
and otherwise. The source for this variable is CMVM and data for the variable are obtained
through a survey to quoted companies. The second is a continuous variable that measures the
degree of compliance with the overall recommendations on corporate governance, as
published in the 4th survey on corporate governance practices (CMVM, 2002).
Analysing compliance with Recommendations on Corporate governance, we conclude
that Portuguese companies still have a long way to go regarding good practices on corporate
governance. Most companies (53%) do not comply with the recommendation related to
independent directors (Table 6, panel B). which includes both the need of having at least
one independent director on the Board and the existence of a definition of independence.
When companies did not disclose this information, all directors were classified as non-independent. This procedure
may create a bias but it is considered preferable to the alternative procedure of eliminating the observations.
" Indeed, the 4th Survey of the Corporate Governance Practices (CMVM, 2002), par.3.9, stales that "this
recommendation (the existence ofone or more independent directors) is the one with lower degTee ofcompliance... this
is due, mainly, to the fact that it has been introduced an additional question associated with this recommendation — the
existence of a clear definition of independence in the company In fact, if this question were not included, 80,4% ofthe
companies would comply with this recommendation..." (authors' translation). As a consequence, CMVM
subsequently decided to include definitions of independence and specifically defined who cannot be considered an
independent director (Regulation no. 1 1/2003 (CMVM. 2003) and Regulation n 10/2005 (CMVM. 2005).
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Table 4
Sample descriptive statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
Total assets 55 22.05 358,137.5] 10,833.29 48,944.85
Total sales 55 5.80 34,885.49 1720.26 4890.21
Sales foreign countries/total sales 55 .00 93.46 24.55 29.64
Total liabilities 55 37.91 96.33 72.55 15.06
Debt/equity 55 .61 26.28 4.93 5.51
Market value total assets 55 3.36 219.49 37.12 39.95
Listing status
Listed, origin country stock exchange
Listed, (one) foreign stock exchange
Multilisting, including USA
Multilisting, not-including USA
50
5
90.91
0.00
9.09
0.00
Auditor status
Big five
Not Bi'j five
42
13
76.36
23.64
The average degree of compliance with all recommendations (Table 6, panel C) is slightly
above 50%, meaning that, on average, almost half of the recommendations are not complied
with by Portuguese companies. No single company complies with all the recommendations
(the maximum value for the compliance degree is 92%).
6. Results
6.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 7 reports the overall means and standard deviations for the dependent variable -
the adjusted disclosure index (Idisc_a) - and for each of its categories. The range of
scores for the disclosure index varies from 16% to 64% with a mean of 44%. The
category with the largest disclosure degree is "Accounting policies". The disclosure
degree within this category, which comprises the disclosure of the accounting policies for
each class of financial instruments, shows a mean of 80% among all companies. On the
other hand, the categories that show lowest levels of disclosure are "Fair and market
values" and "Credit risk". The first includes the disclosure of measurement method and
Table 5
Ownership diffusion (percentage of shares held by top shareholders)
Shareholders Number of disclosing companies Average (%) Max (%) Min (%) S.D.
Top five 27
Top four 7
Top three 6
Top two 10
59.33 95.65 18.09 0.220484
64»8 96.68 25.89 0.2 1 3024
75.41 91.90 55.91 0. 1 24249
70.82 99.20 42 '14 0.167491
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Tabic 6
Corporate governance
Panel A: Proportion of independent directors on the board
Proportion of independent directors Number of companies Percentage (%) Accumulated distribution (%)
>90e<100 15
>80e<90 1
>70e<80 I
>60e<70 6
>50e<60 4
>40e<50 4
>30e<40 3
>20e<30 4
>10e<20 4
<10% 13
27.27 100.00
1.82 72 73
1.82 70.91
10.91 69.09
7.27 58.18
7.27 50.91
-4- 43.64
7.27 38 is
7.27 30.91
2 ! 64 2 ' 64
10055
Panel B Degree of compliance with the CM\ M's Recommendations regarding independent directors
Number of companies
Yes
No
Total
22 (46.81%)
25 (53 19
47
Source: Data gTanted b> CMVN 1
Panel C: Degree of compliance with the CMVM's Recommendations on Corporate Governance
Degree of compliance
Max 92.30%
Min 18.20%
Average 57.13%
S.D. 18.40%
Total obs 4"
Source: CMVM (2002)
significant assumptions. The average disclosure degree within this category is only about
5%. The category for credit risk comprises the disclosure of the main counterparties,
maximum amount of credit risk exposure and significant concentration of credit risk. This
category shows an average disclosure degree of 6%.
Table 8 shows the mean of the index of disclosure by economic sector, by type of auditor
and by listing status. Companies from the technological sector show the highest level of
disclosure and. as expected, cross-listed companies and companies audited the Big 5 show
higher average levels of disclosure.
6.2. Simple regressions
OLS simple regressions were estimated to check for univariate relationships between the
disclosure index and each variable. The results obtained are shown in Table 9: for each
explanatory variable, regression coefficients and /-statistics are reported. When there is a
hypothesized direction for a variable, a one-tailed Mest is used, otherwise two-tailed tests
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Table 7
Dependent variable
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
Disclosure index 0.16 0.641 0.44 0.09
Categories
( 1 ) Accounting policies .000 1.000 .804 .120
(2) Fair values and market values .000 .500 .054 .129
(3) Securitisation .400 .800 .600 .126
(4) Derivatives — Accounting policies .000 1.000 .590 .334
(5) Derivatives — Risks .000 1.000 .535 .323
(6) Derivatives— Hedging 000 1.000 .401 .250
(7) Derivatives — Fair value .000 .500 .171 .221
(8) Interest rate risk .000 1 000 .345 .270
(9) Credit risk .000 1.000 .067 .207
(10) Collateral .000 1.000 .491 .402
(11) Other .000 1.000 ,494 .101
are used. In every regression, we analyze the presence of heteroscedasticity with White's
general test (White, 1980). When this test indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity, the
White's heteroscedasticity consistent variances and standard errors were used.
Three hypotheses are statistically validated. The first is HI which relates the company
size to disclosure level. All measures of size are statistically significant and the sign of the
coefficient is positive, as predicted. There is also a significant relationship between being
audited by a Big 5 company and the level of disclosure, confirming H3. Being listed in
more than one stock exchange (cross-listing) influences the level of disclosure as predicted
by H4. Companies that are listed only in the Portuguese exchange disclose less than
companies with multilisting status. Being a financial or a non-financial company is not
related to the level of disclosure. Neither the degree of multinationality nor any of the
Table 8
Dependent variable means by economic sector, auditor type and listing status
Disclosure index
Mean S.D.
Economic sector
Basic materials .435 .038
Consumer, cyclical .422 .071
Consumer, non-cyclical .465 .101
Financial ,446 .156
Industrial .440 .08
1
Technology 0.471 0.48
Telecommunications .394 .071
Auditor type
Non-big five auditor .399 .085
Big five auditor ,451 091
Listing status
One or more foreign stock exchange .537 .056
Portuguese stock exchange .429 .089
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Table 9
OLS simple regressions (While Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covananee. when necessary)
Hypothesis Variable ( 'oefficienl ^-Statistic
I Tassets
Lassets
Tsales
Lsales
Indl
D_aud
n hst
Mult
Tliab
Fhab
DE
MV
Ind dir
D_ind dir'
Corp_goV'
4.61E-07
012256
5.09E 06
0.015320
008909
0.052654
-0.107740
0.000274
0.000648
1.093E-04
0.003690
-.000196
0.023527
0.036396
1111X2064
4.100543*
1.731635**
2.050536**
2 288001**
0.285146
I 845112**
-2.633464*
0.647
0.777255
0.157
1.010319
-
.622468
0.724669
1.316085
1.51533
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covananee. when necessary; * significant at 1%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%. One-tailed tests.
" These equations are estimated with the number of observations available for these variables (47 observations).
variables related to capital structure prove to be related to disclosure. Moreover, the
variables used for the corporate governance structure, individually considered, do not show
a statistically significant relationship with disclosure.
6.3. Multiple regressions
In multiple analysis, which jointly tests the previously formulated hypotheses, all
independent variables are considered in the models. The different measures for size are
highly correlated (the correlations between variables are shown in Appendix C). which
means that they cannot be all included in the model. In order to circumvent this problem, we
used the same procedure as Cooke ( 1 989): we run a regression for each measure of size (total
assets, total sales, the natural logarithm of assets and the natural logarithm of sales). 1-
Regarding corporate governance variables, we started by including the proportion of
independent directors. Then, an alternative measure using a dummy variable was substituted
for the proportion of independent directors. Finally, we tested another alternative measure
for corporate governance: the degree of compliance with all CMVM's recommendations.
Some literature on determinants of disclosure indices points out a non-linear relationship
between the dependent and the independent variables (Parviainen, Schadewitz, & Blevins,
2001; Cooke, 1998). In previous empirical studies, researchers have often used
transformations in order to allow for non-linear relationships (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman,
2003; Ali, Ahmed, & Henry, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hodgdon, 2004; Lang &
~ In related literature, we found other alternative procedures such as select the most relevant measure based on
their explanatory power in univariate analysis (Dumontier & Raffoumier, 1998) or in a pre-run stepwise
regression (Giner, 1997; Raffoumier, 1995; Street & Bryant. 2000) or, still, create a composite variable using
factor analysis (Dumontier & Raffoumier, 1998).
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Table 10
Regression results
(Dependent variable: idisc_a)
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient (/-statistic) Coefficient (/-statistic) Coefficient (/-statistic)
Tassets 2.24E-07 (1.601922)*** 2.98E-07 (1.964425)** 3.27E-07 (2.202875)**
tad) -0.094637 (-1.452701) -0.138512 (-1.700795)++ -0.135906 (-1.654129)++
D_aud 0.041394 (1.165508) 0.054789(1.446672)*** 0.067667(1.549685)***
D_list -0.085970 (-2.126436)** -0.082827 (-2.083458)** -0.099605 (-2.135163)**
Mult -7.80E-05 (-0.194589) -0.000305 (-0.753093) -0.000308 (-0.717547)
DE 0.006236(1.115077) 0.008090(1.432250) 0.008260 ( 1 .402708)
MV -0.000184 (-0.394449) -0.000273 (-0.547384) -0.000295 (-0.561823)
IncLdir -0.004799 (-0.168400)
D_ind_dir 0.013069(0.469624)
Corp_gov -0.069853 (-0.830426)
Included obs 55 47 47
Adj R 2 0.10537 0.126359 0.135941
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covanance; significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%:
*** significant at 10%. One-tailed tests. ++ significant at 10%. Two-tailed tests.
Lundholm, 1993; Wallace, Naser, & Mora, 1994). According to this past evidence the
logarithmic transformation is commonly applied to address alternative functional forms
between the dependent and the independent variables. We performed the logarithmic
transformation of the dependent variable (log-lin) and estimated these alternative models.
Also, quadratic terms ofsome independent variables were included in the regressions to test
for alternative functional form specifications and to capture decreasing or increasing
marginal effects (Hodgdon, 2004). These models (not reported) did not show any
improvements when compared with linear results: lower R2 s were obtained and the models
showed problems in their overall significance (F-statistic).
The estimation results for the linear models with total assets as a proxy for size are
reported in Table 10. Four independent variables proved to be statistically significant:
total assets, economic sector, auditor type and listing status.
HI, which states that size is positively related with disclosure, is supported by the results.
This finding is consistent with Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), who also find a statistically
positive relationship between size and financial instruments' disclosure. However, this result
is inconsistent with studies that analyze compliance with disclosure requirements of several
IAS at the same time, which found no significance for company size (Glaum & Street, 2003;
Hodgdon, 2004; Street & Bryant, 2000; Street & Gray, 2001; Tower et al., 1999).
H2, winch states that disclosure is related to the type of industry, is also supported by the
results, which show that belonging to the financial sector is negatively related to the
disclosure level. This is consistent with the study of Karim and Ahmed (2005), which also
tests the effect of financial/non-financial sector on disclosure compliance with IAS. Other
After an analysis of the alternative models adequacy, based on broad features of the estimation results, such as
the R- value, the estimated / ratios and the signs of the estimated coefficients in relation to their prior
expectations, models with Tassets (reported in Table 10) show better results than the others (not reported)
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studies do not follow this classification. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) separate mining and
oil companies from the others. Several studies separate manufacturing from non-
manufacturing industries (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Street & Bryant, 2000), and
others use more than two industry classes.
H3, which states that disclosure degree is higher for companies audited by a Big 5 is also
supported. This finding is consistent with Hodgdon (2004), Glaum and Street (2003) and
Street and Gray (2001 ), who find positive significant relationship between IAS compliance
and type of auditor. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) and Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003)
find mixed results regarding this variable.
The coefficient of listing status is statistically significant in all models, providing support
for H4, which states that the degree of disclosure is higher in companies listed on foreign
exchanges than in companies listed on only one (the national) stock exchange. This finding
is widely evidenced in the literature on compliance with disclosure requirements of IAS,
namely in Hodgdon (2004), Glaum and Street (2003), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003),
Street and Gray (2001) and Street and Bryant (2000).
H5, which states that the degree of disclosure is higher in more internationalized
companies, is not supported by our models. This finding is consistent with Street and Gray
(2001), who find that the degree of multinationality is not a significant determinant of the
extent of compliance with IAS required disclosures.
The results do not show any significant influence of capital structure on disclosure. H6
(degree of leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio) is not supported. Previous studies
on compliance with IAS do not find statistically significant relationships either, except for
the study of Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) who find, in some cases, a significant and
negative relationship. Regarding equity financing, the importance of shareholders, mea-
sured by the ratio of market capitalization to total assets, does not prove to be a significant
determinant of disclosure, either. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) find mixed results for
this factor: no significance for non-familiar IAS and significance for familiar IAS.
In spite of what was expected, our data do not show evidence on the influence of
corporate governance on disclosure by Portuguese companies. Neither the proportion of
independent directors nor the degree of compliance with the overall corporate governance
recommendations of CMVM prove to be related to disclosure. The other alternative
measure for the importance of independent directors obtained from the survey conducted by
CMVM does not show any improvements in the results, either.
In summary, our results support H 1 , H2, H3, H4,, that is we find that size, belonging to the
financial sector, auditor type and listing status determine the degree of financial instruments
disclosure. The results do not support the influence of the internationahty degree (H5), of
the capital structure (H6 and H7 ), and of the corporate governance structure (H8) on disclosure.
7. Discussion and conclusions
The Portuguese Accounting Directive 18 (CNC, 1996) establishes compliance with IAS
whenever Portuguese standards are not available. There is a lack of accounting standards for
financial instruments in Portugal, namely regarding derivatives. Consequently, it may be
expected that companies have been adopting IAS requirements in their accounting for financial
instruments. Bearing the mandatory adoption of IAS after 2005 in mind, it is interesting to
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analyze the characteristics of the companies that were already anticipating IAS requirements,
especially with respect to financial instruments' disclosure items before 2005. In order to achieve
this objective, we construct an index of disclosure issues that comprises 54 items relating to
financial instruments. The components of the index are based on IAS 32 and LAS 39.
Besides the factors derived from the agency, the political costs and the signalling theories,
we introduce the analysis of capital finance structure and corporate governance features in
the context of contingency theory. Portuguese companies typically have a high degree of
family ownership and bank-oriented financing policies. Additionally, corporate governance
practices have not been regulated until recently (in 2001 the first Recommendations- non
mandatory- on corporate governance were published by CMVM), and this regulation has
been changing almost every year.
In spite of several difficulties with data availability and consistency among companies,
we perform the analysis and conclude that disclosure degree is significantly related to size,
type of auditor, listing status and economic sector (financial/non-financial). Since the
disclosure index is based on IAS 32 and IAS 39, the results also show that larger
companies, companies listed on more than one exchange market and audited by in-
ternational auditing companies are closer to the IAS requirements. We could not, however,
prove the influence of corporate governance practices, including the board composition, on
disclosure. Similarly, the results do not show a significant influence of the type of capital
financing structure, since the measures of leverage degree and of importance of capital
market's financing do not show statistically significant relations with disclosure level.
These results, however, should be interpreted with caution. As previously mentioned, we
found difficulties on data availability regarding the structure of shareholders, which did not
allow us to proceed with a deep analysis of the effect of family ownership on disclosure
practices. Moreover, regarding corporate governance characteristics, we also found several
inconsistencies on disclosure by companies, namely the definition of independent director.
The fact that, until 2003, there was not a clear definition of independence by the Portuguese
capital markets regulator, led to a situation in which companies could disclose a number of
independent directors that in fact are not independent in the light of current regulation. Our
measures for the proportion of independent directors do not show significant relations with
disclosure level.
This research brings important insights on the characteristics of Portuguese companies,
their corporate governance and capital ownership structures, and on the reporting practices
in the context of capital markets oriented accounting standards. This research allowed the
identification of several areas for improvement and that call for the intervention of the
Portuguese capital markets regulator.
Regarding corporate governance, the Portuguese capital markets regulator has been
introducing several improvements. Additionally, CMVM has been publishing studies on
the compliance degree with corporate governance recommendations/regulations every year,
disclosing the name of companies that do and do not comply. These procedures have a
positive impact on corporate governance practices.
The supervision of listed companies financial reporting is the responsibility ofCMVM.
This function assumes much more importance in the context of mandatory adoption of IAS.
In fact, the change to IAS means a complete change in the attiftide toward financial
reporting. We show that, before 2005, many companies were not applying IAS 32 and IAS
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39 as supplementary accounting standards, nor complying with the Portuguese Accounting
Directive 1 8. This is an indicator that there will be several problems of compliance with IAS
after 2005. Effective enforcement mechanisms are needed. CMVM has been publishing the
name of companies that have certified auditor's reports, which may not be enough for
the enforcement of IAS. Similarly to what is done regarding corporate governance
practices, the market supervisor must develop studies of compliance with IAS based on
annual reports published by companies and implement actions towards non-complying
companies.
Finally, we would like to address some limitations of this study. First, the sample size.
This problem, which is intrinsic to the Portuguese capital market size, restricts our
hypotheses testing by means of linear regression models. Another limitation results from
the index construction process. We were very careful with the scoring process, but errors
may have occurred. Furthermore, annual reports, although important, are not the only
means by which companies disclose financial instalments. Lastly, this study covers the
annual reports for a single year, before IAS became mandatory. Additional research
including other years, namely after 2005, will allow interesting analyzes of evolution of
disclosure practices and compliance by companies within new accounting frameworks. In
spite of these limitations, we believe that this research revealed very interesting relations of
the disclosure practices and several characteristics of Portuguese companies, showing the
applicability of relevant theoretical frameworks in contexts not studied before and with
important policy implications.
Appendix A
Components of the disclosure index
Disclosure index Score (if disclosed)
Accounting policies
Held for trading securities 1
Held-to-maturiry securities 1
Loans and receivables originated by the enterprise 1
Available-for-sale financial assets 1
Held-for-trading liabilities 1
Other financial liabilities 1
Trade date vs settlement date 1
Fair values and market values
Measurement method 1
Significant assumptions 1
Fair value changes in Available-for-sale financial assets 1
Amount recognised in equity 1
Amount removed from equity 1
Unabili/}' of reliability in measurement
Financial assets description 1
Their carrying amount 1
Explanation of the reason 1
Range of estimates within which the fair value is likely to lie 1
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A (continued)
Disclosure mdex Score (if disclosedl
Securitisation and repurchase agreements
Accounting policy
Nature and extent
Collateral
Whether the financial assets have been derecognised
Information about the key assumptions used in calculating the fair value of new and
retained interests
Derivatives — Accounting policies
Risk management policy, including hedging policy
Objectives of holding or issuing derivatives
Accounting policies and methods adopted
Monitoring and controlling policy
Financial controls
Derivatives — Risks
Segregation by risk categories
Principal, stated value, face value, notional value
Maturity
Weighted average/effective interest rate
Derivatives — Hedging
Hedging description
Accounting method
Financial instruments designated as hedging instruments
Fair values
Nature of the risks being hedged
Future transactions hedging
The period in which forecasted transactions are expected to occur
The period they are expected to enter in income
Cash-flow hedging
The amount recognised in equity
The amount removed from equity and recognised in income
The amount removed from equity and added to initial measurement of the acquisition cost
Derivatives — Fair value
Fair value
Method adopted
Significant assumptions
Average fair value during the year
Interest rate risk
Future changes in interest rates
Maturity dates
( redil risk
Counterparties identification
Maximum amount of credit risk exposure
Significant concentration of credit risk
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Appendix A (continued)
Disclosure index Score (if disclosed)
Collateral
Terms and conditions
Carrying amount and fair value
Other
Impairment losses
Total interest income and total interest expense (separately)
In AFS, realized and unrealized gains losses (separate!)
)
Total score
I
1
I
54
Appendix B
Sample companies in alphabetic order
Company name Economic sector Company name Economic sector
Barbosa and Almeida Industrial ITI Consumer, cyclical
BANIF Financial Jeronimo Martins Consumer, non-
cyclical
BCA Financial LISGRAFICA Consumer, cyclical
BCP Financial Mota-Engil Industrial
BES Financial Mundicenter Financial
BPI Financial NOVABASE Technology
BRISA Industrial Soc. Comerctal Orey Antunes Industrial
BSCH Financial Papelaria Femandes Consumer, cyclical
Banco Totta and Acores Financial PARAREDE Technology
Corticeira Amorim Industrial PORTUCEL Produtora de Pasta e Papel Basic materials
Companhia de Celulose do Industrial PT Multimedia Consumer, cyclical
Caima
CENTRAL — Banco de Financial REDITUS Technology
Investimento
CIMPOR Industrial Salvador Caetano Industrial
CIN Basic materials Soares da Costa Industrial
CIRES Basic materials SAG GEST Consumer, cyclical
COFINA Basic materials SEMAPA Industrial
COMPTA Technology SOMAGUE Industrial
Modelo Continente Consumer,
l Vein .ll
non- SONAE Indiistria Industrial
EDP Utilities SONAE SGPS Consumer, non-
cyclical
EFACEC Industrial SONAECOM Telecommunications
Estoril — Sol Consumer, cyclical SUMOLIS Consumer, non-
cyclical
F Ramada Basic materials Teixeira Duarte Industrial
FINIBANCO Financial Portugal Telecom Telecommunications
FISIPE Basic materials TERTIR Industrial
Grao-Para Industrial Vista Alegre Atlantis Consumer, cyclical
IBERSOL Consumer. cyclical Vodafone Telecel Telecommunications
IMOLEASING Financial
IMPRESA Consumer, cyclical
INAPA Basic materials
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Abstract
Do financial analysts convey intellectual capital information in their recommendations? This study
of a sample of analyst reports on large, listed Spanish companies provides some evidence on the
question. Analysts usually report information regarding a company's strategy, customers, and processes;
they less often provide information about research, development, and innovation. When controlling for
endogeneity. we find that certain firm characteristics appear to influence the use of intellectual capital
information. Analysts use this infonnation in the case of highly profitable companies. The results also
show a significant effect of growth opportunities on intellectual capital disclosure by financial analysts.
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1. Introduction
Increasing competition, development of new business sectors, and technological
advances have generated some frustration over traditional financial statements (FASB,
2001b). Financial statements suffer from a lack of timeliness, (some) inaccuracy, and a
limited ability to convey prospective data and risks facing the firm. In this context, financial
analysts, as information intermediaries, are increasingly aware of the importance of
company information that is not directly reflected in financial statements. Intangibles have
become an important source of corporate value and firm wealth in our era of globalization,
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technological change, and knowledge-intensive processes. We know little about the way
financial analysts use this information.
The first objective ofour study is to quantify the extent and type ofdisclosure of intangibles
in financial analyst's reports. The underlying methodology is a comprehensive analysis of the
disclosure of intangibles in 260 analyst reports for Spanish listed firms from 2000 to 2003.
Our results show that financial analysts focus on particular intellectual capital
information. In more than 70% of the reports, they cite information about new investments,
firm credibility, and consistency of strategy, as well as its strategic alliances and
agreements. They do not place a great deal of emphasis on measures of innovation,
research, and development, probably because it is difficult to obtain these data and there is
also a risk that the release of such information could be beneficial to competitors.
After studying the intellectual capital information included in analyst reports, we analyze
the determinants of these disclosures on intangibles. The second objective of this study is to
evaluate to what extent international firm listing, profitability, firm risk, and type of analyst
recommendation influence intellectual capital information use. The regression-based approach
constructed in this paper takes into account the endogenous relation between the use of
intellectual capital information by financial analysts and their recommendations. Since in the
presence of endogeneity, ordinary-least-squares estimation yields biased and inconsistent
coefficient estimates, we base our analysis on a two-stage-least-squares estimation.
We find that, as predicted, the firm's profitability influences the extent of intellectual
capital information use. Analysts provide more intellectual capital information in reports on
profitable firms. The empirical analysis also shows a significant effect of growth
opportunities on intellectual capital disclosure, in firms with high market-to-book ratios,
analysts tend to include more intellectual capital information to justify their recommenda-
tions. Some of the variation in the amount of disclosure of intangibles is also explained by
year, type of analyst report, and industry.
Analysis of the content of reports provides some evidence of the role of analysts as in-
termediaries between managers and investors. These results may help to improve
methodologies to assist investment decision makers. The findings also have direct implications
for accounting and financial-reporting policy. The influence of intangibles in modem cor-
porations has led policy makers and accounting standard-setting boards to consider proposals
to enhance information on intangibles in corporate financial reports. In order to establish a
policy, one needs to know how investment analysts, as sophisticated consumers of financial
information, actually use both financial and non-financial information (Schipper, 1991).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background for
the analysis of non-financial information used by financial analysts; the methodology and
study design are discussed in the third section; the fourth section presents the test results;
and the final section of the paper summarizes the conclusions, describes limitations, and
discusses implications for future research.
2. Related research
Prior research has shown that non-financial information is relevant for making
investment decisions, but there is little evidence to tell us how much importance financial
analysts place on intellectual capital information.
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Bouwman, Frishkoff, and Frishkoff (1987) show that analysts generally use financial
information primarily as a screen for early rejection of unacceptable investment candidates.
The development of a positive case for a company appears to be based on information about
segments, products, and markets. Chung and Meador (1984) report that analysts find
market dominance, the presence of a sound, strategic plan, and planning systems to be of
great importance in stock valuation, a result confirmed in a survey by the Financial
Executives Research Foundation. Its "Investor Information Needs and Annual Report
(1987)" indicates that analysts particularly value competitive position and management
goals. Beattie ( 1 999) survey of 154 users of accounting information identifies the quality of
management as the key factor determining company performance. A Dempsey, Gatti,
Grinell, and Cats-Baril (1997) survey of 420 financial analysts reports that management
experience, potential competition, market share, and brand awareness are some of the most
common measures used. While surveys may give us some useful descriptions of the
perceived needs of financial analysts, they do represent subjective attitudes. The mere fact
of using a questionnaire or interview format may also influence the results (Rogers & Grant,
1997, p. 19; Breton & Taffler, 2001, p. 92).
Another approach is to start with analyst reports. Examples of content-analysis
approaches include Previs, Bncker, Robinson, and Young ( 1994), Rogers and Grant (1997),
Breton and Taffler (2001), Orens and Lyabert (2004).
In their examination of 479 sell-side analyst company reports, Previs et al. (1994) find
that financial analysts make extensive use of non-financial information, including company
risks and concents, competitive position, quality of management, and strategy. Rogers and
Grant (1997) analyze 187 analyst reports, and note that the narrative sections of annual
reports are cited almost twice as often as the financial statements. Breton and Taffler (2001
)
explore 105 sell-side analyst reports. They conclude that financial analysts examine firm
management, strategy, and trading environment when making an investment recommen-
dation. Management issues appear to dominate analysts' rationales for recommendations.
In 50 analyst reports, Orens and Lyabert (2004) find that the items most often mentioned are
strategy of the company, products, and segments.
Very few authors look specifically at intangibles for a comprehensive analysis of analyst
reports. Arvidsson (2003) is one. She analyzes 105 analyst reports on knowledge-intensive
companies in Nordic countries, using a disclosure index of 81 items classified into five
categories: human, relational, organizational, R&D, and environmental/social. Her disclosure
scores show that financial analysts focus primarily on information regarding R&D and
customers, and include little information on organizational or human capital. Analyst reports
on internationally listed companies are more likely to include more information on intangibles.
To the best ofour knowledge, there is no evidence in the literature on firm-specific influences
like risk, or analyst-specific influences like analyst recommendation or brokerage house.
3. Methodology and design
This study examines how much financial analysts use intellectual capital information in
their reports and whether there is a relationship between some specific variables and
information on intangibles. Our study sample consists of a set of 260 full-text sell-side
analyst reports on Spanish listed companies.
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rable 1
Classification of the analyst reports
Variable Category 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Brokerage house National 10 26 31 26 93
/o 3.85 10 11.9 10 35.8
International 56 43 34 34 167
21.5 16.5 13.1 13.1 64 2
Type of recommendation Buy 54 46 36 27 163
% 20.77 17.69 13.85 10.38 62.69
Hold 9 16 21 26 72
% 3.462 6.154 8.077 10 27.69
Sell 3 7 X 7 25
% 1.15 269 3.08 2.69 9 62
Report Company report 29 23 27 26 105
% 11 9 10 10 40
Result report 37 46 39 33 155
ii 14 18 15 13 60
N 66 69 65 60 260
Table 1 presents the classification of the entire simple of analyst reports and the entire sample period (2000
2003 ) according to the year, brokerage house, and type of recommendation. The National brokerage houses are:
Urquijo Bolsa, Banesto Bnl.su, and Ahorro Corporation; the International brokerages houses are: J.P. Morgan,
Morgan Stanley, ABN AMRO. and Merrill Lynch. The types of recommendation are: Buy, Hold, and Sell.
Reports are classified as company reports or result reports. Company reports are issued to explain changes in
firm strategy or new alliances; result reports are reports issued after annual, half-year, or quarterly result
announcements.
Spain is characterized by strong uncertainty avoidance, low individualism, limited
investor protection, and a general acceptance of imposed norms. Typical shareholders are
banks and industrial firms, which has some implications for firms' communication
strategies. Current recommendations for Spanish accounting reform encourage more
reporting on the intangible determinants of a firm's position (Libro Blanco, 2002). As more
Spanish companies voluntarily include information on intangibles in financial statements
and other communications with analysts, more data have become available.
The reports we examine were issued from 2000 to 2003. Seven top-ranked brokerage
houses participated in the research: ABN AMRO, Banesto Bolsa, Ahorro Corporation, J.P.
Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Urquijo Bolsa. Following Previs et al. (1994),
we study four one-year periods in order to take account of different business conditions.'"
Most of the information included in the analyst reports was obtained through company presentations to
analysts fo enable the greatest transparency, a company immediately informs the National Commission of the
Stock Exchange (CNMV) of any decision to hold a meeting with analysts. In a meeting all the documentation
relating to points on the agenda is made available from the moment of the official publication of the call notice on
the website of the CNMV A company must provide an initial broad distribution of the information to meet the
regulatory requirements of the Stock Exchange thai material or price-sensitive information reported to financial
analysts musl be sent before the meeting.
We follow the industry classification of the Madrid Stock Exchange Index. The industries considered are: Banks and
Financial Sen ices; I ftilities; food. Beverage and Tobacco; Construction; Metalworking; Petrochemical; Communica-
tion; Other Industries and Services, anil New Technology
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table 2
Sample distribution by industry
Industry Number of reports % Reports
Hanks and financial funis 22 8 46
Utilities 42 16.15
Food, beverage, tobacco 13 5.00
Construction 54 20.77
Metalworking 1
1
4.23
Petrochemical 1
3
5.00
Communication IS 6.92
New technology 61 23.46
Other industries and services 26 10.00
Total 260 100
Madrid Slock Exchange industry classifications
Analyst reports follow a similar format. A summary provides the principal arguments
behind the recommendation. Reports average 12 pages and include information on the
company's market position, business segments, intra-industry comparisons, and company
performance. Analyst arguments reflect the essential factors that support recommendations
about stock's intrinsic value versus its market value.
Reports are either result reports or company reports. Result reports are issued after
announcements of quarterly or annual results and form a basts for analyst communications
with managers in either telephone or face-to-face interviews (Barker. 1998). Company
reports are more extensive; they give a general vision of the business or elaborate on
specific issues such as mergers, new products, or changes in strategy.
No more than one type of analyst report for each firm, time period, or brokerage firm is
collected. When several reports fulfilling the conditions are available, one is selected
randomly. An analyst report must include an unambiguous buy. hold, or sell recommen-
dation, and financial information on the firm must also be available.
Table 1 describes the sample by year, type of brokerage house, recommendation, ami
report. Note that analysts are quite reluctant to issue a negative opinion; in only 9.62"
»
of the sample do they express a sell recommendation. According to Bradshaw,
Richardson, and Sloan (2001). investors typically interpret a hold recommendation to
mean sell. Analysts show different tendencies in the issuance of positive and negative
opinions over the different business conditions experienced in the research period
(/" = 17.979; /><0.000). Table 2 shows the sample distribution by industry. The
numbers of buy. hold, and sell recommendations by industry segment are shown in
Table 3.
3.1. Hypotheses
We use univariate and multivariate analysis to measure the importance of intellectual
capital information items by how often they occur in the text. Then we explore the relation
between the frequency of occurrence and some particular characteristics. We use the
literature as a guide on some factors that might influence the extent of intellectual capital
disclosure.
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Table 3
Sample distribution by industry' and recommendation
Industry Buy Hold Sell Total
Banks and financial firms 12 8 2 22
Utilities 22 16 4 42
Food, beverage, tobacco 7 5 1 13
Construction 33 IS 3 54
Metalworking 8 2 1 11
Petrochemical 4 8 1 13
Communication 15 3 18
New technology 17 2 7 26
Other industries and services 45 II) 6 61
Total 163 72 25 260
Buy is a dummy variable that takes a value ofone if the report has a buy recommendation; Sell is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one if the analyst report has a sell recommendation and Hold is a dummy variable that takes a value of
one if the report has a hold recommendation- Madrid Stock Exchange industry classifications.
We pose four hypotheses:
HI. Intellectual capital information used by financial analysts is positively related to a
firm's international listing.
Cooke (1989), Hossain, Tan, and Adams (1994), Hossain, Tan, and Adams (1995),
Robb, Single, and Zarzeski (2001 ) find international listing to be a significant determinant
of disclosure levels. According to Cooke (1989), when a firm is listed on an international
market, it will disclose more detailed information because it may need to conform to more
disclosure rules and more disclosure may attract additional analyst coverage. It may be
expected then that an internationally listed firm will also make more extensive disclosures
on intangibles.
The results in Garcia-Meca, Parra, Larran, and Martinez (2005) reveal it is more likely
that an internationally listed company will have a proactive strategy of disclosing
intellectual capital to financial analysts. This implies easier access to intellectual capital
information. We also assume analysts will rely more heavily on information about
intellectual capital when companies are listed on international exchange markets.
H2. Intellectual capital information used by financial analysts is positively related to
profitability.
When company performance is good, companies will want to signal that to investors.
Singhvi and Desat (1971) suggest that higher profitability motivates managers to provide
more information in order to improve their own compensation arrangements and obtain
personal advantages. Disclosure of intangibles may be one form of added information
disclosure. Accordingly, analysts should be expected to have easier access to information
about a profitable company's intellectual capital.
H3. Intellectual capital information used by financial analysts is related to the type of
recommendation.
Analysts' assessments are disclosed to brokerage clients in the form of recommendations
to buy, hold, or sell stocks. Cognitive biases and analysts' incentives are the two main
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determinants of positive-recommendation tendencies analyzed thus far (Garcia-Ayuso.
2003). First, analysts working for investment banks appear to be more likely to issue
optimistic forecasts on the companies their firms underwrite (Michaely & Womack, 1999).
Second, an optimistic bias will tend to improve analysts' compensation.
Analysts may thus focus on non-financial information such as strategy, customer, or
management to justify their frequent positive recommendations. Breton and Taffler (200 1 ) find
greater use of non-financial information in reports that include buy recommendations. We
hypothesize that buy reports will include more intellectual capital information than other reports.
H4. Intellectual capital information used by financial analysts is positively related to firm risk.
Lev (2001 ) finds that the risk associated with R&D is on average three times greater than
the risk associated with physical investment in property, plant, and equipment. Riskier
companies tend to be subject to greater public scrutiny and pressures for information.
Analysts who report some information on intangibles gi\e investors reassurance about the
value drivers in risky companies. Thus, risk is indicative of uncertainty and gives analysts
the opportunity to gain from information acquisition, which would mitigate the uncertainty.
We expect analysts to provide more information on intangibles in riskier companies,
because of the greater demand for informative analyst research.
3.2. Dependent variable: analyst disclosure index
A distinctive feature of our research design is development of a proxy for the use of the
analyst's intellectual capital information. Self-constructed indexes have been applied to
annual reports to estimate voluntary information (Gray, Meek, & Roberts, 1995; Adrem
1999; Williams, 1999; Ferguson, Lam, & Lee, 2002); compulsory information (Ahmed &
Nichols, 1994; Wallace, Naser, & Mora, 1994; Jaggi & Low, 2000); or both (Giner
Inchausti, 1997; Richardson & Welker, 2001).
The major drawback of a disclosure index is subjectivity; it is hard to replicate such
analysis. There are no theoretical guidelines for selecting items, and successful application
of the disclosure indexes depends on critical and careful selection. Yet, Marston and Shrives
(1991) observe that the wide use of indexes indicates their usefulness as a research tool.
We use a self-constructed index that we call the Analyst Disclosure Index (ADI), which
reports the percentage of intellectual capital items disclosed over a predefined list of items
considered communicable by the analyst. The index consists of 60 different items, each
taking a value of one if the item is included in the analyst report and zero otherwise. Thus, it
is a ratio of the particular measure to the total score that an analyst may communicate. A
company is not penalized for a lack of disclosure on items that are irrelevant to its
circumstances. The items are developed following an index derived by Bukh, Nielsen,
Gormses, and Mountsen, (2004) and the literature concerning disclosure (Cooke, 1989) and
intellectual capital (Edvisson & Malone, 1997; Guthrie, 2001; Mouritsen, Larsen, & Bukh,
200 1 ; Guthrie, Johanson, Bukh, & Sanchez, 2003). After totalling the values of the 60 items
in the index, we adjust scores by dividing the total value o\' the index by the maximum
number of relevant items for each firm.
The literature on intellectual capital proposes different ways both to define and to
classify intangibles. There is no general agreement on boundaries between categories or
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into which category a certain type of intangible falls. We follow Bukh et al. (2004), and
divide the items into five different categories or groups: Hitman capital; customers; or-
ganizational; innovation, research, and development; and strategy: These categories serve
to provide a structured vision of the resources available to a company.
Guthrie et al. (2003) suggest several ways to improve reliability in recording and
analyzing the data. First, categories should be based on well-grounded, relevant literature,
and should be clearly defined. Second, the coding instrument must be reliable, with well-
specified decision categories and decision rules. Third, coders must be trained, and coding
decisions made on a pilot sample must reach an acceptable level.
The five categories of the index are found to be central to most of the previous
classifications of intangibles, and all the measures included have merit in providing
information on the value-creation potential of intellectual capital. Following Hail (2002)
and Arvidsson (2003), we assess the validity of the disclosure index using Cronbach's
alpha. It evaluates how well a set of items - namely, the five categories of intellectual
capital - measures a common entity, in this case intellectual capital information. If the inter-
correlation among items is high, the items measure the same construct. Our Cronbach's
alpha is 0.6368, indicating internal consistency in the disclosure scores.
3.2.1. Human capital
Human capital is one of the most commonly cited intangibles. In this group we include
16 items related to the knowledge, skill, and abilities of managers and employees. Human-
capital elements vary significantly depending on the type of company; they may be more
important for some firms and less important for others. We consider:
• Standard information about personnel and managers and we include an analysis of
employees by age, experience, value-added, and productivity.
• More detailed information, such as education and training policies, remuneration policy,
dependence on key employees or career opportunities.
Similar items are included in other studies of intellectual capital, such as Loro (2002),
Arvidsson (2003), and Bukh et al. (2004).
3.2.2. Customers
Sveiby ( 1997) defines "relational resources" and Arvidsson (2003) "relational capital"
as general classifications. Like Kaplan and Norton (1996) or Bukh et al. (2004), we use a
customer category, which assumes a company wants to build good long-term relations
with its customers.
Customer relations are an important contributor to competitive advantage as a
determinant of company performance. The customer category includes 13 items based
on general information (e.g., new customers, market share, sales breakdown) and on more
detailed information (e.g., customer relationships, dependence on key customers).
3.2.3. Organization
Organization is a common category of intangibles in classification schemes. It expresses
the ability to operate in a coordinated manner using the resources available to a company. The
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literature provides several suggestions about which items to include under organization.
Corporate culture can be defined as the invisible structure that creates norms and rules that
influence employees' actions (ltami & Roehl, 1987). Barney (1991 ) includes controlling and
coordinating systems and formal reporting structure. Andreu and Ciborra (1996) include IT
systems that support the firm's work practices and facilitate communication across the
company. Collins and Montgomery (1995) note that a company's routines, processes, and
culture are fundamental.
The organization category comprises 13 items; some examples are IT systems, corporate
culture, organizational structure, and efficiency.
3.2.4. Innovation, research, and development
The fourth category relates to a firm's ability to learn and improve; it is applicable to
more than high-technology companies.
Most authors who examine intangibles include this category in classification structures
(Loro, 2002; Meritum, 2002; Bukh et al., 2004). Low (2000) and Bosworth and Rogers
(2001) confirm that both R&D expenditures and patent activity are positively related to a
firm's market value. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) also report that R&D is associated with
subsequent stock returns.
Innovation, research, and development includes six items such as patents pending, future
projects and basic research. We do not expect to see much information in this category in
analyst reports, because there is little voluntary disclosure of this information in Spain
(Larran Jorge, 2001; Garcia-Meca et al., 2005).
3.2.5. Strateg}'
Strategy performs a central role in the understanding of intellectual capital, allowing a
complete and critical interpretation of intangible assets (Loro, 2002). This category requires
the most analysis to identify the value drivers.
The majority of the information in this category is qualitative in nature: e.g.,
product description, alliances, social responsibility. It covers the firm's business
model and the competitive environment in which it operates. Strategy is closely
related to a company's reputation. Environmental attention, leadership, and strategic
alliances improve financial performance and thereby contribute to a firm's compe-
titive advantage.
There is evidence that these intangible assets have relevance for a firm. Verschoor
(1999) finds a positive relation between a strong ethical commitment and firm perfor-
mance. Some authors find corporate social responsibility to be positively related to a
firm's profitability (Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998; Simpson & Rohers, 2002). Hillman and
Keim (2001) note that shareholder value is increased when the firm invests in socially
responsible activities.
3.3. Methodology
A Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney (./-test of variance are used for each variable
across firm-years to determine any substantial change in characteristics of analyst reports
over the period.
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We regress the analyst disclosure index against various variables to gauge the impact of a
variable on the disclosure of intellectual capital. We estimate a linear regression by ordinary
least squares. The analysis is based on the multiple-regression model:
ADI = a,) + otj Int list,, + aiPro,, + a^Buy,, + a4Hold„ + a^Beta + iX(,L-Mj,
+ a7M/B + a s Report, + anBroker-//,, + Y, + Y^ Ind„ + £,-,.
The independent variables in this study are the following:
International Listing ( In list): a dummy variable with a value of one if the firm is
listed on an international market exchange (international listing status), and zero
otherwise.
Profitability (Pro): measured by the rate of net profit divided by book value of equity.
Recommendation: measured by three dummy variables: buy, hold, or sell recommendations.
Finn risk (ji): measured using firms' historical stock returns.
We control for other variables that may affect the results. Firm size, one control variable,
is measured by the logarithm of market value (L_M) as of the end of the year. Corporate
size, as measured by assets, turnover, or capitalization, has been positively associated with
firm disclosure levels in numerous studies, suggesting that larger companies follow better
disclosure practices than smaller companies (see, e.g., Cerf, 1961; Cooke, 1989; Wallace
et zal., 1994; Giner Inchausti, 1997; Bozzolan, Favotto. & Ricceri, 2003).
Financial analysts thus have easier access to information related to a larger company's
intangibles. Larger firms also experience both greater information demand from financial
analysts (Lang & Lundholm, 1993) and lower information production costs (Leftwich,
Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981; Giner Inchausti, 1997). At the same time, analysts may have
more incentives to reduce uncertainty by disclosing information on intangibles related to
smaller companies, which seem more risky to investors.
The market value-to-book value of equity (M/B) is the second control variable. This
variable has been considered as a proxy of growth opportunities (Frankel, Kothari, &
Weber, 2006). Edvisson and Malone (1997) and Sveiby (1997) posit that the difference
between the market value and book value of a company's equity lies in an organization's
intangible elements which cannot be expressed in conventional financial statements. Tasker
( 1 998) shows that managers of firms with relatively uninformative financial statements who
are more likely to have private information not reflected in the financial figures are more
likely to use private channels to bridge the information gap. We expect more information on
intangibles in companies with high levels of market-to-book ratio because of their higher
information asymmetry. Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) also show that the higher the market-to-
book ratio, the more information on intangibles disclosed to analysts in private meetings.
Type of report (Report), the third control variable, takes a value of one for a result report
and zero for a company report. We would expect more disclosure of intangibles in reports
explaining changes in firm strategy or new alliances (company reports), where there would
be considerable information asymmetry between managers and investors. We would expect
less disclosure of intangibles in result reports issued after annual, half-yearly, or quarterly
results.
Brokerage house (Broker_H) is a control variable that takes the value of one for an
international brokerage house and zero otherwise. We would expect more disclosure in
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Table 4
Model specification and variable measurement
Variable Definition Sign
prediction
Test variables
InUist Dummy = 1 when the analyst report is issued about ,i firm listed on an international market; +
(l othero ise
Prof Rate of net profit dmded bs the book value of equity +
Buy Dummy= 1 when (he analyst report has a buy recommendation; I) othero ise
Hold Dummy- 1 when the analyst report has a hold neutral recommendation; otherwise
Sell Dummy= 1 when the analyst report has a sell recommendation. (1 otherwise
Beta Finn-specific risk +
Control variables
I M Logarithm of firm market value at the end of the yeai +/-
\1 B Market value to book value of equity +
Report Dummy= 1 for a result report, and for a company report
Broker_H Dummy = I for an international brokerage house. (I otherwise
Y_2000 Dummy= 1 for a report is issued in 2000 year; oihcrw ise
Y_-200l Dummy = 1 for a report is issued in 2001 year; otherwise
Y_2002 Dummy = 1 for a report is issued in 2002 year; othero ise
lnd_l Dummy= I for a report in the Banks and financial industry; othem ise
Ind_2 Dummy = 1 for a report in the Utilities industry; 11 otherwise
IihI 3 Dummy = 1 for a report in the Food, beverage and tobacco industry; otherwise
Ind_4 Dummy = 1 for a report in the Construction industry, otherwise
lnd_5 Dummy= 1 for a report in the Metal working industry; otherwise
Ind_6 Dummy= 1 for a report in the Petrochemical industry; otherwise
lnd
~
Dummy = 1 for a report in the Communication industry . t> othero ise
Ind_8 Dummy = 1 for a report in the New technology industry; (I otherwise
international brokerage houses because these analysts have better information resources. We
also control for year and industry by using dummy variables. )', represents temporal effects
(year dummies); Xmd,, represents industry effects (industry dummies): and e„ is the error term.
We retrieved risk information from the JCF database and financial information from the
web page of the Spanish National Commission of the Stock Exchange. Table 4 provides an
overview of the variables.
The descriptive statistics for the continuous variables are shown in Table 5. Table 6
presents correlation coefficients across the variables.
4. Empirical results
Table 7 summarizes the results of the disclosure scores for the analyst reports. In the
260 reports, financial analysts include, on average, 14.88% of the checklist items. They
focus primarily on two categories: Customers and Strategy. They include the most
information on Strategy, 35.16% of the items. Customers is the second-most cited
category, at 25.65%.
Reports include, on average, only 3.65% of Human Capital items and 3.63% of Inno-
vation. Research, and Development items. FASB's (2001a) examination of voluntary
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics for continuous variables
LJV1 Prof Beta MIB
Mean 15.769 0.079 0.825 4.226
S.D. 1.376 0.129 0.584 3.311
Skewness 0.636 -0.665 0.967 1.610
K.urtosis -0.076 10.577 1720 2.728
Ql 14.610 0.040 0460 1.982
Median 15.566 0.069 0.710 2.577
03 16.710 0.121 1.180 5.993
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables of the study. I M: logarithm of market
valuation; Prof profitability; Beta: systematic risk of the firm as of the end of the year; MIB: market value to book
value of equity ratio
disclosures also shows that disclosures about research and development activities and
product development are generally few and far between. Fear of competitive disadvantage
is likely to be the reason. According to Barker (1999), the predicted payoffs ofR&D are so
unreliable that investment in innovation is one of the least useful information sources for
financial analysts. These results are consistent with conclusions in Marston (1996) and
Larran Jorge (2001).
The limited citation of Human Capital items is consistent with surveys (Eccles &
Mavrinac, 1995; Dempsey et al., 1997) and with empirical studies of analyst reports
(Arvidsson, 2003) that conclude employee measures are on average of little use to financial
analysts. According to Johanson (2003), disclosures on human resources are problematical
because these intangibles are not firm-owned.
Table 6
Pearson correlation coefficients
AD1 InLlist Prof MIB Buy Hold Beta LJV1 Report Ulok II
AD1 1 1(1
InUist -0.08 1.00
Prof
MIB
0.20**
0.43**
-0.02
0.04
1.00
1') 1 00
Buy 0.33** 03 15* 0.09 1.00
Hold -0.27** 0.00 Odd -oil -0.80** 1.00
Beta 0.20** 084 0.57 0.55** 06 -0.09 1 .00
L_M 0.00 0.21** -0.26** 04 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 1 .00
Report 0.62** 0.00 -0.13* [i 18** -0.31** 0.31** -0.07 (105 1 00
Brok_H -0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.17** 0.07 1 .00
ADI: Analyst Disclosure Index; InLlist,, is a dummy \ anahle that takes a value of one if the report is issued for an
international listing firm; Prof, is the profitability ratio; MIB,, is the market-to-book ratio; Buy,, is a dummy
\ ariable that takes a value ofone if the report contains a buy recommendation; Hold,, is a dummy v ai table that lakes
a value of one if the analyst report has a hold recommendation; Beta is the systematic firm risk; L_M„ is the
logarithm of market value at the end of the year; Report,, is a dummy variable that takes a value ofone if it is a result
report and zero if it is a company report; Broker_H„ takes a value of one if it is an international brokerage house
*p- oils. **/><0.01.
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Table 7
I )esci ipiix e statistics of disclosure scores
Analyst
Disclosure
Index
Categories of iritellectual cap! tal
Human capital Customers Organizational Innovation, research,
and development
Strategy
Mc.in 14.88 3.65 25.65 15 15 3.63 35 16
Skewness 0.75 1.64 1 19 1.09 3.27 025
Kurtosis 0.83 2 92 0.69 1 4? 15.00 -0.51
01 S47 0.00 7.69 7.69 0.00 25.00
Median 13.11 0.00 1 5 38 1 5 38 000 33.33
03 19.67 6.25 38 4(> 23 OS 0.00 50.00
N items 60 16 13 13 6 12
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics of disclosure scores for the entire sample of 260 analyst reports and for the
entire sample period (2000 2003). Analyst Disclosure Index is the disclosure score on intangibles. The scores by
categories are ratios of actual scores awarded to the maximum seoie m the group considered.
Table S summarizes the results by industry. We can see that financial analysts focus on
intangibles primarily in Communication and New Technology industries; the lowest scores
are found in Petrochemical and Metal Working.
The empirical findings are as follows. The Appendix details the complete results.
I . Human Capital. Management experience and abilities is the item mentioned most often
(43.46%), which suggests that top-level management quality is an important issue
Table 8
Disclosure scores (mean) by industry
Industry Analyst
Disclosure
Categories of intellectual capital
Human Customers Organizational Innovation, research. Strategy
Index
capital and development
Banks and financial firms 14.25 3.13 24.13 11.89 1.95 34.09
Utilities 11.98 2.98 I960 16.48 2 04 30.16
Food, beverage, tobacco 17.65 5.29 23.08 1242 2.20 47.44
Construction 11.08 3.01 23.22 8.55 5.82 28.09
Metalworking 10.13 1.14 7.69 17.48 2 60 25.76
Petrochemical 9.46 240 1 1 83 15.38 1.10 24.36
Communication 20.04 5.90 35.90 17.52 3.97 44 91
New technology 19.02 4.30 34.80 17.40 5.62 40.98
Other industries and services 18.07 4.33 28.99 22 78 0.55 41.67
Total 14.88 3.65 25 65 15.15 3.63 35.16
r 57.11** 10.76 38.96** 26.46** 18.78* 49.31**
Table 8 presents mean values of disclosure scores for the entire sample 260 of analyst reports and for the entire
sample period (2000 2003). Analyst Disclosure Index is the disclosure score on intangibles. The scores by
categories are ratios of actual scores awarded to the maximum score in the group considered. Madrid Stuck
Exchange industry classification
X" = chi squared test.
*/)<0.05; **/><0.01.
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for investors. According to Weetman and Beattie (1999), integrity, reliability, ability
to explain, and performance in response to questions are aspects of management
experience. Career opportunities and insurance policies are not commented on in our
analyst reports.
2. Customers. More than 45% of reports distinguish customers by product or business.
Market share by product (43.08%), new customers (38.08%), and information on
relations with customers (21.54%) are the most frequently noted.
3. Organizational. Installed capacity (42.31%) and efficiency (42.69%) are the most
valued items. Environmental policies (3.46%) or efforts related to the working
environment (2.31%) are rarely used to justify investment recommendations.
4. Innovation. Research, and Development . Despite empirical evidence indicating that this
kind of information is on demand by financial analysts (Eccles & Kahn, 1998), in our
sample this information is rarely cited. Information on patents and licenses is the primary
item (25.77%).
5. Strategy. New investments (98.82%), credibility and consistency of strategy (93.46%),
new products (87.73%), strategic alliances and agreements (70.38%), and leadership
(68.46%) are the items most noted by financial analysts. Environmental investments
and social responsibility are the items represented least. Analysts do not seem
influenced by the debate on investments in environmentally and socially responsible
companies.
Table 9 reports the results of univariate hypothesis tests, which validate three of the
four hypotheses. As expected, the statistics that test for differences between disclosures
and profitability (H2), disclosures and recommendations (H3), and disclosures and beta
(H4) are significant. There are differences in the scores of the analyst-disclosure index
depending on the level of profitability (p<0.05), nature of the recommendation (/;<0.01).
and firm risk (/><0.01 ). Contrary to expectations, the one-tailed Mann-Whitney [/-test of
a relation between international listing and disclosure (HI) is not significant. Analysts
do not seem to include more intellectual capital information for internationally listed
companies.
Table 10 presents the results for an ordinary-least-squares regression of all the analyst
reports issued for the four-year period 2000-2003. A multivariate analysis of the ex-
planatory and control variables simultaneously supplements the univariate results and
controls for potential interactions among variables. As in the univariate results, profitability
explains variations in disclosures in analyst reports (p<0.05). This implies that financial
analysts have easier access to information about a profitable firm's intellectual capital. The
results support previous voluntary-disclosure research showing higher levels of voluntary
disclosure in highly profitable firms.
The regression results confirm that the type of recommendation is positively related to
analysts' use of intellectual capital. There is more intellectual capital information in buy
reports (/;<0.01) than in sell reports. These findings mirror results in Breton and Taffler
(200 1 ). who present evidence of greater use of non-financial information in reports with
positive recommendations.
The results also show that analyst behavior is affected by growth opportunities. Analysts
justify valuations using intellectual capital information in companies with high market-to-
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Tabic 9
Analyst Disclosure Index by international listing, profitability, recommendation, and beta
N Mean S.D Statistic
InUist
87 15747 8 Ml? l/=7209
1 173 14.451 7.673
Pro
-0.57<Pro<0.05 86 12.107 7 390 jt
2
=7.082*
0.05<Pro<0.1 86 13.364 6.831
0.1<Pro<0.62 88 17.212 9 403
Recommendation
Buy 163 16.902 8.264 X
:
= 74 7K**
Neutral 72 11.236 5 003
Sell 25 11.451 8.226
Beta
-0.25<beta<0.5 87 14.318 7 399 £ = 14.475**
0.5 <beta< 1.06 86 12.538 6.300
1.06<beta<3 87 17.841 9.568
lnt_list„ is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the report is issued for an international listing firm; Prof,, is
the profitability ratio; Buy,, is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the report contains a buy recommen-
dation; Sell,, is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the analyst report has a sell recommendation: Beta is
the systematic risk.
d'=Mann Whitney c'-test; x" = cn ' squared test.
*p 0.05; **p<0.01.
book ratios (/><0.1). Growth firms tend to have a high level of information asymmetry:
managers are more likely to have private information that is not reflected in the firm"s
financial statements, and they may, therefore, disclose information voluntarily to mitigate
the information gap. When firms have significant intangible assets, analysts also seem to
supplement financial information by seeking their own private information to issue more
precise forecasts and to compensate for the greater asymmetry. These results are consistent
with the study findings of Barron. Byard, Kile, and Rield (2002), Amir, Lev, and
Sougiannis (2003), and Arvidsson (2003). These researchers find that analysts contribute
the most to valuation in industries characterized by high proportion of intangibles and low
informativeness of financial statements.
The sign on type of report is negative and significant (/;<0.01), which indicates financial
analysts use intellectual capital information more often in company reports than in result
reports. That is, intellectual capital information is commonly cited in reports issued to
explain changes in firm strategy or a new alliance, and less often cited in reports to
announce annual, half-year, or quarterly results.
Listing status does not influence the extent of intellectual capital information in
analyst reports. Contrary to expectations (and the univariate results), neither does firm
risk influence the use of intellectual capital information when the other variables are
considered. This is perhaps because riskier companies have higher market-to-book
ratios. We do not find any influence of size on the extent of disclosure of intellectual
capital in analyst reports. It may have to do with the small differences across the
sample. All the companies are listed on the Spanish stock exchange, and then
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Table 10
Regression model results
Variable Coefficient S.E. VIF
C
IntJist
Pro
MIB
Buy
Hold
Beta
L_M
Report
Broker_H
A2000
A2001
A2002
IndLl
lnd_2
Ind_3
Ind_4
Ind_5
IncL6
Ind_7
Ind_8
N
Adjusted R squared
Standard error
/"-value
/(-value
16.06-4***
-0.430
7.140**
0.387*
4.326***
1.821
-0.406
0.378
-7.600***
0.272
-5.042***
-5.645***
-4.923***
-4.406**
-3.040*
-0.379
-4694***
-5.024***
-4.949**
1.095
436
5.358
0.913
3.088
0.217
1.462
1.390
1 154
0.349
0.785
0.702
1.182
0.946
I 150
2.155
I 651
2.455
1.476
1.622
2.150
2.281
2.071
1.501
1.673
2.679
3.196
3.232
2.679
2.186
1.208
1.113
1.969
1.723
2.151
1.446
2.916
1.527
3.113
1.437
2.038
1.963
3.735
260
0.633
4.943
20.386
0.000
Table 10 contains ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results for the sample of 260 analyst reports of the
model:
ADI = Xo + X\ Int. list,, + xiProf,, + ajBuy,, + x,Hold„ + z,Beta + x,,L A/„ + y.-,M/B + XsReport,
+ *.,Broker H„ + Y, +^ lnd„ + e„.
ADI: Analyst Disclosure Index; InLlist,, is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the report is issued for an
international listing firm; Prof„ is the profitability ratio: MB,, is the market-to-book ratio; Buy,, is a dummy
variable that takes a value ofone ifthe report includes a buy recommendation; Hold,, is a dummy variable that takes
a value of one if the analyst report includes a hold recommendation; Beta is the systematic risk; I M„ is the
logarithm of market value at the end of the year; Report,, is a dummy variable that takes a value ofone if it is a result
report and zero if it is a company report; Broker_H„ takes a value of one if it is an international brokerage house;
Y2000 is the dummy variable for the 2000 year; Y2001 is the dummy variable for the 2001 year; Y2002 is the
dummy variable for the 21102 year; Ind_l is the dummy \ ariable for Banks and financial firms; Ind_J2 is the dummy
variable for Utility industry; Ind_3 is the dummy variable for Food, beverage and tobacco industry: IncL4 is the
dummy variable for Construction industry; Ind_5 is the dummy variable for Metal working industry; IncL6 is the
dummy variable for Petrochemical industry; Ind_7 is the dummy variable for Communication industry; and Ind_8
is the dummy variable for New technology industry.
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
VIF: Variance Inflation Factor
Data calculated using the White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covanance matrix
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information costs are very similar. This result is robust to different definitions of firm
size: natural logarithm of turnover, number of employees, and natural logarithm of total
assets.
The negative and significant signs (/;<0.01) on the dummy year variables indicate
that information in analyst reports issued in 2003 is better than information in the
reports issued in other years. The dummy variables representing the Construction,
metalworking, and petrochemical industries are also significant and negative. The
negative coefficient, according to our dummy variables, indicates that disclosures about
intangibles occur less often in these non-knowledge-intensive industries. Although
other research indicates that investors and analysts engaged in knowledge-intensive
industries find intellectual capital information useful in estimating value (Mavrinac &
Boyle, 1996; Mavrinac & Siesfeld, 1997; Bukh et al.. 2004), the industry variables for
knowledge-intensive companies in our study (Communication and new technology in-
dustries) are not significant.
We evaluate the potential effect of colinearity of each regression using the variance-
inflator factor (VIF), which is equal to \I(\-R 2 ), where R~ is derived from the
regression of an explanatory variable on all other explanatory variables. Heteroskedas-
ticity is corrected by using the White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and
covariance matrix.
4.1. Endogeneity issues
We believe the recommendation issued by the analyst is endogenous in that our
measure of intellectual capital disclosure directly affects the analyst decision. Positive
recommendations may lead analysts to consider intellectual capital information to justify
their decisions and, at the same time, intellectual capital information may lead analysts to
issue buy recommendations. In the presence of endogeneity, ordinary-least-squares
estimation yields biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. Following Frankel et al.
(2006) we base our main analysis of cross-sectional variation of ADI on a two-stage least
squares where we assume that the recommendation variable is endogenous and we treat
the rest of our variables as exogenous. In this two-step procedure, the first step is the
estimation of a logit regression that predicts the probability of issuing a buy
recommendation, and the second-stage (OLS) regression uses estimates from the first
stage to provide consistent estimates of the parameters. Although 2SLS requires the
identification of exogenous instruments, many of our determinants of ADI are not purely
exogenous. Nevertheless, we consider that there are some variables more likely to
influence the analyst recommendation than the analyst disclosure on intangibles. The
exogenous variables selected in our logit model are Negative earnings and Brokerage
house. The selection of these variables is based on previous literature concerning analyst
research (e.g., Previs et al, 1994; Breton & Taffler, 1995; Frankel et al, 2006). It may be
expected that analysts will make more positive recommendations in firms with positive
earnings. Thus, analyst incentives to issue optimistic bias, combined with higher
opportunities of generating investment banking and brokerage business in international
brokerage houses, lead us to expect that in international houses analysts will have more
incentives to issue optimistic decisions.
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Table 1
1
Two sage-least-squares regression
Variable Buy 1 1
1
S.E. adi : S.E. Vlf
C - 524 9.00 0201
Int_list -0338 0.938 1.519
\e
i
^_Ear - 1.210** 0.599
Pro 8.932** 4.304 1.665
MB 0.332* 0.194 .; 022
Fined (Bu> ] -0.167 6.808 1.347
Bee -1.093 1.001 2.667
L_\l 0.388 0.369 2.116
Report :: - 0.759 1.207
Broker_H -0521 0.317
A2000 1 964*** 0.491 -3 910 2 5"5 1.876
A2001 0.817** 0393 -5.117*** 1 555 1.723
A2002 477 0.4O7 -4.693*** 1.456 2.146
Ind_l -2 547** 1.079 -4.961 1.452 1.427
Ind_2! -0 j - -2 " . 1.984 2.936
Ind_J -0.716 0.409 • 1 .493
lnd_4 -0.577 ; :
_
-4.136** 1 666
Ind_3 -0.044 -4.146** 2.122 1.377
Ind_6 -1.91** 77 -5.119 1.973
Ind_7
"
2324 2 314
Ind_8 : - 77J 4 012
N 255 ::•
Adjusted R squared 0.123 0.620
Table 11 contains two least squares (2LS| estimanon results of the models:
Buy = y ~ y NegEar - y_ Broker-H
¥Y, + y^ Ind (1)
.ADI = >:,-! Int List, - 2
: Pro - z3Fitted(Bu} - j.Repon- y--L .1/ - y,M B
- £ Ind (2)
where Buy . is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the report includes a buy recommendation and zero
otherwise: Neg Far, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is negative earnings and zero
otherwise: and Broker_H !; takes a value of one if it is an international brokerage house In the model 2 ADI is
the Analyst Disclosure Index: IntJist . is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the report is issued for
an international listing firm and zero otherwise: Prof, is the profitability ratio: Fitted! Buy) .. indicates predicted
\alue produced by Eq. ( 1); Report.,, is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if it is a result report and zero
if it is a company report 1^ M
...
is the logarithm of market value at the end of the year: M B ... is the market-to-
book ratio: Y2000 is the dummy variable for the 2000 year. Y2001 is the dummy variable for the 2001 year;
Y2002 is the dummy variable for the 2002 year: Ind_l is the dummy variable for Banks and financial firms;
Ind_2 is the dummy variable for Utility industry; lnd_5 is the dummy variable for Food. Bev erage and Tobacco
industry: lnd_4 is the dummy variable for Construction industry: Ind_5 is the dummy variable for Metal
working industry; Ind_6 is the dummy variable for Petrochemical industry; Ind-" is the dummy variable for
Communication industry': and Ind_8 is the dummy variable for New technology industry: and e„ is the error
term.
Significant at 1 : (***), 5%(**) and 10% (*) leveK
\TF: Variance Inflation Factor.
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Based on this argument ADI is modeled as the following system of equations:
Buy = a + a,NegEar„ + a2 Broker H + Y, + ^ Ind„ + £„ ( 1
)
ADI = oo - oti bit List.., + *:Prof,, + ?-,Fitted(Buy)„ + ^Report + y. 5L M
+ xbM/B + Y, + Y^ >"d„ + £/«
2
where Buy,, is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the report has a buy
recommendation and zero otherwise: Neg_Ear„ is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if there is negative earnings and zero otherwise; and Broker_H„ takes a value of one if it
is an international brokerage house. In model 2. ADI is the Analyst Disclosure Index:
IntJist,, is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the report is issued for an
international listing firm and zero otherwise; Prof„ is the profitability ratio: Fitted_(Buy)„
indicates predicted value produced by Eq. (1); Report,, is a dummy variable that takes a
value of one if it is a result report and zero if it is a company report; L_M„ is the logarithm
of market value at the end of the year: MB,, is the market-to-book ratio; )', represents
temporal effects (year dummies); Y'ld,, represents industry effects (industry dummies);
and £,, is the error term.
Model 1 of Table 1 1 shows the results of the first-stage regression. The pseudo-/?^ is
0.12 and there is evidence of more buy recommendations for those firms with positive
earnings. The fitted variable from this equation is then substituted in Eq. (2) to explain
cross-sectional variation in ADI. Under the assumption here, the use of the fitted value
circumvents the endogeneity problems of estimation. This will help us improve our
understanding of the specific role intellectual capital disclosures play in the formation of
analyst expectations.
The results of model 2 in Table 1 1 show that profitability (p<0.05). market-to-book
(p<0.10), and type of report (p<0.01) are statistically significant. The results suggest
that financial analysts include more intellectual capital information for firms char-
acterized by high profitability and high growth opportunities. After controlling for endo-
geneity the type of recommendation does not influence the use of intellectual capital
information. Construction and metalworking industries are statistically significant and
negative ( p < 0.05 ), indicating that disclosures about intangibles occur less often in these
traditional industries.
All the significant variables explain around 62° o of the variability of intellectual capital
information in analyst reports.
5. Concluding remarks
To gain some insight into the relevance of intellectual capital information for financial
analysts, we examine a sample of analyst reports for the essential items considered most
relevant in justifying recommendations. The items most frequently included are related
to coherence and credibility of strategy, new investments, and firms" products, alliances,
or leadership. It is obviously harder for analysts to obtain data on innovation when
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companies do not want to risk releasing information that could be beneficial to
competitors.
In controlling for endogeneity, our study provides evidence on why the average
magnitude of intellectual capital information in analyst reports is greater for some firms
than for others. Some variation in the extent of disclosure of intangibles is explained by the
profitability of the firm. Financial analysts have better access to information about a
profitable firm's intellectual capital because they acquire other information. This supports
agency, signalling, and political-process theories that profitable firms provide superior
information resources.
Growth opportunities also explain variations in disclosures on intangibles in analyst
reports. Financial statements are relatively less informative for firms with high market-to-
book ratios, and here analysts tend to include more intellectual capital information to justify
their recommendations. In this case, firms and investors demand more information about
the role a company's intangibles play in value-creation.
The results show significant differences in the use of intellectual capital information
according to type of report. We are more likely to find data about intangibles in reports
that deal with specific strategic issues, such as new products or changes in a firm's
strategy, and that are often issued to generate investment banking and brokerage
business for their firms. These results would confirm the role of intellectual capital
information as a marketing device, if the primary objective of financial analysts is to
generate commission income.
We reject the hypothesis that a report on an internationally listed company includes more
information on intangibles than a report on a nationally listed company. Nor are there
differences by firm risk, firm size, or analyst recommendation.
This research makes a variety of important contributions, particularly quantification of
intellectual capital information in analyst reports and identification of factors that influence
the use of these data. It extends survey, questionnaire, and interview research to address the
relevance of non-financial information.
Financial analysts are both primary users of financial information and key information
intermediaries. Their needs must be taken into account when regulators establish
accounting policy and set standards. Our work shows that much of the information analyst
reports include does not appear in traditional financial statements. Modified reporting
standards that specify additional types of information might better meet investor needs and
mitigate problems of information asymmetry in capital markets.
Our results have several inherent limitations. We cannot know what information analysts
may have relied on but did not report. Neither do we know about information that was
unavailable and that might have been useful. Nor can we directly infer analyst information
needs from seeing how often an information item is mentioned in reports. We can only
assume that analyst reports deliver relevant infonnation efficiently and effectively, and that
analysts have no incentive to include extraneous infonnation for any reason. Other items in
different categories or distributions might have been considered, which could obviously
influence interpretation of the results.
There is no generally accepted theory or classification scheme for intellectual capital.
Today's frameworks are ad hoc, and empirical work on the nature of intangibles is in its
early stages. Our results, nevertheless, suggest several questions for future research. We
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know analysts use intellectual capital information. Does access to and provision of
intellectual capital information make forecasts more accurate'.'
Appendix A
Items included in the Analyst Disclosure Index by category
Analyst Disclosure Index Frequency (%)
Human Capital
Management experience abilities 43.46
Change in number of employees I (> 54
Agreements with employees 4.62
Breakdown of employees by age oi experience 3 x^
Experience of employees 3.46
Recruitment policy 3.46
Description of competence development program 2.69
Production/Income per employee I 54
Remuneration systems 1.15
Education and training policy 0.77
Pensions 0.77
Job rotation opportunities 0.38
Dependence on key employees II 38
Value added per employee 0.38
Career opportunities
Insurance policies
Customers
Customer breakdown by product or business 46.15
Market share by segment/product 43.08
Sales breakdown by product or business 42 3
1
New customers 38.08
Customer relationships 21 54
Relative market share to competitors 18,08
Sales breakdown by customers 14.62
Market share 9.62
Dependence on key customers 7.31
Value added by customer or business 3.08
Education and training of customers 1.54
Production by customer 1.15
Customers by employee 0.77
Organizational
Efficiency 42.69
Installed capacity 42 3
Investment in technology 33.08
Business model 31.15
IT systems 25.38
Utilization of energy and other input goods 23 4o
Organizational structure 20.38
Information and communication within the firm 13 46
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A (continued)
Analyst Disclosure Index Frequency (%)
Organizational
Corporatize culture 8.46
Environmental policies 3.46
Litigation 2.69
Efforts related to the working environment 2.31
External and internal failures 0.77
Innovation, research, iiiul development
Patents and licenses 25.77
Strategy, objects of 1 and R&D 6.54
1 and R&D in basic research 1.15
I and R&D in product design development 1.15
Future projects regarding I and R&D
Patents pending
Strategy
Investment in new business 98.82
Credibility and consistency of strategy 93.46
New products 87.31
Strategic alliances and agreements 70.38
Leadership and trademarks 68.46
Price policy 4" d9
Information about marketing 29.23
Network of suppliers and distributors 24.62
Quality of products 20.77
Em nonmental investments 5
Best practice 2.3
1
Social responsibility 0.38
Tliis table represents the frequency of use of intellectual capital indicators in the sample of 260 analyst reports
during the period 2000-2003. There are 60 items which take a value of one if included in the analyst report and zero
otherw ise
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Abstract
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were developed in advanced economies, but
are increasingly being applied in emergent economies, potentially ignoring considerations of
whether IFRS are appropriate or relevant to such economies. This case study examines the
relevance and implementation of IFRS to the emerging economy of Kazakhstan from independence
in 1091 to 2006. It concludes that although a strong case for IFRS relevance cannot be made, even
by 2006, Kazakhstan had little choice but to proceed with IFRS, and that IFRS relevance is likely to
increase as Kazakh economic development continues. Implementation of IFRS is proving problem-
atic, but is taking place slowly. This, in turn, has implications for the theoretical status of the IFRS
relevance argument and the pathways that nations might follow in implementing a national
accounting system. If the only choice of accounting system is IFRS. then the IFRS relevance debate
is effectively closed and the real issue is the pathway of change that nations might follow as they
implement IFRS.
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1. Introduction
The tendency for countries to adopt IFRS 1 has been accelerating in recent years
(Deloitte, 2004; Shneidman, 2003). The benefits of this standardizing trend seem widely
accepted among practitioners (PwC, 2000; Tweedie, Chairman of the IASB, as quoted in
Tricks & Hargreaves, 2004), governments (Bolkestein, European Commissioner, as quoted
in Walton, 2004; Commission of the European Communities, 2001; United Nations
Secretary General, 1993; USAID, 2004), and academics (Jaruga, 1993; Thorell &
Whittington, 1994), including Kazakh sources (Serebrennikova, 2004).
However, there are both advantages and disadvantages to harmonization (Thorell &
Whittington, 1994) and these may affect developed and developing countries differently.
The International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation has recognized the "need
to have an understanding of the impact of IFRS as they are adopted in particular regions"
(IASB, 2004, para. 93) as a result of the criticism that the IASB tends to display an "ivory
tower" mentality (Parker, 2004), hence paying insufficient regard to the practical impacts of
its standards. The present case study evaluates these very issues in relation to the transition
from Soviet accounting methods to IFRS in Kazakhstan.
Accounting reform in former USSR countries has been extensively investigated,
particularly among the more westerly of the ex-Soviet nations (Bailey, 1995, 1998; Daniel,
Suranova, & De Beelde, 2001; Jaruga, 1993; Jaruga & Szychta, 1997; Seal, Sucher, &
Zelenka, 1995; Solodchenko & Sucher, 2005; Young, 1999. See Nobes & Parker, 2006,
228ff for overview), perhaps because their geographic proximity to Western Europe and
historical backgrounds meant that accounting reforms came more rapidly to these countries.
Hence a case study of accounting development in Kazakhstan may form a useful addition to
the literature, especially since it is likely that Kazakhstan will have "a critical role to play in
global energy security" (U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman quoted in Kazakhstan
Embassy, 2006a), given her vast natural resources of hydrocarbons which are projected to
supply 2-3% of the world's demand for oil within the next decade (Kazakhstan Embassy,
2006b).
The case study proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the advantages and disadvantages
of IFRS adoption by developing countries. It explicates a four-factor framework for
assessing the relevance of IFRS to a particular country, and presents a categorization of
pathways that governments may take in selecting and implementing a national accounting
system." The methodology and data sources are presented in Section 3. Section 4 applies
the four-factor framework to assess the potential relevance of IFRS to Kazakhstan. Section
5 assesses the progress and problems on the pathway to IFRS implementation. Section 6
discusses the limitations and conclusions in relation to both Kazakhstan and the theoretical
framework.
The abbreviation IFRS is used to denote both IFRS and IAS (International Accounting Standards) throughout.
Similarly the abbreviation IASB is used to denote both the IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) and
its predecessor the IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee).
Following Nobes (1998, 164), the term "accounting system is (defined as) a set of practices used in an annual
(financial) report."
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2. Literature review
"The very idea of classification in international accounting" (Roberts, 1995, 639) is
predicated upon the existence of national differences between accounting systems.
Differences between national accounting systems may arise from economic and
institutional differences (e.g., Mueller, 1967; Nobes, 1983, 1998, 2004) or from cultural
differences (often based on Hofstede's cultural dimensions, e.g., Chanchani & Willett,
2004; Ding, Jeanjean, & Stolowy, 2005; Gray, 1988; Salter & Niswander, 1995) or they
may simply have been identified using statistical clustering techniques (e.g., Nair & Frank,
1980; D'Arcy. 2001). If differences between accounting systems exist, it is natural to
suggest that this is because accounting needs differ among nations (Briston, 1978; Hove,
1986; Nobes, 1998; Radebaugh, Gray, & Black, 2006). This should lead to the development
of nationally specific accounting systems dependent on the specific socioeconomic
environment (Bailey, 1998).
On the other hand, globalizing trends, including international economic and political
interdependence, increasing foreign direct investment (FDI), developments in MNE
strategy, the impact of new technology, the growth of international financial markets, and
the influence of international organizations (e.g., IASB, World Bank), are increasingly
tending to harmonize national accounting systems (Gray, 1988, 1989; Radebaugh et al.,
2006, 52ff). The effects of globalization combined with studies of the development of
accounting systems in different countries have led to revised or "modernised" approaches to
the classification of international differences in accounting systems which suggest that the
degree of freedom to choose, and hence the choices made, between the IFRS and nationally
specific accounting systems will differ between "culturally self-sufficient" and "culturally
dominated" countries (Nobes, 1998; Nobes & Parker, 2006). 3
For culturally self-sufficient countries (e.g., advanced OECD economies), the
accounting system chosen will depend on the strength of the national equity market.
IFRS or related Anglo-Saxon 4 accounting systems (e.g., U.K. or U.S. GAAP), based on a
micro-economic, shareholder-oriented, judgment-based model of financial reporting, tend
to predominate in countries with strong equity markets (Doupnik & Salter, 1995; Jones &
Luther, 2005; Nobes, 1998). In culturally dominated (usually developing) countries, the
pathway is determined by the source of the cultural influence involved rather than by any
indigenous national needs. This might or might not result in inappropriate accounting
systems being implemented in culturally dominated countries. For example, the U.K.
exported its culture, including language, economic, legal and educational systems, to its
colonies, thus bequeathing them (for better or worse) similar institutional environments. As
a result, many former U.K. colonies have found IFRS to be largely or partially relevant to
Nobes ( 1998) suggests thai the degree of cultural self-sufficiency be measured by the number of decades since
a country gained political independence but gives little guidance on measuring the degree of cultural domination,
other than to observe that "researchers should have little difficulty in classifying many countries" (178).
It is argued that there is a dominating Anglo-Saxon bias within IFRS. arguably due to the superiority of
Anglo-Saxon countries in the standard-setting process (Briston. 1978; Chandler. 1992; D'Arcy, 2001; Hove,
1
1
>N<>: Jones & Luther, 2005; Perera, 1989). The nature and extent of any Anglo-Saxon bias within IFRS is not
undisputed (Alexander & Archer, 2000; Cairns, 1997; Nobes. 2003). but few dispute that the underlying basis of
IFRS is a micro-economic, shareholder-oriented, judgment-based model of financial reporting.
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their national needs despite having weak equity markets (Ashraf& Ghani, 2(1(15: Chamisa,
2000; Nobes, 1998, 2003). For other culturally dominated countries with different histories
an IFRS-type accounting system has been held to be inappropriate (e.g., Indonesia, see
Briston, 1978 or former Soviet countries, see Bailey, 1995), with the suggestion that a
macro-economic, rules-based, governmental model with a code-based or uniform
accounting system (UAS), such as the French plan comptable, could be more relevant to
the accounting needs of countries with few listed companies, sophisticated shareholders, or
qualified accountants (Briston. 1978). particularly if entities are already accustomed to
plan-based accounting (.laruga, 1993).
Others see the accounting possibilities for all nations narrowing to a single IFRS option.
Important differences in economic, political, legal and cultural systems (Chandler, 1992;
Kikuya, 2001; Perera. 1989; Radebaugh et al„ 2006, 6 and 182) are ignored under a form of
"accounting colonialism" backed by the coercive power of international financial capital
(Bailey, 1998; Chandler. 1 992; Hove, 1986). Accounting policy makers may be constrained
m their choices of appropriate accounting systems, but perhaps fears concerning the
adoption of inappropriate accounting models are exaggerated (Krzywda, Bailey, &
Schroeder, 1995). In a case study of accounting transition in China, Xiao, Weetman, and
Sun (2004) suggest that IFRS in tandem with an UAS was a relevant rather than an enforced
choice by Chinese accounting policy makers, and conclude that the addition of a third
factor, viz. political influence, to Nobes' (1998) other two factors not only restores choice
but also adds explanatory power to his model.
Belkaoui (2004, 150-3) expands the possibilities for national political choice beyond
the two pathways in Nobes' (1998) parsimonious model to four standard-setting pathways
for nations. Two Belkaoui pathways lead to IFRS, although at differing speeds: ( 1 ) the
"quick fix" involving the "adoption" of IFRS as national standards, and (2) the slower
"transfer of technology" path in which international accounting firms, multinational
enterprises (MNEs) and academicians operating in developing countries disseminate
international accounting techniques. The other two pathways lead to nationally specific
accounting systems: (3) the "situationist" path whereby the developing country adapts
accounting techniques from a variety of sources, including developed nations and IFRS. to
its specific situation, and (4) the "evolutionary" path whereby a country develops its own
standards without reference to outside influence. The pathway selected will depend on the
relative advantages and disadvantages of IFRS versus nationally specific accounting
systems that may apply at standard setting (Kikuya, 2001 ). national (Ashraf& Ghani, 2005;
Briston, 1978; Chamisa, 2000), and company (Joshi & Ramadhan, 2002; Murphy, 2000)
levels.
Advantages to developing nations of harmonizing on IFRS include: the elimination or
reduction of set-up costs in developing national accounting standards; the potential for
rapid national improvement in the perceived quality and status of financial reports;
increases in market efficiency in (inter)national financial markets through the provision of
more understandable, comparable, and reliable financial statements; and a reduction in the
cost to firms of preparing financial statements (Ashraf & Ghani, 2005; Belkaoui, 2004:
Chandler. 1992; Choi & Mueller, 1984; Murphy, 2000; Nobes & Parker, 2006, 76).
Disadvantages of harmonizing on IFRS for developing nations relate to the adoption of a
set of accounting standards unsuited or irrelevant to national needs. At firm and national
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levels, this may result in "standards overload" (Choi & Mueller, 1984), as firms endeavor to
comply with IFRS that exceed their business requirements in complexity (Belkaoui, 2004)
and the ability of indigenous accounting staff to operationalize them (Perera, 1989).
Increasing harmonization and complexity in accounting standards tends to facilitate
expansion of large international accounting firms at the expense of local firms in both
developing (Choi & Mueller, 1984; Radebaugh et al., 2006; Salter & Niswander, 1995) and
developed (Jopson, 2006) countries.
The problem for a government is how to weigh the relative advantages and
disadvantages of these different pathways in order to choose the most appropriate
pathway or. putting the question differently, how to assess the relevance of IFRS to
national needs. Given that economic, institutional, and cultural bases have been used for
the classification of different national accounting systems, it is not surprising that these
same bases have been used to make the assessment of IFRS relevance to national needs—
so that:
1 the degree of similarity of the developing country's economic and social environment to
that of developed economies, including
2. the relative size of the public and private sectors, and
3. the state of development of the capital market, would determine
4. the accounting needs of the country and the relevance of IFRS to those needs (Briston,
1978; Chamisa, 2000; see also Nobes & Parker, 2006, 24ff; Radebaugh et al., 2006,
15ff).
The Briston (1978) and Chamisa (2000) four factors and the Nobes (1998) and Belkaoui
(2004) development pathways are applied to a case study of Kazakhstan's transition to
IFRS in order to assess the extent to which national choice between accounting systems and
their associated development pathways was or is being exercised and the appropriateness of
any choices made.
3. Methodology
The paper adopts a case study method employing a variety of primary and secondary-
sources.
Participants in the transition to IFRS were questioned directly via two 1-h one-to-one
semi-structured interviews'' (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991) with the Directors of
the Accounting Departments in the National Bank and the Ministry of Finance. The
rationale for the selection is that these governmental agencies are, as in other former Soviet
countries (Alexander & Archer, 1998; Jamga, 1993; Nobes & Parker, 2006), the main
accounting regulators. The National Bank (2004) regulates accounting procedures for
financial institutions and the Ministry of Finance regulates accounting for all other
enterprises (ADB, 2005a).
A postal survey comprising questions based on Boross, Clarkson, Fraser, and Weetman
(1995), Illes, Weetman, Clarkson, and Fraser (1996), and Joshi and Ramadhan (2002). plus
the professional experience of the Kazakh researcher, was sent to the 93 companies listed
on Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE) in July 2003. with 35 usable responses.
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representing a response rate of 43.2%. similar to Chanchani and Willett (2004) and Joshi
and Ramadhan (2002).
Secondary documentary sources, including official reports from Kazakh and
international agencies, Kazakh Accounting Standards (KAS), published annual reports of
Kazakh companies, data presented on the KASE, and Kazakh company websites, were used
to provide supplementary data on accounting change in Kazakhstan. Studies of accounting
change in other developing and former Soviet countries provide comparative data.
This use of different data sources in a case study enables triangulation not only among
different types of data but also among competing interpretations of that data (Yin, 2003).
4. The relevance of IFRS to Kazakhstan
4.1. The similar-environments factor
Before independence, Soviet rule of Kazakhstan was almost total, and the time period
since independence is just 15 years, suggesting substantial cultural domination rather than
cultural self-sufficiency, and under a regime that was not even indirectly involved in the
development of IFRS.
Like other former Soviet countries (see e.g., Alexander & Archer, 1998; Bailey, 1995,
1998; Daniel et al, 2001; Jaruga, 1993; Jaruga & Szychta, 1997; Young, 1999),
independent Kazakhstan is a code-law jurisdiction (KPMG, 2004) and its accounting
system derives from the Soviet plan/chart-based system used to exercise central control
over enterprises' assets and operations in order to monitor the achievement of objectives
against the national economic plan (ADB, 2005a). Thus a macro-economic, rules-based,
governmental model designed to provide standardized information across industrial sectors
was the historic basis for the Kazakh accounting system (ADB, 2002). In the post-Soviet
period, as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union (Krzywda et al., 1995), a juridical
interpretation of the accounting concepts of assets, liabilities, equity and profit and loss was
added to this model in Kazakhstan. Due to these differences Tuleshova (2003) finds
substantial obstacles to IFRS implementation in Kazakhstan, suggesting little or no
"similar-environments" basis for the relevance of IFRS to the Kazakhstan of the present.
Since independence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992) has stated that "the...
fundamental foreign policy... of Kazakhstan... (is) to integrate into the world
community... based on partnership with three principal centers of the market-based
system, the USA, Japan and Western Europe." Each of these three centers has now either
adopted IFRS or commenced a convergence program with IFRS. Kazakhstan continues to
signal its integrative intentions (USAID, 2001a, 2004): e.g., in applying to join the World
Trade Organization and to undertake the chairmanship of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (2006). The business culture of Kazakhstan is becoming more
international with increasing business travel, education, and sponsored exchange
programs to the United States and United Kingdom (USAID, 2001b, 2004), and a state
program to promote the study of English as the language of international affairs and
business. Thus, although there may be little evidence of a "similar environment" in
Kazakhstan's past, it can be argued that the future environment which Kazakhstan aspires
to create provides more support for the relevance of IFRS. However, cultures tend to be
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resistant to change, or at least retain traces of earlier cultural features over long periods
(Hofstede, 1984, ch. 8; Smirnova, Sokolov, & Emmanuel, 1995), suggesting that the
relevance of IFRS to the Kazakhstan environment might increase only slowly.
4.2. The private-sector factor
The second factor bearing on IFRS relevance is the comparative size of an economy's
private and public sectors, since IFRS are currently aimed at listed private sector rather than
public sector entities/ Also, the government has little need of published annual reports as it
is in a position to demand information tailored to its specific needs (Nobes, 1998).
During the Soviet period the state controlled 1 00% of Kazakhstan's economic resources.
Since independence, Kazakhstan has undertaken vigourous reform of its economic system,
shifting economic activity from the public to the private sector, hence increasing the
potential relevance of IFRS to the Kazakh economy. Three major factors were involved in
this shift: privatization of thousands of former state enterprises, the creation of new private
businesses, and an influx of foreign-owned enterprises (see Table 1).
In Kazakhstan, as in most countries, SMEs represent a large majority of private entities
(see Table 1) but their contribution to GDP is relatively small. Although there is an
ongoing but controversial project to adapt IFRS for SME use (IASB, 2005), IFRS are not
currently designed for this sector, giving little support for the relevance of IFRS on the basis
of the needs of this group.
There are over 1000 large Kazakh private-sector firms but the number is fairly static now
that the privatization program has slowed, and the state is still the only or major owner of a
significant number of enterprises including large national utilities — e.g., KazMunaiGaz, a
national oil and natural gas company formed in February 2002. These state enterprises still
account for about one third of GDP (STAT-USA, 2004; World Bank, 2004).
There is also considerable state intervention in and support for privatized firms (World
Bank, 2000, 2005). The average Kazakh firm surveyed for the World Bank (2005) earned
23% of its revenues from transactions with the state, and there are high levels of inter-
organizational arrears, with the level of arrears being in direct proportion to state ownership
in the entity (World Bank, 2000, 2005). In addition, there is considerable government-based
credit across the Kazakh economic system. Budget funds provide approximately 12% of
firms' investments (Kazakhstan Embassy, 2006a). The government has established lending
institutions - e.g., National Oil Fund in 2000, Development Bank in 2001. and the
Investment and Innovation Funds in 2003 - because it feels that "the financial system
Although there is an IFAC project to adapt IFRS appropriately for public sector entities in progress.
Kazakh SMEs were privatized through voucher schemes issued to 95% of citizens (Library of Congress,
19%). The pace of privatization slowed after an early peak in 1997, when 6777 SMEs were privatized to 1 825 in
2002 (IMF Country Reports. 2002 and 2003). a pattern common in transitional economies (Jaruga. 1993). Since
then there has been a steady increase in the number of private-sector SMEs. mainly engaged in wholesale or retail
activities, rising from 87,000 in January 1999 (USAID, 2001a) to the levels shown in Table 1, more or less in line
with the annual 10% growth in the Kazakh economy. SMEs account for over 98% of total registered enterprises in
Kazakhstan and together with peasant farms represent 25-30% of total national employment
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Table 1
Number of business entities
Period 01/01/2002 01/01/2006
Sector Total Public Private Foreign Total Public Private Foreign
Small 143,442 16,972 121,535 4935 213,347 14,632 183.160 10,555
Medium 10,908 (,342 4488 78 11,512 7014 431 ) 185
Large 2070 859 1173 38 204V 825 1169 55
Tolal 156,420 24,173 127,196 5051 226,908 27,471 188.642 1(1.745
Source: Kazakhstan. Statistical Agency, 2006.
Note: Small- 50; medium = 51 250; large>250 employees.
cannot ensure long-term and low-interest loans to the economy in view of significant risks"
(Kazakhstan Embassy. 2006a).
The size of both national company sector and private sector reliance on government
funding is decreasing as continuing privatization shifts economic activity towards the
private sector and large firms grow in importance, but it is arguable that the private sector
factor supporting IFRS relevance is likely to grow only slowly. Hence, the current sources
of funding for large Kazakh firms (i.e., the capital-market factor) may be a more immediate
influence upon IFRS relevance in Kazakhstan.
4.3. The capital-marketfactor
In most economies, firms rely considerably upon internally generated funds for their
investment requirements, but it is the source of external funding that determines IFRS
relevance in the Nobes (1998) model. Lending institutions typically negotiate additional
access to financial information from borrowers and so, like governments, place less reliance
on equity-oriented published financial statements (Nobes, 1998).
Kazakh firms generate approximately 80% of funding internally, but their main source of
external funding is the Kazakh banking sector (National Bank, 2004; STAT-USA, 2004).'
The continuing predominance of bank-based finance in Kazakhstan weakens the capital
markets argument for IFRS at present. Thus the relevance of IFRS is limited to firms with
listings on KASE or other financial markets.
KASE has been slow to develop since its founding in 1993. By 2003-6 it listed
approximately 100 companies, i.e., only 10% of the large, private-sector Kazakh firms.
Trading volumes in corporate securities are low at approximately 1% of GDP per annum
(KASE, 2003; World Bank, 2006a). Most transactions occur over the counter and only a
few popular Kazakh shares trade regularly so that the market lacks depth (ADB, 2003;
7
For the banking sector, the loan portfolio to GDP ratio was 33% as of 1 January 2005, while the equivalent
ratio for the bond market was 12%. and the market capitalization of the equity market was 9% (FSA, 20051 ll is
arguable that these figures understate the significance of bank finance since banks and financial institutions are
among the largest enterprises listed on KASE. In September (March) 2006. financial institutions represented
approximately 4X"„ (43%) of KASE bond issues by number and 89% (89%) by value, and 32% (32%) of KASE
equity issues by number and 60% (59%) by value. All KASE percentages calculated from information provided
on the KASE website. http://www.kase.kz/eng/Emitters/, in March and September 2006.
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KPMG, 2004 ). 8 KASE (2003, 8, sic) candidly admits that Kazakhstan "still did not have
the developed stock market and we can only hope that it will appear in the future. (The
corporate securities market) stays narrow, it isn't marketable enough and the prices
developing in this market still reflects neither the economic development of the republic nor
separate sectors of its economy." KASE reiterates these views in its 2004 report (10), the
most recent available as of September 2006.
Given the current stage of development of KASE, it seems difficult to argue for the
current relevance of IFRS on the basis of the capital-markets factor. Cairns (1997) offers a
counter-argument using the Japanese concept ofnemawashi (groundwork), meaning that it
is vital to prepare the ground carefully before planting a tree, a point which is especially
relevant when it is remembered that this kind of economic transition is acknowledged and
been found to be a long process (Jaruga, 1993). For example, it is argued that inadequate
financial records prevent many companies from being listed on KASE (ADB, 2003; STAT-
USA, 2004), so that a move to more rigorous accounting standards might entice firms to
improve their record keeping, promoting the very market they are designed to serve.
4.4. 77ie accounting-needs factor
On the basis of the first three factors, it seems plausible to suggest that now, 15 years
after Kazakhstan began shifting away from a planned economy towards a market-based
model, the arguments for the relevance of IFRS are still much stronger with respect to the
future Kazakh economy than they are to the present Kazakh economy. One might wonder
how long it will be before IFRS would be deemed relevant to Kazakhstan on the basis of
these factors — at least in the short or medium terms. Perhaps a code-based system might
be more relevant to the accounting needs of a country with an environment quite dissimilar
to that of the countries where IFRS were developed, with few listed companies, a weak
equity market, and particularly an economy where entities are already accustomed to plan-
based accounting (Briston, 1978; Jaruga, 1993).
Against that, accounting reform was not undertaken as a stand-alone exercise, but in
tandem with economic reforms in the banking, pension, insurance, tax, and legal systems
(USAID, 2004). The former Soviet approach to financial reporting, under which
accountability against budget allocations had been the prime requirement, is giving way
to a different perspective on the purpose of financial reports, and IFRS clearly provide an
appropriate framework to suit this new mandate. However, there was another contributory
factor — foreign investment.
' These problems are largely a result of the way in which the privatization of large enterprises was handled.
Although a voucher scheme was used, there was a focused distribution of vouchers to only 1 70 government-
licensed investment funds, with 39 funds accumulating 80% of the vouchers. 46 funds 16%, and 85 only 4%
(Library of Congress, 1996|. One fund, Butia-Kapital, received 10% of vouchers and was widely rumoured to be
controlled by a nephew of President Nazarbayev (Library of Congress, 1996). President Nazarbayev's immediate
family and circle of associates still own many of the larger companies (Fidler and Chung, 2006). The existence of
"substantial cross-relationships between financial institutions and industrial groups. . .often under complex
ownership structures" (IMF, Country Report No. 05/240, 2005), together with government and family
involvement, suggest possibilities of financial impropriety (Fidler and Chung, 2006) that deter new investors
(ADB, 2005a;), although the IMF (2004b, p. 19) suggests that the problem is receding in Kazakhstan.
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Since 1993, Kazakhstan lias attracted approximately US$30bn of FDI from MNEs
(Kazakhstan Embassy, 2006c) leading to an increasing number of foreign-owned firms (see
Table 1 ). As in other former Soviet countries (Illes et al., 1 996), MNEs brought an influx of
Western accountants and auditors importing 1FRS or other Anglo-Saxon GAAP in a
Belkaoui (2004) "transfer of technology." In addition, a small number of large Kazakh
firms
1
' have listed on foreign exchanges (ADB, 2005a; STAT-USA, 2004). The suppliers of
funds and the ratings agencies would presumably have been prepared to accept any
internationally recognized accounting standards from these firms, but in practice they have
requested or been offered IFRS financial reports.
At the same time, the Kazakh Government applied for financial and technical aid from
international institutions, including the Asian Development Bank, EBRD, IMF, OECD,
USAID, and the World Bank, e.g., the World Bank (2006b) has provided 24 project loans
totalling almost US$2bn to date. As with other countries (see e.g., Ashraf & Ghani, 2005;
Briston, 1978; Chamisa, 2000; Chandler, 1992; llles et al., 1996; Jaruga, 1993;
Solodchenko & Sucher, 2005; Young, 1999), this financial aid was conditional upon
Kazakh acceptance of IFRS-based accounting standards. International Auditing Standards
(ISA), and internationally recognized audit firms. '"
It could be argued that a Soviet code-based system of accounting might be more relevant
than IFRS to project sponsors for reassuring them about the stewardship of their funds.
Stewardship was the focus of the former Soviet accounting system (Briston, 1978), and
Kazakh accountants were well trained to operate it (ADB. 2002), while it is arguable the
stewardship function is a secondary consideration under IFRS. On the other hand, international
aid agencies would probably prefer recognizable and standardized reports across all the
international projects they sponsor, and IFRS would be an obvious choice in this regard.
Clearly IFRS relevance is high for entities with international funding as it may relieve
them of the need to prepare either two sets of financial statements or a reconciliation
statement. However, the specific IFRS needs of such entities do not necessarily justify the
extension of IFRS to other large, Kazakh private-sector firms. Governments can allow, and
have allowed, internationally listed firms to report under different accounting standards to
domestic listed or non-listed firms (Nobes, 1998). Entities with international funding could
simply be permitted to use IFRS without the need to impose IFRS on other Kazakh firms
where it may be less relevant.
However, international institutional pressure for the use of IFRS was not restricted to the
financial reporting of sponsored projects. Almost all these international institutions fund
programs to promote the use of IFRS more widely in Kazakhstan (USAID, 2006) or
undertake regular monitoring of IFRS progress in Kazakhstan (World Bank and IMF. see
E.g.. in late 2005. KazakhMys and KazakhGold listed on the London Stock Exchange, and in October 2006.
KazMunaiGaz was in the process of an initial public offering (IPO) valued at approximately S2bn. floating 20°o
of a stake in a subsidiary KMG Export and Development, on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE) and
another 20°o on the London Stock Exchange (Chung. 2006).
" For example. World Bank loans in relation to the Uzen oil field ( 1 996, Report No. 1511 4-KZ ), the Kazakhstan
electricity grid (1999, USS140m. Report No. 19620-KZ), the Syr Darya and Northern Aral Sea (2001. $65m.
Report No. 22190-KZ), the Nura River (2003, US$40m. Report No. 25716-KZ), the North-South electricity
transmission project (2005. USSlOOm) and an EBRD loan in the oil sector (2003. US$7m, Project No. 34479) all
either specify that IFRS and ISA are to be used in relation to these projects or note that the relevant entities are
already compliant with these standards.
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IMF, 1999, 2004b) or do both (ADB, 2003). For example, USAID assisted in the formation
of Kazakhstan's Chamber of Auditors in 1993, its Chamber of Professional Accountants in
2000. and the International Council of Certified Accountants and Auditors (representing
accounting associations across Centra! Asia) in 2001.
4.5. Summary
The four-factor analysis tends to suggest that the need for IFRS was an accounting need
in relation to international investors, but that this accounting need could have been satisfied
by the implementation of IFRS in a limited number of relevant entities. There is less support
for the current relevance of IFRS to the wider range of Kazakh firms and investors,
although a stronger, developmental, mode of argument in respect to all four factors could be
made for the relevance ofIFRS in Kazakhstan in the future as both the private sector and the
private capital market expand.
Despite this, the government decided very early on in favour of IFRS rather than a
nationally specific accounting system. The first Accounting Laws (1992, 1995) approved
the development of KAS and a new Chart of Accounts on the basis of IFRS. Given the
preceding analysis it might be expected that the transition to IFRS would prove problematic
and this, indeed, turned out to be the case as the next section will show.
5. The advantages and disadvantages of and progress towards IFRS
5.7. Advantages ofIFRS
When asked to specify the advantages of IFRS to Kazakhstan, the interviewees at the
National Bank and the Ministry of Finance identified similar points to those found in the
relevant accounting research:
O there was no reason for Kazakhstan to independently develop what has already been
developed elsewhere in the world.
O IFRS would provide greater transparency in financial statements, which should attract
increased FDI. Indeed, the largest Kazakh commercial banks have raised money via
international borrowings, and applied for ratings to international agencies such as
Moody's and Standard and Poor's. These successes required financial statements
prepared in accordance with IFRS.
O the adoption of IFRS (i.e., rather than KAS) would significantly ease financial reporting
requirements for international corporations investing in Kazakhstan. Some companies
with foreign listings had to produce financial statements in accordance with KAS, IFRS
and even other sets of accounting standards.
O it would facilitate the quotation of Kazakh company shares on foreign stock exchanges.
However, they also pointed out that:
O the World Bank insisted upon the adoption of IFRS as a condition for the granting of
financial aid to Kazakhstan, and that
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O the adoption of IFRS will prove an advantage when joining the World Trade
Organization.
It can be seen not only that the major advantages identified largely relate to the
investment of international capital in Kazakhstan, overlooking more purely domestic
considerations, but also that the interviewees perceived them as "compulsory" IFRS
adoption factors.
Asked about disadvantages of IFRS. the two interviewees again identified a number of
items including: perceived gaps in IFRS. the requirement for judgment m applying IFRS,
lack of national language translations of IFRS, and a number of specific problems and costs
of implementation of IFRS.
5.2. Perceived gaps in IFRS
Under the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, consultants from PwC were engaged
in the development of KAS. The interviewees argued that IFRS do not cover all the
accounting issues faced in Kazakhstan and pointed to eight Kazakh standards that filled
these gaps. " It is arguable that the interviewees overestimated the extent to which KAS fills
gaps in IFRS. Most KAS cover issues already covered by IFRS. and tend to follow their
IFRS equivalents (KPMG. 2004). but in English translation KAS extend to only 209 pages
(EY, 2004b) compared with 2000+ pages of IFRS. Each KAS is much shorter, with less
detail and guidance on application than its IFRS equivalent, suggesting that KAS have
more rather than less gaps than IFRS do. Furthermore, a number of issues covered by IFRS,
e.g., IAS 29, 32/39 and 36 have no KAS equivalents, and therefore represent gaps in KAS.
The eight KAS specifically nominated by interviewees as "gap-fillers" all relate to
important sectors in the Kazakh economy. However, six of these gap-fillers are short,
averaging a mere seven pages each, and tend to be more concerned with disclosure than
with recognition or measurement. Thus there are gaps within the gap-fillers. The more
substantial gap-fillers are KAS 23 and 24 which prescribe the entire record-keeping format
and methodology for a small business. As Deloitte (2005, 9) somewhat wryly point out:
"foreigners are sometimes surprised by the requirement(s) (of KAS 23 and 24)", which are
in marked contrast to any of the proposed approaches to an IFRS for SMEs (IASB, 2005).
None of the survey respondents agreed with the interviewees that there was a problem
with gaps in IFRS (Appendix, Questions 5-8). Rather, firms felt that an advantage of IFRS
was the provision of more standards dealing with specific accounting issues. Perhaps the
coverage of KAS does more to support the interviewees' opposing contention that
These were KAS 16. 19. 20, 23 26 and 32. The Ministry of Finance felt that IAS 26 Accounting and
Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans was inappropriate for the Kazaklt pension system and developed KAS 16.
19 and 25 relating to pension funds. The National Bank, having taken advice from international accounting firms
and international and domestic insurance companies, developed a standard for insurance companies (KAS }2)
based on the world's best practice before IFRS 4 on Insurance Contracts was issued (March 2004). Similarly there
were no IFRS equivalents to KAS 20 Accounting and Reporting for Oil and Gas Extraction Acli\ itics. KAS 23
Accounting and Reporting of Small Business: KAS 24 Organization of the Accounting Service: or KAS 26
Accounting and Reporting of Broker and Dealer Organizations.
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Kazakhstan, like many other developing countries (Bloom, Fuglister, & Myring, 1998), did
not possess the accounting heritage or practical experience to develop complex market-
based accounting standards.
However, there was a different kind of gap to be filled which the KAS style of standard
could and did fill for a period — the gap between the Soviet economic and accounting
model and the new market-based model. As other transition countries found (see e.g.,
Ashraf & Ghani, 2005; Bailey, 1995; Seal et al., 1995), gaps appeared in Kazakh business
compliance with basic legal and tax requirements and in expertise among staff who have to
implement regulations (ADB, 2005a; USAID, 2001b). Differences between Kazakh tax
codes and 1FRS principles increased the opportunities and incentives for "financial
irregularities, improprieties, and illegalities in the... enterprise and financial sectors" (ADB,
2005a, 9; IMF, 2004b, 43). Particular problem areas were depreciation accounting, pension
liabilities, and valuation of forex items. Differences between financial and tax reporting are
common in developed countries (ADB, 2005a; Nobes, 1998), but were new to both
accountants and tax collectors in Kazakhstan. They are now gradually being resolved by
changes to the Tax Code: e.g., in the acceptance of accrual accounting (Article 65) and
finance leasing (Article 74) (EY, 2004a). But as in other former Soviet countries (see
Alexander & Archer, 1998), a "quick fix" to full IFRS was not feasible. Instead, the more
nationally specific KAS version was developed. KAS were shorter, easier to operate with
undertrained staff, under the control of the Ministry of Finance in order to preserve tax and
regulatory bases, but still introduced the basic principles of IFRS m preparation for full
IFRS later.
5.3. The requirement for judgment in applying IFRS
As the shift to full IFRS approached, survey respondents tended to blame Kazakh
regulatory bodies for a lack of proper instructions in the implementation of IFRS
(Appendix, Questions 5-8). The interviewees were aware of these IFRS implementation
problems which they saw as arising from a culture or "way of thinking" rooted in
traditional Asian obedience to elders and the experience of a 75-year history of a centrally
planned economy with strict directives on accounting. This is reflected in an unwillingness
to take judgment-based accounting decisions, yet IFRS call explicitly for the application of
professional judgment in applying principles to the preparation and audit of financial
statements (Cairns, 1995, 6). Other ex-Soviet nations have experienced similar difficulties
in making this transition between rule-based and judgment-based accounting, and found it
to take a long time (Kosmala-MacLulhch, 2003).
Although IFRS are principles/judgment based, in many cases they are acknowledged to
be complex standards. Indeed the complexities of IAS 32/39 have provoked widespread
calls in Western European economies for application guidance, so it is not surprising that
Kazakh preparers feel a similar need. The ADB (2005b) recognized that the Kazakh's need
for detailed guidance could only be met by the Ministry of Finance, and has been training
staff in the Department of Accounting and Audit Methodology (DAAM) of the Ministry of
The original word used by the interviewee is "MeHTaJiHTeT" As the root word of this is "mental" it has been
interpreted as "mentality" or "way of thinking."
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Finance in IFRS and assisting DAAM with the publication of methodological
recommendations on individual IFRS. Similarly, in the financial sector, the National
Bank (2004) and FSA have provided detailed guidance including standardized financial
reporting forms and guidelines on the application of IFRS to issues such as the recording of
documentary letters of credit and general provisions.
Some survey respondents perceived incompatibilities between IFRS and current Kazakh
legislation (Appendix, Questions 5-8). For example, the current Kazakh Chart of Accounts
(EY, 2004c) does not provide all the account codes needed for the application of IFRS. No
codes are provided for financial assets/liabilities, finance costs, or impairment. This raises
problems because of the procedural approach to accounting taken by many Kazakh
practitioners: e.g., a Kazakh practitioner asked to account for a fixed-asset impairment
might naturally wonder how the accounting entry should be made — i.e., what code to use.
The ADB (2005a) with USAID have been pressing DAAM to develop a new IFRS chart of
accounts and IFRS conversion manuals, pointing out that "(w)ithout concrete guidance on
charts of accounts, enterprise accountants will be very unlikely to fully adopt IFRS" (ADB.
2005b, 5).
5.4. National language translations of IFRS
The IASB provides IFRS in English. This causes a problem of national language
translations, with approximately 30% of IFRS-converging countries reporting it as an issue
(Deloitte, 2003). Interviewees, international agencies, and survey respondents (Appendix.
Questions 5-8) concurred that the lack of Russian and Kazakh translations of IFRS and ISA
has caused problems. An official Kazakh translation of "bare numbered" IFRS (i.e., without
the accompanying application guidance provided by the IASB) is being prepared by the
Kazakh government (per IASB website, October 2006), but the government did not wish to
delay the adoption of IFRS until this is ready. The extent of the Kazakh language problem
may be exaggerated. Although over half of the population speak Kazakh, even more speak
Russian which is used as the primary business and official language (CIA, 2006;
Kazakhstan Embassy. 2006c). The lack of an official Russian translation of IFRS (per IASB
website, October 2006) is more problematic. Most accountants use unofficial Russian
translations of IFRS. The Ministry of Finance is already issuing its methodological
recommendations in Russian. A related issue is the need to develop a new accounting
terminology to cover accounting concepts not needed during the Soviet era in order to make
translation possible.
13 The EU has been providing technical assistance in developing an
IFRS glossary (ADB, 2005a, 13).
5.5. Specific problems and costs ofIFRS implementation
The interviewees and a majority of survey respondents (54%) felt that transfer to IFRS is
a costly process (Appendix, Questions 5-8). The survey respondents who did not consider
the process to be costly (40%) viewed the costs as necessary to promote positive future
outcomes. Interviewees, survey respondents, and international agencies all pointed to
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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similar types of costs and problems associated with IFRS transition: e.g., training of
personnel, changes in software systems, purchase ofnew accounting literature, the need for
consulting sendees, etc.
Most (74%) surveyed companies indicated a need for IFRS training at all levels, i.e., not
only for accounting employees but also for managers, etc. (Appendix, Questions 5-8).
Training was recognized early on as an issue in transitional economies (United Nations
Secretary General, 1993) and experienced as a difficult and lengthy process in many
countries due to such problems as a lack of qualified teachers and suitable textbooks (see
e.g., Ashraf & Ghani, 2005; Bailey, 1995; Deloitte, 2003; Solodchenko & Sucher, 2005).
Kazakhstan was similarly ill-equipped to implement a Belkaoui (2004) transfer of
technology using indigenous academicians. As a result, most practicing Kazakh
accountants learned IFRS through self-study, although hampered by a shortage of IFRS
textbooks (ADB, 2005a: USAID. 2001b). More recently, increasing training provision has
begun to offset these problems. USAID sponsored a public accountancy training program
which had trained 759 Certified Accounting Practitioners by 2004 (USAID. 2004). These
numbers are steadily increasing (USAID. 2006) as training and monitoring programs
extend into firm and governmental organizations (CARANA. 2006).
In general. IFRS require increased disclosure over KAS, e.g., on segmental reporting,
consolidation, and financial instruments (Deloitte, 2005). Some respondents (5%)
(Appendix. Questions 5-8) have found that their IT systems are not collecting the required
information. The data are often available somewhere in the organization but are not
properly controlled or cannot be quickly produced. For example, most of the large
extractive companies are using Russian-developed accounting software, which is
satisfactory for transaction recording and the collection of basic information, but does
not provide any analysis or data for detailed disclosures or control, e.g.. aged analysis of
accounts receivable, inventory movements, maturity analysis, etc. Kazakh accountants will
need to work with IT specialists to specify and supervise software amendments to produce
the required information, but both depend on DAAM to produce the required account
codes. The National Bank (2004, p. 58-59) has intervened directly to improve the
automation of accounting at second-tier banks, insurance organizations and pension funds,
e.g., in the Housing Construction Savings Bank of Kazakhstan JSC.
Most survey respondents prepared their financial statements under KAS or an IFRS/
KAS mixture because their computer systems were not fully IFRS-compatible. Their
financial statements were then transformed to IFRS usually by consulting services or Big
Four auditors (Appendix, Questions 3, 9, and 11) who used "transformation matrices"
(IMF. 2004b, 7) to prepare the IFRS statements required by the National Bank and the FSA.
All survey respondents had an independent audit (Appendix. Question 10), mostly by Big
Four auditors. Only "B" listed respondents (14%) used Kazakh consulting firms. Preference
for a Big Four audit is widespread in former Soviet countries, driven by the desire to
enhance the credibility of the financial statements with foreign investors (Joshi &
Ramadhan, 2002; Sucher & Zelenka. 1998).
Publicly available IFRS reports display remarkable similarities in format, layout, and
wording. This tendency is especially marked when the firms in question share the same
auditor, but similarities can also be observed even when the firms in question use different
auditors. The IFRS reports for financial years 2001-5 of three different first-tier banks, all
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with the same Big Four auditor, show extensive use of identical wording. For example, they
all claim in respect of their "Allowance for Impairment of Financial Assets" that "(t)he
allowance is based on the Group's own loss experience and management's judgement as to
the level of losses. ..." u This level of coincidence might be explained by the common use of
standard FSA forms, or by auditors providing clients with model reports for them to adapt,
and has been observed elsewhere in Western Europe, 1 and in Russia (Nobes & Parker,
2006, 234). Nevertheless, one might still wonder what extent and level of understanding of
IFRS exist, who actually prepared these estimates, how independent the audit opinions are,
and finally how much credibility is being added by all this. It seems quite possible that the
auditors have not only transformed KAS financial statements, a procedure which itself may
be questionable, but then prepared and audited the IFRS statements, a combination that
elsewhere might be considered a violation of auditor independence (e.g.. see Sarbanes-
Oxley restrictions on non-audit services). It is suggested that more recently the larger
Kazakh banks have shifted to preparing IFRS statements themselves (IMF, 2004a).
although the statements may still not be fully consistent with IFRS (IMF. 2004b). Certainly,
the banks assert that their more recent (i.e., 2005/6) statements are prepared in accordance
with IFRS and unlike the earlier (2003/4) statements they make no reference to "Kazakh
accounting and tax regulations." The more recent statements also show more differences
and fewer similarities than the earlier statements did, so the situation may be gradually
improving. In both the banks' and auditors' defence, it should be noted on the specific issue
of the impairment of financial assets that the marking-to-market of financial assets may not
be very meaningful in an illiquid capital market (IMF, 2004b, 43), while on the more
general issue of similarities of presentation, it is probably a more efficient allocation of
scarce IFRS-qualified staff to have them concentrated in the Big Four offices where their
services can be shared among Kazakh firms.
Given that the implementation and quality of IFRS reports and audits seem lagging, it is
not surprising that the supply is too."' Predictably large companies do better than smaller
companies and financial institutions do better than non-financial entities, but even with
large companies the picture is mixed. For example, KazMunaiGaz, while in the process of a
London IPO valued at approximately $lbn, appeared to provide no financial reports on its
website in September 2006, while KazakhMys provided 2005 annual reports and 2006
interims. In the United Kingdom by contrast, almost all listed companies provide a website
with an "investor relations" page giving access to annual and interim reports. Although
14
See: ATF Bank 2001/2 signed 24 March 2003 and 2004/5 signed 24 March 2006. Halyk Bank 2001/2 signed
25 March 2003 and 2003/4/5 signed 24 March 2006; Bank TuranAlem 2001/2/3 signed 1 February 2004 and
2002/3/4 signed 23 February 2005 (all audited by E.Y.). Similarly Deloitte and Touche audited statements for
three other first-tier banks (Alliance Bank 2003/4/5 signed 21 February 2006; Kazkommertsbank 2004/5 signed 3
February 2006; Temir Bank 2004/5 signed 15 March 2006) show extended passages of identical wording,
including the sections on "Allowance for Impairment Losses."
We are grateful to the participants at the 2006 Open University "Accounting in Europe" Conference for these
suggestions.
'" In March (September) 2006. surveys of the KASE website revealed that while almost all Kazakh issuers
supplied KASE with some information about their activities, only about 45% (50"!.) provided working hyperlinks
to their company websites, 30% (40%) provided English translation on their websites and 20% (20%) provided
financial statements in English. In the March 2006 survey, the available annual reports tended to relate to 2003 as
the most recent financial year By September 2006, most of the available reports related to 2005 2II0<>
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there is some evidence of improvement in information provision over the period of March-
September 2006, these findings could be construed as a criticism of Kazakh companies, but
a more realistic suggestion, in line with other research on Internet usage by companies (Fry,
Tyrall. Pugh, & Wyld, 2004), would be that Kazakh companies are reacting rationally to
limited demand for information, confirming the Asian Development Bank's view that
market pressure on noncompliant companies is mostly absent as the market is small (ADB,
2003).
This lack of pressure is reflected in the relatively low percentage of survey respondents
who perceived shareholders as the main users of financial statement information
(Appendix, Question 1), in line with experience in other former Soviet economies (Boross
et al.. 1995). This contrasts with the response one might expect from listed companies in a
developed economy, thus indicating that a shareholder orientation is still developing in
Kazakhstan. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the commercial banks were
revealed as the second most significant user of financial statements. However, the number
of companies offering regulatory bodies, e.g., the National Bank, Government or KASE, as
main users was much lower.
5.6. Summary
As far as the interviewees were concerned the main advantages of IFRS adoption related
to access to international funding rather than an improved accounting system. Survey
respondents saw more advantages to IFRS than KAS, but all sources seem to agree that the
disadvantages relate to the difficulties inherent in transition, rather than any loss of national
specificity in the accounting system.
Given the problems of IFRS implementation just described, it is not surprising that the
shift to full IFRS has suffered delays at the organizational level. Most (80%) firms surveyed
were not early adopters of IFRS and many have lagging implementation of IFRS
(Appendix, Questions 2, 3, and 14 and ADB, 2003). In Kazakhstan, as in the EU (PwC,
2003, 2004), larger companies are further ahead than smaller companies and the financial
services sector is ahead of other sectors, and as elsewhere in former Soviet countries
(Bailey, 1995), enterprises trading with Western economies are ahead of those that do not.
Unsurprisingly, the Government has postponed the IFRS deadlines several times. New
Accounting Laws of (2002, 2003) required financial institutions to adopt IFRS from
January 2003, and other enterprises from January 2004, but these target dates were shifted
several times resulting in a phased introduction with the leading banks first in 2003,
followed by second-tier banks in 2004, then joint stock companies in 2005 and all other
companies, including SMEs, in 2006. Financial reporting under IFRS is developing in
Kazakhstan but, in the absence of a virtuous circle in which active investors receive high
quality financial reports, the pace is slow, and is likely to remain slow.
6. Discussion, limitations and conclusion
Whilst the dangers of applying the results of a single case study to a larger population are
readily recognized, similarities between the Kazakh case study and experience in other
developing and former Soviet countries suggest that Kazakhstan is not unique, so that the
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results may have wider significance. The conclusions of the four-factor model of 1FRS
relevance to the Kazakh case are summarized under the appropriate headings below
6.1. Similar-environments factor
Culturally dominated Soviet Kazakhstan was very different from the culturally self-
sufficient Anglo-Saxon nations that developed IFRS. producing two quite different
accounting systems with different underlying assumptions. The effect of these differences
continues 15 years after Kazakhstan's independence, providing little or no justification for
the rele\ ance of IFRS on the basis of a similar environment. In the transition to IFRS. these
differences have manifested themselves as difficulties with language and terminology,
inhibitions in the use of judgment in applying accounting principles, and a demand for
government-provided accounting procedures and codes. Accounting change is likely to
proceed slowly, which is perhaps unsurprising given the widely accepted persistence of
culture.
6.2. Private-sector and capital-market factors
The private sector is developing in Kazakhstan, especially in the case of SMEs and
foreign-owned firms, but there is still substantial governmental, bank, and familial interest
in private firms. Equity investors are the raison d'etre for IFRS. but the equity market is
weak, creating little demand for and supply of high quality audited financial statements.
Enforcement of high quality IFRS might promote equity market development, but while the
market is insufficiently developed, enforcement must come from the government.
6.3. Accounting-needs factor
The first three factors provide little support for the current relevance and only weak
support for the future relevance of IFRS to Kazakhstan. The needs of foreign-owned or
foreign-listed firms and international aid agencies could be met by permitting them to use
IFRS. without any obvious need to impose IFRS on other firms, for which IFRS are less
relevant. However, international agencies have been promoting the widespread use of IFRS
within Kazakhstan, and the gov eminent is implementing it. On the basis of the Nobes
( 1998) model this seems a curious result — given a weak equity market, and a non-Anglo-
Saxon culture, the model would appear to predict the choice of a nationally specific Kazakh
accounting system, rather than IFRS. and yet Kazakhstan, like many other ex-Soviet
nations has "chosen" IFRS.
One solution to the conundrum is to interpret the outcome as evidence of accounting
colonialism imposed by the coercive power of international capital (Briston, 1978: Bailey,
1998; Chandler. 1992: Hove, 1986). The accounting system was enforced by investment
need, not accounting need, and the Belkaoui (2004) evolutionary pathway, whereby
Kazakhstan developed its standards without reference to outside influence, was not an
option. An alternative interpretation is that the newly independent Kazakhstan, like other
emerging economies, took a political decision to reject the evolutionary path and follow
Western models of economic management. IFRS were not imposed v ia accounting
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colonialism, but were merely the price of integration, or a by-product of other decisions, or
even a desirable part of an overall change package. Whatever the interpretation of this
outcome, it seems that the Nobes ( 1998) model is no longer sufficiently parsimonious. Now
"All Roads Lead to IFRS." Thus the scope for political choice identified by Xiao et al.
(2004) does not lie among competing accounting systems, and so does not add to the
choices in the Nobes (1998) model, but is rather a choice of pathway to IFRS.
In Kazakhstan, the Belkaoui (2004) adoption (quick fix) pathway to IFRS was rejected
as impossible. Given its history and environment. Kazakhstan could not and did not shift to
IFRS directly. Only the transfer of technology or situationist pathways were realistic
options. The government decision to develop KAS and a Chart of Accounts under the
Ministry of Finance looks like a situationist pathway, while the use of consultants from
PwC lends a transfer of technology "flavour." The MNEs took a transfer of technology
pathway, introducing a variety of Western accountants and accounting standards, e.g., IFRS
or other Anglo-Saxon GAAP, to Kazakhstan. Now Kazakhstan is shifting to IFRS plus an
accounting code (compare China in Xiao et al., 2004). This result suggests that the transfer
of technology and situationist pathways may not be readily distinguishable, and taken
together simply constitute a "slow road to IFRS." This makes it possible that Krzywda et al.
(1995) are correct to suggest that the dangers of inappropriate accounting models are
exaggerated, because the transition process is likely to be a long one and governments will
perforce seek nationally specific pathways of transition.
Future research could investigate the extent to which the adoption and evolutionary
strategies are possible or chosen, and the extent to which the situationist and transfer of
technology pathways may be differentiated with a view to reworking the Belkaoui (2004)
categorization.
If the slow road to IFRS was the only option, what of the disadvantages and advantages
of IFRS? FDI is the most obvious gain. The reduction in the set-up costs for accounting
standards suggested by the interviewees may be illusory. Kazakhstan had to develop KAS,
but this was not done ex nihilo, and has alleviated the problem of standards overload,
although the process of moving to full IFRS will be a long one. International audit firms
have certainly benefited more than local firms from the complexity of IFRS. Financial
markets have yet to benefit from more understandable, reliable and comparable reports. To
caricature the situation: if original accounting data, including governmental arrears and
revaluations derived from illiquid markets, have been processed under KAS through a
code-based system with missing codes, transformed by consultants using a matrix based
upon an unofficial language translation of IFRS. and finally copy-pasted into a set of ready-
made documents which even include the audit report, then it is somewhat unclear what
economic meaning or sensible decisions may be drawn from the "information" provided.
More seriously, it would be reasonable to suggest that investors approach these reports with
at least some caution.
Thus, although there may be apparent de jure harmonization of Kazakhstan with other
countries adopting IFRS, real differences in the defacto application of IFRS and hence in the
interpretation of the resulting financial statements may remain for long periods due to differing
stages oftransition to IFRS. Such differences might linger for long periods ifdiffering procedures
are used for IFRS accounting (e.g., whether charts ofaccounts are controlled at company level or
handed down as UAS by governments), thus opening new avenues for classificatory research.
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Appendix A
Section 1: Interview Protocols
One-hour semi-structured (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991) interviews were conducted by
the Kazakh researcher with the Directors of the Accounting Departments in the
National Bank (NBRK) and the Ministry of Finance (MFRK). The rationale for the
selection is that these governmental agencies are, as in other former Soviet countries
(Alexander & Archer, 1998; Jaruga, 1993), the main accounting regulators. The
National Bank (2004) regulates accounting procedures for financial institutions
(including commercial banks, pension funds and insurance companies) and the Ministry
of Finance regulates accounting for all other enterprises (ADB, 2005a). Interviews were
conducted in the language of the interviewees and the resulting notes translated into
English for analysis and citation. Although a set of key questions based on Boross et al.
(1995) and Joshi and Ramadhan (2002) - supplemented by the professional experience
and knowledge of the Kazakh researcher - was prepared, it was obviously impossible
to envisage all possible lines of enquiry that might develop, given the changing state of
the accounting system in Kazakhstan. Different questions were planned and asked
during the two interviews because of the segregation of regulatory duties between the
interviewees.
Implementation ofIFRS in Kazakhstan interview questions — NBRK
1. The NBRK required commercial banks report financial statements prepared in
accordance with IFRS before the new amendments to Accounting Law. What was
the reason?
2. What other types of entities with the exception of commercial banks report to the
NBRK? Are they also required to report in accordance with IFRS?
3. What are the functions of your department in relation to IFRS implementation?
4. Does the NBRK have an IFRS implementation plan?
5. What is the situation with IFRS at the moment? Do all commercial banks, pension
funds and insurance companies keep their accounts in accordance with IFRS as
required?
6. What are the mam problems with the implementation?
7. IFRS is not an official document? What is the guidance for financial institutions?
8. What is your opinion on timeliness of IFRS implementation in Kazakhstan?
9. Do you have enough specialists?
10. Do you use consulting services? Who are your consultants?
1 1
.
Do you think that 2003 was a good time for adoption of IFRS?
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Implementation of IFRS in Kazakhstan interview questions — MFRK
1
.
Who regulates accounting issues in the country today?
2. What were the motives for the adoption of the IFRS?
3. Did the Government undertake obligations to adopt IFRS?
4. Should a transfer from national to international standards have been implemented
voluntarily or on an obligatory?
5. What is the IFRS implementation plan?
6. How you would describe the current situation in regulation ofaccounting in Kazakhstan?
7. To what degree have the companies adopted IFRS?
8. What should companies still do about the process of conversion to IFRS? What
resources and expertise do they need to implement IFRS properly?
9. What are the implications of this change?
10. Are there advantages to be made from the adoption that will make
implementation of IFRS more than just compliance with legislation?
1 1
.
What is the role of professional organizations?
12. What is the role of International organizations?
13. What is the level of authority carried by the MFRK as of today?
14. What are the main problems with the implementation?
15. What is the state of training of accounting specialists? Will the IFRS be included
in the universities' curriculum?
16. Do you think that the country is ready to adopt IFRS?
Section J: Survey Questionnaire
A postal questionnaire comprising of questions based in Boross et al. (1995), Joshi and
Ramadhan (2002) and Illes et al. (1996), plus the professional experience of the Kazakh
researcher, was sent to the 93 companies listed on KASE in July 2003, with 35 usable
responses, a response rate of43.2% (Chanchani & Willett, 2004; Joshi & Ramadhan, 2002).
The questions are listed below are followed by tables detailing the responses. Some
questions permitted multiple responses, and in these tables the number of responses does
not total to 35 neither do the proportions total to 100%.
Name of the Company/Bank
Job title of respondent
Number of employees in the Company/Bank
1. Who are the main users of your financial statements? (indicate all relevant boxes)
Shareholders
Employees
Creditors
Banks
Other
2. Did you prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS before Accounting Law
dated 26 December 1995 #2732 (with amendments and additions)?
YesD
No
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If YES, what was the purpose?
3. As of today do you prepare financial statements in accordance with KAS?
YesD
No
If YES, what are the reasons?
4. Do you think that financial statements prepared under IFRS are more reliable for
users?
YesD
No
Don't know/Find it difficult to comment
5. What are the main problems your Company/Bank faces while transferring to IFRS?
6. How many employees of your Company/Bank need IFRS training?
7. Do you find IFRS implementation process expensive for your Company/Bank?
YesD
No
Please comment on your answer:
8. What are the main expenses inclined by your Company/Bank while implementing
IFRS? (Please list everything that you think is relevant).
9. Do you use consulting services for preparation of IFRS financial statements?
YesD
No
10. Do you have an independent audit of the financial statements?
YesD
No
If YES, which firm do you use?
Big Four (Deloitte and Touche, EY, KPMG, PWC)
Kazakh accounting/auditing firm
Other
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1 1 . Is the audit limited to audit procedures or do the auditors do transformation of KAS
accounts to IFRS?
12. What are the advantages of IFRS for you Company/Bank in particular?
13. Which of the following statements is the closest to your personal opinion (tick
one):
IFRS should have been adopted earlier by Kazakhstan
Year 2004 is the most appropriate time for IFRS adoption
It is too early to implement IFRS in Kazakhstan
You can comment on your answer below:
14. To what degree has your Company/Bank adopted IFRS? (circle one number)
Nothing has been done Fully adopted
Section 3: Survey results
Classification of respondents by: Number of firms %of
firms
16 45.7
5 14.3
14 40.0
35 100.0
12 34.3
12 34.3
7 20.0
2 5.7
2 5.7
35 100.0
IS 514
12 34 3
5 14.3
35 100.0
Location
Almaly
Astana
Other
Total
Economic sector
Banking
Mining/extracti\c
Services
Manufacturing
Other
Total
Number of employees
Less than 1000
1000-10,000
Over 10,000
Total
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Joh title or respondents
Chief Accountant/Financial Director
Head of Accounting Department
Head of Accounting Methodology Department
Deputy Chief Accountant
Senior Accountant
Total
IN
5
5
5
2
35
51 4
14 3
14.3
14.3
5.7
100
Question 1: Who are the main users of your Financial Statements? Number of responses
Shareholders
Commercial banks
Creditors
Employees
Regulatory bodies
Totals (multiple responses I
Question 2: Did you prepare IFRS statements before 1995?
Yes
No
Totals
Question 3: Do you prepare KAS statements today (July 2003)?
Yes
No
Totals
Question 4: Do you consider IFRS-based statements are:
More reliable for users
Less reliable for users
Statement difficult to answer
Totals
Questions 5-8: Identify problems you associate with IFRS
implementation
Need for training
Cost of IFRS implementation
Lack of availability of competent specialists
Absence of detailed methodological recommendations
Lack of text books on IFRS
Inadequate computer software
Absence of proper translation of IFRS into Kazakh and Russian languages
Lack of proper instructions from regulatory bodies
Need for double purpose accounting to meet both tax and financial
reporting requirements
Inadequate chart of accounts
Too tight deadline for adoption of IFRS
Incompliance of the IFRS with current legislation
Lack of knowledge of English
Totals (multiple responses)
15 429
13 37 1
8 22 9
6 17.1
6 17,1
4N n/a
Number of responses %
28 son
7 20.0
35 100.0
Number of responses %
23 66.0
12 34.0
35 100
Number of responses %
21 60.0
1 2.9
13 37.1
35 100.0
Number of responses %
26 74.3
19 54.3
16 45.7
14 40 1)
7 20.0
5 14.3
5 14.3
2 5.7
2 5.7
2 5.7
2 5.7
2 5.7
2 5.7
104 n/a
Question 9: Do you use external consulting services in the
preparation of IFRS statements?
Yes
No
Totals
Number of responses %
23
12
35
66
34.0
100.0
(continued on next page)
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Question 10: Do you have an independent audit of your financial
statements?
Big Four audit firm
Kazakh audit firm
Both types of firm
Totals
Question 11: Does your auditor transform KAS to IFRS statements?
Yes
No
Totals
Question 12: Identify the main advantages of IFRS.
Financial statements prepared under IFRS are more transparent and
comprehensible to users
Financial statements prepared under IFRS will provide firms with easier
access to international financial markets
Financial statements prepared under IFRS are more accurate and reliable
IFRS have more standards specifically relevant to the industry the
respondent is in
Difficult to comment
Totals
Question 13: Do you consider:
Year 2004 is too early for adoption of IFRS
Year 2004 is the right time for adoption of IFRS
Year 2004 is too late for adoption of IFRS
Totals
Question 14: In your company are:
IFRS fully implemented
IFRS partially implemented
IFRS implementation not yet started
Declined to answer
Total
Number of responses
28 80.0
5 14.3
2 5.7
35 100.0
Number of responses %
16 46.0
19 54.0
35 100.0
Number of responses %
12 34.3
10 28.6
9 25.7
2 5.7
2 5.7
35 100.0
Number of responses %
14 40.0
16 45.7
5 14.3
35 100.0
Number of responses %
2 5.7
21 60.0
5 14.3
7 20.0
35 100.0
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Accounting, accountants and accountability: Poststructuralist positions, N.B.
Macintosh. Routledge, London(2005). xvi+165 pages, £22.99, $39.95,
ISBN: 0415384508
This is a paperback edition of a book originally published in 2002, in which Macintosh
aims to explore new ways of understanding accounting. He argues that traditional views of
accounting as the representation of an external economic reality are no longer tenable,
whatever modem accounting standard-setters may believe. Instead of a concern with the
extent to which accounting statements provide a true picture of that economic reality, in the
sense that the statements correspond to "facts out there" that are independent of the
accountant, Macintosh advocates a greater concern with the shifting "regimes of truth" that
underpin accounting: those individuals and entities that have the power to declare whether
or not particular accounting statements are true, the methods and procedures that are
accepted at a given point in time for establishing what is true accounting, and the discourses
and knowledge of accounting that are applied in uttering accounting statements that are
deemed to be true at a particular point in space and time. In developing his argument,
Macintosh uses ideas drawn from theorists such as Derrida, Baudrillard and Foucault,
stressing that accounts are artefacts of language and thus are open to being understood
through the lens of theories of language and discourse.
A major strength of the book is that Macintosh provides a diverse range ofaccounting-related
illustrations to underpin his more abstract theorizing. For example, when discussing how
Baudrillard's ideas of simulacrum and hyperreality can provide an understanding of the
problems faced by financial reporting in the 21st Century, Macintosh examines financial
instruments, such as options, to suggest that the relationship between accounting measurement
and economic valuations is often reversed. Conventionally, accountants are seen as using a
market value that has been determined independently of the accounting and financial reporting
process, and reporting this value in a neutral manner. The accounting sign depends on the
external referent. But increasingly, in many financial markets, the market value ofan instrument
is itself often a calculated figure based on accounting numbers. The accounting sign no longer
reflects an independent referent, but instead both sign and referent become mutually dependent.
Although the book was written before the Enron scandal emerged, several of the accounting-
related issues emerging from Enron provide clear illustrations of Macintosh's arguments. The
problems flowing from non-consolidated "special purpose entities" show how even the concept
ofthe accounting entity is not a "given", but rather is constructed (and deconstructed) in terms of
rules and principles that gain their effect from the power of those who enforce the rules rather
than from any inherent "tightness". The use of "mark-to-model" valuation approaches to
measure long-temi contracts that had been cleverly structured as securities that could be traded in
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theory ifnot in practice, and the recognition ofvaluation gains on such contracts as income, show
not only the malleability ofour concepts ofincome, but also the extent to which the way in which
a transaction is to be accounted can shape the structure ofthe transaction itself. Accounting does
not report neutrally, but instead often actively intervenes in shaping the economic world.
Although Macintosh goes a long way to undermining a naive realist view ofaccounting, he is
aware that accounting influences a significant part ofhuman activity. Accounting seems to work.
but it is necessary, he argues, to consider for whom accounting works: who benefits from a
particular form of accounting. .As accounting is not static but dynamic, it must be studied and
understood from within a historical perspective, one that examines how accounting practices
come to gain their aura ofobjectivity and neutrality. Finally, is it necessary to develop alternative
readings ofaccounting statements, and to allow accounting to tell different stories, to undermine
still further the view that a single "true" accounting is not only possible but also desirable.
Macintosh is to be congratulated on presenting such a clear discussion ofcomplex ideas,
and on illustrating his theoretical concepts clearly by means of practical accounting
situations. Like many critical accountants, he is stronger on identifying what is wrong with
common understandings of accounting, and providing alternative ways of looking at
accounting from the outside, than in giving a practical blueprint of how he believes
accounting should change. His core belief is that attempts to develop accounting practice on
the basis of insecure fundamentals, whether these involve a naive representationalist view
of accounting, an economic analysis that regards accounting as simply an informational
commodity, or a fixation on traditional concepts of capital and income, are doomed to
failure in the long run. Macintosh's book should be required reading for anyone who needs
to think critically about accounting, whether academic or practitioner, rather than merely to
study and practice it as a set of mechanistic procedures.
Christopher J. Napier
Royal Holloway. University of London. Egham. Surrey. L'K
doi: 10. 1016 j.intacc.2006. 12.005
Applying International Accountinu Standards. Keith Alfredson. Ken Leo. Ruth
Picker. Paul Pacter, Jennie Radford. John \\ iley & Sons. Brisbane. Australia! 2005 ).
1102 pages, S90.00. £34.99, €54.50 ISBN-10 0-470-80494-7
The demand for resource materials about international accounting standards has inc :
.
dramatically with the adoption of International Accounting Standards Board < LASB > standards
in the European Union and many other countries from 2005. Adoption of international
standards creates a need for tools to educate both students and practitioners about the "new"
standards, so that the goal of more transparent and comparable financial reporting can be
achieved. Alfredson et al. was one of the first texts published to meet that need.
The aim of the book is to help students and practitioners understand the complex:" .
international accounting standards and to apply the stable platform (p. xiii). that is. the
standards issued by the LASB as at March 2004. The authors note that the new standards
"have major implications" for the practice of accounting, thereby affecting how accounting
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is carried out in business and how it is taught in universities and colleges. In response to the
global business environment and the principles-based nature of international standards, the
approach taken in the text is to place "greater emphasis on understanding accounting
principles rather than applying specific local regulations" (p. xiii).
A striking feature ofthe book is the credentials ofthe authors who have, collectively, a very
impressive track record. Their experience encompasses many years in professional accounting
practice, participation on standard-setting boards, roles as academics and educators, and
extensive experience in writing books and monographs. The combined experience of the
author team leaves no doubt that we are in the hands of skilled professionals who are able to
unravel the mysteries of international accounting standards with accuracy and clarity.
The book is structured in four parts as follows:
Part 1 Framework, includes two chapters. The first provides background about the IASB so
we can learn of the history of standard setting as well as current arrangements. The
second chapter provides an analysis of the IASB's Framework. This chapter is
crucial, given the book's aim of developing readers' understanding of accounting
principles. The Framework is an important starting point for understanding the
content and interrelationship of current standards.
Part 2 Elements, covers the three elements of assets, liabilities, and equity. Elements of equity
(share capital, retained earnings, and reserves) are analyzed. In the asset category,
inventories, intangibles, leases, and property plant and equipment are the subject of four
separate chapters. Liabilities are addressed with a chapter on provisions and con-
tingencies. Two further chapters address topics relevant to both assets and liabilities —
income tax and financial instruments. Business combinations and impairment are also
covered because of their effects on the recognition and measurement process (p. xiii).
Part 3 Disclosure, includes three chapters covering the principles of disclosure (IAS 1. IAS
8, and IAS 10), presentation of financial statements, and cash flow statements. These
chapters are extremely helpful for understanding the required content and
presentation of IFRS financial reports. The chapters draw out key issues from the
accounting standards, thus assisting instructors to understand the fundamental issues
that must be communicated to students. While instructors may refer directly to
accounting standards, it is helpful to have the guidance of experts when developing
an understanding of the new rules.
Part 4 Economic entities, provides material for a serious investigation of the practice of
consolidated reporting. It comprises about 40% of the (approximately) 1 ,000 pages of
the text and covers the key issues relating to consolidations: the method, treatment of
wholly owned subsidiaries, intragroup transactions, minority interests, and indirect
ownership interests. The coverage is broad but detailed enough to assist the
development of a sound understanding of consolidations suitable for students
majoring in financial accounting studies. The material is very similar to that presented
in a previous work by some ofthe authors (Leo, Hoggeft, Sweeting & Radford, 200 1 ),
so it has been developed over a number of editions. Part 4 also includes chapters on
topics often taught along with consolidations, namely foreign subsidiaries (which
covers foreign currency translation), investments in associates (equity accounting),
interests in joint ventures, and segment reporting.
Book reviews 1 15
The above list of content provides an indication of the wide scope of the book. The first
part sets the scene and provides relevant qualitative material. The second section covers main
topical issues and new accounting standards. It provides sufficient material for an entire unit
on recognition and measurement of assets, liabilities and equity, either as a stand alone unit or
as an introductory unit before a more in-depth consideration of business combinations.
Throughout the book the skills of the author team are apparent. First, their technical
knowledge is outstanding. The material presented is soundly based on accounting standards
and also, when appropriate, the basis for conclusions underpinning the standards. Full
references to standards are included to assist the process of understanding the standards.
The material is explained in detail and links made between the standards and other practices
(e.g.. U.S. GAAP) if appropriate. The detailed explanations are of great assistance to those
learning about the new standards, either as students or instructors
Second, the setting out of the material in each chapter reflects considerable thought about
the most effective way to present relevant content. Each chapter makes use of descriptive
sections, many explanatory diagrams and figures. Material is arranged with careful use of
headings, sub-sections and dot points to assist readers to follow the content. The chapters
include numerical examples and journal entries where appropriate to demonstrate the practical
aspects of the topic being addressed. Comprehensive examples, which draw together several
points developed in the chapter, are also provided. Examples are generally "country neutral",
that is. there is a focus on illustrating a point in question in relation to international standards
without reference to a particular country. In some chapters practical applications of the
standards are explored by considering actual listed companies. Selections ofmedia articles are
reprinted to give a "real world" flavor and to show how issues apply in practice. These sections
will prove popular with students and add richness to the text.
Each chapter includes discussion questions and problems. They are based on the material in
the chapter and cover many key issues and complexities. In fact, the book would benefit from
some simpler questions for people who are new to the content or who are struggling to
understand it. Each chapter needs some "easy" questions, where basic principles are
demonstrated, to give less experienced people a chance to develop some knowledge and
understanding. More detailed questions, which cover the complexities of the standards, can
follow. In addition, many accounting topics require students to master journal entries.
Understandably, students like questions where they can "practice" their journal entries, thus
creating a demand for the lecturer to provide such questions. As just one example, I would like
to see more questions which require students to prepare journal entries as part of the process of
accounting for financial instruments. Realistically, there is much about financial instruments
my students will not learn or remember. However. I would like them to master the basic
measurement rules and the journal entries required for various instruments. I would like more
end-of-chapter questions which help them to do this. The publishers are aware of the need for
simpler questions and had planned on publishing an enhanced edition ofthis text in November
2006. More questions and problems are expected to be provided in this subsequent edition.
The publishers provide useful resources for instructors, including a detailed solution manual as
well as topic tests. Resources are accessed online through the publisher's website.
The text addresses the stable platform of standards, that is, those issued by the IASB at
3 1 March 2004. Subsequent changes have been made to some standards. This is a problem
faced by all publishers and instructors. Since the text provides such a comprehensive
1 1
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coverage of the original set of standards, it forms a useful starting point. For many classes,
instructors can focus on the material in the book because it covers principles which remain
in force. Information about current developments can be obtained, if required, from online
resources such as the IASB's websites or Deloitte's IAS PLUS.
Alfredson et al. meet an important need in the current world of accounting education as
teachers require up-to-date texts on international standards. This book addresses many
complex issues in a thorough manner and will be a very valuable resource for many
academics as we grapple with international standards. The authors are to be commended for
their contribution to the process of introducing international accounting standards to both
instructors and students.
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Financial Accounting Theory, Craig Deegan, Jeffrey Unerman, European Edition,
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Maidenhead, UK (2006), xix + 466 pages, £38.99,
ISBN: 13 9780077108960
This accounting theory book of Craig Deegan and Jeffrey Unerman provides an overview
of some well-established accounting theories. The book covers normative and positive
theories, discusses research on the reaction of capital markets and individuals to financial
reporting, and devotes a chapter to the critical accounting perspective, and a chapter to social
and environmental reporting. For this European edition, the authors have introduced many
European examples, which make the text very lively for a European audience.
The material covered is organized in 12 chapters. In the first, introductory chapter, Deegan
and Unerman point out what a theory is. and why one should be motivated to study accounting
theory. They stress that accounting theories provide insights that are crucial to improve
financial accounting practices, and to restore investor trust in capital markets, which was
severely damaged after the recent wave of high-profile accounting scandals. In this
introductory chapter, the authors also give a brief taxonomy of accounting theories (i.e.
positive versus normative theories, true income theories, and decision usefulness theories) and
discuss how one can evaluate those theories.
In Chapter 2, the authors stress that accounting method choices, professional judgment,
and accounting standards influence accounting numbers and can lead to different pictures of
the "economic reality". Therefore, they claim, users of financial reports should understand
financial accounting. The chapter also provides an overview of accounting history, leading to
an introduction to and discussion of theories that favor or oppose accounting regulation, and
theories about why regulation is introduced (namely, public interest theory, capture theory,
and private interest theory). The authors clearly point out that regulation of accounting can
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have economic consequences. They also argue that accountants are quite powerful. However,
as accountants work within or for organizations, and as the board of directors bears first
responsibility for the accounts. I believe that accounting method choices and professional
judgment are likely to be influenced by other persons in the organization as well.
Chapter 3 continues the discussion of theories that favor or oppose the regulation of
accounting. The "free market" and the "pro-regulation" perspectives, and the public interest
and capture theories of regulation are considered. These theories are discussed against the
background of the increase in accounting regulation following the recent wave of high-
profile accounting failures, and of various International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) pronouncements. Deegan and Unerman conclude the chapter with challenging
whether accounting can be neutral, objective, and apolitical.
Chapter 4 first refers to some evidence on the impact of differences in regulation across
countries on accounting practice Next, the chapter discusses various cultural and
institutional reasons for the obsen ed differences in accounting sj stems across countries \s
concents culture, the work of Gray ( l l)NN) and Hofstede ( 1980) is considered \s concerns
institutional factors, the impact of factors such as legal systems, business ownership, and
the financing system are considered. Following the work of LaPorta. Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997). Laporta. Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998),
LaPorta. Lopez-de-Silances, and Shleifer. (1999). the impact of institutions on accounting
issues has been a vibrant research stream, and 1 miss some references to recent work on this
topic. The chapter continues with a discussion of the reasons for and obstacles to
international harmonization or standardization. The chapter concludes with an o\ en icw of
the processes and institutions of harmonization and standardization that are important for
accounting regulation in the European Union (EU).
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to normative theories of accounting. In particular. Chapter 5
discusses various normative theories of accounting that start from the idea that historical
cost accounting has too many shortcomings, particularly in times of inflation. Current purchase
power accounting (CPPA), current cost accounting (CCA), and continuously contemporary
accounting (CoCoA) are considered. The chapter also provides an oven lew o( research that
sheds some light on the demand for price-adjusted accounting, and gi\ es a description of the
support for non-historical cost accounting across time. Chapter 6 continues the discussion of
normative theories of accounting with a discussion of the motivation for the existence, and the
advantages and disadvantages of a conceptual framework for accounting.
Chapters 7 and 8 are dedicated to positive theories of accounting. In particular. Chapter 7
gives a thorough oveniew of Positive Accounting Theory. The chapter starts with a
definition ofPositive Accounting Theory, and continues with a discussion of its origins, its
development, its efficiency and opportunistic perspectives, and its three main hypotheses
(the bonus, debt, and political cost hypotheses). The chapter concludes with an o\ en iew of
some criticisms of Positive Accounting Theory. Chapter 8 continues the discussion o\'
positive theories of accounting with a discussion of three "systems oriented theories".
namely legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory (both the ethical and the managerial branch),
and institutional theory. This discussion is preceded by a discussion of a broader theory
underlying legitimacy and stakeholder theory, namely political economy theory. In this
chapter, the authors complement a discussion of the theories with an overview of the results
of empirical tests of the theories.
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Chapter 9 is devoted completely to social and environmental reporting. In this chapter,
the authors discuss why companies engage in social and environmental reporting, to whom
companies address the social and environmental reports, what information stakeholders
need, and various aspects related to the reporting process itself.
While the previous chapters considered how financial accounting should be undertaken
(normative theory), or why firms make some accounting and disclosure choices (positive
theory), Chapters 10 and 11 deal with how markets and individuals react to alternative
accounting and disclosure decisions. In particular. Chapter 10 provides an overview of
capital markets research, which examines how capital markets (share prices) react to the
release of information. Chapter 1 1 focuses on behavioral research, which studies the impact
of information on the decisions of a variety of individual information users (not just
investors, but, for example, also auditors, bankers, and loan officers). The Brunswik Lens
Model, Verbal Protocol Analysis, and the limitations of behavioral research are considered.
The final chapter. Chapter 12. is dedicated to the critical perspective on the role of
accounting, and to the role of accounting research and accounting practice in supporting
existing social structures.
In short, I believe that the book gives an interesting introduction to a broad range of
accounting theories. The book is well organized. At the start of each chapter, a list of learning
objectives and an opening issue are provided, and throughout the book, there are various
exhibits with real-world examples. Moreover, at the end ofeach chapter, the authors provide a
useful summary and many discussion questions for classroom use. The authors also discuss all
issues against the background of recent developments within the European Union.
In my opinion, the content. European perspective, and well-organized structure make the
book a good text for students willing to pursue a research career in accounting, and an
interesting reference work for accounting researchers. Since the book covers a broad range of
theories, students or researchers willing to apply one of these theories in their own work may
want to read more about the particular theory. Therefore, they can turn to the list of references
at the end of each chapter.
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Auditing and Assurance Services International Edition, Aasmund Eilifsen, William
F. Messier Jr., Steven M. Glover, Douglas F. Prawitt. McGraw-Hill Education,
Berkshire (2006), xxiv + 678 pages, £34.99, €54.94, ISBN: 13 9780077104177; 10 0-
07-710417-X
The first edition of Auditing & Assurance Services International Edition is truly an
international auditing book. By integrating discussions of auditing concepts and processes
with International Standards on Auditing (IASs), the authors bring an international
perspective throughout the book. As globalization increases and with it the international
operations of audit firms, the authors remind us that students and professionals need to
"understand the international environment shaping the profession and international auditing
pronouncements" (p. xii). This book aims to provide that understanding and, in my
assessment, achieves its objective.
1. Organization of the book
The book is organized into eight parts. Part I (chapters 1 and 2) provides an introduction
to financial-statement auditing, and the international environment. Part 11 (chapters 3 and 4)
covers the basic auditing concepts of Risk Assessment, Materiality, and Evidence. Part III
(chapters 5-7) covers audit planning and internal control. Part IV covers (chapters 8-9)
Statistical and Non-Statistical Sampling Tools for Auditing. In Part V (chapters 10-16)
auditing issues related to business processes -- revenue, purchasing, human resource
management, inventory management, assets, liabilities, and cash and investments are
discussed. Part VI (chapters 17-18) covers audit completion and reporting responsibilities
The final two parts (chapters 19 and 20) cover professional responsibilities of auditors
and assurance and other related services. At the beginning of each chapter the learning
objectives and relevant international accounting and auditing standards are listed. Each
chapter ends with definitions of key terms, review questions, problems, discussion cases,
and internet assignments.
To enhance real-world understanding, the authors include analyses of Earthware
Clothiers, a mail-order retailer, throughout the book. Readers are introduced to the
company's Annual Report following chapter 1, and many chapters include problems and
internet assignments relating to this company.
The book is written in a clear, straightforward manner. Although modeled after the U.S.
edition,
1
the authors have clearly written the book with an international perspective.
Frequent references to ISAs, and the use of the Euro as the currency in the financial
statements throughout the book enhance the international flavor.
A discussion of some selected chapters follows. Chapter 1 starts with the discussion
of Enron and the demise of Andersen, and other examples of fraud in Europe, Asia,
and Australia. This is followed by discussion of the nature of an audit, the role of auditing
in society, and the major phases ofthe audit, all ofwhich are common to all environments. The
Although it is the first international edition, the book under review is based on the 4th edition of Auditing and
Assurance Senices: A Systematic Approach (Messier, Glover, and Prawitt, 2006).
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chapter concludes with an interesting example about how to verify the inventory of reindeer
heads. Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the global environment in which the auditor
operates. It provides references to frauds that occurred in several countries (United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Spain, Italy. Belgium, Sweden, France, Germany, Japan,
Australia, and South Korea). Students of various countries will be able to relate to the
implications of these frauds because of the local attention the companies receive from the
media. More importantly, the chapter also provides a detailed and interesting discussion of
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, International Standards on Auditing,
International Federation of Accountants, European Union and the Regulatory Environment in
the USA. In the next edition, the authors might consider adding discussions offoreign audit
firms that are registered with the PCAOB (there are firms from India. Czech Republic. Hong
Kong, United Kingdom. Germany, Switzerland, Thailand, and many more countries that are
currently registered with the PCAOB)." This will further highlight the importance of
international auditing.
Chapter 6 uses the COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission) framework for Internal Control and its components to discuss auditors'
assessments of internal control. Chapter 7 (that primarily focuses on US standards)
discusses standards (following the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002) relating to the
audit of internal control. Because the newly adopted SOX standards on auditing internal
control affect both foreign auditors and foreign companies, this is an important chapter. The
chapter begins with the responsibilities of management and auditors, and proceeds to a
discussion of control deficiencies, significant deficiencies, and material weaknesses and
internal control reports. Both integrated audit and internal control and internal control
reports are discussed. The PCAOB AS2 standard is nicely incorporated in this chapter.
Also of interest is chapter 18, which discusses audit reports using reporting format.
Conditions (e.g.. going-concern problems, scope limitation, departure from applicable
financial-reporting framework) leading to different types of audit reports with illustrative
examples are discussed. Topics dealt with in the concluding section of the chapter include
reports on comparatives, other information in documents containing audited financial
statements, and special reports.
Chapter 19 covers important issues relating to professional ethics, independence, and
quality control. The chapter starts with a discussion of ethics and ethical professional
behavior. The authors do a fine job of presenting the conceptual-framework approach to
auditor independence. There is a section on conflict of interest covering issues such as
obtaining second opinion, fees, marketing of services, gifts, custody of assets, and
objectivity. The chapter also covers issues such as employment with assurance clients,
provision of non-audit sen ices to assurance clients. Some of these issues have surfaced in
recent fraud investigation occurrences at Enron. WorldCom, and Learnout and Hauspie.
The book (Chapter 20) concludes with a discussion of various types of "Assurance
Services" and internal audit services.
In sum, the book is comprehensive in its coverage of auditing issues in an international
environment. However, while the U.S. edition of Messier et al. includes a chapter on litigation
in the U.S. context, the current book (the international edition) does not. I would argue that
- http://www.pcaobus.org/Registratioii'Registered_Firms pdi
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some discussion of legal liability in the U.S. would be useful to non-U. S. auditors and
corporations because of the global nature of auditing. Similarly, including a brief discussion of
U.S. GAAS somewhere in the book could be useful to an international audience.
2. Support materials
The book comes with supplements (PowerPoint slides and weblink) accessible by students
from a website. The PowerPoint slides are ofgood quality and some slides include cartoons that
students will enjoy. The instructor's resources include manuals for solutions and instruction. I
would recommend the inclusion ofa test bank as well. There are links to international accounting
and auditing organizations and international audit firms. Unlike the U.S. edition (which is one of
very few auditing text books that includes the Audit Command Language CDROM), the
international edition does not come with the ACL Software CD. The book provides some
discussion of the ACL software with examples in the context of audit sampling and in chapter 7.
3. Conclusions
I commend the authors for writing this book with a truly international approach. It is
clearly written, and is supported by appropriate examples and figures. ISAs have
increasingly been accepted by many international accounting firms, multinational public
companies, among others, and have received endorsement from international organizations
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Roussey, 1999).
Several countries have either adopted or used ISAs as the basis for their auditing standards.
Netherlands' Auditing Standards Board has decided to "forgo the further development of
national auditing standards and adopted ISAs instead." (Roussey, 1999). The U.K. auditing
practices board "based its standards on the ISAs but used different wording and added local
requirements." Given this trend. ISAs will probably be used either in their entirety or in
modified form by many more countries in the future. Consequently, this book offers an
appropriate international perspective to auditing and can be used in undergraduate and
graduate auditing courses and by practicing professionals.
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Attribute differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS
earnings: An exploratory study
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Abstract
In this study we explore attribute differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS earnings. Our study
is motivated by the ongoing harmonization process in accounting standard setting as well as by
recent convergence projects by the FASB and the IASB. We test two market-based earnings
attributes, i.e., value relevance and timeliness, as well as two accounting-based earnings attributes,
i.e., predictability and accrual quality. These attributes are tested for German New Market firms as
they are allowed to choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP for financial reporting purposes. Overall,
we find that U.S. GAAP and IFRS only differ with regard to predictive ability. The fact that U.S.
GAAP accounting information outperforms IFRS also holds after controlling for differences in firm
characteristics, such as size, leverage and the audit firm. However, our results also seem to suggest
that these differences are not folly valued by investors, as we do not observe significant and
consistent differences for the value-relevance attribute.
© 2007 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Global accounting standards; IFRS; U.S. GAAP; Earnings quality; Comparison
1. Introduction
When comparing and characterizing accounting-standard regimes, IFRS are typically
labeled as concept-based while U.S. GAAP are categorized as rule-based. During recent years
This study was presented at the Illinois International Accounting Symposium held jointly with HEC in Paris on
June 7-8, 2006.
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the FASB repeatedly solicited for research on the feasibility of changing towards more
concept-based standards, as more and more criticisms of its current approach arose, especially
in the aftermath of Enron. Rule-based standards are said to provide companies with the
opportunity to structure transactions to meet requirements for a particular accounting
treatment, even ifsuch treatments do not reflect the true economic substance (see, for example,
Vincent et al.. 2003). Likewise. Sawabe (2005) establishes that proliferation of accounting
rules, as in a rule-based approach, is usually associated with more creative accounting
instruments, suggesting that it leads to more earnings management.
In this paper, we add to the ongoing IFRS/U.S. GAAP discussion by investigating a set
of earnings attributes. Prior empirical research on quality differences between U.S. GAAP
and IFRS is scarce and provides mixed results. In a U.S. exchange context, Harris and
Muller (1999) find that the reconciliations from IFRS to U.S. GAAP in Form 20 F filings
add value. By contrast, based on a sample of German New Market firms, Leuz (2003) and
Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim (2005) document that both U.S. GAAP and IFRS offer no
significantly different quality. While Leuz defines quality as a function of (less)
information asymmetry (bid-ask spreads) and (more) market liquidity (trading volume),
Bartov et al. (2005) relate market data back to accounting information in reUirns/eamings
regressions. In the present study, we further focus on German New Market firms and test
several accounting and market-based quality measures (i.e., value relevance, timeliness,
predictability, and accruals quality) to draw inferences about attribute differences between
IFRS and U.S. GAAP earnings. We restrict our sample to German New Market firms for
the following reasons. First, the need for high quality financial information is particularly
prevalent for these types of new economy firms. Due to unstable performances and the
limited financial history of the firms quoted on this market, investments in such firms are
highly risky, which makes the (quality of) current financial statements highly relevant to
investors, especially as the period studied is characterized by a turbulent stock market. As
a result, the findings of this study are such that they reflect the relative performance of the
two regimes, IFRS and U.S. GAAP, in periods of economic downturn. Second, by limiting
our sample to one equity market, we control for (instiUitional) variation in market features
(Barth & Clinch, 1996). This is necessary as some of the metrics adopted in our study are
based on equity-market variables.
As we execute a comparative study, we address prior claims (such as the one by the
SEC) that the FASB provides qualitatively better standards than the IASC. Note that such
claims led to reconciliation requirements (to U.S. GAAP) for foreign filers on U.S.
exchanges that are adopting IFRS. Prior studies that addressed this issue focused mainly
on U.S. markets. However, according to Glaum and Street (2003), U.S. GAAP
disclosures are generally of lower quality in non-SEC environments. Hence, exploring
the differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP earnings of German New Market firms
that fall outside SEC enforcement further contributes both to the reconciliation and
enforcement debate. Further, we address a comprehensive set of earnings attributes —
both capital market and accounting based — to evaluate financial reporting quality,
whereas prior studies comparing standards typically limit their scope to value relevance
(of earnings). Finally, by comparing IFRS and U.S. GAAP prepared information, we
examine whether concept-based versus rule-based standard regimes result in signifi-
cantly different information.
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We find that U.S. GAAP and IFRS earnings perform equally well on most of the
attributes we investigate. With regard to predictive ability, however. U.S. GAAP earnings
significantly outperform IFRS. These results hold even when controlling for firm
characteristics such as size and leverage. Interestingly, the value-relevance attribute does
not differ significantly and consistently between the two sets of standards, suggesting that
the accounting differences are not fully valued by investors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
existing literature on accounting regime evaluations and earnings-attribute measures,
followed by our expectations for the 1FRS/U.S. GAAP comparison. In Section 3, we
specify the models that we use to estimate and evaluate the earnings attributes. Next, we
document the sample composition and data collection in Section 4. We present the results in
Section 5 and finally give some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Literature review and research questions
Previous studies that evaluate the quality of standards across regimes can roughly be
divided into two groups: those comparing U.S. GAAP to other local regimes, and those
comparing IFRS with local regimes. Studies that report under the first group typically have
two common features. First, almost all studies are performed using a sample of U.S. and
non-U. S. companies listed on the same U.S. stock exchange. This is an interesting setting
since foreign filers are allowed to report under their local standards, provided there is a
reconciliation of earnings and shareholders' equity with U.S. GAAP (called 20F
reconciliation). Second, quality is most often measured by applying value-relevance
models, looking at the association between stock prices (or returns) and accounting data.
In comparing U.K. and U.S. GAAP constructed earnings (and earnings changes). Pope
and Rees (1992), conclude that U.S. GAAP earnings adjustments add only marginally to
the ability of earnings to explain returns. Comparing U.S. GAAP with multiple local GAAP
systems. Amir, Harris, and Venuti ( 1993) find that the 20 F reconciliations made by Non-U. S.
filers are reflected in stock prices and thus are valued by the market. By contrast. Chan and
Seow (1996) find earnings based on local GAAP to have greater information content than U.S.
GAAP.
Splitting up the group of foreign filers, Barth and Clinch (1996) document variations
depending on the country of residence. For U.K. and Australian firms, the reconciliations are
found to be valued more than for Canadian firms. Given that U.S. GAAP and Canadian GAAP
are similar for many items, this finding suggests that the usefulness of reconciliations to U.S.
GAAP decreases, as the foreign GAAP is more closely comparable to U.S. GAAP. Alford,
Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski ( 1993) reach similar conclusions when considering several
European local GAAP systems. They conclude that earnings based on Danish, German,
Italian, Singaporean and Swedish GAAP contain less information and are less timely than U.S.
GAAP earnings, while earnings based on local GAAP of Australia, France, The Netherlands
and the U.K. are relatively more informative and timely.
Overall, results about U.S. stock exchanges seem to suggest that from an investor's
perspective reconciliations add value. While all the above studies compare U.S. GAAP to
other accounting regimes within a U.S. stock exchange environment, Harris, Lang, and
Moller (1994) is the only study that provides an analysis of value relevance across
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exchanges. Similar to the U.S. stock exchange studies, Harris et al. (1994) assess quality by
looking at the association between prices and earnings (or shareholders' equity). These
associations are however not calculated for the entire sample, but for the German and U.S.
stock market separately. They find that the explanatory power of German earnings is
comparable to U.S. earnings, but the explanatory power of shareholder's equity in Germany
is significantly lower than in the United States.
Research on quality differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS is scarce. Harris and
Muller (1999), for instance, use U.S. stock exchange data, in particular a sample of foreign
firms that prepare IFRS earnings for domestic purposes and in addition reconcile from IFRS
to U.S. GAAP in Form 20 F filings, for cross-listing purposes. Value is defined in terms of
price and return models and it is found that the reconciliations add value. By contrast,
subsequent studies by Leuz (2003) and Bartov et al. (2005) document that both U.S. GAAP
and IFRS offer no significantly different quality. Both studies use a sample of German New
Market firms since these companies can freely decide to apply either IFRS or U.S. GAAP.
The studies differ as to the applied quality metrics: Leuz defines quality in terms of
information asymmetry (bid-ask spreads) and market liquidity (trading volume), while
Bartov et al. (2005) apply the more traditional value-relevance measures (also applied by
Harris and Muller). Recently, Barth, Landsman, Lang, and Williams (2006) report on the
IFRS/U.S. GAAP issue by studying a matched sample of European and U.S. firms.
Applying multiple measures (e.g., earnings management), they find that IFRS provide
lower quality accounting information, but the imbalance disappears when looking only at
U.S. cross-listed firms. In the present study, we follow the same vein as Barth et al. (2006)
looking at several quality measures. We focus on one specific environment, however, the
German New Market, to keep institutional factors (such as enforcement) as homogeneous
as possible. In sum, this study explores some of the inconsistencies in prior research, and
adds to the literature on standards enforcement.
In addressing the IFRS/U.S. GAAP dilemma, we argue that differences between the two
sets of standards are likely to be relevant. First, on a very general level, we discern both
structural and organizational differences between the two sets of standards that might
impact the quality of the accounting information prepared accordingly. Proponents of U.S.
GAAP typically argue that the international standards have not been subject to the same due
process as U.S. standards. Both the FASB's organizational structure, its standard-setting
process and the enforcement is claimed to be better defined. However, others argue that the
IFRS standard-setting process is open to more input from a wider interest group.
Second, turning to the standards themselves, it is often illustrated that U.S. standards are
rigorously defined, resulting in a real cookbook of detailed and stringent accounting and
disclosure requirements. Considerable attention is paid to exceptions and special issues and
extensive guidance is provided on specialized industry practices. The IASB (International
Accounting Standards Board) standards book, on the other hand, is far less voluminous and
standards are defined more generally in terms of rules. Whether stricter rules also result in
higher quality accounting information remains, however, an open question. One could
argue that information resulting from the application of U.S. standards is more neutral since
there are fewer opportunities to manage earnings. Reporting on economic activity is more
likely to be truthful and consistent if firms are offered fewer opportunities to color the image
they communicate in order to influence behavior in a particular direction. However, one
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could also argue that the discretion offered by IFRS puts management in a position to more
freely signal the true economic performance of the company.
Finally, differences in specific standards may also be responsible for differences in the
quality of earnings. For example, the opportunity to capitalize R&D under IFRS could
result in more value-relevant earnings. ' Making predictions on earnings and its attributes is,
however, complicated, mainly because it is uncertain whether managers choose the
accounting treatments on which IFRS and U.S. GAAP differ. Returning to the R&D
example, managers could expense development costs even though capitalization is allowed,
simply because it is not opportune at that time. Further, since accounting involves reverting
effects over time, and we cannot determine the application lag for each company and each
item, the earnings-attribute effect is indistinct.
Based on the above-mentioned arguments, we do expect differences between IFRS and
U.S. GAAP earnings to exist. However, it is a priori not clear which set of standards will
result in higher accounting quality.
3. Model specification
To examine quality differences between information prepared based on IFRS versus U.S.
GAAP, we build on the existing literature, which expresses the quality of earnings in terms of
earnings attributes (e.g., Schipper & Vincent, 2003). At the outset, it is important to observe
that we do not address the question of what high-quality accounting is or should be. Instead,
we follow prior literature and define quality in terms ofearnings attributes. Where prior studies
usually tend to focus on one or two earnings attributes at a time (e.g., Bartov et al., 2005; Harris
& Muller, 1999), we consider four attributes: value relevance, timeliness, predictability, and
accaials quality. The first two reside under the market-based attributes, while the last two are
examples of accounting-based attributes. By including this range of attributes, we are able to
evaluate whether differences in the accounting standards actually show up in the earnings
numbers and its properties, and whether the market values these differences.
For each earnings attribute, we estimate two separate models for the respective samples
of IFRS and U.S. GAAP firms. Differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP earnings with
regard to these attributes are reflected in the differences in R~ found between the models."
To assess whether a difference in the R~ is statistically significant, we need to control for
between-sample differences. To that end. we use the same test statistic as Lang, Ready, and
For a full comparison, we refer to the FASB's study (Bloomer, 1999) The 1ASC-U.S. Comparison Project: A
Report on the Similarities and Differences between 1ASC Standards and U.S. G.-l.-lP-second edition.
Most studies comparing IFRS and U.S. GAAP are executed on samples of firms that report under the two
reporting regimes simultaneously. Each sample firm is included twice in the study: once running the prices on
IFRS measures and once on U.S. GAAP measures. If the number of measures is held constant, than comparison
between the two regimes happens directly through comparison of the /?-squares. To statistically test the
difference, a Vuong test is used (see Dechow, 1994). In this study, we also compare an IFRS and U.S. GAAP
model, however the models (and the resulting R~) are estimated using different samples as firms are either
applying IFRS or U.S. GAAP. To compare these ft-squares we control for sample differences by using the
Cramer-based test.
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Wilson (2006) and Barth. Landsman, and Lang (2005), based on the estimation of R 2
standard deviations (see Cramer, 1987).
3. 1. Value relevance
Unlike early capital market research (e.g.. Ball & Brown, 1968; Holthausen & Watts,
2001), we do not simply investigate the link between prices and earnings, but we also take
into account that market prices react differently to positive and negative earnings (e.g.,
Bartov et al., 2005; Collins et al., 1999). Hence, we measure value relevance in terms of the
contemporaneous association between stock returns and earnings as follows:
RET,.,, = a,, + a, —— + a: DX + a,—— * DX (la)
P/./-1 P/J-l
where RET,,,, is the annual market-adjusted return, ending three months after the fiscal year
end, X„ is earnings per share, DX is a dummy equal to one if earnings are negative and zero
otherwise, and P,,_| is the security price at the beginning of the period. The model's R-
squared, which reflects the degree of association, is estimated for the IFRS and U.S. GAAP
sample separately. Second, we also run the price-earnings model as suggested by Ohlson
(1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), where prices are regressed on both earnings and
the book value of equity (e.g.. Penman, 1998). We also distinguish between positive and
negative earnings, resulting in the following regression:
p„ = Ko + ai X„ + a: DX + a,X„* DX + a5BV,-,,_, (lb)
where P„ is the security price three months after fiscal year end t, BV,
,H is the book value
of equity at the beginning of period t, and other variables are as previously defined. In this
regression, the coefficient on earnings, a,, reflects the pricing effect of current earnings.
The coefficient on beginning-of-year book value of equity captures the effect of expected
future normal earnings. Again, our measure of value relevance is based on the explanatory
power of the equation.
3.2. Timeliness
Consistent with prior research, we test this attribute by running the following Basu-like
(1997) reverse regression on the two samples separately:
X„/P,.,_i = x„ + aiRET,-, + * : DR + x,RET„* DR (2)
with RET,, being the annual market-adjusted return (corresponding to the fiscal year), DR
equaling one if returns are negative and zero otherwise, and all other variables as previously
defined.
4
Timely earnings are those earnings that result in stronger associations or higher
R's for the above model.
This is one way of controlling for growth opportunities, as suggested by Holthausen and Watts (2001 ).
J
Both the returns and the accounting data are measured at fiscal year end so that they both relate to the same
time period. By contrast, returns in the value-relevance models go from three months before to three months after
the fiscal year end. Hereby, we take into account that financial statements usually are published within
three months after fiscal year end. and are thus reflected in share prices.
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3.3. Predictability
In testing whether IFRS earnings have different predictive ability than U.S. GAAP
earnings, we model the association between future and current earnings as well as past
earnings (Lipe, 1990) for the IFRS and U.S. GAAP sample separately. We estimate the R~
of the following model:
X,,,+ i = ao + <x\ X„ + a2 X,., i (3a)
where X, is earnings per share for firm i either in fiscal year f+1, t or fiscal year t— 1, and
all variables are scaled by a firm-size measure, that being sales in year t. In addition, we
also run the Dechow et al. (1998) model, where we regress future operating cash flows on
current and past accounting information. The model is as follows:
OCF,,,+, = a + a, X,,, + a: X,,,_, (3b)
where OCF, is the operating cash flow for firm i in fiscal year t, scaled by total sales, and all
other variables are as previously defined. Again, the model's ^-squared is indicative of the
predictive ability of current accounting information, with higher values reflecting more
predictive ability.
3.4. Accruals quality
Following the Dechow and Dichev model (2002), we run changes in working capital on
past, present, and future cash-flow realizations (see also Aboody & Liu, 2003; Francis et al.,
2003; Myers et al., 2003). The focus is on working capital, since related cash-flow
realizations generally occur within one year. The model is estimated for the IFRS and the
U.S. GAAP sample:
A WC„ = a + a, OCF,.,
,
+ a2 OCF„ + a3 OCF,,+ i (4a)
where AWC are changes in working capital (scaled by total sales) and all other variables
are as previously defined. As pointed out by Dechow and Dichev (2002), a positive sign
is expected on both past and future cash flows and a negative sign on current cash flows.
A higher explanatory power of the model indicates high earnings or accruals quality. To
control further for quality effects caused by the negative coefficient on current cash
flows, we also run the model suggested by Wysocki (2004):
A WC„ =«„ + «, OCF„ (4b)
A relatively large R~ of model 4a compared to model 4b reflects high earnings quality
(adjusting for the potential effect of income smoothing). An overview of all specified
attributes is provided in Table 1
.
Note that we do not apply the measure most often used in aceounting research to capture size -total assets.
Our reason is that total assets are largely determined by the standards, which might significantly bias our results.
We did consider other size measures, such as market capitalization and number of shares, and obtained similar
results.
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4. Sample selection
To perform this exploratory study, we selected a sample of German New Market firms.
According to the listing requirements of this equity market, firms are obliged to report
financial statements that are either IFRS or U.S. GAAP compliant. Selecting firms that are
listed on the same market exchange offers the advantage that institutional factors (like
market structure and organization) are constant across all sample firms.
In particular, we selected firms with an IPO date from 1997 through 1999. We identified
184 IPOs. To further ensure a minimum time period for performing robust tests, we single
out only those firms that were continuously traded between 2001 and the beginning of
2003, leaving us with 168 firms. For these firms, we checked the Thomson Worldscope
database, which offers capital market data as well as financial statement data. A number of
firms were dropped either because they are not included in the database ( 1 5) or because the
financial information is incomplete (8). For the remaining firms, we also collected hardcopy
versions of their financial statements, readily downloadable from the New Market website.
We used these reports to check both the firm's identity and the conformity of key
accounting data between the New Market information and the Worldscope database. Ten
observations were deleted due to inconclusive results on this test. Two firms in the financial
sector were eliminated because of their very specific character. And, four firms that are
cross-listed on NASDAQ or NYSE were dropped, since the quality of those statements
might be different due to SEC requirements following (Lang et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006).
On all 129 remaining firms, we retrieved data from the Worldscope database. Financial
statement data, like earnings, book value of equity and operational cash flows, were
collected on an annual basis for the period 2000-2002. Price data at several points in time
during that same period were also gathered. As a result, we obtained 325 firm year
observations. Consistent with Collins et al. (1999) and Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999), we
required each observation to have a positive book value of equity, which resulted in
dropping seven firm-year observations. Subsequently, observations with missing price data
were dropped and observations falling in the top or bottom 1% of some of the variables
Table 1
Overview of attribute metrics
Attribute Model specification
RET ...-?,,- :MX„/P,.,-,)+a 2DX+J..(.\„ P,., ,)*DX
P„=a„ + a!X,+ ^DX + ^X./DX + ouBV,,.,
X, f\ . -<!„ + </, RET„, + l i :DR + a :,RET„*DR
X,,.,=oi„+0(|X„+0(
:X,,.|
O(.'F,,-i=a + aiX, ,+a :X,,-|
AWC„=oto+aiOCFj.^i +a20CF„+a3OCFi , ,
AWC,..=a„+a,OCF„
where RET,, is the market-adjusted return. X„ is earnings per share, P, is the security price 3 months after fiscal year
end, BV,,
,
is the book value of equality at the beginning of the period t, DX (DR) is a dummy equal to 1 when
earnings (returns) are negative and otherwise, OCF„ is the operating cash flow for firm i in fiscal year / and
AW C is the change in non-cash working capital from year r- 1 to /. All variables used in model 3a. }b. 4a and 4b
•no scaled by totals sales in year
;
Value relevance Model 1A
Model IB
Timeliness Model 2
Predictability Model 3A
Model 3B
Accruals Quality Model 4A
Model 4B
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used later on in the multivariate model (such as opening price-deflated earnings) were
further excluded to reduce the effect of outliers on the regression results. The final sample
includes 3 1 3 firm-year-observations spread over 1 24 firms.
5. Results
To obtain comparability across our different metrics, we limit our analysis to
investigating the quality of year 2000, 2001, and 2002 accounting data. The sample
period is restricted because the evaluation of some of the above earnings models not only
requires data in that specific year, but also data from the previous and following year. Since
the sample firms have IPO dates from 1997 until the end of 1999, collecting comparable
price data on all sample firms can only begin at the end of 1999 (or beginning 2000). By
necessity, value-relevance models can only start with the reflection of year 2000 accounting
information captured in returns over the year 2000. Also, due to a restructuring of the
German New Market6 and changing standards' requirements, the data collection ended
with 2002 accounting data. Before discussing the results, some descriptive statistics are
given in the following section.
5.1. Descriptive statistics
The sample consists of 313 firm-year observations, covering the period 2000-2003 and
collected from 124 different companies (see Table 2, Panel A). The number of observations
per accounting period is almost equally distributed, ranging from 103 to 107 observations.
The vast majority of the selected sample firms are incorporated in Germany, 7 had an IPO on
the New Market during 1999, and their activities typically consist of computer or
technology-oriented businesses (see Table 2, panels B, C, and D, respectively). Firms listed
on the New Market are obliged to report either according to IFRS or according to U.S.
GAAP. Overall, there is a slight preference for IFRS (164 versus 149).
Table 3 provides some more descriptive statistics on accounting and capital market
information. First, the stock market on which the sample firms are traded is characterized by
an overall downward trend: on average, prices per share melt down from €24.03 at the end
of 2000 to €3.37 in 2002. The annual returns, furthermore, show that most of the loss is
inclined during 2001 (- 15%), while 2002 returns already suggest some recovery (+ 16%).
Second, the bad economic environment in which these firms operate is also reflected in
their accounting information. Finns, on average, end with a negative earnings number
(Earnings Per Share are equal to €^0.97, €—1.31, and €-1.16. respectively).
Shareholders' equity is also cut back during this period, as it drops from €7.61 per
share in 2000 to €3.79 per share in 2002.
The German New Market, or the high-tech and innovative market segment of the Deutsche Borse, was closed
down on 5 June 2003. All former companies from the Neuer Market segment were migrated into either the Prime
Standard or the General Standard, where other reporting requirements were in force.
At this time, there is a body of literature on country effects in applying IFRS (e.g.. Ding et al., 2006; Hope
et al., 2006; Renders & Gaeremynck. 2006). However, given the relatively low number of non-German firms in
our sample, we do not explore the country effect
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Table 2
General descriptives on observations and sample firms
Full sample IFRS US GAAP
Panel A: General sample distribution (firm year observations)
2000 103
2001 107
2002 103
Pooled 313
Panel B: Distribution according to the country of origin (sample firms)
Austria 6
Germany 1 1
Netherlands 3
Switzerland 2
Israel 3
124
Panel C: Distribution according to date of first listing (sample firms)
During 1997 7
During 1998 30
During 1999 87
124
Panel D: Distribution across industry (sample firms)''
Technology 28
Biotechnology 6
Software 2
1
Internet 19
Media & entertainment 13
Telecommunications
IT services 19
Medical technology & healthcare 3
Industry & industrial services 8
124
57 46
55 52
52 51
164 149
5 1
61 49
1 2
1 1
3
68 56
4 3
16 14
48 39
68 56
15 13
2 4
8 7
14 11
10 3
2 5
11 8
1 2
5 3
68 56
" This classification is based on the New Market's indices.
The evolution in the total assets ofour sample firms is remarkable. While we expect these
firms to expand their asset pool at a rather high rate (since the New Market is aimed at high-
growth firms), we notice instead that the firms seem to abandon their expansion strategy and
even divest, with an average drop in total assets of€ 1 02 million in 200 1 and € 1 5 million in
2002. Overall, however, the firms become operationally better, as evidenced by the increase
in operating cash flow (€-5,252,000 in 2000 to € 1 ,5 1 1 ,000 and even €6,8 1 8,000 in 2002).
Looking at the working-capital accruals, and combined with the changes in earnings, these
results suggest that accruals and thus accounting decisions are of considerable influence.
From panel B of Table 3, we further conclude that the market, in general, does not attach
significantly different prices to U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms (/? = 0.5035). Note that the
market did price the U.S. GAAP-compliant companies significantly higher than their IFRS
counterparts in 2000 (i.e., €32.07 compared to € 1 7.54; p= 0.0369). However, from 2001
onwards, after some large scale U.S. financial scandals, the market no longer priced these
investments differently (e.g., €10.12 versus €6.70; p = 0.53 10). The reported earnings
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number is, in general, not dependent on the applied accounting standards (€-1.16
compared to €-1.18). In addition, and consistent with prior research, our results also
suggest that firms choosing U.S. GAAP, on average, report lower equity numbers per share
(e.g., €5.30 versus €6.16 for the pooled sample), and in consequence also lower total
assets (e.g., € 1 1 8 million versus € 1 6 1 million). Although the pattern is present in nearly all
years, this difference between IFRS and U.S. GAAP is not significant.
5.2. Multivariate models
Differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP earnings with regard to the four attributes we
defined are reflected in (differences in) the models' ^-squared between the IFRS sample
and the U.S. GAAP sample. Since we are analyzing firm-year observations, we also control
for dependence in the error terms through the Rogers' procedure (Petersen, 2006; Rogers,
1993).' Results are presented in Table 4. As shown in the table, we estimate cross-sectional
regressions for the pooled sample, since pooling offers the advantage of increased sample
size, hence, increasing the power of the Cramer test (e.g., Baringhaus & Franz, 2004).
5.2.1. Value relevance
First, running the returns/earnings model, we obtain an R~ of 16.33% for the IFRS
sample and 28.36% for the U.S. GAAP sample, in line with other value-relevance studies
performed during the 1990s (see, for example, Brown et al., 1999; Collins et al., 1997).
Applying the Cramer test statistic, we find only marginal evidence (t= 1.57) of U.S. GAAP
earnings explaining more variance in the share-value evolution (that is, assuming that prices
are good indicators of a share's value) than IFRS.
Based on the alternative-valuation model, where we control for some of the suggested
misspecification in the returns/earnings model, we find no significant difference between
the two sets. Overall, neither set of standards makes accounting information more or less
value relevant than the other. The explanatory power of the estimated models is higher than
for model 1 A (R2 of 37.53% for IFRS versus 32.54% for U.S. GAAP; r = 0.63). indicating
that (book value of) equity under the two sets of standards adds significantly to the
explanatory power of earnings (with estimated-parameter statistics of. respectively, 6.24
and 3.25). In sum. these results seem to suggest that earnings stated according to IFRS
capture approximately as much value-relevant information as U.S. earnings numbers, and
vice versa.
5.2.2. Timeliness
In model 2, we measure timeliness of accounting data and use returns as an indicator of
firm-specific news. By applying market-adjusted returns, we further control for any other,
market or economy-wide, information reaching the investor public. Consistent with prior
studies (e.g., Raonic et al., 2004), we find that the overall power of the timeliness model
remains relatively low and IFRS seems to be as timely as U.S. GAAP in reflecting news (R~
of 2.72 compared to 5.49; r=0.59). In sum. this seems to suggest that accounting
While this leads to unbiased coefficient estimates, it does not change our metric of interest (the model's R~
compared to OLS estimation.
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information in itself, whether it is stated according to IFRS or U.S. GAAP, is not very
timely for the sample firms at hand.
5 2 3 Predictability
As discussed in the models section, predictability can be measured by running an
autoregressive earnings model and evaluating the model's ^-square. The results we
obtained on the two samples are presented m Table 4. model 3a. In general, our results
indicate that U.S. GAAP data better predict future performance than IFRS data (R~ of
45.98% compared to 19.38%). The difference is significant at the 5% level (r=3.55). The
results on the Dechow. Kothari, and Watts (1998) model provide further support for the
superiority of U.S. GAAP earnings. We clearly discriminate between the predictive ability
of U.S. GAAP and IFRS information (R2 of 39.03% respectively 7.12%: z=4.70).
5.2.4. Accrual quality
Finally, the results with regard to accruals quality are reported. These results suggest that
the quality of accounting accruals does not significantly differ depending on which
accounting standards are applied. The Dechow & Dichev measure results in 7?-squares of
13.23% for U.S. GAAP observations and 11.87% for IFRS observations (r = 0.20). In an
attempt to capture the degree of (working capital) income smoothing, we run working-
capital accruals only on the current operating cash flow (model 4b) and we find that both
sets of standards are associated with some income smoothing. However, in general, there is
no significant difference between IFRS and U.S. GAAP smoothing behavior (R~ of 3.88%
versus 0.78%: f=0.89). Consistent with Wysocki (2004). we subtract the (adjusted) R-
square of model 4b from the ^-square of model 4a to control for any current-year income-
smoothing effects. Applying this procedure to our data, we find further evidence that there
are no significant differences between the quality of IFRS and U.S. GAAP accruals
(ad] usted R~ differences of 6.93% on the pooled IFRS sample compared to 1 1.33% on the
U.S. GAAP observations: t=0.1\ not tabulated).
5.3. Robustness tests
In this section, we test the sensitiuty of our results to other specifications. First, we
introduce a quality enforcer into our analysis. Based on year 2000 annual reports. Glaum
and Street (2003) found that although the average compliance level is significantly lower
for companies that apply IFRS as compared to companies applying U.S. GAAP, it is also
positively associated with firms being audited by Big 5 auditing firms. Acknowledging the
potential correcting role of these higher quality Big 5 auditors (e.g.. Street & Gray. 2002;
Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen. 2005). we additionally ran the models on the Big 5 subsample
only i V=207). Interestingly, there are more Big5-audited firms in the U.S. GAAP sample
than in the IFRS subsample. As shown in Table 5. U.S. GAAP earnings remain better
predictors of future company performance than IFRS earnings, while the two regimes are
comparable on all other attributes. Moreover, the marginal significance on model 1A
reported in Table 4 is no longer present in this analysis.
Second, prior research on accounting-regime choice documents that firms do not
randomly choose their accounting regime, hut instead are driven by certain firm
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characteristics (e.g.. Asbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005; Tarca, 2004; Van der
Meulen et al., 2005). As a result, it is unclear whether the observed attribute patterns are due
to the applied accounting standards or whether they are associated with underlying firm
characteristics. To test this argument, we first split the full sample according to a number of
firm characteristics and then reran all regression models (for the IFRS and U.S. GAAP
subsample). The splits are based on (median) firm size (measured by total assets) and
leverage (as long-term debt over equity) and are reported in Table 6. In general, the U.S.
GAAP superiority on predictive ability is further confirmed (e.g., z= 12.67 and 5.13 for
model 3a respectively 3b for large firms, panel A). For large and highly levered firms, we
furthermore find that the market values U.S. GAAP earnings more than IFRS earnings
(model la, z= 1.84 respectively 2.15). However, this result disappears when book values
are taken into account (model lb, r = 0.14 respectively 1.21), suggesting that the balance
sheet for IFRS firms contains valuable information. 1 "
Finally, and in addition to the R~ comparison, we also used an alternative methodological
approach (not further tabulated). We estimated one regression model based on all 313
observations and introducing an indicator variable (STAND) for either IFRS or U.S. GAAP
adopters. The coefficient on STAND represents the intercept shift between IFRS and U.S.
GAAP. We tested the interaction of each independent variable in the respective models with
STAND, and find significant coefficients on the interaction terms (representing the slope
shifts between the two standard regimes) in the predictability models (e.g.,/?-value of0.0125
and 0.08 1 8 on interacting last year's earnings and this year's earnings with STAND variable
in model 3b). This is consistent with the results we report earlier in the paper.
6. Summary
In this study we report empirical evidence about attribute differences between U.S.
GAAP and IFRS earnings for a sample of new-economy firms in a period of economic
downturn. We test two market-based earnings attributes, i.e., value relevance and
timeliness, as well as two accounting-based earnings attributes, i.e., predictability and
accrual quality. Our results indicate that U.S. GAAP and IFRS only differ with regard to
predictability. However, this difference in predictability between U.S.GAAP and IFRS does
not appear to be fully valued by investors as no significant and consistent differences
between the two standards are found for the value-relevance attributes. The latter suggests
that some of the (remaining) technical issues underlying IFRS/U.S. GAAP differences may
be too complex to be fully captured by the investor public.
As a caveat to this study, we acknowledge that our results may not be fully representative
for the average IFRS/U.S. GAAP adopter. While most (U.S. -based) studies focus on the
average firm captured in large data sets, our study addresses a specific sample of high-
growth firms in a period of economic downturn. Although this has implications for the
We also ran a two-stage Heckman procedure (Heckman, 1474) ami concluded ihee was no significant
selection bias. However, we preferred the current approach for two reasons: to keep the Fr comparison across
models/samples possible, and to control for the impact of firm characteristics on the regression variables.
"' Note however that some models are estimated on a rather small sample, thereby the Cramer test might not be
fully representative
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Table 6
Multivariate results controlling for firm characteristics
Panel A: Models' explanatory power when controlling for firm size
Small firms Large firms
IFRS (A"=8I) US GAAP (A'= 76) r-statistic IFRS (N= 83) US GAAP (^=73) r -statistic
Model la 0.1989
[6.37]**
0.2492
[7.97]**
04(, 0.1537
[4.78]**
0.3519
[12.49]**
1.84**
Model lb (i 3078
[7.89]**
0.1737
[3.68]**
1.22 4200
[14.12]**
04343
[13.05]**
14
Model 2 0.0393
[1.05]
0.0403
[1.01]
0.01 0526
[146]
0.1212
[3.17]**
0.78
Model 3a 0.3634
[22.26]**
0.6645
[72 28]**
3.27** 0.0025
[0.10]
0.7079
[84.83]**
12.67**
Model 3b 0.0767
[3.24]**
0.4357
[28.18]**
3.78** 1431
[6.68]**
0.6108
[54.92]**
5.13**
Model 4a 0.1385 0.1045 0.2716 0.2408 1.25 0.2255 0.1965 0.1563 0.1180 0.63
[4.13]** [8.95]** [7.67]** [1.29]
Model 4b 0.0139 0.0012 (10152 (10015 0.03 0634 1)05 /v 0.0029 -0.0108 1.07
[1.11] [1.14] [5.48]** [0.20]
Panel B: Models' explanatory power when controlling for lev erage
Less levered firms Highly levered firms
IFRS (A'=64) US GAAP (7V= 93) r-statistic IFRS (N= 100) US GAAP ^=56) r-statistic
Model la 0.2627
[7.12]**
0.3146
[13.62]**
0.46 0.1364
[5.05]**
03742
[10.36]**
2.15**
Model lb 0.5006
[14.03]**
I) 3834
[1368]**
1.13 0.2802
[9.15]**
0.4164
[9.10]**
1.21
Model 2 0.1201
[2.73]**
0.0910
[2 L»71**
0.30 0.0309
[1.02]
0.0710
[1.32]
0.49
Model 3a 0.4607
[38.44]**
1102:0
[50.32]**
1.80** 0.0218
[1.08]
0.5566
[33.27]**
6.58**
Model 3b 0.2707
[11.32]**
0.4302
[33.97]**
1.43 0.0691
[3.60]**
0.2707
[9.83]**
1.90**
Model 4a 0.1982 0.1582 0.2770 2526 0.70 0.1761 0.1504 0.2800 2iS4 0.90
[4.95]** [11 37]** [6.84]** [6 74]**
Model 4b 0.0738 0.0588 0.0297 0.0191 0.61 0.0207 0.0107 0\Wi<, 0.0944 1.08
[4.94]** [2.79]** [2.07] [6.73]**
where model 1A: R£T,,, = ao +0(|(X„/P,, , ) + a : DX + a,(X„/P,, ,)
model IB: P,-,=a +a, X„ + a 2 DX + a, X„*DX + a, BV, , ,
model 2: X„ P,
, l =a +a, RET„ + « : DR+o, RET :/ *DR
model 3a: X,„i=a + oti X„+a 2 X ; , ,
model 3B: OCF,.,*, =a„ + a, X,,+ cc, X,,
,
model 4A: AWC„=a ll + a, OCF, , , +a : OCF„ + a, OCF, , ,
,
model 4B: AWC
;
,=a +«i OCF,,
DX
Note, /"-statistics on the parameters are presented between ( ) while the overall model's f-test is mentioned
between [ ]; *. **=05 p-value<.10, respectively. Adjusted R~ are presented in italics.
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validity ofour results to other firms and other time periods, it yields insights into the relative
performance of accounting regimes for firms in financial difficulties and firms that have
considerable amounts of intangible assets.
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Discussion
Discussion of "Attribute differences between U.S.
GAAP and IFRS earnings: An exploratory study"
Ole-Kristian Hope
Rolman School of Management. University oj Toronto
1. Introduction
Using firms listed on the German Neuer Markt, Van der Meulen, Gaeremynck, and
Willekens (henceforth MGW) investigate whether there are significant difference in four
attributes of earnings between firms that apply U.S. GAAP and firms that apply IFRS (or
IAS). In my opinion, this study provides a timely investigation of an issue of considerable
interest to both regulators and academics. Currently about 100 countries either require or
allow the use of IFRS for their domestic publicly listed corporations. In the near future, we
will likely only have two accounting standards worldwide: IFRS and U.S. GAAP. 1 Given
the adoption of IFRS around the world and the relative lack of evidence on effects of such
adoption, the authors do not have to try hard to motivate their study.
MGW have made several improvements to the paper following their presentation - and
my discussion of their paper - at the International Journal ofAccounting Conference in
Paris. Consequently, my discussion here will be relatively brief and will focus on a few
selected issues.
DOI of original article: 10.1016/j.intacc.2007.04.001.
E-mail address: okhopeto'Rotman.Utoronto.Ca.
Whether such a "convergence" to one or two accounting standards is optimal or not is hard to say. It is my
feeling that the decision to require IFRS and thus abolish domestic GAAPs - around the world has been mostly
based on "faith" rather than on solid evidence suggesting an overall gain to society (see also Ball. 2006).
0020-7063/S30.00 © 2007 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
doi:10.l016/j.intacc.2007.04.002
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2. Relation to literature
In my opinion, MGW complement the extant literature on differences between IFRS and
U.S. GAAP." That is, there are several prior studies that examine the quality of financial
reporting across countries. Similarly, there are prior studies that focus on the Gennan
market but which either use small sample sizes or focus on information-asymmetry
outcomes rather than earnings attributes. Since quite a few studies examine IAS versus U.S.
GAAP, the main contribution of this study likely lies in its focus on one market, Neuer
Markt, as well as its investigation of several (not just one or two) earnings attributes. 1
Focusing on one market is a strength because it holds many institutional factors constant
(see, however, my comments below regarding differential enforcement). On the other hand,
it also significantly limits the sample size (which, as explained below, rums out to be
important in this setting), and limits the generalizability of results. 4
3. Use of R 2 as a test metric and the Cramer test
At the conference, I raised the question of why the authors have chosen to focus on
differences in R~s between two samples of firms. In my opinion, this choice has few (if any)
advantages and several important disadvantages. Suffice to say that it is very difficult to
compare R~ across different groups of firms (which explains why we do not see such tests
often in research papers). The authors do not provide any discussion ofwhy they have made
this choice. An alternative would be to instead focus on differences in coefficient estimates.
Using such an approach, they could pool all observations and easily test for differences
between the two groups using interaction terms/
Similarly, even ignoring the inherent difficulties involved in comparing R's across
samples, the Cramer test used for testing differences in R~ between samples is an unusually
weak test metric. In particular, the Cramer test is extremely sensitive to the number of
observations included in the tests. This fact is important for the current paper because
MGW want to be able to conclude that there "are no significant differences" between the
" In their literature review, MGW discuss research on 20F reconciliations at sonic length. Such research is of
relevance to regulators (i.e., the SEC), hut the limitation of these studies is that they only examine firms already
listed, whereas regulators may care even more about foreign firms that are not currently listed on the domestic
exchange. In addition, the reconciliation stream of literature tends to focus on incremental value relevance (or
information content, depending on the type of study) of additional, required U.S. GAAP disclosures. Such
research does nol directly address which GAAP system is '"best." Instead, it tests whether there is any additional
information conveyed in having extra information disclosed (a subtle but important difference often overlooked in
the literature
i
Readers should note that there are other papers that investigate differences between IAS and U.S. GAAP using
German firms. For example. Bartov, Goldberg, and Kam (2005) examine value- relevance differences. Van
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) study earnings management differences (i.e . "abnormal accruals" differences),
and Leuz (2003) focuses on differences in bid ask spreads and trading volume.
In addition, the sample period is marked by declining firm performance "Value relevance" tests do not
perform particularly well during such periods.
At the conference I made several specific comments on the four earnings attributes For example. 1 do not
understand why the authors use the R~ from the Dechow and Dichev model when other studies use the standard
deviation of the residuals from this model. Furthermore. I am not quite sure how different the test of "timeliness"
is from the test of "value relevance."
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use of IFRS and U.S. GAAP. A quick perusal of the empirical results reveals a number of
differences in R~ that seem large in magnitude hut which show up as either statistically
insignificant or only marginally significant based on the Cramer statistic. 6 For example, in
the first regression results reported (Model la in Table 4), the R 2 for the U.S. GAAP sample
is 12 percentage points higher than for the IFRS sample (0.2836 compared with 0.1633).
However, the reported results show only very modest (if any) significance, with a reported z
statistic of 1.57. To highlight how sensitive this statistic is to the sample size, I recomputed
the z statistic after artificially increasing the sample size by 200. The resulting z statistic is
2.36, which is highly significant. As another example, in panel A of Table 6, the R 2 % for
large firms in Model 2 using IFRS and U.S. GAAP are 0.0526 and 0.1212, respectively.
Although the latter is 2.3 times larger than the former, the difference is reported as not being
significant according to the Cramer test. Similarly, in the last row of panel A of Table 6, the
R2 for U.S. GAAP is almost 22 times greater than for IFRS. Still, the difference is deemed
insignificant. Such results are indicative of a weak test.
4. GAAP differences
Given that MGW focus on properties of accounting earnings, the paper would benefit
from a richer discussion of the actual accounting differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP
during the sample period. Such a discussion would be interesting for several reasons. First
of all, some readers may not know if there were any material GAAP differences and if so,
which they were. Second, if the GAAP differences were small during the sample period,
one would expect differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS to be (even) smaller today
than they were back then. Finally, knowing more about specific accounting differences
would help readers interpret the reported results. In particular, are the results due to
accounting differences or to differences in firm characteristics? For example, MGW find
that U.S. GAAP firms have more predictable earnings. 7 A reader would like to know which
accounting differences are likely to cause such a result—or whether the difference in
predictability is unrelated to the use of different accounting standards (i.e.. explained by
firm characteristics instead).
5. The potential for differential enforcement
One of the strengths of the study is that by focusing on one market, Neuer Markt, the
authors are able to hold many institutional factors constant. However, it is not clear that till
such factors are constant between the two sets of firms. One such important institutional
factor is the enforcement of accounting standards. In practice, enforcement can be as
important in explaining accounting outcomes as the standards themselves (e.g., Hope,
2003). Applied to the MGW setting, I am not entirely convinced that the auditing of IAS
was as stringent as the auditing of U.S. GAAP financial statements.
In my conference discussion I provided several such examples, which presumably explains why the authors
chose to present results of pooled regressions (rather than year-by-year regressions) in the published version.
A general issue in the literature is whether predictability is good or bad. That is. smoothing is considered
"bad" but smooth earnings are considered "good."
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Generally speaking, prior research has found considerable evidence of noncompliance
with IAS (e.g.. Cairns, 1999). To me this is especially interesting given that IAS allowed
wide latitude in accounting measurement and recognition, and IAS as applied in practice
was often referred to as "IAS light." More specifically, during the sample period there was
no strong market regulator for the German market, and none of the authorities were
responsible for checking the accuracy and completeness of the financial statements (d'Arcy,
2001; Glaum & Street, 2003). In fact, Glaum and Street (2003. 92) state the following
regarding the collapse of the Neuer Markt: "ironically, the sharp downfall has been
attributed in part to the low quality of accounting and disclosure." Glaum and Street (2003)
document that the level ofGAAP compliance is significantly lower for IAS companies than
for U.S. GAAP companies listed on the Neuer Markt, suggesting that IAS was applied less
rigorously than U.S. GAAP.
I appreciate the fact that the authors have attempted the address the issue of differential
enforcement I raised at the conference. Specifically, MGW report multivariate results
excluding firms that are not audited by Big 5 audit firms. This is a nice test.' However,
Glaum and Street (2003) show that GAAP disclosure compliance is significantly higher for
Neuer Markt U.S. GAAP firms than for Neuer Markt IAS firms, even after controlling for
auditor type.
6. Differences in firm characteristics (other than auditor)
One of the main concerns with the study is that readers may not be convinced that
reported results can be attributed to accounting differences (or lack of accounting dif-
ferences) between IFRS and U.S. GAAP and not to the fact that we are dealing with two
different sets of firms (i.e., omitted firm variables).
In the post conference version, MGW show results separately for small and large firms
and for less and more levered firms. This is a useful addition to the paper. Nevertheless, it
also highlights the weakness of the research design employed (which is a result of focusing
on differences in R~). Since the sample size likely is not large enough to use a matched
sample design, a complementary (and efficient) test would be to add intercept controls for
important firm characteristics (e.g., as in Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2005).
7. Conclusion
This is an interesting study that examines an issue of great importance to both
practitioners and academics. It is an unresolved issue—whether there exists material
differences in accounting outcomes between the two (main) remaining GAAP systems
worldwide, IFRS and U.S. GAAP, and whether such differences (if they exist) have
economic consequences. The article by Van der Meulen, Gaeremynck and Willekens will
Note that the R~ for Model 3a (earnings predictability—the only test for which significant differences are
found) m Table 5 is only 0363 as compared with 0.1938 in Table 4. This huge difference in explanatory power
suggests that either "something else is going on'" or that there is very significant noise in the estimation of these
models.
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provide motivation for future research on the economic consequences of IFRS imple-
mentation around the world.
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1. Introduction
We thank the discussant, Ole-Kxistian Hope, and an anonymous reviewer for their
constructive comments and suggestions. We use this opportunity to address the following
topics that embrace their most important comments: potentially differential enforcement;
the use of the R~ as a test metric and the Cramer test; discussion ofGAAP differences; and
firm-characteristic controls.
2. Potential for differential enforcement
Glaum and Street (2003) find indeed that the average level of compliance with
disclosure requirements on Germany's New Market is significantly lower for finus that
apply IFRS than for companies applying U.S. GAAP. However, Glaum and Street also
show that compliance is higher for firms audited by a Big 4 auditor, and that the difference
between the two sets of standards also becomes smaller for such firms. Accordingly, we ran
all four models on a subsample of firms audited by Big 4 auditors. Given the reduction in
sample size and the implications for the Cramer estimation, we choose to report this as an
additional analysis rather than in the paper's base results section.
This paper was presented at the Illinois International Accounting Symposium held at HEC in Pans. France, on
June 8 10, 2006.
DOIs of original article: 10.1O16/j.intacc.2007.04.001.10.1016/j.intacc.2007.04.0(>2
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Next to auditor type. Glaum and Street also identify other factors that positively
influence firms' compliance level with disclosure rules. These include being cross-listed on
a U.S. exchange and the inclusion in the audit opinion of explicit references to the applied
standards. We want to emphasize that both factors are indirectly controlled for in our study
through our sample selection procedure. First, we excluded firms that are cross-listed on a
U.S. exchange. We primarily motivate this decision by referring to prior evidence (Lang.
Raedy, & Yetman, 2003) on differing time series properties of earnings for cross-listed (as
opposed to non-cross-listed) firms. As mentioned above, Glaum and Street also favor a
separate consideration of U.S. cross-listings. However, in their paper disclosure items are
studied; this does not necessarily imply that compliance is equally "problematic" for
measurement issues and bottom-line earnings (as concluded by Glaum and Street). Second,
we identified firms as either IFRS or U.S. GAAP adopters by inspecting both the Notes
section and the auditor's report. Only when both documents explicitly mentioned the
adoption of the same standard, did we include the firm in our sample. Applying such
selection criteria is likely to result in a more homogenous sample, where differences
between IFRS and U.S. GAAP-compliance levels are probably less pronounced than in the
sample used by Glaum and Street.
3. Use of the R ' as a test metric and the Cramer test
Prior research has identified and modelled a number of accounting attributes, using
various regression models. When estimating these models, researchers have typically
focused on either the coefficient estimates (see for example studies in the ERC and
persistence literature, but also Givoly & Hayn, 1992; Francis, Schipper, & Vincent, 2003)
or on the model's R~ (see for example Alford, Jones, Leftwich. & Zmijewski, 1993; Harris,
Lang, & Moller, 1994; Joos & Lang, 1994; Pope & Rees, 1992). The focus critically
depends on the study's purpose. For example, coefficients are typically studied when one is
interested in the incremental explanatory value of one variable over and above other
specified variables already in the model, while the R2 captures the overall degree of
association between the dependent variable and all independent variables. Likewise,
Holthausen and Watts (2001) classify prior value relevance literature into incremental (or
coefficient) and relative association (or R~) studies, respectively.
In our exploratory study, we are interested in evaluating quality attributes of overall
IFRS versus overall U.S. GAAP compliant accounting information. In the case of
timeliness, for example, we are interested in the overall timeliness of earnings and less in
the split up between timeliness towards good or bad news. Therefore, we choose the R~ as a
measure of reference. To test for differences between the two standards sets, we then
estimated the models on both IFRS and U.S. GAAP information separately and compared
the resulting R~. Prior research (for example, the reconciliation literature) applies a Vuong
test to make statistically valid inferences. However, in our setting where firms either apply
IFRS or U.S. GAAP, but not both, we need to additionally control for sample differences.
Consistent with other empirical, accounting research in recent years (e.g., Ball, Kothari, &
Robin, 2000; Ely & Pownall, 2002; Giner & Rees, 1999; Lang et al„ 2003; Nwaeze, 1998;
Harris et al., 1994), we apply the Cramer test (1987) and accordingly estimate the standard
deviation of estimated R's.
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However, and as pointed out by Cramer himself, the discussant and in footnote 9 of our
paper, the computations might not be robust for small samples. To accommodate for some
of the deficiencies in the Cramer estimation, we also executed a bootstrap analysis.
Bootstrapping is a relatively new, nonparametric approach to statistical inferences, and
increasingly used in accounting research (e.g. Malliaropulos, 1996; Goncharov, Werner, &
Zimmerman, 2007). The approach allows for the construction of significance levels for a
test statistic without a priori assumptions about the statistics sampling distribution. The
distribution itself is estimated by constructing an infinite or large amount of re-samples and
using the within-sample variation in R~ . The samples are taken randomly from the original
sample and without replacement. As such, the bootstrap method helps to reduce the bias
that typically originates from using a small sample. Performing a bootstrap with 300 re-
sampling iterations on the Big 5 subsample, we obtained significant r-statistics of 2.33 and
1.83 on model 3a, 3b respectively. For all other models, the r-statistic was insignificant,
ranging from 0.04 in model 4a to 0.53 in model lb).
Notwithstanding our design choice, we do acknowledge that there may exist potential
benefits from using the coefficients approach. For example, it might lead to interesting
insights on the incremental effect of specific earnings components. In addition, such an
analysis could further confirm the robustness of our R~ results. Therefore, and as mentioned
in the last paragraph in the results section, we pooled all observations, introduced a
dichotomous variable to reflect the applied standards and interacted this variable with all
explanatory variables. Significant differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP are reflected
Table 1
Modelling predictive ability of past and present earnings using the coefficient approach and additionally
controlling for some firm characteristics
Model: X,
, + l
= a
(
,
+ a, X„ + a, X, ,_, + a3 STAND,, + aA STAND it *Xj, + a5 STAND/X,,.,
ah SIZE,, + a, LEVERAGE,, + a8 B5„ +«q MTOB,,
t-value R-squarcd
-0.88 0.30**
0.97
-2.10**
-0.20
0.60
I 75*
1.17
1.20
0.16
-1.53
where X is earnings per share, STAND is an indicator variable equalling 1 when US
GAAP is applied and for IFRS, SIZE is the natural logarithm of toial assets.
LEVERAGE is long term debt over equity. B5 is an indicator variable equalling 1 when the
firm engages a Big 5 auditor. MTOB is the market to book ratio, and i and t are indexes
referring to firm i and year t respective!)
coefficient estimate
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in the significance of the interaction coefficient. As reported in the paper, the results from
this analysis confirm the R~ results: only in the predictive ability models do we find a
significant difference (/= 1.79; not further tabulated). Adding intercept controls for firm
characteristics, as suggested by the discussant and the anonymous reviewer, does not
significantly alter our results (see Table 1 ).
4. GAAP differences and firm-level controls
With regard to the GAAP differences between the two regimes under study, we agree
with the discussant that our discussion section is rather concise. However, given the aim of
this paper, being an exploratory research on earnings attributes, we feel that the focus
should be on bottom-line reported earnings numbers and less on the standards and their
wording. There are already ample discussion reports out there, edited by professionals at
some of the most renown accounting firms, that document these differences at great length
(e.g., KPMG). For the sample period we covered, we especially refer to the FASB's study
(Bloomer, 1999) The IASC-U.S. Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and
Differences between IASC Standards and U.S. GAAP-second edition. So instead of trying to
complement those studies with yet another comparison, we prefer to cross-reference these
studies in our paper.
To test the materiality ofthe differences, we point out that direct tests can only be performed
on a sample of firms that report according to both standards sets. So far, the U.S. setting where
foreign firms publish IFRS financial statements together with a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP is
the only possible setting to make such computations. Street, Nichols, and Gray (2000) and
Blanco and Osma (2003), for example, concluded on highly material reconciliation amounts
(of about 20% of U.S. GAAP earnings). Blanco and Osma (2003) also document material
differences in the period after the IASC's Core Standards Project (post 1998), but they also
observe that the materiality is decreasing. However, also in this later period, reconciliation
amounts seem to have an economic impact since trading volume reactions are registered
around the reconciliation announcement. Nevertheless, this setting also introduces some less-
desirable characteristics (e.g.. differences in enforcement and in reporting incentives), which
makes the results less applicable to our German New Market sample.
In an attempt to control for differences in company characteristics in the current setting,
we performed multiple tests that all pointed in the same direction. First, we made
subsamples of small/large and highly/less levered firms and reran the models. Second, we
performed a two-stage Heckman procedure to control for differences in firm characteristics.
Finally, we also added intercept controls on the firm level in the coefficient-approach
models. To the extent that these are adequate controls, we conclude that the observed
difference in predictive ability can be ascribed to the standards rather than to differences in
firm characteristics between the IFRS and U.S. GAAP subsample.
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Stock performance and the mispricing of accruals
Guohua Jiang
Guanghua School ofManagement, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, PR China
Abstract
I investigate the relationship between contemporaneous stock-price performance and the
persistence of accrued earnings, and its impact on the accrual anomaly. I find that, in a fiscal year,
accrued earnings for stocks that have performed poorly are less persistent in predicting future earnings
than accrued earnings for stocks that have performed moderately. I further find that a hedge-strategy
based on accruals earns greater abnormal returns following bad-news years. The results are consistent
with conservative accounting causing accrued earnings to be even less persistent in bad-news years and
investors failing to efficiently price this differential in persistence.
© 2007 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This study attempts to further our understanding of the "accrual anomaly." Sloan (1996)
separates corporate earnings into two components: accrued earnings and cash earnings, and
shows that accrued earnings are less persistent than cash earnings in predicting one-year-
This paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation finished at the Haas School of Business of the
University of California, Berkeley. I am gTateful to my dissertation committee members Brett Trueman (chair).
James Powell and Xiao-Jun Zhang for valuable guidance. Comments and suggestions from Bokhyeon Baik, John
Briginshaw. Kevin Chen (the editor), David Tien, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Berkeley.
Peking University, and the University of Hong Kong were very helpful. I also thank the National Natural Science
Foundation of China for financial support in the revision stage of this paper (approval number 70532002).
E-mail address: gjiang@gsm.pku.edu.cn.
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ahead earnings.' Furthermore, Sloan (1996) demonstrates that the market appears to over-
estimate the persistence of accrued earnings, and hence over-/under-prices stocks with large
amounts of income-increasing/decreasing accruals. A hedge strategy that takes advantage of
the mispricing nets almost a 10% size-adjusted return in the one-year-ahead period.
This study focuses on two questions. First, under what circumstances do accrued earnings
have lower persistence in predicting future earnings? Second, do different levels of mispricing
ofaccrued earnings occur hand in hand with different levels ofpersistence ofaccrued earnings?
Invoking accounting conservatism and its impact on (accrued) earnings, I argue that
accrued earnings are less persistent when stocks perform poorly in a fiscal year, prompting
firms to record accruals following conservative accounting principles. As a result, investors,
failing to fully adjust to the differential persistence of accruals under these circumstances,
misprice accrued earnings to a greater extent in years with bad stock price performances than
in years when stock performance is moderate.
Empirical results largely support my predictions. I separate my sample firm-years into three
news groups, based on stock performance of the sample firms in each fiscal year: a good-news
group when stocks have performed well in a fiscal year; a bad-news group when stocks have
performed poorly; and a neutral-news group when stock prices have not moved much. I show
that (a) the persistence factor ofaccnied earnings (the coefficient on accruals in a regression of
future earnings on current earnings components) for the bad-news group is 16% lower than
that for the neutral-news group; and (b) the persistence factor ofaccrued earnings for the good-
news group is only 5.3% lower than that for the neutral-news group. Furthermore, the
differential persistence leads to a different level ofmispricing. In the framework ofthe Mishkin
test, investors overestimate the persistence of accnied earnings by 50.8% for the bad-news
group, by 22.5% for the good-news group, and by 18.7% for the neutral-news group.
A hedge-portfolio strategy reveals that the mispricing is economically significant. In the
Fama-French three-factor model regression, the one-year-ahead abnormal return to an
accrual-based hedge strategy is 8.8% for the bad-news group, which is significantly higher
than the 4.2% abnormal return for the neutral-news group. The one-year-ahead abnormal
return to the good-news group, 5.8%, however, is not significantly higher than that of the
neutral-news group.
The results in this study are consistent with the notion that persistence is an important
aspect of the quality of accounting earnings (Richardson et al., 2005). In particular, when
accnied earnings are preceded by abnonnally poor stock perfonnance. the persistence of
accrued earnings is lower than that of other finns, and consequently, the mispricing of
earnings is greater. The results in this study draw our attention, when we analyze financial
statements, to the economic events that drive stock-price movement. Accounting numbers
(e.g., earnings) are driven by economic events that drive stock prices at the same time. Thus,
we should analyze accounting numbers in the same environment that produces them. In this
regard, we contribute to the current literature on "accrual anomaly" by pinpointing situations
where "accnial anomaly" tends to be more severe and we hope that further research will
unravel the perplexing question of why "accnial anomaly" arises and persists.
1
Throughout this paper. I define earnings persistence as the ability of current earnings, or components of
current earnings, to predict one-year-ahead earnings. Sloan (19%), and later Richardson. Sloan. Soliman. and
Tuna (2005) used this definition Penman and Zhang (2002) used this concept in a similar fashion
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the "accrual anomaly" literature
and motivates my study. Section 3 presents an empirical analysis of accrued earnings across
the three news groups. Section 4 concludes.
2. Motivation
In the research on financial-statement analysis, researchers are very interested in how
current (or past) earnings (or earnings components) aid in forecasting future earnings or
cash flows, both of which are central inputs in accounting-valuation models
Among others, Sloan (1996) shows that accrued earnings are less persistent than cash
earnings in predicting future earnings, and presents evidence that investors seem to over-
estimate the persistence of accrued earnings and subsequently mispnee stocks with large
amounts of accrued earnings.
The Sloan (1996) results seem to have endured over time and been confirmed by others.
In follow-up papers, researchers have been able to replicate Sloan's results for different
time periods and different definitions of accruals. In addition, these papers have identified
some driving components of Sloan's (1996) results and attempted to explain why accrual
anomaly arises (Chan, Chan. Jegadeesh, & Lakonishok, 2006; Hnbar, 2000: Thomas &
Zhang, 2002; Xie, 2001).
However, the questions surrounding earnings accruals are still very perplexing. Further
research is still warranted into the causes of the differential persistence of cash earnings
versus accrued earnings and the reasons for the market's failure to price accrued earnings
correctly. The present study tries to add to the existing literature by examining accruals in
the context of contemporaneous stock performance and accounting conservatism, and then
impact on the generation of accruals.
How much contemporaneous return" news is incorporated in earnings is one factor in
determining the persistence of accruals and subsequent mispricing of accruals. As is widely
known, stock returns lead accounting earnings (e.g., Beaver, Lambert, & Morse, 1 980). Value-
relevant events drive stock-price movement faster than their economic impact flows through
the financial-reporting system. Therefore, the extent to which current earnings incorporate the
economic impact of these events (hereinafter referred to as return news) has implications for
the persistence of current earnings and for the market's forecast of future earnings.
At least two (mutually nonexclusive) reasons can affect how much contemporaneous
return news current earnings incorporate. First, current GAAP accounting rules are
inherently conservative. Accounting conservatism requires bad news to be recognized in
current earnings faster and more completely than good news. That is, in the event of bad
news, GAAP requires current accounting earnings to fully account for the implications of
the event, not only for current cash flow, but also for future cash flows. In effect, this act
brings future consequences to the present.
However, such a conservative tilt in recognition does not apply for good news. That is.
current earnings do not recognize the implications for future cash flows of good news. The
impact of good news only flows through earnings as it materializes in operation.
By "contemporaneous" I mean thai stock returns are measured during the 12 months of the same fiscal year
for which accruals are measured.
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Because the cash component of current earnings cannot be changed, management needs
to use accruals to account for the early recognition of future cash-flow implications of bad-
news events. This approach thus generates an additional amount of accrued-earnings infor-
mation in a bad-news year.
Second, as Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) argue, stock-price performance provides
management with a strong incentive to manage earnings. These researchers argue that in a
bad-news year, it is likely that the traditional earnings targets, such as outstanding analysts"
consensus-earnings forecasts, zero profit, or earnings of the last period, will not be met. In
this event, some managers tend to take a "big bath" to "clear the deck" for future years. The
"big bath" is reflected in current earnings by large amounts of income-decreasing accruals.
Thus, taking a "big bath" is consistent with accounting conservatism in the sense that they
both incorporate bad news in current earnings faster and more completely than otherwise.
Once again, because managerial discretion over cash flow is very limited, to achieve the
earnings-management objective, management has to act on accrued earnings.
In summary, both accounting conservatism and earnings management in response to
stock performance cause additional amounts of accruals to be included in current earnings.
The focus of this study is thus on the persistence of accrued earnings when stock
performance is bad/ Furthermore, I examine whether the accrual anomaly is stronger in bad-
news years. That is, whether an accrual-based hedge strategy generates larger amounts of
abnormal returns in bad-news years than otherwise.
I separate sample firm-years into three groups: a bad-news group (those firm-years in
which stocks have performed poorly); a neutral-news group (those firm-years in which stock
prices did not change much); and a good-news group (those firm-years in which stocks have
performed well). I then use the neutral-news group as my benchmark to test whether accrued
earnings in the bad-news group are less persistent than accrued earnings in the neutral-news
group, and whether such differences in persistence lead to different levels of mispricing.
Similarly, I also test the differences between the good-news group and the neutral-news
group. However, I expect the difference to be small and less economically significant.
Following Sloan (1996). I conduct two analyses. The first is a Mishkin test that compares the
actual persistence of earnings components with the market-perceived persistence. A significant
difference would suggest market mispricing of those earnings components. More relevant to
this study, I test whether there is a differential in the persistence ofaccrued earnings between the
bad-news and the neutral-news group-that is, whether the persistence ofaccrued earnings in one
group is larger or smaller than in the other group, and whether the market misprices this
differential in persistence. The second test is a hedge-portfolio test that is complementary to the
Mishkin test. It determines whether mispricing is economically significant.
In a study similar in spirit to my paper, Dopuch. Seethamraju, and Xu (2005) investigate
the differential persistence of accruals between profit firms and loss firms. They find that
There is potentially another reason to explain the lower persistence of accrued earnings in the bad-news years
and in the good-news years. Normally, very bad news or very good news does not recur often and so lacks
persistence As a result, accrued earnings in these years may also lack persistence, aside from what can be
explained h\ accounting conservatism and earnings management. Accrued earnings in good-news years are less
persistent than in neutral-news years However, the magnitude of persistence differential is much smaller for the
good-news/neutral-news comparison than for the bad-news/neutral-news comparison. In addition, the differential
of persistence was not mispriced by investors.
G.Jiang The International Journal ofAccounting 42 (2007) 153 170 157
accrued earnings are more persistent for profit firms than for loss firms and that only in profit
firms accrued earnings are o\ erpriced. while in loss firms accrued earnings are underpriced.
albeit insignificantly.
Taken together. Dopuch et al. (2005) and this paper emphasize the importance of
understanding the environments in which accruals are generated and how investors price
accruals differently under different situations. These analyses lead to a sharp improvement
in the detection of the mispricing of accruals.
4
3. Data analysis
3.1. Variable measurement
I begin by defining the variables used in this study.
Following Sloan (1996). accruals are derived from successive balance sheets and income
statements:
ACCR, = (ACA, - ACASH,) - (ACL, - ASTD, - ATP.,) - DEP,. (1)
CA Current assets
CASH Cash or cash equivalents
CL Current liability
STD Debt included in current liabilities
TP Income tax payable
DEP Depreciation and amortization expenses
A Indicates change of a variable from year t- 1 to year t.
Total earnings (EARN,) are defined as operating income after depreciation, and. there-
fore, the cash flow component ofearnings (CASH,) is defined as the difference between total
earnings and accruals:
CASH, = EARN, - ACCR,. (2)
EARN. CASH, and ACCR are all deflated by average total assets.
To test market efficiency with regard to earnings. I compute one-year-ahead twelve-month
buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns starting with the fifth month after fiscal-year-end t. The
four-month lag is to make sure that the market has already learned the earnings information
contained in the firms' annual financial reports.
ABRET,+ i = 11(1 +RET(/))- II (1 + SIZRET(/)). (3)
;— 1 /— I
ABRET,-, 12-month compounded size-adjusted returns in year r+1, starting from the
fifth month after fiscal year end t.
RET(z') Finn raw return in month i. Here the first month of the return accumulation period
is the fifth month after fiscal year end t.
Thanks to the referee's comments, I realize it would be interesting to investigate the impact on accrual anomaly
of the interaction between stock performance and earnings performance. I leave this to a later research project
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SIZRET(/) Return in month / on the size portfolio that the firm belongs to in year /+ 1,
the size portfolio is supplied by CRSP.
Following previous studies (e.g., Basu, 1997; Pope & Walker, 1999), I use a stock's raw
annual return during fiscal-year t to measure the return news during the fiscal year:
FRET, = Ft (1 +RET(/))- 1. (4)
i—\
RET(/): firm raw return in month i. Here the first month of the return-accumulation
period is the first month of fiscal-year /.
The reason that I use raw return as a measure of news, instead of other metrics such as
changes in analysts' consensus-earnings forecasts, is as follows. Raw return in a fiscal year
is a measure of economic impact on a firm from value-relevant events having occurred to
the firm or to the market as a whole during this period. News that are impounded in returns
will factor into corporate earnings as the economic impacts materialize in the firm's
operations. That is, return leads earnings. In Pope and Walker's (1999) model, accounting
conservatism garbles the price-leading-earnings process by requiring fast recognition of
bad-return news. Therefore, the property of the time-series of earnings is affected by how
return news is incorporated in earnings in different situations. While all the above-cited
studies focus on the implications of return news for total earnings, it is logical to believe that
the implications have more to do with accrued earnings than with cash earnings because the
latter cannot be as easily garbled in response to economic events and accounting rules.
Therefore, I choose to use raw return as my measure of news.
3.2. Research design
Sloan (1996) developed two complementary tests to examine the persistence of earnings
components and market mispricing. The present study utilizes these two tests with some
modifications.
The first test employs the Mishkin test/ Mishkin (1983) developed a framework to test
the rational-expectation hypotheses in macroeconomics. Sloan (1996) introduced this test
into accounting research to test whether the market efficiently prices accrued earnings and
cash earnings.
The Mishkin test in this study is in the following form:
EARN,+ 1 = a + a, ID, + />„CASH, + />,CASH,*ID, + r„ACCR,
+ c,ACCR,*ID, + e (5)
ABRET,+
i
= % + /?*(EARN,+ | - a - a, ID, - ^CASH, - 6*CASH,* ID,
- cJjACCR, - <^ACCR,*ID,)- (6)
I lliank Scott Richardson, Richard Sloan, and Hong Xie for their assistance in programming the Mishkin test.
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EARN,,
i
is operating earnings in year t+ 1,
ACCR, is total accruals in year t,
CASH, is total cash earnings in year t.
ABRET,, | is size-adjusted huy-and-hold returns in the twelve months starting from the
fifth month after fiscal-year-end t,
ID, is a dummy variable that takes value "one" for bad-news/good-news firms
and "zero" for neutral-news firms.
A superscript e indicates market expectation.
The dummy variable, ID,, indicates which news group a firm belongs to. Each year, I
partition firms into three news groups. Finns whose FRET, is in the highest quintile in the
annual cross-section are grouped into the good-news group, whereas those in the lowest
quintile are grouped into the bad-news group. I classify firms in the three middle quintiles into
one group, the neutral-news group. With this partitioning scheme, this study contrasts accrued
earnings in the relatively extreme ends of the return-news spectrum with those in the middle.
In the analysis below, I discuss the Mishkin test using bad-news/neutral-news groups.
However, the same analysis applies to the comparison of good-news/neutral-news groups.
Eq. (5) is the forecasting equation that determines the weights (hereafter referred to as the
persistence factor) that should be assigned to earnings components in forecasting future
earnings. b() and cn are the persistence factors for cash earnings and accrued earnings in the
benchmark case, the neutral-newsgroup; and (ft + /'i) and (co+Cj) are the persistence factors
for cash earnings and accrued earnings for the bad-news group. Our focus is on r, , which is the
differential persistence factor (negative sign expected) for accruals in the bad-news group
relative to the neutral-news group. If 1 1 is significant, it tells us that there is a difference in the
persistence of accrued earnings in the bad-news group versus the neutral-news group.
Eq. (6) is the pricing equation that estimates the weights that the market assigns to earnings
components in forecasting future earnings and uses in valuation. Comparing cn and (co + c, ) in
Eq. (5) with c% and {c%+c\) in Eq. (6) will tell us whether the market prices accrued earnings
efficiently in both the neutral-news group and the bad-news group. In particular, comparing C\
with c\ will tell us whether the market recognizes the differential in the persistence of accruals
between the bad-news group and the neutral-news group and prices them efficiently.
Eqs. (5) and (6) are estimated jointly, using an iterative generalized non-linear least squared
estimation procedure. To test whether the weight on an earnings component is the same
between the forecasting equation and the pricing equation-that is, whether the market prices
the earnings component efficiently — I calculated the following likelihood-ratio statistic:
2A'Ln(SSR7SSR").
where: iV is the number of observations in the sample;
Ln is natural logarithm operation;
SSR' is the sum of squared residuals from the constrained regressions of the system;
SSI; is the sum of squared residuals from the unconstrained regressions of the system.
This likelihood-ratio statistic is asymptotically %"(</) distributed under the null hypothesis
that the market efficiently prices the earnings component with respect to its implications for
future earnings, where q is the number of constraints imposed on estimating the system. I
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reject efficient pricing of an earnings component if the likelihood-ratio statistic for it is
sufficiently large.
The second test in this study is a hedge-portfolio analysis. An accrual-based hedge
strategy takes advantage of the mispricing of accruals. It longs undervalued stocks (as
predicted by the Mishkin test) and shorts overvalued stocks (as predicted by the Mishkin
test) to earn abnormal trading profits when stock prices move back to intrinsic values. If
the abnormal trading profits prove to be significant, the hedge-portfolio test supports the
Mishkin test's conclusion on the market mispricing of the earnings component of
interest.
Sloan (1996) conducts the hedge-portfolio analysis by forming portfolios on one
variable, accrued earnings. In this study. I first partition sample firms annually into three
groups: good news, no news and bad news, based on the return news. FRET,. Then, inde-
pendently. I partition the whole annual sample again into five portfolios, based on the
amount of accrued earnings. ACCR
;
. Then I track one-year-ahead abnormal returns to the
return news-accruals portfolios. That is. I implement the accrual-based hedge strategy within
each return-news group. If the persistence of accruals is different across news groups, and if
the market fails to fully adjust to this. I expect an accrual-based hedge strategy to eam higher
abnormal returns for the news group in which the persistence of accruals is lower, relative to
accruals in other news groups.
The measure of abnormal returns is the intercept term in a regression based on the
Fama-French three-factor model. 6 Fama and French (1993) argued that this model
accounts for the majority of the cross-sectional variation in portfolio returns over time.
When I use this measure of abnormal returns. I only use firm-years with a December
fiscal-year-end. Each year, firms are assigned to one of 15 return news-accrual
portfolios. Then I compute the monthly equal-weighted returns for the highest-accrual
portfolio, lowest-accrual portfolio, and hedge portfolio for the twelve months in the one-
year-ahead period, starting with the fifth month after fiscal-year-end t. As a result, we
have a time-series of monthly portfolio returns and three factors. Then I run the three-
factor model, and the intercept term is the monthly abnormal return to the portfolio.
Multiplying this by 12, I get an annual portfolio abnormal return (Hribar. 2000: Xie,
2001):
'
Rpj - R,_, = olp + pp {RmJ - R,.,) + spSMB, + hpHML, + zpA . (7)
Rf, the one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates)
Rml the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks
SMB. the difference between the month t returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small
stocks and one of large stocks
HML, the difference between the month t returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high
book-to-market stock and one of low book-to-market stocks
t'sing the Fama-French factors plus a momentum faclor produces similar results.
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3.3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
I draw my sample firms from COMPUSTAT industrial, full-coverage and research files, and
stock returns and size-portfolio returns from CRSP. Only firms that are traded on the New York
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ are included. M\ sample
starts in 1964 and ends in 1997. My final sample w ith necessary data consists of 56.940 firm-
years for 5617 firms. Among these, 1 1 ,377 firm-years are classified into the good-news group.
34,188 firm-years into the neutral-news group, and 1 1 .375 firm-years into the bad-news group.
Table 1 provides sample statistics of and correlation coefficients among some variables.
The results in Table 1 are very consistent with those in prior studies. For example. Panel A
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations of selected variables
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of selected variables
Variables Mean STD 5 10°o Med 75 90%
EARN 0.110 0.097 -0.053 0.002 0.061 0.111 0.165 0.225 267
CASH 0.126 0.109 -0.065 -0.005 0.067 0.131 0.192 0.255 0.298
ACCR -0.015 0.080 -0.138 -0.105 -0.063 -0.022 0.026 0.085 129
FRET 0.175 0445 -0.401 -0.302 -0.120 0.104 0.376 0.729 1.028
ABRET 0.028 0.492 -0.556 -0.444 -0.257 -0.045 0.026 0.054 0.083
Panel B: Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal! correlations among selected variables
LDEAN CASH ACCR FRET ABRET
LDEARN 0.58 0.13 0.24 0.21
CASH 0.56 -0.52 0.16 0.04
ACCR 14 -0.50 0.09 -0.07
FRET 0.29 0.19 0.08 -0.01
ABRET 0.27 0.09 -0.08 0.01
Notes: variable definition.
ACCR, = i ACA - ACASH,) - (ACL- - ASTD. - ATP. - DEP
CA = current assets (COMPUSTAT data item 4)
CASH = cash (COMPUSTAT data item 1).
CL = current liability (COMPUSTAT data item 5).
STD = debt included in current liabilities (COMPUSTAT data item 34).
TP = income tax payable (COMPL STAT data item 7 1 i
DEP = depreciation and amortization expenses (COMPUSTAT data item 14).
CASH.. = EARN, - ACCR,
EARN =COMPUSTAT data item 178.
LDEAR is one-year-ahead earnings
ABRET,^, = ri 1 1 - RETli) ) - IT i. 1 - SIZRF I
ABRET: 12-month compounded size-adjusted returns.
RETlil: firm raw return in month i, where i= 1 is the fifth month after fiscal-year-end.
SIZRET(i): return on the size portfolio corresponding to the firm in month i. the size portfolio is supplied by CRSP
FRET, = IT ( 1 + RET(/)) - 1
FRET.: compounded annual firm returns during fiscal-> ear I
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shows that on average, accruals are income-decreasing, with a mean of -0.015 and a
median of -0.022. Panel B indicates that current cash earnings have a much stronger
correlation with one-year-ahead earnings, with a Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient
of 0.58 (0.56), than current accrued earnings, which have a Pearson (Spearman) correlation
coefficient with one-year-ahead earnings of 0.13 (0.14).
Next, I test whether or not there is a differential between the persistence of accrued
earnings for the bad-/good-news group and that of accrued earnings for the neutral-news
group. Then 1 test whether or not the market efficiently prices this differential in persistence,
if it exists.
3.4. Differences in the persistence of accruals among return-news groups
I test the differential persistence ofaccruals between the bad-news group and the neutral-
news group by running regressions with Eq. (5). Panel A of Table 2 reports the results. The
persistence factor for the neutral-news group is 0.75, but for the bad-news group, the
persistence factor is smaller, by -0. 12, at 0.63. The difference is statistically significant with
a t-statistic of - 12.99. As expected, accrued earnings for the bad-news group are less
persistent in predicting future earnings than accrued earnings for the neutral-news group.
Cash earnings are also less persistent for the bad-news group than for the neutral-news
group, with a differential of- 0.06. However, the differential for accrued earnings represents
a 1 6.0% drop in persistence, but the differential for cash earnings represents only a 7.2%
drop in persistence.
Panel B of Table 2 reports parallel results for testing the differential persistence between
the good-news group and the neutral-news group. The differential persistence for both
accruals and cash earnings, although statistically significant, is much smaller. For accrued
earnings, the persistence factor of the good-news group is lower than that of the neutral-
news group by - 0.04 (a 5.3% drop in persistence). For cash earnings, the persistence factor
of the good-news group is lower than that of the neutral-news group by -0.03 (a 3.6% drop
in persistence).
Table 2
Ordinary least squares regressions of future earnings on the accruals and cash components of current earnings
Panel A: The bad-news group versus the neutral-news group
/>„ />, i„ c\ b„+b, ca+C\ R
2
Estimate 0.83 -0.06 "5 -0.12 0.77 0.63 0.62
(-statistic 212.46 9.18 138.34 -12.99
Panel B: The good-news group versus the neutral-news group
b b, c c b„ + b, Co+Cj R :
Estimate 0.83
/-statistic 229 13
-0.03
-4.35
II
"5
149.20
-0.04
-3.95
0.80 0.71 0.63
Notes: Variable definitions: see Table 1 notes ID. is a dummy variable that takes value one for bad-news good-
news firms and zero for neutral-news firms.
EARN,., = <j I n i ID, + />„CASH, +ft,CASH,*ID, +c ACCR, + i , ACCR,*ID, + e
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In the premise of this study, it is difficult to make a clear prediction regarding the
difference in the level of persistence for accruals between the good-news group and the
neutral-news group, because accounting conservatism and earnings management in
response to stock-price movement do not dictate that accrued earnings for the good-news
group should be more or less persistent. The result here indicates that accrued earnings are
also less persistent in predicting future earnings for the good-news group than for the neutral-
news group. However, the differential is much smaller than the differential between the bad-
news group and the neutral-news group.
3.5. Tin- Mishkin test
Sloan (1996) shows that accrued earnings are less persistent than cash earnings, whereas
the previous section shows that accrued earnings preceded by bad return news are in-
crementally less persistent. This section tests whether the market misprices this differential
in persistence for accrued earnings.
The first test of market efficiency is the Mishkin test. The test results are reported in
Table 3. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates of Eqs. (5) and (6).
For the neutral-news group, the actual persistence factor for accrued earnings is 0.75;
however, the market overestimates this factor by 18.7%, to be 0.89. The likelihood ratio for
the efficient-pricing constraint c$=c% is 62.43 (Panel B), and it is statistically significant,
winch rejects the efficient pricing of accrued earnings for the neutral-news group.
Between the bad-news group and the neutral-news group, the differential persistence
factor is -0.12, but the market-perceived difference is 0.06. The likelihood-ratio statistic for
the efficient pricing of this differential persistence (c"i=c'1) is 31.60, signaling that the
market overestimates the differential persistence for accrued earnings between the bad-
news group and the neutral-news group.
Overall, for the bad-news group, the market overestimates the persistence factor for
accrued earnings by 50.8% (an actual persistence factor of 0.63 versus a market-perceived
persistence factor of 0.95, with a significant likelihood ratio of 219.46 for the efficient-
pricing constraint, Cq=c% c
i
=c
c
\). The overestimation of the persistence factor of accrued
earnings for the bad-news group (50.8%) is markedly higher than for the neutral-news
group (18.7%). 7
Thus, the Mishkin test supports the argument that the market does not fully see through
the incrementally lower persistence of the accrued earnings for the bad-news group than for
the neutral-news group, and that the market misprices the stocks in the bad-news group to a
greater extent.
Table 3 also reports the results for cash earnings. Sloan (1996) reports that investors
underestimate the persistence for cash earnings. However, Table 3 shows no underestimation
of the persistence of cash earnings for the neutral-news group (with a likelihood ratio at an
insignificant 2.28 for the efficient-pricing constraint bQ = b%). F°r the bad-news group, while
the actual persistence factor is 0.77, the market overestimates it by 13%, at 0.87 (with a
I do not attempt to test statistically the significance level of the difference between the mispricing of accrued
earnings for the neutral-news group and the mispricing of accrued earnings for the bad-news group, because such
a test statistic is not readily available (Xie, 2001 ).
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Table 3
Nonlinear generalized least squares estimation (the Mishkin test) of the market pricing of accruals with respect to
their implications for one-year-ahead earnings, the bad-news group versus the neutral-news group
Panel A: the Mishkin test results
Parameter
Bad-news versus neutral-news Good-news versus neutral-news
Estimate Asymptotic Estimate Asymptotic
standard error standard error
0.83 0.004 0.83 0.004
0.85 0.013 0.85 0.011
2 4",,* 2.4%*
-0.06 0.007 -0.03 0.007
0.02 0.022 -0.07 0.020
13.0%* -2.5%*
0.75 0.005 0.75 0005
0.89 0.018 0.89 0.015
18.7%* 18.7%*
-0.12 0.009 -0.04 0.009
0.06 0.031 -0.02 0.028
50.8%* 22.5%*
2.28 0.035 2.47 0.035
b%
/',
b\
i„
eg
Panel B: Test of efficient pricing of earnings components
Bad-news versus neutral-news
Efficient pricing constraints
Good-news versus neutral-news
Likelihood Marginal Likelihood Marginal
ratio statistics significance ratio statistics significance
level level
2.28 14 2.69 0.11
13 33 <0 01 4.04 0.05
62.43 <0.01 72.16 <0.01
31.60 <0.01 044 0.52
33.12 <0.01 7.62 <0.01
33.50 <0.01 4.48 0.04
219 46 mil 112.03 <0.01
228.20 <0.01 150.09 <0.01
b = />f,
/', =$
c =4
c, = C|
b, =b\ c. =c\
bu =*o b =6'
c =c% e, =c\
b„ = b„ b\ =b\ ca = c„ C\=c\
Note:
Variable definition: see Table 1 notes. ID, is a dummy variable that takes value one for bad-news/good-news firms
and zero for neutral-news firms.
Numbers with * are percentages of misestimation and are computed as (market-perceived persistence/actual
persistence)/actual persistence.
EARN, + i = a„ + a i ID, + 6„CASH, + />|CASH,*ID, + c ACCR, + c,ACCR,*ID, + e
ABRET, +I = x + /;*(EARN„, - a» - a,ID, - ftJCASH, - fti;CASH,*lD, - cJACCR, - i-'jACCR^ID,)
statistically significant likelihood ratio at 33.50 for the efficient pricing constraint h =bo
b] =b'i). The overestimation for the bad-news group is mainly due to the overestimation of
the differential-persistence of cash earnings between the bad-news group and the neutral-
news group. While the actual differential persistence factor for cash earnings is -0.06, the
market perceives it to be 0.02 (with a statistically significant likelihood ratio of 13.33 for the
efficient-pricing constraint />,
=£f).
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Table 3 also reports the Mishkin results for the good-news group and neutral-news group
comparison. First, while the market overestimates the persistence factor of accrued earnings
for the neutral-news group by 1 8.7%, it does so by 22.5% for the good-news group (an actual
persistence factor of 0.71 versus a market-perceived persistence factor of 0.87, with a
statistically significant likelihood ratio of 1 12.03 for the efficient pricing constraint c t) = L\]
C\=c\). The difference in misestimation, 22.5% versus 18.7%, is much smaller than that
between the bad-news group and the neutral-news group, 50.8% versus 1 8.7%. Second, the
differential-persistence factor for accrued earnings between the good-news group and the
neutral-news group is -0.04, but the market perceives it to be -0.02. The likelihood-ratio
statistic for the efficient pricing of the differential persistence (cj =cf) is only 0.44, which
lacks statistical significance. Therefore, the Mishkin test indicates that the market does not
misestimate the persistence of accruals to a greater extent for the good-news group than for
the neutral-news group.
The market does not appear to misestimate the persistence of cash flow for the neutral-
news group (an insignificant likelihood-ratio statistic of 2.69 for the efficient-pricing
constraint />o = />o). With marginal statistical significance (a likelihood ratio of 4.04 for the
efficient-pricing constraint b
t
=b'), the market underestimates the differential persistence
for cash flow between the good-news group and the neutral-news group. Overall, the
market appears to underestimate the persistence of cash earnings in the good-news group by
2.5% (an actual persistence factor of 0.80 versus a market-perceived factor of 0.78, with a
significant likelihood ratio of 7.62 for the efficient-pricing constraint bo=b% b
t
=Z>i). This is
the only case consistent with Sloan's (1996) finding that market underestimates the
persistence of cash earnings.'
3.6. The hedge-portfolio analysis
I complement the Mishkin test with a hedge-portfolio test, which tests whether a trading
strategy based on accruals would yield higher abnormal returns for the bad-news group than
it would for the neutral-news group. For each year, I partition firms independently into five
accrual portfolios and three return-news portfolios (bad-news, good-news, and neutral-
news). Each of the 1 5 return news-accruals portfolios that this procedure generates consists
of firms falling into an accrual/return news intersection. As a result, I get five accrual sub-
portfolios for each return-news group. To implement a hedge strategy for each return-news
group. I long stocks in the lowest-accrual portfolio of that return-new s group, and short
stocks in the highest-accrual portfolio of that return-news group. The hedge return is the sum
of the returns from the long and the short portfolios. I track the returns to the hedge portfolios
in the one-year-ahead period to determine whether economically significant abnormal
profits can be earned.
The measure of abnormal returns is the intercept term from a regression with the Fama-
French three-factor model. The results are reported in Table 4. Panel A reports the coefficient
estimates for the long, short, and hedge portfolios for each of the three return-news groups
separately. My discussion focuses on the hedge portfolio, whose returns are the sum of
I conducted a Mishkin test for the mispricing of accruals and cash flows in the full sample, and find that cash
flows were overpriced, contrary to evidence from earlier literature.
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Table 4
Abnormal returns to accrual portfolios and hedge portfolios
Panel A: Portfolio returns by return-news groups
Intercept MKT SMB HML
Bad-news group
Neutral-news group
Good-news group
Lowest-accrual portfolio 0.488 1.019 1.353 0.530
(2.67) (22.43) (21.02) (7.15)
Highest-accrual portfolio -0.244 1.072 1.314 0.303
(-1.49) (26.32) (22.75) (4.55)
Hedge portfolio 0.732 -0.054 0.039 0.228
(3.86) (-1.14) (0.59) (2.95)
Lowest-accrual portfolio 0.336 0.976 0.828 0.327
(4.23) (49.35) (29.52) (10.12)
Highest-accrual portfolio -0.011 1.021 1.002 0.075
(-014) (52.83) (36.57) (2.36)
Hedge portfolio 0.347 -0.045 -0.174 0.252
(324) (-1.71) (-4.68) (5.89)
Lowest-accrual portfolio 0.432 0.963 0.892 -0.139
(2.75) (24.66) (1612) (-2.17)
Highest-accrual portfolio -0.146 1.110 1.035 -0.214
(-1.29) (39.22) (25.77) (-4.64)
Hedge portfolio 0.579 -0.147 -0.142 0.076
(3.27) (-3.25) (-2.28) (1.05)
0.774
0.819
0.028
0.923
0.942
0.184
0.783
0.903
0.067
Panel B: Difference in portfolio returns between return-news groups
Intercept MKT SMB HML
Bad news/neutral news
Good news neutral news
Lowest-accrual portfolio 0.151 0.043 0.526 0.204 0.171
(0.86) (0.97) (8.43) (2.83)
Highest-accrual portfolio II 233 0.052 0.312 0.228 0.105
(-1 52) (1 36) (5.78) (3.67)
Hedge portfolio 0.385 -0.009 0.213 -0.025 0.018
(1.95) (-0.18) (3.07) (-0.31)
Lowest-accrual portfolio 0.096 -0.013 0.065 -0.465 0.121
(0.58) (-0.31) (1.11) (-6.97)
Highest-accrual portfolio -0.136 0.090 0.033 -0.289 0.128
(-1 03) (2 75) (0.71) (-5.41)
Hedge portfolio 0.232 -0.103 0.032 -0.176 0.010
(1.21) (-2.15) (0.47) (-2.26)
Notes
The Fama-French model is based on Fama and French (1993). It is in the following form:
«.,, -RfJ = y.p + /!,,(«,„,, - RfJ ) + s;,SMB, + /i;,HML, + £,,_,
/?., = the one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates).
A'„„ = the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP).
SMB, = the difference between the month / returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large
stocks.
HML,=the difference between the month / returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and
one of low book-to-market stocks.
Rr , is the equally-weighted returns of all stocks in a portfolio.
G Jiang Tin- International Journal of Accounting -t2 (2007) 153-170 167
returns to the long and the short portfolios. For the hedge portfolio, the intercept term for the
bad-news group is 0.732 (8.8% on an annual basis), 0.579 for the good-news group (6.9% on
an annual basis), and 0.347 for the neutral-news group (4.2% on an annual basis), which are
all statistically significant.
Panel B reports the differential returns to the accrual-based hedge strategy across the
three return-news groups. For example, when I compare the bad-news group to the neutral-
news group on accrual-based hedge returns, I take the differences between the monthly
hedge returns for the bad-news group and the monthly hedge returns for the neutral-news
group, then I regress this time-series of monthly differential hedge-returns on the Fama-
French factors. If the intercept term is statistically significantly greater than zero, it indicates
that after controlling the Fama-French factors, the accrual-based hedge strategy earns
higher abnormal returns for the bad-news group than for the neutral-news group.
The intercept term is 0.385 (4.6% on an annual basis) when I compare hedge returns between
the bad-news group and the neutral-news group, and the intercept term is significant with a
t-statistic of 1.95. This result confirms the Mishkin test finding (Table 3) that investors
significantly overestimate the differential persistence ofaccrued earnings between the bad-news
group and the neutral-news groups. Most importantly, such mispricing is economically signif-
icant and can be exploited to earn higher abnormal returns for an accrual-based hedge strategy.
In the good-news group/neutral-news group comparison, the intercept term is 0.232
(2.8% on an annualized basis), but it is not statistically significant, consistent with the
Mishkin test finding (Table 3) that while investors overestimate the persistence of accrued
earnings for the good-news group more than for the neutral-news group, the difference is
not statistically significant.
In summary, the Mishkin test and the hedge-portfolio test suggest that the market fails to
recognize the incrementally lower persistence of accrued earnings for the bad-news group and,
subsequently, misprices those stocks to a greater extent. For the good-news group, there is
evidence of lower persistence of accrued earnings than for the neutral-news group. But the
differential is small relative to that between the bad-news group and the neutral-news group, and
greater mispricing is not detected. The Sloan accrual anomaly concentrates on bad-new s firms.
3. 7. Multivariate analysis of returns to accrual-based trading strategy
There is one concern about the strength of the conclusions derived from the hedge-
portfolio analysis. Low-accrual portfolios tend to contain low-return stocks, and high-
accrual portfolios tend to contain high-return stocks. Therefore, the higher hedge returns
from the bad-news group may be a result of a larger magnitude of income-decreasing
accruals, which tend to accompany bad return-news stocks. Even without a differential in
persistence, such a larger magnitude of accruals for the bad-news group would yield higher
hedge returns. This argument contradicts my argument that it is the differential in persistence
of accrued earnings that leads to the higher hedge returns.
To address this concern, I conduct a multivariate analysis in the following form:
FRET,+ , = a„ + a, ID, + fi,ACCR, + /?,ACCR,*ID, + -y () SIZE,
+ -y,SIZE,*ID, + 6„B/P, + M//>,*ID, + d.BETA,
+ ;,BETA,*ID, + »;„£//>, + »/,E/P,*ID, + e, (8)
168 G Jiang The International Journal oj Accounting -42 (2007) 153-170
The dependent variable is a one-year-ahead raw return. This multivariate analysis has two
important features. First, the regression includes a variety of control variables used in
accounting and finance literature as proxies for factors that predict stock returns (Penman &
Zhang, 2002; Sloan, 1 996). Among them are firm size, book-to-market ratio, CAPM beta, and
earnings-to-price ratio. Second, I include a dummy variable, ID, which interacts with ACCR
and other variables in the regression, indicating which return-news group a firm falls into. For
the bad-news group and the neutral-news group comparison (other comparisons defined
similarly). ft t) measures the relation between accrued earnings and firms' one-year-ahead stock
returns for the neutral-news group; and ji\ measures the incremental relation (relative to the
neutral-news group) between accrued earnings and future stock return. If, after controlling for
the magnitude of accruals and these variables that have been proved to predict future returns,
/}, is still significantly negative, it supports my argument that the differential persistence of
accrued earnings for the bad-news group drives the greater mispricing of accruals.
Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), I run Eq. (8) annually. Table 5 reports the means of
the time-series of coefficient estimates. The ^-statistics are based on the time-series of the
standard errors of the estimated coefficients. When comparing the bad-news group to the
neutral-news group. p , the coefficient on accruals for the neutral-news group, is significantly
negative at -0.322. (ju the incremental relation between accrued earnings and future returns
Table 5
Cross-sectional tests of the differential explanatory power of accruals with respect to future raw returns
Bad-news group/ Good-news groups;
Definition
neutral-news group neutral-news group
Coefficient f-statistic Coefficient /-statistic
°t(] Intercept 0.259 4.78*** 0.259 4.78***
1*1 Incre. Intercept 0.040 1.11 0.029 0.66
ft ACCR -0.322 -4.86*** -0.322 -4.86***
A Incre. ACCR -0.178 -2.17** 0.031 0.32
Vo SIZE -0.025 -3.57*** -0 025 -3.57***
Ti Incre SIZE -0.013 -2.53** 0.002 0.24
5o Book-to-Market 0.003 0.26 0.003 0.26
5, Incre. Book-to-Market -0.006 - 43 -0.000 -0.01
Co CAPM Beta -0.003 -0.23 -0.003 -0.23
c, Incre. CAMP Beta 0.006 -0.49 -0.039 -2.43
la Eamings-to-price (i 183 2.07** 0.183 2.07***
>li Incre. Earnings-to-pnce 0.000 0.01 0.090 0.97
Notes:
The numbers reported arc time-series averages of the estimated parameters from annual cross-sectional regressions.
T-statistic is based on the time-series standard errors of the estimated coefficients.
The dependent variable is one-year-ahead raw returns. ACCR is defined in Table 1 . Size is market value at the end
of fiscal-year I. BIP is book value-to-market value at the end of fiscal-year t F. P is earnings-to-price ratio at the
end of fiscal-year /. BETA is estimated from a regression of monthly raw returns on the CRSP value-weighted
monthly stock returns up to the last month of fiscal-year I
** Denotes significance al the 0.05 level using a two-tailed Mest.
*** Denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed Mesl
FRET,+
,
= xa + *|1D, + /i„ACCR, + /?,ACCR,*ID, + 7„SIZE, + -y,SIZE,*ID, + 6„B/P,
+ S,B/P,*XD, + CoBETA, + £|BETA,*ID, + n E/P, + i),£/P,*ID, + e,
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for the bad-news group, is significantly negative at -0. 1 78. This supports my findings that the
incrementally lower persistence of accrued earnings for the bad-news group causes greater
mispricing, consistent with the findings of the Mishkin and hedge-portfolio tests. On the other
hand, |5] in the good-news/neutral-news comparison is insignificant, also consistent with the
Mishkin test and the hedge-portfolio test.
In summary, multivariate analysis supports the conclusions from the Mishkin and hedge-
portfolio tests.
4. Conclusion
This paper adds to a growing literature on financial-statement analysis with regard to
earnings accruals and their implications for the efficient-market hypothesis. 1 argue that in
response to stock performance, accounting conservatism and earnings management generate
earnings accruals that are less persistent for firms that have experienced adverse stock-price
movements. The market fails to detect this differential persistence, and subsequently
misprices accruals in this situation to a greater extent.
The results in this paper largely support this argument. Accrued earnings in years when
firms performed poorly tend to be even less persistent than accrued earnings in years when
firms' stock prices do not change much. However, investors do not fully understand this
differential and subsequently misprice accrued earnings in this group to a greater extent.
Overall, this paper indicates that to understand the accrual anomaly, we need to take into
account the environment in which accruals are generated. In particular, contemporaneous
stock-price movement provides an indicator of the level of persistence of accrued earnings.
Nevertheless, this paper only provides one factor that predicts the lower persistence of
accruals in the cross-section. The accrual effect is strong even for the neutral-news group,
although a lot weaker than documented previously by other studies. Therefore, future work
is warranted to enhance our understanding of why the market fails to appreciate this long-
held, basic accounting property: accrual accounting.
1
'
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Abstract
This paper considers the adoption, perceived benefits, and expected future emphasis of western
management accounting practices in the Chinese emerging market economy based on a sample of 64
joint ventures (JVs) and 115 State Owned Enterprises (SOE) gathered from a questionnaire survey.
The study finds that the level of adoption of management accounting practices is most influenced by
ownership type of the enterprise (JVor SOE) and to a lesser extent by the nature of the management
accounting techniques to be adopted. A further significant finding is that management accounting
practices such as budgeting for controlling costs, profit and sales budgeting, and target costing are
perceived to be more beneficial for SOEs compared to JVs. However, responsibility accounting
which is traditionally associated with SOEs and accounting for decision making is perceived to be
less beneficial to SOEs compared with JVs.
1 2007 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Adoption; Management accounting practices; Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs); Foreign joint
ventures (JVs) in China
1. Introduction
After many decades of heavy government involvement in the economy, China has
embraced a market-liberalization program which includes the attraction of foreign direct
investments as a means of achieving rapid and sustainable economic growth. State
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intervention in enterprise management - particularly through State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs), a significant feature of the Chinese centrally planned economy - is being
systematically dismantled. Prior research evidence indicates that over the last decade the
modernization and restructuring of SOEs have been placed at the top of the economic-
reforms agenda (Lee, 2001). At the core of these reforms is the massive shift in opinion
about the role of the state in enterprise management in China. Policy makers in China
now believe that dynamic economic growth requires a greater role for the private sector.
As a result, privatization of SOEs has been a key element of Chinese market reforms. It is
thus argued that privatization of SOEs will not only lead to efficient and effective
allocation of resources but will also enable managers to take more responsibility for the
well-being of the enterprises they run (Boateng & Glaister, 1999; Hassard, Sheehan, &
Morris, 1999).
As privatization in China welcomes foreign investors, competition has heightened as
monopoly positions granted to SOEs under the central-planning system have evaporated.
This line of reasoning is consistent with the conclusion drawn by Child (1994). These
changes in the business environment present challenges in terms of the coexistence of
market forces and state influences (Child. 1994) and the organization of production and
marketing (Lin, Cai, & Li, 1998). More importantly, these changes affect the information
needs and processing techniques required to facilitate good decision making within firms.
According to Firth (1996), the change towards a free-market enterprise system in China
constitutes a major economic shock for many Sino companies, thereby leading to a serious
performance gap, in that accounting systems developed under socialist philosophy are
totally inadequate for the emerging capitalist staicture.
Institutional theory suggests that organizations will respond to environmental
complexity brought about by the changing task and institutional environments by adapting
their management practices needed to ensure their long-term survival (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983, 1991; O'Connor, Chow, & Wu, 2004). In the context of China, Naughton (1995),
Nee ( 1992), and Perkins (1994) argue that when a centrally planned system is dismantled,
both the task and institutional environments become more uncertain and unpredictable
which has implications for information needs for management decision making. The
question is how do the Chinese SOEs adapt to meet the changing task and institutional
environments as posited by institutional theory? A number of scholars such as Child and
Markoczy (1993), Firth (1996), and Yan and Gray (1994) argue that reforms offer SOEs
engaged in foreign joint ventures (JVs) an opportunity to model their foreign partner's
capitalist-style management systems and management accounting practices. Others studies
such as Kimberly (1980), Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest
that the opportunity to diffuse management ideas in a changing environment is not limited
to foreign-partnered JVs, but extends across companies nationwide. Guthrie (1999)
supports this line of reasoning and points out that the change in environment provides both
impetus and opportunity for mimetic isomorphism, where SOEs perceive legitimate foreign
enterprises as models to imitate.
Unlike Western economies, we know little about management accounting practices in
the Chinese emerging capitalist economy. The few studies investigating management
accounting practices in China, for example, Lin, Cai, and Li (1998), Firth (1996), and
O'Connor, Chow, & Wu (2004) have focused on the factors influencing the adoption of
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management aecounting practices in either SOEs or JVs, but no attention has been paid to
the benefits of adopting management accounting practices.
Modernization and internationalization of the Chinese economy since the 1980s have
raised a number of questions, however some critics suggest that internationalization and
economic reforms have destroyed China's long-term policy of self-reliance. Others contend
that Western management accounting practices are unsuited to Chinese circumstances and,
when adopted, have failed to meet expectations (Yang, 1999). In order to increase the
adoption rate of traditional and contemporary management accounting practices in Chinese
companies, we investigate the perceived benefits of such adoption. This paper examines
data we collected from a survey to provide new empirical insights into management
accounting practices in both SOEs and JVs in China with the aims of examining the
adoption of management accounting practices in both Chinese SOEs and JVs; (2) con-
sidering the comparative perceived benefits derived by Chinese SOEs and JVs in adopting
capitalist-style management accounting practices over a five-year period; and to consider
the emphasis that SOEs and JVs intend to place on particular management accounting
practices in the future.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews literature
on the existing management accounting practices under the socialist system. The research
method used is presented in Section 3. The Section 4 presents the results and discussion.
The final section contains the summary and conclusions.
2. Literature review
2.1. Management accounting practices prior to economic reforms
A number of western scholars have suggested that under China's centrally planned
economy, SOEs only carried out fund accounting rather than business accounting (Chan &
Rotenberg, 1999; Chow, Chau, & Gray, 1995; Xiang, 1998). This notion was based on the
fact that enterprises under the socialist philosophy were tightly controlled by the
government in respect to product planning, material supplies, cost targets, and product
distribution. However, this is at variance with the views of Chinese accounting
academicians such as Yang (1999) who point out that prior to economic reforms in
1980, management accounting practices and cost accounting were important methods for
measuring SOEs performances under the centrally planned economy. During the first
15 years of the founding of the People's Republic of China (1950-1965), two notable
developments that occurred in management accounting practices were the build-up of cost
accounting systems for different industries and the implementation of cost management
techniques. An analysis by Yang (1999) indicated that management accounting techniques,
such as responsibility accounting, were widely employed in SOEs and documented in the
accounting literature. This line of thinking is supported by Xiang (1998) who indicated
management accounting played an important role in assisting the economic planning and
implementation of state economic policies.
In short, the management accounting practices relating to planning and budgeting that were
appropriate for a centrally planned economy were broadly applied in SOEs between the 1 950s
and 1970s. For example, "The Enterprise Financial Plan" which was all-inclusive and very
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detailed was similar to a master budget. "Cost units" were equivalent to cost centers, "internal
profit units" (i.e. artificial profit centers) contained some elements ofprofit centers in terms ofthe
Western concept. However, Western practices of management accounting relating to decision
making could not be adopted easily because the socialist system provided no opportunity for
decentralized investment decisions. For example, an academic paper which described cost-
volume-profit (CVP) analysis was published in the early 1950s in the New Accounting (a
Chinese magazine), but it was not until 30 years later that CVP and other Western practices of
management accounting were formally introduced into China (Yang, 1999).
The process of diffusion and adoption of Western management accounting in China
began with the economic-reform policies that started in 1978. There are four stages to this
process. The first stage, the introduction of Western theories and practices of management
accounting in textbooks, magazines, and academic papers, occurred between the late 1970s
and the early 1980s (Yang. 1999). The second stage, the learning and enthusiastically
attempting to implement Western techniques of management accounting, which lasted for
approximately 10 years. Scapens and Yan (1993) summarized these practices as follows:
CVP analysis, operational budgeting, responsibility accounting, standard costing/variance
analysis, contribution analysis, variable costing, transfer pricing, and investment appraisal
techniques. Among these methods, CVP analysis, contribution analysis, and operational
budgeting were of special interest to Chinese enterprises because of the ability to link target
profit with planning operations. The diffusion of management accounting practices at that
time was much quicker and was at the forefront of accounting reforms compared with
financial accounting reforms and the adoption of international accounting standards.
The third stage marks a cooling off of the reception and subsequent neglect of Western
techniques of management accounting. From the middle of the 1980s to the middle of the
1990s, Chinese academics and practitioners began to question the suitability of importing
Western practices of management accounting without considering that the diffusion of
management accounting techniques may be highly conditional on the Chinese national
culture. According to Yang (1999), the benefits of applying Western methods of man-
agement accounting did not meet the initial high expectations.
The fourth stage started at the end of the 1990s when the Chinese accounting profession
realized that the transition from a centrally planned economy to a full market economy
would be a long and complicated process. Chinese environmental factors such as market
maturity, the progress of enterprise reforms, the legal, bureaucratic, and administrative
systems, the quality ofmanagement team and accounting personnel in SOEs, and the inertia
of traditional systems have limited the diffusion and use of management accounting
practices. Chinese academics and practitioners are now reconsidering and seeking to
identify those practices that are suitable within the Chinese context in order to establish an
appropriate Chinese version of management accounting. Considerable attention has been
given by Chinese academics and practitioners in many large-sized SOEs to the use of
management accounting practices in recent years (Yang, 1999).
2.2. Joint ventures and state owned enterprises
The dominant entry strategy for foreign companies into the Chinese market is through
JVs with SOEs. Beamish (1993) suggests that the frequency of association with
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government partners is far greater in the People's Republic of China (PRC) than in other
developing countries. Yu and Tang ( 1992) support this conclusion and point out that the
risks of operating in China without JVs are high. JVs are also the Chinese government's
preferred mechanism for introducing foreign direct investment into China as it enables
the government to continue exercising control (Pearson, 1991). Moreover, it is argued
that JVs enable SOE partners to benefit from the technological know-how, management
skills, and capital brought in by the foreign partners while providing foreign partners
with the knowledge of the domestic market, reduced risks, and political advantages (Hu
& Chen, 1996; Miller, Glen, Jasperen, & Karmokolias, 1997).
Based on an awareness that JV partners may have incompatible management styles/
approaches and different economic, social, and political systems, and values, the Chinese
government has carried out overall reforms to help SOEs introduce advanced Western
technology and management styles. These reforms have encouraged Chinese partners in
JVs to accept the business frame of mind of their capitalist counterparts and compared
with a traditional SOE, JVs are more dynamic in terms of structure and style. The typical
JV uses advanced production and management techniques and recruits more new, young,
and educated staff, and operates its business in accordance with market and competitive
rules.
3. Methodology and sample characteristics
To gather data for our research we mailed a survey questionnaire to a sample of JVs
and SOEs in China. The questions were based on the aims of the study and were
modelled on the questionnaire of a similar study undertaken by Chenhall and Langfield-
Smith (1998) in Australia. The questionnaire presented a list of 40 items aimed at
identifying the following: ( 1 ) the perceived benefits received from management
accounting practices adopted over the past 5 years and (2) the emphasis that SOEs
and JVs intend to place on various management accounting practices in the future.
Responses were assessed using a seven-point scale (i.e., l=no benefit; 7 = very high
benefit; and 1 =no emphasis; 7 = very high emphasis). The middle-point (4) was labeled
by an adjective representing a neutral or moderate opinion to help categorize the
responses into groups such as low, moderate, and high. The questionnaire was divided
into sub-groups as follows: (1) product cost systems, (2) budgeting and performance
evaluation systems, (3) planning and control, (4) decision support systems, and
(5) responsibility accounting. This structure was designed based on the following:
(1) product costing systems are traditional practices used in Chinese organizations,
especially in SOEs; (2) budgeting techniques in China are the most important financial
performance measures in business management; (3) performance measures play a crucial
role in translating business strategy into results (Lingle & Schiemann, 1996); (4) planning
(especially long-term planning), forecasting and decision making are the most important
key factors for organizations operating in today's rapid and changing competitive
environment; (5) responsibility accounting is considered to be the most successful
management accounting practice in the Chinese accounting literature (Qiao, 1997).
Management accounting is a comparatively young discipline in China and most recently
developed techniques have not been widely used. It is also likely that recently developed
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and strategically focused practices of management accounting, such as benchmarking,
balanced scorecard, and shareholder value analysis, may not be understood by the ma-
jority of Chinese accountants. Therefore, these items were not incorporated in the
study.
During the questionnaire design stage a series of techniques were employed in order to
maximize the response rate. First, a pre-test of the questionnaire was undertaken in two
stages. The first stage involved Professor Yu Xuying at Xiamen University (one of the
pioneers who introduced Western practices of management accounting into China) together
with six other academics at Chinese universities. The second involved six senior managers
in 4 SOEs and 2 JVs in China.
The research population of interest was obtained from secondary sources (The State
Economic and Trade Commission, 1999 - SETC. PRC and Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation - MOFTEC. PRC. 1998). These sources of data were used because
they are the authorized company database and represent the most reliable sources in China.
The data used in this study consist of senior financial managers' perceived benefits of
adopting management accounting practices. In 2000 and 2001. 1093 questionnaires were
mailed or delivered to the senior financial managers ofJVs and SOEs in China. We received
179 usable responses, representing an overall response rate of 1 9%-64 (36%) from TVs and
SOEs from 115 (64%).'
3.1. Sample characteristics
The characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 1 . Manufacturing
constitutes about three-quarters of both TV and SOE samples, and the fourth quarter
consist of enterprises in agriculture (forestry and fishery), financial services (banking and
insurance), transport (road. sea. rail, and air transport), general trade (retail, wholesale,
and import and export trade), building and construction, information technology, other
sendees (hotel, restaurant, travel, entertainment, and media). The size of the companies
used in the sample was measured by the number of employees. Table 1 shows that
companies employing more than 2000 people constitute about 44.4% of the sample. This
is followed by companies employing between 500 and 2000 people (30.6%). and
companies employing fewer than 500 (25%). In terms of age of the enterprises in the
sample. Table 1 indicates that about 5 1 .9% have been in existence for over 23 years,
19.1% between 10 and 22 years, and 29%, the majority of the sample, for fewer than
10 years.
3.2. Statistical analysis
The data analysis in respect to the adoption, benefit, and future emphasis were
conducted by considering differences in the means of management accounting practices.
' A non-response bias was tested for by implementing chi-square and Mann-Whitney U comparing early and
late responses along a number of key descriptive variables. Differences between the two groups were not
significant, suggesting that non-response bias is not a problem in this study.
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Table 1
Sample characteristics
JVs(%) SOEs (%) Total
73.4 73.3
1.2
4.0 3.7
4K 4.3
8.1 6.2
2.4 4.3
3.2 3.7
4.2 3.1
100 100
20.3 25.0
29 3 30.6
Ml 4 44.4
100 100
19.2 29.0
15.2 14 1
65.6 51.9
100 100
Industry classification
Manufacturing 73.0
Agriculture 5.4
Financial services 2.7
Transport 2.7
General trade
Building and construction 10.8
Information technology 5.4
Other services
100
No. ofemployees
Less than 500 40.5
500-2000 35.1
More than 2000 24 4
100
Year established
Less than 10 years 62.2
10-22 years 32 4
More than 23 years 5.4
100
Note: Number = 179.
Both parametric and non-parametric tests were used, that is, two-sample t-test and
Mann-Whitney U.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Adoption ofmanagement accounting practices in JVs and SOEs
Table 2 shows the comparative adoption levels of seven main groups of management
accounting practices for JVs and SOEs. Three of the management accounting practices,
namely, decision support systems (p<0.05), planning and control (p<0.05) and
responsibility accounting (/><0.01) have mean scores statistically different between JVs
and SOEs. In respect to the three management accounting practices, JVs tend to have higher
adoption rates compared with SOEs. However, in the case of management accounting
practices relating to product cost systems, budgeting systems, detailed budget system, and
performance evaluation system and rewards, JVs appear to have higher mean scores
compared with SOEs but the differences were not statistically significant.
The results from this analysis suggest that foreign-partnered JVs tend to adopt
management accounting practices to a much greater extent compared with SOEs [without
foreign partners]. The evidence lends support to the conclusion drawn by Firth (1996) that
JVs represent an important vehicle for the transfer of free market management ideas and
techniques to business entities in centrally planned socialist economies. SOEs are less likely
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Table 2
Relative importance of adoption of management accounting practices in China: JVs and SOEs
Management accounting practices Ownership Mean SD 7"-value
Product cost systems
Budgeting systems
Detailed budgeting systems
Performance evaluation and rewards
Decision support systems
Planning and control
Responsibility accounting
JVs 4.36 0.73
SOEs 4.52 1.14
JVs 5.03 0.84
SOEs 4.83 1.07
JVs 4.88 0.79
SOEs 4.89 1.08
JVs 4 48 0.84
SOEs 4.32 1 15
JVs 4.57 1.05
SOEs 4.15 1.15
JVs 4 53 0.88
SOEs 4 08 1 14
JVs 4.70 1.05
SOEs 4 05 1.32
-0.077
1.050
-0.094
0.767
1.915**
2.346**
2.653***
Notes: N= 179; SD = standard deviation.
**p<0.05; **V<0.01
to adopt management accounting practices that provide data for managerial decision
making compared to other techniques such as budgeting systems and group-performance
evaluation. This is not surprising given the frequency of state interference and the level of
the governance system in China. Despite the progress made in economic reforms, SOEs in
China are still typical socialist organizations following a hierarchical model that exhibits
complex features such as dual lines of authority and multiple centers of power. In SOEs,
there is close cooperation between the government, the enterprise, and the communist party
committee that parallels the managerial line within every enterprise. Moreover, the Chinese
government influences SOEs' decision making through the appointment of managers,
cadres, and party functionaries to boards of directors (Hassard, Sheehan, & Morris, 1999).
While such influences are not uniform across industries and regions (Lin, Cai, & Li, 1998),
the power of these appointed officials can reduce SOE management's ability to act, to
restrict managerial discretion, and to adopt advanced management systems, thereby leading
to reductions in organizational efficiency (Branine, 1996; Child, 1994; Groves, Hong,
McMillan, & Naughton, 1994; Peng & Heath, 1996). This is consistent with O'Connor
et al. (2004) finding that government influences can shift SOE management's attention
away from efficiency or profitability. For instance, the government requires SOEs to retain
redundant labor in order to maintain social stability. Goodall and Warner (1999) found that
government influence impedes the adoption and implementation of new management
practices. This may explain why SOEs attach relatively less importance to the adoption of
management accounting techniques relating to performance evaluation and rewards,
decision support systems, planning and control, and responsibility accounting — SOE
managers do not appear to have strategic decision-making responsibilities.
In contrast, JVs are formally supervised by one board, which legally represents the
interests of the owners. The board has decision making authority over strategic policy and
planning and provides for a single hierarchy of executive authority accountable to the
owners of capital. JVs in China, therefore, have much more autonomy to make decisions in
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all aspects of the enterprises they run. These differences in governance and interferences by
the state have an impact on the organizational performance and competitive abilities of both
JVs and SOEs.
Other important factors that may account for the differences in the adoption ofmanagement
accounting techniques are the norms and practices of SOEs under the socialist ideology
emphasizing collective identity and regarding innovation as a matter for social rather than
individual decisions. This implies that everyone in an SOE should share equally in the rewards
according to the efforts of the team. General social solidarity and economic security are
emphasized over the partial and individual interest. Thus under SOEs. workers are rewarded
on the basis ofteam and group, rather than on individual achievements. This may explain why
group-based management accounting practices are used more and valued by SOEs.
The diffusion ofadvanced management accounting techniques in SOEs may be restricted
by two factors: a lack of knowledge on the part of the average accountant, and a weak sense
of market competition held by the SOE management team. It may be argued that a
commitment to hire high-quality accounting personnel and to adopting advanced production
techniques suggests that new management accounting practices will be easier to implement.
However, this is not the case in Chinese SOEs. SOEs continue to have old-fashioned
production systems and managers are expected to implement production plans handed down
to them by superior authority. This suggests that managers still lack decision-making
responsibilities. This lack of authority coupled with the low wages paid to accounting
personnel in SOEs (compared to those in JVs) makes it difficult to attract high quality staff
which renders the implementation of new management ideas in SOEs extremely difficult.
The differences in management accounting practices in SOEs and JVs may be due to
management norms and organizational cultural differences. Cultural differences affect people
in terms of their thinking and behavior, and therefore influence managerial philosophy and
practice (Hofstede, 1984; Gray, 1988; Perara, 1989; Chow, Chau, & Gray, 1995). Chinese
traditional management norms can also impede the adoption of more formal, transparent
processes and controls of management. Examples include security of employment, formal
centralized bureaucracy, respect for status and seniority, and a strong sense of egalitarianism
(Davidson, 1987; Von Glinnow & Teagarden, 1988; Baird, Marjorie, & Robert, 1990). These
norms generally reflect a preference for well-established routines and procedures (O'Connor,
Chow, & Wu 2004). The leaders of SOEs try to avoid some of these shortcomings and only
choose certain features that do not conflict with valued local patterns. Therefore an innovation
is likely to be stifled in older SOEs compared to a TV as it is a newer organization that recruits
more new, young and educated staff. JV is also organized in terms of a new structure and
system and uses advanced technique and management. The dynamic nature of such an
enterprise is beneficial to innovation.
4.2. Benefits ofmanagement accounting practices: SOEs and JVs
Table 3 lists the average perceived benefits of management accounting practices ordered
by the mean scores of respondents based on using each practice over the past 5 years for
each of the JVs and SOEs in the sample. Table 3 indicates that several techniques
(production budgeting, responsibility-centered accounting, customer satisfaction surveys,
product life-cycle analysis, working capital budgeting, long-range forecasting.
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Table 3
Management accounting practices: perceived benefits in JVs and SOEs
Management accounting practices JV's average
perceived benefit
(past 5 years)
Mean SD Rank Mean SD
SOE's average
perceived benefit
(past 5 years)
Rank
Production budgeting
Budgeting for coordinating activities across the business units
Responsibility center accounting
Budgeting for profitability analysis
Performance evaluation and reward: customer-satisfaction surveys
Sales budgeting
Product life-cycle analysis
Budgeting for controlling costs
Cash/working capital budgeting
Long-range forecasting
Budgeting for planning financial position
Profits budgeting
Target costing
Activity-based management (ABM|
Cost-volume-profit/break-even analysis
Budgeting for day-to-day operations
Performance evaluation and reward: return on investment (ROI)
Responsibility budgeting
Performance evaluation and reward: employee attitudes
Investment appraisal non-discounting techniques
(e.g., Payback, ROI)
Standard costing and variance analysis
Investment appraisal discounting techniques (e.g., NPV, IRR)
Performance evaluation and reward: group decision
from top management
Performance evaluation and reward: controllable profit
Responsibility reporting distinguishing between
controllable and non-controllable items
Product/service profitability analysis
Performance evaluation and reward: budget variance analysis
Strategic planning
Relevant and irrelevant cost analysis
Performance evaluation and reward: team performance
Performance evaluation and reward: divisional profit
Full (absorption) costing
Sensitivity analysis
Variable costing
Performance evaluation and reward: residual income
Performance evaluation and reward: cash flow return on investment
Activity-based costing (ABC)
Planning and control: personal business experience and intuitive
managerial judgment
Performance evaluation and reward: individual judgment from
immediate superior
5.43
5.23
5.17
5.16
5.14
5.13
5.13
5.12
5.03
4.93
4.91
4.91
4.88
4.82
4.77
4 75
4 69
469
4.68
4.68
4.68
4.68
4.67
4.65
4.60
4.53
4,48
4.48
4.46
441
441
4.33
4 25
4.18
4.13
4.08
4.00
3.50
0.90
1.15
1.23
1.26
1.03
0.98
1.41
1.08
1.18
1.28
1.04
I 15
115
1.33
1 19
1.05
1.00
I 32
1.22
1.28
1.32
1.38
1.27
1.27
1.26
1.42
1.35
1.50
1 .35
1.37
1.70
0.98
1.48
1.63
1.25
1.19
1.22
0.97
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
4.83
4.80
4.03
491
4.43
4.94
3.59
5.22
4.61
3.96
4.76
4.95
4.91
4.38
4.59
4.80
4.40
4.08
4.32
4.02
4.21
3.80
4.68
4.33
4.03
4.36
4.35
4.20
3.84
4.24
4.57
4.68
3.83
4411
3.83
4.12
4.00
3.62
(1.28)
(1-44)
(1-44)
(1 52)
(1.51)
(1.26)
(1.80)
(1.32)
(146)
(1.49)
(1.44)
(1.24)
(1.46)
(1.56)
(1.61)
(1.30)
(1.60)
(1.52)
(1.35)
(1.34)
( 1 46)
(1.71)
(1.41)
(1.61)
(1.53)
(1.59)
(1.49)
(1.78)
(1.50)
(1.42)
(1.63)
(1 34)
(1.72)
(152)
(1.78)
(1.78)
(1.81)
(1.27)
28
5
15
3
39
1
12
32
9
2
4
18
13
7
17
27
22
30
24
36
11
21
29
19
20
25
33
23
14
10
34
16
35
26
31
38
3.16 (1.64) 39 3.65 (1.31) 37
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responsibility budgeting, investment appraisal, relevant and irrelevant cost analysis) receive
significantly different mean scores in JVs and SOEs. Employees in JVs perceive higher
benefits from using the management accounting practices listed above than those in SOEs.
The results in Table 3 may help explain the findings reported in previous research. First.
the long-standing nature of some management accounting practices used in SOEs, (e.g.,
operational budgeting and performance evaluation) and techniques promoted by the
government and superior authorities (e.g., variable costing and Chinese "target costing")
were found to have higher perceived benefits for the SOEs than for JVs. Second, most of
the recently developed strategically focused and market oriented practices (such as
customer satisfaction surveys, long-range forecasting, activity-based management, strategic
planning, and sensitivity analysis, investment-appraisal methods, and non-financial
measures) tend to be perceived as more beneficial for JVs than SOEs. Third, management
accounting practices that are based on Chinese traditional culture and management norms
(e.g., group decisions from top management and individual judgement from immediate
superiors, personal business experience and intuitive managerial judgement), have higher
perceived benefits for the SOEs than for JVs.
The findings also indicate that the responsibility-accounting related practices have
higher perceived benefits for JVs than for SOEs. This result is surprising in that
responsibility accounting has been traditionally associated with Chinese SOEs and
therefore it was expected that this long-standing management accounting practice should be
perceived as more beneficial by employees in SOEs. However, this does not appear to be
the case. Perhaps a reasonable explanation might be that the responsibility accounting
practices promoted by the government in SOEs have not reached the level required for such
practices to be most effective. In contrast, employees in JVs perceive these practices to be
very beneficial as they suit the Chinese environments faced by JVs.
4.3. Future emphasis ofmanagement accounting practices
Table 4 shows the perceived expected future emphasis on each management accounting
practice in the JV and SOE samples over the next 3 years following the survey. Table 4
indicates that the items that have significantly higher expected future emphasis by employees
in JVs include strategically focused, market-oriented, product-development and profitability-
related practices. Specific practices include strategic planning, product life-cycle analysis,
long-range forecasting, standard costing variance analysis, product/service-profitability
analysis, sensitivity analysis, relevant and irrelevant cost analysis: non-financial measures
of performance evaluation and rewards (i.e., customer-satisfaction surveys and employee
attitudes), investment-appraisal techniques and responsibility-accounting related practices.
On the other hand, items that have relatively higher expected future emphasis in SOEs
include long-standing detailed-budget related methods (i.e., profit budgeting, budgeting for
financial planning purposes and operational budgeting), group-based methods of
performance evaluation and rewards (such as divisional profit, team performance, and
group decision from top management), subjective methods (i.e., business experience and
intuitive managerial judgment and individual judgment from immediate superiors) and full-
absorption costing. This finding suggests that despite many years of reforms, SOE
employees expect much of the management accounting data produced in China to be
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Table 4
Management accounting practices: expected future emphasis in JVs and SOEs
Management accounting practices
Production budgeting
Strategic planning
Budgeting for controlling costs
Product life-cycle analysis
Budgeting for profitability analy sis
Responsibility centre accounting
Cash, working capital budgeting
Long range forecasting
Sales budgeting
Target costing
Performance evaluation and reward: customer satisfaction surveys
Standard costing and variance analyst
Budgeting for coordinating activities across the business units
Profits budgeting
Product sen ice profitability analysis
Responsibility reporting distinguishing between controllable and
non-controllable items
Responsibility budgeting
Budgeting for planning financial position
Acti\ ity based management (ABM)
Variable costmg
Performance evaluation and reward: divisional profit
Sensitivity analy sis
Performance evaluation and reward: return on investment (ROI)
Budgeting for day-to-day operations
Performance evaluation and reward: controllable profit
Relevant and irrelevant cost analy sis
Cost-volume-profit break-even analysis
Performance evaluation and reward: budget variance analysis
Investment appraisal non-discounting techniques
(e.g. Payback. ROI)
Performance evaluation and reward: employee attitudes
[mestment appraisal discounting techniques (eg NPV. IRR)
Performance evaluation and reward: team performance
Performance evaluation and reward: cash flow return on investment
Performance evaluation and reward: group decision from top
management
Performance evaluation and reward: residual income
Activity -based costing (.ABC)
Full (absorption) costing
Planning and control: personal business experience and intuitive
managerial judgment
Performance evaluation and reward: individual judgment from
immediate superior
TV's expected SOE- > expected
future emphasis future emphasis
(next 3 years) (next 3 years)
Mean 5D Rank Mean SD Rank
5.74 0.96 1 5.39 (1.29) 5
5.71 1.06 2 5.32 (1.41) 7
5.61 i i: 3 5.56 (1.30) 3
5.60 1 45 4 4.46 (181) 37
5.56 1 20 5 5 26 (5.51) 10
5 52 1 16 6 4.84 (1.33) 25
5.50 1.14 7 5.25 ( 1-39) 11
5.50 1 41 8 4.96 (1.28) 21
5.33 1.11 9 5.64 (1.25) 1
5 33 1 31 10 542 (133) 4
5 2^ 1.30 11 5.19 (1.44) 13
5.27 1.35 12 4.79 (1.49) 29
5.23 1 27 13 5.18 (142) 14
5.19 1 28 14 5.64 (125) 2
5.19 1 52 15 5.06 (160) 19
5.13 1 45 16 4.90 (1.29) 24
5.12 1 34 17 5.08 (1.46) 17
5.09 1 25 18 5.37 (1.26) 6
5.07 1 35 19 4!S4 (1.39) 26
5.00 1.37) 20 4.93 (1.43) 23
5.00 1 67 21 5.27 (1.29) 9
5.00 1.77) 22 4 s;- (145) 27
4.93 23 5.31 (1.46) 8
4.93 1 22 24 5.17 (1.24) 15
4.90 1 02 25 4.77 (1431 30
4.88 23 26 4.62 (1.21) 34
4.83 1 39 2~ 5.08 (148) 18
4.82 1 31 28 4.95 (1.31) 22
4.80 1 26 29 4 <_ (1.20) 35
4.79 1 39 30 4.65 (1.18) 33
4.78 1.56 31 4.77 il 55) 31
4.65 1 32 32 4.79 (1.24) 28
4.62 1 26 33 5.11 (159) 16
4.52 1 53 34 5.05 (1.44) 20
4.50 1.16 35 4 "2 (1.70) 32
4.47 1.59 36 4.57 (1.66) 36
3.87 1
— 3" 5.24 (1.39) 12
3.60 1.24 38 405 (1.38) 39
3.21 (1.96) 39 4.36 (1.69) 38
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oriented towards calculating inventory costs and budgeting for costs, with limited
expectations of the use of cost data for future decision-making purposes. This finding is
consistent with conclusions drawn by Bromwich and Wang ( 1991 ) and Skousen and Yang
(1988). Firth (1996) suggests that the orientation of management accounting data towards
calculating inventory costs may be due to the lack of decision-making responsibilities of
SOE managers who are traditionally expected to carry out production plans handed down
by the state. Even with the sweeping modernizations and restructuring taking place within
SOEs, the findings suggest that management accounting practices may not evolve signi-
ficantly over the next 3 years
5. Conclusion and future research directions
This study represents one of the first attempts to examine the adoption, perceived
benefits and expected future direction of management accounting practices of SOEs and
TVs in the Chinese emerging market economy. We find that SOE. and JVs adopt
management accounting practices at significantly different levels. Ownership type also
affects the kind of management accounting practices adopted. For example. JVs (with a
foreign partner) tend to adopt more Western management accounting practices compared to
SOEs. The difference in adoption levels is more pronounced for management accounting
practices relating to decision making, planning and control, and responsibility accounting.
The difference in adoption rates according to ownership type supports earlier research
conclusions drawn by Firth (1996) and (O'Connor, Chow. & Wu. 2004). indicating that
foreign-partnered JVs constitute an important vehicle for importing Western management
accounting practices into China compared with SOEs that have no foreign involvement
With regard to the perceived benefits obtained from adoption of Western management
accounting practices, this study suggests that the practices relating to budgeting for cost
control, profit budgeting, sales budgeting and target costing are perceived to be the more
beneficial by the senior financial officers of SOEs as compared to those of JVs. However,
employees of SOEs perceive less benefits arising from management accounting techniques
in respect to decision-support systems, planning and control systems, and performance-
evaluation systems based on individual rewards.
In relation to changes in future adoption, the employees of SOEs expect to place more
emphasis on sales budgeting, profit budgeting, budgeting for cost control, and target
costing and relatively lower emphasis on decision support system practices encompassing
cost-volume-profit analysis (rank of 18). activity-based management (26). relevant and
irrelevant cost analysis (34). and product service profitability (19).
It appears, therefore, that little has been achieved despite two decades of reforms and
modernization. Consistent with the conclusion drawn by (Hassard. Sheehan. & Morris.
1999). government interference in SOE management is still prevalent and pervasive. To
further support this point, a respondent from one of the top SOEs noted:
"Due to heavy influences by the old planned economic system, most SOEs do not
appreciate the value of the management accounting information. This situation must
be improved by increasing the sense of market economy held by the staff and the
quality of leadership in SOEs."
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While this study contributes to our understanding of the adoption, perceived benefits and
expected future emphasis of management accounting practices in China, further
investigation appears warranted. The findings of this study suggest that JVs with a foreign
partner tend to adopt more Western management accounting practices compared SOEs.
However, the reasons for variations in the adoption ofmanagement accounting practices are
not fully apparent, particularly at a firm level. Future investigation should explore how
firm-specific factors may influence adoption rates in both JVs and SOEs using multivariate
regression analysis.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the economic motives offixed-asset revaluations ofSwiss listed companies. We
provide international insights on revaluation motives, particularly in a stakeholders' regime, over a period
which is characterized by significant changes ofthe accounting standards relative to fixed-assets valuation.
We also test the impact of international stakeholders on the choice of whether to revalue assets. Results
from pooled data show positive associations between revaluation and both the proportion of foreign sales
and leverage, and a negative association with the investment opportunities. These findings suggest that
revaluation is used as a device to improve creditors' and foreign stakeholders' perceptions of the financial
health of the finn and thereby improve the firm's borrowing capacity. Cross-sectional results show that
although leverage has declined over the periods investigated, interest rates have become lower for firms
that revalue upward their fixed assets (compared to non-revaluers). emphasizing the debt-costs hypothesis.
2007 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In several countries (e.g., Australia, Belgium, and the United Kingdom), accounting laws
allow the value of fixed assets to be revalued upward—without a previous write-down—at the
managers' discretion. ' Information asymmetry about the finn's assets value should be reduced
E-mail address missonier-pierateessec.fr.
Different countries have different regulations in this area. For example, upward revaluation is strictly forbidden
in Canada and the United States but is authorized (under certain conditions) in Australia, Belgium, Spain. France.
Hong Kong, Italy. Japan. New Zealand, the Netherlands. Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Raffournier.
Haller, & Walton. 1998. p. 438).
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by this departure from the historical cost principle ( Brown. Izan. & Loh. 1 992. p. 4 1 ). Research
on the value relevance of this accounting practice in Australia ( Easton. Eddey. & Trevor. 1 993:
Standish & Ung. 1982). in New Zealand ( Emanuel. 1989; Courtney & Cahan, 2004). in the
United Kingdom (Aboody. Barth. & Kasznik. 1999; Barth & Clinch. 1998). and for Hong
Kong firms (Jaggi & Tsui, 2001 ) provides mixed results." Given that the choice of whether or
not to implement revaluation lies with management, there is good reason to question the
motivations underlying a practice that has no direct impact on the firm's cash flow besides
implementation costs (e.g.. additional audit fees). It is reasonable to think that these costs are
compensated (Watts, 1977). It may therefore be interesting to understand the origins of the
compensations, in orderto comprehend the reasons why managers opt forupw aid rex aluations
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the economic factors likely to affect
fixed-asset revaluation of Swiss listed companies by concentrating on contractual relation-
ships (implicit and explicit). Investigation of the choice ofupward asset revaluation— that is.
without a previous write-down— in the specific Swiss context is of interest for several
reasons. First, and unlike most countries, the Swiss stock exchange market (SWX) has a
long tradition of international accounting standards. Until 2005. it used to allow
companies to report their financial statements using IFRS. U.S. GAAP or local Swiss
GAAP Accounting standards for assets" revaluation have changed significantly over the
last decade (see Section 2). This paper provides insights on managers' revaluation policy
in a changing accounting environment Second, few articles have considered the impact
of international stakeholders (i.e.. customers, suppliers, and foreign investors) on the
firm's accounting-policy choices (Cullman. 1999; Inoue & Thomas. 1996). Financial
statements of firms facing international competition are not exposed to the scrutiny of
only local stakeholders. Numerous Swiss listed firms have expanded their activities
abroad, providing the opportunity to test the impact of international stakeholders on
reporting valuation choice (i.e.. historical cost vs. upward revaluation of fixed assets).
Third. Switzerland has a concentrated and relatively illiquid stock market that differs from
those in "stockholders-oriented" countries (Hilary. 2003). and a small but open economy
(Cauchie. Hoesli. & Isakov. 2004). This paper increases understanding of managers"
accounting choices, particularly asset revaluation, in such a "stakeholder's regime" where
banks play a major role. Indeed, although some empirical works have focused on the
economic logic underlying the decision to revalue, most previous studies ha\ e been
concerned with firms in an Anglo-Saxon environment (i.e.. Australia, New Zealand, and
the United Kingdom). Only Jaggi and Tsui (2001) in Hong Kong and Gaeremynck and
Veugelers ( 1999) for non-listed Belgium firms offered empirical results—on a manager's
motivation to revalue assets—in different institutional and cultural environments. Lastly.
the accounting literature has extensive research on the associations between a firm's
characteristics and its accounting-method choices. Yet. unlike most accounting choices
To some extent, Nichols and Buerger (2002) found upward revaluation relevant in the debtors/a
relationship in a German context
Results from prior research that has focused on managers" motives to explain the decision to revalue a firm's
assets generally suggest that upward revaluation may be a signaling contracting device to reduce debt costs
(Black. Sellers, & Manly. 1998; Brown et al., 1992; Cotter. 1999: Cotter & Zimmer. 1995; Lin & Peasnell. 2000a.
2000b; Whittled & Chan. 1992i
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that accelerate or delay the recording of profits (e.g., via discretionary accruals management),
effects of revaluation on the financial statements—all things being equal—do not reverse
over time. Besides, upward revaluation may have a substantial effect on the financial
statements' aggregates.
4
In order to investigate the rationale underlying upward asset-revaluation choice of the
main Swiss listed companies, we derive hypotheses from the Swiss environment.'"' We
argue that revaluation is mainly a device to decrease debt costs, as well as to meet foreign
stakeholders' information needs, while it also reflects managers' compensation considera-
tions. It is further hypothesized that upward revaluation is positively associated with a
firm's leverage ratio, its level of export sales, and negatively associated with the firm's
ownership diffusion. The empirical analysis is based on univariate tests and Logit-type
regressions on Swiss listed firms from the years 1994, 1997, 2000, and 2004 (using both
pooled and cross-section data). The four years were selected to capture the significant
accounting changes Swiss firms have experienced over the last decade. Results from the
pool regression suggest that the leverage ratio and the ratio of foreign sales to total sales are
positively associated with upward revaluation of fixed assets, whereas investment
opportunities are negatively associated. For the most part, these observations are supported
with a cross-sectional analysis (using both univariate and multivariate analyses) which also
exhibits that although leverage decreased for both groups of firms (revaluers vs. non-
revaluers), interest rates have become lower for firms that revalued upward their fixed
assets. This latter result emphasizes the debt-costs hypothesis.
The paper is organized into the following sections. The next section describes the
accounting context in Switzerland and examines the issues associated with revaluation, the
third develops the hypotheses, the fourth presents the research design, the fifth discusses the
main statistical results and the sixth offers a conclusion.
2. Accounting for asset revaluation in Switzerland
Switzerland follows the continental European model of a legal approach to accounting
standard settings, as its accounting regulation is mostly of legislative origin. Firms'
accounting choices must be consistent with the legal rules set out in the Swiss Company
Law (Code des Obligations, hereafter CO), which used to give firms considerable
flexibility with regard to publication of information—the CO contains very few accounting
principles or rules. As a result, Switzerland, although it was one of the world's most highly
industrialized countries, was considered to be underdeveloped from the accounting
standpoint (Ziind, 1993, p. 257). The situation has changed significantly in recent years. In
1984 the Swiss Institute of Certified Accountants created the Foundation for
Recommendations concerning the Presentation of Accounts, known in Switzerland by its
German acronym FER. for Fachkommission fur Empfehlungen zur Rechnungslegung. The
FER is a Swiss accounting standardization board modeled on the American FASB
4 Under IFRS. revaluation cannot apply to a given isolated asset only, but must encompass all assets in a gi\en
class, which increases the overall value involved.
Hypothesis developments from prior studies are also used when non-context specific.
The generally accepted accounting rules and principles in Switzerland are set out in sections 662 to 673 of the CO.
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(Financial Accounting Standards Board). Its mission is to draw up recommendations
(i.e., the Swiss GAAP FER) that intend to improve the quality and comparability of financial
statements and help bring accounting practices into line with international standards (FER's
standards apply mostly to consolidated accounts). The CO. which dates from 1881. was
revised in depth in 1992. with emphasis on standardization of annual accounts, in respect of
which it now contains a number of rules (art. 663 and 663a). Since October 1996. firms listed
on the Swiss Stock Exchange (Swiss Exchange: SWX) must also comply with the Swiss
GAAP FER (Accounting Rules Recommendation), the IFRS (International Financial
Reporting Standards), or the U.S. GAAP, as well as with the CO. These new SWX Riles
merely confirmed a de facto situation, in that Switzerland's listed companies already
voluntarily published their group accounts in accordance with recognized standards or
standards consistent with generally accepted practices (Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998),
such as the IFRS, Swiss GAAP FER, U.S. GAAP, or European Directives. 7
Besides U.S. GAAP, all available accounting standards—for Swiss listed companies
—
allow some form of upward revaluation. At the legislative level, except for the specific case
of losses of half the capital stock and reserves (art. 670 CO), the CO prohibits revaluations
in individual accounts but authorizes them in consolidated accounts. The CO does not,
however, provide any guidelines relative to the accounting for upward revaluation. Instead,
it invites managers to follow recognized GAAP for the reporting of consolidated accounts
(art. 663 CO). Managers of Swiss listed firms may then prepare consolidated financial
statements with upward revaluation of fixed assets under the other accounting references
required by the SWX (i.e., Swiss GAAP FER and IFRS). Indeed, Switzerland's own
standard. Swiss GAAP FER No. 5 "Valuation Principles for Group Accounts," authorizes
both the historical-cost method and the fair-value method in consolidated accounts, and it
does not state a preference. The accounting treatment of upward revaluation is stipulated in
Swiss GAAP FER No. 1 8, "Tangible Fixed Assets." Firms may measure their tangible fixed
assets at the "actual values" (FER 18, §8). This standard is similar to the one of IAS 16,
"Property, Plant and Equipment" [International Accounting Standards) in terms of
revaluation. * Thus, under IFRS and Swiss GAAP, a company may choose the revaluation
model as its accounting policy for PPE (Property, Plant & Equipment) after the initial
recognition. As stipulated, PPE may be revalued at fair value (at the date of the revaluation),
normally appraised by professionally qualified valuers (IAS 16, §32). The revaluation of
assets should then be made with sufficient frequency (IAS 16, §34; FER 18. §10). and it
should concern the entire class of PPE to which the assets belong (IAS 16, §37). Upward
revaluation is recorded first by measuring the difference between the fair value of the assets
and their book value. The revaluation difference is then added to the net book value of the
assets and to the firm's equity capital as a revaluation surplus. If the revalued assets are
depreciable, depreciation is recorded in the income statement. Where the difference
between the fair value of an asset and its net book value is negative, the asset is depreciated
by the same amount. When revalued assets are derecognized, the revaluation surplus may
Because Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, all references to the European Directives in
Swiss firms' annual accounts were, and still are. entirely voluntary.
Swiss GAAP FER No. 9 provides the accounting rules for intangible assets, which do not allow upward
revaluation.
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be transferred to the retained earnings (IAS 16, §41; FER 18, §13), or instead it could be
"dissolved to profit" (FER 18, §13). 9
Effective for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 January 2001,
the new version of Swiss GAAP FER No. 18, "Tangible Fixed Assets," and IAS 40,
"Investment Property" (i.e., lands or buildings held to earn rentals or for capital appreciation),
may have affected the overall revaluation policy as they require the isolation of investment
properties from fixed assets before implementing a revaluation method (if desired). Thus, the
new and revised IAS 1 6 does not apply to fixed assets considered as mere investments, which
reduces the scope of the revaluation policy. The rationale ofIAS 40 is different from IAS 1 6. in
that it requires that either upward revaluation be recorded in the income statement (instead of
equity capital) or it stays at the historical cost. '" In order to be consistent over the four years
considered, this paper investigates the revaluation under IAS 1 6 only.
3. Background and explanatory factors
Asset revaluation allows firms to take into account changes in the fair value ofsome assets
when determining their carrying amounts in financial statements. The need to revalue certain
non-current assets has its roots in the debate over the effects of changing prices. Some firms
revalue their assets within the scope of inflation accounting standards (Griffiths, 1990). A firm
may also consider upward revaluations to reveal its true economic and financial situation to
investors. Where it is clear that an asset's book value is far different from its fair value,
management should make the relevant adjustment in order to reduce information asymmetry
(Brown et al., 1992), even if this means increasing the book value of the asset in question.
The debate relative to such departure from the historical cost principle is ongoing
(Aboody et al., 1999; Lin & Peasnell, 2000a, 2000b). The principle of conservatism dictates
that firms should consider only those events likely to reduce asset values, eliminating any
upward valuations. Moreover, upward revaluations generate more in terms ofdirect costs (as
discussed below) than they contribute in terms of business image; following this logic and
according to Henderson and Goodwin (1992), accounting standards should prohibit them.
Under both IAS 16 and FER IS, the amount in the revaluation surplus may change for three reasons, (a) As a
results of a revaluation, an increase of the carrying amount of an asset shall be credited directly to the revaluation
surplus (or in profit or loss to the extent it reverses a revaluation decrease of the same asset previously recognized
in profit and loss) (IAS 16. §39; FER IS. §13). (b) As a result of a revaluation, a decrease of the carrying amount
of an asset shall be recognized directly to the revaluation surplus to the extent of any credit balance existing in the
revaluation surplus of the assets (or directly in profit or loss in the absence of any credit balance of a revaluation
surplus of the same assets) (IAS 16. §40; FER IS, §13). (c) When the revalued asset is derecogmzed, the
revaluation surplus shall be transferred directly to retained earnings (and not through profit and loss) (IAS 16,
§41; FER IS, §13).
"' IAS 40 allows the choice between two valuation methods: a cost model and a fair-value model. With this latter
approach, "investment should be measured at fair value and changes in fair value should be recognised in the
income statement" (IAS 40. §5a). It is thus stipulated thai "The fair value model differs from the revaluation
model that the Board already permits for certain non-financial assets. Under the revaluation model, increases in
carrying amount above a cost-based measure are recognised as revaluation surplus. However under the fair value
model, all changes in fair value are recognised in the income statement" (IAS 40. §6). The new FER IX. §14 is
similar lo the IAS 40 but leaves open the choice between the recognition of the fair-value changes in the income
statement or in stockholders' equity (i.e.. revaluation reserve).
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Upward fixed-asset revaluation generates a certain number of direct costs. One is the
cost of obtaining an estimate of the fair value of the assets in question. In some cases, higher
audit fees could be expected, for example where auditors have to verify the assumptions the
company made when estimating internally the fair value of assets. Certain difficult-to-
measure costs also result from the time spent in discussions and negotiations between
auditors and management on the new asset value to be recorded (Brown et al., 1992, p. 37).
Some indirect effects can arise from the lasting impact of revaluation on all the firm's
financial statements." The published amounts may affect the decisions of some stake-
holders in their relationship with the firm.
The empirical literature offers a number of factors to explain the revaluation decision in
different contexts and environments. First, in Australia, the United Kingdom, and to some
extent Hong Kong, upward revaluations help avoid violations of debt covenants, restricting
debt levels (Brown et al., 1992; Cotter, 1999; Whittred & Chan, 1992) while improving the
firm's ability to obtain new loans because the firm can report a lower debt ratio as a result ofits
higher asset value (Black et al., 1998; Brown et al., 1992; Cotter, 1999; Cotter & Zimmer,
1995; Jaggi & Tsui, 2001; Lin & Peasnell, 2000b). In such a context, and given that outside
financing is more costly for firms composed mainly of investment opportunities than for those
composed mainly of assets-in-place, it appears that the managers of the former have more
reasons to implement upward asset revaluation (Brown et al.. 1992; Whittred & Chan. 1992).
Second, revaluations also serve to dissuade hostile takeover bids. If revaluation allows a firm
to bring its book value into line with its fair value, this move lowers the probability of a
successful under-value bid (Brown et al.. 1992; Easton et al., 1993). Third, by reducing the
return on equity and the return on assets, upward revaluation reduces the political costs borne
by firms (Brown et al.. 1992). Fourth, in the United Kingdon and prior to 1993, when gain
from a sale of fixed assets could be calculated based on historical cost and flow through the
income statement, revaluation could be part ofan overall earnings management policy (Black
et al, 1998). Fifth and last, managers may implement upward revaluation simply to report the
fair value ofthe firm's assets. For example, Aboody et al. (1999), in the United Kingdom, and
Jaggi and Tsui (2001 ), in Hong Kong, have both shown a positive link between upward asset
revaluation and the firm's future performance, suggesting that the managers' choice was
actually motivated by asset-value-modification considerations. 1 " Within a Swiss context,
several factors are also likely to influence managers' accounting decisions.
3.1. Leverage
The Swiss credit market is well developed, although, since the collapse of real estate prices
in the early 1990s, its banking sector has experienced an important consolidation process
(Hertig, 1997; Rime and Stiroh. 2003). The handful of banks that dominate the credit market
(i.e.. Credit Suisse, UBS, and Kantonal Banks) may find themselves in a dominant or even
occasionally a monopoly position vis-a-vis corporations seeking external financing, which
These effects increase in proportion to the variation between the fair value and the book value of the assets,
and they are larger as revaluation frequency declines.
Gaeremynck and Veugelers (1999) conclude that revaluation is a negative signal in Belgium. They develop an
analytical model that suggests that poorly performing firms benefit more than others from upward asset revaluation.
Their empirical tests on unlisted Belgian firms appear to confirm their anal> ses. hut only for a somewhat volatile industry
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could lessen the firms' bargaining power. Creditors use accounting information to analyze a
firm's financial standing and assess the risk they would be taking when granting credit or
agreeing to a loan. Managers seeking to reduce financing costs may influence the accounting
decisions to reduce the perceived risk of creditors, and thus reduce debt costs. Swiss bank
loans may be priced and may contain restrictive debt covenants according to the debtor's
financial standing (Missonier-Piera, 2004).' ' Indeed, one of the main concerns of creditors is
the risk of reducing or diluting the guarantees offered by the firm's assets in case of
bankruptcy, which is positively correlated to the firm's leverage. Managers (acting on behalf
of shareholders) will try to reassure creditors by opting for an upward revaluation policy for
their fixed assets. This choice will not only reduce information asymmetry about the assets'
fair value but also will reduce leverage ratios and the related perceived bankruptcy risk.
Results from Nichols and Buerger (2002) indicate that bankers (in Germany) would grant
significantly larger loans to firms reporting their financial statements with fixed assets at fair
values instead of historical cost. This suggests that creditors may prefer such a revaluation
practice, or at least that it is appropriate for debtors to present fixed assets at revalued amounts
in their financial statements. This accounting choice becomes more relevant as the firm's debt
level increases and as the firm moves closer to its contractual limits (Begley, 1990).
HI. The higher the firm's leverage, the more likely it is that its managers will use upward
fixed-asset revaluation.
3.2. Ownership control status
The Swiss stock market is concentrated and relatively illiquid (Cormier, Magnan, &
Morard, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Hail, 2002). Most corporations, including some of the
biggest, are owned and controlled by a small number of shareholders, and the general public
owns only a small fraction of the firms' stocks (Schmid & Burkhard, 1997). Koke (2004)
provided empirical evidence that changes in control—due to poor performance—may play a
disciplinary role in a bank-based economy (i.e., like that of Switzerland), although the
probability of changes in control is reduced as ownership concentration increases. The
ownership structure ofthe firm may then affect managers' accounting method choices. Indeed,
senior managers have considerable discretionary power over the firm's management—in
particular, regarding the publication of information on its performance (Williamson, 1967,
p. 13)— in firms where the cost of controlling managerial activities is high. This particularly
tends to be the case in firms with diffuse shareholdings (Salamon & Smith, 1979; Dhaliwal,
198S; Hall, 1993). Managers of firm with such agency problems may select accounting
methods in order to convince shareholders that the firm's performance is satisfactory in order
to increase managerial compensation, or at least give a flattering image of the firm (Donnelly
& Lynch, 2002), u even though this favors appearance over fair disclosure (Vafeas, 2005).
Hence, Elston and Goldberg (2003) find a positive association between the level of executive
"Deal Scan" from Loan Pricing Corporation (a private worldwide database) provides such detailed information
on some Swiss private-debt agreements.
4
This should discourage hostile takeover bids by ensuring that existing shareholders do not wish to sell their
shares. Such practices should be all the more relevant in a market with a low ratio of firms' owners (i.e., the main
shareholders! to managers, as the competition between these laner is stronger (Williamson. 1975).
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compensation and both firm profitability measures and ownership dispersion for firms in
Germany (i.e., a country close to Switzerland in terms of corporate-governance attributes).
Upward revaluation decreases accounting profitability measures.'" leading us to expect:
H2. The more diffused the ownership of the firm, the less likely it is that its managers will
use upward fixed-asset revaluation.
3.3. International stakeholders
According to the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics, exports represented 28%, 32%, 37%
and 42% ofGDP in 1994, 1 997, 2000, and 2004, respectively. On the Swiss stock market, a
large proportion offirms are exposed to foreign economic conditions (Cauchie et al.. 2004).
In addition, due to the relatively small size of the Swiss market, numerous listed firms have
expanded their activities abroad and have sought external funds on foreign financial markets
(i.e., on foreign exchanges) to finance their expansion. A firm engaged in international
activities has to provide information not only to its domestic stakeholders—such as
investors, creditors, and customers—but also to those from abroad. Very few articles have
considered the impact of international stakeholders on accounting-methods choice (e.g.,
Cullinan, 1999). Financial statements of firms facing international competition, however,
are exposed to the scrutiny of local and international stakeholders, both ofwhom may affect
managers' accounting decisions. From abroad, Swiss companies may be perceived as more
risky than local firms. Not only do users of financial information (e.g., foreign customers)
have to convert the financial statements into their local currency, but they also do not share
the same amount ofinformation and do not have the same expertise and knowledge about the
firm (e.g., its business history) as financial statement users from Switzerland. Swiss firms
have, therefore, an incentive to enhance their perceived financial strength by reducing
information asymmetry. Upward revaluation may be a device to achieve this goal, especially
when this practice may be well perceived in some neighbor countries and significant
economic partners, such as Germany (Nichols & Buerger, 2002). We may then expect that:
H3. The higher the level of a firm's export sales, the more likely it is that its managers will
use upward fixed-asset revaluation.
3.4. Investment opportunities
Myers (1977) claimed that a firm is composed of assets-in-place (whose value is easily
identifiable) and growth (or investment) opportunities (whose value depends on future
The increase of managers' compensation may result from the presence of a bonus (for example). Indeed, the
literature in the area assumes that— in order to monitor managers' activities more effectively— the presence of a
bonus plan within the firm is positively associated with more diffused ownership of firms (Salamon & Smith,
1979; Dhaliwal, Salamon. & Smith. 1982). Managers' compensation contracts are difficult to obtain for Swiss
corporations, however. The few bonus plans identified (in Switzerland) seem to leave shareholders some latitude
in fixing the amount of managers' bonus payments (Pratt & Bher, 1989, p. 20). The scarcity of compensation
contracts available for study and the difficulty in obtaining them may result simply from the relatively highly
concentrated ownership structure of the Swiss stock market, which—according to the literature—should be
negatively associated with the presence of such contracts.
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discretionary investments). Investment opportunities may have two countervailing
associations with asset-revaluation policy, (a) On the one hand, by definition, firms
composed mainly of investment opportunities have fewer assets-in-place. From this
perspective, these growth firms have fewer possibilities than firms composed mainly of
assets-in-place to revalue their assets upward. Indeed, fixed-asset revaluation may concern
only existing assets (i.e., assets-in-place). (b) On the other hand, managers of firms
composed mainly of growth opportunities are better acquainted with their value than are
outside investors, due to information asymmetry (i.e., the asset value is difficult to
appraise). It is, therefore, more difficult to control the activities of growth firms than it is to
control the activities of firms composed mainly of assets-in-place. For creditors, the
presence of investment opportunities generates a problem of underinvestment and of asset
substitution"
1
(Galai & Masulis, 1976). Creditors will then perceive such growth firms as
more risky, and they will have higher expectations in terms of financial health. ' This gives
an incentive to opt for upward revaluation of fixed assets (Whittred & Chan, 1992), along
with the need to reduce information asymmetry with potential investors (Brown et al,
1992). Because of these two opposite arguments, it is difficult to make a prediction a priori
about the sign of the association between investment opportunities and upward revaluation
of fixed assets.
H4. The importance of the firm's investment opportunities is associated with the use of
upward fixed-asset revaluation.
4. Research design
4.1. Sample selection
The sample is composed of industrial and commercial firms listed on the Swiss Stock
Exchange (SWX) for the four distinct periods of 1994. 1997. 2000 and 2004; only firms
that do not report their financial statements under U.S. GAAP are included. The time
periods are not selected arbitrarily. Use of these four periods captures the accounting
changes that have occurred over the last decade in Switzerland. The year 1994 takes into
The first risk is the potential risk of underinvestment. By definition, managers will decide at the appropriate
time whether or not to proceed with the investment (i.e.. to take up the investment opportunity). They will not
make the investment if its net present value—even if positive —is less than the amount the firm must repay to its
creditors, generating a problem of underinvestment. The second risk arises from the possibility that manager-
shareholders may undertake projects that are more risky than those for which creditors granted the loan (Galai &
Masulis. 1976). This is because the additional gain resulting from the increase in risk will benefit the shareholders
only, not the creditors, who receive a fixed amount. The capacity to substitute assets is greater if the firm is
composed mostly of growth opportunities rather than assets-in-place. As a result, creditors consider growth
opportunities to be more nsk\ than assets-in-place.
' In addition, given the conservatism of accounting valuations, accounting data are very poor indicators of the
firm's performance where the firm is composed mainly of growth opportunities (Smith & Watts. 1991). It is
reasonable to suppose that the use of loan covenants and manager-compensation contracts based on accounting
data is more likely in firms composed mainly of assets-in-place. Skinner (1993) concluded from this that the
managers of such firms have more incentives than others to select accounting methods that speed up profit
accounting in order to maximize their own compensation or comply with loan covenant provisions.
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account the last 1992 review of the CO, which came into force on 1 July 1993. Moreover.
IAS 16, revised in 1993 and applicable to years beginning on or after 1 January 1995,
became more restrictive, requiring for example that revaluations take place at regular
intervals and that assets be valued by professionals.
'
s
Since October 1996. firms listed on
the SWX have had to comply with Swiss GAAP FER. U.S. GAAP, or IASB standards
in addition to the CO. The year 1997 is chosen to test the effect of the new requirement
of the SWX on managers' reporting of valuation choice. The year 2000 allows control
for regularity over time relative to managers' accounting decisions, as well as the ability
to disregard the introduction of IAS 40, on "Investment Property." The year 2004 allows us
to examine the revaluation policy after the implementation of the new IAS 16 and IAS 40.
The sample firms all published consolidated accounts because the CO prohibits
revaluations in individual accounts. This constraint also allows the analysis to ignore the
fiscal impact of accounting decisions, because a major characteristic of Swiss accounting
practices is compliance with Massgeblichkeitsprinzip. This "Authoritative Principle"
simply states that commercial accounts are directly linked with accounts for tax purposes
(Achleitner, 1998).
|g
The data set was collected manually from all annual reports ofindustrial and commercial
listed companies (excluding financial and government institutions) available at the
Universities of Geneva and Lausanne (Switzerland). Among them. 103. 97, 103, and 124
firms disclosed all necessary information (for the years 1994, 1997, 2000, and 2004.
respectively), and 30. 22, 17. and 15, respectively, recoursed to upward revaluation of fixed
assets for the reporting of their consolidated financial statements. This sample selection
represents 65%, 74%, 82%, and 92% of all industrial and commercial listed companies in
terms of market capitalization in Switzerland for the 1944. 1997, 2000. and 2004, respec-
tively (excluding financial and government institutions). According to annual reports,
land and properties (until 2001) were the types of assets most involved in revaluations.
For firms that revalue upward their fixed assets, on average revaluation represents
(respectively for 1994. 1997, 2000 and 2004) 26%, 16%, 8% and 17% of their fixed-asset
values (without revaluation).
4.2. Variable measurement
The accounts of the sample firms are recalculated to take into account the impact of
revaluation on the measures of the independent variables. The reprocessing consists of
establishing the values of the financial statements' aggregates that would exist in the
absence of the upward revaluation. Several methods can be used to measure the leverage
ratio. We use, as did Brown et al. (1992). the total of financial debt to total assets (LEV).
Ownership diffusion (OD) is measured by one minus the percentage of voting rights held by
the known major shareholders. This variable is thus continuous. The firm's ownership
structure is likely to determine both managerial behavior and the nature of managers'
In addition, annual reports from prior years were not available for many companies or did not pro\ ide
sufficient information for the testing of the hypotheses.
The IFRS and the Swiss GAAP FER are used for group accounts and not for tax purposes. Tax accounting uses
its own rules, generally based on the rules set out in the CO. that is. the Swiss Company Law (Oberson. 1998)
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Table 1
Independent variables (financial statements at historical cost exclusively —; or with upward fixed-assets revaluation +)
Leverage (expected sign: -|
LEV=[total financial debt total assets]
Ownership diffusion (expected sign: —
)
OD=[ 100 -voting rights of the main known shareholders]
International pressure (expected sign: -)
EXPORT = [total foreign sales total sales]
Investment opportunities set (expected sign: ±)
IOS = [firm market value firm book value]
Control variables
SWX = [1 if listed in Switzerland only; if cross-listed]
SIZE = log [total sales]
INTEREST = [interest expenses average financial debt]
Total financial debt = ( short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt) + long-term debt.
Fimi market value=market capitalization at year end -"-financial debt.
Firm book value = total assets.
compensation contracts. Hypothesis 2 suggests that managerial corporations"' select
accounting methods that tend to enhance company performance results. The measure used
for this research is similar to that used by Hall (1993) and Dumontier and Raffournier
(1998). The pressure from international stakeholders is measured with the percentage of
sales outside Switzerland (EXPORT). Investment opportunities (IOS) are measured by the
market-to-book ratio." 1 Finally, the analysis also includes control variables such as the size
(SIZE) of the firm, its listing status (SWX). its interest rate (INTEREST) and its industry
sector. Most empirical research uses either total assets or sales as a measure of firm size
(Bujadi & Richardson. 1997). A total sale (SIZE) has the advantage of not being affected by
the accounting choices tested in the study described here. To limit the amplification effects
of a small number of extreme values, the decimal logarithm of total annual sales is used as a
measure of size. Listing status is controlled with a dummy variable (SWX) that takes the
value one if the firm is listed on the SWX only and the value zero if it is also listed on a
foreign stock exchange. The interest rate (INTEREST) is the ratio of interest expenses over
the mean of financial debt between two fiscal periods. The firms are grouped in six industry
sectors: agricultural and natural resources, manufacturing industries, transportation.
consumer and non-consumer goods, real estate, and services. Table 1 shows all the
proposed measures, and Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics.
20 According to the criteria of Monsen and Downes ( 1 965 1, a firm is a managerial corporation if none of the
shareholders has more than 5% of the voting rights. Otherwise, one shareholder is able to exercise effective
control over managerial activity. Others (Dhahwal et al.. 1982. Dhaliwal. 1 9SS) consider firms to be shareholder
corporations if a shareholder owns more than 10°o of the firm's capital stock, or if a group of shareholders owns
more than 20%. In all other cases, firms are considered to be managerial corporations.
We also used the Tobin's Q instead of the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for IOS. With sufficient data, the
results are not affected by this other proxy. Tobin's Q has the advantage of not being affected by the accounting
choice tested in this study Yet. because it requires a long history of financial statements to be computed, too many
observations would be dropped for 2004 (many newly listed companies) and 1994 (many companies with an
absence of prior financial statements!. The Tobin's Q was measured following the modified version of Lewellen
and Badnnath (199"| proposed by Lee and Tompkins (1999|. which provides a method to estimate the
replacement cost of the fixed assets.
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Tabic :
Descriptive statistics (pooled data I
Variable Mean Standard deviation First quartile Median Third quartile
LEY 0.2730 0.1551 0.14-5 0.2724 0.3725
OD 0.3680 2 S678 0.2910 0.49 0.7115
EXPORT (15100 03270 0.2600 0.5500 0.8100
lOS 1.0858 1.3816 0.4469 0.725^ 1.1616
s\\\ 0.8600 03420 1.0000 1 0000 1.0000
SIZE 4.8661 1.6131 5 4681 5 4413 5 4%0
INTEREST 0.0379 0.0197 0.0197 0.0373 0.0535
LEV is the total financial debts-to-total-assets ratio SIZE and OD are respectively the logarithm of total sales and
one minus the percentage of v ming rights of the main known shareholders. IOS is the market-to-book ratio.
EXPORT is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales SYYX takes the value zero for cross-listing status and one
otherwise. INTEREST is the total interest expenses of a year average financial debt of the same year.
The general form of the empirical models is as follows:
Yi = a + aiLEV - y. :OD - y.EXP+^IOS + ^Control
i = 0. 1 and 1 = 1,2,3
}' represents the effect of accounting choice: zero if the firm chooses the historical cost-
valuation principle and one if the firm opts for upward revaluation of fixed assets. A
pooled-data analysis if first carried out. followed by a cross-sectional analysis to examine in
more details any year effects.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Pooled-data analysis
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous. the analysis is based on a Logit model
regression. Pearson correlation matrix does not exhibit significant correlation between
explanatory variables, besides IOS and LEV. The specification of the model takes into
account fixed year and industry effects with dummy variables. The correlation matrix of
coefficients is presented in Table 3 and the logit model's results are presented in Table 4.
The model is statistically significant and offers classification superior a naive model
(;r of 57.81 and Pseudo R2 of 30.3%). The leverage (LEV) coefficient is statistically
significant and with the expected positive sign, supporting HI. This suggests that highly
leveraged firms have an incentive to select accounting-method choices that decrease their
perceived leverage ratios, thus signaling additional available borrowing capacity to
creditors. This result is consistent with findings obtained in Australia, the United Kingdom,
and New Zealand by most of the authors who have studied asset revaluation (Black et al..
1998: Brown et al.. 1992; Cotter. 1999: Cotter & Zimmer. 1995; Lin & Peasnell. 2000a.b:
Whittred & Chan. 1992). Courtney and Cahan (2004) found that revaluation is not value
relevant for New Zealand firms that exhibit a high leverage ratio.
Results relative to international stakeholders (i.e., firms engaged internationally) are as
expected. The coefficient of the variable EXPORT (foreign sales) is significant and posith e
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Table 3
Pearson correlation coefficients (pooled data I
LEY OD EXPORT IOS SWX SIZE INTEREST
LEY 1 00(1
OD 0.006 1.000
EXPORT -0.035 (in--; 1.000
IOS -0.303*" 0.014 130" 1.000
SWX 0.109" -0.025 -0.141"* -0.094" 1.000
SIZE 0054 -0.042 0.247"* -0.019 -0.232*** 1.000
INTEREST 0.017 0.051 -0021 -0.059 0.009 - 0.099 1.000
*. **. ***. statistically significant at the 10"o. 5%, and 1% level respecm ely. LEY is the total financial debts-to-
total-assets ratio SIZE and OD are. respectively, the logarithm of total sales and one minus the percentage ofvoting
rights of the main known shareholders. IOS is the market-to-book ratio EXPORT is the rario of foreign sales to
total sales SWX takes the value zero for cross-listing status and one otherwise. INTEREST is the total interest
expenses of a year average financial debt of the same year.
(at the l°o level). This result confirms the expectations from H3. differing from prior
Canadian results but similar to those from Japan. Cullman (1999) argued that international
exposure (export sales) should lead to selecting an income-increasing accounting policy for
Table 4
Logit regression (pooled data)
Variable Expected sign Coefficient Std err. Student I P>\1\
LEY - 2.4789 1.0079 2.46 0.014
OD 0.04"4 0.1617 0.29 0.769
EXPORT - 1 0497 "4410 2.38 0.017
IOS ± -1.1699 0.3376 -3.46 0.001
SWX 0.2732 0.5050 0.54 0.589
SIZE -0.5350 0.2384 -2 24 0.025
INTEREST 1.98J 3.9914 0.50 0.618
Year 1997 -0.0888 0.4678 -0.19 0.849
Year 2000 -0.2204 0.445 s -1144 0.621
Year 2004 -1.8715 0.9215 -2.03 0.042
Industry 2 -0.4154 0.8775 0.47 0636
Industry 3 -1.6137 1 0005 -1.61 0.107
Industry 4 -1.0002 0.95O2 -1.05 0.292
Industry 5 "24h 1.1845 -0.61 0.541
Industry 6 -0.8897 (I0m-(i -0.89 0.372
Constant 1.8311 1.9718 0.93 0.353
Sample size 427
Model significance /' 57.81***
% correctly classified 84.3%
Nai\ e classification 68.7%
Pseudo^ (Nagelkerkel 30.3%
** statistically significant at the 1% level The independent variable l'=0 when financial statements are based on
historical costs exclusively, and }'= 1 otherwise (i.e., with upward asset revaluation). LEV is the total financial
debts-to-total-assets ratio ratio. OD is one minus the percentage of voting rights of the main known shareholders.
EXPORT is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. SIZE is the logarithm of total sales and. IOS is the market-to-
book ratio SWX takes the value zero for foreign exchange listing and one otherwise. INTEREST is the total
interest expenses of a year average financial debt of the same year
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Canadian companies. Inoue and Thomas (1996) considered that Japanese firms with
significant export sales support more political costs than others, and therefore should select
accounting methods that decrease earnings. The result in the present study suggests that
firms engaged internationally should have managers who select an accounting policy that
enhances the perceived financial strength of the firm. Upward asset revaluation is preferred
as a policy that enhances the firm's perceived financial situation by reducing lev erage ratios.
The coefficient for the IOS variable, measuring investment opportunities (relative to H4 1.
is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is contrary to those obtained by
Whittredand Chan (1992) and Brown et al. (1992) in Australia, although it corroborates the
results of Lin and Peasnell (2000a.b) in the United Kingdom, although in Cotter and Zimmer
(1995) and Cotter (1999) this variable is not statistically significant. There are three possible
explanations for such a result. First, although investment opportunities are slightly and
negatively correlated with leverage, firms composed of assets-in-place are likely to revalue
upward those assets that can be revalued. They cannot revalue assets they don't yet have
(that is. as-yet-unrealized investment opportunities). Second, estimating the value of a firm
composed mainly of investment opportunities is costly because the value of its assets is
difficult to appraise. As observed by Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Skinner (1993). there
appears to be a negative link between the quantity of growth opportunities and the use of
accounting data in the firm's covenants. Hence, there is less incentive to select a particular
accounting method because it will have little impact on the firm contracts. Third, managers
may prefer not to damage their profitability measures (with upward revaluation), given the
level of risk of their firm (i.e.. composed mainly of investment opportunities).
Lastly, firm size (SIZE) is negatively associated with upward revaluation. Thus, smaller
firms are more likely to select upward revaluation (the coefficient is statistically significant at
the 5% level), perhaps because having less bargaining power with creditors, smaller firms may
be more prone to revalue their fixed assets upward their fixed assets. No other control variables
appear to be significantly associated with the revaluation policy, besides the year 2004. Cross-
sectional analysis may provide more detailed insights into the motives for selecting a particular
revaluation policy and help control for regularity over the years examined.
5.2. Cross-sectional analysis
The cross-sectional analysis relies on univariate and multivariate tests. For the univariate
tests, the difference in the means of the two groups (revaluers vs. non-rev aluers) is tested
using the Student parametric test (/ test) and the Mann-Whitney nonparametnc test ( [/test).
The use of a nonparametric test is justified given that, a priori, there is no reason to consider
a particular form for the independent variable distribution curve. The multivariate analysis
uses the same specification as with pooled data (without year effects).
The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 confirm the validity of the hypotheses concerning
the choice of valuation principles for leveraged firms, the inv estment-opportunin sets, and
to a lesser extent the international pressure for the first three years under investigation. The
results validate the importance of leverage (LEY ), which is significantly associated with the
choice of the firm's financial statement's valuation principle. Finns preparing their
financial statements with upwardly revalued assets exhibited a higher lev erage ratio than
firms using historical costs entirely. Firms with the highest ownership diffusion (OD) are
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associated with the historical cost principle, as is expected according to H2, although the
association is not significant for any of the years. Interesting results also appears in the year
2004, i.e., after the implementation of the new IAS 16 and IAS 40 which reduces the scope of
the upward revaluation policy (via capital equity). Indeed, one may first note that the interest
rate is not significantly different between the two groups from 1994 to 2000. That is, firms
with more leverage exhibit similar interest rates to companies with less leverage. This would
confirm the debt-costs hypothesis. Second, over the 1 1 years of the study, leverage declined
and by 2004 the levels between the two groups were quite similar (i.e. 22.5% and 23.5%,
respectively). Yet, with similar leverage ratios (without revaluation), firms that revalue their
fixed assets upward exhibit a lower interest rate (INTEREST) than when using historical
cost (the coefficient is significant at the 1% level with univariate tests).
The impact of export sales is puzzling. In 2004, contrary to prior years, upward revaluers
had less export sales than non-revaluers. Thus, firms with more domestic activities (compared
to the non-revaluers) have more incentive to revalue upward. The unbalanced samples may
explain the differences. Although the motives for decreasing debt costs (or for increasing
borrowing capacity) remain valid, the type of the companies that revalue has changed.
6. Conclusion
This paper investigates the economic factors likely to affect asset revaluation of the main
Swiss listed companies. The Swiss environment provides interesting institutional
characteristics because, in contrast to countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia
(Cotter, 1999), firms rely heavily on bank loans for their external financing. It also allows
the examination of the impact of international stakeholders' information needs on
accounting-policy choices. Indeed, numerous Swiss companies rely on foreign sales or
foreign investors to support their activities. This study contributes to the existing literature
by shedding light on the motives for upwardly revaluing a firm's assets over a period where
accounting standards relative to revaluation policy have changed. It also provides an
opportunity to seek some international regularity in the rationale underlying such an
accounting practice.
Results from the pooled-data regression suggest that firms using upward asset
revaluation are more leveraged and have fewer investment opportunities than firms using
only historical costs. It appears that upward revaluation is used as a method of signaling the
firm's additional borrowing capacity and to increase its credit rating, as well as to reduce its
likelihood of violating restrictive covenants. The empirical analysis also confirms prior
studies relative to managers' concerns about international exposure (as such) in their
accounting-procedure choices (Cullman, 1999; Dumontier & Raffoumier, 1998; Murphy,
1999; Raffoumier, 1995). In a Swiss context, foreign sales are associated with the use of
upward asset revaluation. Such a policy tends to decrease reported profits and leverage
ratios. Assuming that managers aim to enhance the financial situation of their firm as
perceived by foreign stakeholders, it seems that the financial situation is signaled via
creditworthiness variables rather than profitability variables. The cross-sectional analysis
confirms the results from the pooled regression and emphasizes the debt-costs hypothesis
(although leverage has declined over the periods investigated) as interest rates have become
lower for firms that revalue their fixed assets upward (compared to non-revaluers). Yet, two
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caveats must be considered. First, it is difficult to exclude any potential, endogenous
problem between variables. Second, revaluation motives should also consider fiscal impact
in jurisdictions where tax accounting relies partly on group accounts: that is. where the
unrealized gains from revaluations are taxed. Notwithstanding those caveats, overall it is
reasonable to consider that, based on this study's results, the decision to implement
revaluation seems to be guided mainly by the need to signal the firm's financial health,
especially its additional borrowing capacity, and to a lesser degree sufficient profitability
for its level of risk (i.e., the lOS).
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1. Introduction
In this paper Franck Missonier-Piera examines the economic motives of fixed-asset
revaluations for companies listed on the Swiss stock exchange. He finds that foreign sales,
leverage, and investment opportunities are associated with revaluations and concludes that
revaluations are a vehicle towards improving the perceptions of international stakeholders
and borrowers about the firm's financial health.
The general theme of this paper is one of clear relevance in accounting research and its
examination is worthwhile: that is. what factors explain the variation in accounting choice
across firms? Identifying factors that are correlated with different accounting practices is a
basic stream of research in accounting that illuminates the importance of accounting choices
in shaping a firm's economic reality. In the text that follows, the reader should keep in mind
that as a discussant I necessarily focused on areas of concern and further improvement.
Notwithstanding such comments, my overall disposition towards this paper is positive.
2. Contribution of the paper
It is typical in any study revisiting an old research question in a new country setting to
ask: what can we learn from this study that we did not previously know from other settings?
In this case. I believe the author has exploited the Swiss setting to justify the reason
revaluations are worth studying here separately, in addition to the work carried out in other
countries. Switzerland is, for the most part, a bank-based economy, and it is not a priori
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clear that accounting choice in Swiss firms would follow the same path as in Anglo-Saxon
firms. Two of the research hypotheses posited here are closely related to the Swiss setting:
access to debt financing, and the role of international stakeholders. Although variable-
measurement issues and data limitations, detailed below, somewhat compromise the
paper's message, one interesting underlying implication of this paper is that there are
previously underemphasized context-specific factors that help to explain the variation in
accounting practices across firms in Continental European countries.
3. Research hypotheses and related results
I found hypotheses one and three to be intriguing. What they really suggest, without
explicitly stating it, is that accounting-method choice is a vehicle towards conveying
management's positive, private information about a firm's financial health. In an envi-
ronment where an information asymmetry gap exists between management and the firm's
other constituents (traditionally thought of as shareholders, but in this case creditors and
customers as well), accounting practice can help bridge that gap. That is, management self-
selects into revaluing its fixed assets, with the external guarantee of its auditor, thereby
conveying a costly-to-replicate signal about its creditworthiness and overall financial health
to creditors and international customers. Although not formally framed as such, this is
effectively a signaling hypothesis, an aspect of the paper that I found very intuitive.
The second hypothesis indirectly suggests that managerial incentives help to explain
earnings-management motives by managers. The empirical prediction is that ownership struc-
ture is related to revaluation policy. I believe managerial incentives are an important
determinant of accounting practices. There are, however, a few issues of concern with the
conceptual development and empirical approach adopted here: the incentive effects of
ownership are likely to be nonlinear, positive for the lower-ownership range, and negative, due
to a dominating entrenchment effect, thereafter. This nonlinearity is not conceptually discussed,
nor empirically accounted for, in the model. Related to that, the variation in ownership staicture
across the sample firms is very low. From Table 1 . 75% of firms have insider ownership ofmore
than 29. 1 %. The great majority of sample firms are owner-controlled, rendering the study of
differences in accounting choice across ownership structures difficult. Also, the study does not
separate between managers and other external blockholders, aggregating their ownership
interests into a single measure. The two groups may have quite different reporting incentives.
The fourth hypothesis makes mixed predictions according to the author: high-growth firms
may have a greater need to revalue, to convey information to shareholders about the firm or,
alternatively, they may be less likely to revalue simply because they have fewer assets in place,
a mechanical association. My view on this is that measuring growth opportunities using
market-to-book ratios by definition identifies high-growth firms: that is, firms whose assets are
already highly valued by the market and which have higher market values relative to book
values. Therefore, firms would have a greater need to revalue their assets to send a signal to
shareholders if those firms are not appreciated by the market, as signified by their lower
market-to-book ratios. Both this alternative scenario, which is also another version of an
information-signaling hypothesis, and the mechanical explanation posited by the author, point
to a higher incidence of revaluations among firms with lower market-to-book ratios. The
empirical evidence is strongly consistent with this line of thinking.
I
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4. Naniplinu and methods
A broad cross-section of firms is sampled in each of four years from 1 994 to 2004. The
author has done his best to include all Swiss firms with available data in the model. Even so.
the sample for any one year is fairly small, limiting the degrees offreedom and the test power,
thereby limiting confidence in the significance ofthe coefficients. Further, firms are classified
as revaluing and nonrevaluing and then compared across several hypothesized dimensions. A
notable limitation of this approach is that, in any given year, we cannot definitively conclude
whether a significant association uncovers an antecedent or a consequence of revaluation
because we do not know the exact year the revaluation policy was first adopted by a firm. For
example, given a positive association between leverage and the incidence of revaluation, does
a firm revalue its assets because it is highly leveraged, or was it able to borrow more as a result
of revaluation? Thus, we can only speak of associations, not causality.
Further, omitted correlated variables may affect the results to the extent firms self-select
into the two categories on the basis of factors that are not adequately controlled for in the
model. The two samples are not matched, as is customary, although the models control for
industry and size considerations. Identifying the first year a revaluation policy was adopted,
and matching adopters to nonadopters would abstract from these problems, albeit at the
expense of sample size.
Also, by pooling firms across years in a single model, independence is likely to be
violated because firm characteristics are likely to exhibit high temporal correlation within
each firm. A panel-data technique that would in theory control for this problem would be
the inclusion offirm fixed effects in the model, or the focus on variable changes, rather than
variable levels. Nevertheless, the relative "stickiness" in the variables of interest from
period to period reduces the signal-to-noise ratio, and the possibility any significant effects
will be discerned with such an approach.
. limitations keep the author from further refining measurement of the hypothesized
effects. For example, if revaluations are motivated by access to capital, it is reasonable to
expect that banks have proprietary access to information that the investing public does not
have. Public debt holders are in a greater need for information through financial statements.
Thus, it may be that the relative magnitude of public, rather than bank, debt is most important
in the results. A related breakdown of the leverage variable could be informative. Further, in
addition to international customers, international stakeholders comprise foreign shareholders
of the firm, foreign employees, and foreign suppliers. Collecting such information and
comparing it across revaluing firms and all others would enrich the empirical analysis. The
stakeholder dimension of this paper comprises a distinct contribution and building up the
empirical rigor supporting it would better illuminate its role in this accounting choice.
5. Conclusiniiv
One policy implication of the results not discussed in the paper is the following: broadly.
this paper documents that a certain accounting choice (the decision to revalue the firm's
is not random, but rather it is systematically related to firm-specific
characteristics. In equilibrium, this may be interpreted as evidence that a firm optimizes on
the amount and type of information it provides to external users of financial statements by
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weighing related costs and benefits. Finns with different needs (for financing and customer
base, for example), select different accounting alternatives. This, in turn, suggests that if
policy makers take away flexibility by mandating uniform accounting rules across firms
they may create unnecessary costs and redundancy in information disclosure, while limiting
the ability of firms to signal information to the public.
6. Possible extensions
There are some interesting possible extensions to this study that would complement the
current results. A study focusing on long-term changes in firm characteristics following asset
revaluation would provide more definitive evidence about the true consequences of the
revaluation decision. For example, if revaluation is motivated by access to capital
considerations, are there any changes in the revaluing firm's leverage, its ratio of public to
private debt, and its cost of capital following the revaluation year, either raw or relative to an
industry or control-firm benchmark? Also, if revaluation is an attempt to appeal to inter-
national stakeholders, is there a change in the firm's fraction of foreign sales, importance of
foreign suppliers, and the fraction or cumulative ownership of foreign shareholders following
revaluation? Of course, such tests presuppose that the year a revaluation was first adopted is
identified.
Further, what are the stock market effects of revaluation? How does the market react to
the announcement a firm will revalue its assets? Is the market response to this announcement
related to the hypothesized effects? That is, do the stock-related benefits to shareholders
depend on the firm's financing needs, agency problems, degree of stakeholder orientation,
and growth opportunities?
More broadly, a separate study could use revaluations as a setting to examine the role of
the firm's internal-governance mechanisms in determining accounting-method choice.
Revaluations have a material effect on financial statements, carrying both potential benefits
and risks to shareholders. Do the characteristics of the firm's board of directors, its audit
committee, and the compensation incentives of its managers influence the likelihood the
firm will revalue its assets? Can the market see through the managers' variant incentives, in
the backdrop of the firm's internal governance, in adopting such an accounting choice?
In closing, I believe Franck Missonier-Piera has executed a timely and interesting study
with policy implications. Despite its data limitations, this work manages to shed light on the
revaluation decision in the Swiss bank-based economy. This work also points to a number
of research questions that are worth studying by researchers in the future.
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1. Introduction
In his discussion, Nikos Vafeas (the discussant) makes general comments and raises
two important issues relative to some of the hypotheses 1 test, and to the methodological
approach 1 follow. 1 appreciate the detailed and constructive comments Vafeas provides, and
I thank him for his contribution with the possible extensions he suggests. 1 hope this reply
addresses his main concerns.
2. Research hypotheses and related results
The discussant points out two issues on two of my hypotheses, i.e.. one related to
o\\ nerslnp structure and the second relative to investment opportunities. I consider the issues
are mainly caused by data limitation, as I explain below.
Hypothesis two: Association between ownership structure and revaluation policy
The discussant has concerns about the association between the ownership structure of the
firm and its revaluation policy. He considers that "The incentive effects of ownership are
likely to be nonlinear, positive for the lower-ownership range, and negative, due to a domi-
nating entrenchment effect, thereafter". The association I propose relies on the underlying
assumption that ownership dispersion amplifies agency problems due to the separation of
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control and ownership. When ownership is diffused, managers have more latitude in
selecting the relevant revaluation policy that maximizes their utility. Due to data limitation.
1 could not refine further my analysis and the corresponding empirical approach: i.e., if and
when the interests of the managers are aligned with those of the shareholders. For example,
as suggested by the discussant, when measuring ownership concentration. 1 could not isolate
managers' ownership from other external block-holders. We may also consider another issue
with my hypothesis. It assumes also that the remuneration committee will not adjust
managers' compensation for accounting choices (Baber, Kang, & Kumar. 1998).
Yet, I do not think the lack of data availability should impede me proposing such a
hypothesis. Indeed, managers have at least two incentives to select income-increasing
revaluation policy (i.e., not to revalue upward): the presence of a bonus plan tied to earning
figures and the will to report a flattering image of the firm. Both incentives are more likely to
occur in diffused-ownership firms (i.e., to increase compensation and/or to dissuade hostile
takeovers, respectively).
Hypothesis four: Association between investment opportunities and revaluation policy
Hypothesis four makes mixed predictions and states that the importance of the firm's
investment opportunities is associated with the use of upward fixed-asset revaluations. The
discussant brings up an issue relative to the proxy I use for investment opportunities, i.e., the
market-to-book ratio. He then proposes an alternative argument that is: "Firms would have a
greater need to revalue their assets to send a signal to shareholders if those firms are not
appreciated by the market, as signified by their lower market-to-book ratios". Prior studies
have suggested a similar argument (Brown, Izan, & Loh, 1992; Easton, Eddey, & Trevor,
1993). Although I would agree with the discussant, it does not compromise the hypothesis of
the paperper.91\ but its corresponding proxy. Besides, as mentioned in footnote 21,1 also use
Tobin's Q as another proxy (not affected by the revaluation policy), and obtain similar
results.
The research design I use simply considers that there should be an association between
the investment opportunities and revaluation (ex post). The hypothesis provided by the
discussant is based on an ex ante market-to-book ratio, which is not the subject of the current
paper. Due to data limitation (see next section), to test the discussant's assumption would
require me to identify the year of the upward revaluation. This point has been emphasized by
the discussant: "we cannot definitively conclude whether a significant association uncovers
an antecedent or a consequence of revaluation because we do not know the exact year the
revaluation policy was first adopted by a firm".
3. Sampling and methods
The discussant raises several concerns about the sampling and the methodology used in
this paper. First, because of my cross-sectional design, we can only speak of associations,
not causality, between the revaluation choice and independent variables. 1 concur with the
discussant's observations on this point and would argue such is the case with most studies
relying on a similar empirical approach. Second, the discussant is concerned about the
absence of the use of a matched sample. I should emphasize that because very few Swiss
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listed companies use upward revaluation < i . 22, 17, and 15. respectively for the years
1994. 1997. 2000. and 2004). opting for a matched-sample approach would lower sig-
nificantly the size of the sample and the robustness of the empirical analysis. Third, he
mentions that ""by pooling firms across years in a single model, independence is likely to be
violated because firm characteristics are likely to exhibit high temporal correlation withm
each firm". Although, this remark is relevant it should be noted that I use unbalanced panel
data. Thus, a quite low number of firms appear in the four periods included in the pooled-
data sample (i.e.. 1994. 1997. 2000. and 2004). This limits the relevancy of the use of a
firms fixed-effect- Fourth, data limitation kept me from refining the test ofthe stakeholders"
hypothesis. Hence -uggests including other stakeholders in the analysis-such as
foreign shareholders of the firm, foreign employees, and foreign suppliers-instead of only
foreign customers. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain information-for a sufficient
number of firms-for these other international stakeholders.
4. Possible extensions
The last section of the discussion provided by the discussant proposes several interesting
possible extensions, among them: "For example, if revaluation is motivated by access to
capital considerations, are there any changes in the revaluing firm's leverage, its ratio ofpublic
to private debt, and its cost ofcapital following the revaluation year, either raw or relative to an
industry or control-firm benchmark?^ The question relative to the impact revaluation may
have on the cost ofcapital is taken into consideration in the paper (partially only ). Indeed and
again although it was not possible to identify' the year of the upward revaluation, it is
interesting to observe (from Table 5 1 a decrease in the leverage ratios {ex ante) for both groups
of firms {re\aluers and non-re\aIuers) over the years, to a point where they reach similar
levels. Interestingly, the expost interest rates evolved in the opposite manner. That is, interest
rates for both groups started at a similar level in 1 994 and became lower in 2004 for re\aluers
compared to non-revaluers. This suggests that re\aluers exhibit a lower cost of debt
. . measured at the expost interest rate ) when they have a similar leverage ratio, and a similar
cost of debt when they have a higher leverage ratio.
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Paul Rosenfield has been on the "firing line" of the development of financial accounting
reporting standards. A CPA, in the 1970s he served on the research staff of the AICPA's
Accounting Principles Board (APB) and was the first full-time secretary of the International
Accounting Standards Committee. He drafted the APB's Statement on Basic Concepts and
Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises (1970),
the forerunner of the FASB's conceptual-framework project. Consequently, it is somewhat
surprising that he is so critical of that framework - indeed, of both the current and proposed
practice of financial reporting. Rosenfield contends that issuers of financial statement "have
collectively skewed the standards to their benefit and to the detriment of the users and of
society [p. xix]." In his opinion, "the issuers have turned financial reporting under GAAP
into a Wonderland portrayal of the product of their imaginations ... rather than a neutral
portrayal of the current financial condition and past financial progress the reporting entity
has thus far achieved, and of current factors the users should consider in evaluating the
reporting entity's prospects for further financial achievement [p. xix]." As a result, he
writes, "those developments prevent successful auditing of the amounts in financial
statements prepared in conformity with current GAAP [p. xx]."
I found it quite difficult, though, to determine the specifics of his complaints, since a
substantial portion (perhaps more than half) of his 512 page book (excluding references and
index) quotes brief assertions by over 430 accounting authorities (most notably: Ray
Chambers, Eugene Flegm, Vernon Kam, AC. Littleton, Leonard Lorensen, W.A. Paton,
Walter Schuetze, George Staubus, and Robert Sterling). In addition, Rosenfield offers short
selections from AICPA, FASB. and other official statements, often as a prelude to equally
brief and often disparaging comments. Although these are designed to give readers a sense
of the variety of opinions that abound, few of the quotations do more than just state an
opinion, conclusion, or pithy remark without supporting reasoning, example, or study.
Essentially, the reader is given a series of written "sound bites." Although these do provide
readers with evidence that many topics are supported or criticized by many observers, it was
difficult for me, at least, to discern just what Rosenfield, himself, is critical of and, of greater
importance, his reasoning and evidence for that criticism. Nevertheless, I was able to glean
the following from his book.
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Rosenfield does not like the matching concept, which he says is but a vestige of venture
reporting, where income and expense were and could be matched because the venture was
dissolved. Although that system met the needs of investors in ventures, they are not the
current users of accounting reports - investors and creditors of ongoing companies.
Accounting statements should provide them with information from which they could
appraise accountability and make economic decisions.
The problem, as Rosenfield sees it, is that issuers of financial statements do not want to
inform users of those statements. Issuers want to manage income - to report income as high
as possible and expenses as low as possible, and to smooth net income. Financial statements
should be designed to prevent such manipulations. In his discussion of how this should be
accomplished. Rosenfield goes through the usual list of desirable attributes -
representativeness, relevance, neutrality, reliability, understandability, verifiability, timeli-
ness, consistency, and comparability - discussing each briefly with copious quotations
from various authorities.
But what is it about our current and proposed system of financial reporting to which
Rosenfield objects? After 130 pages, his general objections are specified in Part II. entitled
"Issues underlying financial reporting." Rosenfield writes: "Violation of neutrality by
stabilizing reported income by the design ofGAAP for the benefit of the issuers is the single
worst and most pervasive cause of deficiencies in current GAAP [p. 145]." The main way
income is stabilized is by avoiding or dampening earnings volatility, presumably with
historical-cost numbers and accrual accounting. From this critique (and from his belief that
financial statements should serve users' demands for information that informs economic
decisions), it would seem that Rosenfield favors restating assets and liabilities at their
present values. But he objects to these measurements, primarily because they require
estimates of future cash flows. He asserts: "financial statements need to report what is and
what happened, outside of thoughts of the issuers about the future [p. 37]." These
"thoughts" include probabilities about future events, including the probability that
employees will continue with the firm (which informs accounting for pensions and post-
employment compensation) and that the issuer will continue as a going concern. He writes:
"the continuance of the reporting entity shouldn't be assumed in the preparation of financial
statements ... [But, issuers and their outside auditors should determine if the entity] soon
might be a stopping concern, [in which event]... the issuers might revise the financial
statements to a basis assuming liquidation of the reporting entity, such as the statement of
affairs [p. 180]." He later advocates reporting assets and liabilities only at their selling
prices, the key attribute of a statement of affairs.
This section of the book ends with a chapter entitled "The elements of the reporting
entity represented in financial statements." Rosenfield again insists that although "[t]he
entire matter of financial statements is economic resources [p. 202]," the numbers reported
therein should "be based solely on reliable measurements of the financial effects of relevant
events affecting economic resources" that do not involve expectations of future events (e.g.,
cash flows). Hence, financial statement numbers cannot include present values. He agrees
with the FASB's 1976 Conceptual Framework that emphasizes the asset and liability
approach, which, he writes "contrasts with the so-called revenue and expense approach,
which has in effect been discarded [p. 214]." But, he does not discuss the FASB's current
move towards restating assets (starting with financial assets) at their fair values, except in
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his rejection of present value calculations. Rosenfield presents some suggestions for
alternative procedures in the next section of his book.
Part 111 is entitled, "Broad issues in financial reporting." A substantial portion of this
section is devoted to objections to recording assets at their acquisition costs, which then are
amortized as expenses. Once more Rosenfield objects to depreciation, because it serves to
smooth income. He then turns to inflation accounting which, he writes, was abandoned
by the FASB because "[pjeople said they didn't know what to do with the information
[p. 270]." Their confusion, he believes, resulted from their being given supplementary
information that competed with the usual unadjusted financial statement information. His
solution: "One set of financial statements should be presented ... [where the numbers]
should be defined in terms of the consumer general purchasing power of the unit of money
[p. 271]." He does not show how this might be done.
Following a chapter in which he elaborates on his objection to present value for
measuring the current values of assets (and, presumably, liabilities), primarily because they
require estimates of future events, Rosenfield considers using current buying prices. He
writes: "once a reporting entity buys an asset, it's finished with the buying market for the
asset. ... Current buying prices violate the number one user-oriented criterion,
representativeness, because they purport to represent nothing about the assets held by the
reporting entity [pp. 288-9]." He objects to enterprises reporting holding gains (as
proposed in 1961 by Edwards and Bell), because these are "cost savings [that] are in no
sense revenue [p. 292] (from Paton & Littleton. 1940, p. 64)" In effect, he rejects
opportunity gains and costs because these are not part of history, and, hence, should not be a
component of net income. Replacement costs are similarly rejected, since they refer to
assets the entity doesn't own and hasn't sold. In short, Rosenfield concludes: "Gains and
losses involving fictional conditions shouldn't be presented in income statements [p. 298]."
Rosenfield wants the accounting authorities to adopt "current selling price reporting
(CSPR)," wherein assets and liabilities are stated continuously at their selling (exit) prices,
with changes in those prices from previously recorded numbers reported as income or
expense. If an asset has no severable value to an outside, independent potential buyer, it
would be written down to positive or negative scrap value (net scrap value). Thus, if a
company purchased a special-puipose machine that could not be sold, it would be written
down immediately to its scrap value. Presumably, if the company would have to pay to have
the machine removed, it would have a negative value and be stated as a liability. Rosenfield
doesn't mention work in progress, but since semi-finished goods would rarely have a ready
market, they also would be recorded at net scrap value.
Liabilities similarly would be reported at the amounts that a third party would require to
assume the liabilities. This application of CSPR. though, seems to bother Rosenfield. He
writes: "if prospective creditors decide that a reporting entity's debt instruments have
become worthless, they will bid them down to near zero. The reporting entity's reported net
income will skyrocket. There has to be something wrong with that [p. 343]." But, when an
entity's prospects have improved such that it finds investing in a special-puipose machine
or other fixed assets that are not regularly traded, its expenses will skyrocket downward
when it makes these investments. There seems to be something wrong with that!
Furthermore, since many assets and liabilities have no ready markets, accountants would
have to estimate the prices. But, Rosenfield should object to such estimates as they present
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the same problems as do estimates of entrance costs. Consequently, it appears that if the
price cannot be readily and objectively determined from actual transactions, these assets
and liabilities would be recorded at zero, which would additionally reduce net income, at
least initially, and then as such assets and liabilities are acquired.
The fourth section of the book addresses "specific issues in financial reporting."
Rosenfield applies CSPR somewhat consistently to these issues. He would have a
corporation granting stock options record as an asset the services received in exchange for
the options at an amount equal to the value of the stock options. But, he apparently forgets
that the asset, employee services, would have no selling price and, hence, no value, and
under his regime would immediately be expensed. He is consistent, though, in his
discussion of deferred employee benefits: "imagined future vesting and imagined future
salaries and wages should be ignored in reporting on pensions [p. 483]." Leases would be
reported as assets only at the amount for which they could be sublet (presumably not
present values), and the liability, therefore, would be reported at the amount required to
have it taken over.
Stating assets and liabilities at the exit values does meet most of his list of desirable
attributes, including relevance, assuming that users want to know the liquidation value of
entities. Creditors might want exit or liquidation values, assuming that they could trust the
numbers reported. Often these numbers must be estimated. For example, consider an
inventory of finished goods that are discontinuously sold, such as special-purpose machines
or houses. The exit values of these assets might be estimated with appraisals that could not
readily be validated. Of greater importance. Rosenfield does not consider the extent to
which financial statements prepared with exit values would be of value to investors. Since
investors either are considering whether or not to buy or hold equity in a particular
company, it would seem that they would want to know the economic value of assets and
liabilities to that company (which is value in use), rather than the value of those assets and
liabilities to others (which is exit value). Income statements would report as expenses the
reductions in value of assets that have no resale value and the transaction costs of
purchasing assets and liquidating liabilities. Considering the subtitle of the book - "a user-
onented approach" - Rosenfield should have analyzed how users might in fact use the
statements he would have issuers produce. It seems clear, to me at least, that the system he
proposes would be of very limited, if any, usefulness to investors in on-going companies.
Nevertheless, the FASB and perhaps the IASB have adopted the balance-sheet, fair-
value model, where fair value is defined in terms of exit values. As stated in FASB
Statement 1 57 (paragraph 5 ): "Fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset
or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the
measurement date." Thus far this definition of fair value has been applied only to financial
assets and short-term liabilities. Its shortcomings are not as clear in this application, because
there tend to be active markets for these assets and liabilities with proportionately small
transaction costs. Hence, the entrance and exit prices usually are similar. But why should an
approximation be sufficient when entrance prices are better measures of value for investors?
Companies buy goods and services and assume liabilities because they expect them to
transform them to increase stockholders wealth; the benefits from these transactions are
expected to exceed their costs, including transaction costs. Entrance values, therefore, are
clearly more meaningful to stockholders of going concerns than exit values. Furthermore,
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once exit values are applied to other than financial assets and short-term financial liabilities,
as discussed above, the resulting financial statements are of little or no value to equity
investors. If exit values are not applied to anything but financial assets and short-term
liabilities, both the balance sheet and income statement necessarily will be a curious
mixture of exit and historical values.
Why. then, hasn't the FASB defined fair values in terms of entrance prices? One reason, I
believe, is that many assets do not have entrance prices, since they would not be replaced in
the same form. This is particularly true for productive assets, such as machinery and
buildings. Indeed, the SEC's and FASB's required repotting of replacement values (ASR
190 and FAS 33) were rescinded following many complaints of both the cost and
uselessness of the data. But, the current costs (replacement values) of financial assets and
liabilities should be no more problematic than their exit values. Furthermore, the current
values of purchased inventory, a major asset for many companies that the FASB and IASB
have ignored in their quest for more relevant numbers, could readily be stated at their
replacement costs. In fact, by the time financial statements are prepared, for many
companies those inventories would have been replaced at known prices. Consequently, I
am at a loss to understand why the accounting authorities opted to define fair values in
terms of exit rather than entrance prices.
But, even entrance prices provide insufficient information for investors. It is value in
use, not value in exchange, that investors buy when they purchase or hold a company's
stock. Exit values are useful indicators of stockholders' wealth only when their companies'
managers have paid more for the assets or assumed greater liabilities than they should have
(ex post or ex ante) and the managers are too incompetent or dishonest to offload them.
But there are very good reasons why financial statements should not be based on values
in use. These amounts are measured primarily as present values of expected cash flows.
Such calculations require estimates of the cash flows, an exercise fraught with error, both
inadvertent and deliberate, as is the appropriate discount rate. Joint and common activities
make such calculations even more difficult, indeed conceptually impossible if the goal is to
assign values to individual assets and liabilities. The most important disadvantage, though,
is that present value and similar calculations allow over-optimistic, opportunistic, and
dishonest managers to manipulate reported asset, liability, and net profit amounts.
It is a truism, though, that one can beat a model only with a better model. The FASB and
IASB are moving towards the asset/liability model, wherein the balance sheet is restated at
fair values, and away from the traditional income/expense model wherein expenses are
matched to reported revenue and for which the balance sheet serves essentially as a bridge
between income statements rather than as a statement of economic values. Rosenfield does
not consider these alternatives except to criticize aspects of traditional accounting. This is
not the place for a rigorous or even adequate consideration of the asset'liability model.
Therefore, I refer readers to Worldwide Financial Reporting: The Development and Future
ofAccounting Standards, Oxford University Press, 2006, in which my co-authors (Michael
Bromwich, Robert E. Litan, and Alfred Wagenhofer) and I consider the issues in some
detail. We conclude that although the asset/liability approach is attractive, it cannot be
1
For an example of such manipulations that, in my opinion, directly led to the failure of the Enron Corporation.
Benston and Hartgraves (2002). and Benston (2006).
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implemented, substantially because a large portion of the required economic values cannot
be determined objectively. Hence, financial statements based on them would be subject to
the type of managerial manipulation to which Rosenfield correctly objects. Our overarching
requirement is that the numbers reported in financial statements be trustworthy, that they are
what they purport to be. All the other often enumerated desirable attributes - neutrality,
reliability, understandability, verifiability, timeliness, consistency, comparability, and parti-
cularly relevance - are secondary if the numbers cannot be trusted. It should be recognized
and accepted that financial statements cannot provide investors, creditors, and other users
with all the information they need to make effective economic decisions. But, they can
provide them with information they can trust, in large measure because they were audited
and attested to by independent public accountants.
These numbers reported in financial statements have been and can be very useful to
investors and other users. Historical costs are valuable for providing stockholders with
information as to how the resources entrusted to managers were used and with assurance
that gross misuse and dishonesty, at least, has been tested for and, if found, was reported to
the board of directors through the audit committee and to stockholders. The traditional
income/expense matching model provides investors with information that has been found
to be very useful for estimating future prospects as well as past performance. The model,
though, can readily be modified to include current values when these can be objectively
determined (including the replacement values of inventories that would be replaced), with
holding gains and losses reported as part of current net income. Where comparisons are
made with past periods, the numbers can be transformed to the current purchasing power of
the unit of exchange, much as international firms translate the statements of foreign
subsidiaries into the home country's currency. Subject to these basic "principles," there
would be less need for the increasingly large body of rules that the accounting authorities,
particularly the FASB, have been generating.
Returning, now to Rosenfield's book, it should be clear that I found much with which to
disagree. Many readers, though, might find it worth reading and considering. Rosenfield
presents a remarkable array of quotations from and references to important thinkers about
current accounting issues. His views reflect, to a substantial degree, the thinking of FASB
and IASB policy makers. Consequently, both practitioners and academics might find the
book useful for understanding the standard setters' drive towards fair-value accounting.
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Abstract
In China, listed companies are required to achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) before they
can apply for permission to issue additional shares through seasoned-equity offerings (SEO). We
document two benefits of this accounting-based regulation in China. First, this regulation limits the
increase in the supply of shares and the dilution of existing share prices. The Chinese stock market
reacted positively to the announcement of this accounting-based regulation. Moreover, investors'
reactions to SEO, announcements are less negative since the accounting-based regulation was
introduced than before the regulation was enacted. The second benefit is that the regulation reduces
adverse selection in SEO, as shown by the finding that prior to this regulation, firms below the ROE
threshold underperformed the market after their SEO, much like what has been observed in other
markets; while those above the threshold outperformed the market. Thus, although positive
accounting theory predicts that regulations based on accounting numbers create incentives for
managers to manipulate their accounting numbers, accounting-based regulations in China seem to
serve some useful purposes.
© 2007 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G18; M4I
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1. Introduction
Contracts and regulations based on accounting numbers could provide the incentive for
contracting parties to opportunistically manipulate accounting data (see a review in Healy
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& Wahlen. 1999) because it is costly for enforcers to ""undo" such earnings management
(Watts & Zimmerman. 1990). Thus, in a mature market, regulations seldom are based on
accounting numbers. However, in China, regulators have long required listed companies to
achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) before allowing them to apply for permission to
issue additional shares through rights issues. Moreover, after allowing companies to
conduct seasoned equity offerings (SEO) in 2000. the Chinese government found it
necessary in July 2002 to impose a minimum ROE of 10% as a qualification for firms to
initiate SEO (referred to as the "2002 Regulation" hereafter). 1 Although previous studies
show that the accounting-based regulations in China have led to opportunistic earnings
management and capital misallocation (Chen & Yuan. 2004). Chinese regulators still
maintain the ROE threshold requirement in determining the qualification of rights issues
and SEO.
The public-interest theory of regulation, or the "helping hand" view that originated from
Pigou ( 1 938 ). characterizes the regulation process as one in u Inch government intervention
corrects market failures and maximizes social welfare (Joskow & Noll. 1981 ). In the case of
regulating equity issuance after initial public offerings (IPO), regulators in many countries
typically adopt a ""disclosure-based approach." That is. no official approval is needed for the
issuance of additional shares as long as companies provide adequate disclosure. For
example, a company must file an application to and seek authorization from the New York
Stock Exchange prior to the issuance of additional shares. There is no profitability threshold
that the company has to meet before making the application.
The situation in China differs in at least three aspects. First, when the market is moving
up. investors tend to gobble up most of rights issues or SEO due to a lack of market
efficiency. As time goes by. investors might learn to weed out firms that have poor
prospects. However, at the current stage of China*s market development, investors do not
have this level of sophistication. At least, the government does not believe so. The second
difference is that firms can sell additional shares at a discount from the ongoing price. This
is typical in other markets. For example. Corwin (2003) reports that in the United States, the
SEO discount (the discount of offer price from the market price before the SEO
announcement) averaged 2.92% in the 1990s. In China, the average discount is much
higher: 2 1 .6% based on 1 1 9 SEO from June 1 998 to June 2005. This high discount in effect
forces current holders of tradable shares to buy the additional shares to avoid the dilution of
the value of their shareholdings. The majority shareholders, who typically own nontradable
shares (Chen & Xiong. 2002), do not suffer from the dilution. The third difference is that
research in many equity markets worldwide has documented an "adverse-selection
problem" in equity offerings. That is. managers know more than the market about the true
value of the firm and have incentives to issue SEO when the prices of their stocks are
overvalued (\l\ers & Majluf. 1984). Asa result, investors typically react negatively to SEO
announcements (e.g.. Eckbo &. Masuhs. 1992) and the stocks of SEO firms significantly
underperform the market after the offering (e.g.. Loughran & Ritter. 1997, December). This
problem is more severe in China, again because most of the majority shareholders" shares
are not tradable and they do not suffer from negative market reactions or from poor post-
A firm can issue additional sliarcs through rights issues, in which shares are sold to existing shareholders, or
SI ' I in which shares are sold to the public
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SEO stock performance. Thus. Chinese regulators considered the use of a mechanical
hurdle to limit the number of firms that can undertake SEO.
We postulate that China's 2002 accounting-based regulation of SEO serves two
purposes. First, by restricting SEO opportunities to firms meeting the 10% ROE threshold,
the regulation limits the potential supply of additional shares to the market. Second, the
ROE threshold precludes firms with relatively poor operating performance from issuing
additional shares. Since their stock prices are more likely to underperform in the future, the
regulation can reduce the adverse-selection problem. In this study, we use 250 firms
announcing SEO proposals around the timing of the 2002 Regulation ( 1 87 firms before the
regulation and 63 firms after) to document several pieces of empirical evidence that are
consistent with these two benefits We find that the Chinese stock market reacted positively
to the announcement of the accounting-based regulation. Moreover, for firms with ROE
above the threshold, the market's reaction to the SEO proposal announcement was less
negative after the accounting-based regulation than before the regulation. We also find that
firms below the ROE threshold underperformed the market after their SEO, much like what
has been observed in other markets, while those above the threshold outperformed the
market. That is. the accounting regulation was able to reduce the adverse-selection problem
whereby firms conduct SEO when their stocks are overvalued. Thus, although positive
accounting theory predicts that regulations based on accounting numbers create incentives
for managers to manipulate their companies' accounting numbers, the accounting-based
regulation in emerging markets such as China's seems to serve some useful purposes.
Table 1
China's regulation of rights oft'enngs and SEOs
Date Regulation of rights offering Regulation of SEO
Nov. 17. Listed companies were allowed to issue rights to SEO was not allowed
1993 existing shareholders if they are profitable in the
previous two years.
Sept. 30. Three years' profits and three-year average
1994 return on equity (ROE|> 10%
Jan. 24. ROE> 10% in each of previous three years.
1996
Mar. 1 7, Three-year a\ erage ROE > 1 0% and ROE > 6%
1999 in each of previous three years
May 22. The 2(MUi Regulation: companies with three years'
2000 profits can apply to the CSRC for conducting SEO '
Mar 15. Three-year average ROE _ 6 The 2001 Regulation: three-year average
2i 'i 1
1
ROE>6"o hut not definitive. Companies not
meeting the threshold can be qualified provided that
the management and the underwriter provide
detailed explanation that shows the healthy
condition of the company.
July 24. The 2002 Regulation: Three-year average
2002 R( )E _ 111",, and ROE> 10% in the pre\ ious > ear
J
The regulation was released by the CSRC on May 22 and published in newspapers on the next day
TTie regulation was released by the CSRC to all listed companies on Mar 1 5 and published in new spapers on Mar 28
The exposure draft was released on June 22 and the final regulation was released by the CSRC on July 24 It was
published in newspapers in July 26
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I he rest of the paper is organized as follows Section 2 briefly introduces the Chinese
government's regulations on additional share issuance and some testable predictions.
Section 3 discusses the sample and the empirical results. Finally, Section 4 offers concluding
remarks
2. China's regulations on issuing additional shares and possible benefits
2.1. Background oj China's regulations on issuing additional shares
China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has been using a merit-based
system to regulate share issuance by listed companies. In the early 1990s, listed companies
were able to issue additional shares only through preemptive rights offered to their existing
shareholders. This kind of offering is known as a rights ottering in the United States. Due to
the lack o\' other means for listed companies to raise capital and the Chinese investing
public's insatiable demand for stocks in the early 1990s, rights offerings were excessively
abused by listed companies (Chen & Yuan, 2004). To curb this excessive activity, the
CSRC issued a series of regulations to restrict rights issues after November 1993. As
summarized in Table 1. each regulation required a minimum level of profit or ROE. The
restrictions were tightened gradually: the 1993 regulation required only 2 years of profits;
this was tightened to a three-year average ROE of 10% in 1994. : However, the 1994
regulation proved to he ineffective because the amount of capital raised through rights
issues exceeded that from initial public offerings (IPOs) in 1995. As a response, the
regulation in 1996 required an ROE of at least 10% in each of the previous three years.
However, the 1996 regulation also created a remarkably clear pattern of opportunistic
earnings management. Fig. I shows that there was a sharp increase in reported ROE
between 10 and 11% for 1995-1998; this pattern was not found for 1992 1994. however,
when there was no ROE requirement. In early 1999, in response to public criticisms of the
earnings-manipulation phenomenon, the CSRC reduced the ROE requirement from 10 to
6% for each of the previous three years. However, the reduction of the ROE threshold did
not seem to reduce the magnitude of earnings manipulation. Fig. 1 also shows that the spike
in the distribution of reported ROEs moved to 6-7% for 1999-2004. In other words, the
earnings manipulation target shifted from 10% to 6% as the regulation on rights issues
changed
To give companies more options to raise additional capital, the CSRC started to allow
large-scale seasonal equity offerings (SEO) in May 2000 by issuing a regulation (the 2000
Regulation hereafter).' This regulation did not impose a strict profitability threshold and
any company with profits m the previous three years could apply to the CSRC for SEO
authorization. Since the regulation on rights issues was much tighter at that time (i.e.. a
minimum three-year average ROE of 10",,). a large number of firms rushed to announce
Sin proposals. I he CSRC then modified the regulations on both rights issues and SEO to
[en percent was rough]} the rate paid on oik yeai bank deposit in ("lima in 1444 The idea is that firms should
reium more than the bank-deposit rate to deserve .Hlilinnn.il share issuance Because bank-deposit rates declined
later, the threshold was reduced to 6% in March 1999, again roughly the prevailing bank-deposit rate
See fable I tor a series of regulation-, on si o since 2000
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1995-1998 (N=21 87)
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30%
Fig. 1. The distribution of ROEs This figure plots the distribution of the reported ROEs of all Chinese listed
companies in three different periods from 1994 to 2004. ROE is net income divided by total shareholders" equity.
impose a consistent threshold (a minimal three-year average ROE of 6%) in March 2001
{the 2001 Regulation hereafter). However, the 6%-ROE criterion is not definitive: any
company that did not meet the 6%-threshold could qualify if the management and the
underwriter provided a detailed explanation that showed the healthy condition of the
company. 4 Thus, the 6%-criterion was almost equivalent to no profitability requirement at
all. Many firms continued to announce SEO proposals. As tabulated in Table 2, there were
187 firms making such announcements in the span of about two years (from May 2000 to
July 2002). Among them, 90 (48%) did not meet the 10%-ROE requirement." In July 2002,
after calls by the media for stricter regulations (e.g., Liu, 2002), the CSRC required a
minimal three-year average ROE of 10% for an SEO (the 2002 Regulation hereafter). This
regulation was successful in substantially reducing the number of firms announcing SEO
proposals. As shown in Table 2, there were only 63 proposals announced in the two and a
half years from July 2002 to December 2004. and only seven firms did not meet the 10%
ROE threshold. The seven firms were eligible according to a separate regulation issued in
2001 that allowed firms that were re-organized due to mergers, acquisitions, and major
restructuring to issue additional shares with a minimum ROE of 6%. This change in the
regulatory regime provides a unique setting for us to investigate the possible benefits of
accounting-based regulations.
For example. Wuhan Department Store Group Co. Ltd. announced an SEO proposal right after the 2001
Regulation went into effect. Its ROEs in the previous three years (I'M* to 2000) were 3 16°,,. 2 "2",,. and
2.41%, all below 6%. A report by NetEase.com criticized the proposal and warned investors to invest with
caution
Table 2 also shows that, among the 47 SEO announcements made before July 2002 by firms with ROE above
10%. 48 (51%) completed their SEOs. By comparison, among the 90 firms that announced SEO in the same
period whose ROE was below 10%, only 17 (19%) completed their SEO. The remaining 8 1% of firms were cither
rejected by regulators or approved but then abandoned the SEO plans voluntarily due to lower share prices The
high percentage of possible rejection by firms with ROE below 10% indicates that Chinese regulators might have
used the 10% hurdle as an implied criterion in the approval process.
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Tabic 2
The liming and ROF distribution of firms announcing SEOs before and after the July 2002 Regulation
SEO proposals Before 2002 Regulation After 2002 Regulation Total
made (May 2000 to July 2002) (August 2002 to December 2004)
By firms whose ROE> 10% 97 (48) 56 (18) 153 (66)
By firms whose ROE < 10°
o
90(17) 7(1) 97(18)
Total 187(65) 63(19) 250(84)
The table reports the number of firms announcing SEOs before and after the July 2002 Regulation and the
completion status (the number of firms that completed SEOs reported in parentheses). The numbers are broken
down into firms whose ROE was above or below 10°o in the year before the SEO announcement.
2.2. Possible costs and benefits of China's regulations on issuing additional shares
The various regulations on SEO mentioned above imposed at least two types of costs for
China's securities market. The first was the possible earnings management to achieve the
numerical accounting threshold. Chen and Yuan (2004) show that a similar accounting
threshold (i.e., an ROE of 10%) for rights issues set forth in 1996-1998 induced a clear
earnings-management pattern, in which firms used non-operating items to achieve the
rights-issue qualification. They document that many of those firms were able to obtain the
governmental approval to conduct rights issues, but their subsequent performance was
generally below the industry norms. The second cost of a numerical threshold for SEO was
that it would exclude firms with good future performance ("type I error") and allow firms
with poor future performance ("type II error") to conduct SEO. For example, among all
firms with ROEs less than 10% in 2002, only 13.4% had a turnaround in 2003 (with ROE
above 10%). On the other hand, among all firms with ROEs above 10% in 2002, 35.5% had
their ROEs fall below 10% in 2003. Thus, using 10% as a benchmark for performance, the
numeral rule creates both types of error.
Despite the costs of the numerical rules, the Chinese government until now still uses
similar rules to establish rights issue and SEO qualifications. As we mentioned in Section 1,
there are two possible benefits of this accounting-based regulation: one is that the regulation
limits the potential supply of additional shares to the market and the other is that the
regulation can reduce the adverse selection problem in equity offerings. We make three
testable predictions from these two benefits. First, as mentioned in the previous subsection,
when there was essentially no profitability threshold requirement before 2002, a great
number of firms rushed to propose SEO. The profitability threshold set forth in Regulation
2(102 substantially reduced the number of firms that could issue SEO. In China, the supply
of shares is tightly controlled by the government, whose approval is needed before a listed
firm can issue additional shares. Since the overall stock-price level is determined by the
supply and demand of shares, any regulation to restrict the supply of shares, such as the
2002 Regulation, is likely to be considered by the stock market as good news. That is,
we expect to find a positive market reaction to the announcement of the 2002 Regulation.
As a comparison, the 2001 Regulation did not require a clear-cut profitability threshold,
thus the market reaction to the announcement of that regulation should be much weaker. In
addition, the 2002 Regulation should affect firms that did not meet the 10% cut-off more
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positively because it disqualified those firms from issuing new shares and hence reduced
their adverse-selection problems. Thus, we predict that the market reaction to the
announcement of the 2002 Regulation is stronger for firms whose ROE are below 10% than
for firms whose ROE are above 10%.
The second prediction is that investors might react less negatively to individual
firms' SEO announcements after the 2002 Regulation. In other markets worldwide,
investors typically react negatively to SEO announcements. One of the reasons is the
"adverse-selection problem," i.e., managers know more than the market about the true
value of the firm and have incentives to conduct SEO when the prices of then stocks are
overvalued (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Thus, an SEO announcement is interpreted as
overvaluation of the firm's stock in established markets (Eckbo & Masulis. 1995). We
expect that the Chinese stock market would also react negatively to SEO announce-
ments. In addition, when no accounting-profit threshold existed prior to July 2002,
every company with a "healthy financial condition" could apply to the CSRC for SEO
authorization. Firms had to compete with many others for SEO capital. Since the 2002
Regulation severely reduced the number of firms that qualified to conduct SEO,
qualified firms no longer needed to compete with many others for SEO capital. Thus,
we predict that investors reacted less negatively to SEO proposal announcements alter
the 2002 Regulation.
The third prediction about the 2002 Regulation is that it reduced the adverse-selection
problem in SEOs. The adverse-selection problem arises because firms time the market in
issuing additional shares when their market values are high, relative to book value and past
market value (Baker & Wurgler, 2002. February). Thus, Loughran and Ritter ( 1 995, March,
1997, December) find that firms conducting SEOs substantially outperform their non-
issuing peers in both stock returns and accounting profitability prior to the SEO, but they
significantly underperform their peers after the offerings. Under the 2002 Regulation, firms
were required to have an average three-year ROE of 10% in order to propose an SEO. Due
to their superior performance, such firms are less likely to underperform their non-issuing
peers after the SEO. Thus, we predict that the 201)2 Regulation reduced this adverse-
selection problem. Empirically, we expect that, among the 65 firms that completed SEO
before the 2002 Regulation, the firms meeting the 10% ROE threshold should outperform
the market after the offerings, while those that fall below the threshold should underperform
the market.
3. Empirical results
3.1. Market-level reaction to the 2002 Regulation
To test the market reactions to the two regulations in 2001 and 2002, we employ an
augmented market model used in previous studies (see, e.g., Berger, Li, & Wong, 2005;
Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2005). More specifically, we form a value-weighted portfolio of all
1 126 listed firms with available data and analyze the cumulative abnormal returns around
the announcement dates of the 2001 and 2002 Regulations. We examine the market
reactions to the regulations within a three-day window, starting from one trading day before
to one trading day after the CSRC release of the new regulation (or the draft of the new
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regulation, the exact dates for each regulation announcement are provided in Table 1 ). We
estimate the cumulative mean-adjusted returns around each regulation announcement using
the following ordinary least square (OLS) model:
R, = />'0 + />', *REG20oi + j32*REG2002 + e„ ( 1
)
where R, is the return for day / on the value-weighted market portfolio; REG2m ] and
REG2002 are dummy variables that equal to 1 /3 for days within the event windows around the
release of the 2001 and 2002 Regulations (March 1 5, 200 1 and July 24, 2002, respectively)
and zero otherwise.
Our sample period for estimating Eq. ( 1 ) is from the first trading day of 2000 (January 4)
to the last trading day of 2002 (December 31), resulting in a window of 716 trading days.
The sample forming the market portfolio includes all 1 126 firms (with available data) listed
on the two stock exchanges as of December 2002. Market return data are obtained from the
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) trading database. The two
coefficients, ft\ and /K in ( 1 ) capture the cumulative mean-adjusted returns during the event
windows around the release of the 2001 and 2002 Regulations, respectively. We expect /}>
to be significantly positive and greater than /i,
.
Model 1 in Table 3 presents the regression results of Eq. ( 1 ) using the three-day short
windows. The results show that the coefficient on REG^io: (jh) is significantly positive
(with ;;<0.01), i.e., the market reacted positively to the 2002 Regulation in the short
window. This is consistent with our prediction that the market favored the introduction ofthe
accounting-based regulation. The coefficient on REG2C101 is insignificant (with ap-value of
0.640) and the magnitude is significantly less than the coefficient on REG2002 (with an
/•"-value of 9.87). This is due to the fact that the 2001 Regulation did not set forth a rigorous
numerical threshold to limit the number of firms that could conduct SEOs.
In Model 2 of Table 3, we add two interactive terms: REG20111 * DROE and REG^oo;
* DROE, where DROE is defined as one if the portfolio consists of firms with ROE less
than 10% and zero otherwise. Since the 2002 Regulation disqualified firms with ROE
below 10% to issue new shares, investors in those firms were no longer subject to the
adverse-selection problem from SEO. Thus, we expect the coefficient on REG2002 *
DROE to be positive, while that on REGiikh * DROE to be no different from zero.
Model 2 shows that both terms are not significantly different from zero at conventional
levels (with /^-values of 0.911 and 0.957, respectively). The estimated coefficient on
REG:,,,,: (/»0 remains significantly positive and significantly larger than that on REG;,,,,!.
Thus, the 2002 Regulation affects the overall market valuation due to its limitation of
additional supplies of shares to the market.
Long windows are defined as one trading day before the CSRC release of the new regulation (or the draft of
the new regulation) until one trading day after the regulation was first published in newspapers. The long window
is necessary because the information about the regulation was released to a limited number of market participants
including regional securities regulatory offices, the two stock exchanges, investment hankers, and listed
companies- The restricted release of information makes it likely that many investors received the information only
after the regulations were published in newspapers. However, the long windows are likely to include other news
that might confound our results. Thus, we use the short-window test in Table 3. The long-window tests yield
similar results
o.ooo 0.000
(0.865) (0.813)
0.012 012
(0.640) (0 655)
002
(0.957)
0.124*** 116***
(0.000) (0 000)
0.004
(0.911)
712 1432
3.02% J 30%
9.87*** 9.65***
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Table 3
Slock price reactions to SEO regulations announced in 2001 and 2002
Predicted Model I Model 2
sign
Intercept
REG :„,„
REG; *DROE ?
REG;oo2 +
REG;„„;*DROE +
No. of observations
Adj. /{-square
/•"-value for difference between the coefficients on REG;,,,,, and REG;,,,,;
The table reports market reactions of SEO regulations announcements in China. The stock price reactions are
estimated using the model below over the period from January 4. 2000. to December 31. 2002 (/=716):
R, = ^0 + /i
l
*R£G ;„„ + /i;*R£G;,„ i; - . (1)
R, = /so + 0|*REG2Ooi + /i;*REG;„,„*DROE + /33*REG2oo2 + /34*REG20o2*DROE (2)
In model (1). R, is the return for day / on the value-weighted market portfolio In model (2). we decompose the
market portfolio into one with firms with ROEs of 10% and abo\e and one with firms with ROEs less than 10%.
We compute R, for both portfolios and then pool them together. DROE is one if the portfolio consists of firms with
ROEs less than 10% and zero otherwise. REG;,,,,, and REG2002 are dummy variables that equal 1 3 for days within
the event windows around the release of the 2001 and 2002 Regulations (March 15, 2001 and July 24. 2002,
respectively) and zero otherwise p-values are in parentheses *** denotes significance level at I ,, for two-tailed
tests.
3.2. Market reactions to SEO announcements before and after the 2002 Regulation
To test the second prediction that the market reacted less negatively to the SEO
announcements after the 2002 Regulation, we employ the event-study methodology
summarized by Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). The event date (day zero) is defined
as the date the firm makes an announcement of a proposal to issue additional shares. 7 For
each company, we use an event period of 300 days (starting at day - 279 and ending at day
+20 relative to day zero). The first 259 days in this period (- 279 through - 21) are
designated as the "estimation period," and the following 41 days (— 20 through +20) are
The proposal is the first public information made available about a seasoned-equity offering in China. After
approving the resolution, the board of directors should inform the exchange and announce the resolution
including the SEO proposal and the notice on the holding of a general meeting in two working days. The proposal
should disclose the relevant information such as the proportion of shares and the total number of shares to be
issued, the pricing method of the issuing price, and the use of the funds to be raised. The announcement should be
published in three major Chinese financial newspapers (China Set unties. Shanghai Securities Sens, and Set unn
Times). Our event date is defined as the date the announcement is made in the newspapers.
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designated as the "event period." We use the following market model to specify the normal
returns of security i as
R„ = a, + piRml + £,„ (2)
where R„ is the observed return for security i at day /, Rm , is the return on the value-weighted
market index for day /, and £,-, is the zero mean disturbance term. For every security, the
abnormal return ( AR) for each event day is estimated as:
ARu =Rit -A,-$iRml , (3)
where d, and ft, are the estimated values from applying the OLS regression to Eq. (2). The
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a r-day period is then calculated as:
CAR,
: = ]T AR» I4 )
To test the null hypothesis that the mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR, T ) is equal to
zero, we use a /-statistic calculated as the ratio of the mean CAR/T to its estimated standard
deviation; the standard deviation is estimated from a time series of mean abnormal returns.
The sample includes 187 and 63 SEO proposal announcements made before and after
the 2002 Regulation, respectively. s Fig. 2 shows CAR of the two samples from day - 20 to
day +20. The figure indicates that CAR drop substantially in both samples around day zero
and that the drop is steeper in the sample of announcements before the 2002 Regulation.
Panel A of Table 4 provides a statistical test of the difference in CAR of the 187 and 63
SEO announcements before and after the 2002 Regulation, respectively. The tests are
conducted on two event windows: (— 1, + 1) and (— 3, + 1).' The panel shows that CAR in
both windows is significantly negative, indicating that investors generally understood the
SEO announcements as bad news. This is similar to the results documented from other
markets worldwide (Eckbo & Masulis, 1995). In addition, the panel shows that CAR before
the 2002 Regulation were significantly more negative than those after the regulation, based
on the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. For example, the median three-day CAR surrounding
SEO proposal announcements made before July 2002 is - 3.79%, which is significantly
more negative (with a z-statistic of - 2.09) than the median three-day CAR (- 3.42%)
surrounding announcements made after July 2002.
Due to the profitability threshold required in the 2002 Regulation, the firms announcing
SEOs before and after this regulation were naturally different in terms of profitability and
other characteristics. We control for the differences in firm characteristics in two ways.
Fust, we limit the pie-2002-Regulation sample to those with ROEs above 10%. According
to panel B of Table 4. CAR of this reduced sample is still more negative than those of the
post-2002-Regulation sample, according the Wilcoxon r-statistics.
The sample is identified from a Chinese website (www.cn/ij/coni), which compiles all corporate
announcements, including SEO proposal announcements, made by Chinese listed companies. Financial and
regulated utilities companies and those thai issued only foreign-currency denominated shares are excluded
Tests using a longer window of up to seven days ( -5, + 1 1 yield the same results.
K.C.W. Chen. J. Wang The International Journal "/ Accounting 42 {21107/ 221-236 231
-20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -6-4-2 2 4 6
Event Time (days)
10 12 14 16 18 20
Fig. 2 Plot of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcements ofSEO proposals The figure plots the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the SEO proposal announcements- The sample consists of 250
announcements made by China's listed companies during the period June 2000 to December 2004. The
announcements are categorized into two groups, before July 2002 when there was no accounting-based regulation
on SEO applications ( 1 87 announcements! and after July 2002 when there was an accounting-based regulation (63
announcements!. The figure also plots a sub-sample of the former group, i.e., before July 2002 and ROE> [0%(97
announcements!. The horizontal axis is the event daj relative to the announcement day, and the vertical axis is the
value of CARs.
The second approach we use to control for firm characteristics is to conduct a regression
analysis using CAR as the dependent variable. The independent variables include a dummy
variable TIME (equal to one if the SEO was announced after July 2002 and zero otherwise)
and four firm-specific variables: cash flows from operations (CFO); the percentage of the
number of additional shares to be issued according to the SEO proposal over the total number
of existing shares (SEOP); financial leverage (LEV, total liabilities divided by total assets), and
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets to measure the size of the firm (SIZE).
The regression results, together with a comparison of firm-characteristic variables, are
reported in Table 5. Panel A of the table shows that in the pre-2002 sample, the characteristics
offirms with ROEs above and below 1 0% are not different except in the variable ofCFO. That
is, firms with ROEs above 10% have more cash flow from operations than those with ROEs
below 10%. In addition, between the firms with ROEs above 10%, the pre-2002 group has
lower financial leverage (LEl r) and smaller size (SIZE) than the post-2002 group. Panel B of
Table 5 reports two regression models. Column ( 1 ) includes all 250 firms that announced SEO
proposals before and after July 2002. and column (2) includes only firms that had a minimum
ROE of 10% prior to their SEO announcements. It is seen that the dummy variable TIME is
significant in both columns in Table 5. Thus, the inclusion ofcontrol variables does not change
the basic result that the market reacted more negatively to SEO announcements made before
97 -3.73 -3.20
56 -2.57 -2.76
97 -4.10 -3.60
56 -2.29 -2.24
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Table 4
Cumulative abnormal returns surrounding SEO proposal announcements made before and after the July 2002
Regulation
Number of A\ erage Median /-statistics
events CAR (%) CAR (%) (r-statistics)
Panel A: comparison of CARs for SEO announcements made before and alter the July 2002 Regulation
Three-day window CAR (- 1,+ I
)
Before July 2002 187 -3.94 -3.79
After July 2002 63 -3.22 -3 42 -2.10** (-2.09**)
Fi\e-day window CAR (-3,+ 1
)
Before July 2002 187 -4.32 -3.81
After July 2002 63 -2.94 -2.65 -2.19** (-2.12**)
Panel B: comparison «/ CARs for SEO announcements made he/ore and after the Juh 2002 Regulation, for firms
withROE>10%onl)
Three-day window CAR (- 1 .+ 1
Before July 2002 and ROE> 10%
After July 2002 and ROES 10%
Five-day window CAR (-3.+ 1)
Before July 2002 and ROE> 10%
After July 2002 and ROE> 10% -2.06** (-2.05**)
The table reports the cumulative abnormal returns of various windows surrounding the SEO proposal
announcements. The sample consists of 187 and 63 announcements made by China's listed companies during the
period from June 2000 to June 2002 and July 2002 to December 2004. respectively. The market model using the
CSMAR value-weighted market return is used for the normal returns. CAR is the sample average cumulative
abnormal return for the specified event window. The last column reports /-statistics ( Wilcoxon r-statistics) that are
used to test the mean (median) CAR difference between the samples before and after July 2002. ** denotes
significance at a level of 5% in two-tailed tests.
the 2002 Regulation than after. In addition, the difference in the market reactions to SEO
announcements exists in films that were qualified under both the new and the old regulations.
In summary, the 20112 Regulation seems conducive to a less negative reaction hy the market to
SEO announcements.
3.3. Subsequent performance ofSEO firms
In Section 2, we predicted that among the firms announcing SEO before the 2002
Regulation, those meeting the ROE threshold outperform, while those below the threshold
underperform, the market after completion of their SEO. As in previous studies on post-
SEO performance (e.g., Loughran & Ritter, 1 997, December), we focus on the performance
after the completion of the SEO. Since many firms did not complete the SEO proposals that
they had announced, the sample is reduced from 187 to 65 firms, including 48 firms above
the threshold and 17 below the threshold. 1 " In addition we measure performance using
" That is, 51% of 97 firms with ROEs above Id",, and 19% of 90 linns with ROEs below 10°,, completed their
SEO proposals. Those that failed to complete the SEOs could have either abandoned the proposal voluntarily, or
have had it rejected by the regulators. The large difference in the completion rates between the two groups
indicates that Chinese regulators might have used the 10-percent hurdle as an implied cntenon in the approval
process.
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Table 5
Cross-sectional regressions of CARs surrounding SEO announcements
Panel A descriptive statistics of independent variables
Full sample Sub-sample A Sub-sample B Sub-sample C A vs. B
(/- and z-stat)
A vs. C
(r- and r
Firms with Firms with Finns with
-stat)
ROE > 10% and ROE < 1 0% and ROE > 1 0% and
before July 2002 before July 2002 after July 2002
CFO 061 (0.060) 0.065 (0.068) (1043 (0.044) 0.085 (0.093) 1.90(2.17) -127 (- 1.56)
SEOP 0.260(0.228) 0.249(0.221) 249(0 221) 0.310 (0.238) 0.29 (-0.91) 1 .80 ( 1.39)
LEV 0.464(0.471) 0.443 (0 419) 435 (0.437) 0.537(0.547) 0.31 (0 llll -3.73 (--3.60)
SIZE 2.458(1.332) 2.028(1 278) 1 '142 (1.254) 42IS (2 571) 0.30(0.68) -2.47 ( -2.67)
Panel B regression analysis
Predicted sign
(1)
All firms
(2)
Firms with ROE l(l"„
Intercept ? -0.182(0.240) -0,042 (0.847)
TIME + 0.034** (0.026) 0.043** (0.033)
CFO + 0.090(0 119) 0.178** (0.035)
SEOP 4 412 (0 326) -6.108(0.317)
LEV ? -0 002 (0.958) -0.029(0.582)
SIZE 7 0.007 (0.389) 0.001 (0.949)
Number of obs. 250 153
Adj. ^-square 3.62% 7.12%
Panel A of this table presents descriptive statistics of independent variables used in the regressions. Mean and
median values (in parentheses) are reported for the full sample and three sub-samples as well. The last two columns
of Panel A report /-statistics for mean comparisons and signed rank r-statistics (in parentheses) for median
comparisons among the three sub-samples. Statistics in hold indicate significant differences at a level of at least 5%
Panel B shows the results from regressing the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR,) surrounding the SEO
proposal announcement on the variables TIME,, CFO,, SEOP,, LEV, and SIZE,
CAR, = ji„ + /y,*TIME; + /J
:
*CFO, + /i,*SEOP, + ft*LEV, + /><*SIZE, + c,
where TIME, equals one if firm Vs SEO proposal was announced after July 2002 and zero otherwise; CFO, is firm i's
cash Hows from operations in the year prior to the announcement year scaled by concurrent average total assets;
SEOP, is firm i's proposed number of shares for SEO over the total number of outstanding shares before
announcement date, LEV, is firm i's leverage ratio (total liabilities over total assets); SIZE, is firm i's natural
logarithm of book value of total assets at the end of year prior to the announcement year. Column ( 1 ) reports the
regression results for 250 firms that announced SEO proposals and Column (2) reports the sub-sample of 153 firms
in which all firms have a minimum ROE of 10% prior to their SEO proposal announcement year. />-values are in
parentheses. ** denotes significance at a level of 5% in two-tailed tests.
market-adjusted returns (cumulative monthly stock returns minus cumulative monthly
market index returns).
Table 6 shows that the pre-SEO stock returns were higher for firms whose ROEs were
above 10% than for firms whose ROE were below 10%. The difference, however, does not
reach statistical significance levels according to the Wilcoxon r-test. After the completion
of the SEOs, the market-adjusted returns of firms above the 10% threshold are positive in
the 12 and 24-month intervals (6.71% and 9.48% respectively), while the market-adjusted
returns of the firms below the threshold are negative in the same two intervals (- 1 1.65%
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Tabic 6
Comparison of pre- and post-SEO market-adjusted returns (%)
2 years before I year before Issuing year 1 year after 2 years after
Above threshold 28 N^ 8.15 6 71 9.48
Below threshold 3.04 -0.43 -11.65 -6.45
Wilcoxon .--statistics 1.77 1.50 3.22*** 2.15**
This table reports pre- and post-SEO stock returns of firms that had completed SEO before July 2002 when there
was no strict hurdle of ROE as an SEO qualification. The sample consists of 65 firms, including 48 firms with
minimum ROEs of I0°o in the preceding year and P firms below the threshold. The market-adjusted return is
measured as the cumulative daily market-adjusted stock returns, r-statistics for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test of
median difference between two groups are also provided. ** and *** denote the significance level of 5% and 1%
for two-tailed tests, respectively.
and - 6.45% respectively)." All the post-SEO return measures are significantly different
from zero according to unreported /-statistics. Moreover, the differences between the two
groups' market-adjusted returns are significant during each of the two intervals. That is, the
firms above the 10°o threshold significantly outperform those below the threshold up to at
least 2years after the completion of the SEO. These results indicate that firms below the
threshold are more likely than firms above the threshold to conduct SEO at the peak of their
stock prices. Since underperformance in the post-SEO period is typically taken as an
indication of the adverse-selection problem (e.g.. Loughran & Ritter. 1997, December),
Table 6 demonstrates that the problem is less severe in firms above the threshold than in
firms below the threshold. 1 "
4. Conclusion
In China, listed companies are required by regulations to achieve a minimum return on
equity (ROE) before they can apply for permission to issue additional shares through rights
issues or seasoned-equity offerings (SEO). Although such accounting-based regulations
have led to clear earnings-management behavior, the Chinese government still maintains
the threshold requirement even today.
We document two possible benefits of this accounting-based regulation for China, an
emerging market: ( 1 ) to limit the supply of shares and the dilution of existing share prices
and (2) to reduce adverse selection in the SEO. As evidence for the first benefit, we find that
the Chinese stock market reacted positively to the announcement of the accounting-based
regulation. Moreover, among firms with ROE above the threshold, the market reaction to
their SEO announcements was less negativ e after the accounting-based regulation went into
effect. As evidence for the second benefit, we find that firms below the ROE threshold
underperform the market after their SEO. much like what has been observed in other
The finding that SEO firms whose ROEs were above the threshold outperformed the market after their SEO is
consistent with Wang. Wei. and Praia's 120061 finding that China's rights-issuing firms' stock returns
outperformed those of control firms after the rights issue. But Wang et al.'s (2006) sample includes firms whose
ROE was above the threshold only
1
' Since our purpose in Table 6 is to in\ estigate « nether firms time the market to conduct SEOs when their stock
prices arc relatively high, we do not examine the accounting-based performance measures.
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markets; those above the threshold outperform the market. That is. the accounting-based
regulation is able to reduce the adverse-selection problem in which firms conduct SEO
when their stocks are overvalued.
Positive accounting theory predicts that regulations based on accounting numbers create
incentives for managers to manipulate their accounting numbers (Watts & Zimmerman,
1990). Chen and Yuan (2004) have shown that China's accounting-based regulations led to
some resource misallocation. Our paper extends that study by showing that the regulations
seem to achieve some useful objectives in China's particular investment environment. Our
study also explains why the accounting-based regulations still exist given the manipulation
behavior they create.
Finally, one important limitation should be pointed out. That is. our objective is to
examine whether the adverse-selection problem is reduced by using an ROE cut-off relative
to the regulatory regime in which no cut-off was imposed. It could be argued, however, that
a measure such as market-to-book ratio might be a better measure for regulators to reduce
the adverse-selection problem; but this is beyond the scope of this study.
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Abstract
This paper examines whether the use of non-financial information by sell-side financial analysts
influences the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. The research findings, based on a survey of Belgian
financial analysts, suggest that financial analysts who use more forward-looking information and
more internal-structure information offer more accurate forecasts. Furthermore, the listed Belgian
firms examined in this study have improved their non-financial information reporting over time.
However, neither the frequency nor the quantity of non-financial information mentioned by financial
analysts in their reports appears to have increased over time.
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1. Introduction
Earlier research emphasizes the important role of sell-side financial analysts on capital
markets (Barker, 1998; Holland & Johansson, 2003; Covrig & Low, 2005). By means of
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their analyses, earnings forecasts and recommendations, financial analysts have a sig-
nificant influence on the investment community. However, investors have to be cautious
when making investment decisions based on analysts' predictions because earnings fore-
casts tend to be optimistic (Capstaff, Rees, & Paudyal, 1998; Duru & Reeb, 2002; Gu &
Wu, 2003) and dispersed (Stickel, 1992; Sinha, Brown, & Das, 1997). Numerous studies
(e.g., Clement, 1999; Jacob, Lys, & Neal, 1999; Brown, 2001) document that the dif-
ferences in the forecast accuracies are influenced by various factors as, for instance, the
years of experience of the financial analyst, the number of companies followed by the
financial analyst, or the size of the company assessed by the financial analyst.
The extent to which financial analysts use corporate information is rarely judged. This
may be surprising, especially since analysts require firms to voluntarily disclose more
information. In this study we examine whether or not financial analysts really use the
information that is voluntarily disclosed by listed firms and if so whether its use influences
the analysts' forecast accuracy.
Moreover, this paper concentrates on voluntary non-financial information. This type of
information can be defined as "all information disclosed outside the financial statements
issued by the company" (Robb, Single, & Zarzeski, 2001). Prior research (Amir & Lev.
1996, Irtner & Larcher. 1999; Lev & Zarowm. 1999; Graham, Cannice, & Sayre. 2002;
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Liang & Yao, 2005) documents the increased relevance of non-
financial information due to increased competition and globalization, technological devel-
opments, and the introduction of new businesses. When financial analysts predict future
earnings, they have to rely on non-financial information such as the future activities of the
company or the acquisitions realized by the company. Vanstraelen, Zarzeski, and Robb
(2003) find that the disclosure of non-financial forward-looking information positively
influences the accuracy of the analysts' earnings forecasts.
The puipose of this paper is to directly relate the analysts' use of information and their
forecast accuracy. Our study is similar to McEwen and Hunton (1999) with one major
difference: we examine non-financial information while McEwen and Hunton concentrate
on financial information.
This research topic is important for the following reasons. First, corporate managers are
interested in the extent to which financial analysts actually use the non-financial infor-
mation published by the companies. More importantly managers want to know whether the
analysts' use of reported information really influences their forecasts. By studying this
relationship, corporate managers may be able to enhance their disclosure strategy in regard
to information that might influence the output of financial analysis. Besides, earlier studies
have examined the benefits to the firms such as lowering cost of capital or increasing firm
value as a result of disclosing more relevant information (Sengupta, 1998; Lang, Lins, &
Miller, 2003; Richardson & Welker, 2001).
In addition, analysts and regulators have another consideration. In particular, do regulator's
requirements fulfill the information needs of financial analysts and, if not, which changes are
needed?
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1997) distinguish two legal systems:
the civil-law system and the common-law system. Legislation in the latter system (as in the
United States and the United Kingdom) is based on judgments, whereas legislation in the
civil-law system is part of a scholar- and legislator-made tradition. Due to differences within
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the civil-law countries. La Porta et al. ( 1997) subdivide them into three groups: the French
civil-law system (e.g.. Belgium, France. Spain), the German civil-law system (e.g., Ger-
many, Japan), and the Scandinavian or the Nordic civil-law system (e.g., Norway, Sweden).
Based on prior literature findings. Table 1 provides a comparison of various environmental
and institutional characteristics between the four legal systems (Belgium's scores are
included for comparison).
Legal systems differ in terms of the amount of required disclosure. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Schleifer (2006) found that companies in common-law countries provide more
information than companies in civil-law countries. The system in Belgium, as well as the
majority of French civil-law countries, does not oblige companies to report as much
information as in the common-law countries.
Table 1 shows further that the legal rules protecting investors and creditors differ between
countries. Shareholders and creditors are most protected in common-law countries, while
these stakeholders are least protected in the French civil-law countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1998); shareholders in Belgium, for example, do not possess
any rights included in the La Porta et al. measurement while creditors are moderately
supported. However, based on the liability standard. La Porta et al. (2006) demonstrate that
investors in Belgium are more protected compared to average investors in the French and
German civil-law countries, but are less protected compared to the average common-law and
Nordic civil-law countries.
To be effective, enforcement of these regulations is essential. La Porta et al. (1998)
proxy the quality of law enforcement by the characteristics of the judicial system, rule of
law, corruption, risk of expropriation and contract repudiation by governments. They
demonstrate that the quality of law enforcement is the highest in Nordic and German civil-
law countries, followed by common-law countries, with the lowest being the French civil-
law countries. In Belgium, however, the quality of law enforcement is similar to that in
Nordic and German civil-law countries. Yet, the picture is less favorable when comparing
Belgium's scores on the other measurements of enforcement developed by Mueller,
Gernon. and Meek (1994), Hope (2003), or La Porta et al. (2006). All these studies show
that Belgium scores very low in comparison with the average civil- and common-law
countries.
The low-level investor protection may induce management to manipulate accounting
results. In fact. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) show that companies in French and
German civil-law countries manipulate their earnings to a larger extent when compared to
companies in common-law and Nordic civil-law countries. The situation in Belgium is very
comparable to the average French civil-law country. In addition. La Porta et al. (1998)
document that countries with low investor protection have more concentrated ownership
structure; the ownership structure in Belgium is less dispersed compared to companies
operating in common-law, Nordic civil-law and German civil-law countries (Table 1 ).
These factors taken together might explain the limited importance of equity markets in
these countries. In general, however, the information environment has not reached the level
of the capital markets in the other legal structures.
Finally, Belgium is characterized in Hofstede's (2001 ) comparison of cultures by a high
level of both power distance, and uncertainty avoidance, a position very comparable to
other French civil-law countries. But, in contrast to the average French civil-law countries.
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Belgium also scores high on individualism. Regarding the masculinity variable. Belgium is
comparable to the average French civil-law country.
There are two important implications to be drawn from our multi-country analysis. First,
as the level of disclosure requirements is quite low in Belgium, it can be assumed that other
disclosures by Belgian companies are voluntary in response to demands from various
stakeholders. The extent to which this voluntary disclosure extends to non-financial
information is one objective of this study. Second, the less protected investors or share-
holders and the lower information requirements are, the more that investors are likely to rely
on financial analysts. This statement is empirically supported by Covrig and Low (2005) for
financial analysts and Japanese companies (characterized by a low-quality financial-
reporting system). It is, therefore, possible that financial analysts following Belgian com-
panies also exert a greater influence on the decision made by the investment community.
Indeed, Sercu and Sips (1993) and Engelen (1999) observe that investors benefit from
following the recommendations of financial analysts.
Our research findings demonstrate that listed Belgian companies voluntarily provide
additional non-financial information in annual reports over time. Nevertheless, this im-
provement does not result in an increase in the overall amount of non-financial information
provided in the analyst reports, except for the amount of forward-looking information and
information about the internal structure of companies. The analysis also reveals that those
financial analysts relying more on these information items make more accurate forecasts.
The outline of the remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
some prior literature findings and states some hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research
design; section 4 presents the research findings. The final section summarizes the paper and
provides some questions for further research.
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Before discussing the main research question, we need to generate base information and
review literature about the following sub-research questions:
( 1
)
Which voluntary non-financial information do the listed firms disclose and whether
the amount of their disclosure evolved during the years under study?
(2) Which voluntary non-financial information do financial analysts use and how the
amount has evolved during the years under study?
(3) Are corporate managers making an effort to disclose more non-financial information
in the information categories that financial analysts find important?
With respect to the first sub-research question, Beattie, Mclnnes, and Feamley (2002)
examine the annual reports of 1 1 British companies and observe that these companies provide
much descriptive information as well as information about management and shareholders. On
the other hand, managers give less attention to forward-looking information and information
about reasons for changes in performance. Similar research findings are observed in
Vanstraelen et al. (2003) for 120 Belgian, Dutch, and German companies. Other studies focus
on the disclosure of intellectual capital (IC) information. Guthrie and Petty (2000). for example,
analyze the annual reports ofthe 20 largest Australian companies and find that firms report more
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information about their external structure (e.g., brand names, customer loyalty) compared to
internal structure (e.g., patents, research and development) and human capital (e.g., education,
know-how). The same conclusions are in Bozzolan, Favotto, and Ricern (2003) that examines
the [C information reporting of 30 Italian firms, and in Brennan (2001 ) for 1 1 Irish firms.
Over time, there appears to be an increase in the disclosure ofnon-financial information
as shown by Moneva and Llena (2000) for environmental information in the annual reports
of 70 Spanish companies and by Marston and Polei (2004) for both environmental and
corporate governance information on the websites of 50 German companies. Vandemaele,
Vergauwen, and Smits (2005) find that the top 20 listed companies of the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom report more EC information over the period 1998-2000,
while no significant change was found for the period 2000-2002. Abdolmohammadi
(2005) concentrates his study on 58 United States companies and shows an improvement in
the disclosure of IC information over the period 1993-1997.
The major consequence of reporting voluntary non-financial information seems to be a
reduction in the information asymmetry (Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Brown, Hillegeist. &
Lo, 2004; Guo, Lev, & Zhou, 2004), which leads to a reduction of the risk of investing in the
reporting company. This diminished risk in turn improves the liquidity of the companies'
shares (Healy, Hutton. & Palepu, 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia. 2000). Consequently, more
efficient investment decisions can be obtained (Gray, Radebaugh, & Robert, 1 990). Another
benefit appears to be a decrease in the firms' cost of capital ( Welker. 1 995; Francis, Khurana,
& Pereira, 2005). Sengupta (1998) documents that a policy of timely and detailed dis-
closures results in a decrease of the cost of debt for the company. Botosan ( 1997), Botosan
and Plumlee (2002). and Hail (2002) demonstrate that an increased reporting of voluntary
information in annual reports is associated with a lower cost of equity. Healy and Palepu
(1993) further suggest that financial analysts are more convinced about the reliability of
mandated information when companies also disclose voluntary information. Moreover,
financial markets continue to demand more information in order to make investment
decisions (Griming & Stockmann. 2004; Kristensen and Westlund, 2004).
The Financial Services Action Plan that was launched by the European Commission in
1999 aims at improving the functioning of pan-European capital markets by 2005 as noted
in Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonization of transparency requirements following an
earlier directive (Directive 2001/34/EC on the admission of securities to official stock
exchange listing and on information to be published on those securities). Listed Belgian
companies are, for instance, required to publish a separate annual report including financial
statements along with a management's discussion and analysis. This directive is integrated
into the Belgian law by the issuance of the Royal Decree ofMarch 31, 2003. Although these
;
requirements are mainly financial, listed firms are also disclosing more non-financial
information on a voluntary basis due to their perceived beneficial effects. These arguments
lead to the following hypothesis (stated in the alternative form):
HI. The disclosure of voluntary non-financial information by listed firms is increasing
over time.
To gain insight into the use of non-financial information by financial analysts, several
studies examined the "contents" of the financial analysts' reports. Among the first studies to
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analyze the content of analyst reports are Previts, Bricker, Robinson, and Young (1994) and
Rogers and Grant ( 1997). Both studies observe that financial analysts pay limited attention to
non-financial information. Nielsen (2005) finds that analysts' reports contain detailed back-
ground information about the company, but intellectual capital information is infrequently
discussed. Garcia-Meca and Martinez (2007) also observe a limited reliance on intellectual
capital information (human capital, innovation, research and development projects), and
report that financial analysts rely mainly on information about company strategy. Breton and
Taffler (2001) find that financial analysts frequently use non-financial information about
market conditions. The survey results in Dempsey and Gatti (1997) indicate that financial
analysts often rely on non-financial performance measurements to judge the value of the
company; Ho and Wong (2004) document that financial analysts mainly use information about
a company's future prospects, market share, and acquisitions or disposals.
Recent studies (e.g., Nielsen, 2005; Garcia-Meca & Martinez, 2007) point out the
growth in the use of non-financial information by financial analysts over time. Due to
technological developments, increased competition among companies, globalization, and
the introduction of new business, non-financial information is gaining in importance for
judging the value of a company (Amir & Lev, 1996; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Graham et al.,
2002; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). Thus, even if firms may not provide more non-financial
information over time, it can be assumed that financial analysts will search for such
information. This gives rise to the following hypothesis (stated in the alternative form):
H2. The use of voluntary non-financial information by financial analysts is increasing over
time.
Hirst, ECoonce, and Simko (1995), Ackert, Church, and Shehata (1996) and Womack
( 1 996) document that the investment community relies to a large degree on the analyses and
recommendations made by financial analysts. It is, therefore, expected that the disclosure of
voluntary non-financial information will mainly be directed to those categories that analysts
find important. However, as Nielsen (2005) observes, annual reports include more intel-
lectual capital, corporate governance and social and sustainability information compared to
analyst reports. Conversely, financial analysts refer more often to segment information and
background information about the company. Due to the financial analysts' influence on
coiporate managers, we posit the following hypothesis:
H3. Corporate managers make an effort to disclose more non-financial information in
those categories that financial analysts mention more frequently in analyst reports.
Plumlee (2003) makes reference to a large number of studies showing that financial
analysts fail to include all information in their analyses. Numerous studies relate the level of
forecast accuracy to firm-specific attributes such as the level of disclosure of listed com-
panies (Vanstraelen et al., 2003) or the complexity of the information reported (Plumlee,
2003 ). Other studies relate differences in forecast accuracy to analyst-specific attributes such
as experience or task complexity (Jacob et al., 1999; Brown, 2001 ). McEwen and Hunton
(1999) find that the use of key ratios (share-price information and five-year earnings
summary) is positively associated with the analysts' forecast accuracy. Conversely, the
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analysts who rely merely on financial statement information (information from the balance
sheet or the footnotes) are forecasting less accurately.
Some studies document the relationship between the disclosure of non-financial in-
formation and the analysts' forecast accuracy. In particular, Vanstraelen et al. (2003) show a
positive relationship between the reporting of non-financial forward-looking information
by Belgian, Dutch, and German firms and the analysts' forecast accuracy. The empirical
study by McEwen and Hunton (1444) demonstrates that financial analysts make more
accurate forecasts when they use more information than what is included in the financial
statements. Since non-financial information is defined as all information disclosed outside
the financial statements of a company, we posit the hypothesis that financial analysts who
employ more non-financial information are forecasting more accurately.
H4. The financial analysts' usage of voluntary non-financial information is positively
related to his/her forecast accuracy.
3. Research design
In the first stage of our research, we study the content of annual reports since these
reports are an important source of information for financial analysts (Vergoossen, 1993;
Blij. 2001; Ho & Wong, 2001 ). The narrative sections of the annual reports of 2001, 2003
and 2005 are examined. The sample contains all listed Belgian companies that have a
market capitalization of more than 75 million euro at the end of the fiscal year 2005,
excluding banks, insurance companies, holding and real estate companies, and have
annual reports for all periods. The final sample consisted of40 annual reports for each year.
We examine the financial analysts' use of voluntary non-financial information by first
studying the analysts' reports that are made public after the issuance of the 2001, 2003, and
2005 annual reports for each of the 40 listed companies in the sample. That is, the content of
company reports' that were issued by financial analysts of local Belgian brokerage firms,
was investigated. If a financial analyst published more than one report following the
issuance of annual reports in the years of study, only the first one was used in the sample.
The final sample comprised 52 analyst reports issued in 2002, 63 analyst reports issued in
2004, and 62 analyst reports issued in 2006.
To research the content of the annual reports and the analysts' reports, we use a
disclosure index that relies heavily on the information items recommended by tinsAmerican
Institute ofCertified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB). Studies such as Rogers and Grant ( 1997) or Nielsen (2005), among others,
base their disclosure indexes on these recommendations as well.
In 1994, the AICPA established a reporting model which includes a comprehensive set of
relevant corporate financial and non-financial information that users of coiporate information
are thought to require. This reporting model consists ofa limited number ofrecommendations
classified into five information categories: (a) business data, (b) management's analysis of
In general, two types of analyst reports can be considered: result reports and company reports. The latter
contain lots of corporate information in order to make a fundamental analysis of the company, while the first only
I discuss an event taking place in the company, hereby limiting the amount of information in such reports.
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financial and non-financial data, (c) forward-looking information, (d) information about
management and shareholders, and (e) background information about the company. Four of
these five information categories contain information of a largely non-financial nature: only
the category "business data" mainly contains financial data. To this, the FASB (2001)
recommended adding information about the firm's intangibles.
For this study, the disclosure index contains five information categories. Four of them are
based on the AICPA recommendations. The fifth information category includes Don-
financial information indicators as recommended by the FASB (2001) paper plus the non-
financial information indicators of the "business data" information category of the AICPA
(1994) paper. In our study, we call this information category "intellectual capital in-
formation". To summarize, our disclosure index consists of 71 information items assigned to
the following five information categories:
• Management's analysis of financial and non-financial data (ANA): 11 items:
• Forward-looking information (FWL): 11 items:
• Information about management and shareholders (MAN): o items:
• Background information about the company (Bl): 23 items:
• Intellectual capital information (IC): 20 items.
These 71 non-financial information items are summed up in column 1 of Table 2 as
shown.
In Table 2. some of the information categories are divided into two or three sub-
categories such as the items of the information categories ANA and BI. If an annual report
or an analyst report incorporates an item, it gets the value "one", and otherwise "zero"."
In the second stage of the study, we have sent a questionnaire to all sell-side financial
analysts employed by a Belgian brokerage house who w ere also included in our sample of
analysts' reports The questionnaire contained the same list of non-financial information
items used in the content analysis noted earlier. Each analyst had to indicate on a five-point
Liken scale, ranging from zero ( = never used) to four ( = always used).' the extent to which
(s)he uses each item in the analysis of the companies (s)he follows. The questionnaire also
contained some demographic questions for the analyst such as the number of years of
experience and the number of companies followed. The survey mailing resulted in 31
response-., a response rate of 63%
The analysts' forecast accuracy was measured as the absolute value of the difference
between the actual earnings per share (EPS) and the forecasted EPS divided by the actual
EPS (Fort. 1997: Capstaff et al.. 1998: Ho cV Tsa>. 2004). The data was obtained from the
database AQUTE. This database provides data about the performance of financial analysts
all over the world tor the listed companies they follow. Both the survey results and the
disclosure index of the content analysis were related to the mean earnings forecast accuracy.
This hmar\ coding scheme is often criticized, .is it does not take into account the differences in importance
attached to the various information items However, previous studies found similar results whether or not the
information items were weighted (Cooke. 1989; Marston and Shrives, 1991; Meek ei al . 1995)
The Liken scale is composed as follow , zero ne\ er used, one = rarek used, two r: sometimes used, three =
often used, four = always used The questionnaire can he obtained from the authors
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For the multivariate analysis, the control variables included are the number of companies
followed by the financial analyst (COM,) and the years of experience of the financial
analyst (EXP,). The following model was estimated:
ACC, = /)',, + />,COM, + /)' ; EXP, + ftU_CAT, + e,
where:
ACC, the mean forecast accuracy of the firms followed by financial analyst i:
COM, the number of companies followed by financial analyst i;
EXP, the years of experience of financial analyst i:
LLCAT, the use of non-financial information category CAT by financial analyst i.
e, error term.
4. Research findings
4. /. Disclosure of voluntary non-financial information in annual reports
Table 2 (columns 2 to 4) shows the extent to which each of the 71 non-financial
information items is mentioned in the annual reports. Column 2 provides the percent-
age of non-financial information items reported in the 2001 annual reports. Columns 3
and 4 compare the use of each information item in the 2003 and 2005 annual reports.
respectively, in relationship to the 2001 annual reports. The research findings reveal
that the items MAN.l (the directors and executive management), BI.4 (the industry in
which the business participates), and BI.6 (the principle markets and market segments),
are disclosed in at least one annual report for each company. The results further show
an increase in the reporting of intellectual capital information items such as the item
IC.14 (technological know-how) increasing by 25% in 2003 and 5(1".. m 2005 compared to
2001; and IC.I2 (quality of the products or services), increasing by 35% in 2003 and
48% in 2005. In addition, the annual reports of 2003 and 2005 include more forward-
looking information such as the item FWL.l 1 (future production capacity of the company)
increasing by IIS",, in 2003 and 33% in 2005; FWL.2 (future opportunities of the company)
increasing by 8% in 2003 and 33% in 2005: and FWL.l (future risks of the company)
increasing by 13% in 2003 and 55% in 2005. The latter result has to be interpreted with
caution since Belgian companies were required, as of 2005, to disclose information about
the risks of the company.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 demonstrate that on average the 2001 annual report
contains 40% of all non-financial information items. This percentage increases to 46% in
2003 and to 52% in 2005. These figures clearly highlight an increasing trend in the
reporting of non-financial information over time. In particular, the enhanced reporting of
the information categories IC.B (internal structure), FWL (forward-looking information),
and ICC (external structure) is noteworthy. Table 3 also shows that the information (sub)
categories BI.A (broad objectives and strategy), MAN (information about management and
shareholders), and BIB (scope and description of business and properties) receive the most
attention in the annual reports.
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We apply the non-parametric. Friedman /-"-test to test the statistical significance of the
increased disclosure of voluntary non-financial information. The research findings related
to this test are presented in Table 4 and show that listed Belgian companies report a
significantly varying amount of non-financial information (D_TOT) in at least one period.
The increasing trend in the rank figures suggests that Hypothesis 1 is not rejected. It also
appears that firms report significantly more non-financial information in at least one
period for the information categories FWL (forward-looking information), Bl (background
information), 1C (intellectual capital information), and all the sub-categories of BI and
IC. except the category IC.A (human capital). The remaining information categories
MAN (information about the management and shareholders) and ANA (management's
analysis of financial and non-financial data) show a significant increase only at the
10% level.
Additionally, we use the Wilcoxon rank test for a pair-wise (between 2 years) research on
the change in the disclosure ofnon-financial information. The results, in Table 5. show that the
aggregate amount of non-financial information (D_TOT) increased significantly from 2001 to
2003 and from 2003 to 2005. In each pair-wise analysis, corporate managers disclose more
information of the categories FWL (forward-looking information), and IC (intellectual capital
information), especially the sub-category IC.B (internal structure). The 2005 annual reports
contain significantly more non-financial information in every information category compared
to the annual reports 2001. So these findings support Hypothesis 1.
4.2- The use of voluntary non-financial information by financial analysts
Column 5 of Table 2 shows how often each of the 71 information items are noted in the
analyst reports of 2002. Columns 6 and 7 demonstrate the change in the amount of non-
financial information mentioned in the analyst reports from 2002 to 2004 and from 2002 to
2006. Table 2 also shows that nearly every financial analyst mentions item BI.4 (the
industry in which the business participates). The descriptive statistics further show that
financial analysts discuss items BI.6 (the principal products and services): and BI.7 (the
principal market and market segments), in more than 90" o of their reports. Inconsistent with
our assumptions, some information items are included in fewer analysts' reports over time,
such as the items B1.2 (the broad strategies of the company) decreasing by 24% in 2004 and
12% in 2006: BI.3 (the (in)consistency of the strategy with the key trends affecting the
business) decreasing by 23% in 2004 and 25% in 2006, and BI.l (the broad objectives of
the company) decreasing by 2 1% in 2004 and 1% in 2006. The decline in the frequency of
information about objectives and strategy is remarkable since nearly all annual reports
contain such information. Large decreases are also shown for item BI.9 (the seasonality and
cyclicality of the company) decreasing by 40% in 2004 and 27% in 2006. Non-financial
information items discussed in an increasing number of analyst reports include, for
instance, the item FWL. 7 (the comparison of actual business performance to previously
disclosed opportunities, risks and plans of the company): IC.17 (the main brands of the
company): and IC.9 (innovation).
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics of the use of non-financial information provided in
the analyst reports over time. As Table 6 shows, the amount of voluntary non-financial
information (LLTOT) included in analyst reports remains stable over the three periods. On
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Table 4
Results of the non-parametric Friedman tesl on the disclosure of voluntary non-financial information in annual
reports during three years (N= 40)
Categorj Year Rank Chi square Significance level
D_TOT 2001 1 .350
2003 1.925
2:005 2.725
D^ANA 2001 1.750
2003 2.100
2005 2.150
D_ANAA 2001 1.850
2003 2 063
2005 2 088
D^\NAB 2001 1 .850
2003 2.000
2005 2 150
D_FWL 2001 1.513
2003 1 938
2005 2 550
D_MAN 2001 1 800
2003 1 463
2005 2.238
D_BI 2001 1.675
2003 1 MOO
2005 2.425
D_BI.A 2001 1 ,XKK
2003 1 850
2005 2.263
D_BI.B 2001 1.713
2003 1 413
2005 2.375
D_BI.C 2001 1.813
2003 1 913
2005 2.275
D_IC 2001 1 .463
2003 2 063
2005 2 475
D_1C.A 2001 1.913
2003 1 413
2005 2.175
D_1C.B 2001 1 403
2003 2 125
2005 2 413
D_IC.C 2001 1.613
2003 2.100
2005 2.288
;»„!(,
4 X<>4
I 832
2 4.W
24014
5 04
1
12.556
343
11.S24
(.(IK,
23.700
2 442
24.111
1273S
000
ooss
400
230
II IIOO
05N
0.002
042
0.003
044
0.000
2XS
0(100
002
Notes: D_CAT: the disclosure ofnon-financial information category CAT, with CAT = TOT: "aggregate amount
of non-financial information"; ANA: "management's analysis of financial and non-financial data"; ANA.A:
"reasons for changes in the financial, operating and performance related data"; ANA B: "the identity and past
effect of key trends"; FWL: "forward-looking information"; MAN: "information about management and
shareholders"; BI: "background information"; BI.A: "broad objectives and strategy"; BI.B: "scope ami
description of business and properties"; BI.C: "impact of industry structure on the company"; IC: "intellectual
capital information"; IC.A: "human capital"; IC.B: "internal structure"; ICC: "external structure".
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Table 5
Results of the non-parametric Wilcoxon ranks test on the disclosure of voluntary non-financial information in
annual reports during 2 years
Category Comparison 2003 2001 Comparison 2005-2003 Comparison 2005-2001
Number Mean z-value Number Mean r-value Number Mean ;-value
AR rank AR rank AR rank
D_TOT 9 12 44 -3.690*** 6 14.92 -4.081*** 3 12.00 -4.854***
+ 2° 21.53 32 20.36 35 20.14
= 2 2 2
D^\NA 8 14.81 -1.727** 15 15.57 -0.857 10 9.60 -2.662***
+ 19 13 66 18 18 14 19 17.84
=13 7 II
D^ANA.A - 10 1230 -1.374* 14 13.54 -0625 II 1109 -1.918**
+ 16 14.25 15 16.37 17 16.71
= 14 11 12
D-ANA.B - 9 10.17 -1.204 8 10 25 -0 927 8 10.94 -1.883**
+ 13 1242 12 1067 16 13.28
=18 20 16
DJWL - 11 13.50 -2.764*** 8 15 75 -2.967*** 5 10.90 -4.406***
+ 24 20 06 26 18.04 31 19.73
= 5 6 4
D_MAN - 10 9.70 -1.288* II 13.27 -1.394* 6 10.50 -2.857***
+ 13 13.77 17 15.29 19 13.79
= 17 12 15
D_B1 - 14 18 04 -1.530* 10 14.85 -3.097*** 10 9.60 -3.883***
+ 23 19.59 27 20.54 27 22 48
= 3 3 3
D_BI.A - II 12.00 -0.200 6 12 50 -2449*** 8 12.00 -1.980**
+ II 11.00 18 12 50 17 13.47
= 18 16 15
D_BI.B - 12 13.83 -1.401* 8 15 25 -2.122** 7 13.00 -3.138***
+ 18 16 61 21 14 40 24 16.88
= 10 II 9
D-BI.C - 13 16.31 -0432 9 12 44 -2.378*** 10 13.20 -2.332***
+ 17 14 NX 20 16.15 21 17.33
=10 II 9
D.JC - 7 1043 -3.732*** 9 1189 -2.956*** 6 9.25 -4.371***
+ 26 18.77 23 18.30 30 20.35
= 7 8 4
DJC.A - 13 12.35 -0323 12 9 67 -2 244** 10 14.00 -1.706**
+ II I2<-N 17 18.76 19 15 53
= 16 11 II
D_IC.B - 5 6 50 -3.813*** II 1045 -2.284** 4 7.13 -4.635***
+ 22 15.70 18 1778 30 18.88
=13 II 6
D_IC.C - 8 12 56 -2 543*** 10 12.85 0.952 7 13 50 -3.303***
+ 21 1543 15 13 10 25 17.34
=11 15 8
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average, 33% to 35% of all the non-financial information items are discussed over time
in each year (2002, 2004 and 2006). The frequency with which certain non-financial
information categories are mentioned in the three periods evolves as well. For example,
analysts provide less information for the categories BI.A (broad objectives and strategy)
decreasing by 23% in 2004 and 12% in 2006; and BIB (scope and description of business
and properties) decreasing by 1 1% in 2004 and 7% in 2006. In contrast they mention more
non-financial information for the information categories ANA.A (management's analysis
of financial and non-financial data) increasing by 5% in 2004 and 9% in 2006; and 1C .B,
(internal structure) increasing by 2% in 2004 and 7% in 2006. The remaining categories
demonstrate a limited evolution over time.
Table 6 shows further that the items in category BI are often discussed in the analyst
reports, despite an overall decrease in mentioning this category in 2004 and 2006. Each
analyst report discusses about one half of the information items belonging to this category.
The category FWL appears to be important as well, with almost one half of the information
items appearing in each analyst report. On the other hand, financial analysts only occa-
sionally discuss the category IC although Table 6 shows a moderate increase in the number
oftimes these items are mentioned in the analyst reports. The table also shows that only a low
amount of human capital information (category IC.A) is provided in the analyst reports
which drives our finding that intellectual capital information as a whole is only moderately
used. We also show that the analyst reports contain a limited amount of information items
belonging to the category MAN (around 21% in the three periods).
In order to compare the quantity of voluntary non-financial information mentioned in the
analyst reports over time, only those analyst reports issued for the same company by the
same financial analyst operating at the same brokerage firm in all periods, are included for
further analysis resulting in 30 paired analyst reports. The average amount of voluntary
non-financial information is somewhat larger in this paired sample compared to the full
sample. This finding is consistent with the results of Flostrand and Strom (2006). To
examine the significance of the changes in the frequency with which non-financial
information is included in analyst reports, we apply the Friedman test to the limited sample
of 30 analyst reports. The research findings, in Table 7, do not show a significant difference
in any one of the three periods analyzed, suggesting that Hypothesis 2 is not supported. The
research results in Table 7 further reveal a significant difference in the amount of
information mentioned for information category BI and its sub-categories BI.A and BIB.
As previously discussed, financial analysts mention a larger number of items in the 2002
Notes to Table 5:
D_CAT: the disclosure of non-financial information category CAT. with CAT = TOT "aggregate amount
of non-financial information"; ANA: "management's analysis of financial and non-financial data"; ANA. A: "reasons
for changes in the financial, operating and performance related data"; ANA.B: "the identity and past effeel of
key trends"; FWL: "forward-looking information"; MAN: "information about management and shareholders";
BI: "background information"; BI.A: "broad objectives and strategy"; BIB: "scope and description of business and
properties"; BI.C: "impact of industry structure on the company" IC: 'intellectual capital information" IC.A: "human
capital"; IC B: 'internal structure"; ICC: "external structure": number AR: the number of annual reports showing
a decrease (-), an increase (+) or no evolution (=) between the periods analyzed; ***significant at a 1% level;
**significant at a 5% level; *significant at a 10% level.
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Table 7
Results of the non-parametnc Friedman test on the use of voluntary non-financial information in analyst reports
during three years (N=10)
Category- Year Rank Chi square Significance level
LLTOT 2002 2.21?
2004 1.733
2006 2.050
U_ANA 2002 1.9S3
2004 1 MSI
2006 2 033
LLANA.A 2002 1.850
2004 2 167
2006 1 983
IU\NA.B 2002 2.117
20(14 1 417
2006 1 467
U_FWL 2002 1.917
2004 1 717
2006 2.367
U_MAN 2002 2.033
2004 2 067
2006 1 400
U_BI 2002 2.4X3
2004 1 .683
2006 1.833
U_BI.A 2002 2 317
2004 1 750
2006 1 933
U_BIB 2002 2.4X3
2004 1.650
2006 1.X67
UUBI.C 2002 2.200
2004 1X67
2006 1.933
IUC 2002 1.883
2004 1 933
2006 2.183
U_IC.A 2002 2.083
2004 2 100
2006 1.817
UJC.B 2002 1.883
2004 1 867
2006 2 250
lUC.C 2002 1 .900
2004 2 11"
2006 1.983
3.774
064
2.116
I
nun
~45X
644
12 056
6.473
14 I6S
2.154
I 691
3.0X5
3 444
1.089
0. 1 52
464
ii !47
0.607
024
"25
002
0039
0.001
341
0424
0214
0.178
o 580
Notes: U_CAT: the use of non-financial information category CAT. with CAT = TOT: "aggregate amount of
non-financial information"; ANA: "management's analysis of financial and non-financial data"; ANA.A:
"reasons for changes in the financial, operating and performance related data"; ANA.B: "the identity and past
effect of key trends": FWL: "forward-looking information"; MAN: "information about management and
shareholders": BI: "background information"; Bl A: "broad objectives and strategy"; BIB: "scope and
description of business and properties"; BI.C: "impact of industry structure on the company"; IC: "intellectual
capital information"; 1C.A: "human capital"; IC.B: "internal structure"; ICC: "external structure"
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Table 8
Results of the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank test on the use of voluntary non-financial information in analyst
reports during 2 years
Category Comparison 2004 2002 Comparison 2006 2004 Compari;ion 2006 -2004
Number Mean r-value Number Mean z-value Number Mean r-value
AR rank AR rank AR rank
LLTOT - 24 18.04 -1.934** 20 19.88 -0.676 15 16.63 -0.029
+ 11 17.91 n 22 98 16 15.41
= 2 3
U^\NA - 12 12.67 -0,613 18 16,28 -0.080 11 12.32 -0.740
+ 14 1421 16 18 88 14 13.54
= 9 10 9
U^iNAA - 8 II 81 -1.369* 19 1426 -0 176 8 10.06 -1.528*
+ 15 12 10 14 20.71 14 12.32
= 12 II 12
LUUMA.B - 11 10.59 -0.920 12 11 88 -0 144 14 10.14 -0.520
+ 8 9.19 11 12 14 8 13.88
= 16 21 12
U_FWL - 18 15 44 -0.948 15 20,60 - 1 604** 8 15.31 - 1 093
+ 12 15.58 26 212? 17 11.91
= 5 3 9
U_MAN - 12 11 17 o 126 20 14 20 1 121 14 14.54 -0.747
+ 11 12.91 10 18 10 12 12.29
= 12 14 8
U_BI - 20 16 81 -3,248*** 18 19,75 -0.483 21 14 43 -2.287**
+ 6 15 17 21 20 21 7 14.71
= 3 5 6
LLB1.A - 19 13 00 -2.877*** 12 15.21 1 582* 18 15.11 -1.687**
+ 5 10 60 20 17.28 10 13.40
= 11 12 6
LLBI.B - 24 14 00 -3 404*** 12 13.79 ((804* 20 13.68 -2.060**
+ 4 13 88 16 15.03 7 14 93
= 7 16 7
UJB1.C - 18 15 00 - 1 54 1 * 19 16 95 -0755 17 15 41 -0.973
+ 10 13 60 14 17.07 12 14 42
= 7 11 5
U_IC - 15 16 77 -0 069 19 1871 -0742 11 15 45 - 1 .043
+ 16 15 28 21 22.12 18 1472
= 4 4 5
i: K A - 8 8.50 000 14 10 93 - 1.966** 8 5 00 -1.387*
+ 8 8 50 6 9 50 2 7.50
= 19 24 24
ILIC'.B 14 16.14 -0910 11 12 91 1 889** 9 11.50 1 866*"
+ 13 11.69 19 1 7 00 17 14 56
= 8 14 8
LUC.C - 7 13 57 (1 735 15 15.20 -0240 11 9.82 209
+ 14 9 71 14 14.79 10 12 30
= 14 15 13
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analyst reports compared to the analyst reports for the remaining periods. A significant
increase in the information category FWL is noted in analyst reports issued in 2006.
We also perform a pair-wise analysis of the various two-year periods in order to
observe possible changes. The Wilcoxon rank test is applied to a limited number of
analyst reports selected by the same criteria as discussed above. This limitation results in a
sample size of 35 paired cases between 2002 and 2004. 44 cases between 2004 and 2006
and 34 cases between 2002 and 2006. The results, in Table 8, show that the total amount
of non-financial information in analyst reports significantly declines between the period
2002 and 2004. This decrease is especially noticeable in the information categories Bl and
the sub-categories BI.A and Bl.B. The 2006 analyst reports show an increase in these
information categories compared to the 2004 analyst reports. We also note a lower amount
of human capital information in the 2006 analyst reports compared to the 2004 analyst
reports. A significant increase in the reporting of forward-looking information in the
period 2006 compared to the pre\ ious periods is consistent with the hypothesis. In
addition, the 2006 analyst reports contain a larger number of items from category IC.B
(internal structure).
Although two information categories show a significant increase in use in the analyst
reports, the general trend is that financial analysts do not include much more non-financial
information items in their reports over time. Therefore, with the exception of the
information categories FWL and IC.B, our results do not support Hypothesis 2.
4.3. The comparison between corporate managers and financial analysts
Comparing Tables 3 and 5. shows that annual reports include more non-financial
information than analyst reports, a consistent finding of Garcia-Meca (2005). This finding,
however, is expected because companies have to respond to multiple stakeholders (Bowen,
DuCharme, & Shores, 1995; Moneva and Llena. 2000). Firms also report some information
in order to enhance stock prices and or to reduce the cost of capital (Garcia-Meca, 2005).
Rogers and Grant ( 1997) further mention that financial analysts do not mention all available
information in their analyst reports. In particular, they tend to avoid including information
they consider less reliable (e.g., human capital information).
By examining the mean scores for each information category separately (Tables 3 and 5),
we see that analyst reports issued in 2002 discuss more information of the non-financial
information (sub (categories ANA.B. FWL, BL and its sub-categories BIB and BI.C. Annual
Notes to Table 8:
U_CAT: the use of non-financial information category CAT. with CAT = TOT: "aggregate amount of non-
financial information"; ANA: "management's analysis of financial and non-financial data": ANA A: "reasons
for changes in the financial, operating and performance related data"; ANA.B: "the identity and past effect of
key trends"; FWL: "forward-looking information"; MAN: "information about management and shareholders":
BI: "background information"; BI.A: "broad objectives and strategy"; Bl.B: "scope and description of
business and properties"; BI.C: "impact of industry structure on the company"; IC: "intellectual capital
information"; IC.A: "human capital"; IC.B: "internal structure"; ICC: "external structure"; number AR: ihe
number of analyst reports showing a decrease (-), an increase (+) or no evolution (=) between the periods
analyzed; ""significant at a 1% level; ""significant at a 5% level; "significant at a 10% level.
~.
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repcr- F 20 lain more information of the remaining non-financial information
. tes When comparing the content of annual reports of 2003 with analyst reports issued
1 5 see thai financial analysts only include more information for the non-financial
informal: . . . _ sFWL and BI.C in their reports. The 2006 analyst reports mention more
information or. . - regqryBLC.
The ' . comparing the amount of non-financial information pre-
od in annual reports and analyst reports confirm our descriptive findings. So. Table 9
_ "leant difference 1 1' 1 1 respect to the aggregate disclosure
jf -v oluntary non-financial information, suggesting that corporate managers are
S ttk re .untary non-financial information m their reports. However.
ana . _ ore information for the categories F\YL. BI. and the
.- Bl.B and BI.C. Annual reports, on the other hand, discuss significantly more
information for the categories .ASA. ANA.A. MAN, IC. and each of the IC sub-categories.
The _ ficani difference in the disclosure and usage of the
-.N.AB and Bl.A.
Table 9 demonstrates that corporate managers also increased
FWL and BI.C. since investors can find the same amount of this
d annual re m analyst reports. With regard to the remaining mfor-
. i annual reports contain significantly more
n than the 2006 analyst reports.
Our research confirms our expectations. Consistent with Hypothesis 3. companies have
i their reporting in those categories that financial analysts were using more often in
1 1 . . ^formation categories FWL, BI. BIB. and BI.C.
md the accural I I -.casts
In the second stage, a questionnaire, which included the same non-financial information
. ndex applied in the content-analysis method, was sent to the same
. a] analysts. The extent to which each of the 3 1 respondents relies on
Dn-financial information for each information category and a summary of
ibout control variables are presented in Table 1 0.
4 On average, our respondents
follow S compar _ ng from tw o to 1 5 companies ). The respondents reported having
7.5 yt
The resregai _ .: of non-financial information range from zero (never used)
to four The average score for our research analysts is 2.46. indicating that
. .mes to often" rely on voluntary non-financial information. Table 1 also shows
use, depending on the non-financial information category. Financial
. b-category Bl.A (broad objectives and
.\b average score of 3 .23 denotes that analysts "often to always" use the items in
. gory. The category FWL (forward-looking information) is the second
-.ant information catet :th an average value of 2.99 which shows that
•
.rd-lookine information. Our research also shows
iormatioD item can be obtained from the authors
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Table 9
Results of the Mann Whitney V
financial information
'.-
-'.-;. —
.:;
- *y 2002 : i - : >
r-value Mean rank : - -; :- . -.-;
DU TOT Annual reports -1.920* :- M --.„,.
Analyst reports - -
DU-ANA Annual reports - 74 :
"
-
. I*»*
Analyst rep _ - - . « -
DU-ANA A Annual reports 48.66 : : : 25 56.36 1
Analyst reports I -
DU_ANAJJ .Annual reports 40 14 :
"
-
-
-
:
Analyst reports - « 44.69 42
DULFWL Annual reports ." 42 • • -0.620
Analyst reports •:
"-
- 1
DU_MAN Annual reports " ! " " -8.09 7 -
n :: : : :-
DU_BI Annual reports .; • 55 • - .
-
.
-
-
;
_
41.91
DL"_BI.A Annual reports - -0.112 - rj*** - "
.Analyst reports - - J 40.07
Dl_"_BI.B Annual reports 810* 61.01 -3.157*"
'
Analyst reports - 40.17
DL"_BI.C Annual reports J*** 40.03 - 17 -0.028
-: reports - - -
BULK Annual reports - - "500 1 i
- reports i
DULIC A Annual reports 55 "I - - i -5.0 : -6 -
3t reports 52.79 n i
DL'JC B Annual reports 54 - - ' 54 -"' -
:
Analyst reports $3 -. -
DCJC C Annual reports ] :; ; " - ' -
Analyst reports _
DLLCAT: the dist sure/use ^finai
amount of non-fir... '. \: ~ma
jes in the financial, operating
rends": F\VL: forward-lookfng
:tal mformanon cafe e with CAT
... - - .
..-.:.-.-- —..-..-.
....j. ia:.- \\ \ .3 "V.; -.-:.:: _ . -. -
shareholders". BI 'background information': BI_A: "broad obji
of business and properties'*: Bt.C: ""impact of tndu>
information"; IC.A: "human capital". IC.B: "internal structure":
level: "significant a: a 5% '.e\ d. *> _ .
BIB
that financial analysts use the information r. . _ es ANA.A (reast - Ganges in the
financial, operating and performance related datal. BIB scope test -.istness
and properties) and Bl.C (impact of industry structure on the company) to a large rteg .
.
Conversely, we find that financial analysts rarely use information from the category 1C.
A. (human capital). An average score of 1.3 . s mat me items in this information
category are "rarely to sometimes" used, but they occasionally use the informal
MAN (information about management and shareholders) which has an a\ . _. -. .
of 1 9
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Tabic Hi
Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables based on the survey method
Variables Mean Mm Max SD
ACC,
COM,
I \l'
LL.TOT,
LLANA,
LLANA.A,
ILANA.B,
U_FWL,
ILMAN,
LLBI,
U_BI.A,
ILBI.B,
U_BI.C,
U_IC,
LLIC.A,
ILIC.B,
iuc.c,
0.61
8.23
"4s
2.46
2.39
2.82
1.87
2.99
1.91
2 XX
323
2 "(i
2 76
1.91
1.39
2.04
2.45
11(10
1
1
I 06
i :
_
1.50
(Kill
1.55
0.17
0.60
1 .00
1 .00
1.20
65
0.29
0.50
1 40
3.91
15
26
3.77
3.64
4.00
3.20
4.00
4.00
4.40
4.00
4.00
4.00
3 45
3.71
3.25
3.80
0.88
3.73
4.88
0.56
0.61
069
0.68
0.66
0.90
0.88
0.83
0.83
0.71
0.52
0.60
0.61
0.60
Notes: This table provides the descriptive statistics for the variables ACC,: the mean forecast accuracy (measured
as the absolute difference between the forecasted and the actual EPS scaled by the actual EPS| of the companies
followed by financial analyst i; COM,: the number of companies followed by financial analyst i, EXP the years
ofexperience of financial analyst i: LLCAT, : the use of non-financial information category CAT by financial analyst
i. with CAT = TOT: "aggregate amount of non-financial information"; ANA: "management's analysis of
financial and non-financial data". ANA A "reasons for changes in the financial, operating and performance
related data": ANA.B: "the identity and past effect of key trends"; FWL: "forward-looking information":
MAN: "Information about management and shareholders": Bl: "background information"; BI.A: "broad objectives
and strategy"; BI B: "scope and description of business and properties"; BI C "Impact of industry structure on the
companv "; 1C: "intellectual capital information"; IC A "human capital". K B "internal structure": ICC: "external
structure"; 1 1. CAT, is measured based on a Likert scale ranged as follows zero = never used: one = rarely used; two =
sometimes used; three = often used; four = always used
The survey results are comparable to the content analysis of the analyst reports. In both
analyses the categories ANA.A, FWL, BI.A, and BIB are seen as most important, while the
categories ANA.B, MAN, and IC.A are seen as least important. The two research methods
show differences however. For instance, the item IC. 1 8 (customer satisfaction) is almost
"never" discussed in the analyst reports, whereas the survey results document that financial
analysts "sometimes" use this item. This finding illustrates that financial analysts do
employ some non-financial information items, even when they do not discuss them in their
reports.
To determine whether or not forecast accuracy is influenced by the use of non-financial
information, we perform univariate correlation analyses on the data we collect by the survey
The comparison between the content of analyst reports and the survey results is first conducted on a limited
sample that only contains the respondents to the questionnaire for whom analyst reports are analyzed. The sample
consists of 15 respondents of the survey and 40 analyst reports. Second, the results of the 31 respondents to the
survey and the content analysis of the 62 analyst reports are compared with each other as well. The research
findings ol both analyses the comparison conducted on the full sample and on the limited sample arc similar.
indicating that no biases exist which can be attributed to the difference in the samples.
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method. These results in Table 1 1 demonstrate an insignificant correlation coefficient
between the aggregate use of more non-financial information and accurate forecasts. Thus,
Hypothesis 4 is not supported. Although the use of various non-financial information
categories is positively related to the analysts" forecast accuracy, this association is only
significant with respect to the categories FWL (forward-looking information) and 1C.B
(internal structure). For all the remaining information categories. Hypothesis 4 is no1
supported.
We also note that financial analysts who follow more companies forecast less accurately
than those with fewer companies, which is consistent \\ ith earlier studies (Jacob el al., 1999;
Clement & Tse. 2003). Furthermore, as in Jacob et al. ( 1 999), length of experience does not
influence the analysts' forecast accuracy.
We also estimate a regression model with the dependent variable being the ranking of raw
data. The results, presented in Table 12. confirm the univariate research statistics in Table 1 1
:
analysts assessing fewer companies perform better, and analysts with more years ofexperience
do not necessarily make more accurate forecasts. Our multivariate regression results show.
Table 1
1
Univariate correlalion statistics between the analysts' forecast accuracy and the analyst-specific characteristics
based on the sun. ey method
Pearson correlation Speamians'
ACC,
rho correlation
COM,ACC, COM, EXP EXP,
ACC, 1.000 0.473*** ii P5 1.000 0.328* 0.164
COM, 0.473*** 1.000 220 ii 328* 1.000 0.327*
EXP, 0.175 0226 1 000 0.164 32"* 1.000
LLTOT, -0 I4(. 0.234 042 - 1 42 0262 -0.057
U_ANA, -0.0% 0.119 0.080 -0.077 0.101 -0.059
ILANA.A, -0 124 146 0.142 -0.037 0.177 0.058
ILANA.B, -0.032 0.053 022 -0.044 0.059 -0 154
ILFWL, -0.393** 0.108 -0.108 -0.392** 0. 1 9
1
-0.265
U_MAN, 0.189 0.398** 0.019 0.097 0.317* 0.004
U_BI, -0.128 (1240 0.061 o 190 213 -0 020
U_BI.A, -0.069 240 0.068 -0.133 0.295 -0.009
U_BIB, 0009 0.322* 0.099 -0.154 0.294 -0.025
UJBI.C, 230 0.087 0.014 -0.181 214 0.017
LUC, -0.141 o 174 0.033 0.037 069 -0.073
LUC.A, -0.024 0.148 0.060 0. 1 5
1
0.039 0.002
ILIC.B, -0.332** 0.180 0.063 -0.318** 0.137 -0.044
IUC.C, -0.097 0.130 -0.027 -0.131 123 -0.107
Notes: This table provides the Pearson correlations and the Spearman's rho correlations for the variables ACC: the
mean forecast accuracy (measured as the absolute difference between the forecasted and the actual EPS scaled by the
actual EPS) of the companies followed by financial analyst ;; COM,: the number of companies followed by financial
analyst i; EXP,: the years of experience of financial analyst /; LLCAT, : the use ofnon-financial information category
CAT by financial analyst /, with CAT = TOT: "aggregate amount ofnon-financial information"; ANA: "management's
analysis of financial and non-financial data"; ANA.A: "reasons for changes in the financial, operating and performance
related data"; ANA.B: "the identity and past effect of key trends"; FWL: "forward-looking information";
MAN: "information about management and shareholders"; Bl: "background information"; BI.A: "broad objectives
and strategy"; BIB: "scope and description of business and properties"; BI.C: "impact of industry structure on the
company": IC: "intellectual capital information"; IC A: "human capital": IC B: "internal structure"; ICC: "external
structure"; '"significant at a l°u level: "significant at a 5% level; 'significant at a 10% level.
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Table 12
Multivariate regression statistics between the analysts' forecast accuracy and the analyst-specific characteristics
based on the survey method
Variables Beta coefficient /-value Significance level variable F-value model p-value model R~
3.820 0.021** 29.8
3.052 0.046** 25.3
Intercept 0.702 1.145 0.262
COM, 115 3.063 0.005***
EXP, 0.012 415 0.682
LLTOT, -0.394 -1.631 II 114
Intercept 0.319 531 0.600
COM, 105 2.760 0.010***
EXP, 0.013 0470 0.642
U^\NA, -0 215 -0.940 0.356
Intercept 0.519 II 845 0.406
COM, 0.107 2.851 0.008***
EXP, 016 0.554 0.584
IU\NA.A, -0.266 -1.289 0.208
Intercept -0.038 -0.077 0.939
COM, 102 2.654 0.013**
EXP, 012 (1402 0.641
LU\NA.B, -0.065 -0.322 0.750
Intercept 1 .000 1.793 0.084
COM, 0.118 3.332 0.003***
EXP, 0.009 0.33 0.742
U_FWL, -0.434 -2.453 0.021**
Intercept -0.165 - 0.4 1
5
0.681
COM (i 100 2.394 0.024**
EXP 0.012 414 0.682
U_MAN, 0.006 0.038 0.970
Intercept 0.653 1.070 11294
COM, 0.115 0.005 0.005***
EXP, 0.012 0.442 0.662
U_BI -0.328 -1.550 133
Intercept 0.518 0.868 0393
COM, 0.116 2.990 0.006***
EXP, 0.012 0.428 0672
ILBI.A, - 0.241 -1.338 0.192
Intercept 0.290 0497 0.623
COM, 0.112 2 X2S 0.009***
EXP, 0.013 11444 0.661
LLBI.B, -0.192 -0.919 0.366
Intercept 0.582 1 . 1 02 0.280
COM, 0.106 2.916 0.007***
EXP, 0.012 0.425 0.674
ILBI.C, -0.294 -1.733 0.094*
Intercept (1436 0.818 0.421
COM, 0.110 2 923 0.007***
EXP 0.012 0417 0.680
U_IC, -0.344 -1.386 0.177
Intercept 0.001 0(11 1.000
COM, 104 2 704 0.012***
1 Xl» 0.012 430 0670
LUC.A, 132 -0 576 569
3 ?SN 0.032** 27.3
2.715 0.065* 23.2
5.270 0.005*** 36.9
2.671 0.068* 22.9
3.709 0.024** 29.2
3 444 0.031** 27.7
3.035 0.046** 25.2
^ "(,n 0.018** 30.(
3.500 0.029** 28.0
2.814 0.058* 23.8
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Table 12 (continued)
Variables Beta coefficient /-value Significance level variable /•'-value model p-value model R
Intercept 614
COM, (1 114
EXP, 0.013
IUC.B, -0.434
Intercept 0.321
COM, 0.106
EXP, (1010
U-JC.C, -0.205
1.276 213
3.144 0.004***
o 493 O 626
2.063 0.049**
0.532 0.599
2 782 0.010***
364 714
0.937 0357
4 504
3 050
(1.01 1**
(I.IMh 1
33 4
25.3
Notes Tins table includes the regression results of the following model
ACC, = /?„ + /l.COM, + /> : EXP, 4 /?3U_CAT, I e,
where ACC,: the mean forecast accuracy ( measured as the absolute difference between the forecasted and the actual
EPS sealed by the actual EPS) of the companies followed by financial analyst /; COM,: the number of companies
followed by financial analyst i; EXP,: the scars of experience of financial analyst i; U_CAT, = the usage of the non-
financial information category CAT by financial analyst /, with CAT = TOT: "aggregate amount of non-financial
information"; ANA: "management's analysis of financial and non-financial data"; ANA.A: "reasons for changes in
the financial, operating and performance related data"; ANA.B: "the identity and past effect of key trends";
FWL: "forward-looking information"; MAN: "information about management and shareholders". BI: "hack-
ground information"; BI.A: "broad objectives and strategy"; BIB: "scope and description of business and
properties"; BI.C: "impact of industry structure on the company"; [C: "intellectual capital information";
IC.A: "human capital"; IC.B: "internal structure"; ICC: "external structure"; *** significant at a l% level.
** significant at a 5% level. * significant at a I0"„ level; e,: error term.
consistent with the univariate statistics, a positive, significant relationship between the use of
the non-financial information categories FWL and IC.B and the analysts' forecast accuracy, as
well as a significant positive association (on a 10% level) between the use of the information
category BI.C (impact of industry structure on the company) and the analysts' forecast
accuracy. Hypothesis 4 is, therefore, supported regarding the information categories FWL, IC.
B, and BI.C; it is not supported for the remaining information categories.
5. Discussion and topics for further research
This study examines the relevance of non-financial information to the Belgian capital
market. Prior studies document that non-financial information is given greater weight in
judging the value of a company. And, capital-market participants are requiring firms to
voluntarily disclose more non-financial information.
Our empirical results suggest that companies have disclosed more non-financial infor-
mation over time in response to the demands of regulatory bodies, financial analysts, and
other capital-market participants for these disclosures. These findings correspond to the
research results of earlier studies (e.g., Marston & Polei, 2004; Vandemaele et al., 2005).
Despite this increase, financial analysts tend not to use the additional voluntary non-financial
information except in two categories: forward-looking information and the internal struc-
ture of the company. Our findings further document that the increase in the disclosure of
voluntary non-financial information has narrowed the gap between the information financial
analysts require and the information provided by corporate managers.
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We e\ aluated the use ofnon-financial information b> examining the content offinancial
analysts" reports as compared to annual reports. This analysis is supplemented by a survey
questionnaire. In general, the information use statistics found by the content-analysis
method and the survey method differ very little. However, based on the survey results, we
note mat the use of forward-looking information and internal-structure information is
positively related to the anal) sts' forecast accuracy. This is in contrast to the content analysis
of analyst reports which shows no significant relationship.
An interesting topic for further research would be to examine whether information used
by financial analysts, but which does not appear in their reports, has an influence on forecast
accuracy. The results of this study should encourage listed companies to continue to
enhance their disclosure strategy.
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Abstract
International harmonization of financial accounting standards has been the goal of many
professional and academic accountants during the last 40 years. As of January 1. 2005. international
accounting harmonization entered a new and perhaps decisive phase From that date, all companies
domiciled in the European Union with shares listed on securities exchanges are required to prepare
their consolidated accounts in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
This landmark event presents an opportunity for accounting researchers to assess the status of research
on international accounting harmonization. In this paper, we review articles published in major English
language accounting journals dunng the period from 1 965 through 2004 in order to trace thematic and
methodological trends in this line of research and to assess where the research ma\ evolve from here.
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1. Introduction
International harmonization of financial accounting standards has been the goal of many-
professional and academic accountant for main years, but progress has been slow in
achieving this goal. There have been impediments to the creation of a uniform set of
accounting standards for financial reporting purposes on a worldwide basis, not the least of
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which have been cultural, economic, and legal differences among countries. However, the
process of international accounting harmonization has now entered a new phase. From
January 1. 2005, all companies domiciled in the European Union with shares listed on
securities exchanges must prepare their consolidated accounts in accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting
Standards Board (1ASB). This event presents an opportunity for accounting researchers to
analyze trends in research on international accounting harmonization and to assess where
this research may proceed from here.
In this review article we identify over 200 research articles published between 1965 and
2004 that deal with international accounting harmonization. We also identify trends in this
line of research, some of which grew or were reduced in importance during the 40 year
period examined. In general the volume and level of rigor of the research increased, thus
providing evidence of the importance of this line of subject to the accounting research
community. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we situate
international accounting harmonization research within the larger field of international
accounting research, and within the discipline of accounting generally, and we discuss the
significance of this line of research. In Section 3, we present the methodology used to
undertake this review. In Section 4 we identify and discuss trends in research on international
accounting harmonization, noting how these trends have grown or were modified during the
period examined. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Situating IAH research
The accounting discipline can be divided into a number of sub-disciplines, including:
financial, managerial, auditing, tax, and governmental accounting. Each sub-discipline
follows certain research methodologies and targets a relatively small number of journals as
the primary outlets for its efforts. In contrast. International Accounting Research (IAR) can
involve any of the sub-disciplines of accounting, provided there is an international
connection (Prather-Kinsey & Rueschhoff. 2004). Wallace and Meek (2002) define IAR as
being concerned with:
accounting phenomena in one country with lessons or repercussions extending to
other countries...accounting phenomena related to multinational enterprises... global
movements to shape the direction of accounting. ..and comparative accounting
requirements and practices.
While IAR has been recognized as a sub-discipline of accounting research for many
years." Falk (1994) argued that most IAR lacked rigor and an adequate theoretical
underpinning. In recent years, however, there has been an increase in the volume of IAR (see
Prather-Kinsey & Rueschhoff, 2004), and there has also been an increase in the rigor and
level of theory used in undertaking IAR (see for example. Meek & Thomas, 2004). As part
of IAR, international accounting harmonization research has contributed to the increase in
volume and rigor of IAR.
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Accounting Research
Fig I Situating [All research within accounting research.
While the subject matter of IAR might involve any of the sub-disciplines of accounting,
this review article focuses on research dealing with the international harmonization of
financial accounting standards (hereafter IAH). IAH research investigates the arguments for,
efforts made towards, and trends in the direction of achieving international harmonization of
financial accounting standards. IAH research is a subset of IAR, and it is also a subset of
financial accounting research within the overall discipline of accounting. See Fig. 1 for a
diagram which graphically situates IAH research within the accounting discipline.
2.1
.
The importance of IAH research
As with many topics in accounting research, practicing accountants may develop an
interest in the topic prior to academic accountants. There was little interest in IAH research
on the part of the academic community prior to 1965. Most of the early articles dealing with
IAH were written by practicing accountants, and they were published in professional
journals, such as the Journal ofAccountancy (see for example: Brandt, 1962; Englemann,
1962; Enthoven. 1965; Jennings, 1962). For example, the objective of Brandt's (1962)
article in (he Journal of Accountancy was to examine "differences in accounting principles
and practices in European countries, with a suggested approach to worldwide uniformity"
(p. 68). The goal of achieving worldwide uniformity of financial accounting standards
continued to be important for practicing accountants throughout the intervening period
(see for example: Cairns. 1989; Carey, 1990; Fisher, 1990; Linowes, 1969; Wilson, 1991;
Van Hulle, 1989a,b; Wyatt & Yospe, 1993).
The creation of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in 1973.
appears to have prompted an increased interest in IAH research. Wyatt ( 1 989) noted that one
of the primary reasons for the creation of the IASC was to advance the international
harmonization of financial accounting standards. In response, accounting researchers began
to investigate the feasibility of achieving international harmonization and also to investigate
the reasons behind the observed diversity of accounting practices. Between 1973 and 1989,
progress was slow towards achieving the goal of international harmonization. In a move to
Published by the American Institute <>t CPAs
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speed up this process the IASC issued a Framework for the Preparation and Presentation oj
Financial Statements in 1989 which set forth the basic concepts underlying international
accounting standards (IAS). The purpose of this framework was to promote greater
international harmonization by reducing the number of alternative accounting treatments
permitted. However, once again, progress was slow towards reaching the goal of inter-
national harmonization. In 1995, an agreement was reached between the IASC and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) whereby IASC agreed to
develop a core set of accounting standards, and IOSCO in turn agreed to recommend that
these standards be allowed for use in global capital markets (IASC, 1995). This agreement
between the IASC and IOSCO signaled that one of the primary reasons for international
harmonization was to facilitate the operations ofworldwide capital markets. This recognition
led to an increased interest in IAH research on the part of American accounting researchers
who had been investigating relationships between accounting variables and share-price
returns for a number of years. Other events which have also been significant in the
development of IAH research include the creation of the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) as the successor to the IASC in 2001, and the European Parliament's approval
in 2002 of the use of IAS/IFRS for listed companies in the EU. Fig. 2 provides a timeline of
the important events in international harmonization which have had an impact on the
development of IAH research.
The following section describes the methodology we used in this paper to investigate
trends in IAH research.
3. Methodology
To explain our methodology, we first discuss the selection of materials pertaining to IAH;
second, the selection of academic journals; third, the identification of articles; fourth, the
classification of articles.
3.1. Selection ofmaterial pertaining to IAH
We initially attempted to identify all of the available literature pertaining to IAH,
including: articles in academic journals; articles in non-academic journals; articles in
newspapers; directives and other material issued by the European Commission; material
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Fig. 2. Timeline of Important events in IAH
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from accounting firms; chapters in accounting textbooks, and so forth. The extent of this
materiel was formidable. By analyzing a sample of these documents, we concluded that the
most important contributions to the literature have appeared in academic research journals
which, therefore became the focus of our attention.
3.2. Selection of academic journals
In order to place a limit on the scope of the research, a decision was made to concentrate
on English language accounting research journals. There were several reasons for this
decision. First, we observed that non-English language journals are often intended for a
national audience, and they do not publish a great deal of research on IAH. A second factor
was that IAH specialists from various countries often publish their work in English language
journals. Consequently, we decided to restrict our search to the English language journals
shown in Appendix A. This list of journals includes all English language accounting journals
with the word "international" in their title, as well as a number of other journals that are
generally considered to be of high quality (see Lowe & Locke. 2005; Prather-Kinsey &
Rueschhoff. 2004. for examples of previous studies which have looked at journal quality in
the international arena).
3.3. Identification oj articles
We reviewed all of the accounting research journals listed in Appendix A from the date
of their inception. The identification of IAH articles was based on a systematic analysis of
tables of contents, abstracts and keywords, focusing on the words: "harmonization" and
"international accounting standards". (Fig. 3) If the title or the keywords did not
specifically include the keywords pertaining to our subject, but the abstract contained an
idea that caused us to read the article, we read the article completely. Therefore, even ifthe
title, keywords, or abstract did not mention IAH directly, we were able to identify articles
pertaining to IAH. This process resulted in the identification of the articles listed in
Appendix B. The first article identified was published in The Accounting Review in 1965
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(B: Kollaritsch, 1965).
4
Consequently, our analysis begins in 1965 and extends through
2004.
4. Trends in IAH research
We identified 202 IAH research articles dealing with IAH published in the 24 accounting
research journals listed in Appendix A during the time period 1965 to 2004 (see Table 1).
The range of articles published per year was from zero in years 1 970, 1971, 1 974 and 1 977,
to a high of 13 articles in 2003. There was an increasing trend in the number of articles
published per year (see Fig. 2), with an average of 2.3 articles per year in the period 1965-
1973; 2.9 articles per year in the period 1973-1989; and 8.9 articles per year in the period
1990-2004. These time periods were chosen to indicate the relative change in IAH research
over the total period examined. The first period corresponds with the time before the creation
of the IASC in 1973. The second period extends from the creation of the IASC to the
issuance of the IASC Framework in 1989, and the third period extends from the creation of
the IASC Framework through 2004 (Fig. 3). Because of the length of time that it takes from
the inception of a research project to its eventual publication, this division into three time
periods is meant to be indicative of the trends in IAH research rather than implying a causal
factor which explains the rate of growth.
4.1. Classification of articles by theme
In order to develop a method of classifying IAH research, previous articles which
classified IAR, such as those of Meek and Saudagaran (B: 1990) and Zambon (B: 1996),
were examined. Similar classification schemes by Van der Tas (B: 1992), Barniv and
Fetyko (B: 1997) and Rahman, Perera and Ganesh (B: 2002) were also examined. In
addition, certain themes were identified by studying the articles directly. Through a
detailed process of reading and analyzing the IAH articles appearing in Appendix B, we
were able to identify certain research themes. The initial themes were Accounting
I 'niformity, Comparative Studies, and Reflections on the IAH Process. The following
section discusses these themes.
4.2. IAH research during the Initial Period: 1965-1973
4.2.1
. Accounting uniformity
During the Initial Period, there was a strong interest in accounting uniformity
(B: Wilkinson, 1965; B: Morgan, 1967). Wilkinson (B: 1965: 11) defined accounting
uniformity as when: "each company presents only one set of accounts for all investors, of
whatever nationality". This interest in accounting uniformity was evident not only in the
academic literature, but also in the practicing community. There were topics dealing with
accounting uniformity at international congresses on accounting (Jennings, 1962) and.
significantly, a compilation of accounting practices in different countries was prepared by the
Committee on International Relations of the American Institute ofCPAs (AICPA, 1965). This
The Idler B before the reference indicates thai the reference is found in Appendix B.
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Table 1
Number of IAH articles: 1965 \
Penod Number of Average number of Number using Percent using
articles in period articles per year empirical methods empirical methods
1965-1973 21 2.3 3 14
1974-1989 46 : s 14 30
1990-2004 135 67 50
Total: 1965- 20O4 202 5.0 ^4 42
publication appears to have signalled the emergence of IAH research. According to Wilkinson
(B: 1465: 1 1 1. the AICPA publication was "in part a reply to the pleas for uniformity of
accounting throughout the world that have been heard at almost every one of the more
recently held International Congresses on Accounting." There was also a belief on the part of
both practicing and academic accountants that international harmonization of financial
accounting standards would be achieved through a better understanding of differences in
accounting practices in different countries (B: Beazley. 1 968: B: Alhashim and Gamer. 1973).
Unfortunately, this belief proved to be ill-founded. Other authors who dealt with the theme of
Accounting Uniformity included: Enthoven (B: 1973), Felt (B: 1968). Lowe (B: 1967). and
Savoie (B: 1969). The research methodology pursued by most of these authors was
descriptive and normative, relying on archival texts in support of the author's conclusions.
4.2.2. Comparative studies
Even though there was a general focus on achieving accounting uniformity, it became
clear that there was also a need to explain differences in financial accounting practices,
particularly among advanced industrial nations (B: Kollaritsch. 1965: B: Davidson and
Kohlmeier. 1966: B: Hatfield. 1966). Several authors attributed these differences to
environmental factors. Among the factors identified w ere differences in culture and economic
systems (B: Choi. 1973a.b: B: Mueller. 1968: B: Clapp, 1967: B: Davidson & Kohlmeier.
1966: B: Tyra. 1469). These authors also primarily used descriptive methodologies.
4.2.3. Reflections on the IAH process
There were also a number of articles which reflect on the impediments to achieving
international harmonization during this Initial Penod of IAH research (B: Hauworth, 1973:
B: Mueller. 1965. 1967. 1970: Seidler. 1967). Among the impediments identified was the
linkage between financial accounting standards and tax laws in main countries. These
reflections often included recommendations pertaining to the creation of one set of inter-
nationally recognized accounting principles as a necessary pre-requisite to achieving
international harmonization. See Table 2 for a summary of the IAH research published in the
Initial Penod.
4.2.4. Research methodologies used during the Initial Period
For the most part, the research methodologies used during the Initial Penod were
descriptive in nature, relying on subjective analyses of archival textual materials as support
for recommendations and conclusions. Of the 21 articles identified dunng the Initial Period,
only three article^ 1 14%) used empirical methodologies where the researcher collected data
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Table 2
Themes in 1AH research during the Initial Period: 1965-1973
Theme Articles (see Appendix B) Number of papers
Accounting uniformity
Comparative studies
Reflections on the 1AH process
Totals
Alhashim and Garner (1973), Beazley (1968),
Enthoven (1973). Felt ( 1968), Lowe ( 1967),
Morgan (1967). Savoie (1969). Wilkinson (1965)
Choi (1973a,b), Clapp(l967),
Davidson and Kohlmeier 1 1966), Hatfield 1 1966),
Kollaritsch (1965). Mueller (1968), Tyra (1969)
Hauworth (1973), Mueller (1965, 1967, 1970).
Seidler(1967)
Descriptive:
Empincal:
Sub-total:
8
8
Descriptive:
Empirical:
Sub-total:
5
3
8
Descriptive:
Empirical:
Sub-total:
5
5
Descriptive
Empirical:
Total:
IS
3
21
and tested hypotheses using statistical methods. These three articles were authored by
Davidson and Kohlmeier (B: 1966) and Choi (B: 1973a) in the Journal oj Accounting
Research; and Choi (B: 1973b) in The International Journal ofAccounting. These three
articles provide some evidence regarding the emerging influence of the Journal oj
Accounting Research within empirical accounting research and the influence of The Journal
ofInternational Accounting in international accounting research generally (see Table 2).
4.3. IAH research during the Intermediate Period: 1974-19H9
After the creation of the IASC in 1973, several new themes emerged in IAH research.
These new themes included: a focus on the creation of a Conceptual Framework for
international accounting standards-setting as a means of fostering greater international
harmonization; investigations of Factors ofthe Environment as a way to explain differences
in accounting practices; discussions about the IASC as a way of enhancing the IAH process;
and studies of the harmonizing effects of the Accounting Directives issued by the European
Union. Some of these themes, such as the Conceptual Framework, reflected similar
developments in standards-setting in the United States under the newly created FASB. In
Europe, there was a growing interest in studying the effects of the Accounting Directives
issued by the European Commission.
4.3.1. Continuing theme: Accounting uniformity
The continuing theme of Accounting Uniformity focused on the achievement of greater
levels of international harmonization, with the eventual goal of achieving uniformity in
accounting practices. Among the authors who addressed this theme were: Bromwich
(B: 1980), Fitzgerald (B: 198?), Nair and Frank (B: 1981 ). Dopunik (B: 1987). Van derTas
(B: 1988). From the standpoint of methodology, Bromwich (B:1980) used an analytical
modeling technique to examine international accounting harmonization. Van der Tas
(B: 1988) introduced the use of the Herfindahl index to measure the extent of accounting
homogeneity in different countries. However, in the other papers, the research method-
ologies were primarily descriptive and normative.
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43.2. New theme: Conceptual framework
The idea of creating a conceptual framework to facilitate accounting harmonization was
present in both the practicing and academic accounting literature in the United States for many
years, extending to at least the work of Patton and Littleton ( 1940). The American conceptual
framework was established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board ( FASB) over a seven-
year period between 1978 and 1985. With regard to international harmonization, Peasnell
(1982) argued for the creation of a conceptual framework for financial accounting in the United
Kingdom, and he felt that this should be extended to the international accounting standards-
setting arena as well. Later, DePree (B: 1989) analyzed the structure of the FASB's conceptual
framework and discussed its potential applicability to international accounting standards-setting.
Other authors who investigated conceptual framework as a basis for achieving international
harmonization included: Previts(B: 1975),Frank(B: 1979), Baxter (B: 1981).Nobes(B: 1981),
Choi and Bavishi (B: 1982). Violet (B: 1983), Aitken and Islam (B: 1984), Taylor (B: 1987).
Most of these authors used descriptive and normative techniques in pursuing their research
rather than collecting empirical data and testing hypotheses. An exception was DePree (B: 1989)
who used an analytical modeling technique to investigate the conceptual framework.
4.3.3. Continuing theme: Comparative studies
A number of IAH research articles were published during the Intermediate Period which
compared accounting practices in different countries. Similar to the Initial Period, it was
believed that accounting uniformity would emerge through a better understanding of
differences. For example, Barrett (B: 1976) measured the degree of financial accounting
disclosure by 103 companies in seven countries: Germany, the United States. France, Japan,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden. He analyzed annual reports from 1963 to
1972 and concluded that the financial disclosure of English and American companies was
more complete than in the five other countries. Comparisons between IAS and US GAAP
also became common during this period. For example. Rivera (B: 1989) compared IASsand
their American equivalents. For Fitzgerald (B: 1981), Choi and Bavishi (B: 1982) and
McComb (B: 1 979), the reduction ofthe differences was considered to be essential to the IAH
process. Using the C index of conservatism, Gray (B: 1980) estimated the impact of
differences in accounting standards on various measures of company performance. The
identification of differences in financial performance alerted researchers to the possibility of
studying relationships between capital market variables and accounting practices in the
international setting. Other researchers who pursed this theme included: Burnett (B: 1975),
Benston(B: 1976),Bnston(B: 1978), DaCosta, Bourgeois and Lawson(B: 1978). Evans and
Taylor (B: 1982). Nobes (B: 1983). Goodrich (B: 1986). Chow and Wong-Boren (B: 1987),
Puxty. Willmott. Cooper and Lowe (B: 1987), Wallace (B: 1988), Biddle and Saudagaran (B:
1989), Cooke (B: 1989). and Rees and Sutcliffe (B: 1989). Many of these researchers used
more rigorous research methodologies than previously, which involve the collection of data
and the testing of hypotheses. Examples of these more rigorous studies included: Barrett (B:
1976), Choi and Bavishi (B: 1982). Gray (B: 1980), and Nobes (B: 1983).
4.3.4. New theme: Factors of the environment
During this period, two primary factors in the environment were hypothesized to explain
differences in accounting practices in different countries: the cultural factor and the
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economic factor. The impact of culture was the subject of research by various authors who
used the cultural frameworks of Hofstcde ( 1980) and Gray (B: 1988) to analyze differences
between countries. Cultural variables also interested Violet (B: 1983) who attributed the
relative lack of success of the IASC to cultural factors. Belkaoui (B: 1983) viewed language
as a variable and studied the impact of language on accounting practices. Jaggi (B: 1975),
Radebaugh (B: 1975). Ndubizu (B: 1984), Schweikart (B: 1985), Taiga and Ndubizu
(B: 1986), and Nair and Frank (B: 1980) also analyzed the impact of culture on accounting
practices in various ways, including both empirical and descriptive methods.
The impact of economic factors on accounting differences was investigated by several
authors. Gray (B: 1988) and Perera (B: 1989) concluded that international harmonization of
accounting practices depended not only on the level of regulation within an economy, but also
on macro-economic factors. Chow and Wong-Boren (B: 1987) analyzed micro-economic
factors that impacted on accounting choices and the financial reporting practices ofcompanies.
Some researchers went further by proposing a classification scheme for countries according to
economic factors in the environment. For example. DaCosta et al. ( B: 1 980) analyzed a number
ofeconomic factors influencing the accounting practices of various countries. They developed
a classification scheme to differentiate countries according to these economic factors. From a
methodological perspective most of the research within this theme was descriptive, however,
there was a notable increase in the use of empirical methods, including the papers by Belkaoui
(B:1983). Nair and Frank (BT980), and Chow and Wong-Boren (B:1987).
4.3.5. New theme: The I.4SC
There were two primary sub-themes within this new theme addressing the IASC. The first
sub-theme focused on histories ofthe IASC, and the second sub-theme dealt with International
Accounting Standards (IAS).^ Shortly after the creation of the IASC, histories of the IASC
began to appear. For example. Lord Benson, who was instrumental in creating the IASC,
produced two histories of its founding (Lord Benson, 1976, 1989). Cummings(B: 1975) also
discussed the background and origins of the IASC. Baxter (B: 1 98 1 ) offered an analysis of the
history, advantages and disadvantages of IASs. He also explained the international standard-
setting process and he expressed concerns about the slowness of the process. Other research
following this theme included: McKinnon and Janell (B:1984) and Wyatt (B:I989). From a
methodological standpoint all of the research in this area was descriptive and normative.
4.3.6. New theme: Accounting directives
One ofthe primary reasons for the founding ofthe European Economic Community'1 (EEC)
was to create a free market for goods and services throughout Europe. The EEC also wanted to
establish a uniform set of commercial laws to facilitate the creation of a common market. This
led to the issuance of Accounting Directives which were intended to produce a uniform set of
accounting standards among the member states ofthe European Union. Initially there was little
interest on the part of accounting researchers in studying the Accounting Directives. This may
have been because British and American researchers in the 1970s and 1980s did not believe
that harmonization of accounting standards in the European Union was achievable, and
Now International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
Today the European Union.
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therefore they did not focus on this subject. Nevertheless, this theme eventually came to be of
great interest to accounting researchers. For example, the 4th Accounting Directive issued in
1 978 dealt with valuation rules, financial reporting standards, and annual reporting obligations.
The origins of this Directive, dating from 1971, lay in German corporate law. Valuation rules
were conservative and financial reporting standards were detailed. The entrance of Denmark.
Ireland and the United Kingdom into the European Community led to a modification ofthe 4th
Directive in 1974 in the direction of greater flexibility. The 4th Directive also introduced the
concept of the "true and fair view" into European accounting standards-setting (B: Nobes,
1993). Burnett (B: 1975) surveyed the extent of harmonization achieved through the
Directives, especially the 4th Directive. Also. Turley (B: 1 983) discussed the impact of the 4th
Directive on European corporate law. From a methodological perspective, all of the articles in
this theme used descriptive and normative methods.
4.3.7. Summary of the research themes and research methodologies used during the
Intermediate Period
In comparison with the Initial Period (1965-1973). the Intermediate Period (1973-1989)
was characterized by an increase in the volume of research (46 articles versus 2 1 in the Initial
Period). There were also more research themes. In addition to the recurring themes of
Accounting I 'niformity and Comparative Studies there were several new themes, including:
the Conceptual Framework; Factors of the Environment; the IASC; and studies of the
European Accounting Directives. These new themes reflected the growing interest in
empirical research on the part of American accounting researchers. Of the 46 articles
published during the Intermediate Period. 14 (30%) were empirical studies versus 14% in the
Initial Period. However, there were still 32 (70%) articles which used primarily descriptive
or normative approaches to IAH research. The principal journal for the publication of IAH
research during the Intermediate Period was The International Journal ofAccounting, which
published 22 (49%) of the 46 papers. The two most important outlets for empirical research
were the Journal of Accounting Research (5 articles) and The Accounting Review (5 articles).
No other journal published more than two articles focusing on IAH research during the
Intermediate Period. See Table 3 for a summary of the research articles in this period by
theme.
The following section will discuss the Mature Period of IAH research (1990-2004).
4.4. IAH research during the Mature Period: 1990-2004
At the end of the Intermediate Period ( 1 974-1989) there was still a lack ofharmonization
of accounting practices on an international basis. This prompted IAH researchers to
investigate more thoroughly the factors that caused differences in accounting practices and
to conduct their research in a more rigorous manner. Some authors developed ways to
classify countries empirically according to their accounting practices. Others investigated
correlations between environmental factors, such as economic and cultural variables, and
different practices. A new theme emerged during the Mature Period which involved the
investigation of relationships between differences in accounting practices and share-price
returns in international capital markets. Another new theme measured the extent of IAH
using various economic and statistical indices.
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Table 3
Themes m IA11 research during the Intermediate Period: 1974 19X9
Continuing themes New themes Articles (see Appendix B) Number of
articles
Accounting
uniformity
Comparative
studies
Conceptual
framework
Factors of the
environment
Reflections on the
IAH process
Totals
The 1ASC
Accounting
directives
Bromwich (1980), Nair and Frank (1981),
Dopumk (1987), Van der Tas (1988).
Previts (1975). Frank ( 1479), Nobes (19S1 |,
Aitken and Islam 1 19X4). I.i\ lor (1987),
DePree(1989)
Barrett (1976). Benston (1976). Bnston (1978),
DaCosta,, Bourgeois and Lawson (197S).
McComb (1979), Gray (1980), Fitzgerald (1981 1,
Choi and Bavishi (1982), Evans and Tayloi 1 1982),
Nobes (1983). Goodrich (1986), Puxty, Willmott,
Cooper and Lowe (1987), Wallace (1988),
Biddle and Saudagaran ( 1989). Cooke (1989),
Rivera ( 1989), Rees and Sutcliffe (1989).
Jaggi ( 1975). Radebaugh ( 1975). DaCosta,
Bourgeois and Lawson ( 19X0),
Nair and Frank (1980),Violet (1983).
Belkaoui (1983). Ndubizu (1984).
Schweikart (1985), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987).
Talaga and Ndubizu (1986), Gray (1988),
Perera (1 989).
Cummings (1975). Baxter (1981).
McKinnon and Janell (1984). Wyatt (1989)
Burnen(1975), McComb (1982).
Turley(1983)
Descriptive
Empirical
Sub-total
2
2
4
Descriptive
Empirical:
Sub-total:
3
3
6
Descriptive
Empirical:
Sub-Total:
11
6
17
Descriptive
Empirical:
Sub-total:
3
12
Descriptive 4
Empirical:
Subtotal: 4
Descriptive: 3
Empirical:
Sub-total: 3
Descriptive: 32
Empirical: 14
Total: 46
4.4.1. Continuing theme: Accounting uniformity
Using an interview approach involving Sir Bryan Carsberg, the General Secretary of the
IASC, Schweikart, Gray, and Salter (B:1996) presented normative arguments in favor of
accounting uniformity, which included: the increasingly globalized nature of business
activities; the needs of the common market within the European Union; the increasingly
globalized nature of capital markets; the privatization of many formerly public enterprises;
and the need to reduce the costs of financial reporting. The importance of a conceptual
framework in achieving accounting uniformity was investigated by Brown and Tarca
(B: 2001 ). who compared the conceptual frameworks of the American. British, International
and European standards-setting bodies. The normative arguments for greater accounting
uniformity also led to strategies to increase international harmonization. Goeltz (B: 1991)
considered international harmonization to be virtually impossible to achieve, but other
authors focused on the importance of preserving the process towards increased
harmonization and achieving eventual uniformity. Wallace (B; 1990) analyzed the external
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Table 4
Themes in IAH research during the Mature Period: 1940-2004
Continuing New
themes themes
Articles
(see Appendix B)
Number of
papers
Descriptive: 1
5
Empirical: 8
Sub-total: 23
3
22
25
Accounting Wallace ( 1 990), Goeltz ( 1 99- 1 ), Purvis et al. ( 1 99 1 ). Descriptive: 1
7
uniformity Chandler (1992). Wolk and Heaston (1992). Empirical: 1
Van Hulle (1993), Most (1994), Ijiri (1995), Sub-total: IS
Kenny and Larson (1995), Adams et al. (1993),
Cairns ( 1997). McGregor (1999). Brown
and Tarca (2001 ). Booth (2003). Dean
and Clarke (2003). Jones and Wolmzer (2003).
Standish (2003), Barker (2004)
Comparative Bhoocha and Stansell ( 1990). Meek and
studies Saudagaran (1990). Nobes ( 1990).
Biddle and Saudagaran ( 1991 ), Choi and Levich (1991),
Cooke (1993), Grove and Bazley (1993),
Frost and Pownell (1994), Yang and Lee (1994).
Boross et al. (1995), Roberts et al. (1996).
Schweikart et al. (1996), Zambon (1996),
Adhikan and Emeyonu (1997). Bamiv and
Fetyko (1997), Sutton (1997). Nobes (1998).
Street and Shaughnessy ( 1998). Street and
Gray (1999), Ding et al (2003).
Maines et al (2003. 2004). Tarca (2004)
Impact on Meek (1991), Amir et al. ( 1993). Descriptive:
share prices Pope and Rees (1992). Bandyopadhyay et al (1994). Empirical:
and returns Harris et al. (19941. Barth and Clinch (1996). Sub-total:
Rees and Elgers (1997). Hams and Mueller (1999),
Adam, Weetman and Gray ( 1 993 ).
Alford el al (1493). Hellman (1993),
Rahman et al (1944). Saudagaran and Meek (1997).
Weetman et al. (1998), Aboody et al (1994).
Pownall and Schipper ( 1999). Guenther
and Young (2000). Hung (2000). Schipper (2000).
Asbaugh and Pincus (2001 ). Asbaugh
and Olsson (2002). Dumontier
and Raffoumier (2002), Bhattacharya et al. (2003),
Leuz (2003), Bradshaw et al. (2004)
Factors of the Cooke and Wallace (1990), Perera and Mathews (1990), Descriptive:
environment Tay and Parker ( 1990). Weetman and Gray ( 1940). Empirical:
Riahi-Balkaoui and Picur ( 1991), Wallace and Sub-total:
Gernon (1991), Ndhui/.u ( 1992). Ahadiat and
Stewart (1992). Fechner and Kilgore (1994).
Perera ( 1 944). Baydoun and Willett (1995).
Hoarau (1995). Nobes (1995). Van der Tas (1995),
Hussein (1996). Taylor-Zarzeski ( 1996), Doupnik and
Salter ( 1995), Craig and Diga (1996),
Luther (1996), Sudagaran and Diga (1997),
Flower (1997), Sailer (1998). Williams (1999).
Ali and Hwang (2000). Parker and Morris (2001 ).
HassabElnaby et al. (2003), Hope (2003a.b).
Evans (2004). Meek and Thomas (2004)
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Table 4 (continued
)
Continuing
themes
New
themes
Articles
(see Appendix B)
Number of
papers
Accounting
directives
Measures of
the extent of
harmonization
Implementation
oflASIFRS
Total
Walton ( 1992). Emenyonu and Gray ( 1992).
Nobes ( 1 993). ZetT ( 1 993 1. 1 lopwood ( 1 994 1.
Theumsse ( 1994). Herman and Thomas ( 1995),
Diggle and Nobes (1994). Thorell and
Whittington (1994|. E\ans and Nobes (I99S).
Combarros (2000), Waller (2002)
Tay and Parker (1992), Van der las (1992a,b),
Vrcher ct al ( 1 99s. 1946k Dopunik and Salter (1995).
Lainez et al. (1996. 1999), Knsement (1997),
El-Gaz/ar et al. ( 1999). Cafubano and Mora (2000),
Morris and Parkei (1999), Aisbitt (2(1(11 ).
Oamdo ct al. (2002). Land and Lane (2002),
Taplin (2003, 2("i4i
( ooke 1 1 99 1 1. Rai> (1992), Guenther
and Hussein ( 1995), Glaum (2000).
Street and Bryant (2000), Kakma (2001 i
Chen el al (2002), Ahd-l Isalam
and Weetman (2003 1. Larson
and Street (2(l(i4 1. Xiao el al (2004)
Descriptive
Empirical: 5
Sub-total: 12
Descriptive: I
Empirical 16
Sub-total: IV
Descriptive: 5
Empirical: 5
Sub-total in
Descriptive 68
Empirical: 67
Potal 135
environment of the IASC in order to propose a survival strategy for that body. Chandler
(B: 1992) argued for the acceptance of IASs, while Van Hulle (B: 1993) suggested four
possible ways for the EU to proceed with respect to international harmonization: ( 1 ) stop
harmonization efforts in the EU; (2) allow the IASC to determine the extent of accounting
harmonization within the EU; (3) allow the Americans to dominate the IAH process; (4) call
on the EU to become a more active player in the process. In retrospect, we can see that the
second option was the one that was pursued. From a methodological standpoint, the articles
in this theme continued to be primarily descriptive and normative; only one of the 1 8 articles
used an empirical research methodology (see Table 4).
4.4.2. Continuing theme: Comparative studies
In the Mature Period, a number of researchers compared IAS/IFRS with U.S. GAAP. For
example. Grove and Bazley (B: 1993) compared 20 IASs with their American equivalents.
They also recommended certain accounting treatments which they believed would improve
the efficiency of global capital markets. In addition, they estimated the costs and benefits of
their recommendations. Street and Shaughnessy's (B: 1 998 ) research described the evolution
of accounting standards during the period 1973-1997; they discussed similarities and
differences in financial reporting practices ofthe IASC and the national accounting standards-
setting bodies of the United States, England. Canada and Australia. Nobes (B: 1990)
examined the effects of IASs on financial reporting of American companies listed in the U.S.
capital markets. Because US GAAP is more detailed than IASs: "for a US company that is
obeying GAAP, it is very difficult not to comply with IASC standards" (p. 42). Nobes also
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compared U.S. GAAP and IASs and concluded that that the differences between IASs and U.
S. GAAP have little impact on the financial reporting practices ofAmerican listed companies.
Research in this area also indicated a growing convergence between international standards
and American standards. Of the 23 articles included in this theme, eight (35%) were empirical
and 15 (65%) continued to be descriptive or normative (see Table 4).
4.4.3. Continuing theme: Factors of the environment
Before 1990. two factors were identified as being the primary explanatory factors for
differences in accounting practices: the cultural and economic. After 1989, other factors
began to be considered and researchers argued that the diversity of accounting practices was
caused by factors beyond the cultural and economic, including: the historical development of
a nation's economy and its capital markets; differences in legal systems; differences in the
nature of property rights; the size and complexity of companies within a country; the social
climate; the degree of currency stability; the existence of accounting laws; and the
educational system. The studies in this theme can be divided into two categories: studies
emphasizing a single factor; and studies emphasizing a multitude of factors.
4.4.3.1 . Studies emphasizing a single factor. The cultural factor has been one of the most
studied variables to explain differences in accounting practices. Many authors have used
Hofstede's ( 1980) or Gray's (B: 1988) cultural frameworks. For example, Tay and Parker
(B: 1990), Baydoun and Willett (B: 1995) and Hussein (B: 1996) analyzed the accounting
practices of industrialized countries based on cultural factors using the Hofstede framework.
Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (B: 1 991 ) also found that cultural factors explained differences in
accounting practices. These differences were also observed by Taylor-Zarzeski (B: 1996),
who emphasized the importance of cultural variables for differences in financial reporting. In
addition, he pointed out that multinational companies tend to present more information than
national companies.
4.4.3.2. Studies emphasizing a multitude offactors. While various authors (B: Weetman
and Gray, 1990; B: Nobes, 1990) privileged the idea of economic factors as the primary
explanatory reason for differences in accounting practices, Wallace and Gemon (B: 1991)
criticized these conclusions, arguing that there is no precise way to explain the reasons for
differences in accounting practices among countries. The studies of Cooke and Wallace
(B: 1990), Doupnik and Salter (B: 1995), Saudagaran and Diga (B: 1997), Salter (B: 1998),
Craig and Diga (B: 1996), and Williams (B: 1999) also contributed to the analysis of
multiple factors as having an influence on differences in accounting practices.
4.4.3.3. Studies emphasizing political factors. Luther (B: 1996) maintained that political
factors were the primary reason for differences in accounting practices among countries. His
premise was that conflicts exist between shareholders and other parties regarding the
provision of accounting information. Political influences on accounting standards-setting is
therefore inevitable. Consequently, accounting standards-setting can be seen as a political
process where the point of view of the most powerful often prevails. Research in this area
suggests that there has been domination of the 1AH process by the major English speaking
countries. For example, Chandler (B: 1992) examined the connections between IASC and
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IOSCO from a political perspective. Ahadiat and Stewart (B: 1992) looked at the
relationships between the SEC, the European Union and the IASC. Most of these studies
emphasized the influence of American institutions such as the SEC and the FASB on
international accounting standards-setting. Along this line, Hoarau (B: 1995) argued that
international accounting harmonization is a pretence to achieve a consensus around the
Anglo-American accounting model. In a similar vein. Flower (B: 1997) asserted that "for
more than 20 years of the IASC existence, the attitude of the Americans was rather that of
patronage." From a methodological standpoint.
4.4.4. Continuing theme: Accounting directives
Three Accounting Directives were issued during the Intermediate Period of IAH research
(1974-1989), but research pertaining to this theme began only to be significant about ten
years later. The gap between the issuance of the Accounting Directives and researchers'
interest in studying the Directives suggests that researchers were waiting to see the reaction
to the Directives within the European countries. With respect to the 4th Directive, Walton
(B: 1992) sought to answer the question of whether the extent of accounting harmonization
required by the 4th Directive allowed comparability of accounting information among
European countries. Emenyonu and Gray (B: 1992) studied the extent of accounting
harmonization in Germany, France and the United Kingdom. They use two indexes (chi-
square and I) to analyze the annual reports of 26 companies in these three countries. Their
conclusion was that there were significant differences between financial reports issued by
companies in these countries, thus, indicating a lack of harmonization. This lack of
harmonization was also observed by Theunisse (B: 1994) who found differences in financial
reporting practices and discussed the consequences of these differences for financial
statement analysis in three different countries (France, Belgium and Germany). She
attributed the lack of harmonization to the options available under the 4th Directive, as well
as the adaptation of accounting practices to national legislation and the socio-economic
environment of each country. Herrmann and Thomas (B: 1995) studied the impact of the 4th
Directive by adding Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal to Emenyonu
and Gray's (B: 1992) sample. They argued that countries should be divided into two
categories: those with a legal influence (Germany, Belgium, France and Portugal) and those
with an economic influence (Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United kingdom).
The second category was considered to have a greater degree of harmonization than the first
category. Nobes (B: 1993) also examined the introduction of the true and fair view by the 4th
Directive and the effects of this requirement on accounting law and practice in the European
Union. Finally. Zeff (B: 1993) analyzed the connotations implied by the true and fair view.
With respect to the 7th Accounting Directive, Diggle and Nobes (B: 1994) analyzed the
options available under that Directive in order to determine if consolidated accounts lead to
harmonization. With respect to the 8th Accounting Directive. Evans and Nobes (B: 1998)
focused on the development of rules contained in that Directive and examined the
implementation of the Directive in England and Germany. There was also research that dealt
with several Directives simultaneously. Thorell and Whittington (B: 1994) discussed the
development of harmonization under the 4th and 7th Directives as well as under IASs. Haller
(B: 2002) discussed the development of accounting standards in the European Union from
the date of the issuance of the 4th Directive through 2002. Also, Combarros (B: 2000)
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analyzed the evolution of financial presentation practices in the European Union. From a
methodological perspective, research on this theme was about evenly split between
empirical research (five studies out of 12) and descriptive/normative research (seven studies
out of 12)(see Table 4).
4.4.5. New theme: Impact ofharmonized accountingpractices on shareprices and returns
As capital markets have become increasingly globalized there has been a perceived need
for more relevant and reliable accounting information in the international arena. As a result,
securities exchanges have begun to require multi-national companies to prepare their
financial statements in accordance with a recognized set of accounting standards. For
example, companies using IAS/1 FRS who want to raise capital in American capital markets
have been required to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP using SEC Form
20-F. This requirement provided the background for Amir et al. (B: 1993), Pope and Rees
(B: 1993), Bandyopadhyay et al. (B: 1994), Barfh and Clinch (B: 1996) and Rees and Elgers
(B: 1997), and others to study the effects of using foreign GAAP on raising capital in the
United States. For example. Amir et al. (B: 1993) studied the value relevance of accounting
numbers measured in accordance with U.S. and non-U. S. GAAP that were summarized
in reconciliations of earnings and shareholders' equity as required by SEC Form 20-F.
The research question was, do the reconciliations of accounting data from foreign GAAP to
U.S. GAAP increase the associations between accounting numbers and share prices or
returns? The results indicate that the reconciliations of earnings and shareholders' equity are
value-relevant. This finding is important for public policy making and the setting of
international accounting standards because it indicates the value of the reconciliations. In
another study. Pope and Rees (B:1993) investigated the information content of two
alternative accounting earnings measures constructed under U.K. and U.S. GAAP. Their
analysis was based on data in the SEC 20-F filings by UK domiciled companies having
ADRs listed in the United States. The research design involved testing the association
between U.K. stock returns and alternative accounting numbers. The evidence indicated
that U.K. GAAP earnings changes have incremental information content after controlling for
U.S. GAAP earnings changes, but that earnings levels measured under U.S. GAAP also have
independent incremental information content after controlling for U.K. GAAP earnings. The
empirical results were consistent with prior research indicating that GAAP earnings
adjustments add to the ability of earnings to explain share-price returns. From a method-
ological standpoint, research in this area is empirical involving data collection and testing of
hypotheses, typically using theories based on variations of the capital asset pricing model. Of
the 25 articles on this theme. 22 (88%) were empirical (see Table 4).
Other studies on this theme focused on the acceptance of IASs in international capital
markets. For example: Schipper (B: 2000) argued in favor of IASs. but Hams and Mueller
(1999) considered that the Form 20-F reconciliation requirement was insufficient to
determine the degree of compatibility of IAS with U.S. GAAP. As IAH became more
prominent as an area of research, there was a general extension of capital markets research
into the international arena. One of primary questions studied by this line of research was
whether the capital markets could be fooled by the presentation of different accounting
numbers because of the application of different accounting methods in different countries-.
The use of different accounting methods may impact various accounting numbers (e.g..
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earnings, return on assets, return on equity, book value, price-earnings multiple, etc). Using
the conservatism index ofGray (B: 1980), Adam, Weetman and Gray (B: 1993) analyzed the
effects of using IAS on earnings and shareholders' returns. Weetman and Gray (B: 1990) and
Hellman (B: 1993) demonstrated that variations in the degree of accounting harmonization
in different countries can explain differences in the accounting numbers reported by
companies (e.g., earnings). Weetman et al. (B: 1998) also investigated differences in the
measurement of profits by comparing English. American and international standards. The
same kind of diversity was observed by Aisbitt (B: 2001), for whom the harmonization of
accounting standards argued in favor of the harmonization of tax systems. Alford et al.
(B: 1993) also conducted studies of the relationships between accounting methods in
different countries and share prices.
4.4.6. New theme: Measures of the extent oj international harmonization
The general objective of the research conducted on this theme 7 has been the measurement
of the extent of international harmonization of accounting practices. This theme can also be
classified according to the statistical method used to measure the degree of harmonization.
Two types of measures were used: indices and statistical methods.
4.4.6.1
.
Indices. The H index (Herfindahl index) has been used to estimate the degree of
harmonization at the national level, and the 1 index (a variation of the H index) has been used
to measure the degree of harmonization at the international level. These indices were
originally proposed by Van der Tas (B: 1988). Because the I index has certain limits.
Herrmann and Thomas (B: 1995) proposed an alternative — the adjusted I index. However,
because these indices do not allow for complete comparability of financial reporting
practices. Van der Tas (B: 1988) also created the C index which measures the extent of
international harmonization. Van der Tas expanded the C index to take into account the
situation where information published in the footnotes allows reprocessing of data that later
appear in the accounts. Archer et al. (B: 1995) divided the C index into two sub-indexes:
intra-national and international. The C index has been considered to be the most reliable way
of measuring the extent of 1AH, but criticisms have also been levelled against this method.
Krisement (B: 1997) concluded that the number of observations affects the C index. In
addition, he criticized of Archer et al's. (B: 1995) decomposed index because the sum of the
intra-national and the international indices did not equal the global C index. These indices
were also criticized by Canibano and Mora (2000). who noticed the failure to include a
significance measure. In their study, Canibano and Mora used the C index and proposed a
bootstrapping test to calculate the significance ofa change in the C index value. Another test
to measure the extent of IAH was the Wilco.xon test employed by Lamez. Callao and Jame
(B: 1996) and also Aisbitt (B: 2001).
4.4.6.2. Statistieal methods. A chi-square test was utilized by Tay and Parker (B: 1990) to
investigate the extent of international accounting harmonization. Although the chi-square is
easily calculated, it has several limitations because it does not consider the sample size and its
value is not significant when the number of observations is low. To measure the extent of
Reviews of the I iterature on this theme can be found in Moms and Parker ( B : 1 999 ) and (. anibano and Mora ( B : 2( l( It) I
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harmonization in Sweden, Cooke (B: 1989) used Cramer's V test and the coefficient of
contingency (O as a supplement to the chi-square test. Knsement (B: 1997) also applied
Cramer's V test to measure the extent of harmonization of accounting practices in nine
European countries. Another statistical test used to measure the extent of harmonization
involves the generation of linear regression models such as those developed by Archer,
Delvaille and McLeay (B: 1996) and McLeay et al. (B: 1999). Taplin (B: 2003) argued that
the H and C indexes are not adequate to measure the level of accounting harmonization. This
is because there is a significant difference between an index (H or C) calculated for the sample
and an index created for a population. He proposed that the standard error should be used. A
summary of these different methodological approaches is shown in Table 5. Virtually all of the
studies on this theme were empirical ( 16 out of 17 studies total)(see Table 4).
4.4.7
.
New /heme: Implementation of IAS/IFRS in different countries
With respect to the implementation of IAS/IFRS, Glaum (B: 2000) investigated the
evolution of German companies' attitudes towards financial reporting standards over a
period of three years (1994-1997) using an empirical study. The German companies studied
were characterized as having a negative attitude toward British and American standards
(IASs/US GAAP) at the beginning of the study. Three years later, they changed their
attitudes and accepted IASs. The transition to IAS/IFRS has also been investigated in Asian
countries such as Japan and China. For example, Kikuya (B: 2001) discussed the
participation of Japan in IAS/IFRS after 1990. Other studies of this nature included those of
Cooke (B: 1991), Raty (B: 1992), Guenther and Hussein (B: 1995), Street and Bryant
(B: 2000). Chen et al. (B: 2002). Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (B: 2003), Larson and Street
(B: 2004), and Xiao et al. (B: 2004). From a methodological standpoint, the research in this
area was evenly divided between empirical studies (five out often studies) and descriptive/
normative studies (five out often studies)(see Table 4).
4.4.8. Summary of the research themes and research methodologies used during the
Mature Period
In comparison with the Initial Period, and the Intermediate Period, the Mature Period ( 1 990-
2004) was characterized by an increase in the volume of research (21 articles in the Initial
Period. 46 in the Intermediate Period, and 135 in the Mature Period). There were also more
research themes. In addition to the recurring themes of Accounting Uniformity, Comparative
Studies. Factors ofthe Environment, and Accounting Directives there were several new themes,
including: the Impact on Share Prices and Returns. Measures ofthe Extent ofHarmonization
and Implementation of IAS/IFRS. These new themes reflected an even greater increase in the
use of empirical research. Of the 135 articles published during the Mature Period, 67 (50%)
were empirical studies versus 14% in the Initial Period and 30% in the Intermediate Period. Two
new themes in this period, the Impact on Share Prices and Returns and Measures of the Extent
ofHarmonization relied almost exclusively on empirical research (see Table 4).
The principal journals for the publication of IAH research during the Mature Period were
European Accounting Review, which published 26 (19%) of the 135 articles, and The
International Journal of Accounting, which published 25 (19%) of the articles. Other
important outlets were Abacus ( 12 articles). Accounting and Business Research ( 1 1 articles),
lecounting Horizons (II articles) and Journal of Accounting Research (10 articles). In
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Table 5
Empirical studies measuring extent of 1AH and tests used
Authors (see Appendix B) Tests used
H c c„,
, fed I In, icd Others
Van der Tas (1988) X X X
Tay and Parker ( 1 WO, 1992) X ( oncentration index
Van der Tas (1992a. 1992b) X X
Emenyonu and Gray (1992) X X
Archer, Delvaille and McLeay ( l c ' l '^i X
Hermann and Thomas 1 1995 I X \ X
Archer, Delvaille and McLeay (1996) X Linear regression
Lainez. Callao and Jarne ( 199d) X Friedman's test, Wilcoxon s test
Knsement(1997) V index
Adlukan and Emenyonu I 1997) X X
McLeay etal. (1999) Linear regression
Morris and Parker (1999) X \
Lainez. Jarne and Callao ( 1999) X
Cafiibano and Mora (2000) X X Bootstrapping tesl
Parker and Morris (2001) X X X
Aisbitt (20011 X \\ ileoxon's tesi
Chen, Sun and Wang (2002) X
Taphn (2003) X \ Standard error
Ding. Stolowy and Tenenhaus (2011 5
1
Logistic regression
comparison with the Initial and Intermediate Periods, a greater range of journals published
IAH research during the Mature Period: especially interesting is the increase in the number
of articles published by European Accounting Review.
5. Summary of the trends in IAH research and conclusion
In this review article we have discussed research on international harmonization of
financial accounting standards published in major English language accounting research
journals during the period from 1965 to 2004. Our discussion has concentrated on identifying
the trends in IAH research and assessing the ways that this research has grown or been
modified during the period examined. In summary, it can be seen from Tables I, 2, 3 and 4
that there was a significant increase in the number of IAH articles published (from 2 1 in the
Initial Period, to 46 in the Intermediate Period, to 135 in the Mature Period), and a significant
increase in the use of empirical research methodologies (from 12% in the Initial Period, to
30% in the Intermediate Period, to 50% in the Mature Period). There was also an increase in
the number of themes in IAH research, even though some of the themes remained essentially
the same throughout the 40-year period. The various themes have been influenced by
increasing levels of globalization, leading to demands for greater harmonization of financial
accounting standards on an international basis, and by a growing interest in accounting
practices in countries outside of the United States, particularly on the part of capital markets
researchers. Certain key events in the process of international harmonization, such as the
creation of the IASC/1ASB and the Accounting Directives of the European Union have also
affected researchers' interests and the themes that they have pursued.
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During the Initial Period of IAH research (from 1965 to 1973), there was a strong concern
with accounting uniformity, and also with comparing accounting practices in different
countries. There was a belief that by understanding differences in practices, accounting
uniformity could be achieved. It was quickly recognized, however, that there were significant
impediments to achieving accounting uniformity on a worldwide basis due to a number of
factors, including historical, cultural, economic, legal and political factors. The research
approaches during this Initial Period primarily involved the use ofdescriptive compilations of
differences in practices, and normative arguments in favor of eliminating differences in order
to achieve the goal of accounting uniformity. After the creation of the IASC, in 1973, the
interests ofresearchers began to shift towards an investigation ofthe reasons for differences in
practices as well as advocating for the creation ofa conceptual framework that would be able
to reduce or eliminate accounting choices. Various attempts were made to increase
harmonization of accounting practices among countries, including the creation of the IASC
Framework (1979), and the agreement between IOSCO and the IASC that the IASC would
establish a core set ofaccounting standards that could be used in international capital markets.
These events marked the beginning ofa more Mature Period ofIAH research (1990-2004) in
which there began to be more rigor in the research, often borrowing methodologies from
American empirical research. IAH research during this more Mature Period focused on
comparisons between IAS/IFRS and U.S. GAAP, including capital markets effects, and
explanations for differences based on cultural, economic and other factors. This led to studies
which statistically measured the extent of international harmonization. The changes in the
trends in IAH research over the 40-year period examined are summarized in Table 6.
While uniformity of accounting standards has not yet been achieved, there is now a
greater degree of accounting harmonization among industrialized countries, especially in
countries that follow IAS/IFRS. Future IAH research will most likely focus on questions that
can be answered through the use of empirical methodologies like those that have used in the
major North American accounting research journals during the last 25 years. Tables 1. 2. 3,
and 4 indicate that there has been an increased use of empirical research methodologies over
the 40-year period studied. These tables also indicate that, while there has been a divergence
in the themes of IAH research, there has also been methodological convergence. Future
research will probably focus on attempts to measure the extent of compliance with IFRS in
different countries. It is also expected that there will be an increased level of rigor and greater
Table 6
Themes in IAH research 1965 2(1(14
Initial Period 1465 1473 Intermediate Period 1974-19X4 Mature Period 1990-2004
Accounting uniformity Accounting uniformity Accounting uniformity
Conceptual framework Conceptual framework
Comparative studies Comparative studies Comparative studies
Factors of the environment Factors of the environment
Comparisons of the value relevance of IAS versus
US GAAP
Reflections on the Studies of the Studies of the accounting directives
IAH process accounting directives
The IASC Measures of the extent of harmonization
Implementation of IAS IFRS in different countries
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use of theory in future research. The themes that were apparent in IAH research during the
Mature Period will most likely continue. In conclusion, IAH research appears to have moved
beyond Falk's ( 1994) criticism that most international accounting research lacked rigor and
an adequate theoretical underpinning. Hopefully these trends will continue.
Appendix A. English language accounting journals selected for review
Name Date of inception
Abacus 1 965
Accounting and Business Research 1 970
Accounting Historians Journal 1977
Accounting Horizons 19X7
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 1987
Accounting. Business and Financial History' 1990
Accounting. Organization and Society 1976
Advances in International Accounting I9S7
Behavioral Research in Accounting I9S9
Contemporary Accounting Research 1 984
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1990
Journal of Accounting and Economics 1 979
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 1 9X2
Journal of Accounting Literature 1 9X2
Journal of Accounting Research 1963
Journal of Accounting. Auditing and Finance 1977
Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting 1 969
Journal of International Accounting. Auditing and Taxation 1 942
Journal of International Accounting Research 2000
Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 1989
The Accounting Re\ iew 1 926
The British Accounting Review 1 974
The European Accounting Review 1992
The International Journal of Accounting 1965
Adapted from: Lowe and Locke (20051 and Prather-Kinsey and Rueschhoff (2004).
Appendix B. List of IAH research articles
Abd-Elsalam. O. H., & Weetmar, P. (2003). Introducing International Accounting
Standards to an emerging capital market: relative familiarity and language effect in Egypt.
Journal ofInternational Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 12, 63-84.
Aboody, D., Barth, M., & Kasnik, R. (1999). Revaluations of fixed assets and future
firm performance: Evidence from the UK. Journal <>/ Accounting and Economics, 26,
149-178.
Adams, C. A., Weetman, P., & Gray, S. (1993). Reconciling national with international
accounting standards. European Accounting Review, 2(3), 471-494.
Adhikari, A., & Emenyonu, E. (1997). Accounting for business combinations and foreign
currency translation, an empirical comparison of listed companies from developed
economies. Advances in International Accounting, 10, 45-62.
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Ahadiat. N.. & Stewart. B. R. (1992). International geographic segment reporting
standards, a case for the harmonization of accounting and reporting practices. The
International Journal ofAccounting, 27, 45-56.
Aisbitt. S. (2001 ). Measurement of harmony of financial reporting within and between
countries, the case of the Nordic countries. European Accounting Review. 10(1). 51-72.
Aitken. M. I.. <k Islam, \1. A. (1984). Dispelling arguments against International
Accounting Standards. The International Journal ofAccounting, Spring. 25-45.
Alford. A.. Jones. J.. Leftwich. R.. & Zmijewski ( 1993). The relative informativeness of
accounting disclosures in different countries. Journal of Accounting Research. 31
(Supplement). 183-223
AJhashim, D. D.. & Garner. S. R (1973). Postulates for localized uniformity in
accounting. Abacus. June. 9( 1 ). 62-73.
All. A.. & Huang. L. (2000). Country -specific factors related to financial reporting and
the value relevance of accounting data. Journal oj Accounting Research. 38. 1-21.
Amir. E.. Hams. T. S.. & Venuti. E. K. ( 1993). A comparison of the value-relevance of
US versus non-US-GAAP accounting measures using form 20-F reconciliations. Journal of
Accounting Research 3 I (Supplement). 230-264.
Archer. S.. Delvaille. P.. & McLeay, S. (1995). The measurement of harmonization and
the comparability of financial statement items, within-country and between-country effects.
t i minting anil Business Research. 25(98). 67-80.
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A bstract
This study analyzes the difference in earnings quality between public and private firms in Spain.
We go beyond the income-increasing incentives on which the United States debate has been
exclusively based and build on previous Belgian results by considering institutional differences and
differences in the type of blockholder and by proposing a new income-smoothing methodology
No significant differences are found for income smoothers and increasers except for those
included in the Spanish Ibex 35 index, which show lower manipulation lex els due to the
predominance of supervision over market pressure. Higher levels of income decreasing are found for
private companies. We attribute this to the expropriation practiced by public firms through real
activities in their relationship with the banks, which leads to a lower need to engage in downwards
manipulation.
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1. Introduction
This paper tests whether there is a difference in the earnings quality of public vs. private
firms in Spain. We first build on previous United States references that have widely
signalled market pressure as the main driving force of higher income-increasing
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manipulation practices among public companies and we argue that this is not sufficient to
explain the situation in less market-dependent economies.
In Spain, where most funis are privately held, the public/private debate is still an
interesting one because public companies face great social, political, and media supervision
and the different position of shareholders in the outsider/insider dichotomy creates a
divergence in agency relations and information asymmetries between the two groups. Spain
is a typical code-law country, where the presence of banks, not only as general providers of
external finance, but also as key blockholders of many public companies, affects their
interest in accounting information. Moreover, given that certain types of practices (income
smoothing and income decreasing) have been defended in recent papers as highly typical of
code-law countries (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003: Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma, & Mora,
2005; Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma & Mora, 2006), we extend our analysis towards a wider
variety of incentives than those (almost exclusively limited to income increasing) discussed
in the U.S. case.
The only results published so far, for a similar continental European context, on this
public/private manipulation debate are those of Vander Bauwhede, Willekens, and
Gaeremynck (2003) for Belgian firms. For this reason, and following encouragement from
these authors, ' we take their paper as a direct reference, considering the differences between
the Belgian and Spanish cases. First, from an institutional point of view, both countries have
high ownership concentration, somewhat higher in Belgium than in Spain. Additionally,
banks have a much greater presence as blockholders of listed companies in Spain, so an
interesting research question is whether differences in the type of blockholder could be
affecting the results.
Second, the Belgian study fails to separate income smoothing from income increasing
and decreasing (their vision of smoothing is based solely on the fact that income increasing/
decreasing is practiced by the majority of below/above-target firms), so they do not carry
out a test of the conflict in a real smoothing scenario. Our study includes such a test by
proposing an alternative methodology that defines the smoothing area more precisely,
based on the argument that not all above/below-target companies necessarily have
earnings-stabilizing intentions. We establish smoothing limits that are based on the distance
between post-managed (reported) earnings and our reference target (prior year's earnings)
and consider that increasing/decreasing actions are restricted to observations outside these
limits. We then formulate the public/private hypothesis for three (and not only two)
different manipulation scenarios: income smoothing, income increasing and income
decreasing.
Finally, their study matches public and private firms by using a similar number of
companies in both groups which makes it more difficult to generalize results for a
population where the vast majority of firms are privately held (Vander Bauwhede &
Willekens, 2004). As this same situation occurs in Spain, our sample tries to represent the
population better by including a much greater proportion of private firms.
Belgian law is representative of the French family of law systems We believe, therefore, that the hypotheses
we derive can he tested in other continental European countries that belong to the same class of accounting and
family of law systems such as Spain. France. Portugal. Turkey, Italy, etc (Vander Bauwhede el al . 2003, p 4|.
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We develop a multivariate model regressing earnings quality on a public/private
dichotomous variable and several control factors. Earnings quality is measured using
discretionary accruals obtained from the Modified-Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, &
Sweeney, 1995).
Descriptive statistics reveal that below (above) target firms mostly engage in increasing
(decreasing) actions, respectively, and that both types of incentives coexist with income
smoothing in Spain.
No significant differences arc found between public/private income smoothers, denoting
that stakeholder pressure on private firms to stabilize their earnings is similar in strength to
that found in public firms. The latter are clearly influenced by banking regulation that
penalizes both their income volatility and that of their subsidiaries.
Results also reject the existence of differences in income-increasing practices. The
higher dependence of private Anns on banks as creditors forces them to increase reported
numbers to influence contractual outcomes. In the public case, although less pronounced
than in the United States, there is still some kind of market pressure that maintains earnings
levels in Spain. Although the Belgian study also fails to find income-increasing differences,
which they attribute to lower market pressure than in the United States, we further replicate
our analysis by sub-periods and by sizes and find that, when dealing with only very large
companies, lower levels of upwards manipulation are found for the public group. This
denotes that the cost-benefit of manipulation is, for the most relevant listed Spanish
companies (those included in the Ibex 35 Spanish index out of a total of 150 listed firms),
clearly influenced by a stricter scrutiny of market regulators and analysts and by higher
reputation costs. We also find that firms in the Ibex 35 index show lower levels of
manipulation than a parallel group of smaller listed firms. Thus, it seems that different
behaviors could exist even within the public group, reflecting the relevance of this type of
index in code-law stock markets.
As regards income-decreasing actions, higher levels are clearly associated with private
companies, in line with results presented for the Belgian case, which they attribute to high
earnings levels that result in wage-increase demands from employees and higher taxation.
Accepting expropriation of outsiders as a widespread managerial practice in Spain, we
propose an alternative explanation based on the argument that public firms cany out this
expropriation basically through real activities in their relationship with the banks and. thus,
have a much lower need to engage in income-decreasing practices. Contrary to the Belgian
findings, we do not find differences in income-decreasing practices for the above-target
firms that lie inside our smoothing limits.
Our results are robust to several tests like the assignment of non-smoothers as income
increasers (decreasers) independent of their previous above (below) target status, the use of
two alternative earnings-management models (Cash Flow and Accounting Process
models), or the inclusion of post-managed (reported) earnings instead of pre-managed
earnings when controlling for profitability.
This study contributes to the public/private manipulation debate by presenting evidence
for a European context where a different set of arguments is needed to that normally
employed for the United States case. The fact that most firms are privately held in Spain,
that a special relation exists between public companies and institutional blockholders, and
that income-decreasing and smoothing actions are engaged in much more frequently than in
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the I 'nited Suites, turns the debate into a much more complex and interesting one. We also
extend the only results previously published for a similar code-law country (Belgium) by
considering the possible effects ofthe different types ofpublic blockholders and by treating
income smoothing as a manipulation action that is independent of income increasing or
decreasing. As the Belgians limit then analvsis to the last two options, our paper contributes
by testing public private smoothing differences lor the first time.
Finally, we find different beha\ iors within the public group. Contrary to what happens in
the United States ease, tor relevant indexed companies the supervision factor seems to be
more influential than market pressure, leading to lower upwards manipulation than for other
linns. This stratifying behavior within listed linns has not been reported before.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how to deal with the
public/private conflict in code-law countries life Spain In Section 3 we review the
literature and theories about the different manipulation incentives that coexist in Spain and
we develop hypotheses on the public/private conflict for our three different incentive
scenarios. Section 4 includes the research methodology, sample, and descriptive statistics.
In Section 5 we present the mam results and. finally, the summary and conclusions appear
in Section 6.
2. The public/private conflict in code-law countries
J / Accounting manipulation in code-law countries
Research debates about the two offset forces that dine the public/private accounting-
quality conflict in the United States seem to agree that market pressure is stronger than
supervisory regulation and explains evidence of higher levels of earnings manipulation
among public finns (Klassen. 1997; Mikhail. 1997; Beatty & Harris. 1998; Beatty. Ke. &
Petroni, 2002). This argument, however, does not hold when institutional differences lead
to the emergence of alternative incentives in less-market-dependent economies like those of
some European countries. Whether, in these contexts, the public private conflict is still an
interesting debate requires a wider variety of arguments than those simply based on market
pressure.
Recent literature not only finds that code-law countries show higher levels of earnings
manipulation (Burgslahler. Hail. & Leuz, in press; Hung. 2001; Leuz et al., 2003) but also
that several specific incentives like income smoothing oxpayout-driven income decreasing
are more commonly practiced in some European countries than in the United States (Ball.
K.othari. & Robin. 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; Garcia Lara et al., 2005, 2006).
Most companies in code-law regimes are privately held' and although empirical
research (following the United States model) has usually been limited to public companies,
the study of how management incentives affect private companies is essential (Ciarcia
Osma, Gill de Albomoz, & Gisbert, 2005) and still not well documented (C'oppens & Peek.
2005). It is only recently that some papers have recognized the role of private companies in
Europe and the need to extend accounting-quality studies to them (Burgstahler et al.. in
Private firms constitute the majority of the EU economy and the ELI market foi audit sen ices (Van [endeloo
& Vanstraelen, 2oos>
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press; Coppens & Peek, 2005; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2005, Peek, Cuijpers, &
Buijink, 2006)/ This emerging interest not only keeps the public/private discussion alive
but also makes it more relevant than in the United States.
The possibility of a difference between the earnings quality of the two groups relies on
the fact that, although few in number and not submitted to as much pressure as in the United
States, listed companies in continental European countries arc socially and politically
relevant, suffer from higher media supervision and reputation costs and their ownership
structure presents some unique attributes that might condition their manipulating behavior.
The evidence that public/private firms respond differently to institutional factors
(Burgstahler et al., in press) justifies the comparison of their manipulation levels in a
European code-law context (Spain) in which, with the exception of the Belgian case, no
previous evidence exists.
2.2. The Spanish case compared to the I 'nited States <///</ Belgium
Spain is a typical code-law regime with remarkable institutional differences compared to
the United States. Stock markets are far less developed. Only an average of 1 50 firms have
been listed on the interconnected (continuous) market in the period 1996-2002, which
gives a number of 3. 75 per one million inhabitants as compared to 30.1 in the United States.
The ratio of market capitalization to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during this period was
71.47. compared to 82 in the United States. As expected in any relationship-based financial
model, banks are a major source of business finance in Spain. Bank loans to the private
sector (measured as the ratio of claims of deposit money banks over GDP in the year 2000)
was 1.012 and 0.493 in Spain and the United Slates, respectively (Rajan & Zingales, 2002).
Important differences are also found in legal protection and judicial enforcement. An
indicator of the rights that minority shareholders have to challenge incumbent managers
(Laporta, Lopez, Shleifer, & Wishny, 1998) shows a high score of five for the United States
compared to a mere two for Spain. Litigation risk is almost non-existent in Spain.
Most arguments regarding the public/private conflict in the United States are, in fact,
debating about ownership concentration. Despite the fact that concentration levels in Spam
do not reflect the public/private conflict so well (concentration levels are high both for
public and private companies), a special kind of shareholder is found that drives incentives
differently. Whereas most private companies are family-owned or subsidiaries of
multinationals, blockholders of listed companies are mainly of an institutional character
like banks or savings banks, which makes Spain a very interesting case (Casasola & Tribo,
2004).'
In fact, most United Suites research highlighting the relevance of market manipulation incentives lias been
carried out using only public linns, which is logical as the economic role of private firms is quite low
Peeket al. (2006) highlight the importance of the difference between closely/widely held public companies lor
a proper understanding of agency conflicts.
During the last decade. Spain has witnessed the liquidation of former public monopolies where the Stale has
been substituted by institutional investors, mainly banks, that have established stable cores promoted, in part, by
the Spanish government to maintain their national character. A recent example of this is the debate that arose alter
Spanish Gas Natural and German E On launched a public offei foi ill outstanding shares oi the Spanish electricity
company Endesa
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For a general sample taken from the Spanish Sabi database, an average of25% of public
firms have a bank as one of their two largest shareholders, whereas for the private group this
is only true for 6%. Because banks in Spain also act as representatives of important
percentages of stocks in the hands of individuals or investment funds, the same as described
for Germany (Kdndgen, 1994), it is clear that they will typically dominate voting rights in
listed companies and their simultaneous roles as managers, supervisors and reference
creditors will create different types ofinformation asymmetries than those affecting private
firms.
The presence of a bank as the main blockholder has been interpreted in terms of
willingness to expropriate the minority. Casasola and Tribo (2004) demonstrate that
Spanish banks expropriate wealth from minority shareholders, and find a negative effect on
a firm's return when a bank becomes its main shareholder. In Germany, Goergen,
Rennebog, and Correia (2003) also find that firms whose ownership structure includes
banks, pay lower dividends, which they take as a signal of expropriating intentions. The
interest of banks in their insider business, even at the expense of their subsidiaries, will
make accounting numbers less informative.
The tact that Spanish banks act as main blockholders in many public companies could be
considered a unique characteristic even with respect to Belgium, the only other code-law
country for which results on the public/private manipulation debate have been published so
far. Vander Bauwhede et al. (2003) find no income-increasing differences and a higher
tendency of private Belgian firms to practice income decreasing, but their hypotheses are
simply based on market-pressure arguments. Ownership concentration is somewhat higher
in Belgium than in Spain. Property owned by the largest three shareholders is 60% vs. 50%
(Laporta et al., 1998), but the percentage of banks as blockholders of Belgian public firms is
only 3% (Goergen & Renneboog, 2000). Therefore, an interesting research question is
whether both the slightly higher concentration level and, especially, the type of blockholder
are affecting the results of the public/private manipulation debate.
At the same time, and though operating in a market with lower pressure, the small
number of companies listed in Spain is submitted to important social, political, and media
supervision which leads to serious reputation costs but, at the same time, maintains a certain
avoidance of reporting low-earning figures.'' The fact that, in code-law countries like Spain,
strictly controlled indexes are created for a reduced number of relevant, listed firms means
that this confrontation between pressure and supervision could be also dependent on
membership in the Spanish Ibex 35 index.
The literature on ownership structure has recently broadened its main focus by
considering not only agency problems between managers and shareholders but also
between large and minority shareholders (Bloch & Hege, 2001; Gomes & Novaes, 2001,
etc.). In fact, the extension to an outsider's vs. insider's vision of the conflict proposed by
Leuz et al. (2003) seems perfect to represent what happens in Spain. For public firms,
insiders (including managers and banks, both as blockholders and creditors) use their
The Spanish National Stock Exchange Commission, which is the Spanish Slock Exchange regulator
ci|ui\alcnt to the SEC in the United States of America, keeps an Official Register of audited annual accounts.
freely accessible to the public through the internet Access to private companies' accounting information is more
costlv and difficult to obtain.
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control over the firm to benefit themselves at the expense of outsiders (minority owners and
the other stakeholders). For private firms, banks, acting only as creditors, are part of the
outsider group which increases their demand for relevant accounting information. The
existence of this double scenario not only keeps the public private conflict alive but also
forces us to look for more specific incentives or accruals to test for differences in accounting
quality.
3. Different types of incentives coexisting in Spain. Development of hypotheses
The stakeholder model typical of low -enforcement countries like Spain encourages
certain kinds of manipulation. Leuz et al. (2003) find that earnings management is more
pervasive in countries where legal protection of outsiders is weak (continental Europe and
Asia) because insiders enjoy greater private control benefits and have stronger incentives to
obfuscate firm performance. Similar evidence is obtained by Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen
(2005) for a sample of private European firms and by Burgstahler et al. (2006) for a
combination of public/private firms in which they confirm the central role of enforcement
mechanisms over financial-reporting practices. These references provide evidence of higher
lev els of manipulation but do not investigate whether they are increasing or decreasing or
the varied incentives that might be driving them.
Building on this evidence, Garcia Lara et al. (2005) provide consistent arguments that
explain why continental European managers persistently engage in more income-
decreasing strategies: existing links between reported income and current payouts to
different stakeholders, the pecking order theory and the less-pronounced market pressure to
manage earnings upwards. They find that the discontinuity in the earnings distribution on
the positive part of earnings is much stronger for Germany and France than for the United
Kingdom, which is evidence of greater income-decreasing practices. In a subsequent paper.
Garcia Lara et al. (2006) collect evidence (Ball et al.. 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; Bao & Bao,
2004) that firms in code-law countries tend to smooth earnings to a much higher degree
than their common-law counterparts.
A key point for our paper taken from these references (Garcia Lara et al., 2005, 2006) 7 is
that two different types of incentives (income decreasing and income smoothing) are
broadly accepted to coexist in continental countries like Spain, so it will be necessary to
analyze their effects separately. Based on some national references (Azofra. Castrillo, &
Delgado. 2003; Gallen & Giner, 2005), we extend our analysis to include a third incentive
(income increasing) and present separate hypotheses (H2 and H3) for below (above) target
firms whose increasing (decreasing) manipulation practices lie outside the limits of what we
consider real income smoothing, to which we devote Hypothesis 1
.
Burgstahler et al. (2006) explore the interaction between market forces and several
institutional variables and find that some of their effects (e.g., book-tax alignment, outside
investor protection, etc.) are mitigated by the market, improving the quality of earnings in
Garcia Lara et al (2006) use this argument as a base on which to analyze the opposite effects of these two
manipulating actions on earnings conservatism (an alternative dimension of earnings qualitv ) and find that
income-decreasing incentives dominate those of income smoothing. They argue that managers would choose
different time frames and types of accruals to achieve each of these objectives
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listed firms. Their manipulation variables are, nevertheless, taken from a very general point
of view and do not permit a segregation of the analysis into the three separate types of
incentives.'
3.1. The income-smoothing hypothesis
Beidelman (1973) defined income smoothing as an attempt on the part of the firm's
management to reduce abnormal variations in earnings to the extent allowed under sound
accounting and management principles. This definition has been subsequently extended to
include GAAP departures (Gallen & Giner. 2005).
In a review of smoothing methodology, Moses (1979) classifies approaches as one-
period (annual) and multi-period, the former trying to identify smoothing attempts and the
latter whether smoothing had been achieved in the long run.
Annual approaches are based on the redirection of pre-managed earnings towards a
certain target. The income-smoothing hypothesis is defined as the propensity of managers
to increase (decrease) reported earnings when pre-managed earnings are below (above) the
target. Among the possible targets, lasl year's earnings is the most commonly tested
(Vander Bauwhede et al., 2003) but other references like median sector data, analysts'
forecasts, etc., have also been used (DeFond & Park, 1997; Gill de Albomoz & Alcarria,
2003).
Bao and Bao (2004) point out two reasons why the study of income smoothing has been
more successful than that of other forms of earnings management: its more precise
definition and the success in differentiating between smoothers and non-smoothers. The
hypothesis behind many annual studies that all firms above (below) a target necessarily
have smoothing intentions is not a particularly precise point of view. Building on Garcia
Lara et al. (2005, 2006), we argue that important incentives other than income smoothing
(e.g., reducing payout levels) could be hidden in such a broad vision of the term.
Prior efforts to analyze the factors affecting income smoothing have been confined to
listed firms (Healy, 1985; Gaver, Gaver, & Austin, 1995; DeFond & Park, 1997; Chaney,
Jeter, & Lewis, 1998; Young, 1998), but it makes sense to extend this strategy to the private
group, especially if we consider previous references to the higher level of income
smoothing in code-law countries. This extension is supported by Trueman and Titman
(1988) who link income stability with the claimholder's perception of firm risk, thus
reducing the firm's cost of capital.
In fact, some of their institutional factors li's . hook-lax alignment) are more related to income-decreasing
practices than to a real idea of smoothing
One of the most widely used income-smoothing indicators in the multi-period approach is the comparison ol
the coefficient of variation of a period change in earnings with the coefficient of variation of a period change in an
alternative measure that is apparently free of manipulation, like sales or operating cash How (Albrecht &
Richardson. 1990; Booth et al., 1996; Mtehelson et al, 1995, 20(1(1. Bao & Bao. 2004. Generating sales is a real
economic activity and so the variability of earnings will be smaller than that of sales for an income smoother
( Imhofl. I MX 1 1 Other studies have used correlation levels between operating cash How and accruals based on the
idea that a negative value is always expected because of the role of accruals, but an excessively high negative one
will he the consequence of accruals being discretionary.
I Amedo el ul The International Journal oj Accounting 4: (2007) 305 32S 313
As we remarked in Section 2. banks have a special relationship with public companies in
Spain, enjoying a privileged position on their boards of directors and acting simultaneously
as reference creditors. Considering that bank-leverage regulations penalize bank-income
volatility and, consequently, that of their subsidiaries (Ball et al., 2000; Garcia Lara et al.,
2006), and that Spanish analysts will still positively assess earnings persistence to a certain
extent, we should expect that listed firms would engage in greater smoothing actions to
reach these persistence objectives.
An alternative theory (Trueman & Titman, 1988) relies on creditors also looking at
earnings variability to evaluate the risk levels of their clients, which is a very common
practice in Spain. That would make private firms, whose outsider bank creditors suffer from
greater information asymmetries, more dependent on earnings as a signalling device and,
hence, willing to smooth their earnings to a greater extent. An empirical question is. then,
which of these opposite effects prevails and whether a first-order market effect exists on
income-smoothing practices in Spain. Our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1. Spanish companies (public and private) engage in real income-smoothing
practices but no significant difference exists in the level practiced by both groups.
This first hypothesis was not separately tested in the Belgian study (their vision of income
smoothing was based solely on the fact that income increasing/decreasing is practiced by the
majority of below/above-target firms), so they do not carry out a test of the public/private
conflict in a real smoothing scenario. Our study includes such a test by proposing an
alternative methodology that defines the smoothing area more precisely, arguing that not all
above/below-target companies necessarily have earnings-stabilizing intentions.
3.2. The income-increasing hypothesis
Although not as clearly as in the Anglo-Saxon literature, where extensive empirical
research evidences that income-increasing practices are mainly the consequence of market
pressure (Albarbanell & Lehavey, 1999; Burgstahler & Eames, 1999; Degeorge, Patel, &
Zeckhauser, 1999; Payne & Robb. 2000). some papers defend that listed firms could have
incentives to increase earnings in Spain too (Azofra et al.. 2003; Gallen & Giner, 2005). It is
an open question whether a real smoothing intention could be behind this increasing
behavior, but it seems reasonable to think that, although less pronounced, some kind of
market pressure might still prevail that forces public firms to opportunistically increase
earnings with an other than smoothing aim. The lower degree of ownership concentration
could explain this greater pressure and the possibility of obtaining different results than
those from Belgium, where no significant differences were found between public and
private companies in the income-increasing sense.
The important presence of banks as blockholders of public companies will tend,
nevertheless, to reduce the above incentives because access to private-information
channels will lessen the importance of accounting numbers. Neither must we forget that
there are, in Spain, control systems inherent to listed firms: careful supervision from the
National Stock Exchange Commission and analysts (especially for firms belonging to
carefully monitored indexes like the Spanish Ibex 35), free access to their accounting
information through the Internet, and the almost exclusive presence of the Big N audit
314 / Arnedo et al The Internationa/Journal ofAccounting 42 (2007) 305 328
companies. '" Additionally, in the private case, the huge dependence on banks, in this case
as providers of external finance, especially in the short term, will also force firms to
increase reported numbers to influence contractual outcomes.
If we compare the situation with the United States, it seems reasonable to expect lower
levels of income increasing in public companies, which will make it more difficult to find a
difference between public and private companies in Spain.
Regarding the Belgian results, it is an open question whether the higher pressure derived
from the slightly lower concentration lev els could be stronger than both public supervision
and the incentives of private companies. However, we find it reasonable to think that
the differential role of banks as blockholders of public companies will make private
firms practice upwards manipulation to a greater extent. Our second hypothesis is, there-
fore, that:
Hypothesis 2. For below-target firms, income-increasing incentives other than income
smoothing are greater for private than for public Spanish companies.
3.3. The income-decreasing hypothesis
The literature clearly suggests that income-decreasing practices are common in code-law
countries but not that these incentives are exclusive to public firms. Laporta, Lopez,
Shleifer. and Wishny (2000) argue that listed firms in these regimes have more incentives to
present high payout ratios as a signal of a lower expropriation, which explains the use of
income-decreasing actions to achieve them. Building on the evidence presented by
Casasola and Tiibo (2004), we agree with this payout incentive but argue that, in Spain, the
power of banks will allow this type of expropriation to be achieved through real activities
(e.g., higher interest rates and commission costs imposed on their subsidiaries), making
income-decreasing practices unnecessary for public firms.
Arguments regarding tax minimization, used by Vander Bauwhede et al. (2003) to
justify differences in the Belgian case, propose that a direct relation exists between book-tax
alignment and manipulation levels but that public firms are less sensitive to it (Burgstahler
et al., in press). Recognizing that accounting numbers have a strong dependence on tax
legislation in Spain," we argue that tax-saving intentions are not exclusive to private firms
but that public companies could be achieving them through a more efficient use of timing
differences, that is, without the cost of penalizing their reported earnings.
The expropriation arguments above lead us to expect greater lev els of income decreasing
among private firms. Both the maintenance of a certain market pressure and the higher
supervision inherent to public firms (National Stock Exchange Commission, higher
presence of Big N auditors, etc.) would reinforce arguments supporting our expectation.
According lo the National Stock Exchange Commission, about 85% of Spanish public companies arc audited
by a Big N (94% in the case of rums in the Ibex 35 index) this percentage is much lower in the private case
(around 20% according to Arnedo, Lizarraga, & Sanchez, 2006).
" In Spam, all entries m the hooks are relevant lot lav purposes with the exception of permanent and timing
differences
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which is. then, similar to the one proposed for the Belgian case, but based on reasons that go
beyond both mere tax minimizing incentives or the lower market pressure.
Hypothesis 3. For above-target firms, income-decreasing incentives other than income
smoothing are greater for private than for public Spanish companies.
4. Research design, sample and descriptive statistics
4.1. Reference target, pre-managed earnings ami incentives other than smoothing
We use last year's earnings as our target as it fulfils the condition that firms try to meet a
simple benchmark (Burgstahler & Dichev. 1997; Payne & Robb, 2000: Vander Bauwhede
et al„ 2003). Following recent studies (Young, 1998; GUI de Albornoz & Alcarria, 2003),
we define pre-managed earnings as current year's reported earnings minus discretionary
accruals, the latter used as our earnings-management measure. Our earnings variable is
ordinary income after taxes, that is, excluding extraordinary items.
Recent annual studies link the existence of income smoothing merely with the practice of
income increasing/decreasing by firms below/above a target (Young, 1998; Gill de Albornoz
& Alcanna. 2003; Vander Bauwhede et al.. 2003). The use of such a broad definition of the
term "smoothing" leads to two kinds of problems. First, firms whose earnings variation
increases instead of diminishing (the distance to the target is greater after manipulation) will
not show a real smoothing intention. Second, firms that, even when reducing the distance,
show incentives other than smoothing will not be properly controlled. Confining the target
distance to a limited interval in accordance with a more credible smoothing aim will permit us
to analyze the smoothing behavior and other manipulation incentives, separately.
We establish smoothing limits based on the distance between post-managed (reported
earnings) and our reference target (prior year's earnings) and test the increasing/decreasing
hypotheses using only observations outside these limits under the argument that
manipulation incentives other than smoothing clearly exist in Spain and that it is necessary
to analyze their effects on the conflict separately.
To test HI. an income smoother is identified when post-managed (reported) earnings lie
inside a confined distance (percentage) above/below the target. We test intervals of 20%,
10% and 5% around our prior year's earnings target. H2 and H3 are consequently restricted
to what we call non-smoothers, that is. firms above (below) target whose post-managed
(reported) earnings lie outside these ranges.
4.2. Earnings-management measure
The Modified-Jones model is used to obtain discretionary accruals and pre-managed
earnings. Dechow et al. (1995) propose a modification of the original model (Jones, 1991)
that regards revenues as entirely non-discretionary. They first estimate coefficients for the
original model and then apply them to the following version:
TA„
_ fJREV,,
- ZIRECV
, - Po + P\ ~,
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where TA represents total accruals computed as the yearly change in current accruals
(change in current ordinary assets, except for cash, minus the change in current ordinary
liabilities) minus fixed assets amortization. REV represents revenues; PPE is gross property
plant and equipment; AREC represents the change in accounts receivables. A is total assets,
used to deflate all the variables in the model to control for scale effects. Discretionary
accruals are obtained as the error term of the above regression
4.5. Sample selection
We estimate cross-sectional versions of the Modified-Jones coefficients for each
industry (two-digit Spanish C.N.A.E.) and year combination. To do so, we take all the
available industrial and commercial firms from the period 1996-2002 that include a clean
audit opinion as an approach to the "absence of earnings management" assumption. 1 "
For the testing of our hypotheses, we construct a second sample where we relax the clean
audit opinion requirement but force private firms to have minimum total assets similar to
those from each year-sector combination of public firms.
This testing sample has a total of 46, 1 3 1 firm-year observations, (745 of them for public
firms) with a minimum of 4.863 in 1998 and a maximum of 5,856 in 1999. It is trimmed to
exclude extreme values of absolute signed discretionary accruals (scaled by lagged total
assets) greater than one.
4.4. Multivariate model
To capture a first-order market effect on our three different types of manipulation
incentives, we develop the following OLS multivariate model that regresses the value of
discretionary accruals on a 0/1 dichotomous variable (PUBLIC) that captures the private/
public status of the firm.
DA„ SIZE,, LEV,,
= al + x2PUBLIC„ + x3 + a4-
h i Au i Aji—\
GROWTH,, ROA„
,
+a5 1- a6— h c„.
Au-[ Ajt-\
For the test of HI. discretionary accruals (DA) are taken at absolute value because the
income-smoothing action and not the direction of manipulation is the important point of
study. Results are presented for each of the target distance intervals (20%, 10% and 5%)
that we use to confine the boundaries of what is considered real income smoothing.
Assuming that the narrower the range, the better the definition of smoothing, a tendency
These sampling criteria give us a final sample of 79,51 1 firm-year observations, varying from a minimum of
8,419 in 1996 to a maximum of 14.1 S3 in 2002. The sample is trimmed to exclude the l"o of the observations
with the highest and lowest values of some variables, depending on the model estimated.
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in the coefficient should be observed along the three intervals in the test of our first
hypothesis. For H2 and H3, that is, for increasing (decreasing) incentives other than
smoothing, discretionary accruals are, logically, regressed at the signed value.
Several additional variables are introduced to control for firm characteristics for which
prior research suggests an association with earnings-management levels. The effect of SIZF
Table 1
Descriptive statistics ol the tesl and control variables lor below above-target firms
Mean SD p.25 Median p.75 \ f-statistic (p-value)
Panel A. Distributional statistics and univariate differences between public/private firms whose pre-managed
earnings are above lasi year's earnings (all above-target firms)
DA
Public -0 084 i) 103 114 0.060 0.023 312 3 832
Private -0.114 0.13° o 158 0.079 - 0.030 17,086 0)000)***
LEV
Public 0.570 0.261 ii )70 0.570 n 770 312 9.056
Private 0.711 l)2
_
4 Drill 0.760 0.950 17,086 (0 00(1)***
GROWTH
Public 0.076 (i 236 -0.035 oik,; 0.168 312 1.719
Private II 103 0.273 0.008 0.090 0.213 17,086 (0.085)
SIZE
Public 4X24 ii 899 4 240 4 MO 5.396 312 16.393
Private 4.174 0.690 3.780 4 142 4 547 17,086 (0000)***
R( > 1
Public 0.063 0.054 1)034 01152 00S1 312 o 848
Private 0.060 0.075 0.029 054 OOXs 17,086 (0 390)
Panel B. Distributional statistics and univariate differences between public/private firms whose pre-managed
earnings are below last year's earnings (all below -larger firms)
DA
Public 0.085 0.118 0.021 050 0.105 370 5 197
Pri \ ate 0.133 178 0.026 0.077 0.1 82 17,530 (0.000)***
LEV
Public 0.587 0.254 0.410 o 580 0.770 S70 1041
Private 0.731 0.262 0.560 0.790 0.960 17,530 (oooo)***
GROWTH
Public 0.047 0.243 024 061 0. 1 5
1
370 o 820
Private 01,0 312 -0.054 0.067 0.200 17.530 (0412)
SIZE
Public 4.922 oooo 4 394 4 966 5.491 370 22 XX
Private 4.090 0.687 3 706 4.095 4.487 17.530 (0.000)***
ROA
Public 0.052 0.063 1)020 040 070 370 4.65
Private 032 0.084 0.005 0.034 004 17.530 (0 000)***
The initial sample comprises 46. 1 3 1 industry-level observations tor the period 1 996 2002. The sample is trimmed
to exclude extreme values of absolute discretionary accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) greater than one
Definition of variables: DA: signed discretionary accruals obtained using the Modified-Jones model, scaled by lagged
total assets. LEV: financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. GROWTH: annual increase in sales
SIZE: logarithm of revenues for the fiscal year. ROA: pre-managed ordinary income calculated as reported ordinary
income minus discretionary accruals obtained from the Accounting Process model, sealed by lagged total assets
"'Significant at the 0.01 level ( /--value 0.01)
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is controlled for by using the logarithm of revenues for the fiscal year. Political cost
hypotheses suggest thai large firms arc more controlled by the public and government, so it
is to be expected that they will engage less in earnings-management practices (Moses.
I9N7). We include a financial-leverage variable (LEV total debt to total assets), since
access to different corporate financing alternatives depends on agency costs and
asymmetric information (Rajan tV; Xmgales. 1995). GROWTH is defined as the annual
increase in revenues ami we expect it to increase the level of total accruals and. hence, the
possibilities of manipulation. ROA is pre-managed yearlj return on assets measured by
ordinary income minus tax and discretionary accruals. We choose pie-managed instead of
reported earnings because a /we- and not a /JO.sr-reference is the one driving manipulation
forces. In order to avoid correlation derived from the use of the same accrual measure for
both the dependent and independent sides of the model (backing-out problem. I.im &
Lustgarten. 1998), we obtain discretionary accruals from an alternative earnings-
management model (Accounting Process, Garza-Gomez, Okumura, & Kunimura, 1999)
when creating this proxy lor pre-managed earnings as a control variable in the model.
Expected relations for each of these control variables will differ depending on each of
the three hypotheses, so we will consider them in the interpretation of our results.
4.5. Descriptive statistics
Table I presents descriptive statistics lor above (below) target observations in public ami
private linns ami a /-test lor mean differences between the two groups. Supporting the broad
\ ision ol the income-smoothing definition and similar to DeFond and Park ( 1 997) and Gill de
Albomoz and Alcanna (2003). discretionary accruals arc overwhelmingly negative for the
above-target group (percentile 75 is 0.023 and -0.030 for public private firms, respectively,
panel A) and positive for below-target firms (percentile 25 is 0.021 and 0.026 for public
private, respectively, panel 1?) We can also observe that all public firms are significantly
greater in size ami less leveraged than private ones, but significant differences in profitability
are only found lor below-target firms. No differences are found in their growth levels.
Table 2 presents additional descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals for all above
ami all /u7<m-target firms (panel A) and for smoothers, above-target non-smoothers and
below-target non-smoothers (panels B, (' and D) foi each of the target intervals used in
our definition of income smoothing. We also present a /-statistic that tests whether
discretionary accruals are significantly different from zero.
We can observe that similar values of discretionary accruals are found in all
distributions, denoting the existence of important levels of manipulation (in all cases
significantly different from zero) throughout all the panels of the table. This is a sign that
manipulation actions (other than smoothing) are taken in both the increasing ami decreasing
sense by Spanish companies.
I he last row in each section of the table {Alt. smoothing measure) presents values for the
cross-sectional ratio of the standard deviation of ordinary income (ROA) over the standard
deviation of operating cash llow (O(T). which we present as an alternative measure of
income smoothing I lie lowest values found in the smoothers' part of the table (0.425.
0.430, and 0.41 I. panel B) support our restricted approach as a more adequate vision of
income smoothing.
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Tabic 2
Descriptive statistics on discretionary accruals
All above target All below target
Panel A. Distributional statistics and /-test of discretionary accruals for those firms whose pre-managed earnings
are abosc below last scar's earnings
DA (signed value) Percentile 25 -0.157 0.026
Percentile 50 -0.078 0.076
Percentile 75 -0.030 ll I Ml
/-statistic (p-value) (0.000)*** (oooo)***
N 1 7.39S 17.4(111
Alt. smoothing measure 0.628 492
Panel B. Distributional statistics and /-test of discretionary accruals for income smoothers
Target interva 20% Target interval- III",, large! inierval = 5%
DA (absolute value) Percentile 25 0.030 1131 0.030
Percentile 50 0.071 0.070 070
Percentile 75 0.142 I3X ii 138
(-statistic [0(11 10)*** (0.000)*** (0 000)***
(p-value)
N 7044 3759 1896
Alt. smoothing measure 0425 4311 0411
Panel C. Distributional statistics and t -test of discretionary accruals for above-target non -smoothers
Target inter\al = 20",, Target interval=10% Target interva] 5%
DA (signed Percentile 25 -0.162 -0 159 0.158
value) Percentile 50 0.079 -0.079 -0.079
Percentile 75 024 -0 029 OIL1 ')
/-statistic (/i-value) (0 000)*** Hiiiili))*** (0.000)***
N 1 3,8(1
1
15.477 16.427
Alt. smoothing measure 62X 0.630 0.627
Panel D. Distributional statistics and t-test of discretionary ace ruals for below-target non-smoothers
Target interval -20",, Target interval = 10% Target interval 5%
DA (signed Percentile 25 0.025 025 02(i
value) Percentile 50 0.079 0.078 0.077
Percentile 75 0.190 0.185 1X3
/-statistic (/)-valuel (0.000)*** (II 000)*** (0 000)***
N 14.330 10.04(1 16.992
Alt smoothing measure 4X9 0.490 49 1
The initial sample comprises 46, 1 3 1 industry-level observations for the period 1 996 2002 The sample is trimmed
to exclude extreme values of absolute discretionary accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) greater than one
DA: discretionary accruals obtained using the Modified-Jones model, scaled by lagged total assets.
Alt. smoothing measure: alternative smoothing measure, calculated as the standard deviation of return on assets
(ROA) divided by the standard deviation of Operating Cash Flow KX'F)
The /-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the mean of DA is equal to zero.
'"Significant at the 0.01 level ( p-value<0.01)
Income smoothers are firm-year observations whose post-managed earnings lie inside intervals of 20",,. 10% and
5% around last year's earnings.
Above- and below-target non-smoothers are firm-year observations whose post-managed earnings lie outside
intervals of 20",,. HI",, or 5",. around lasl seal's earnings
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5. Results
5.7. Results for the income-smoothing hypothesis (HI)
Table 3 presents multivariate results for each around-target interval (20%, 10% and 5%)
that we use in our definition of income smoothing. The coefficient of the PUBLIC variable
is, in all cases, negative but never significant, and its value decreases with the range of
variability (p-value 0.092. 0.382 and 0.552 for the 20%. 10% and 5% intervals,
respectively). So, the stricter the definition of income smoothing, the more we tend to reject
that a difference exists between public and private companies (Hypothesis 1). These results
denote that, for private firms, the pressure from stakeholders to stabilize earnings is not
significantly different to that derived from bank regulation and analysts' perception of stability
in the public case. The tendency found across the three intervals supports the need to
differentiate smoothing from other incentives in the testing of our hypotheses. Results for this
type ofincome-smoothing actions cannot be compared with the Belgian case because they only
show results for the increasing and decreasing hypotheses. However, and as an alternative, we
separately analyze above/below-target firms that lie inside our limits of income smoothing and
find that, contrary to the Belgian study, no differences appear in the decreasing sense.
Table 3
Multivariate regression of absolute discretionary accruals on PUBLIC and control variables for different levels of
income smoothers
|DA„| = a,+ x :PUBLIC„ + a ; LEV„ + 2 5GROWTH„ + x,SIZE„ + z„ROA
Variable
e.s.
Target interviil=20% Target mien al=10u o Target interval = 5%
Coefficients t- P- Coefficients t- />- Coefficients /- P-
estimate statistic value estimate statistic value estimate statistic value
Intercept 0.147 13 810 0.000 0.138 9 684 0.000 0.126 6. 1 89 0.000
PUBLIC - -0.015 - 1 OS 7 0.092 -0.010 -0.875 0.382 0010 -0 544 0.552
LEV + 0056 10.097 000 0.065 8 694 0.000 0.058 5.490 0.000
GROWTH + 0.037 5 052 0000 0.039 3 825 0.000 020 1 338 0.181
SIZE - -0 013 5 342 000 -0.013 - 3 984 0000 0.007 -1.611 0.107
ROA 9 0.288 -12.145 0.000 (1254 -".427 0.000 -0.316 - 6 564 0000
R- 0(146 0.047 0043
N 7094 3759 1896
The table shows pooled estimation coefficients- The initial sample comprises 46.131 industry-level observations
for the period 1996 2002 The sample is trimmed to exclude extreme values of absolute discretionary accruals
(scaled by lagged total assets I greater than one
Definition of variables: |DA|: absolute discretionary accruals obtained using the Modified-Jones model scaled by
lagged total assets. PUBLIC dichotomous variable that takes value one for public firms, zero otherwise. LEV:
financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. GROWTH annual increase in sales. SIZE:
logarithm of revenues for the fiscal year ROA: pre-managed ordinary income calculated as reported ordinary
income minus discretionary accruals obtained from the Accounting Process model, scaled by lagged total assets:
Income smoothers arc firm-year observations whose post-managed earnings lie inside intervals of 20%, 10% and
5% around lasi year's earnings
e.s. = expected sign
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Control variables present significant coefficients that are clearly in line with expectations
except for pre-managed ROA, for which, as a consequence of taking discretionary accaials
at absolute value, both positive and negative signs would be justified.
5.2. Results for below-targel non-smoothers (H2)
Table 4. panel A, presents multivariate results for below-target firms lying outside each
of the three intervals of income smoothing. We find that the PUBLIC sign is negative
(private firms tend to manage more) but never significant (p-value 0.645, 0.834 and 0.962
Tabic 4
Multivariate regression of signed discretionary accruals on PUBLIC and control variables lor above/below-targel
firms that do not engage in income smoothing
DA„ = a, f 3t2PUBLIQ, f ?;LE\ ',, 4 ^GROWTH,, r X|SIZE„ + z„ROA„ I- i:„
Variable e.s. Out of target ( inten al - 20°ol Out of target (interval 10%) Out of target ( interval =
Coefficients t-
5%)
Coefficients l- P- Coefficients t- />- P-
estimate statistic value estimate statistic value estimate statistic value
Panel A. Below-targel non-smoothers
[ntercepl 0.239 26287 0.000 0235 27,735 0.000 0.232 28.086 000
PUBLIC - -0.004 342 645 - 002 0.210 834 000 048 962
LEV + 0.058 10.678 0.000 0.053 10.768 000 0.057 11.764 0.000
GROWTH + 0.030 3 510 1 0.015 3.689 000 016 4.012 0.000
SIZE - 0.015 14 8^8 0.001 -0 028 -14.747 0.000 -01128 15 194 0.000
ROA - -0.871 -53.617 000 -0.882 57 783 000 ONI 5 -57.217 1)000
R2 0.2 03 0207 0.197
N 14.33(1 16,046 16.492
Panel B. Above -target non-smoothers
Intercept -0.033 4 402 0.000 -0.040 5 (.-(i 0.000 -0.042 -6.131 0.000
PUBLIC + 0.014 1 544 123 our 2 008 045 018 2.251 0.024
LEV - -0.087 20 595 0.000 -0.087 -22.184 0000 -0.087 -23.125 0.000
GROWTH + 0.022 5 591 000 0.019 4 423 1)01) 0.016 4 343 I) )
SIZE + 0.003 1 .945 052 005 3.521 I) 000 006 5 W2 0.000
ROA - 0.666 -44.609 0.000 0.659 -46.678 0.000 -0.638 -46 868 0.000
«
:
0.1 38 0.136 0.131
N 13,861 15.477 16,427
The table shows pooled estimation coefficients. The initial sample comprises 46.131 industry-level observations
for the period 1996 2002 The sample is trimmed to exclude extreme values of absolute discretionary accruals
(scaled by lagged lotal assets) greater than one
Definition of variables: DA: discretionary accruals obtained using the Modified-Jones model scaled by lagged total
assets. PUBLIC: dichotomous variable that takes value one for public firms, zero otherwise LEV: financial
leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. GROWTH: annual increase in sales SIZE: logarithm of
revenues for the fiscal year ROA: pre-managed ordinary income obtained as reported ordinary income minus
discretionary accruals obtained from the Accounting Process model, scaled by lagged total assets
Above and below-target non-smoothers are firm-year observations whose post-managed earnings lie outside
intervals of 20" ... 10".. or 5% around last year's earnings.
e.s. = expected sign.
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for the 20" o. 10% and 5% intervals, respectively). An interval effect is also observed
because the greater the non-smoothing area (the better-defined smoothing is), the less
significant the PUBLIC coefficient is, leading us to reject a first-order market effect on
income increasing (other than smoothing) practices in Spain (H2). Lower pressure, typical
of code-law countries, together with the higher supervision and control inherent to public
companies, do not permit us to ratify, as expected, the differences in income increasing
usually found in Anglo-Saxon countries. Our results extend the less-pronounced influence
of the market on income-increasing practices found for Belgian companies by Vander
Bauwhede et al. (2003) to the Spanish case. It seems, then, that neither the level of
concentration nor the type of blockholder (banking vs. non-banking) is strong enough to
affect income-increasing results between these two European countries.
Our Spanish results, nevertheless, show no differences between public and private
companies but not an absence of income-increasing practices, as we have previously seen in
Table 2. We extend the double (income decreasing and income smoothing) vision of
manipulation practices that had been proposed for code-law countries by Garcia Lara et al.
(2005. 2006) and find that private and public companies engage in income-increasing
practices in Spain. In the private case, this is because their higher dependence on bank
creditors forces them to increase reported numbers in order to fulfil the contractual
outcomes that depend on them (especially necessary for low -earning firms). In the public
case, and although less pronounced, some kind of market pressure still seems to prevail in
Spam.
As regards the control variables, a positive sign is consistent with a situation m which
leveraged and growing firms are practicing significantly more income increasing and a
negative sign with one in which firms with higher levels of pre-managed profitability need
fewer income-increasing practices A negative sign is found for size, which is consistent
with expectations, except for the 20"o interval.
5.3. Results for above-target non-smoothers (H3)
Similar multivariate results are presented in panel B (Table 4) for above-target non-
smoothers in each of the target intervals. Coefficients show that, in this case (above last
year's reference), earnings are a less relevant signalling device for private firms as
is reflected by the positive sign of the PUBLIC variable (fewer negative values of
signed DA in public companies). This is significant at the standard levels in two of the
intervals (p-value 0. 123. 0.045 and 0.024 for the 20",,. 1 (')",, and 5% intervals, respectively).
These results are consistent with a situation where market forces are providing a
counterweight to the influence of manipulation incentives in code-law countries, as
Burgstahler et al. (2006) propose, but where their effect is limited to income-decreasing
practices. The results are also in line with the Belgian case. Although they justify their
income-decreasing differences on wage-increase demands from employees and higher
taxation being consequences of high reported earnings in private firms, we propose an
alternative explanation that could also make sense and help us to better understand the
results for the Spanish case. Our argument is that the difference might be more related to the
lower dependence of bank-dominated companies on income-decreasing practices to justify
outsider expropriation. Public firms would achieve this aim more effectively through real
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activities in the relationship between the bank and the firm, which would result in higher
interest rates and commission costs.
Our results would, nevertheless, also support differences either in tax-decreasing
incentives or in tax-decreasing mechanisms. A good way to analyze which of these two
alternatives is prevailing for public firms would be through the level of deferred taxes on
the balance sheet (Cloyd, Pratt, & Stock. 1996; Lev & Nissim. 2002; Erickon, Nalon, &
Maydew, 2004; Holland & Jackson, 2004; Hanlon, 2005), a line which we leave for future
extensions.
The fact that the PUBLIC variable gains significance with the restriction of the
smoothing definition (interval) ratifies the need, pointed out by Garcia Lara et al. (2006)
and Bao and Bao (2004). to analyze the effects of different incentives (i.e., smoothers vs.
other non-smoothers) separately. Otherwise, we could be making erroneous inferences.
Whereas in our study no differences have been found in real smoothing practices of above-
target firms while differences exist in the non-smoothing income-decreasing area, in the
Belgian study, results for both situations were presented as a joint above-target-smoothing
difference.
Control variables are again in line with expectations. The negative sign shows that more
leveraged firms practice more manipulation but a positive sign is found in growth and size.
Finally, the negative significant coefficient found for ROA shows that pre-managed
profitable firms engage in more income-decreasing practices (signed DA) with payout or
expropriation intentions.
5.4. Robustness tests
5.4.1. Differences within the market. The relevance oj the Ibex 35 index
The different size distribution of each type of firm (public firms tend to be larger than
private ones, see Table 1) might also be influencing our results. To better control for this
effect, we create three sub-samples based on total assets (small, medium-sized and large). A
difference emerges for below-target (income increasing) non-smoothers in the group of
largest companies. Large public firms show significantly lower levels of discretionary
accruals, in line with the first-order market effect proposed by Burgstahler et al. (2006).
which was previously found only for income decreasers. This leads us to think that for the
largest and most relevant public companies (those included in the ibex 35 Spanish index out
of a total of 1 50 listed firms) supervision is stronger than pressure and a different behavior is
found. Membership in such type of indexes gives a special status to the firm, considerably
reducing their possibilities for manipulation. This has been ratified by the fact that,
comparing the large vs. small sub-samples inside the public group of companies, in all cases
(income smoothing, increasing and decreasing), significantly lower levels of manipulation
were found for the largest (indexed) listed group. This differentiation between indexed vs.
non-indexed public companies might also be relevant in similar small markets in other
Spanish Inditex is a good example of the market giving preference to supervision over pressure for firms
belonging to the Ibex 35 index. Reported earnings for the first semestei 21103 showed an increase of21% Despite
that, figures were not in accordance with analysts' perspectives and stock prices fell 12%. Obviously, it does nol
seem that the firm engaged in income-increasing actions to stay just below expectations.
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code-law countries and is an interesting topic to study in greater depth as a future line of
research.
5.4.2. Other robustness checks
Our basic results in Tables 3 and 4 could be influenced by several methodological
factors, so in this section we perform additional analyses to assess their robustness. We have
maintained a similar structure as in previous annual-smoothing papers (DeFond & Park,
1997; Gill de Albornoz & Alcairia, 2003; Vander Bauwhede et al., 2003), using pre-
managed earnings as the partitioning variable to classify observations as above (below)
target. However, this procedure could lead to biases because a mechanical association with
our dependent variable (discretionary accruals) could be conditioning the increasing/
decreasing actions found in the sub-samples used for the test of H2 and H3. In the case of
HI (real smoothing purposes), as we use reported (post-managed) earnings to select
smoothing firms, this is not a problem.
Even though our main concern was not to demonstrate the type of actions (increasing/
decreasing) engaged in by above/below-target firms, we have re-estimated the regressions
in Table 4 using all non-smoother increasing/decreasing observations, independently of
their previous below/above-target status. Inferences are robust to this change.
Our sample period is very wide, so we are concerned that differences in macroeconomic
stability might affect our inferences. Albrecht and Richardson ( 1990) state that conclusions
about income smoothing might differ if we choose different periods of time. Although the
Spanish economy was quite stable (with only moderate increases) during the period under
study (1996-2002). the regressions have been re-estimated for sub-periods 1996-97,
1998-99 and 2000-02. The results are not sensitive to this kind of period stratification.
Taking into account that the Jones model used to estimate our discretionary-accruals
measure has been shown to suffer from possible specification problems (Young, 1999;
McNichols, 2000; Thomas & Zhang, 2000; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005, etc.), we have
repeated the analyses using two alternative earnings-management models frequently cited
in the literature: the Cash Flow model (Jeter & Shivakumar, 1999) and the Accounting
Process model (Garza-Gomez et al., 1999). Their use gives results that are robust and
consistent with those previously obtained using the Jones model.
Finally, we carry out a test to control for a possible correlation problem between our
dependent variable and pre-managed ROA as a control variable in our multivariate model
but, as we pointed out in Section 4. the correlation coefficient is within the standard levels
of acceptance. We also re-run the mam regression using reported (post-managed) earnings
as the proxy for profitability levels but it does not affect the sign and significance of our
PUBLIC variable. This new proxy, nevertheless, presents a positive sign, which makes
sense considering the effects of the manipulative actions themselves.
6. Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have tested whether a difference exists in the earnings quality of public
vs. private firms in Spain. The public/private debate is interesting in a code-law country like
this because, although most firms are privately held, public companies face important social
and political pressure and the presence of banks as their main blockholders affects their
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information asymmetries very differently. The fact that recent papers (Garcia Lara et al.,
2005, 2006; Leuz et al., 2003) have shown that certain types of practices (income
smoothing and income decreasing) are more typical of code-law countries redirects the
analysis towards a wider variety of incentives than those (almost exclusively related to
income increasing) discussed in the United States case.
We have built on Vander Bauwhede et al. (2003 ), the only paper that has published results
on the public/private manipulation debate in a similar European context (Belgium), and we
have tried to test for the effect of institutional differences between these two countries. The
Belgian study fails to separate income smoothing from income increasing and decreasing
(their vision of smoothing is based solely on the fact that income increasing/decreasing is
practiced by the majority of below/above-target firms), so they do not carry out a test of the
conflict in a real smoothing scenario. Our study includes such a test by proposing an
alternative methodology that defines the smoothing area more precisely under the argument
that not all above/below-target companies necessarily have earnings-stabilizing intentions.
We then formulate separate hypotheses for three (and not only two) different manipulation
scenarios: income smoothing, income increasing and income decreasing.
We have not found significant differences between public and private smoothers,
confirming that outsider pressure on private firms to stabilize their earnings is similar to that
found in public firms. The latter are clearly influenced by banking regulation that penalizes
their income volatility and that of their subsidiaries.
Our results also reject the existence of differences in the income-increasing practices.
The higher dependence of private firms on banks as creditors forces them to increase
reported numbers to fulfil contractual outcomes. For public firms, some kind of market
pressure, although less pronounced than in the United States, still prevails to maintain
earnings levels in Spain. Although the Belgian study also fails to find income-increasing
differences (which they attribute to lower market pressure in Belgium than in the United
States), we further replicate our analysis by sub-periods and by sizes and find that, when
dealing with only very large companies, lower levels of upwards manipulation are found
for the public group. This shows that the cost-benefit of manipulation is, for the most
relevant listed Spanish companies (those included in the Ibex 35 Spanish index out of a
total of 150 listed firms), clearly influenced by stricter scaitiny and higher reputation
costs.
As regards income-decreasing actions, higher levels are clearly associated with private
companies, in line with the results presented for the Belgian case, which they attribute to
wage-increase demands from employees and higher taxation as a consequence of reporting
high profits. Accepting expropriation of outsiders as a widespread managerial practice in
Spain, we propose an alternative explanation based on the fact that public firms achieve this
aim through real activities in their relationship with the bank, resulting in a much lower
need to engage in income-decreasing practices.
Institutional differences in the degree of ownership concentration and in the public
control of banks between Belgium and Spain do not seem to significantly affect the income-
increasing or decreasing results, but do help us to find alternative and more reasonable
explanations.
We have also found a different behavior within the public group, highlighting the
relevance of the limited group of listed companies that compose specific public indexes in
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some European markets like the Spanish one. Contrary to what happens in the United States
case, the supervision factor seems to be more important than market pressure for these
relevant indexed companies, leading to lower manipulation lex els than for other firms. This
stratifying behavior within listed funis had not been tested before.
Our results are robust to several sensitivity tests but should be taken with caution for
several reasons. First, it will be necessary to look for more specific incentives or accruals
that could reflect the effects of earnings manipulation more precisely. One of the most
important incentives for public firms, impossible to compare with the private group, would
be that of firms meeting or beating analysts' forecasts. Second, data could also be
influenced by the goodness of the discretionary-accruals model applied. We should never
forget the need to continue estimating better models for each context and group of firms.
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Business Research Methods, Boris Blumherg, Donald R. Cooper, Pamela S. Schindler,
McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, UK(2005), \\+ 596 pages+ CD with 281 pages, £34.00,
£54.19, ISBN-10: 007710742X
This book is Boris Blumberg's European version of Business Research Methods by
Donald R. Cooper and Pamela S. Schindler, which was in its eighth United States edition
when this European version was created. Whilst Blumberg is primarily associated with
universities in the Netherlands, his examples are drawn throughout Europe. As well as the
596 pages of text, the book comes with a CD containing a further 281 pages relating to
statistical analysis. Interested readers can consult the comprehensive web site, for both
students and lecturers, which contains information on all the chapters plus nine sets of
resources for students and eight for lecturers (www.mcgraw-hill.co.uk/textbooks/
blumberg).
The first question that such a book presents to the reviewer is why a European edition is
necessary. I have not seen the original United States book, but Blumberg's version makes
the following claim:
"The current text is more than just an adaptation of the original text, however. It
contains completely new chapters, as well as substantially rewritten and rearranged
chapters. Moreover, 25 new exhibits have been added to clarify issues discussed and
new data sets are provided on the accompanying CD-ROM to reflect the European
and international examples used in the book" (p. viii).
1 am not sure that creating a hybrid like this is necessarily the best solution, as it has
never bothered me whether a textbook was a United States one provided the principles
being expounded were equally applicable in the United Kingdom. This is not always
true of books that reflect the institutional and regulatory bodies in the United States, but
in the case of a book on research methods, I am not sure that there is much to be gained
by creating a European equivalent, since research methods are universal. In the
introduction, there is a sense that Blumberg has attempted to soften the positivism of the
United States original and also to focus more on students and academic research instead
of the original focus of the United States text on "research conducted or sponsored by
companies" (p. viii). However, this is only partly successful, because the text is still
primarily aimed at management students who might be expected to need to understand
how to conduct or commission research once they are in senior management positions.
Hence, 1 would not see this as a text book for students pursuing a research career in
academia.
The book consists of 13 chapters with an additional five on the CD-Rom. The book
chapters are grouped into three areas: essentials of research, research approaches, and
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conducting the research. Under the heading essentials of research, there are three chapters:
the nature of business and management research (Ch. 1 ). the research process and proposal
(Ch. 2) and ethics in business research (Ch. 3). There is no discussion of the philosophy of
science, which one might have expected in this section. Thomas Kuhn gets a mention, but
only in relation to "why scientists attack their problems with such passion and devotion"
(p. 26). This omission is presumably because the primary focus of the book is on using
research in a business environment rather than within an academic one. In this respect the
book is much more ofa practical guide on how to undertake business research, without much
theorizing about the nature of the research process and its purpose. Chapter 1 contains a
section on the differences between positivism and interpretivism (with realism being
characterized as somewhere in-between) and a discussion of the difference between
induction and deduction, but little else. Chapter 2 on the research process and proposal
further reveals that the main objective of the book is to provide guidance to managers on how
to use research. A management research question hierarchy is described as follows: ( 1
)
research dilemma. (2) management question. (3) research question. (4) investigative
questions, (5) measurement questions and (6) decision. The second halfof this chapter deals
with the research proposal, which it is assumed is an individual's or company's offer to
produce a product or render a service to a potential buyer or sponsor. Within the proposal, it
is envisaged that there will be a section on the importance and/or benefits of the study. The
book says that "this section also requires you to understand what is most troubling to your
sponsor" (p. 77) and the clear pedagogic message is that sponsored research is designed to
meet the needs of the sponsor rather than producing benefits for the greater good. Chapter 3
looks at the ethics ofbusiness research and makes some sensible comments about the ethical
treatment of participants, including how deception can be used ethically. Given the focus of
the book, the section on potential ethical conflicts between the researcher and the sponsor is
too short. The issue of the sponsor asking for unethical research is broached, but not
discussed in sufficient detail to help potential researchers resolve such awkward situations.
Given that the potential ethical conflicts between researchers and sponsors is a key problem,
it would have been worthy ofmuch more discussion, with at least one case study ofhow such
a problem has arisen in the past and how the researcher chose to act in accordance with his or
her conscience.
The second section on research approaches has six chapters. Chapter 4 discusses the
differences between quantitative and qualitative research and provides a useful taxonomy
of the different ways of conducting research. Chapter 5 looks at the literature review
process, providing a useful overview of the objectives of such a review, together with how
to judge what a "good" literature review is. The last part of this chapter is very helpful and
explains how to search for a subject in the databases available. The book is strongest in the
subsequent chapters explaining how to do research from sampling (Ch. 6), survey research
(Ch. 7), observational, action and ethnographic research (Ch. 8) and experimentation
(Ch. 9). These chapters give a good description of the approaches and I would imagine
would be very helpful for students. Section 3 is equally good at describing how to conduct
research with chapters on: secondary data (Ch 10), measurement and scales (Ch. II).
fieldwork - questionnaires and responses (Ch. 12) and writing up and presenting research
outcomes (Ch. 13). Again these chapters would give students a good idea of how to
undertake research and they contain many practical tips. Chapter 13 in particular has lots of
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handy hints about presenting the results of the research in a way that is interesting to a busy
audience. I think that many people would gain much from reading this chapter, for as the
final sentence says "Good presentations add lustre to both the research and the reputation of
the researcher" (p. 505). My only quibble is that there is nothing on the academic publishing
process. This is such an important topic for would-be academics that some summaries of the
large literature on the subject would have been very useful as the final act of the research
process.
The CD-Rom looks to have been a missed opportunity. Initially, I thought that it would
have some form of interactive material on it so that students could play around with real
data etc. Instead, it looks as if someone has looked at the book with a fourth section
containing the five chapters on statistics and decided that this would make the book too
heavy and simply prepared PDF files of the chapters in exactly the same format as the rest
of the book. Personally I have difficulty reading material from a computer screen and so I
would have to print out these chapters. This is also necessary on the odd occasion when the
landscape setting is used as otherwise the reader would have to angle his or her head at 45
degrees trying to read the screen. The statistical section looks to be competently done, but
whether it would be sufficient I am not so sure. Given the large number of introductory
statistics books available, the CD is unlikely to be used as a primary source, particularly as
the printed version is bulky. One curiosity occurs in Chapter 1 7, where one of the examples
uses the currency of French Francs to discuss the effects of average growing temperature on
the price of Bordeaux wine. In these post-euro days seeing French Francs again was like a
trip down memory lane!
To what extent readers of the book will consult the web site is an open question. The
student site contains some useful material, particularly the excel data sheets relating to
cases in the book, which would allow students to practice analyzing real data. There are
also some interesting case studies that could be used in workshops. I am less clear of the
usefulness of the web-links resource as I would have thought most people would use
Google or its equivalent. The multiple-choice quizzes might be of interest, although some
of the distracters are less than convincing. The crosswords look too sketchy for crossword
enthusiasts and I cannot see them being used much. The password-protected web site for
lecturers contains some useful material. There are plain PowerPoint slides and
PowerPoint "artwork" slides for each chapter that contain many useful diagrams that
can be used to make a lecture more interesting. There are notes on the case studies
contained in the student section plus three different types of question and answers
(multiple choice, short questions and essay questions). These could all be of use to a
time-pressured lecturer.
My overall feeling after reading the book is that it is very' strong on the practicalities of
undertaking research and presenting the results. It would be a strong contender as a course
book for a business research module in an MBA program. However, I miss the more
academic side of undertaking research, such as reflecting on the philosophy of research
and the need to publish the results to a wide audience via international research journals.
For this reason, I would not see the book being used in master's in management programs
that have aspirations of producing future Ph Doctorate students. The back cover of the
book talks of its "unrivalled coverage of the ethical and philosophical dimensions of
research," but 1 did not detect much of this. 1 suspect that this might be Blumberg's
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preferred way of teaching business research, but that he was too constrained by having to
adapt the existing United States text
Peter Moizer
Leeds University Business School. UK
E-mail address: pm@lubs.leeds.ac.uk.
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Best Practice in Corporate Governance: Building Reputation and Sustainable Success,
Adrian Davies, Gower Publishing Limited, Aldershot, Hants, England (2006),
xiv+ 165 pages, £55.00, US$99.95, £81.54, ISBN: 566 08566 6
Corporate Governance is an essential aspect for anyone concerned with the company's
sustainable growth. This book is devoted to identifying the key factors of good
governance, and eventually the best practices. It relies on practical experiences, interviews
and numerous real cases—which are mainly related to United Kingdom settings
—
analyzed in depth. The author points out regularly throughout the chapters several specific-
characteristics that emerge from its analysis of the different cases. And, notwithstanding
the necessary need to implement the different recommendations from reports especially for
the board of directors (such as the Cadbury Report), the relationships with stakeholders,
managers' personal values and leadership style seem to be also key elements of good
corporate governance.
Besides the appendixes, the book has nine chapters divided in two main parts. The first
part ("Organizing for Effective Governance") encompasses four chapters that set what the
author considers the main attributes of corporate governance, whilst the second part is
devoted to "Different Models of Corporate Governance," in the five last chapters.
After a brief overview of the Corporate Governance (hereafter CG) genesis in the United
Kingdom, Chapter 1 emphasizes the need to integrate different stakeholders in the analysis.
The main stakeholders identified— i.e. shareholders, the board of directors, customers,
employees, suppliers, community and the government— are cautiously introduced as the
"interplay of these stakeholders is the theme of this book" (p. 6). The main dimensions ofC( i
are then presented.
Chapter 2 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the distinct approaches CG
models may have, such as rules-based models (e.g., the Cadbury Report) vs. other more
interacting models. In doing so, it exhibits the main features of different governance
regimes (i.e. United States of America. Japan. France, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy,
Spain, Switzerland, Russia. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and China). A
micro perspective then emphasizes the main functions (Finance, Communication, etc.)
within a company that concern CG and the role they may play within CG.
Chapter 3 focuses on leadership, an attribute that should be taken with attention when
considering effective CG. It proposes a typology of five leadership styles, i.e., heroic, crisis,
collegiate, servant, and transformational, and how these styles may impact CG. The
!
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underlying idea is that leadership may facilitate good CG. Hence, the main characteristics
of a good leader are discussed.
Chapter 4 details and defines the key dimensions of CG (i.e., leadership, culture,
structure, processes, and brand of a company). An analysis of the implementation of CG
within the dimensions is also provided, and how they should be integrated within a CG
model to be effective.
Chapter 5 begins the second part of the book by providing a description of five real
cases— i.e.. The Carphone Warhouse, Cobra Beer. Diageo, Scottish and Southern Energy,
BPAmoco—that serve as illustrations of different company models. The cases selected are
generally well presented, with a good description of their activities following the history of
the company, and propose diversified views ofCG models (different industries, countries).
Depending on the case studied, some key attributes are identified such as leadership, re-
sponsible behavior, trust between stakeholders, integrity or particular values from the
founder of Cobra Beer, for example. The author provides a plus with the BPAmoco case, in
the sense it offers paragraphs that propose discussions on specific issues of governance that
BP Amoco faced, and "Implications for the future role of the Board."
Chapter 6 focuses on the specificities of family companies and entrepreneurs in terms of
CG. The two types of company models are analyzed separately. Thus, besides financing
issues, the needs for leadership (i.e., from the founder of the company) but also trust among
stakeholders seem to be the key features of governance for entrepreneurs. Contrary to the
previous chapter, a broader analysis is provided. Several principles of good CG (from the
Nolan Committee) are compared with the characteristics of entrepreneurs. It emphasizes the
difficulty of implementing those principles to entrepreneurship. Hence, and although a new
CG approach is proposed for such a company model, which should lead stakeholders to
support the entrepreneur as well as prompt him to share power, neither precise nor detailed
solutions are given. The second part of the chapter is devoted to family business. The
difficulties of governing such businesses are tackled. It emerges that the Board needs to be
more open to external directors (i.e., non-family members).
Chapter 7 emphasizes the need for companies to integrate, into their CG approach, the
impacts of social responsibility. A case based on Business in the Community, as well as the
Corporate Responsibility Index, illustrates this growing trend in CG. Throughout the
chapter, corporate responsibility, ethical behavior and also, eventually, reputation are
identified as underlying, intertwined components of the firm's social responsibility
("Building a solid reputation among its stakeholders is the way for a company to build
profitability" p. 1 16).
Chapter 8 introduces risk considerations for CG. Yet, the chapter focuses mainly on
money laundering and corruption risks. Organizational, procedural, and financial risks are
ignored. It points out the lack of risk management awareness from numerous companies.
Relying on the case of Hermes Investment Management. Ltd, it proposes to tackle several
principles (respectively financial, communication, strategic, social, ethical and environ-
mental principles) that should be followed in order to help companies gain effective CG.
Lastly. Chapter 9 proposes to investigate the future ofCG. It compares and discusses two
extreme scenarios—among 20 published by Shell in 2002—that could occur in 2020. The
issues on CG attributes (i.e., more specifically board characteristics) are examined in light
of the future supposed changes in the institutional, legal, and economic environment. In
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order to address the issues the different scenarios may raise, several generic and specific
actions (for CG to be effective) are then proposed. For example, generic actions may lake
the form of a Society of Non-executive Directors, or the break-up of big audit firms.
Eventually, the author identifies other aspects which should be accounted for, such as the
necessity to integrate strategy, reputation and risk management into CG. and the need to
focus now on the relationship between shareholders and the board of directors.
Overall, this book provides a rich overview of different CG issues taken from relevant
real cases. The governance issues and the attributes addressing them that have emerged in
the last decade from practitioners and companies are regularly put into parallel with
propositions from diver Reports (i.e., Cadbury, Tumbull, OECD or EU Guidelines, etc.).
Yet, it is difficult to understand what we should conclude from the examples in terms of
good CG. The analysis would ha\ e required a synthesis or at least a comparison among the
numerous cases. Hence, the attributes of good CG may appear ad hoc. and one may
perceive the purpose of the cases as "|ust" providing a list of attributes or identifying some
benchmarks.
The approach is practitioner-oriented, although some concepts are presented also.
Furthermore, the book contains verj few references from corporate governance academic
literature. Its target audience should be. then, more oriented tow aid practitioners—and may
benefit undergraduate students who may gain interesting input from the real-life cases
—
than researchers.
Franck Missonier-Piera
ESSEC Business School. Ave Bernard Hirst h.
BP 50105 - 95021 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, Frame
E-maii address: missoniertoessec.fr.
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International accounting, Timothy Doupnik, Hector Perera, McGraw-Hill Education,
(2007), (Asia) (International edition 2007), xvi+ 640 pages, 09.99, ISBN: 007-125420-X
The title of this book understates the breadth of its coverage. Overall it lives up to the
authors' objective of focusing "on the accounting issues related to international business
activities and foreign operations" (p. v). This is not to say that international accounting in the
narrow sense of international financial reporting standards is not covered, as almost40% ofthe
book is devoted to these. However it is mainly the remainder of the book that captures the
imagination, surveying accounting-related topics affecting the multinational coiporation
(MNC) such as taxation, transfer pricing, strategic-management control issues and
international auditing. The sheer range of topics covered does mean, however, that this is a
book for students already possessing a good accounting knowledge, as will be seen below.
The book does not shy away from the "diversity versus harmonization" tension that faces
' all treatments of international accounting today. An early chapter covers the nature and sources
of international accounting diversity. A clutch of chapters then surveys international
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accounting standards, but still retains a diversity theme by also providing outline comparisons
with U.S. standards. In addition, there is a chapter containing brief (about 12 pages per
country) overviews of accounting practice in five countries selected as being representative of
the major clusters of accounting systems-China, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the United
Kingdom (where, it should be pointed out. pic stands for public, not private, limited company,
seep. 210).
Those standards deemed of special interest to MNCs are dealt with in a fair amount of
detail. These include accounting for foreign exchange transactions and hedging (Chapter 6);
foreign currency statement translation (Chapter 7); and inflation accounting, consolidations
and segmental reporting (all covered in Chapter 8). However, apart from the detailed treatment
of the Chapters 6 and 7 topics, in seeking virtually comprehensive coverage of each
accounting standard the authors have necessarily had to sacrifice much detail, and it is not
always clear what type of readership is being targeted by the resulting summaries of the
standards. Thus, reference will be found to almost all international accounting standards other
than those mentioned above, but often brief in the extreme. IAS 7 Cash Flow Statements, as a
typical example, is given 1 1 lines (p. 140), which enables neither the beginner to learn the
principles nor the advanced student to study the finer details. There is insufficient space for any
discussion of the motivation for or events surrounding controversial standards, such as those
dealing with leasing or intangibles. As a further example, there is a nine-page section on
consolidations (p. 354-363). This contains a clear exposition of the concept of control and
summarizes alternative consolidation methods, although there is insufficient technical detail
for a reader to leant how to actually prepare a set ofconsolidated financial statements. Pooling
of interests is described and its banning in the U.S. and internationally is referred to, but
without an explanation of the controversy surrounding it. Similarly no room is devoted as to
why the concept of control is so crucial, although the problems of applying it in the Japanese
keiretsu system are discussed.
Once the book moves on from international accounting standards, its horizons begin to
broaden and interesting issues of international diversity confront the reader. The chapter on
international financial statement analysis (Chapter 9) contains an excellent discussion of
the difficulties the analyst still faces despite accounting method standardization, including
differences in terminology, format and extent of disclosure. The chapter then provides an
extensive worked example restating ICI's accounts from the United Kingdom format and
GAAP to those of the United States. This provides a valuable framework for both
discussion and technical work in an advanced financial analysis course. Once again it
should be pointed out that the chapter assumes that the reader is familiar with the basics of
financial ratio analysis.
The substantial chapter on international taxation (Chapter 10) is especially welcome as
taxation is an area neglected in most accounting texts. It addresses issues such as how tax
drives key strategic international decisions, double taxation and international tax planning,
and how foreign-currency translation affects a company's tax liability. As with the chapter
on transfer pricing, the main detailed regulatory examples draw on United States practice.
The chapter on strategic accounting issues facing MNCs (Chapter 12) examines the
problems of capital budgeting and performance measurement in an international context. The ;
final chapter, despite its title Comparative International Auditing and Corporate Governance
(Chapter 13), focuses almost exclusively on audit issues. It provides a good treatment of
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international diversity in audit practice and, in particular, in audit report wording with a wealth
of real-world examples. However the differences in emphasis in wording are not linked here to
the rules versus principles debate, which is covered much earlier m the book in a section
entitled 'What Is This Thing Called Anglo-Saxon Accounting''"
The book contains a large number of accounts extracts of companies from a wide range
of jurisdictions. It also has some reference to recent research findings, and provides many
case studies for class discussion. Given the broad coverage aimed for. it could have devoted
more space to issues related to raising finance on the international stage and to international
differences and developments in corporate governance in general. However, for advanced
students wishing to extend their horizons beyond the usual treatment of international
accounting standards, this book takes us out of the accounts department and presents us
with a stimulating discussion of the accounting-related issues faced by the top management
of MNCs as well as those who use their published accounts.
David B. Citron
Cass Business School, City University, London, UK
E-mail address: D. B.Citron i/ cily.ac.uk.
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International Accounting and Multinational Enterprises, Lee Radebaugh, Sidney J.
Gray, Ervin L. Black, 6th edition, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ, USA (2006),
xiv + 506 pages, US $123.95, £86.50, €123.50, ISBN-13: 978-0-471-65269-4,
ISBN-10: 0-471-65269-5
First appearing in the 1980s. "International Accounting and Multinational Enterprises"
quickly became a classic among international accounting textbooks. Since then, there
have been many changes in the world of accounting: the increasing number of cross-listed
firms and the growing power of international investors has made the international
accounting harmonization not just a wish but a reality. Multinationals have expanded their
influences in the world economy and operate in a more innovative but challenging
environment (increasing M&A activities, popularization of financial instruments, and
tighter regulation and monitoring). Last but not least, there are now many more textbooks
in English in the area of international accounting than when the first edition of their book
was published.
Radebaugh, Gray and Black's 6th edition is the new est textbook trying to cope with new
challenges. From its inception, the book has been taking a unique position compared to
other international accounting textbooks: "This hook presents international accounting
within the context ofmanaging multinational enterprises (MNEs)" (Preface, p. v). In fact,
the authors hope that this book will serve as a sort of one-stop solution toolbox for B-school
students and managers by covering main accounting issues in multinational enterprises,
including financial accounting, managerial accounting and control, auditing, corporate
governance and taxation.
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1. Organization of the book
The material is covered in 16 chapters. In the first introductory chapter, the authors
describe the field of international accounting and link it to international business. After
summarizing the international accounting history, this chapter covers firms' internation-
alization, factors influencing accounting development, and aspects of accounting in
multinationals. This chapter is essential as a 'bridge' into the international business field, for
accounting students or into the accounting area for international business students.
Chapter 2 covers the literature on international accounting classification and cultural
dimensions. Chapters 3 and 4 present country-specific studies on major developed and
developing nations. Chapter 5 relates to the major differences in international accounting
and their effects on financial statement analysis. Chapter 6 focuses on disclosure practices
in multinationals. Chapter 7 concentrates on accounting harmonization. Beginning with
Chapter 8, the book starts to treat, one by one, main accounting issues in multinationals:
business combinations, goodwill and intangibles (Chapter 8), segment reporting (Chapter 9),
foreign currency (Chapter 10), inflation (Chapter 11), corporate governance (Chapter 12),
derivatives (Chapter 13). budgeting and performance evaluation (Chapter 14), auditing
(Chapter 15) and taxation (Chapter 16).
Each chapter starts with the learning objectives and ends with a summary, discussion
questions, exercises and selected references. Supplementary cases (two per chapter) are
downloadable from the book website There is also a complete set of instructor's resources
on the website, including PowerPoint presentations, instructor's manual, test bank, cases.
Excel solutions, practice set solutions, case solutions, discussion question solutions, exercise •
solutions and a practice set. The book is well written in a clear, straightforward manner. The
examples given in the book are relevant, timely and with an international perspective.
2. Some comments and suggestions
In the following section, I present some comments and suggestions from my reading and
use of the book in my lectures.
Regarding Chapter I. I find that the current edition of the book, the information is
divided into too many sections and the transition from one section to another is not very
smooth. In the next revision, perhaps the authors could start with accounting issues (history,
factors), then cover the development of multinationals, ending with accounting aspects in
multinationals.
Chapter 2 contains essential information for students learning international accounting.
It allows students to move from detailed and country-specific accounting issues to a general
picture of accounting systems in the world. 1 think the chapter would benefit from the
inclusion of international finance literature on law system, legal enforcement and
ownership (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleiffer& Vishny, 1997. 1998. 1999. 2000, 2002;
La Porta. Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleiffer, 1999, 2006), and connecting this information with
existing accounting classification literature.
The titles and subtitles of Chapters 3 and 4, are a bit confusing. First, since the
accounting system in each country is presented separately, the information is not really
"comparative". Second, from the titles and subtitles, readers cannot know that Chapter 3
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deals with accounting systems in major developed countries and Chapter 4 with accounting
systems in major developing countries. Third, the subtitles (sections) correspond roughly to
the clusters obtained from international accounting classification literature except for
"Asian Accounting". Putting Japan and China into the same "Asian Accounting" category
implies their accountings are quite similar, which is not the case for historical, political and
economic reasons (personally. 1 prefer to see China with the Eastern European Group). If
we admit that "Asian Accounting" is a geographic term, then authors should also include
India and Malaysia in this category.
One remark on Chapter 5 is that nowadays, thanks to the success of 1FRS, there are
fewer and fewer accounting dcjure (at GAAP level) (Tay & Parker. 1990) differences in the
consolidated accounts of multinationals, which is the scope of the analysis in this book (if
we admit that there are few differences between United States GAAP and IFRS and put
Japan apart). In the next edition, it might be more interesting for the authors to concentrate
on international financial analysis difficulties caused by the legal enforcement of the
country (GAAP compliance) and differences in business environment (Choi et al., 1983;
Brown & Stickney. 1992).
Finally, I wish to remark on the global structure of the book. The 16 chapters of the current
edition are not grouped into clusters (or parts). Some of my students found that the current
structure made it a bit difficult to locate specific information. Maybe after the introductory
chapter, the authors could divide the book into two parts: international accounting studies
(including Chapters 2. 3, 4. 5 and 7) and accounting issues in multinationals (including
Chapters 6, 8-16). Furthermore, since the multinational enterprise is the key issue in this book,
the authors should clarify the definition of Multinational Enterprises. This organization-part
two on accounting issues m multinationals-would make the book more reader-friendly. Since
different types of internationalization induce different accounting issues, Chapters 6 and 8-16
could have been organized thus: commercial and investment internationalization (exporting,
joint venture and M&A): related accounting issues are Chapters 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 14 and 16; and
financial internationalization (cross-listing, foreign shareholding within the multinational):
related accounting issues are in Chapters 6, 12 and 15.
3. Conclusions
In summary, I think this book is well worth reading and using in the classroom. The
comments and critiques mentioned above are meant as suggestions for future improvements. As
I mentioned in the beginning of this review, the positioning of this book as a text on accounting
for multinationals is veiy useful for two populations of students: those majoring in accounting,
who have an interest in international business or those majoring in international business/
generalist MBAs, who wish to extend their knowledge into the field of international accounting.
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Abstract
This study examines the economic consequences for UK firms of the European Union's decision
to impose mandatory IFRS. We hypothesize that the impact varies across firms and is conditional on
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from the prior GAAP choices of German firms. We show that this proxy predicts cross-sectional
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1. Introduction
The mandatory adoption of IFRS 1 in the European Union (EU) is one of the largest
regulatory experiments in financial reporting ever undertaken, and may eventually prove to
be a vital step towards global GAAP harmonization. The EU and European Economic
Area (EEA) include 30 countries with integrated financial markets and more than 7000
listed firms. Almost all EU/EEA listed firms are legally required to adopt IFRS in their
consolidated statements no later than 2005.
'
In this paper, we examine the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption for
United Kingdom (UK) listed firms. We study both the short-term price response to news
about IFRS adoption, and the changes in the implied cost of equity for a large sample of
firms between a date before the mandatory adoption was expected and a date by which
mandatory adoption was effectively certain.
The short-run share-price response and long-run implied cost of equity methods
complement each other when testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption. The potential
advantage of focusing on short-run abnormal returns is that we are able to isolate specific
days when news affects all firms in the sample. The disadvantage is that it is reliant on
precise identification of the event days. In particular it assumes that there has been no
leakage of the policy deliberations to the market. Unfortunately the dates on which the
probability of mandatory adoption of IFRS changed are debatable. In contrast, an advantage
of using the implied cost of equity method is that it is not sensitive to the identification of
specific dates — we simply exclude the period of uncertainty and test the difference
between the implied cost of equity before and after the announcement period. However, the
estimation of the implied cost of equity is also potentially problematic, because it is often
difficult to control for all factors affecting the implied cost of equity over a long period of
time. Thus we view the two methodologies as being complementary and we believe that
their joint use should increase the robustness of our conclusions.
We hypothesize that UK firms vary in their willingness to adopt IFRS, because the costs
and benefits of IFRS adoption are likely to vary across firms. In terms of the literature on
accounting choice, the decision to mandate IFRS for UK quoted firms was unusual in the
sense that it cannot be simply portrayed as the imposition of a restriction on the accounting
choices of UK firms. Prior to 2005 UK firms were not permitted to adopt IFRS for UK
financial-reporting purposes. After 2005, UK firms are not allowed to use pre-2005 UK
GAAP in their consolidated statements for financial reporting purposes. Thus the EU
decision changed the choice set for UK firms by mandating a new set of rules for financial
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is the name of accounting standards produced by the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
: The EU's motive for adopting the regulation is the creation of a more transparent and efficient capital market
that will facilitate a lower cost of capital for EU firms(EC 16/06/2002)
EC 16 116 20(12 requires all listed firms in a regulated market to comply with IFRS in their consolidated
statements no later than 2(105 unless they are listed in non-member state and have been using internationally
accepted standards prior to September 2002. Member countries can allow adoption to be postponed until 2007 for
firms that comply with US-GAAP. The UK has decided not to use this option and all listed firms in a regulated
market are. therefore, required to comply with IFRS from 2005
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reporting that some UK firms might have adopted voluntarily, if they had been given the
choice. If UK firms had been given a choice between UK GAAP and IFRS it is logically
possible that some would have chosen not to adopt IFRS, and some would have chosen to
abandon UK GAAP in favor of IFRS. Thus it is possible that some UK firms would have
been constrained by the EU's decision, while others would have been liberated.
For the purposes of this paper we need a counter-factual proxy for what choices UK firms
would have made, if they had been given an option to choose between UK GAAP and IFRS.
One possibility, which we explore in this paper, is to exploit the information in the choices
made by funis in an economy similar to the UK. but where firms had the choice to adopt IFRS
before 2005. In particular Germany is a major EU economy that allowed early adoption of
IFRS and that also experienced extensive early adoption. This combination of Germany and
the UK as two major EU economies, but with very different IFRS adoption processes,
produces a unique setting for testing the factors affecting the economic consequences of
mandatory IFRS adoption.
We hypothesize that the characteristics of voluntary/early adopters of IFRS or US-
GAAP4 in an EU jurisdiction that allowed voluntary adoption of international accounting
standards (IFRS or US-GAAP) might serve as a viable proxy for how UK firms might have
behaved given the same choice. In particular we focus on the choices made by Gentian
firms. In Germany, listed firms have had the option to choose between an international
accounting regime (IFRS or US-GAAP) and domestic standards for their consolidated
| statements since 1998.'' Economic theory predicts that firms committing to an international
accounting regime are those that perceive the greatest net-benefit. We measure the degree of
similarity to German voluntary adopters by estimating a logistic choice-model using
German data and calculating the probability of voluntary adoption in the UK based on this
model. We use the estimated probability of voluntary adoption from our model based on
German firms as a counter-factual proxy for the probability of voluntary adoption by UK
firms.
The advantage of this approach is that it focuses on actual observed choices, there is no
potential for response bias, and it is based on a large population of firms. The disadvantage
of this approach is that the German GAAP and financial disclosure regime is not the same
as UK GAAP. The choice between UK GAAP and IFRS for UK firms is not the same as the
choice between German GAAP and IFRS for German firms. For example, German IFRS
1 adopters will typically experience a greater leap in disclosure quality. Due to these
differences one might expect two sets of determinants for firms' willingness to switch to
IFRS, i.e., one set that is common across both countries and another set that is country-
For brevity we describe German firms that comply with either IFRS or US-GAAP in 2002 as voluntary
idopters in this paper.
An alternative approach might be to ask firms directly what they might have done if they had been gi\ en a
:hoice. However this approach is also problematic for the following reasons: 1 ) firms may not know what they
would have done given the choice. 2| many firms may be unwilling to respond to the survey (typical response
lates are 20 30%). 3) some firms may not tell the truth.
In April 1998 KapAEG was adopted in Germany allowing listed firms the option only to comply with either
FRS or US-GAAP in there consolidated statements.
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specific. For instance, factors that correlate with corporate governance may be less
transferable from Germany to the UK. Convincing outside investors that the firm is
committed to improved corporate governance may be an underlying motive that is more
important to firms in Germany due to the ownership and legal system they operate in. The
implications of this fact for our research design is that we run the risk of identifying some
determinants from the German adopters that are not necessarily relevant to the UK firms,
which would add noise and reduce the power of the tests based on the UK sample. Thus our
analysis reports two sets of results for the UK. One set assumes that the choice model for the
UK is the same as for Germany. The other set attempts to isolate the Germany-specific
choice drivers from the common drivers.
We find that the common-driver set produces consistent results both for implied cost of
capital changes and for the short-run market responses. In both cases we find a significant
positive cross-sectional association between the economic response to mandatory IFRS
adoption and our counter-factual proxy for the probability of voluntary adoption by UK
firms.
The study makes two main contributions. First, understanding that the costs and benefits
of IFRS adoption varies systematically across firms is important not only to countries that
have already decided to make IFRS mandatory, but also to countries that are currently
considering taking this step. Second, the study also makes a novel methodological
contribution, by showing that under certain circumstances the information contained in
voluntary GAAP choices in one economy can predict the economic responses to a
mandatory GAAP change in a similar economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature in the
area and Section 3 develops the testable hypotheses of the paper. Section 4 describes the
methodology and sample including the key dates that changed the likelihood of mandatory
IFRS in the EU and the calculation of the counter-factual proxy for voluntary adoption in
the UK. Section 5 presents the results and discusses the implications. Section 6 summarizes
the paper.
2. Literature review
2.1. Voluntary adoption
Until recently, empirical studies on the connection between GAAP changes and the cost
of capita] have focused on voluntary adoption of either IFRS or US-GAAP over domestic
standards. The assumption is that the accounting regime affects the quality of information
and that the quality of information in rum affects the cost of capital.
One stream of research examines proxies for the cost of capital either within an event
study around the adoption of IFRS or US-GAAP, or cross-sectionally between firms that
have adopted IFRS or US-GAAP and firms that use local-GAAP. Leuz and Verrecchia
(2000) and Leuz (2003) take this approach by examining bid/ask-spreads, trading volume
According to GAAP convergence (2002) over 90% of the 59 countries surveyed intend to convert national
standards to 11 Rs
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and share price volatility as proxies for the information asymmetry component of the cost of
capital. They find reduced information asymmetry when firms change from German < i \ \ P
(HGB) to either IFRS or US-GAAP. but no significant difference between IFRS and US-
GAAP. Contrary to this conclusion. Daske (2006) finds no evidence of a reduced cost oi
capital when using both the residual-income valuation model and the Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) abnormal earnings growth model to estimate the implied cost of equity.
These three studies limit their sample to German firms, thus keeping the institutional
settings constant. Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) use a European sample to test the affect of
changing from local-GAAP to either IFRS or US-GAAP. They examine information
asymmetry proxied by analyst following, forecast dispersion and stock return volatility and
the implied cost of capital estimated using the method suggested by Easton, Taylor. Shroff.
and Sougiannis (2002). They document a positive effect of adopting IFRS or US-GAAP on
analyst following, but fail to find support for a lower implied cost of equity. Dargenidou,
McLeay, and Raonic (2006) also use a European sample to test how the change from local
GAAP to international accounting standards (IFRS or US-GAAP) affected the estimated
cost of capital using the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) abnormal earnings growth
model. Contrary to Daske (2006) and Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) they find that the cost of
capital increased by more than 4% after voluntary adoption but that the effect is smaller for
large firms. Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2007) extend these studies by focussing on
whether the impact varies with the degree of compliance. Survey evidence documents that
compliance varies considerably among voluntary adopters (Cairns. 1999. 2000). Daske et
al. (2007) show that the cost of capital is only reduced when adoption is serious (i.e., leads
to improved accounting quality). The heterogeneity that they document in the voluntary
setting arises from differences in compliance level. The heterogeneity that we explore in the
mandatory setting arises because the willingness to adopt varies across firms. To
summarize, prior research that uses proxies for either the cost of capital or components of
the cost of capital have produced mixed results.
Another stream of research looks at the market reaction to the announcement of future
compliance with IFRS or US-GAAP. The idea is that the market reaction around the
announcement contains the change in the required risk premium, and thus impounds the
change in the cost of capital. Pellens and Tomaszewski (1999) find insignificant market
reactions to the announcement of future compliance with either IFRS or US-GAAP in
Germany. The statistical power of their test is. however, low due to a sample size of only 16
firms. Karamanou and Nishiotis (2005) use an international sample of 54 firms adopting
IFRS and show that firms experience abnormal positive returns around the announcement
of future compliance with IFRS. They also find evidence that the positive market reaction is
not identical among firms with different characteristics. Thus, firms with low valuations
and high growth opportunities experience a stronger market reaction. Karamanou and
Nishiotis suggest that firms use the adoption of IFRS to signal to the market that they are
undervalued. This signalling motive does not apply to the mandatory-adoption setting as in
1
the case of the UK. Indeed, the study of mandatory adoption differs from voluntary
adoption in two ways. First, mandatory adoption eliminates the self-selection issues
I
inherent in voluntary adoption. Second, the choice to voluntarily adopt is a signal that
includes information in itself, which could be difficult to disentangle from the underlying
issue a study seeks to examine.
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2.2. Mandatory adoption
Three prior studies examine mandatory rather that voluntary adoption of 1FRS.
Comprix, Muller and Stanford-Harris (2003) examine abnormal returns around the
dates of public announcements that increase the likelihood of mandatory 1FRS in the
EU. They apply the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) approach to evaluate the relationship
between announcement returns and a number of firm and country characteristics. They
find that firms that are a) audited by a big 5 auditor, b) located in countries that will
experience the greatest increase in quality of financial information as a consequence of
IFRS, and c) are subject to the highest level of legal enforcement experience significant
positive returns. Apart from the nature of the auditor these characteristics are all country
specific. Although the methodology of Comprix et al. (2003) is similar to the market-
reaction test we conduct in our study, the underlying research question is different.
While they predominantly examine differences among country characteristics we
investigate the role of firm characteristics within one country, which keeps the
j
institutional framework constant.
Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, and Riedl (2006) also investigate market reactions
to events that they argue would affect the likelihood of mandatory IFRS in the EU.
Unlike Comprix et al. (2003), which studies the events from 2000 to 2002, they
analyze later events between 2003 and 2004 that are related to the endorsement of
the IFRS standards in general and IAS 32/39 in particular. In general, they find
positive (negative) market reactions to events they classify as increasing (decreasing)
the likelihood of mandatory IFRS and interpret this as evidence that investors
perceive benefits of harmonized accounting standards under IFRS. The focus of
Armstrong et al. (2006) is on whether mandatory IFRS is good or bad as perceived
by investors. In our study, the focus is instead on the differences in the economic
consequences of mandatory IFRS between firms that are likely to incur relative
benefits and costs due to the decision. Differences in economic consequences are of
particular interest when evaluating a mandatory policy change. Since all firms by
definition are treated equally by such a policy, those that are disadvantaged by the
policy are still forced to comply.
Instead of examining the short-term market reactions, Pae. Thornton, and Welker
(2006) investigate the consequences of mandatory IFRS by looking at Tobin's Q. They
show that firms with high agency cost measured by concentration of control and excess
of the largest shareholder's voting rights over cash flow rights experience relative
increases in valuation as a consequence of mandatory IFRS. The underlying idea in the
study is that the shares of some firms trade at a discount due to weaker protection for
minority shareholders and that mandatory IFRS force these firms to improve their
disclosure, which in turn reduces the discount. Pae et al. (2006) use a European sample
where early adoption is allowed in several countries and national disclosure quality
generally is lower than IFRS. In this setting it makes sense to test whether the
restrictions imposed by mandatory adoption of IFRS have benefited some investors.
Contrary to this we restrict our test to a UK setting where firms have not had the option
to comply with IFRS voluntarily. Furthermore, the disclosure quality in our UK setting
is generally high and it is unsure whether IFRS is an improvement for all firms. Our
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sample is more relevant for an investigation into whether or not relative benefits differ
across firms than whether or not it enhances protection of minority investors.
The key contribution of our study to the literature is the focus on firm-specific cross-
sectional differences in the economic consequences of mandatory 1FRS. We define the
firm-specific differences through a counter-factual proxy for willingness to adopt. The idea
is that heterogeneity in the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS arises because some
firms are forced to comply against their will, while others have net benefits and would have
complied voluntarily had they been given the opportunity. We are not aware of any prior
studies that connect the voluntary accounting GAAP commitment offirms in one country to
the economic consequences of a mandatory policy in another country.
3. Hypotheses development
The starting point of our analysis is the assumption that the costs and benefits of
IFRS adoption, relative to firm value, will vary across firms. The mandatory adoption
of IFRS imposes two kinds of changes on the financial-reporting practices of firms.
First, firms are required to adopt a new set of accounting-measurement rules that in
some cases will have a material effect on a firm's reported earnings and balance-sheet
values, and in other cases will not. Second, IFRS introduces a new set of required
disclosures that in some cases will be greater than the original disclosure requirements
and in other cases less.
Empirical research suggests that the cost of capital is related to both disclosure and
measurement policies. Examples of such studies are Botosan (1997), that examines the
association between disclosure levels and the implied cost of equity, and Francis, LaFond,
Olsson, and Schipper (2004), that examines the relationship between earnings attributes and
the implied cost of equity. Both studies find that a lower quality of information is associated
with a higher cost of capital.The main hypothesis of this paper is (stated in alternative
form):
H 1. The cross-sectional variations in the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS
adoption by UK firms are related to the probability that the firm would have adopted IFRS
voluntarily if it had been given the choice.
In order to convert H 1 into an empirically testable proposition we need to identify
specific, measurable, economic consequences, and we need to specify how to model the
probability of (counter-factual) voluntary adoption by UK firms. For the purposes of this
paper we focus on two. potentially related, types of economic consequences. First we
consider the market response to news about the decision by the EU to mandate IFRS.
Second we consider the relative change in implied cost of equity between the time when the
EU started to consider IFRS adoption and the time when the decision to adopt IFRS was
effectively final and binding on all member states.
The main hypothesis is divided into two testable hypotheses (stated in alternative form):
H 1A. The stock price reaction of UK firms to announcements that increased (decreased)
the likelihood of mandatory IFRS adoption is positively (negatively) related to their degree
of similarity to the characteristics of German voluntary IFRS adopters.
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H 1 B. The change in the implied cost of equity ofUK firms before and after the mandatory
IFRS adoption decision is negatively related to their degree of similarity to characteristics
of German voluntary IFRS adopters.
Both hypotheses exploit the fact that an informationally efficient market should rapidly
incorporate the expected costs and benefits of IFRS adoption into share prices. That is to
say, that if the market expects UK firms with characteristics similar to German early
adopters to derive a relative benefit from IFRS adoption over other firms then such firms
should experience a reduction in their relative cost of capital after future mandatory IFRS
adoption became known, and a relatively positive (negative) response to news indicating
that mandatory IFRS adoption was more (less) likely.
Hypothesis HIA tests how the market initially received the news of mandatory IFRS
adoption. Hypothesis H1B tests how the market perceives mandatory IFRS adoption in the
longer run. Consistent results for HIA and H1B should increase the robustness of the
conclusion with regard to the main hypothesis.
In thinking about these hypotheses it is important to recognize that our focus is on the
possibility that some firms may benefit more than others from the implementation of IFRS.
In particular we do not deny the possibility that the value of IFRS adoption could be
relatively greater in Germany than in the UK. Indeed, while there does seem to be a
common perception that IFRS could be beneficial for German firms (Leuz and Verrecchia,
2000). the general perception of IFRS seems less favourable for UK firms. Studies such as
Ginger and Rees (2001) show that UK-GAAP and IFRS are generally assumed to be very
close. Some practitioners hold the belief that UK GAAP is of higher quality than IFRS. S
However, despite such perceptions recent empirical evidence has found that the investment
decisions of fund managers in the UK have been affected by the transition to IFRS. 9
Furthermore, we are not concerned in this paper with testing the overall effect of
mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of capital of UK firms. It could be that the median
level of accounting information quality decreases in the UK due to IFRS being of a lower
quality than UK accounting standards, but at the same time the effect of IFRS adoption
could be smaller for UK firms similar in characteristics to German volunteer adopters. In
this case our main alternative hypothesis would be accepted in the UK even though the
overall affect of introducing IFRS was to decrease the quality of financial statements and
increase the cost of capital.
Another issue we face in relation to the changes to measurement and disclosure policies
due to IFRS is the differences between Germany and the UK. Economic intuition suggest
that a firms' accounting policy choice is driv en by it's perception of net benefits. If the
perceived net-benefits are at least partly determined by a function of measurement and
disclosure issues then it is unlikely to be identical for Germany and the UK due to their
institutional differences. Ball (2006) and Nobes (2006) both analyse how differences in
Sec Accountancy. January 1999, p. 6. and Accountancy, May 1999. p. 77. for examples
In a PwC MORI (20051 survey of fund managers. 70% said that thej found the first IFRS information fairly
useful or very useful, 29% reported that the disclosure had influenced them to disinvest from a company, and 21%
s.ud that they had been influenced to not invest in a company and 13% had been influenced to invest
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financing, ownership, legal, and taxation systems across countries influence the
development of their domestic accounting regulations and suggest that this is likely to
have effects on the implementation of 1FRS.
Thus, to the extent that these institutional differences affect the decision of IFRS
adoption, there will be country-specific factors in Germany that are not transferable to the
UK context and therefore induce noise into our counter-factual proxy for a UK. firm's
willingness to adopt IFRS. That is to say, our research design potentially underestimates
the differences in economic consequences and therefore we run the risk of failing to reject
that no differences exist when differences actually exist. Thus this issue, m effect, loads
the dice in favor of our null hypothesis. The fact that we are able to reject the null, in spite
of this issue, suggests that even stronger results in support of our alternative hypotheses
could be found if a more powerful counter-factual proxy could be designed than the one
we use here.
4. Methodology and sample
4.1. Development of the counter-factual proxy
In this section we explain the development ol' the counter-factual proxy for UK.
firms' willingness to adopt IFRS based on their degree of characteristics similar to
German voluntary IFRS adopters. We use the observed voluntary GAAP choices of
German firms to predict which UK firms would be more likely to adopt IFRS given the
same choice. The following logistic regression models are used to explain the choice of
Gentian firms:
Adopter, = a + a, FS, + a :DTM, + a,LMV, + e, (1)
10
Adopter, = ft, + /*, FS, + /*:DTM, + />',LMV, +^ /^TNDDUMa-, + £, (2
)
7
Adopter, = y„ +^ 7tINDDUM A , + r, ( 3
k=\
The dependent variable (Adopter) is assigned the value of one if firm i complies with
an international accounting regime in 2002 and the value of zero otherwise. 10 FS is the
foreign sales divided by total sales, DTM is the long-term debt divided by the sum of its
long-term debt and market value, LMV is the natural logarithm of the market value, and
INDDUM are seven industry dummies set equal to one for the industry for which the firm
belongs and zero otherwise. Model 1 (Eq. ( 1 )) only includes the three firm-characteristic
variables that measures foreign sales, leverage, and size. To capture the long-run norm, we
We do not distinguish between IFRS and US-GAAP. The reason is that we are interested in firms that have
net-benefit of committing to an international accounling regime regardless which one. We do. however, re-run the
models excluding firms complying with US-GAAP. The results are consistent in all material aspects, which is also
consistent with the result of Leuz (2003).
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use the five-year mean value of these variables from 1998 to 2002. Model 2 (Eq. (2)) adds
seven industry dummies to the existing independent variables in Model 1 in order to
incorporate any industry effect. Model 3 (Eq. (3)) includes only these industry dummies.
We group firms into industries using the Worldscope industry classification. The three
variants enable us to observe whether firm characteristics or the industry is more relevant
in capturing the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS. In the process of developing
our choice model from the German sample, we experimented with additional variables
such as operating margin as a proxy for performance, sales growth as a proxy for growth,
and operating cash flow as a proxy for finance need. Unfortunately, none of these were
statistically significant. This is not surprising since existing studies (e.g., Ashbaugh,
2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Hams and Muller, 1999; Leuz, 2003; Leuz and
Verrecchia, 2000; Tarca, 2004) find mixed results and the way in which these variables
influence accounting-policy choice remains under debate. Therefore, to avoid weakening
the power of our counter-factual proxy in distinguishing UK firms' willingness to adopt
the IFRS, we excluded these variables from our final models in Eqs. (1) and (2).
In determining the explanatory variables in Eqs. (1 ), (2), and (3), we refer to the firm
characteristics identified in the existing literature on voluntary accounting-regime choices
such as Harris and Muller (1999), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Ashbaugh (2001), Leuz
(2003), Tarca (2004) and Cuijpers and Buijink (2005). These studies generally argue that
the decision to adopt an international accounting regime is a function of financial
performance, leverage, firm size, finance need, and cross-listing. Tarca (2004) adds foreign
exposure and industry as explanatory variables. An important issue in applying these to our
research design is to find proxies that are the same under international accounting standards
and German domestic standards. Significant differences could result in wrong conclusions.
For instance, leverage measured as total liabilities divided by book value of equity, is larger
under HGB than under IFRS (Hung and Subramanyam, 2004). This relationship is driven
by the book value of equity being measured significantly lower under HGB than under
IFRS, which is consistent with HGB being more ex-ante conservative than IFRS. Hung and
Subramanyam (2004) perform a survey of reconciliation items disclosed by firms that adopt
IFRS for the first time. Hung and Subramanyam (2004, Table 4) show that differences are
significant for total assets and the book value of equity. We therefore avoid these accounting
figures.' ' Furthermore, theoretical predictions suggest that information asymmetry, analyst
following, and liquidity motivate disclosure choices and proxies for these are, therefore,
possible explanatory variables. Despite this there is a likelihood that their incorporation in
the choice-model estimated on German data will induce causality and/or endogeneity
problems because prior studies (e.g., Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Leuz and Verrecchia,
2000) suggest that these variables are influenced by voluntary adoption. In line with the
existing literature on accounting standard choices, we therefore exclude these variables
(e.g., Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Harris and Muller, 1999; Leuz. 2003;
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Tarca, 2004).
" In Eqs. (1) and (2) our measure of leverage is affected by the accounting regime. According to Hung and
Subramanyam (20(14) total liabilities tend to be lower under HOB than under IFRS. This means that our measuri
of leverage will be biased towards zero, thus underestimating leverage's effect on the choice of an international
accounting regime.
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Due to the difficulty in identifying variables that are available under the same
definition in both Germany and the UK, as well as limitations in data availability, we
exclude direct proxies of corporate-governance variables in our study. However, we do
not rule out the possibility that the leverage variable and/or industry dummies we include
in Eqs. (1). (2). (3) may indirectly capture cross-sectional variations in corporate
governance structure. Existing studies argue that leverage proxies the level of "insider"
finance available to the firm, which in turn affects a firm's disclosure incentives, because
insiders do not rely on public disclosures (e.g., Cuijpers and Buijink. 2005; Meek,
Roberts, and Gray, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996). Variations across industries have also been
documented for governance mechanisms such as ownership structure (Demselz and Lehn,
1985), executive compensation (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999), and board structure
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). Gillian, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) also find that the
strength of monitoring through board and charter provisions is industry specific. Another
variable that could possibly serve this purpose is free-float but the trade-off here is a
significantly reduced sample size. Since Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find that free-float is
insignificant (p-value 0.96) in Germany, leaving this variable out of the equation is
unlikely to bias our results significantly. In terms of finance need, the most commonly
applied proxy in the voluntary-adoption literature is a dummy variable taking the value of
one if the firm issued equity after adoption, which generally turns out significant in prior
studies (e.g., Ashbaugh, 2001; Harris and Muller. 1999). The intuition is that firms
planning to issue capital in the future are more likely to adopt voluntarily to decrease the
i cost of capital. However, in the context of mandatory adoption this line of argument does
not hold and it is unclear from which time period we should collect the data in order to
make the test comparable to prior studies. An alternative approach would be to define it
in terms of capital intensity (long-term assets/total assets), following Leuz and Verrecchia
(2000). The problem of applying this proxy in our study is that both long-term assets and
I total assets are highly affected by the change from German GAAP to an international
accounting regime. This makes it difficult to distinguish between the effect of changing
the accounting regime and the effect of the finance need the proxy was meant to capture.
Our existing models avoid the empirical measurement problems of corporate governance
and finance need variables. Assuming that corporate governance, finance need, and other
possible variables have accounting-policy-choice implications, their exclusion would
reduce the explanatory power of the counter-factual proxy applied in the UK and reduce
the chances of finding results in support of our hypothesis. While we do not deny the
theoretical relevance of these variables to the context of our study, we leave them for
future research as the objective for this paper is to investigate whether there are cross-
sectional differences in economic consequences not to identify all possible drivers of
these differences.
We compute the counter-factual proxy for a UK firm's willingness to adopt 1FRS as
follows:
01 , = % + ZiFSj + 5 :DTM ; + JiLMV, (4)
in
02 , = K + PiFSj + 0,DTM ;- + J?,LMV, +^ fl, INDDUM;v ( 5
)
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and 3) (7)
where Pn
:/ are the probabilities ofvoluntarily IFRS adoption by firmj based on model / (i.e.
Models I. 2. and 3). coefficients ao to oo, /A) to fh, and yo to y<-, are estimated from Eqs.
(1), (2), and (3) respectively, and FS,. DTM,. LMVy, and INDDUM*., are proxies of foreign
exposure, leverage, size, and industry dummies for firm /'. The definition of these inde-
pendent variables follows their German sample counterparts described earlier and are
measured as the five-year mean over the same period of 1 998-2002. Model 4 assumes that
FS. DTM, and LMV are the common drivers between the UK and Germany. Model 5
assumes that the industry dummies that are relevant for German voluntary adoption are also
relevant drivers for the UK. This assumption will be incorrect if the industry dummies proxy
the governance motive for IFRS adoption by German firms.
4.2. Test ofHIA
Hypothesis HI A assumes there is a positive relationship between a UK firm's degree of
similarity to the characteristics of German voluntary IFRS adopters and their stock-price
reaction to announcements relating to mandatory IFRS adoption. To test HI Awe apply the
Sefcik and Thompson (1986) portfolio-weighting approach commonly used to test the
effect of firm characteristics on stock market reaction to time clustered events (e.g.,
Comprix et al.. 2003: Li, Pincus. and Rego, 2004). This approach involves the following
steps. First, construct a matrix F defined as follows:
F = [Int Pr] (8)
where Int is an .V 1 vector of one and Pr is aniV* 1 vector of the degree ofUK firms' similarity
to German volunteer adopters (based separately on Models 1 . 2. and 3 ) and .V is the number of
sampled UK firms. Second, create portfolio weights Was follows:
W II
'
Int
w (F'Ff'F' (9)
where H]
nt is the row of portfolio weights based on Int. W>r is the row of portfolio weights based
on Pr. and F is the Ar*2 matrix defined in Eq. (8). Third, compute the returns (RPr ) of the
portfolio weighted on the information pertaining to Pr as follows:
Rpr., = W'PTRi, (10)
where R,, is the V I vector of individual firm stock returns on day /, and r covers 521 trading
days from 01 '01/1999 to 3112 2000. Finally, we run the following time-series regression:
K
RPU = a + [iR,„ , + ^2 5kDkA + e, (11)
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where a is the intercept, ft is the risk coefficient, R,„, is the return on Financial Times All Shares
Index on day t, t\ is the risk-adjusted abnormal returns pertaining to event A', Dkx is a dummy
variable for the Alh event during the three-day period (days - l. 0, and +l relative to the
announcement date) and is set to one (— l ) ifthe event is assumed to be favorable (unfavorable) to
mandatory IFRS adoption and zero otherwise. Eqs. (9) and ( 10) can also be implemented on the
//;/ portfolio, but for brevity we do not report the results. The risk-adjusted abnormal return i\
reflects the effect of Pron the stock price reaction to the events examined. Sefcik and Thompson
(1986) argue that these estimates are equivalent to those in a cross-sectional regression of
abnormal returns on firm characteristics but fully control for the cross-correlation and
heteroskedasticity in firm disturbances, which is essential in time-clustered event studies. 1-
Eq. (II) estimates the relationship between UK linns' degree of similarity to German
\ oluntary IFRS adopters and their stock market reaction to the relevant announcements. In H l A.
we expect that UK firms with higher Pr values should enjoy a relatively more positive market
reaction to announcements that are favourable to mandator)' IFRS adoption. This is because they
share greater similarity in characteristics to the German voluntary adopters whose accounting
regime commitment is due to their perceived net benefits.
4.3 Test of H1B
Hypothesis H I B assumes that long-run changes in the cost of capital ofUK firms after the
mandatory IFRS adoption decision is negatively related to their degree of similarity to the
characteristics ofGerman voluntary adopters. To test this hypothesis, we calculate the implied
cost of equity capital based on the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) abnormal earnings
valuation model and the Easton (2004) PEG model. Under the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth
(2005) approach, the implied cost of equity capital (ICEa/) is defined as follows:
ICEOJ A- +
Pi
eps, +; - eps,+ ,
eps,+
.
(12)
(7-0 +
V p,
(13)
1 where eps,
,
and eps, : are one- and two-years ahead analyst-consensus forecasts ofearnings
per share, dps, ,
i
is the one-year-ahead analyst-consensus forecast ofdividend per share. P, is
the current price, and (y - 1 ) is the perpetual growth rate at which the short-term growth decays
|
asymptotically. We follow Gode and Mohanram (2003) in setting the (y- 1) equal to the risk
' free rate minus 3%, which is the long-term inflation rate. If (y - 1 ) is negative, we set its value
Our use of Sefcik and Thompson's (19.S6) approach to test market reaction is similar to Comprix ct al.
1(2003). which studies a similar context. However, another study h\ Armstrong el al (2006) applies the
traditional cross-sectional regression of announcement time of abnormal returns on company characteristics. To
'iddress the cross-correlation issue, they implement a separate test to compare announcements with randomly
Sampled non-announcement returns Nevertheless, this methodology could not simultaneously address the time-
clustering issue along with the research design seeking to test the relationship between market reaction and
company characteristics. The Sefcik and Thompson's (1986) approved is directly designed for this purpose.
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to zero following Claus and Thomas (2001). Following Chen, Jorgensen, and Yoo (2004),
when eps,
, 2 < eps, , 1 we assign short-term earnings growth (eps,
, 2
~ eps, ,
,
) to zero. When
the value inside the root is negative, we assume the \CEol=A. Under the Easton (2004)
approach, the implied cost of equity capital (\CEPFG ) is calculated as follows:
ICEPEG =
^
epS^- epS
'+1 ) (.4)
These two models are preferred over the residual-income valuation model applied in
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001 ) as they do not require clean-surplus assumptions.
The value of ICEPF(i is equivalent to ICE, ); ifwe assume (y- l) = 0anddpsM i=0. Because
[CEpi g requires that eps, t i<eps, , 2 , it tends to skew the sample toward growth stocks.
Due to inherent measurement problems associated with the estimation of the cost of
equity from historical returns (Fama and French, 1997; Elton, 1999), inferring the cost of
equity from analyst forecasts and market prices through accounting-based valuation models
has emerged and promulgated in contemporary literature. Although some studies suggest
possible weaknesses of such an approach (Easton, 2006; Guay, Kothari, and Shu, 2005)
other studies show that their estimates capture common proxies of risk (e.g., Gebhardt et al.,
2001 ; Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). In our study, we apply this
established methodology to evaluate H 1 B, which associates our counter-factual proxy of
UK firms' willingness to adopt IFRS with long-run changes in the level of market-
perceived risk around the decision-making period. It provides a more direct proxy for the
impact on firms' cost of equity capital than short-term market reaction tests. As mentioned
earlier, tests ofboth H 1 A and H 1 B mutually complement each other and the triangulation of
the results suggests a more powerful inference to our research question.
Following Daske (2006), we compute the implied cost of equity capital on a monthly
basis from January 1996 to December 1998 (pre-announcement period) and September
2001 to October 2004 (post-announcement period). We calculate the change (\ICEOJ and
AICEpEc) by subtracting the median implied cost of equity of the pre-announcement period
from the median implied cost of equity of the post-announcement period. 1. To determine
the relationship between UK firms' degree of similarity to German voluntary adopters and
changes in cost of capital, we run the following cross-sectional regressions:
JICE01 , = /.,) + /.,Pr, + /. :JMV, + /.,/IBM, + /^DM, + /UdSG,
+ X6AO?Mj + £j (15)
where AICEoj, is the change in implied cost of equity capital of firm / from pre- to post-
announcement period, Pr, is the degree of similarity with German voluntary adopters of
firm / (based separately on Models 1.2. and 3), AMV,, ABM,, ADM,, ASG,, and AOPM,
are the changes in three-year median-market value, book-to-market value, debt-to-market
value, sales growth, and operating-profit margin, respectively, for firm / from pre- to post-
" Our research design seeks to detect cross-sectional variations at a company-specific level. To achieve litis, we
need to estimate the changes of implied cost of equity on an individual-company basis instead of using the
approach that Easton et al. (20(12) suggest.
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announcement period.
14
Market value, book-to-market values, and debt-to-market values
have been confirmed by previous research to be correlated with implied cost of equity
(Botosan & Plumlee, 2005; Chen et al., 2004; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gode & Mohanram.
2003) and are, therefore, incorporated as control variables. In addition, we control for
growth proxied by sales growth and profitability proxied by operating-profit margin. The
same regression of Eq. (15) is applied using AICEPEg ;|s a dependent variable. The
coefficient Ai gives the relationship between Pr and long-run changes in cost of capital,
after controlling for changes in various firm-specific attributes over the same period. In
H1B we assume that there should be a negative relationship between the Pr and long-run
changes in the cost of capital. This is again based on the assumption that higher Pr firms
bear greater resemblance to German firms that adopted an international accounting regime
and therefore have a net economic benefit upon the adoption of IFRS.
4.4. Key dates
The timeline of events leading to the mandatory adoption of IFRS is crucial for this study.
For the event study we need to know the days when the market revised its expectations about
IFRS adoption. For the cost ofcapital study we need to identify a pre-decision period when the
issue ofIFRS adoption was far from being resolved and a post-decision period when the issue
of IFRS adoption was clearly settled.
To narrow down the period when expectations changed we first searched The Financial
Times and Accountancy for all articles related to IFRS between 1st January 1999 and 31st
December 2002. 1999 was the first year where commentators began concrete discussions on
mandatory IFRS adoption and 2002 was the year the final directive was formally adopted by
the council of ministers. This search revealed that after 3 1 December 2000 most commentators
expected mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU by 2005. This is prior to the formal adoption
of the directive but consistent with evidence from Binder (1985) that suggests that formal
regulatory announcements are generally anticipated in event sUidies using public
announcements. We, therefore, narrowed down the search from 1st January 1999 to 31st
December 2000. Seven events appeared relevant. These events are tabulated in Table 1
.
Event 1 is the commission's presentation of its preferred option to the Financial Services
Policy Group. The preferred option included all the important elements of the final
directive. This event was not widely discussed in the Financial Times but due to the early
stage and the importance of the Financial Services Policy Group this event is included.
Thus, we classify Event 1 as favorable.
The year after the first event is the period with most uncertainty. It involved prolonged
discussions about the future structure of the International Accounting Standard Committee
(IASC, the IASB's predecessor). US stakeholders, among them the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), wanted less political influence in the accounting standard-setting process.
while the EU commission took the opposite view. The future structure of the IASC was the
We calculate the percentage change for market value.
E.g., KPMG's (2002) comment on the final adoption of the directive: "In June 2002. the Council of Ministers
ot the European Union adopted the much anticipated regulation requiring all listed groups in the European Union
to apply International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in their financial statements hy 2005
"
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Table 1
Events changing the likelihood of mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU
Event Effect on
likelihood
Date Source Description
Favorable
Unfavorable
Unfavorable
28/01/ FT04/04/
iqog logo
22/03/ IASC
2000 website I
)
18/05/ FT25/05/
2000 2000
4 Favorable 09/06/ IASC
2000 website 1
1
5 Favorable 13/06/ FT 14/06/
2000 2000
6 Favorable 17/07/ FT 17/07/
2000 2000
7 Favorable 27/11 FT28/11/
2000 2000
Tile Financial Services Policy Group, representatives of EU finance
ministers, were presented with the European Commission's preferred
option for accounting harmonization
Preliminary announcement of IOSCO endorsement of IFRS
Forma] IOSCO endorsement of IFRS
IOSCO conditional endorsement decreased the likelihood of mandatory
IFRS in the EU because it was the culmination of US influence in the
IASC (later IASB)as it was connected to a changed struchire much as
proposed by the FASB and a changed team of trustees with more
influence from the US. Furthermore, the OSCO's conditional
endorsement was disappointing to the commission because it allows
countries a series of opt-outs. Opt-outs that were expected to be used by
the US
Fritz Bolkerstein. EU commissioner, makes a preparatory announcement
that IFRS will be proposed as compulsory for all EU-listed companies
The European Commission's propose that all listed EU companies should
prepare their consolidated financial reports in accordance with IFRS
ECOFIN meeting supporting the commission's proposal on this day
ami Britain calls for the completion of the European single market in
financial services to be brought forward
PricewaterhouseCoopers survey published The survey shows support
for IFRS among CFOs of European companies
This table presents the events that changed the likelihood of mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU The events were
identified by searching The Financial Times (FT| and Accountancy from January I 1999 to December 31 2000.
The dates shown are the event dales The two dates marked by I ) are obtained from Comprix et al. (2003). 2) refer
to Financial Times 25/05/2000 "Brussels' lost voice" for further discussion of the implication of IOSCO
endorsement and EU mandating IFRS. Favorable means that the event increased the likelihood ofmandatory IFRS
in the EU and unfavorable means that the event decreased the likelihood of mandatory IFRS in the EU.
main obstacle for the International Organization of Securities Commissions' (IOSCO)
endorsement of IFRS. IOSCO is an organization of securities commissions in the world
working to promote high standards of regulation (www.iosco.org). IOSCO endorsement was
to be the culmination of the core standard project. A process was begun in 1997, jointly by
IOSCO and IASC, to reach a core set of accounting standards to be used for cross-border
listings (www.iasb.org). The discussion on structure ended in May 2000 when the IASC
decided to follow almost entirely the US proposal for a new structure. In addition to this
restructuring, a number of high-ranking positions in the IASC's board of trustees went to US
officials. The new structure and the US influence on the board of trustees paved the way for the
IOSCO endorsement."1 The endorsement itself turned out to be only conditional. It allowed
'" Accountancy June 2000. p 7: "The (core standard) project took a long time, partly because of the SEC's
apparent hostility to anything but US GAAP. However, since the IASC finalized ns restructuring proposals in
which the SEC played a major role it seems lo have moderated its approach "
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countries a number of significant opt-outs. ' The new structure, the appointment ofUS trustees,
and the weak conditional endorsement lead to a decreased likelihood of mandatory IFRS
adoption in the EU. We use the dates of endorsement and expected endorsement as proxies for
moves by the IASC toward the US and away from the EU commission. Thus, we classify 1 \ cut
2 and Event 3 as unfavorable.
The period of uncertainty ended in the second halfof2000 when four announcements made it
clear that the EU would proceed with the regulation regardless of the new structure of the IASC
and its reduced influence on the board of trustees. In June and July the commission pledged its
support first through the responsible commissioner and second by a formal communication.
Third, ECOFIN, consisting of the EU fiscal ministers, supported the commission's com-
munication. And fourth, towards the end of2000 a survey showed strong support among firms in
the EU for mandatory adoption of IFRS. We classify Events 4 to 7 as favorable.
Although, all dates of changed likelihood are in 1999 and 2000 we acknowledge that
some uncertainty might still have existed at the beginning of2001. We therefore exclude the
first nine months of 2001 in the analysis of long-run changes in the implied cost of capital.
We define the pre-announcement period as the 36 months from 01/01/1996 to 31/12 1998
and the post announcement period as the 36 months from 01/10 2001 to 30/09/2004.
When building the counter-factual proxy (in Section 4. 1 ) used to extract the characteristics
ofvoluntary adopters, we need to define a voluntary commitment and to connect this definition
to the choice ofan international accounting regime. Following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) we
define a voluntary commitment as a decision by the firm about what it will disclose before it
knows the content of the information. A decision to disclose after the information is known to
the firm is a voluntary disclosure. The voluntary adoption of an international accounting
regime is a commitment because it is not possible to change back to domestic standards in
years where the firm for some reason decides compliance is undesirable.
The strength of a commitment is determined by a combination of how rigid it is and how
long into the future the commitment stretches. Thus, a commitment made before the EU
decision to require mandatory IFRS is stronger than a commitment made after the decision.
This is because the latter only lasted till 2005, whereas the length of the former was unsure at
the time it was made. From the above discussion of key dates, we know that most of the
uncertainty as to whether IFRS would become mandatory had diminished by the end of 2000.
Accountancy. June 20(10. p.7 ".., the US regulator (SEC) still has concerns about the quality of'IFRSs and is
thought to be behind IOSCO's less-than-wholehearted endorsement." FT The Financial Times. May 25. 2000 p2:
"The IOSCO agreement will appear anaemic to the Commission. While committing to international standards, the
deal permits national regulators several degrees of freedom. They are allowed to require extra disclosure. In apply
their own interpretations and to demand items be reconciled to domestic standards. Brussels will portray this, with
some justification, as an exercise in American ego massaging. The US Securities and Exchange Commission
thinks its standards are the best, implying that some IASC rules are deficient by comparison. The pick and choose
|
approach of the IOSCO deal could allow the US to keep its beloved rales more or less intact.The European
j
Commission will perceive similar US dominance in the team of trustees. Mr Volcker is backed up by another
I
regulatory heavyweight in the form of David Ruder, a one-lime SEC chairman. None of Europe's seven
representatives have held such elevated positions'T'aul Volcker was appointed within days of the IOSCO
1 endorsement. The above view is further supported by a commentary in the Financial Times The Financial Times,
|
June 6. 2000 p25: "The Commission is equally critical of the IOSCO deal It views as disastrous a decision u<
allow countries a series of opt-outs from global rales. Regulators will have the power to require rcinlerprclation.
greater disclosure and reconciliation to national standards
"
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The final decision was. however, not formally made before 2002 even if no dates in 2001 and
2002 appear to significantly change the likelihood of mandatory IFRS. Furthermore, the
decision to change accounting regime requires a certain period of preparation. KPMG (2002)
states that firms need to start the process of transition in 2002 if they are to be ready to comply
with IFRS from 2005. Based on these factors we use the accounting-regime choices of
German firms in 2002 as the dependent variable in the choice model. That is to say. firms that
complied with an international accounting regime no later than 2002 made a commitment
before knowing that IFRS would later become mandatory and, therefore, it is assumed that
they perceived net economic benefits from committing to comply with IFRS.
Like Comprix et al. (2003), our study differs substantially from Armstrong et al. (2006)
in the choice of time frame to extract announcement events. Their market-reaction study is
conducted on a set of later events that took place between 2002 and 2004. The events are all
related to EFRAG's endorsement of IFRS in general and IAS 32/39 in particular. They
argue that these events capture a change in the likelihood of mandatory IFRS. There is no
doubt that these events are significant in the process towards mandator)' IFRS adoption
worldwide, but it is unlikely that they capture any changes in the likelihood of mandatory
IFRS adoption in the EU. Finns adopting IFRS on the 1st of January 2005 have 1st of
January 2004 as the day of transition (firms with a calendar fiscal year). In order to be able
to meet this deadline firms need a certain period of preparation. KPMG estimates that firms
adopting in 2005 need to begin preparation in 2002 (KPMG 2002). In addition to this, the
final decision to impose mandatory IFRS was made in June 2002 (EC 16 06/2002). Thus it
is unlikely that any significant uncertainty as to whether IFRS (except for IAS 32/39) would
become mandatory remained in 2003 and 2004.
4.5. The German sample
The German sample is based on all existing and dead firms available from Datastream. We
exclude financial institutions, firms with negative common equity, preferred shares, foreign
firms, and those cross-listed on a non-German stock exchange. Since cross-listed firms are
often required to provide higher-quality disclosure, their motive, cost, and benefit of adopting
IFRS voluntarily are likely to be different from the rest of the firms in our German sample.
Apart from that, since the UK-GAAP demands relatively higher disclosure standards than the
HGB, the impact of involuntary disclosure due to cross-listing is higher for German than UK
firms. This in turn leads to a disparity in the perceived benefit of IFRS adoption between firms
from these two countries that are cross-listed abroad. Thus, the inclusion of cross-listing in the
Pr value estimation is likely to pick up effects that are neither comparable nor transferable
between the two samples. Following Daske (2006) and Karamanou and Nishiotis (2005) we
should be concerned with the quality of information on accounting standards in commercial
databases. The possibility of errors is largest for domestic standards, because a classification
identical to the year before rarely results in an error when the firm already complies with an
international accounting regime. This is because firms rarely switch from international to
domestic standards. The opposite is not true. We. therefore, test all German firms classified as
domestic-standard firms in their annual reports for 2002. For firms classified as complying
with IFRS or US-GAAP we match the Compustat classification to the Datastream
classification and check all data that do not agree with the annual reports for 2002. If we
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are unable to find the annual report for 2002 in Thompson One Banker we classify the
accounting-standards variable for that firm as missing. The data for all other variables in Eqs.
( 1 ). (2) and (3) are obtained from Datastream. The final Gentian sample size for Models 1 , 2,
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for the UK and Germany
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on firm-specific characteristics for Models 1 and 2
( iennam UK
IBES sample Full s ample
OBS FS DTM 1 MY OBS FS DTM LMV OBS FS DTM LMV
Model Mean 35.0% 14.5% II 8 24.3% 14 4",, [2.0 23 2",, 11 7% 11.2
1 Pr Median 34 1% 11.7 15.2% 8.7% 12 1 4 2",, 6.0% II 1
Standard 2" 5% 17.1% 16 26.4% 14.0% 1.5 31 0% 14 1% 1.7
deviation
Sample 3X9 469 1310
size
Model Mean 54.9% 14.6% 11.8 24 5% 144",, 12.0 23 2"„ 11.7% 11.2
2 Pr Median 33.6% 7.6% II 7 15.2% 8 7% 12 1 •i " 6.0% 111
Standard 27.6% 17.1% 1.6 264",, 14 0",, 1.5 31 0% 14 l"„ 1.7
deviation
Sample 382 469 1 S09
Sl/C
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on industries (Model 3 only)
pe cla sification)
Germany UK
Industry (Worldscc IBES sani| le Full sample
OBS q OBS 1 OBS
Resource utility (5 200, 5800, 8200) 3 4 16 3 230 9
Electronics (3700. 4000) 104 17 74 16 377 15
Constniction/manu 1'ucUirc (1300. 600, 1400. 2500. 168 27 134 30 547 22
2800, 4900. 5500. 6100. 7300)
Retail/Transport/Media (6400. 7000. 7900) 40 6 62 13 265 It)
Non-cyclical consumer goods (22 10, 4600 7600) 35 6 24 5 101 4
Drugs/healthcare (3400) 16 3 IS 4 Xs 3
Other (3100. 6700 8500. 8800) 231 37 136 29 933 37
Total 623 100 469 1 00 253S inn
Panel C: German firms' accounting-standard choice
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OBS OBS % OBS %
|
Adopter
IFRS
US-GAAP
Non-adopters (HGB)
124 33 126 33 216 35
70 18 66 17 114 18
199 51 142 50 330 53
190 44 1 90 50 293 47
(continued on next page)
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Tabic 2 [continued 1
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for the counter-factual proxy of UK firms' willingness to adopt 1FRS (Pr)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IBES sample Mean 0.48 0.49 0.5
1
Median 047 0.48 0.45
Standard dev. 0.17 0.26 0.21
Full sample Mean 0.43 0.45 0.53
Median 1141 1143 0.63
Standard dev. 0.26 0.26 0.19
This table shows the sample size and descriptive statistics on the data used to estimate the logistic regression
models of voluntary adoption of international accounting regimes (IFRSTJS-GAAP) in Germany and to
calculate the counter-factual proxy lie . the likelihood of voluntary adoption) in the UK. Firm characteristics
such as foreign sales (FS). leverage (DTM), and size (LMV) are measured as the five-year mean from 1998 to
2002 Industry dummies are assigned based on industry groups from Worldscope. Panel A presents the sample
for Models 1 and 2 and Panel B provides the sample for Model 3. OBS is the sample size. FS is calculated as the
foreign sales to total sales DTM is calculated as long-term debt (long-term debt + market capitalization). LMV is
the natural logarithm of market value Panel C describes the accounting-standard choice of German firms in the
sample used in building the logistic regression models. Panel D presents the distribution of the counter-factual
proxy of willingness to adopt 1FRS among UK firms (Pr). IBES sample is applied to test of H1B. Full sample is
only applied to test of HI A.
and 3 are 403, 386, and 641, respectively. Table 2 shows the size and relevant descriptive
statistics for the German sample. Table 2 panel C describes the accounting standards that the
German firms in our sample use in 2002 across the three models. Firms are equally divided
between adopters and non-adopters. For instance, adopters account for 51%, 50%, and 53% in
the dependent variable of the logistic regressions in Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) (Models 1, 2, and 3).
respectively. This even distribution ensures that we do not skew heavily toward either adopters
or non-adopters in our estimation.
4.6. The UK sample
Our UK sample is based on all existing and dead UK firms in Datastream. To construct
the full UK sample, we exclude financial institutions, firms with negative book value of
equity, preferred stocks, foreign firms, and those cross-listed on a non-UK stock exchange.
The purpose of the latter criteria is to address the issue that cross-listed firms are already
under more scrutiny from foreign investors and analysts. Thus, the costs and benefits that
cross-listed firms incur from mandatory IFRS adoption is not comparable with the average
fnms in our UK sample. However, in Section 5.5.3 we re-introduce ADR firms into the UK
sample for robustness check. A relatively small number of fnms that already complied with
either US-GAAP or IFRS are also excluded. Is The data for foreign sales, leverage, and size
used to compute the counter-factual proxy in Eqs. (4), (5) and (6) are from Datastream. For
Models 1.2, and 3 we have 1 3 1 0. 1 309, and 2538 observations, respectively. As discussed in
lx
Compliance with IFRS or US-GAAP prior (o 2005 is only possible by supplementary reporting e producing
tvu> sets of financial statements I. thus imposing additional costs on the issuer
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Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we apply two sets of tests on the UK firms. The market-reaction test of
the HI A can be implemented using the full sample. We obtain the daily returns of the
individual firms and the Financial Times All Share Index from Datastream. The test of H I
B
imposes additional data constraints. To measure changes in implied cost of equity over the
pre-announcement (January 1996 to December 199M) and post-announcement (September
2001 to October 2004) periods, we obtain analyst-earnings forecasts and actual current price
from the 1BES. The data to compute changes in other control variables over the pre- and
post-announcement periods, i.e. size, book-to-market value, leverage, sales growth, and
operating profit margin in Eq. (15), are from Datastream. This results in a reduced common
sample of 469 observations. Panels A and B of Table 2 present the sample size and relevant
descriptive statistics for the UK sample applied in our study. In comparison to the German
sample, the level of dependence on foreign revenue appears smaller m the UK, although the
difference is not significant. In terms of leverage and size, our samples for these two
countries are fairly similar. Table 2 panel D describes the counter-factual proxy of
willingness to adopt IFRS. Mean and median arc both close to 50%, suggesting a fairly equal
distribution. This ensures that our subsequent tests are not conducted on UK samples that are
heavily skewed toward firms that are either very similar or different in characteristics to
German voluntary IFRS adopters.
5. Empirical findings
5.1. The counter-factual proxy
Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression models (Eqs. (1) (3)) we use to
extract the characteristics of German voluntary adopters.
The results ofModel 1 suggest that large firms with a low level ofdebt financing and a large
I foreign exposure are most likely to adopt an international accounting regime voluntarily. This
is consistent with existing studies on voluntary commitments. For instance, Cuijpers and
Buijink (2005) and Dargenidou et al. (2006) argue that larger firms tend to have lower
disclosure costs. Meek et al. (1995) suggest that there is a greater demand for information and
need for disclosure among large firms due to their higher political and agency costs. Tarca
(2004) argues that higher foreign-sales firms have greater need to disseminate information
abroad due to their exposure to foreign operations and capital markets. Tarca (2004) also
suggests that firms with lower leverage depend more on equity capital and. therefore. ha\ e a
greater need to reduce information asymmetry. Following the hypotheses developed in
Section 3, we expect that firms with these characteristics have the largest net-benefit of
mandatory IFRS adoption in the UK. In Model 2. the addition of industry dummies subsumes
the relationship between voluntary adoption and leverage. This is not surprising since capital
structures are known to be industry-specific. Another possible reason is that leverage may be
|
jointly capturing the influence of a firm's dependence on equity financing as well as its
coiporate-goveniance structure. The latter effect in the leverage variable may be subsumed by
the industry dummies since corporate-governance mechanisms are documented to be
industry-specific (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Gillian et al. 2003). However, as
I
described in Footnote 12, the leverage coefficient is biased towards zero; we, therefore, keen
leverage in Eq. (2). Model 3 applies only the industry dummies. Notice that the Electronics and
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Table 3
Characteristics of German early adopters of international accounting regimes (IFRS or US-GAAP)
Variable Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FS
DTM
LMV
Resource/utility
Electronics
Construction/manufacture
Retail/transport/media
Non-cyclical consumer goods
Drugs/health care
Intercept
Pseudo R~
Observations
2 0685
[5.01]
-2.6003
[-3.68]
I) 263(1
[3.40]
-3 4120
[-3.77]
0.1143
389
2.002
[3.91]
-1.1 696
[-1.59]
0.3908
[3.89]
-1.6459
[-2.64]
4025
[1.03]
-1.6030
[-5.01]
-1.4058
[ 2.29]
-3.8042
[-4.01]
NA
-4.3002
[-3.80]
0.2425
382
-0.7300
[-1.84]
0.6816
[2.53]
-1.0587
[-5.04]
-1.2533
[-3.44]
-3.3257
[-4.49]
2.1857
[2.10]
0.5224
[3.84]
0.1274
623
This table presents the results of the logistic regression models of German firms' accounting-regime choice with
(-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is set to one for German voluntary IFRS US-GAAP adopters and
zero otherwise and the independent variables are firm characteristics (Model I), both firm-specific characteristics
and industry dummies (Model 2), and industry dummies only (Model 3). FS is foreign sales to total sales. DTM is
long-term debt '(long-term debt + market value). LMVis the natural logarithm of market value. See Table 2 for the
Worldscope industry-classification code for the industry dummies. In Model 2. there is no observation for the
Drug healthcare firms because they all complied either with IFRS or US-GAAP
Drug/Healthcare industries are significantly associated with voluntary adoption. This may be
capturing the adoption of non-domestic standards by the high-tech growth firms listed in the
Neuer Marki of Germany.
5.2 Market reaction
Table 4 presents the abnormal stock returns over three alternative window periods for
portfolios based on UK firms during public announcements of events that changed the
probability of mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU, i.e., the test of H1A.
We apply the Sefcik and Thompson (19S6) approach and weight the UK firms'
portfolios (Eqs. (8)— ( 1 0)) by their Pr values, which are the counter-factual proxies (Eqs.
(4)-(7)) measuring UK firms' willingness to adopt IFRS (Eqs. (l)-(3)). We run a time-
series regression of the UK Pr weighted portfolios' return on the market portfolio return
proxied by FT All Shares Index and a set of event dummies representing the window
periods covering each of the seven sampled events (Eq. (11)). The market-portfolio return
controls for systematic risk and the event dummies capture the risk-adjusted abnormal
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returns pertaining to the corresponding event windows. These risk-adjusted abnormal
returns are conditional on the Pr values through the portfolio weights. The event dummies
are set to one (— 1 ) for announcements that are favorable (unfavorable) to mandatory 1FRS
adoption in the EU and zero otherwise. For brevity, we only show the coefficients and t-
statistics for the event dummies. The last column is based on a dummy variable that
combines the values of all seven events. This enables us to make a joint inference that
aggregates the net effect of Pr on market reaction across all seven events.
Panels A, B. and C of Table 4 show the results of the tests for days -1.0, 1 , days -1,0,
and day 0. respectively, across the full sample. Across all panels of Table 4 the portfolio
weighted on Pr values calculated from Model 1 (Eq. (4)) has a significantly positive
relationship with the net risk-adjusted abnormal returns of all sampled events as shown in
the last column. The net risk-adjusted abnormal returns of this particular portfolio are
0.672%, 0.718%, and 0.485% in panels A. B. and C. respectively. These findings provide
evidence in support of HI A by indicating that UK. firms with higher Pr values, i.e.. the
degree of similarity with the German voluntary adopters, are associated with significantly
higher market reactions relative to their lower Pr counterparts. To evaluate the role of the
industry effect in the share-price response, wc construct Models 2 and 3 (Eqs. (5) and (6)).
(The former adds industry dummies into Model 1 and the latter contains only the industry
dummies.) The net risk-adjusted abnormal returns for the portfolio weighted on Model 2 Pr
are insignificant in panel C and only marginally significant in Panels A and B. The net risk-
adjusted abnormal returns for the portfolio weighted on Model 3 Pr are statistically
insignificant throughout all three panels. The general observation in Table 4 is that industry
dummies only seem to add noise to our analyses of the UK sample despite the finding in
Table 3, which shows that in the German sample industry membership has explanatory
power for voluntary IFRS adoption.
We argue that a firm's willingness to adopt IFRS may be determined by factors that are
common across countries as well as factors that are country-specific due to institutional
differences. Our finding in Table 4, that the Pr values based on Model 1 are associated with
significant net-market reactions, suggest that foreign sales, size, and leverage are common
factors in both Germany and the UK. The observation that Pr values incorporating industry
dummies in Models 2 and 3 exhibit a weaker association with abnormal returns could be
due to the possibility that the industry effects are correlated with country-specific factors
that are only applicable in Germany and not in the UK. We argue that this may be the case
because the industry effects may be capturing the influence of corporate-governance
structure on the adoption of IFRS by German firms. As shown in Table 3, the association
between IFRS adoption in Germany and firm leverage, which is often applied to capture-
corporate governance structure (e.g., Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005), is weakened in the
presence of industry dummies. This provides weak evidence that the industry effect
captures cross-sectional variations in governance structure of German firms and
corroborates existing studies that document such relationship (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber,
2001: Gillian et al.. 2003).
In terms of individual events, notice that the portfolios weighted in Model 1 Pr have a
.'onsistently and significantly positive relationship with risk-adjusted abnormal returns
jissociated with Event 1
.
According to Table 1 , this is the day when the Financial Services
olicy Group, comprised ofrepresentatives of the EU finance ministers, were presented with'
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the European Commission's preferred option for accounting harmonization. This is our
earliest sampled major announcement with favorable implications for the EU decision to
impose mandatory IFRS adoption. Events 2 and 3 are considered to have unfavorable
implications for mandatory adoption of IFRS. We expect the Pr value to be negatively
Table 4
Abnormal slock returns of UK firms conditional on their degree of similarity to German voluntary IFRS adopters
during announcements of decisions to impose mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU
Events 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Net
Dates 28-01-1999 22-03-2000 18-05-211011 09-06-2000 13-06-2000 1 7-07-2000 27-11-20110
Effect Favorable Unfavorable Unfavorable Favorable Favorable Favorable Favorable
Panel A : Window -1 ,0,1
Model 01117 01386 0.01204 00453 -0.00272 0.00725 -000311 0.00672
1 Pr [4 59] [1.97] [4.28] fl 16] [-1.07] [6.26] [-0.96] [3.14]
Model 0.00344 11111471 0.01644 0.00362 1065 0.01074 -0.012X2 0.00488
2 Pr [3.78] |? 13] [4.48] [1.31] 1 i.87] [10.31] [-2.51] [1.77]
Model -0.00845 0.02054 0.02126 00328 -0 0080S 01300 02309 0.00351
3 Pr [-6.20] [2 04] [664] [2.58] [-4.54] [4.21] [-2.38] [0.84]
Panel B : Window -1,0
Model II 01 3X1 01 soil 00034 11110459 -0.0057 00867 0.00134 0.00718
1 Pr [8.74] [1.55] [3 02] [1 18] [-10 48] [12.46] [1.98] [2.55]
Model 0.00434 0.01947 0.01298 0.00374 -0.00833 0.00948 -0.00570 0.00573
2Pr [6.94] [2.31] [3.59] [1.36] 1 6.84] [13.91] | 8.60] [1.84]
Model 0.00872 02762 01074 00345 01003 0.00945 -0.00953 0.00527
3 Pr [-4.86] [2.27] [4.60] [2.76] [-9.39] [10 12] [-10.55] [1.11]
Panel C Window
Model 0.01592 0.00154 0.01284 -0.00072 -0.00569 00X68 0.00136 0.00485
1 Pi [28.87] [2.87] [20.98] 1 1.21] [-10.26] [12.47] [2.00] [1.76]
Model 0.00487 00754 0.01794 0.00007 -0.00981 0.00951 -0.00567 0.00353
2Pr [9.09] [14.31] [30.25] [0.11] [-18.23] [13.93] [-8.56] [1.07]
Model 0.00628 01044 02552 00228 -0 00050 00950 -0 00944 0.00327
3Pr [-8.75] [14.55] [31.89] [258] [-13.17] [10.20] [-10.44] [0.72]
This table presents the abnormal stock returns and (-statistics (in brackets) ofUK firms during announcements of
mandatory IAS adoption in the EU based on the Sefcik and Thompson ( 1986) weighted portfolio approach over the
test period of 01/01/1999 to 31/12/2000. The portfolios are weighted by the counter-factual proxy for willingness
to adopt IFRS based on three models. Each model is estimated using a German sample where the dependent
variable is set to one lor German voluntary IFRSTJS-GAAP adopters and zero otherwise and the independent
variables are firm characteristics, which include foreign sales, leverage, and size (Model I), both firm
characteristics and industry dummies (Model 2). and industry dummies only (Model 3) The time-series returns of
the weighted portfolios are regressed over the test period on market portfolio returns proxied by FT All Shares
Index and a set of event dummies representing the window period covering each of the seven sampled events. The
event dummies are set to one(- 1 ) for announcements thai are favorable (unfavorable) to mandatory IAS adoption
in the EU and zero otherwise. Each column shows the coefficients estimated for the corresponding events and the i-
statistics adjusted for hcteroskedasticily. The last column is based on a dummy variable that combines the values ol
all sc\cn events. Panel A shows the results when a three-day event window is used (- 1.0.1 ). Panel Ft shows the
results when a two-day event window is used (- 1 .0) and panel (' shows the results when only the actual evenl day
is used (0)
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associated with market reaction to these cases. By setting the corresponding event dummies to
-1 over the measurement windows, the anticipated negative relationships will appear with
positive signs in our analysis. Notice that portfolios weighted on the Pr values calculated from
all three models yields a significantly positive relationship with the risk-adjusted abnormal
returns associated with Event 3 across all three panels. The results for Event 2 are also mostly
significantly positive. These findings confirm that UK firms with higher similarity to German
voluntary IFRS adopters experience a market reaction that is relatively more negative (for
events 2 and 3 ) than those with lower Pr values. Events 4 to 7 are all considered to be favorable
to EU mandatory IFRS adoption. Nevertheless, then results are generally mixed as they vary
across event windows and models. In particular, events 5 and 7 are generally associated with
negative returns contrary to our expectations. However, it is not uncommon in studies that use
public announcement dates to observe that the ability of events to capture changes in
expectations tend to decrease through time and that some events are associated with returns
that are counter intuitive (e.g.. Armstrong et al., 2006, Table 5 panel A). This is due to the
challenge of identifying events that only change expectations regarding the issue under
investigation and the tendency of later announcements only to re-confirm their earlier
counterparts. Therefore, we focus our primary inference on the net effect and restrict the
discussion of individual events to the robustness tests in Section 5.3.3.
5.3. Robustness texts of market reaction
To enhance the robustness of our findings in Table 4 we conduct additional tests on the
relationship between our counter-factual proxy for the willingness to adopt and short term
market-reaction tests. First, we examine if our findings also hold in the intersection sample
with IBES, which we use in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 to test long-run changes in cost of equity
for H1B. Second, we apply an alternative approach to further control for possible
correlation with industry membership. Third, we examine the sensitivity of the results to the
identification of specific events. Finally, we regress the market reaction on each
characteristic of Model 1 in order to establish whether the results are driven entirely by
one of the three characteristics.
5.3.1. IBES Intersection sample
As explained in Section 4.6, our tests of short-run market reaction in Table 4 are based
on a full sample while tests of long-run changes in cost of equity are based on a smaller
sample subject to IBES data-availability constraints. We also implement the market-
reaction test using the IBES sample for two reasons. First, if the short-run market reaction
(HI A) and long-run changes in cost of equity (H2B) tests are to be mutually
complementary, then the findings for the former based on a larger sample should also
hold in the smaller sample in which wc test the latter. Second, if the market-reaction results
I also exist in the IBES intersection sample, this will mitigate the possibility that our findings
in Table 4 are driven by smaller funis not covered by the IBES database. In Table 5 panel A,
j
we show that the relationship between announcement returns and the counter-factual proxy
i (Pr) estimated from firm-specific characteristics (Model 1 . Eq. (4)) holds even in the smaller
;
IBES sample. Notice that the net risk-adjusted abnormal returns in the last column is
0.586% and statistically significant.
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Table 5
Robustness lest of the connection between the similarity to German voluntary 1FRS adopters and abnormal stock
returns
Panel A: 1BES sample
Events Net
Model I Pr 0.0092i 0.01441 0.01698 -0.00753 -0.00606 0.01011 -0.00211 0.00586
[2.66] [1.40] [3.54] [-12.70] [-6.15] [2.71] [-0.53] [1.95]
Panel B: Controlling for industry effects
Events 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Net
Model 1 Pr 0.01 386 0.0107 0.00577 000327 -0.00068 0.00171 0.00380 0.00593
[5.52] [2.08] [3 62] [0.99] [-0.5 5] [1.67] [3.35] [3.71]
Panel C: Net abnormal returns excluding individual events
Event excluded: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Model 1 Pr 0.00580 0.00533 0.00572 0.0086 0.00858 0.00663 0.00793
[2.37] [2.71] [2 34] [2.96] [3.87] [2.76] [3.62]
Panel D: Portfolios build on individual characteristics
MV DTM FS
Window - 1 . 0. 1 0(10077
[2.91]
-0.00315
[-0.75]
0.00166
[1.67]
Window -1,0 0.00061
[1.83]
-0 1)11427
[-0.85]
0.00279
[3.00]
Window 0.00026
[0 721
-0.00323
[-0.81]
0.00299
[4 13]
This table presents the abnormal stock returns and /-statistics (in brackets) ofUK firms during announcements of
mandatory IAS adoption in the EU based on the Sefcik and Thompson ( 1 986 ) w eighted portfolio approach over the
test period of 01/01/1999 to 31/12/2000. Panel A provides the results over the days -1,0, I window of the seven
events and their net effecl foi the portfolio weighted by Pr value that is estimated from Model 1 (Eq. (4)) using the
1BES sample. Panel B provides the results o\ er the days - 1 . 0, I window of the seven events and their net effect for
the portfolio weighted by Pr value that is estimated from Model 1 (Eq (4|| using the full sample. In this case. 25
industry dummies based on Worldscope classification are applied during the formation of the weighted portfolio to
control for industry effect (see Section 5.3.2). Panel C provides the results over the days - 1, 0. 1 window for the
net effect after excluding each of the seven individual events in turn for the portfolio weighted by Pr value
estimated from Model I (Eq (4)) using the full sample. Panel D shows the results over days -1,0, I, days -1.0.
and da> windows of the net effect of all seven events for portfolios weighted by market capitalization (MV).
leverage (DTM) and foreign sales (FS) using the full sample. In Panels A to D. the time-series daily returns of the
weighted portfolios over the test period are regressed on market portfolio returns proxied by FT All Shares Index
and a set of event dummies representing the test window for each of the seven sampled events. The event dummies
are set to one (- 1 ) for announcements that are favorable (unfavorable) to mandatory 1FRS adoption in the EU and
zero otherwise. All /-statistics have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
5.3.2. Alternative control for industry effects
The analyses in Section 5.2 indicate that the association between Pr value and
announcement returns is more pronounced when the former is estimated only with firm-
specific characteristics, i.e.. Model I (Eq. (4)). This relationship deteriorates once industry
membership is incorporated into the Pr estimation. As mentioned earlier, it is possible that
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the industry effect is capturing factors correlated with governance, which is more important
in determining IFRS adoption choice in Germany and, therefore, less transferable to the UK
setting. To rule out the possibility that the announcement returns associated with the Pr
value that we proxied by firm-specific characteristics are driven by industry effects, we
address the influence of industry membership in the construction of weighted portfolios
under the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) approach. To implement this, we add 25 industry
dummies based on Worldscope classification to the F matrix in Eq. (8) so that the portfolio
weights generated in Wp
r
of Eq. (9) account for information pertaining to the Pr value
based on Model 1 that is orthogonal to industry effects. Table 5 panel B presents the market-
reaction tests based on this alternative industry-control approach for the days -1.0. 1
window across the seven events individually and the net effect. The results are broadly
consistent with those in Table 4. The last column, showing a net risk-adjusted abnormal
return of 0.593%, is significant at the 1% level. Thus, our short-run market-reaction test for
H1A remains robust even when controlling for industry effects.
5.3.3. Sensitivity to individual events
The market-reaction study of this paper is similar to Comprix et al. (2003) and Armstrong
et al. (2006), in that it relies on identifying events that changed the likelihood ofmandatory
IFRS in the EU. In this study we argue that expectations regarding mandatory IFRS adoption
in the EU were formulated mainly in 1999 and 2000 based on the arguments we presented m
Section 4.4. Comprix et al. (2003) use events from 2000 to 2002 but conclude that their
empirical evidence shows that only those events that were early in this period had significant
news content. In the intersect period of 2000 we identify the same events but we interpret the
events where IOSCO endorsed IFRS conditionally (Events 2 and 3) as unfavorable, which is
different in direction to Comprix et al. (2003). Our classification builds on comments in the
Financial Times in the weeks around the conditional endorsement as described in
Section 4.4.
|g We believe our identification and classifications of events is correct but
acknowledge that some events are open to interpretation. To ensure the robustness of our
results, we exclude each of the seven events in turn from our analyses. Table 5 panel C shows
that regardless of which event is excluded, the net market reaction remains statistically
significant to at least the 5% level. In other words, our findings in Table 4 are not driven by
any individual event. Even when we exclude Events 2 and 3 simultaneously, the net market
i reaction remains significant at the 10% level (and at the 1% level when we control for
industry effects). For brevity we do not tabulate these additional results.
5.3.4. Sensitivity to individual components
In this study we have chosen to characterize a firm by it's similarity to a German
voluntary adopter by using the Pr value as a measure of similarity. Recall that the Pr
estimated from Model 1 (Eq. (4)) consists of three components: i.e., market capitalization,
|
leverage, and foreign sales. Our analyses in Table 3 show that these firm-specific
characteristics are significantly associated with voluntary adoption in Germany. In using the
Pr value, we essentially capture information contained in these components as well as their
See Financial Times the 25th May 2000. p. 2. "Brussels' lost voice" tor a more detailed discussion of the
.implication of events in this period.
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relative weights in determining voluntary adoption. To determine whether the relationship
between Pr value and announcement returns is dominated by an individual component, we
construct weighted portfolios based on these firm-specific characteristics and conduct
market-reaction tests using the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) approach. To implement this,
we substitute the Pr vector in the F matrix of Eq. (8) with vectors of the values of market
capitalization, leverage, and foreign sales. This results in three separate sets of portfolio
weights in the IV matrix of Eq. (9). Table 5 panel D, summarizes the results of the net
abnormal returns across all events associated with each specific characteristic from the main
model. Notice that the coefficients of market capitalization and foreign sales are positive
and the coefficients for leverage are negative. Thus, the direction of the relationship
between the net market reaction and each of these component variables in panel D of
Table 5 is consistent with the direction of their association with voluntary non-local GAAP
adoption in Table 3. This implies that all three components contribute to the overall effect
captured by the Pr value in the expected direction."' In terms of statistical significance, the
foreign-sales and market-capitalization components vary in degrees depending on the test
windows. The leverage component is not significant in any test windows. The fact that the
Pr value is more powerful than its individual components in capturing market reaction
implies that it contains information associated with voluntary non-local GAAP adoption
beyond these components and it is not driven by any of them individually.
In summary, the results of the short-term market reactions support HI A. Finns with a
high willingness to adopt voluntarily experience a positive (negative) market reaction on
days that increased (decreased) the likelihood of mandatory 1FRS, although the strength of
the evidence depends on assumptions made in connection to events that changed the
likelihood of mandatory IFRS. As described earlier, the drawbacks to short-run market-
reaction tests are the identification and classification of events. Thus, to increase the
robustness of our conclusion, in the next section we test a parallel hypothesis, H1B, using a
different methodology that does not rely on identifying specific events.
5.4. Long-run changes in the cost oj equity
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics on the changes between the pre-( January 1996 to
December 1998) and post-(October 2001 to September 2004) decision periods in the
implied cost of equity and control variables used for the analysis of the long-term effect of
mandatory IFRS.
The descriptive statistics reveals a general upward time trend in the implied cost of
equity, since the changes from the pre to the post period are significantly positive when
measured in both the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) abnormal earnings valuation
model (AICEoj) and the Easton (2004) PEG valuation model (AICEPEG). This time trend is
consistent with the findings of Daske (2006) in a German sample, Lee, Ng. and
Swaminathan (2004. Table 1) in G7 countries, and Botosan and Plumlee (2005. Fig. 1 ) in
the US. Changes to the proxies for size (AMV) and profitability (AOPM) are insignificant.
On the other hand, increases in book-to-market value (ABM) and debt-to-market value
We also applied industry control based on 5 3 2 and obtained similar results.
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Table 6
Descriptive statistics on changes in implied cost of capital and control s arables
AICEoj AlCEpH , AMV ABM ADTM ASG AOPM
Mean 0.028 0.036 0.004 0.304 0. 1 56 -23.359 1.951
StDev 0.173 0.116 0.095 546 0426 84.263 81.891
/-statistics (Mean) 3.505 6.721 0912 12.058 - 93
1
-6.003 0.516
Observations 469
This table present descriptive statistics on changes in the calculated implied cost of equity according to the Ohlson
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) abnormal earnings growth model i\ICE, ,, ) and the Easton (20114) PEG model
(AICE,,,.,,). AA/I'is relative change in the natural logarithm of market value \B\l is the change book-to-market
value. ADTM is the change in long-term debt to market value. ASG is the change in sales in growth. AOPM is the
change to the operational margin. The changes are calculated as the difference in a 36-month median between the
pre-announcement period (January 1996 to December 1998) and post-announcement period (October 2001 to
September 2004).
(ADM) and decreases in sales growth (ASG) are significant, which indicate a decline in
growth and a rise in borrowing between the pre- and post- decision periods.
Table 7 presents the results of the analysis on long-run changes in implied cost of equity
subsequent to the decision to impose mandatory IFRS adoption across the EU.
We apply cross-sectional regressions (Eq. (15)) of changes in implied cost of equity
capital (AICEqj or AICEpeg) on the Pr, which is the counter-factual proxy for willingness
to adopt IFRS controlled by relative changes in market value, changes in book-to-market
value (ABM), changes in debt-to-market value (ADTM). changes in sales growth (ASG).
and changes in operating profit margin (AOPM). The dependent variables and control
variables are calculated as their difference in three-year median value between pre- and
post-decision periods. The Pr value is calculated based on Models 1 and 2, where the former
is based only on firm characteristics and industry dummies are added to the latter. Model 3
is excluded for brevity since its performance is weak as shown in Table 4. Panels A and B
presents the results based on AICEOJ and AICEPeg respectively as the dependent variable.
In both panels A and B of Table 7. the intercepts of all regressions are significantly
positive, which confirms the background upward trend of implied cost of equity capital
(e.g., Daske. 2006). In panel A. the long-run changes in the implied cost of equity capital
obtained from the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) abnormal earnings growth model
have a significantly negative relationship with the Pr value estimated from Model 1, which
is evidence in support of H1B. This relationship is significant both before and after the
addition of control variables, indicating the robustness of our findings. Panel B shows that
the coefficients for the Pr value in Model 1 are also significantly negative when using the
Easton (2004) PEG valuation model. This result is also significant in both univariate and
multivariate regressions, indicating our findings are robust even to changes in proxies of
implied cost of equity. In general, the results in Table 7 demonstrate that UK firms that share
similarities in foreign sales, leverage, and size with the German early adopters have
significantly lower increases in the cost of capital between the pre- and post-decision
periods. The results are not subsumed by control variables that correlate with the implied
cost of equity. Since two of these control variables, leverage and size, are components of the
Model 1 itself, this implies that the significant relationship between Pr and changes in
implied cost of equity are not simply driven by changes in the values of these two
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Table 7
Changes in implied cost of'equity capital of UK firms conditional on their degree of similarity to German voluntary
IFRS adopters following the decision to impose mandatory IFRS adoption in EU
Intercept Pr AMV ABM ADTM ASG AOPM
Panel A: A1CE,,,
Model 1 0.07903
[4.04]
-0.10642
[-3.01]
0.07382 -0.09826 -0.52616 -0.01809 0.03086 -0.00000 -0.00008
[3.69] [-3.08] [-5.00] [-0.87] [2 74] [-0.01] [-0.93]
Model 2 0.03436
[2.78]
-0.01297
[-0.63]
0.03921 -0.00952 -0 522X5 -0.01660 0.03436 0.00000 -0.00007
[2.78] [-0.52] [-4.91] [-0.78] [2.96] [0.01] [-0.79]
Panel B dICEPEC
Model 1 0.06867
[3.79]
-0.06867
[-210]
0.06272 -0.05876 -0.56048 -0.01881 0.02250 -0.00004 0.00004
[3.49] [-2.10] [-5.66] [-0.93] [2.25] [-0.49] [0.47]
Model 2 0.03384
[3 112]
0.00368
[0.19]
03036 000787 -0 56029 -0.01862 0.02484 -0.00004 0.00004
[2.90] [0.48] [-5.64] [-0.91] [2.42] [-0.48] [0.55]
This table presents the coefficient and ^-statistics (in brackets) of cross-sectional regressions of changes in implied
cost of equity on the degree of similarity to German voluntary adopters (Pr) controlled by changes in market value
(AMV), changes in book-to-market value (ABA/), changes in debt-to-market value (ADTM), changes in sales
growth {ASG), and changes in operating profit margin (AOPM)- The implied cost of equity is calculated based on
the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) abnormal earnings valuation model ( AICE,,,) in panel A and the Easton
(2004) PEG valuation model ( AlCEr ,.,,) in Panel B. The changes in implied cost of equity and control variables are
calculated as the difference in a 36-month median between the pre-announcement period (January 1996 to
December 1998) and post-announcement period (October 2001 to September 2004). The Pr value is calculated
based on two models Each model is estimated using a German sample where the dependent variable is set to one
for German voluntary 1FRS/US-GAAP adopters and zero otherwise and the independent variables are firm
characteristics, which includes foreign sales, leverage, and size (Model 1) and both firm characteristics and
industry dummies (Model 2). The ^-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
components between the pre- and post-decision periods." Although Daske (2006) and
Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) did not confirm a significant decrease in cost of equity
subsequent to adoption, our study shows that UK firms sharing similar characteristics to
German voluntary adopters experienced a significantly lower increase in their cost of equity
subsequent to the decision of mandatory IFRS adoption across the EU. Higher Pr firms in
the UK are, therefore, associated with higher economic benefits from this regulatory
decision relative to their lower Pr counterparts. The elimination of self-selection bias in the
21 As a further test of the robustness we also include changes in foreign sales to total sales between pre- and post-
decision period as a control variable. This does not change the results. The /-statistics on the Pr coefficients are -
3.12 and 2.41 when estimating the cost of capital according to the abnormal earnings growth and PEG models
respectively. It is left out of the tabulated results as there is no theoretical or empirical evidence for a connection
between foreign sales and the cost of capital
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mandatory setting we study could account for this difference with previous studies of
voluntary accounting-policy-choice setting. Finally, in both panels A and B of Table 7, the
Pr values based on Model 2 exhibit an insignificant relationship with long-run changes in
implied cost of equity. This is consistent with our interpretation of Table 4 that the addition
of industry dummies only adds noise to the analyses of the UK sample. It also strengthens
the argument that industry effects may be more important in capturing the first-mover
advantage in Germany than in the UK, perhaps because it is correlated with corporate
governance structure that is more important in explaining 1FRS adoption choice in
Germany than the UK.
5.5. Robustness tests oflong-run changes in cost of equity
To enhance the robustness of our findings in Table 7 we conduct additional robustness
tests on the relationship between our counter-factual proxy for the willingness to adopt and
the long-run changes in the cost of equity. First, we include industry dummies in our tests to
control for possible correlation with industry membership. Second, we control for other
disclosures than those presented in the annual and interim reports. If our results are robust
we should find the strongest relationship among firms with the least other disclosures, as
IFRS adoption is only related to the annual and interim reports. Third, we test whether the
relationship is less pronounced among ADR firms that already indirectly comply with an
international accounting regime. Finally, we test if this relationship only exists around the
decision period (1999 and 2000) by reperforming the test just before this period.
5.5.7. Controlling for industry effects
Although we control for changes in factors generally known to be correlated with risk, it
remains uncertain whether our regression model sufficiently controls for cross-sectional
differences in firm characteristics. Many firm characteristics are correlated with industry
membership and thus controlling for industry fixed effects enables us to test whether the
relationship is independent of these. Table 8 panel A includes 25 industry dummies based on the
major industry classification in Worldscope (the coefficients on industry dummies are not
reported). The results show that the relationship is slightly stronger after controlling for the
industry effect. Thus, the lack ofcontrol for industry effects is not responsible for the relationship
between the implied cost of equity and the counter-factual proxy for willingness to adopt.
1 5.5.2. Disclosures unrelated to IFRS
IFRS is limited to disclosures in the annual and interim reports. Although these
statements are among the most important a firm makes it is not the only way to
communicate with the market. If other disclosures are substantial the annual and interim
reports would become relatively less important. Therefore, the economic consequences of
mandatory IFRS are expected to be less pronounced. Following Leuz (2003) and Lang and
Limdholm (1996) we use analyst following as a proxy for the level of other disclosures. We
partition the sample into two sub-samples, following Botosan (1997), and define low
following as below the median of the sample (3. 5 analysts) and high following as above the
sample median. The number of analysts following the firm is defined as the average yearly
following from 1998 to 2002 obtained from IBES.
?72 H.B. Christensen el al. The International Journal ofAccounting 42 (2007) 341-379
S
0.
O
<
o
</J
<
>>
3
—
s
H
U ~
o <
w
u
—
U
c
£ s
(0
u <
o
ao
B
ra
~ >
u 5£ i
a
V,
U
a.
o
T3
re a
U <
a!
U.
C?
« C*
c a
<
>
c C
re
c
4>
O
o
&
.£ Qu
a
en
U
J3
EX
C uU u
£
•_l
-C
C
=
re
u
c/a
s
re
o
J2
s.
U
t/i
r
4>
X S
[flU 32
-g3 °p OS
g g 8 2
= — = —
,5ii
| 5 2 = Sg§ ?
8 f d 7 d f 8 2oil i iid2
-
- d "' 5 •* 5 r|lili d £d £ g od i
on
,
,
m
,
,
~ — ~ \ET
O
,
T
,
.
^C rJ tn ^m (3 * oV, H C —
; M rl
— C
r^
,
,n
yz — in
I i I I
O
. I
I
o
I
(N
, ,
sc
,
,
r- —^ r- z:
E <1 E =
d 7 o «
O
,
,t-~,
,
£i <* JN
3>
3C *CO
,
3C
,
"' O- CJ T2 in 2 i.
_ rH
_; r-i
-
I
=
I
I IT
=c 5T —
— ZSj
2C 0>O m
,O^Ogo
g "0 3 m
c Ci d &
d 7 o 7
oaou «o
.s c
S
.4.
_3 E
£ 5: o
S E
s — O
2 »< -o
— 3
J o
o
,
,
?I
rn
,
,
so
Is
11
Tf
,
,
I
H.B. Christensen et al. The International Journal oj Accounting 42 (31)07) 341-379 373
00 r-
5 ""
11111111
•/-, no fs) — ^_O
,
,
O _ — 2 NO
^r i*
CO O ~ X>
EF c o
3
"3
? a "8 b£ "g
"2 2 9 .a
^ "H o. 3 <*- = " -a ii -
^> Z "73 _ v >„ r £ caS
o -3 a - >-
5 vi
o 2 -c
~
-1 i ° .
OJ
NO rw-i
—
,
on
00 m -i
o
o- ST —
dtid
CN w — I—
-"fo
^§
"**>
as rn
s - g
° o
I
o
' O a
3 c
— <u
C5 -
> -e « e
i> -
.2 = D
g 2 y -£5 "3 n
5 t°
£ S E
Cfl
5 c °
,- O «
o, c o _ = >,* j= .2 B S =
* i JS^.2 f" d & = C r- X
<l> u ,.V — -^ ., a h " f s3 ^ </) 5 H
3
o
_5 w =
1 -2 ^ S
2 <« o <*-1
3 CO C3
l> iS ^w -— ST
ra d, ° -
*- - C ,4)
-o
c —
sis
<
a: -g
U
0)
S | « £
-:
to
i J_ i
©
^ m „ so ;7p oo
^ T! oc °c IT, -
o V
2 m «!
o i
^ %
—
i <si
o
c E —p s -
3 E e - ^ a . u
2 5 g •!= tt S u Q 'C on
»jj- a« ,'« ,5.sfiJ33W1-; ^_ ,— ,= >
°- a _ O x aj 2 so ra C
ME^E-2 " "3 S>
"S
a-.E ^ « ra '5 - "2 -2
sl: <u fr,iuiz)"OOScN3
- ^
-a
c o
-
o g
i— <
rt o
O o
o
n_/
oi,
s s
<•"' OC NO V,?n
,—
,
— On
,
,
r-
6 2cir,6ida
5 .S
Crt <u '-J oj u^
QJ Ctt « J= —
TO
J1
y g
T3 e .
S s H £
<k E
o s
u
"m •£ ~ Jr ^
h t. ra — _ o c
S =3 = o i -9 -S | « a S I I
= S ^ £ a. «?l-|g S -S
o ^
o
O r^i 0O
,—
,
c>
,
,
m o
oo —
'
pn] ""* r- ^
2 5 ^ S °° § ?
1«
o
I I
a
A vm
0)
w 00
Cj
> E > >
« w _o o
E q: £ "o4J q w
u
-a
o
E
<
Q 'SISi
<
c c
C3 c"5 CQ
a c
*o 00 S
^ s C X O
o " -1- '- °° c '"
1-^ Is c
s-i.fi s-i-il-e
3 a u u Qj .— oo
ra o +-1 u
-
o ° „ C
^: ^ o >
9 .2 I S
to oj 1>
«-3^i Sis >. s S3 a «H ^M £ ah v " JS
Sio» 2-2 C.-E §^ t"
~ — «3 > n o_ b "tj ra Ji
ti tt ^ ao nc —- q—if-^d^
5 5"
r ~ 3 c
jc £ O n 5
'^
^ -^! ^'
t» t=; r- -E
| £- & a
•S n « c
m 5
o §
1 O «
§1
s b ; * o : •« .1 § * s? S c Q. u - ^ ,3 w - -*j
P S = (u p ^ E r
'
O nU
a
s
- O
"O r-j
3 *a
-u
o
-c > _
S £> ° F
a. oo nj
511
-
ex
374 H.B. Christensen el al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 42 (2007) 341-379
Table 8 panel B reports the findings. The absolute size of the coefficient on the counter-
factual proxy for willingness to adopt is almost three times larger in the low analyst-
following group than in the high analyst-following group using the Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) abnormal earnings growth model to estimate the implied cost of equity, and
twice as large using the Easton (2004) PEG model. In the low analyst-following group the
relationship is significant at the 1% level (p-value 0.006), whereas it is only significant at
the 10% level (p-value 0.087) in the high analyst-following group when estimating the
implied cost of equity using the abnormal earnings growth model (the difference is
significant at the 10% level). When the PEG model is used, the relationship is marginally
significant (/;-value 0.075) in the low analyst-following group and not significant (p-value
0.238) in the high following group (the difference is not significant at conventional levels).
These results are consistent with the findings in Botosan (1997). The additional disclosure
imposed by IFRS mainly benefits firms with low analyst following. The results are
consistent with the relationship between long-run changes in the cost of capital and the
counter-factual proxy for willingness to adopt being caused by changes to the annual and
interim reports, which is associated with IFRS, and not with an omitted correlated variable.
5.5.3. Including a control group
Until now we have excluded cross-listed firms from the sample. The logic behind this
approach is that firms that are cross-listed are under more scrutiny from foreign investors
and analysts and therefore are not on a comparable basis with the rest of the UK sample. In
the UK, the majority of cross-listed firms have ADR-listings in the US. These firms
generally produce reconciliations of income and book value of equity to US-GAAP. That is
to say, these firms are indirectly already complying with an international accounting
regime. Leuz (2003) provides empirical evidence that the difference in economic
consequences of voluntary adoption of IFRS or US-GAAP is statistically insignificant.
As a robustness check, we test if the connection between our counter-factual proxy and
the change in the implied cost of capital is indeed less pronounced among ADR-listed firms.
If the relationship is equally significant among the ADR-listed firms, which already disclose
earnings and book value of equity under an international accounting regime, this could
imply that the connection arises by chance or is driven by some unobserved correlated
variable and not mandatory adoption of IFRS. On the other hand, the observation that this
relationship only exists among firms that do not have an ADR listing would mitigate these
concerns. We identified 43 firms that are ADR-listed in the US stock market, and meet all
data requirements described in Section 4.6. The number of ADR-listed firms is too small to
partition the sample based on this variable but large enough for us to add them to the main
sample with a dummy variable (ADR) and an interaction term between ADR and the
counter-factual proxy for willingness to adopt (Pr*ADR). Table 8 panel C reports the
results. The coefficient on Pr*ADR is positive both when estimating the implied cost of
equity, using the abnormal-earnings growth and PEG models, but only significant in the
former case. Regardless of estimation model, the relationship between the change in the cost
of equity and the counter-factual proxy for ADR-listed firms (the coefficient on Pr and
Pr*ADR together) is positive and insignificant (p-value 0.377 and 0.647, respectively).
These results imply that the connection is not present in the ADR-listed control group and are
consistent with the counter-factual proxy for willingness to adopt only explaining the change
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in the implied cost of equity when the firm does not already comply with an international
accounting regime.
5.5.4. Non-decision making period
If the relationship between our counter-factual proxy of the UK firms' willingness to
adopt and long-run changes in cost of equity exist by default and is not specific to the
decision period we examine, then we would wrongly infer the results in Table 7 as a support
for H1B. To mitigate this concern, we measure the long-run changes in cost of equity
around a non-decision-making period and replicate the tests in Section 5.4. We use the latest
possible period before the decision period (1999 and 2000) and restrict our tests to PEG
estimates of the cost of equity to limit the loss of observations due to data availability. The
results presented in Table 8 panel D show that the coefficient on the Pr value, contrary to
expectations, is positive but insignificant (p-value 0.27). Including ADR firms as a control
group does not change this result and the interaction term between the ADR dummy and the
Pr value is insignificant (p-value 0.13). Finally, the coefficient on the Pr value is higher in
absolute terms for firms with a high analyst following (although insignificant), inconsistent
with the relationship being driven by changes to the annual and interim reports. Thus,
replication of the test just prior to the decision period does not suggest that the relationship
between Pr and changes to the cost of capital exists by default.
5.5.5. The technology bubble
Our overall study period spans from 1996 to 2004 during which the technology bubble
occurs. Since this phenomenon is likely to be sector-specific, the observations that our results
for the short-run market-reaction analyses (Table 5 panel B) and for the long-run changes in
cost of equity-capital analyses (Table 8 panel A) remain robust after controlling for industry
effect indicate that they are not driven by the bubble. In addition, the long-run change in cost of
equity capital is computed from the pre-announcement period (January 1996 to December
1998) to the post-announcement period (October 200 1 to September 2004), which is likely to
exclude the peak period of this bubble. Finally, we also applied ADR-listed firms as a control
group in the robustness check for the analyses of long-run changes in cost of equity capital
(Table 8 panel C). Since the ADR control group is also likely to be affected by the bubble, it is
unlikely that our findings would be driven by this particular phenomenon.
5.6. Implications
The inferences from both methodologies used in this study are consistent with signif-
icant differences across the population of UK quoted firms in the perceived net benefit of
mandatory IFRS adoption.
These results highlight another dimension of the implication of IFRS adoption not
explored in existing literature, which suggest either a reduced cost of capital (Leuz &
Verrecchia, 2000) or no effect (Daske, 2006; Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005). Contrary to these
|
views, we conclude that IFRS adoption has resulted in winners and losers. Rather than
;
portraying IFRS as a uniformly good thing or a uniformly bad thing, it is important to
recognize that some firms gain and some firms lose from complex, mandatory-accounting
changes such as IFRS. This seems to us to make sense, because if all UK firms would have
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benefited from a regime like IFRS then it would have been adopted by the Accounting
Standards Board (ASB) years ago.
Although our results do not imply that the cost of capital has been reduced or increased
as a consequence of mandatory IFRS in general, the knowledge that significant differences
exist among firms is important when considering costs and benefits to society.
Implementing mandatory IFRS has the potential to redistribute wealth among agents in
society through changes to the cost of capital. If the sole aim of the policy is to reduce the
cost of capital, the best solution might be optional compliance as opposed to mandatory
compliance. Optional compliance would allow firms to assess their own net benefits before
committing to IFRS.
This paper also makes a methodological contribution by showing that the economic
consequences of mandatory-accounting regulation in one economy may be partially
predictable by using information contained in the accounting-policy commitments in a
similar economy. This is a particularly interesting finding in the setting we use. because
Germany and the UK differ in their approach to accounting regulation. Germany is generally •
classified as a code-law country and the UK is generally classified as a common-law country
(Nobes, 2006). The fact that the same factors are significant determinants of benefits to
international accounting harmonization suggests that benefits are driven by firm-specific .
characteristics rather than or maybe in combination with the quality of the national legal :
frameworks firms are departing from. Prior studies have focused on the quality of national
regulation (Comprix et al., 2003). Future research in this area could examine how differences
and links between country-specific and firm-specific factors affect the cost of capital changes
caused by regulatory changes like mandatory IFRS adoption.
Finally, the finding that UK firms with a higher willingness to adopt the IFRS if given a
chance are also those that would benefit from additional disclosure leads to several
interesting questions. First, what is the disclosure quality of these firms? Are these firms that
supply lower-quality information by choice or are these firms with increased demand for
information due to growing investor interest? Second, if such firms knew that improvements
in disclosure will benefit them, then what action did they take when voluntary adoption of
IFRS was not allowed in the UK? To what extent are they allowed to voluntarily disclose
more information under existing UK-GAAP? Could they have compensated with high-
quality auditors? Finally, if UK-GAAP is assumed to be close to IFRS, then why should the
decision of mandatory IFRS adoption incur economic consequences? Could our empirical
evidence imply an overestimation of the degree of similarity between the two sets of
standards? Alternatively, could any given differences between UK-GAAP and IFRS
(although small relative to the difference between HGB and IFRS) have varying
implications across UK firms? These questions are worthy of further study."
6. Summary
In Germany, firms have had the option to comply with an international accounting regime
(IFRS or US-GAAP) instead of domestic standards since 1998 and voluntary adoption is
widespread. In the UK firms have not had this option and compliance with an international
We thank Willem Buijink for suggesting them
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accounting regime is. therefore, very limited and only as a supplement to UK-GAAP. From
2005, IFRS is mandatory in both Germany and the UK as a consequence ofEU regulation. We
use this unique setting to create a counter-factual proxy for UK firms" willingness to adopt
IFRS based on German firms' actual accounting-standard choices, and show that this proxy
can predict cross-sectional variations in the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS
adoption in the UK.
Using an event-study methodology, we find evidence that the stock-price reaction ofUK
firms to announcements favorable (unfavorable) to mandatory IFRS adoption is positively
(negatively) related to our proxy for UK firms' willingness to adopt IFRS. To increase
robustness we also study the long-run changes to the implied cost of equity ofUK firms after
the decision to mandate IFRS. We find that the change to the implied cost of equity is
negatively related to our proxy for UK firms' willingness to adopt IFRS. Based on these two
methodologies, we infer that cross-sectional variations in the economic consequences of
mandatory IFRS adoption by UK firms can be predicted by their willingness to adopt IFRS
proxied by the degree of similarity in characteristics with German voluntary IFRS and US-
GAAP adopters.
Thus, mandatory IFRS has a different effect on the cost of capital depending on firm
characteristics. Finns with similar characteristics to German voluntary adopters have
greater benefits from international accounting harmonization and in particular from
mandatory IFRS adoption.
This study also provides evidence on the information contained in firms' accounting
policy commitments. We show that commitments made in one country can be used to
predict the economic consequences of mandatory regulation in another country. Of course,
some determinants may be less transferable from Germany to the UK, given the fact that the
two countries investigated differ in their approach to accounting regulation, with the UK's
common-law regulation being more similar to IFRS than Germany's code-law regulation.
Thus, whereas the prior literature generally argues that relative reductions in cost of capital
is related to the quality improvements in the legal framework, this study suggests that
relative benefits are at least partly explained by firm-specific factors.
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Abstract
This study investigates the association between publicly available information disclosed in
the SEO prospectus and offer prices of SEOs, as well as the association between this type of
publicly available information and stock returns subsequent to an SEO after controlling for
self-selection bias. The empirical evidence shows that disclosure of the planned uses of the
SEO proceeds reveals value-relevant information which has been incorporated by the
underwriters in setting the offer prices. Control for self-selection bias appears necessary to
obtain unbiased estimates in the regression model explaining the determinants of offer price in
SEOs.
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1. Introduction
A number of studies have attempted to explain stock returns subsequent to Seasoned
Equity Offerings (SEOs) by using variables that rely on historical accounting information.
Specifically, these studies use historical financial information as potential drivers of post-
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issue stock returns.
1
'" Firms, however, operate in a complex environment where the
investor's needs for information force firms to provide additional information with a
forward-looking orientation. The prospectuses of SEOs, for firms listed on the Athens
Stock Exchange, contain information about the planned uses of the SEO proceeds and the
forecasted earnings.
The planned uses of the SEO proceeds provide information with a forward-looking
orientation that has not been used to explain the post-issue stock return performance. ' The
introduction of the planned uses of the proceeds as additional explanatory variables is
important as it reveals to the stock market the future investments of the issuing firm.
Another important aspect that has been neglected in the case of SEOs is that the external-
financing decision comprises a natural self-selecting event. A firm's intention to seek
external financing, through a rights issue, could itself reveal information about the capital
structure and/or financial performance of the firm. To control for this self-selection-bias
phenomenon, the study includes Heckman's (1979) inverse Mills' ratio in the regression
models examined. This methodology requires that the sample include not only firms that
have issued equity but also firms that have not (i.e. non-issuers).
Cross-sectional regression models are used to investigate the association between the
planned uses of the proceeds disclosed in the SEO prospectus. This includes the price at
which the new shares are offered to the public and the stock returns subsequent to the
seasoned equity offering event. The SEO prospectus discloses the intended uses of the
proceeds, which are desegregated into four different categories: payment of pre-SEO debt,
investments in working capital, investments in fixed assets, and investments in other
companies. The study examines the following research questions: Do the underwriters
efficiently price the SEOs by incorporating in the offer price all publicly available
information, including information with a forward-looking orientation? If they do, then no
association is expected between stock returns subsequent to the SEO event and the forward-
looking information regarding the planned uses of the proceeds. In addition, is self-
selection correction an important variable in explaining offer prices and stock returns?
Loughran and Ritter (1995); Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995); Yoon and Miller, 2002, have focused on
examining the poor stock-price performance in the post-offering period. Loughran and Ritter ( 1995) and Spiess
and Affleck-Graves ( 1 995 ) find that issuers underperfomi their benchmark firms on average about 7% per year in
a 5-year horizon. They attribute the underperformance to the information asymmetry between managers and
investors that allows firms to issue overvalued securities. Other studies, Teoh et al. (1998); Rangan (1998);
Shivakumar (2000), have examined the phenomenon of using an earnings management technique to inflate
earnings prior to seasoned equity offering in order to succeed a positive price reaction at the equity issuance.
Loughran and Ritter ( 1995) find the book-to-market ratio and the market value of equity, as a control for size,
to be the most important determinants of post-issue returns during their sample period. Teoh et al. ( 1998) find a
significant negative association between pre-issue discretionary accruals and two-and three- year post-issue stock
returns. Also that firm size is only marginal by significant in predicting future returns, while the book-to-market
ratio is highly significant. Rangan (1998) finds that discretionary accruals over a one-year period around the
offering are negatively associated with market-adjusted returns in the following year. This finding is robust to the
inclusion of other explanatory variables such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, sales and capital expenditures
I
growth. Shivakumar (2000) documents that abnormal accruals prior to the SEO do not predict future returns
j
above and beyond the book-to-market ratio and the firm size.
Jeanneret (2005) examines the long-run performance of French SEOs by using the intended uses of the
proceeds as a classificatory mechanism and not as explanatory variables.
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The following are the major findings of this study: The planned uses of the proceeds, the
forecast of earnings, and the book value of equity are value-relevant in explaining offer prices.
These findings suggest that underwriters rely on the information disclosed in the prospectus
about capital that has already been invested (i.e., the book value of equity in the year prior to
the SEO), the future investments of the firm (i.e.. the planned uses of the proceeds), and the
forecasts of earnings to set offer prices. The insignificance ofthe intended uses ofthe proceeds
to explain stock returns subsequent to SEOs is consistent with efficient pricing of this
information by the underwriters. The control for self- selection bias is necessary to obtain
unbiased estimates only in the regression model that explains offer prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the equity-
offering process for Greek SEOs. Section 3 presents the research methodology developed to
control for self-selection bias. Section 4 describes the sample and data sources. Section 5
discusses the empirical findings. Section 6 presents additional robustness checks and
Section 7 summarizes the findings.
2. The SEO process
The standard method of increasing share capital for firms listed on the Athens Stock
Exchange (ASE) is through an equity-rights issue. Greek legislation (P.D. 348/1985)
requires that a firm deciding to proceed with a rights issue must call a general assembly of
the shareholders. The announcement must appear in the press at least 20 days prior to the
meeting. A majority of 2/3 of the voting stock is required for the general meeting to reach a
decision to proceed with the offering. After the meeting of the stockholders, firm
management informs the Ministry of Development and the Athens Stock Exchange of its
decision to proceed with the rights issue and waits for their approval. The firm, in
accordance with the requirements of the Commission on Capital Markets and the Athens
Stock Exchange, must publish an SEO prospectus. The firm must have one or more
underwriters, who guarantee the accuracy of information disclosed in the prospectus and
are responsible for disseminating the prospectus to potential shareholders. 4 New
shareholders can subscribe to the capital increase bj buying rights from the old
stockholders. The ASE. through a press release, announces the trading date of the new
shares, which is usually 15 days after the last trading date of the preference rights. In some
cases, it is stated in the prospectus that the leading underwriter has the responsibility to take
up the rights that are neither exercised nor sold/
1
In the period that the share capital increase
occurs, the preference rights are traded on the ASE and market forces determine their price.
4
Underwriters in the Greek stock market are either large banks (i.e.. the National Bank of Greece, Emporiki
Bank. EFG Eurobank, Alpha Bank I or major securities firms.
5 A special element of the rights issue is that the capital increase favors existing shareholders. The rights to
purchase the new shares (preference rights) are sent to old shareholders in the form of a provisional-allotment
letter.
" This is optional. If the underwriter does not take up the rights that are neither exercised nor sold, the firm
could either raise less money than expected or sell the shares not taken up to the public. These decisions are made
up during the shareholders' general meeting when the capital increase is approved.
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3. Methodology
Accounting literature contains a number of studies that have investigated the impact of
self-selection bias in a variety of economic events (Abdel-khalik, I990a,b). Abdel-khalik
(1990a) investigated the significance of self-selection bias resulting from the endogenous
partitioning of firms into good-and-bad-news portfolios and found that the correction for
self-selection bias is an important determinant of security-price reaction at the
announcement of historical accounting earnings. Abdel-khalik (1990b) also examined
the cost to the auditor's client of self-selecting on acquiring management advisory services
(MAS) from the incumbent auditor.
The notion that some firms decide on an SEO and others do not. introduces the issue of
self-selection bias in the analysis. In response to the self-selection problem, the
methodology proceeds by presenting the following two-equation model:
i* = zai -si ( i
)
Y=X
i
p,+u, (2)
where:
/* is a latent variable representing the firm's preference either to make an equity offering
(7=1) or not (1=0).
• Zj is a vector of financial variables influencing this decision.
Kis the economic outcome observed. In this study, Y represents the offer price and the
post-issue stock returns.
X, is a vector of financial variables used to explain the offer price and the post-issue stock
returns.
"),, P, are vectors of coefficients.
•
€{, </, are random error terms.
Eq. (1) specifies a probit regression that models the decision of a firm to conduct
an SEO and determines the presence of self-selection. Eq. (2) models the association
between publicly available information and offer prices or post-issue stock returns.
The presence of self-selection bias causes the error terms e, and u, to be correlated.
This could cause standard OLS estimation procedure on Eq. (2) to yield inefficient
and inconsistent estimates. To estimate the parameters consistently, the estimation
method adopted is the two-stage estimation technique developed by Heckman (1976,
I
1979). 7
The probit model (Eq. (1)) is used to estimate the probability that a firm will make a
seasoned equity offering is a sequential-decision model with partial observability, as
'described in Maddala (1983). In this model, management first decides whether the firm is in
The specification of the two-stage estimation procedure is presented in the appendix of the study.
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need of new capital and then chooses the way to raise the capital needed (equity vs. debt),
which is described as follows.'
prob(issue) = prob(external financing)*prob(issue|external financing)
where:
Z| is a vector of variables that predict external financing.
Zi is a vector of variables that predict preference of issuing equity vs. debt given the need
for external financing.
"
"f l ! Ji are vectors of parameters.
3.1. Variables predicting external financing
The vector (Zi ) of the variables that are used to estimate the probability that a firm will
seek external financing are:
• The PAYOUT RATIO. The lower the ability of a firm to pay dividends, the higher the
probability it will seek external financing (see, for example, Martin and Scott, 1974; and
Marsh, 1982 for the use of the payout ratio as a predictor of the decision to issue equity).
The Financial Slack (FS). Finns with higher financial slack are less likely to issue equity
(Bayless & Diltz, 1991; Ooi, 2000).
Prior SEOs. Finns that had SEOs in the recent past are less likely to need additional'
external financing.
3.2. Variables predicting equity issue over debt
Given that the firm is in need ofnew capital, the following vector (z2 ) of variables is used
to examine whether the finn will issue equity or debt:
STD IND. Standard deviation of ASE general index 252 trading days preceding the
issue. Finns are less likely to issue equity when the market is more volatile (see, Choe.
Masulis, & Nanda, 1993).
SR. The cumulative stock returns 252 trading days preceding the issue. Finns with large
positive returns in the recent past are more likely to issue equity (see, Guo & Mech
2000; Loughran & Rittcr. 1995; Lucas & McDonald, 1990; Marsh. 1982 who havf
shown that finns with large positive abnonnal returns are more likely to issue equity)
AGE. The number of years between the IPO date and the issue announcement date. Thi
more years a finn is listed on the stock market, the higher the likelihood to issw
additional capital.
MV/BV. The market-to-book value of equity ratio. The higher the market-to-book ratii
the lower the probability of equity issue. The market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy fc
In this model we observe a single indicator variable /=/,*A and not /| and I2 individually The binai
variable / is set equal to one if the company conducts an SEO and zero otherwise.
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the level of information asymmetry'. Myers and Majluf (1984); Jung, Kim, and Stulz
(1996) suggests that information asymmetry is higher for firms with higher market-to-
book ratios.
DEBT. Firms with high leverage are more likely to issue equity (see, Jung et al., 1996;
Marsh, 1982; McLaughlin et al.. 1996).
4. Sample selection
The sample of the study consists of 237 SEOs that occurred during the period 1992 to
1999.
9
Sample firms have not been involved in an IPO or SEO the year prior to the offering
and have not conducted multiple SEOs in the same year. Further, firms are included in the
sample if the following items are available: a prospectus, financial statements for the year
prior to the offering, stock prices for at least 252 trading days preceding the SEO and
504 days following the SEO."' The implementation of these selection criteria yields a
sample of 129 firms issuing shares in SEOs."
To develop the partial observability probit model, as described in the methodology
section, a second sample of non-issuing firms is required. A non-SEOfirm is a firm that has
not been involved in an IPO or SEO in the year prior to and the two years after the event date.
The event date is randomly selected (pseudo-issuing date) from the available population of
security trading days over the period 1992-1999.'" The non-issuing firm must have
available financial statements for the previous year and stock prices for at least 252 trading
days prior to the non-issuing day. Each non-issuing observation is chosen only once in each
year. Firms having negative book values of equity are excluded from the sample. These
selection criteria yield a non-issuing sample of 518 non-issuing observations. 14
The fiscal year in which the SEO occurs is year f; thus fiscal year t— 1 is the year prior to the
SEO and fiscal years t + 1 and t + 2 are the one and two years subsequent to the SEO. The
historical accounting information is derived from published financial statements at the end of
fiscal year /- 1
. Information with forward orientation about the planned uses ofSEO proceeds
(i.e.. information about investments in fixed assets, investments in other companies, debt
repayment, and investments in working capital) comes from the SEO prospectus. Forecasted
earnings for year / (the year for which the forecast pertains) are also retrieved from the SEO
prospectus. The information used in this study is hand collected from prospectuses and
publicly available financial statements. Stock prices are retrieved from the ASE database.
Banks, insurance, lease and investment companies have been excluded from the sample.
The methodology of this study requires available stock returns for four years surrounding the offering This
expands the years included in the study from 1990 to 2001.
From the initial sample of 237 SEOs that occurred during the sample period. 36 did not had available financial
information. 34 had an IPO or an SEO in the year preceding the issue. 7 had a negative book value of equity, and
31 did not had available stock prices.
During the 1992— 1999 period the total number of security trading days in the population is 322,308. From
these days, pseudo issuing dates were randomly selected.
Three observations were deleted for having negative book value of equity.
Non-SEO firms have not conducted an equity offering in the three consecutive years surrounding a pseudo-
|
issuing date. The number of issuing vs. non-issuing firms is based on information from the general population of
i the ASE firms. Jeanneret (2005) also classifies as non-issuers firms that have not undertaken an equity issue
within the last 36 months.
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Table 1
Frequency of SEOs over the study period
Year Listed companies SEOs Non-SEOs
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
199^
1998
1999
Total
98
104
145
161
180
182
196
217
3
14
17
6
7
12
17
53
129
16
30
44
34
39
90
123
142
518
J
The number of listed companies on the ASE. excluding banks, insurance, lease and investment companies,
during the sample period. 1992-1999.
Stock returns SR lt and market returns. MR,, are measured for 24 months (504 trading days)
subsequent to the SEO. Appropriate adjustments for stock splits and stock dividends are also
considered. Table 1 shows the frequency of equity issuing and non-issuing firms over the time
period of the study. Most SEOs occur in the years 1993, 1994, and 1999. 1
"''
Table 2 panel A provides descriptive statistics for the 129 issuing and 518 non-issuing
firms included in the probit model. Table 2 shows that issuing firms have substantially
higher price run-ups prior to the event ( 1 .50% vs. 1 .06%) than non-issuing firms and lower
debt-to-total assets ratios (27.7% vs. 21.5%). Also, they differ m terms of financial slack
(9.10% vs. 7.03%). The univariate test also shows that the market conditions (standard
deviation of the index) prevailing for the issuing firms are different than those for the non-
issuing firms. The correlations presented in Table 2 panel B between the variables included
in the probit model are relatively low. The correlation matrix of the variables used in the
regression models is presented in Table 2 panel C. These correlations are also not especially
high.
Table 2 panel D presents the univariate statistics for the variables on the designation of
the SEO proceeds. The mean (median) value of gross proceeds derived from the SEOs is
58,990 (15,050) thousands of euros, while the mean (median) value of the issuing offer
price is 4.82 (3.82) euros. As measured by the market value of equity at offer prices, the
means (medians) of firm size are 110.529 (38,937) thousands of euros. Observing the
statistics for the planned uses of the proceeds variables we notice that investment in fixed
assets (invFA,) has the highest mean, median, and interquartile ranges. The amount of
capital designated for investments in other companies (invOTHER,) is higher than the
amounts designated for working capital needs (invWC,) and for payment of pre-SEO debt
(PoiD,). 10 The mean earnings forecast error, -24.48%, is significantly less than zero at the
5% level of significance. The minus sign of the earnings forecasts error indicates that, on
'" Cumulative market returns (CMR) over the sample period reveal that the years 1993. 1998. and 1999 could be
characterized as years of euphoria for the ASE. while the years 1992 and 1994 were bad years (CMR of 38 93%.
68.76%, 70.87%, — 14.62%. and -- 10.61%, respectively I
" The distributions of the variables regarding the use of the proceeds are highly skewed to the left, indicating
that there are some firms in the sample that raise high amounts from the equity issue.
G. Siougle / The International Journal oj Accounting 42 (2007) 380 395 387
average, earnings forecasts are over-estimated. This means that SEOs firms forecast higher
earnings for the equity offering year than they actually report.
5. Empirical findings
5.1. The probit model
The objective of the study is to examine whether information disclosed in the SEO
prospectus explains offer prices and stock returns subsequent to the equity offering after
controlling for self-selection bias. This requires the estimation of the inverse Mill's ratio
through probit analysis specifying the probability of a firm to make an equity offering. 1
Table 3 reports the outcome of the probit estimation. The financial slack variable (FS) is
negative and statistically significant, indicating that firms with higher amounts of cash and
cash equivalents are less likely to need additional financing. The significant explanatory
variable (SR) is consistent with prior research (Bae, Jeong, Sun, & Tang, 2002; Guo &
Mech, 2000; Jeanneret, 2005; Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Lucas & McDonald, 1990; Marsh,
1982), which has shown that firms tend to issue shares after large price run-ups in the time
period preceding the issue. Moreover, the coefficient of the variable debt (DEBT) is
positive and statistically significant. Is This finding is in line with prior research, which has
shown that firms with high leverage are more likely to issue equity. The remaining variables
are not significant. '" The percentage of correctly classified firms is 67.39%.""
5.2. Determinants of the offer price
This section examines the association between the offer price of the new shares issued and
the planned uses of the SEO proceeds disclosed in the prospectus. The model investigates
whether the uses of the proceeds provide value-relevant information and whether the
underwriters use this information in setting the offer price."
1
If the planned uses of the SEO
proceeds to finance specific investment projects provide information about the value of the firm
and underwriters take into account this information while setting the offer prices, then the uses
ofthese proceeds should be significantly associated with the offer price ofthe new shares issued.
The following regression is estimated:
Offer price = aiPofD, + « 2 invWC, + a3invFA, + a4 invOTHER, + a5FE,
+ a6BV,_, + a7A + e (5)
The program that has been used to compute the inverse Mill's ratio is LIMDEP.
A measure of risk, which was used instead of debt, was the standard deviation of market-adjusted returns 126
trading days (approximately six 6 months) preceding the issue-announcement date and the results remained in the
same direction.
Other accounting variables have also been used to estimate the probability of an SEO (i.e., the growth in
earnings for three years prior to the SEO and total assets as a proxy for size). The inclusion of those variables did
not change the findings of the model.
"" See Maddala. G.S. (2000) for the explanation of the Count R2 measure.
Investors are not fully aware about the items of information that the underwriters, in conjunction with
company's management, utilize in setting the offer price of the new shares issued.
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Table 3
Results of the partial observability probit model
pi oh( issue) = prob(external financing )*prob(issue|external financing! = <P(z
1 ",'i I *<P(z : , : |
Variables Coefficients /-Statistic
Variables predicting external financing
Constant -0.202 (-1.16)
PSEO 419 (1.23)
PAYOUT RATIO -0.093 (-0.72)
FS -1.462 (1.64)*
Variables predicting issuance of equity over debt
Constant -0.426 (-0.90)
AGE -0.005 (-0.87)
MV/BV -0.022 (-0.38)
DEBT 1.371 (2.27)**
SR 0.801 (2.64)**
STDIND 31135 (1.16)
Count «: = 67.39°„
Definitions of the variables:
PSEO: dummy variable taking the value one if the firm made an SEO in the years /-2 and /-3 and zero otherwise.
PAYOUT RATIO: Annual dividends (/ 1 ) net profit (/- 1).
FS: (cash and cash equivalents it 1)1 total assets (f— 1).
AGE: is the number of years between the issue announcement date and the IPO date.
MY BV: market value of equity (7 1 (book value of equity (r - 1). The market value of equity is computed as the
number of total shares in year t 1 (the year prior to the SEO) multiplied by the price of the last trading day for the
year / - 1.
DEBT: short term and long-term debt it - I) total assets (f- 1 ).
SR: the cumulated stock return 252 trading days preceding the issue.
STD IND: standard deviation of ASE general index 252 trading days preceding the issue.
'Significant at 10°.. level (2-tailed test).
"Significant at 5% level (2-tailed test).
Where:
PofD,: company's SEO proceeds designated for debt repayment divided by the number
of shares outstanding in year r.
• tn\ WC,: company's SEO proceeds designated for working capital needs divided by the
number of shares outstanding in year /.
in\ FA,: company's SEO proceeds designated for investments in fixed assets divided by
the number of shares outstanding in year /.
invOTHER,: company's SEO proceeds designated for investments in other companies
divided by the number of shares outstanding in year /.
FE,: forecasted earnings divided by the number of shares outstanding in year t.
• BV,
| : the book value of equity in year t- 1 divided by the number of shares outstanding
in year t- 1.
/.: inverse Mill's ratio.
Forecasted earnings and book value of equity in / - 1 have also been used as explanatory
variables by Ghicas, Iriotis, Papadaki, and Walker (2000) in explaining the offer price of
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Greek IPOs." Proceeds designated for investments in fixed assets, working capital, investments
in other companies, and repayment of pre-SEO debt are expected to be positively associated
with the firm's offer price, i.e.. these investments are undertaken because there are expected to
be positive net present-value projects for the issuing firm and increase firm value. The four uses
of the proceeds variables provide different information. Proceeds designated for the payment of
pre-SEO debt and investments in working capital imply short term-needs, while proceeds
designated for investments in fixed assets and in other companies imply long-term growth
opportunities." Selectivity bias is controlled by introducing the Mill's ratio (A) in model (5).
Table 4 presents the empirical findings from the estimation of the regression model (5). The
reported t-statistics for this model as well as for all the other models of this study have been
estimated using White's ( 1 980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix." The planned
uses of the proceeds for investments in fixed assets (invFA,), suggesting the presence of long-
term growth opportunities, and payment ofpre-SEO debt (PofD,) are positively associated with
the offer price of the new shares and considered value-relevant information in setting offer
prices. The insignificance of investments in working capital (invWC,) and investments in other
companies (invOTHER,) suggests that these investments are zero net present-value projects.
Forecasted earnings and book values of equity are also positively associated with the offer
priced These findings suggest that book values of equity and the forecasts of earnings contain
value-relevant information that explains offer prices in SEOs. The overall findings indicate that
underwriters rely on the information disclosed in the prospectus about capital that has already
been invested (i.e., the book value ofequity inf- 1) as well in the future investments of the firm
(i.e., the planned uses of the proceeds) and forecasts of earnings to set offer prices.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the selectivity variable (A)
indicates that omitted variables having an impact on the choice of an equity offering are
positively correlated with the offer price of the issuing firm. Moreover, the estimated
coefficients and /-statistics in this model would be biased if self-selection was not controlled.
5.3. Post-issue stock returns
The study tests the efficient pricing of the information disclosed in the prospectus about
the intended uses of the SEO proceeds. This test is based on the following regression model:
SR„ = /?,PofD, + /?,invWC, + /?,invFA, + /?4invOTHER, + />\FE,
+ />' (,BV,_,+/?7MR, t + /,,/ + £ (6)
Regulation of the Athens Stock Exchange (P. D. 34X 19X5) requires that earnings forecasts appearing in the SEO
prospectus must he formed based on assumptions provided by firm's management and approved by the underwriter. The
underwriter guarantees the accuracy of the prospectus in the sense that information contained is not "misleading' and is
based on reasonable assumptions. Investors retain the legal right to request explanations and financial compensation
from the firm or the underwriting institution if they have been misled by information disclosed in the prospectus.
Four (4) firms have designated the funds raised in only one usage. Three firms ( 3 ) have invested the SEO proceeds in
fixed assets and one ( 1 ) in re-pavment of pre-SEO debt.
Two outlying observations have been detected and removed by using the Cook's D measure proposed by Belshey
et al. (1980). The Cook's D measure for these two observations was higher than one.
This finding is consistent with the finding of Ghicas et al. (2000) where earnings forecasts disclosed in
prospectuses are significant determinants of IPO offer prices in the Athens Stock Exchange.
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Table 4
Determinants of offer priee
Offer price = (i,PofD, + (j : invWC, + i/,invFA, + (j4invOTHER, + a,FE, + a hBV, , +a 7X + E
Variables Coefficients /-Statistic
PofD,
invWC,
invFA,
invOTHER,
FE,
BV,
|
X
Adj fl- = 84.25%
/r-statistic = 75.10***
2.496
-0.887
1 .648
1 .036
3.362
0.718
1.465
(1.85)*
(-0.70)
(1.84)*
(142)
(3.54)***
(2.73)***
(3.60)***
Definitions of the variables:
Offer price: the offer price of the new shares issued.
PofD,: payment of debt /number of shares t.
invWC,: investments in working capital /number of shares /.
invFA,: investments in fixed assets/number of shares ;.
invOTHER,: Investments in other companies/number of shares /.
FE,: forecasted earnings/number of shares /.
BV,
,: book value of equity /number of shares t-\.
X: Mill's ratio.
'Significant at 10% level (2-tailed test).
***Significant at 1% level (2-taiIcd test).
Where:
• SR„: Stock returns for 504 post-issue trading days.
• MR,,: The return on the ASE market index for 504 post-issue trading days.
• All the other variables are defined in model (5).
Table 5
The regression model
SR„=ftPofD, + lMnvWC,+ftinvFA, + ftinvOTHER, + ft,FE, + ftBV, ,+ftMR„+|V. + C
ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft Adj R
2
F-statistic
-1.072 1323 0.665 0.014 0.197 -0.402 3 819 0.560
(-126) (-0.91) (0.55) (0.04) (0.23) (-0.24) (2.22)** (084)
0.52 7.20***
Definitions of the variables:
SR„: stock returns for 504 post-issue trading days.
PofD,: payment of debt/number of shares t.
invWC,: investments in working capital /number of shares t.
invFA,: investments in fixed assets 'number of shares t.
invOTHER,: investments in other companies /number of shares t.
FE,: forecasted earnings /number of shares t.
BV,
i
: book value of equity /number of shares t- 1.
MR,,: The return on the ASE market index for 504 post-issue trading days.
X: Mill's ratio
"Significant at 5% level (2-tailed test)
Significant at 1% level (2-tailed test).
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Table 5 reports the empirical findings from the estimation of model (6). " The findings
do not reveal a significant association between forward-looking information and future stock
returns. This finding suggests that the underwriters have efficiently priced the SEOs by
incorporating the information on a firm's intended uses of the proceeds in setting offer prices.
The return of the market (MR,,) is the only significant variable that explains stock returns
subsequent to SEOs.
6. Additional robustness checks
The following two sensitivity tests are performed to examine the robustness of the
findings regarding the uses of SEO proceeds. First, models (5) and (6) have been
estimated by substituting the multiple uses of the proceeds variables with a single use of
funds variable. This new variables takes the value of the "largest" use of funds for each
sample firm. Untabulated empirical findings show the robustness of the reported findings
in Tables 4 and 5.
Second, to mitigate concerns that some other unobservable variables drive the results,
models (5) and (6) have been estimated by including the book-to-market ratio, the natural
logarithm of the market value of equity and the earnings-to-price ratio as additional
explanatory variables. These variables have been suggested by Fama and French (1992).
The introduction of the additional explanatory variables did not alter the findings reported
in Tables 4 and 5, while the book-to-market ratio, used as a surrogate for growth, was not
significant.
7. Conclusions
This study investigates the relation between publicly available information disclosed
in the SEO prospectus and offer prices or post-issue stock returns after controlling for self-
selection bias.
-1
Information with a forward-looking orientation has not been used to
explain the market valuation of SEOs. The findings illustrate that underwriters rely on the
prospectus information and they incorporate this information in setting offer prices.
Omitted variables, which have an impact on the choice of an equity offering, indicate the
presence of selection bias in determining the offer price of SEOs. This finding suggests
that self-selection bias affects inferences and that future research should control for this
bias. Moreover, the insignificance of the intended uses of the proceeds to explain stock
returns subsequent to an SEO is consistent with efficient pricing of this information by the
underwriters.
The estimated condition number implies the absence of multicollinearity among the independent variables in
model (6).
The model in Table 5 has been developed by including year dummies. The findings for these dummies have
not been tabulated.
The exclusion of Mill's ratio from regression models (5) and (61 will lead to the estimation of biased and
inconsistent regression coefficients. Nevertheless, the exclusion of the Mill's ratio does not affect the inferences
! drawn from these models
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Appendix A
The methodology to address the self-selection problem is based on the following two-
equation model:
/* = Z
i7 i -£ i (1)
J'=.V,/?, + », (2)
where: Heckman (1976) and Maddala (1983) suggest that the conditional mean of the error
term it, must be estimated as follows:
^(i/ilsample selection) = £(i/,/7>0)
E{ui\r.i<L^,) = a,
<*>(z,7,)
where: </?() and <P(.) are the density and the distribution functions of a standard normal
distribution.
The term 'j^ y '
,
is known as the inverse Mill's ratio and can be obtained from the probit
model (Eq. (1)). Including the inverse Mill's ratio in Eq. (2) corrects for self-selection and
yields consistent parameter estimates in OLS. As a result, Eq. (2) can be rewritten as follows:
}' = X\l\ + a,
</>(Zi7,
.
<P(z.7il
+ "',
The heteroskedasticity problem of the error term in Eq. (3) is corrected by using White's
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. The models that are estimated
based on Eq. (3) are the ones that explain offer prices and stock returns and are presented in
Section 5 in the text.
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members. In this paper, we develop a generalized efficiency index for a much larger set of 57
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1. Introduction
Productivity literature lias generally focused on growth or slowdown in the developed
OECD (Organizations of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries during the
seventies and eighties (Costello, 1993; Fare, Grosskopf. Norris, & Shang. 1994; Wolff,
1996). Although there has been a growing interest in productivity growth (decline) in
highly developed nations, we have not seen a similar focus applied to a broader range of
developing countries across the new world economies. The productivity winners and losers
in the new global-information economies need to be identified and analyzed, both at the
aggregate and individual country level. This is relevant since productivity rankings provide
important inputs for sustainable and equitable resource-allocation decisions by national
governments (NGs hereafter), as well as by international organizations like the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund. Presumably, financial markets around the globe impound
the GNP-and-GDP related aggregates, which are crude measures of productivity, in the
pricing of foreign (national) currencies and debts issued by national governments. Decision
makers may also use subjective rank ordering of productivity, as reflected in the various
testimonies of the Federal Reserve Board Chairman before Congress. 1 The importance of
the rank ordering made by NGs, in terms of sustainable productivity, has been recognized,
[though not technically possible in classics such as Adam Smith's The Wealth ofNations,
(1776; reprinted 1953, pp. 3-4.)]
Nations tolerably well advanced as to skill, dexterity and judgment in the application
of labour, have followed \ ery different plans in the general conduct or direction of it;
those plans have not all been equally favourable to the greatness of its produce. The
policy of some nations has given extraordinary encouragement to the industry of the
country;...
In this paper we develop a more generalized linear-programming approach to rank 57
NGs in terms of overall production efficiency. Unlike traditional aggregate productivity
measurements such as those generated by Cobb-Douglas functions, we use linear pro-
gramming to measure and rank relative technical efficiency. This approach can include a
large number of countries, in various stages ofdevelopment (sustainable or not), employing
resources to produce the various components of GNP Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
ranks relative efficiency by evaluating the extent to which the NG of each country
minimizes input components (to be efficiently allocated), and maximizes the output
components that comprise the GNP. The NG in each country is assumed to choose particular
weights or coefficients for inputs and outputs that allow the country to achieve its maximum
efficiency ranking." In the conventional productivity growth studies that employ regression
weights a single transformation function for all NGs is implied, or else subjective fixed
Although there are frequent references to changes in productivity in Alan Greenspan's and Ben Bernanke's
(testimonies before Congress, it is unclear how productivity rankings are determined vis-a-vis other national
Ijovernments (NGs). We believe that the approach elaborated in this paper could become an important tool in the
lands of the Federal Reserve Board and other NG central banks throughout the globe.
This is in the spirit of Adam Smith, cited above.
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weights are utilized. In our DEA approach, differing sustainable growth strategies followed
by different NGs are accommodated by different coefficient weights for each NG. From these
more flexible transformation functions we can identify the sources of efficiency or
inefficiency for every NG included in our analysis.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the DEA National Governmental
Model employed to rank 57 NGs' productivity efficiency. Section 3 describes the empirical
model employ and the data set used in measuring NGs' production efficiency. Sections 4
presents the basic results of the additive model and sensitivity analysis, and section 5
compares the additive to the ratio model's results. Section 6 partitions the 57-NG frontier
into separate high- and low-income frontiers and examines the differences between the two.
Section 7 looks at possible institutional explanations for the observed relative-efficiency
differences. Section 8 provides a conclusion and discusses the governance and sustainable
global-development implications of production-efficiency rankings.
2. The DEA National Government (NG) Model
The DEA model can be used to evaluate relative technical efficiency by transforming a
set of inputs or resources to produce a set of multiple outputs. As a linear-programming
implementation of Farrell's (1957) notion of technical efficiency, DEA is a frontier
approach to efficiency evaluation as implied by production or cost theory. In particular, an
efficient frontier is constructed that is composed of the NGs that either have as little input as
possible to produce a given level of output, or produce as much output as possible from a
given level of input consumption. Those NGs meeting one of the above criteria comprise
the efficient frontier and are technically efficient, while those NGs not on the efficient
frontier are technically inefficient (enveloped by the efficient NGs).
The original DEA model (the CCR model of Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978), also
known as the ratio or constant returns to scale (CRS) model, has been joined by other DEA
models (such as the BCC model of Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984). The additive model
of Charnes, Cooper, Golany, Seiford, and Stutz (1985) and the BCC model are char-
acterized by variable returns to scale (VRS), and both provide insights into NG productivity
comparisons. Using the additive model and an accompanying sensitivity analysis to rank
order the NGs from most robustly efficient to most robustly inefficient, we employ a two-
step process: In the first step, the technical efficiency status (efficient or inefficient) for each
NG is determined by solving a linear program for each country. This envelopment model
serves only to categorize NGs as either efficient or inefficient. In the second step, two
different linear programs are solved, one for the efficient NGs and another for the inefficient
NGs. For a particular efficient NG, the linear program yields a measure of its efficiency
robustness (or amount of adjustments between inputs and outputs necessary to change the
efficient classification to almost inefficient). For a particular inefficient NG, the linear
program yields a measure of its inefficiency robustness (or amount of adjustments between
inputs and outputs necessary to change the inefficient classification to almost efficient).
These robustness measures then comprise the index for the order in which the NGs were
ranked. We describe these two steps in detail below.
In the additive DEA model, the observed input consumption and output production for a
number of NGs are measured; they are referred to as an NG's component vector. All
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component vectors for the NGs under scrutiny are combined to form the empirical
production possibility set (PE):
PE=\ (YT,XT)=J2n,()^X,T);^2 /', = l-/'^0. (1)
< = i
where ; represents the general index of /'= 1,..., 57 NGs and ( )', ..V, ) is the transposed vector
of outputs and inputs, respectively, for NG,.
To determine the technical efficiency status (efficient or inefficient) for a given NG, its
component vector is compared to PE. Ifno component vector in PE, observed or hypothetical,
can be found that strictly dominates the tested NG, then it is said to be technically efficient.
Those NGs, for which a component vector can be found in PE that strictly dominates, are said
to be technically inefficient. Fig. I provides a graphical depiction of a set ofNGs for a single-
input, single-output example. In Fig. 1, NGs #1. #2. and #3 would be technically efficient,
while NGs #4, #5, #6, and #7 would be technically inefficient. Segments 1 2 and 23 comprise
the efficient frontier.
Mathematically, the test for the technical efficiency status of NG, is achieved by solving
the following linear program:
~e
T
s
+
-eTf
XX + s- = Xj
e
TA = 1
X,s+,s~>0
(2)
where Yand .V represent the pre-scaled matrices of the outputs and inputs, respectively; and .?
'
and s denote the slacks for production shortfalls and excess input use. As the additive model
is not units invariant, fand A' were pre-scaled by the standard deviations of each component.
INPUT
• 7
4
OUTPUT
Fig. 1. Production possibility Set PE. Note: Efficient frontier comprised of segments 12 and 23
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as suggested by Lovell and Pastor (1995). The c T vector is the sum vector, guaranteeing a
convex combination or scalar multiple (less than one) of the NGs under scrutiny.
Again, the execution of Eq. (2) for each NG serves only to categorize the NGs as
technically efficient or inefficient. That is, the execution of Eq. (2) for each NG does not
yield a set of measures which can be used to construct a rank order (efficient NGs all have
efficiency scores of unity and cannot be ranked). To develop a rank order of most robustly
efficient to most robustly inefficient NGs, one additional linear program must be executed
for each NG. with the result yielding a infinity-norm measure of the minimum distance to a
Pareto optimum point (efficient frontier). This sensitivity analysis establishes the robust-
ness of the efficiency classification.
Charnes, Haag, Jaska, and Semple (1992), Charnes, Rousseau, and Semple (1996) and
Seiford and Zhu (1998) developed a sensitivity analysis technique based on the infinity-
norm measure of a vector. This technique defines the necessary simultaneous perturbations
to the component vector of a given NG that cause it to move to a state of "virtual"
efficiency. Virtual efficiency is defined as a point on the efficient frontier where any
miniscule detrimental perturbation (increase in inputs and/or decrease in outputs) will cause
an efficient NG to become inefficient, or any miniscule favorable perturbation (decrease in
inputs and/or increase in outputs) will cause an inefficient NG to become efficient.
For an efficient NG, the infinity-norm measure, or the radius of stability (herein termed
stability index), defines the largest "cell" in which all simultaneous detrimental pertur-
bations to the input and output components will not cause a change in the efficiency status
from technically efficient to inefficient. As such, the larger the stability index, the more
robustly efficient the NG is said to be. Those efficient NGs with small stability indices will
thus become technically inefficient, with smaller detrimental perturbations than those
efficient NGs with larger stability indices.
Mathematically, the stability index for an efficient NG (NG,) is determined by solving
the following linear program:
(3)
where represents the stability index. The matrix of outputs and inputs are represented by
YiE) andXit] , respectively, with the component vector for efficient NG, omitted. Finally, d
and d] are given by t/^and rff=(l, 1,.., 1 ), which cause 6 to simultaneously increase inputs
and decrease outputs as the linear program determines the optimal solution. Fig. 2 provides
a graphical depiction of the infinity-norm measure (stability cell) for efficient NG 2. Note
that represents the lengths of the dotted lines within the stability cell.
For an inefficient NG, the stability index defines the largest "cell" in which all
simultaneous favorable perturbations to the input and output components will not cause a
change in the efficiency status from technically inefficient to technically efficient. As
such, the larger the stability index for an inefficient NG the more robustly inefficient the
NG would be. An inefficient NG with a large stability index thus rests a greater distance
from the efficient frontier than does an inefficient NG with a smaller stability index.
min 6
s.t. r<
£U - S+ + (Wo =
X^A+S - (hi, = Xj
e
T
/. = 1
Ls+ ,s~, (>>0
OUTPUT
STABILITY
I
CELL
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,
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NEW EFFICIENT FRONTIER
WITH DMU »2 REMOVED
A
6"
INPUT
Fig. 2. Stability measure for efficient NG. Note: depicted as a dotted line segment when NG #2 is removed. That
is the largest increase in inputs and decrease in outputs which will allow NG #7 to just remain efficient.
max
s.t. Yl-s+ - 9d --= Y,
Xk + s-Od, =Xj
e
TA= 1
/..s+ .s~.0>0
Mathematically, the stability index for an inefficient NG (NG
;
) is determined by solving
the following linear program:
(4)
where all notations are as defined in the prior formulations. Observe that simultaneously
decreases inputs and increases outputs as the linear program determines the optimal
solution. Fig. 3 provides a graphical depiction of the infinity-norm measure (stability cell)
for inefficient NG 7.
Once the stability index is known for each NG, the NGs can be ranked from most robustly
technically efficient to most robustly technically inefficient. To do so, the stability indices for
inefficient NGs are first negated. This principle of ranking can be applied to NGs in reverse
order from most efficient to most inefficient. NG relative efficiency then can be rank ordered
from highest to lowest based on their stability index values. This use of the radii of stability
provides a new way of implementing rankings." Also we have explicitly avoided measuring
between-year shifts in annual frontiers using the Malmquist index, because of the autonomous
changes that are associated with instabilities not originating from economic sources or
government policy in many developing NGs in the 57 NG group. 4
Charlies, Cooper, and Li (1989) specifies the principle on which rankings of decision making units (NGs in
our case) can be based. Also see Cooper et al. (2001).
This paper emphasizes pure production efficiency. Past studies employing the Malmquist Index refer to the
approximately 1 7 more stable OECD countries. We have restricted ourselves to measuring the existing frontier of
a given year rather that measuring production function shifts using the Malmquist Index. With 57 NGs. especially
including the 33 developing NGs. autonomous changes can occur such as famine, pestilence, war, weather shifts,
tsunamis, volcanoes, earthquakes, and very importantly, regime changes in the more unstable NGs. all of which
lean shift the production frontier. The technical change portion of the Malmquist has been termed somewhat
i inaccurately, innovation on the positive side, or negative technical change on the negative side. Where large
;
between-year changes in ranks for a particular NG occur, we prefer to examine the inputs and outputs directly to
see why these autonomous changes may have affected technical efficiency.
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OUTPUT
2.
INPUT
Fig. 3. Stability index measure for inefficient. Note: depicted as dotted line segment when the cell around NG #7
is enlarged until it barely touches the frontier; that is. the maximum simultaneous decrease in inputs and increase in
outputs which will cause NG #7 to remain inefficient.
3. The data and empirical DEA Model
Our linear-programming approach to efficiency measurement incorporates a criterion
that simultaneously maximizes GNP, and minimizes resource consumption. The GNP
components include expenditures for consumption, gross investment, government con-
sumption, and exports. This formulation of outputs confers an important role to investment
and its contribution to future economic growth. These expenditures are all expressed in
constant 1995 US dollars.
The appropriate resources (inputs) employed in production processes are more difficult
to identify from the available data. The labor force represents labor availability. Arable land
was defined in units of hectares and represents the land available for primarily agricultural
production. Commercial energy use directly measures energy use in worldwide production
techniques. However, Costello ( 1993) used electricity consumption (kilowatts per hour) as
a proxy of capital usage for six of the OECD countries. She notes that electricity, like capital
usage, cannot be easily stored, and the flow of electricity may well correspond to the flow of
capital used in production. A similar argument can be offered for commercial energy use,
but this broader measure may apply better to the larger array of worldwide production
techniques, rather than to a smaller group of heavily industrial countries, as in the previous
studies of production efficiency.
Net merchandise imports include imports of chemicals, basic and miscellaneous
manufactures, and machinery and transport equipment. We exclude fuel imports because
they are included in the commercial energy-use component. Service imports include the
classifications of transport, communications, computer information and other services, and
insurance and financial services. We expect that these service imports may be used
primarily as inputs in production and, therefore, are to be minimized, rather than outputs to
be consumed and, therefore, are to be maximized. However, travel imports have been
explicitly excluded from service imports since some NG's outputs may well be comprised
of tourist services, much of which may be interpreted as an output to be maximized. In any
case, imports of communications, computer, and information services are rapidly outpacing
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travel imports. With these inputs to be minimized and outputs to be maximized, the
empirical DEA model is as follows:
Inputs (minimize resources)
Labor force (total)
Arable land (hectares)
Commercial energy use (kilotons of oil equivalent)
Net merchandise imports (merchandise imports less fuel imports in current US $)
Net service imports (service imports less travel imports in Balance of Payments in
current U.S. S)
Outputs (maximize outputs):
Private consumption (constant 1995 U.S. S)
Government consumption (constant 1995 U.S. $)
Gross domestic investment (constant 1995 U.S. $)
Exports of goods and services (constant 1995 U.S. $)
Extensive missing cases for these nine variables limited the sample to 57 NGs out of 227
NGs in the CD-ROM version of the 2001 World Development Indicators. Appendix A
shows the data for the 57 NGs on which the DEA was performed. Note that the inputs and
outputs were divided by each component's respective standard deviations. This tech-
nique is used to obtain a units invariant model. This normalizes the observations, and
according to Lovell and Pastor (1995), assures that the DEA results will be both trans-
lation invariant and units invariant. Even after normalization, however, considerable
variations in inputs and outputs exist across the 57 NGs. In the context of this model then.
the efficient NG has comparable resources to other NGs in the frontier, but better
employs its available resources to produce greater amounts of consumption, investment,
government purchases and foreign export sales. Conversely, an efficient NG may simi-
larly be viewed as having comparable outputs, or national product, but produces those
outputs with fewer resources.
4. Basic empirical results: NG efficiency rankings using the additive DEA model
Table 1 displays the stability rankings for the 57 NGs for the combined eight years, as
well as for the individual years 1991 to 1998. The NGs are ranked from most robustly
efficient to the least robustly efficient for the combined period. The individual-year
rankings seem relatively stable across years. Ireland exhibits significant improvement from
near the bottom of the rankings to the 12th rank by 1998. The top of the list is headed by the
United States and Japan and includes a number of the more prosperous OECD European
NGs including Germany, France. Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Norway,
Finland, Iceland, Ireland, and Sweden.
The top quartile also has some unexpected newcomers such as Brazil, China. India, and
Bangladesh. Because of its low per capita income, Bangladesh unexpectedly occupies the fairly
"obust 14th rank. This counter-intuitive result can be explained by very low levels of per capita
output, but even proportionately lower resource use, shown in Appendix A. Even though
'..'fficiency generally may be highly related to prosperity (we found a positive correlation between
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Table 1
Country stability index rankings as efficiency rankings
Country Name Region I9Q1 QS iqqi 1QQ2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
United States North America 1
Japan East Asia and Pacific 7
Germany ! urope 3
Brazil South America 4
France Europe 5
China East Asia and Pacific- 6
Switzerland Europe 7
Netherlands Europe 8
Denmark Europe 9
Belgium Europe 10
Norway Europe 11
India South Asia 12
Finland Europe 13
Bangladesh South Asia 14
Iceland Europe 15
Ireland 1 urope 16
Israel Middle East and
North Africa
17
N icaragua Central America IS
El Salvador Central America 19
Uruguay South America 20
Sweden Europe 21
Honduras Central America 22
Panama Central America 23
Bolivia South America 24
Costa Rica Central America 25
Guatemala Central America 2o
Austria Europe 27
Kenya Sub-Sahara Africa 28
Ecuador South America 29
Venezuela. RB South America 30
Jamaica Caribbean 31
Korea. Rep. East Asia and Pacific 32
Tunisia Middle East and
North Africa
33
Colombia South America 34
Morocco Middle East and
North Africa
35
Turkey Middle East and
North Africa
36
Greece Europe 37
Romania Europe 38
South Africa Sub-Sahara Africa 39
New Zealand East Asia and Pacific 40
Peru South America 41
Chile South America 42
Egypt. Arab Rep. Middle East and
North Africa
43
Portugal 1 urope 44
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
6 6 5 5 4 4 4 4
5 5 7 6 10 6 6 7
7 7 6 7 7 8 7 8
8 8 8 8 11 9 8 9
10 10 10 9 13 14 9 11
11 11 12 12 12 11 12 17
15 12 14 10 14 17 17 24
16 9 9 11 19 12 18 49
28 jo 11 15 23 19 11 14
19 14 16 16 20 21 13 15
14 13 15 14 16 20 14 18
33 32 29 24 17 18 16 12
12 15 18 20 22 22 20 21
18 16 19 19 21 23 21 22
17 17 20 22 24 24 22 25
21 20 21 23 25 26 23 26
25 29 17 18 18 25 19 19
24 19 23 25 30 27 28 29
20 21 22 28 35 34 24 30
26 24 26 27 29 28 26 31
22 26 24 26 31 30 27 27
2" 31 30 31 32 31 29 32
29 30 27 29 33 32 25 20
35 33 25 30 39 37 33 34
32 27 28 33 36 33 36 39
43 48 47 17 26 16 32 47
23 23 31 32 38 39 35 35
45 35 41 42 41 45 15 6
34 39 39 39 yn 35 30 33
13 18 38 37 40 36 31 28
36 38 34 4(1 43 40 34 36
48
39
44
40
30
38
31
9
34
41
53
44
36
411
37
25
42
35
33
45
37
36
42
13
44
13
36
38
44
41
34
35
48
28
42
49
47
46
44
45
48
51
46
38
49
29
44
43
42
47
48
51
39
42
37
38
41
46
40
45
54
37
40
23
38
41
43
53
44
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Table 1 [continued)
Country Name Region 1991-98 1991 1992 1993 [994 1495 1446 1997 1998
Pakistan South Asia 45 51 47 50 43 15 15 48 42
Indonesia East Asia and Pacific 46 49 4^ 52 51 53 53 52 13
Hungary Europe 47 41 43 48 44 50 50 44 46
Mexico Central America 4K 57 57 57 56 8 7 10 10
Spain Europe 44 4d 51 43 47 27 41 47 51
Canada North America 50 54 54 53 46 9 10 43 16
Poland Europe 51 52 52 51 50 54 54 44 50
Australia East Asia and Pacific 52 4^ 4d 44 52 >2 52 50 48
Italv Europe 53 50 49 411 21 6 13 53 55
Malaysia East Asia and Pacific 54 53 50 54 54 56 55 54 45
Philippines East Asia and Pacific 55 37 28 46 53 55 56 55 56
United Kingdom Europe 56 55 55 55 55 34 51 56 57
Thailand East Asia and Pacific 57 56 56 56 57 57 57 57 52
GNP per capita and the stability indexes of r= 0.369 and significant at all levels), it is possible
that a low per capita income or high level of destitution can be accompanied by relatively lower
levels of resource use. appropriately resulting in robust efficiency.
On a matched pair comparison between two relatively homogenous Islamic bloc
developing countries in the Indian sub-continent who were previously parts of the same
country until 1971, Bangladesh's overall efficiency ranking for 1991-98 in Table 1 is 14th,
compared to Pakistan's 45th, and their comparable respective average incomes are $323
and S496. Table 2 shows five inputs as a percent of four outputs' value, or 20 percentages
for each NG. Bangladesh uses considerably fewer resources per dollar of outputs for 1 7 out
of these 20 percentages (three exceptions are noted in bold print). Simply put, Bangladesh
in maximizing very low outputs, and minimizing even lower resources, chooses a set of
weights for outputs and inputs that confer a very high relative-efficiency score.
Table 2
Matched pair NGs inputs as a percent of output
Country Efficiency rank (Average Commercial Land Labor Merchandise Services
per capita GDP) energy use (%) use Co) force Co) imports Co) imports (%)
Bangladesh 's
Outputs
Consumption
Investment
Gov't
purchases
Exports
14(S232)
151 577 14 103 45
620 238 57 423 186
218 836 20 149 66
238 910 22 162 71
Pakistan's
Outputs
' Consumption
Investment
'Gov't
purchases
[Exports
45 ($496)
293 1018 707 146 158
424 1484 1 03
1
213 231
460 1609 1118 231 250
277 965 670 138 150
406 R.L Raab, EH Feroz The International Journal ofAccounting 42 (2007) 396-415
Spain, Canada, Australia, Italy, and the United Kingdom have relatively high standards
of living (See Table 3, High GDP per capita) and apparently very low robust efficiency
(bottom decile of Table 1 ). These NGs have moderate per capita outputs, but Australia and
Canada have relatively high levels of arable land; and Canada. Italy, the United Kingdom,
and Spain have relatively high merchandise and service imports. These NGs exhibit fairly
high per capita outputs, but also very high use of a number of inputs. This explanation is the
logical opposite of Bangladesh's case for robust efficiency (as we have just explained).
5. Comparison of the results of the additive and CCR models
The additive model, as a variable-returns-to-scale model, measures only technical
efficiency and allows an efficiency comparison between NGs of different sizes using a
singular, technical efficiency metric, but ignores scale efficiency. The additive model
frontier is comprised of the most technically efficient NGs of a particular size range, and
less efficient economies of various sizes are compared to that portion of the frontier for that
particular reference set. In constant-returns-to-scale models like the CCR, the frontier is
Table 3
Additive versus CCR Models 1991-1998
Variable-retums-to-scale (VRS) results Constant return s-io- scale (CRS) results
Additive mode BCC model CCR model
Efficiency Country Stability Omega ( pi ) Country Efficiency
rank (ER) mde\ score
1 United States 3.6271 0.7869 Bangladesh 1 .0000
2 Japan 2.3225 0.6351 Belgium 1 .0000
3 Germain 0.7348 0.435? Brazil 1.0000
4 Brazil 0.2475 0.39 1
8
China 1.0000
5 France 0.1584 0.2892 Denmark 1 .0000
6 China 0.1199 0.1940 Finland 1 .0000
7 Switzerland 0.0864 0. 1 284 France 1.0000
8 Netherlands 0.0514 0.1278 Germany 1 .0000
9 Denmark 0.0198 0.1275 Iceland 1 .1X100
in Belgium 0.0137 0.1127 India 1 .0000
11 Norway 0.0131 0.1095 Ireland 1 .0000
12 India 0.0108 0.0966 Israel 1 .0000
1? Finland 0.0102 0.0949 Japan 1.0000
14 Bangladesh 0.0096 0.0849 Netherlands 1.0000
15 Iceland 0.0096 0.0631 Norway 1.0000
16 Ireland 0.0068 0.0626 Sweden 1 .0000
17 Israel 0.0059 0.0576 Switzerland 1 .0000
18
19
Nicaragua
El Salvador
0.0040
0.0034
0.0575
-0.8574
United States 1.0000
Austria 0.9774
20 Uruguay 0.0025 -0.8983 Korea. Rep. 0.9668
21 Sweden 0.0024 -1.3159 Venezuela, RB 0.9351
22 Honduras 0.0012 -4.1801 Turkey 0.931 1 i
23 Panama 0.0009 -7.0703 Spain 0.9266
24 Bolivia 0.0005 -13.2860 South \lnca 0.9215
25 Costa Rica 0.0005 -25.2455 Mexico 0.9O9I
{continued on next page)
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Table 3 {continued I
Variable-return s-to-scale (VRS) results Constant returns-lose ale (CRS) results
Additive model BCC model CCR model
Efficiency Country Stability Omega in) Country Efficiency
rank (ER) index score
26 Guatemala -0.0004 0.1 102 Italy 0.8994
27 Austria -0.0010 -2.2988 Indonesia 0.8991
28 Kenya -0.0018 0.1153 Greece 0.8669
29 Ecuador -0.0019 00270 Canada 0.8623
30 Venezuela, RB -0.0026 -1.1 879 Chile 0.8597
31 Jamaica -0.0030 0.1095 Colombia 0,8570
32 Korea. Rep. -0.0031 0.0909 Australia 0.8467
33 Tunisia -0.0033 -2.2988 New Zealand 0.8286
34 Colombia -0.0035 0.0909 United Kingdom 0.8270
35 Morocco -0.0053 0.1060 Malaysia 0.7958
36 Turkey -0.0056 0.1033 Uruguay 0.78') 1
37 Greece -0.0059 -0.8150 Ecuador 0.7785
38 Romania -0.0060 0.0631 Tunisia 0.7721
39 South Africa -0.0064 0.1153 Portugal 0.7622
411 New Zealand -0.0069 0.0441 Egypt. Arab Rep. 0.7321
41 Peru -0.0071 0.063 1 Honduras 0.7286
42 Chile -0.0073 0.0575 Guatemala 0.7251
43 Egypt. Arab Rep. -0.0117 0.0966 Morocco 0.7246
44 Portugal -0.0122 0.0909 Romania 0.7151
45 Pakistan -0.0157 0.063 1 Poland 0.7092
46 Indonesia -0.0159 0.063 1 Costa Rica 0.7073
47 Hungary -0.0163 0.0261 Hung. ii \ 0.7031
48 Mexico -0.0196 0.0441 Peru 0.6979
49 Spain -0.0205 0.0257 Thailand 0.6902
50 Canada -0.0212 0.0631 Panama 0.6837
51 Poland -0.0260 0.0944 Kenya 0.6758
52 Australia -0.0264 0.063
1
El Salvador 0.6533
53 Italy -0.0374 0.0944 Bolivia 0.6308
54 Malaysia -0.0431 0.0631 Pakistan 0.6279
55 Philippines -0.0432 0.044 Philippines 0.6142
56 United Kingdom -0.061 1 0.0575 Jamaica 0.57 1
8
57 Thailand -0.075 1 0.0575 Nicaragua 0.4613
comprised of the most technically efficient NGs across all of the size ranges and less
efficient NGs in other size ranges are compared to the most efficient countries without
regard to (their) scale of operation. Thus different sized economies will be ranked dif-
ferently when the additional scale criterion is imposed by the CCR model.
A comparison of the frontiers for the additive, variable-retums-to-scale (VRS) model
and the CCR or constant returns-to-scale (CRS) model provides a type of scale analysis.
;
NGs comprising the frontier in the CRS model are both technically efficient and scale
efficient, while the frontier economies identified in the VRS model are only technically
efficient and therefore may not appear in the CRS envelope. In Table 3 the additive model's
frontier (shaded in the table) contains 25 technically efficient NGs (with positive stability-
iindex values) and the CCR frontier (also shaded m the table) contains only 18 technically
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and scale efficient NGs (first 18 alphabetically ranked efficiency scores of unity). In Table 3
these seven technically but not scale efficient NGs that were the least robustly efficient out
of lowest eight (with Sweden being the exception) were from Central and South America
including: Nicaragua. El Salvador, Uruguay, Honduras, Panama, Bolivia, and Costa Rica.
These seven NGs appear at the bottom of the CCR frontier.
By examining the dual of the BCC model, an intercept of a facet on the frontier can be
used to indicate whether scale economies or diseconomies exist. This term, sometimes
referred to as omega, w, identifies returns to scale in the sense that the numerical value of
zero occurs if the projected facet goes through the origin of the output scale. If co<0, then
the NG has a steep facet or transformation function and experiences increasing returns to
scale. If tjq>0, then the NG has a flat facet and experiences decreasing returns to scale.
These seven NGs in Table 3 exhibit significant decreasing returns to scale, and when
highlighted in the CCR model column, the imposition of the scale criterion substantially
lowers their efficiency ratings. Thus these NGs are technically efficient when they help to
define the reference set for their peers, but they exhibit substantial decreasing returns to
scale when they are compared to the most efficient NGs of all sizes on the 57 NGs frontier.
6. Sensitivity analyses: partitioning the frontier into high and low per capita GNP
A major contribution of this paper has been to compare the relative efficiency of
developed and developing NGs using a common metric, as documented in Table 1. The
significant correlation between material well-being (average GDP per capita) and efficiency
(Spearman correlation /=0.225 and significant at the 10% level), suggests that partitioning
the 57 NGs into high and low per capita income may yield some further insights into the
relative-efficiency analysis of the two groups. The 57 NGs were ranked by average 1991-
98 per capita GNP and an obvious gap of S6000-S 10,000 resulted. For the 24 NGs in the
high per capita income group, Switzerland had the highest average GDP per capita (PPP
current international $s) of $46,195 and the Republic of Korea had the lowest with $10,264.
For the 33 low per capita income NGs, Uruguay had the highest average GNP per capita of
$5675 and Bangladesh had the lowest with $323. The purpose of the partitioning NGs into
more homogeneous per capita income groups is to form two separate frontiers, where the
high income frontier and the resulting stability index rankings will not be compared to some
highly efficient low income NGs. and the low income frontier will not be compared to some
highly efficient high income NGs.
This rationale for partitioning the 57 NGs by income is reinforced by the high Spearman
rank correlation of /=0.980 between the 24 ranked stability-index values selected from the
full 57 NG frontier in Table 1 and the 24 high income NG frontier, suggesting that the
frontiers are very nearly identical. One might additionally expect that the 33 low GDP per
capita NGs' frontier might well be very different, since the generally more efficient, large
economies will not be used to establish the frontier of the 33 developing economies.
Table 4 displays the stability index rankings for the low and high average per capita GNP
frontiers for the combined 1991-98 period. For the 57 NGs' frontier, a positive relationship
exists between income (average per capita GNP in Table 4) and efficiency (stability index
values in Table 3) with a Spearman correlation of ;=0.225 that is significant at the 10%
level. For the 24 high income NGs' frontier, a Spearman correlation ;= 0.708 between the
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income and efficiency was significant at all levels. However, for the 33 low income NGs'
frontier, a Spearman correlation r= 0.260 was not significant at any acceptable significance
level. Clearly significant differences exist between the two partitioned frontiers, and one
might conjecture that this higher correlation for the more prosperous NGs exists because of
a strong relationship between efficiency and high standards of living.
The high per capita income frontier contains the 18 OECD NGs used in the Lovell,
Pastor, and Turner (1995) macroeconomic performance rankings (1970-90) and our
efficiency rankings. Correlating Lovell et al.'s 18 OECD NGs to our 24 NGs' frontier, a
Pearson correlation of /•= 0.667 is significant at the l°o level. Even though our frontier
covers a subsequent time period, and our model employs somewhat different inputs and
outputs, these ranking appear quite robust in their measurement of fundamental economy-
wide efficiency. This result indirectly lends credibility to the 33 low GDP NGs' frontier.
Several observations are in order regarding Tables 3 and 4. First note that in Table 3
stability-index rankings for the top NGs are almost identical to Table 1 . Similarly, as we
move down the list, there is incremental upward drift from past rankings because the exit of
low GNP per capita NGs makes room for efficiency gains by NGs with high GNP per
capita. Equally noteworthy are the NGs at the bottom of the list in Table 3. these NGs are
almost identical to the frontier based on 24 high GNP NGs in Table 4, and include countries
like Spain, New Zealand. Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. These subsets of
NGs have low robust efficiency in both tables.
The new frontier of 33 low GNP NGs includes some high efficiency economies with
high value petroleum and mining interests like Malaysia. Mexico, Indonesia, South Africa,
Colombia, and Venezuela that have moved up in efficiency rankings. Equally noteworthy,
some NGs have had consistently high relative efficiency under both frontiers despite low
GNP per capita, such as China, Indonesia, India, and Bangladesh. With the exception of
these differences involving the low income NGs, the 57 NG frontier and the high GNP
frontier appear quite similar.
7. Worldwide efficiency rankings and related measures
Since there exist no independent validity checks of NG performance rankings, we
investigated whether any institutional indicators may be associated with the efficiency
rankings. We hypothesized that relative-efficiency rankings of large numbers of NGs may
be closely associated with institutional, economic, and political variables. A composite
index. The Market Potential Indicators for Emerging Markets—2002, is employed in this
section. Of eight component rankings, a priori we selected four of these rankings as being
directly related to sustainable NG efficiency: ( 1 ) the market-size dimension defined as
urban population in millions; (2) the market-intensity dimension including the variables
GDP per capita and private consumption as a percentage of GDP; (3) market-
! consumption-capacity dimension defined as the percentage share of middle class (middle
,60%) in consumption/income; and (4) the economic-freedom dimension represented by the
Economic Freedom Index and the Survey of Political Freedom. We selected the variables
':hat were employed directly in forming these rankings (except for the political and
'-'conomic freedom indexes that are inherently subjectively defined) and regressed them
ugainst the stability-index values.
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Table 4
Stability index values and rankings (1991 1998)
High GNP countries Low GNP countries
Rank Country Avg 1991- Stability Rank Country Avg 1991- Stability
1998 index 1998 Index
GNP per capita GNP per capita
1 United States $27,631.51 3.6271 1 Brazil $4,258.63 0.6942
2 Japan $41,785.78 2 3225 2 China $547.52 0.5400
3 Germany $29,925.71 0.7348 3 Malaysia $3,927.26 0.2193
4 France $26,790.90 0.2021 4 Mexico $3,220.90 0.0779
5 Iceland $26,239.63 0.1189 5 Indonesia $946.56 0.0246
6 Switzerland $46,195 32 0.0879 6 Colombia $2,291.08 0.0243
7 Netherlands $27,197.93 0.0514 7 India $367.16 0.0159
8 Denmark $33,442 89 0.0198 8 South Africa $3,806.12 0.0120
9 Belgium $27,387.63 0.0137 9 Venezuela. RB $3,477.51 0.0109
10 Norway $32,674.29 0.0131 10 Bangladesh $322.75 0.0101
11 Finland $24,794.48 0.0102 11 Chile $4,300.22 0.0065
12 Ireland $16,669.90 0.0068 12 El Salvador $1,585.57 0.0063
13 Israel SI 5.094 X(, 0.0059 13 Turkey $2,893.04 0.0061
14 Sweden $26,167.32 00024 14 Jamaica $1,683.30 0.0059
15 Austria $28,909.64 -0.0010 15 Uruguay $5,675.16 0.0051
16 Greece S 1 1 .694 44 -0.0030 16 Costa Rica $3,315.21 0.0045
17 Korea, Rep. $10,263.60 -0.0031 17 Nicaragua $346.86 0.0040
18 New Zealand $14,891.03 -0.0069 18 Thailand $2,567.49 0.0038
19 Spain $14,887.33 (10106 19 Panama $2,843.31 0.0027
20 Portugal $10,827.38 -0.0111 20 Philippines $1,118.43 0.0027
21 Canada $18,833.04 -0.0212 21 Tunisia si. 945. 88 0.0020
22 Australia $19,840.18 -0.0246 22 Honduras $657.70 0.0014
23 Italy $18,688.57 -0.0374 23 Bolivia $869.86 0.0011
24 United Kingdom $19,066.27 -0.061
1
24 Peru $2,073.02 0.0002
25 Guatemala $1,433.66 0.0000
26 Ecuador $1,508 44 -0.0002
27 Morocco $1,279.00 -0.0002
28 Kenya $324.30 -0.0012
29 I lungary $4,254.81 -0.0022
30 Romania $1,329.06 -0.0041
31 Egypt. Arab Rep $1,03761 -0.0052
32 Pakistan $496.56 -0.0126
33 Poland $2,887.91 -0.0181
The stability-index values are treated as the dependent variable and are compared to the
three frontiers of all 57 NGs, the 24 higher GNP frontier, and the 33 lower GNP frontier. The
envelopes themselves were recalculated for the years 1 996-98 to correspond more closely to
the years in which the independent variables were collected. Our model includes three-year
averages for the independent variables of urban population (million), and GNP per capita
estimated using PPP (United States Dollars). Selected years within the 1996-98 period
describe percentage share of the middle class (middle 60%) in consumption/income (latest
year available), Economic Freedom Index, and Survey of Political Freedom expressed as
subjective rankings. The results of the three models are presented in Table 5. In the 57 NG
model, Eq. (2), urban population, along with GNP per capita, private consumption as a
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Table 5
Institutional determinants of stability index values
Models independent variables Complete envelope of Higher income Lower income
57 countries 24 countries 33 countries
(1) (2) (3)
Urban population'' (1(111(1.0(10.004*** -0.000,000,001*** -0.000.000.007***
GNP per capitab 0.000,028*** 000.012** 0.0001**
Private consumption % of GDP" 0.023***
Percentage share of iniddle 10%
consumption income
1
Economic freedom^ 0.210*
Political freedom' 009*
Constant -2.377*** (1426*** -0.649**
R- 453 896 631
F 10.8*** 90.7*** 16.5***
*** Significant at .01 level ** Significant at .05 level * Significant at .10 level.
J
Averaged from 1996-98 from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2001 CD.
b
Averaged from 1996-98 Estimates using PPP (US dollars) - 2000
cAveraged from 1996-98 from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2001 CD.
dAveraged from 1996-98 from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2001 CD.
'Averaged from 1996-98 from World Bank from Heritage Foundation. The Index oj Economic Freedom. 2002.
'Averaged from 1996-98 from Freedom House. Survey oj Freedom in the World. 2001 2002.
percent of GDP, and the economic freedom index are significant at the 10% level. Similar
results are noted for the high GNP NGs and the low GNP NGs, except that for the lower
income NGs, the political freedom index is not quite significant at a = .106. These somewhat
differential results seem to validate the partitioning of the 57 NG frontier, and also seem to
provide a useful means of assessing development policy. This analysis indicates that
urbanization is strongly associated with the measurement ofNG production efficiency.
8. Summary and governance implications
The main contribution ofthis study is to provide a generalized linear-programming approach
to international production-efficiency rankings, which can be applied to a wide range ofNGs in
various stages of sustainable development. Although our approach is comparable to Lovell and
Pastor ( 1 998), we provide stability rankings that are easily interpretable by decision makers and
comparable across a wide range of NGs. developing and developed. Our approach has the
advantage of comparing a large number ofNGs in various stages of sustainable development
on a comparable metric of inputs and outputs, allowing the individual NGs to choose appro-
priate transformation frontiers in determining the relationships between inputs and outputs.
Our results are generally consistent with earlier productivity growth accounting studies,
I
particularly those related to the OECD countries. However, there are also some new
counter-intuitive insights to be gained from this approach: some less developed NGs seem
to be sustained by rather high levels of efficiency, given their choice of inputs and outputs.
'While our choice of inputs and outputs was motivated by incremental contribution to
overall sustainable efficiency, it is noteworthy that the choice of inputs and outputs may
influence stability index rankings.
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These results, subject to the caveats implied by econometric assumptions and choice of
inputs and outputs, do have implications for sustainable resource-allocation decisions (both at
the national and international levels) and country risk analysis for investment, credit, and
foreign aid decisions by international agencies. As in Adam Smith (1953) cited earlier, NGs
could follow very "different plans [input and output mix in our DEA context] in the general
conduct or direction" to sustainable productivity growth. For example, the Bangladeshi
strategy to sustainable productivity growth need not be identical to that ofthe United States. In
this sense, a "cookie cutter" approach to productivity growth (or development) often imposed
by an international lender or agency such as the IMF or World Bank could be ineffective, ifnot
detrimental, to the sustainable productivity growth of a less developed country. It appears that
sustainable productivity growth models for "nations tolerably well advanced as to skills,
dexterity and judgment in application of labor" need not be the same as for those NGs who are
not nearly as "well advanced as to skills, dexterity and judgment in the application of labor"
and other inputs in order to generate and sustain a certain level of outputs. Economic
development and productivity growth in the post World War II period have largely followed
the footsteps of the more developed NGs-high GNP frontier in our analysis or OECD
countries in the earlier studies (Solow, 1987). Perhaps, it's time for the less developed NGs to
try not to simply mimic the more developed NGs. Instead, every NG needs to take a serious
look at its own history, religious diversity, demographic trends, and comparative advantage
regarding the inputs and input mix vis-a-vis the desired level of output within the context of
global economy. In short, one generic model of sustainable productivity growth may not fit all
NGs. Every NG needs to tailor its strategic plan for sustainable productivity growth, keeping
in mind its own relative advantages in terms of inputs and outputs.
One of the more interesting policy questions that arise from our empirical findings is as
follows: Should an international lending agency such as the World Bank or IMF allocate
more resources to NGs with higher or lower efficiency scores? We respond to this question
at two levels. Strictly speaking, on the grounds of investor protection and production
efficiency, NGs with higher efficiency scores are more likely to make more productive uses
of these resources than those with lower efficiency scores. However, production efficiency
might be one of the many factors influencing policy makers. For example, on the grounds of
sustainable and equitable global development, one could argue that NGs with low
efficiency scores should be provided with more resources to see if that will help them
improve and sustain their efficiency. Although some infra-structural resources are
indispensable for any NG to sustain and equitably compete in the global economy, there
is little or no evidence that more resources beyond a certain threshold necessary for
minimum sustainability will provide incentives to the NG to be more efficient.
Finally, we believe that production efficiency should be as important a consideration as
the aggregate wealth measured by GDP and GNP in sustainable resource-allocation
decisions at the national and international public and private sector levels. Comparative
statistics that are simply based on aggregate measures such as GNP and GDP without
accounting for productivity growth can be inadequate if not misleading. At this point, we do
not have a good understanding of how productivity growth measures are precisely
impounded by the international financial and commodity markets into the pricing of foreign
currency, commodities, and foreign (and national) bond ratings; that would certainly be a
fruitful direction to follow from these results.
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Abstract
We pnmanly examine three issues pertaining to quarterly reporting; its benefits, drawbacks and
determinants. This study is conducted in a voluntary-disclosure environment with respect to reporting
quarterly earnings. On the benefits side, we find that quarterly reporting is associated with higher analyst
following, and on the drawbacks side we find it is associated with high price volatility. If left to its own
discretion, we find that a finn with high growth prospects, large size and a technology orientation is likely
to disclose earnings on a quarterly basis.
B 2007 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: M4I
Keywords: Quarterly reporting; Analyst following; Online announcements; Liquidity; Price volatility; Earnings
management; Determinants
1. Introduction
In the United States, quarterly reporting was mandated in 1970. Subsequent research on
U.S. firms has revealed that quarterly earnings are value-relevant and provide performance
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information in a timelier manner than semiannual earnings (Butler, Kraft, & Weiss, 2005;
Landsman & Maydew, 2002). Nonetheless, quarterly reporting has been met with stiff
opposition in other parts of the world. In 2004, the European Union (European) Parliament
rejected the proposal to mandate the use of quarterly reporting because of the concerns
voiced by various sections of the capital market (IFLR, 2004; Schlesinger. 2004).
Singapore, a major Asian stock market, introduced quarterly reporting in 2003 with both
support and resistance from the business community. Its regulatory authorities continue to
monitor its usefulness amidst concerns about its drawbacks (Straits Times, 14 January
2006). Unresolved scenarios also exist in other parts of the world, e.g., in Australia
(Carnegie, 2004).
In the debate over quarterly reporting, those in favor believe that the more frequent
reporting of earnings increases analyst following of firms, improves timeliness of earnings,
and, improves stock trading. Those in opposition argue that it encourages short-termism,
which can lead to earnings management and stock price volatility, and feel that quarterly
reporting should be left as a voluntary form of disclosure
While the issue of quarterly reporting is being debated, a new form of reporting has
emerged — the online reporting of corporate events and actions on the websites of stock
exchanges and other information intermediaries. In comparison with quarterly reporting, this
form of disclosure is considered to be timelier for reporting price-sensitive information
(Debreceny & Rahman, 2005). Some opponents of quarterly reporting favor online corporate
announcements (Carnegie, 2004).
hi this paper, we examine the pros and cons ofquarterly reporting in a voluntary— disclosure
environment that is also experiencing an increasing level of online reporting of corporate
announcements. We also attempt to identify the reasons for choosing quarterly reporting in this
environment. By choosing a voluntary-disclosure setting, we can examine the effectiveness of,
and reasons for quarterly reporting without the intervention of the regulators. The particular
disclosure setting chosen is Singapore prior to mandating quarterly reporting but after the
introduction of online announcement. Although the stock exchange requires firms to disclose
price-sensitive information, the determination of what is price sensitive is left to the discretion of
the firms (Debreceny & Rahman, 2005).
Our base sample consists of520 Singapore Exchange (SGX) listed firms for 2001, ofwhich
66 disclosed their earnings quarterly and all others were semiannual reporters. The actual
sample for our analyses vary in size depending on the availability of data for the relevant
variables of specific tests. By being flexible, we maximize the sample size for most analyses.
We are constrained from increasing the sample by adding more years because of limited data
availability for online announcements of prior years and the changing institutional
arrangements for disclosure across years.
Our findings are that analyst following is high for quarterly reporters. However, they also
have high stock price volatility. In addition, we find that if left to their discretion, firms with high
growth prospects, larger size, and a technology base are likely to adopt quarterly reporting of
earnings. However, we note that online reporting is also positively associated with analyst
following, and is, additionally, positively associated with liquidity and negatively associated
' with earnings management. We conclude that as expressed by its proponents and adversaries,
i quarterly reporting has its benefits and drawbacks, and in the contemporary reporting
i environment, online reporting seems to play a strong role in keeping the market better informed.
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In addition, we find that analysts also contribute to stock liquidity and to reducing earnings
management, implying that they help enhance stock trading and act as monitors of firms.
This paper makes several contributions. First, it tests the efficacy of quarterly reporting
in a disclosure environment with no regulatory intervention for quarterly reporting. Second,
it tests the efficacy of online reporting as a competing source of frequent disclosures. Third,
by conducting the study in a voluntary quarterly-reporting environment, we attempt to
discover firm-specific reasons for quarterly disclosure. Fourth, we directly test the major
policy question, i.e., whether or not to mandate quarterly reporting after taking into
consideration the context in which the policy will be implemented.
Finally, we extend the disclosure literature in accounting into the area of frequency of
disclosure. Prior studies have examined the efficacy ofthe level of disclosure in annual reports
(Botosan, 1 997), the disclosure of specific information, e.g., segment information (Botosan &
Harris, 2000), and the expanded disclosure of earnings information (Healy, Palepu & Hutton,
1995). Most studies of the frequency issue compare the usefulness of quarterly earnings with
those of semiannual earnings (Butler et al.. 2005). In this study, we not only examine the
efficacy of quarterly reports in comparison with the efficacy of semiannual reports, we do this
examination along with an assessment of the efficacy of online reporting and the presence of
information intermediaries. Although some prior studies examine the informativeness of
competing sources ofinformation (Francis, Schipper, & Vincent, 2002a), they focus on their
immediate market effects; e.g., the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding their releases. In
that manner, they find little difference between the efficacies of the competing sources. We, on
the other hand, examine the longer-term effects, e.g., effects on analyst following, liquidity,
earnings timeliness, earnings management, and stock price volatility.
The remained of this paper is organized in the following manner: The second section deals
with the disclosure setting ofour choice and the identification ofthe research questions. The third
section describes the hypotheses and specifies the research models. The fourth section describes
the sample selection, sources of data, the descriptives and the bivariate correlations. The fifth
section provides a discussion of the multivariate results. Section six draws the conclusions,
identifies the limitations of this study and provides suggestions for future research.
2. The disclosure setting and the research questions
Singapore provides an ideal setting for evaluating the usefulness of quarterly reporting in
the new information environment of firms. Up until 2002, quarterly reporting was optional for
listed companies in Singapore. At the same time, arrangements were put in place for firms to
make online disclosures of price-sensitive information, where the determination of what was
price sensitive was left to the discretion of the company managers (Debreceny & Rahman,
2005). This setting allows us to ascertain the pros - and cons - of quarterly reporting without
any regulatory biases and helps us understand the firm-specific reasons for the adoption of
quarterly reporting when more frequent forms of disclosure could also be used by companies.
2.1. Institutional developments in quarterly reporting in Singapore
The Disclosure and Accounting Standards Committee (DASC) in Singapore proposed the
idea of mandatory quarterly reporting for listed companies in May 2001 (Ministry of Finance
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Media Release, 2002) and the government accepted its recommendation that all listed
companies publish quarterly reports for financial periods starting from 1 January 2003. The
DASC was a private-sector-led consultative committee appointed by the Singapore Ministry
of Finance in wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. One of the causes of the Asian
financial crisis, identified by DASC, was insufficient disclosures by corporate entities.
Although the DASC recognized that quarterly reports may not be prepared as diligently as
annual reports, they felt that more frequent, periodic disclosures would enhance certainty and
confidence in the market. However, due to the reservations of the smaller companies, the issue
came under scrutiny again in the second half of 2002. After its formation in August 2002, the
Council on Corporate Disclosure and Governance (CCDG), a regulatory body for setting
accounting standards in Singapore, initiated a discussion on quarterly reporting and
recommended that companies with a market capitalization of SS20 million or below be
exempted from reporting on a quarterly basis (Ministry of Finance Media Release. 2002). The
limit was later raised to $75 million (SGX, 2004).
In the debate leading up to the requirement for quarterly reporting being established.
questions were raised about the usefulness of quarterly reports. Critics pointed to the
reasons of the London Stock Exchange's (LSE) opposition to an EU proposal for
mandatory quarterly reporting. The LSE felt that six-monthly reporting and continuous
disclosure requirements were sufficient and that quarterly reporting would not add
meaningfully to the disclosure process. Quarterly reports were also felt not to be equally
useful for all companies. In the case of technology companies where business cycles were
short, such reports were generally regarded as useful, but the case may not be the same for
other companies such as banks and property developers whose business cycles are longer
(The Business Times, 21 Aug 2002c). Also, local investors and analysts felt that quarterly
reporting in its suggested format was not ideal as its bottom-line figures did not tell the
whole story. It was felt that other announcements, not contained typically in financial
statements, could be far more useful (The Straits Times, 22 Aug 2002).
In the United Kingdom, the Treasury, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the
Association of British Insurers, and the European Savings Banks Groups have argued against
having quarterly reporting. They have argued that the Enron and WorldCom scandals arose
from the 'short-termism' that stems from quarterly reporting. Ifcompany executives, they felt,
were put under pressure to show results every three months, they would be tempted to
manipulate accounts (The Business Times, 21 August 2002c). Meanwhile, in the United
Kingdom, Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) wanted that without the
conclusion of enough management commentary on business outlook in quarterly reports,
companies ran the risk of making short-term decisions to make the bottom-line numbers
attractive to investors. This they felt would increase price volatility (The Standard. 26 Nov
2002). Similar concerns about increased speculation were voiced in Singapore. Critics were
dismayed that Singapore had tilted in favor of traders in stocks rather than investors.
i (Dhanabalan, 2002). The opinion expressed was that quarterly reporting would increase the
i
volatility of stock prices, as investors would react to the short-term information flow (The
Business Times, 2 Nov 2002b). In this respect, it was also felt that management would report
earnings more opportunistically, seizing upon the increased regularity of financial reporting to
1
"massage" earnings figures to meet expectations or achieve targets upon which their bonuses
\
and other performance-based pay are dependent (The Straits Times, 22 Aug 2002).
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Furthermore, according to industry feedback, preparing the accounts for public
dissemination every three months was a cost small companies could not afford. Fund
managers and brokers believed that regular updates on company performance were more
important for medium to large corporations and less so for small companies. But others
argued that it was the small firms that lacked transparency and, thus, should be required to
provide the market with more regular feedback (The Business Times, 13 Nov 2002a).
However, with approximately 12% of firms (66 out of 520 firms listed on the SGX main-
board and SESDAQ) already opting to publish quarterly reports before the regulation came
into effect, there were obvious supporters of quarterly reporting within the coiporate sector.
Therefore, there were reasons to believe that certain firms were inclined to adopt quarterly
reporting on a voluntary basis.
This study is carried out to address the doubts over the usefulness of quarterly reports to
investors. In particular, we seek to investigate the following research questions:
Benefits ofquarterly reporting:
1. Do quarterly reporters have higher analyst following than semiannual reporters?
2. Does quarterly reporting enhance trading in stocks?
3. Does quarterly reporting increase earnings management?
Drawbacks ofquarterly reporting:
4. Does quarterly reporting increase earnings management?
5. Does quarterly reporting increase stock price volatility?
Determinants ofquarterly reporting:
6. What types of firms would voluntarily adopt quarterly reporting?
2.2. Contemporary online-reporting setting in Singapore
Online reporting is fairly common in Singapore. Internet-linked or online-reporting
venues provide low-cost means of disseminating market-relevant coiporate information on
a continuous basis. They provide the stakeholders ease of access, low transaction costs of
the information search, near-instantaneous availability of information, fair disclosure to all
interested parties, and a wide reach (Debreceny & Rahman, 2005). Singapore listed firms
are required to make announcements of price-sensitive information in the Singapore
Exchange (SGX) website through the MASNET (Monetary Authority of Singapore
website) website. Stock trades by insiders, accounting information, and prospective
information are the three most popular forms of information reported through this online
system (Debreceny & Rahman. 2005). We control for the influences of online reporting on
the SGX website in answering the above questions on quarterly reporting.
1 A similar but not identical list has been published by Corporate Governance Executive (2003) at www.cgfrc.
nus cdu sg/Publications/CGE/cge_l_3.htm.
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Another form of online reporting that has also evolved in recent times is disclosure
through company websites (Debreceny, Gray, & Rahman, 2002). We do not include data
from the corporate websites in our analyses as we feel that most price-sensitive information
would be disclosed in the stock exchange website because of the SGX requirements. Also,
stock exchange disclosures would be more credible as the SGX penalizes firms making
misleading disclosures. Debreceny and Rahman (2005) examine the types of disclosures in
the announcements of 22 MSC1 mid-cap companies of Singapore. They find that of the
1,514, 66.73% are about share transactions by insiders, 12.63% are about earnings and
accounting (only 1.84% are about quarterly earnings), 12.74% are about prospective
information and 7.28% are on corporate governance information.
Furthermore, apart from the online announcements, the SGX website is a "one-stop-
shop" for other important corporate information including annual and interim financial
reports. Therefore, we feel that there would be little additional price-sensitive information
on the corporate websites.
3. Prior literature, hypotheses, and models
Corporate disclosure turns private information into public information (Easley & O'Hara,
2004), which reduces the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and
between informed and uninformed outsiders (Brown, Hillegeist, & Lo, 2004; Leuz &
Verrecchia, 2000). It is also understood that managers will make announcements or
additional disclosures voluntarily when the benefits of disclosure exceed the associated costs
(Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Dye, 1986). Dye (2001) and Verrecchia (2001 ) feel that there
is no generally accepted categorization of disclosure studies. However, from an empirical
disclosure literature perspective, we see two sets of disclosure studies, one set examining the
effects of disclosure and the other set dealing with the determinants of disclosure.
Within the effects-of-disclosure category, there are studies that examine the effects of
disclosure on earnings. They examine how disclosure may compete with or support
accounting information, particularly earnings (e.g., Francis et al.. 2002a; Francis, Schipper, &
Vincent, 2002b). Within the effects-of-disclosure literature there also are studies that examine
the effects of level of disclosure (e.g.. Botosan, 1997). There are also those who examine the
determinants of disclosure (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Debreceny & Rahman, 2005).
The questions that have risen in the quarterly-reporting debate relate mainly to the level
of disclosure effects on market parameters and the determinants of disclosure. Therefore,
we address our questions based on the literature in these two strands of research.
3.1. Benefits of quarterly reporting
Early research in quarterly reporting suggests that quarterly earnings are value relevant
(Brown & Niederhoffer, 1968), and investors put equal emphasis on both quarterly and
annual accounting earnings (May, 1971). Furthermore, Foster (1977) and Abdel-khalik and
Espejo (1978) show that quarterly earnings help predict annual earnings. Recent research
shows that while the value relevance of annual earnings is receding (Francis & Schipper.
1999; Lev & Zarowin. 1999), quarterly reporting has experienced an increase in value
relevance over time (Landsman & Maydew, 2002).
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We attempt to confirm the issue of relevance of quarterly reporting by answering our
questions on the benefits of quarterly reporting identified in the earlier section.
3.1.1 . Do quarterly reporters have higher analyst following than semiannual reporters?
Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that if more timely information is available, then analyst
coverage could become lower because there is less demand for alternative sources ofinformation.
Nagar, Nanda. and Wysocki (2003 ) and Skinner (2003 ) support this argument by explaining that
analysts are an important part of the demand mechanism ofcoiporate disclosure. However, Lang
and Lundholm ( 1 993 ) and Lang et al. (2002 ) find that when more timely information is available
analyst coverage is higher. This they feel occurs because timely information enables analysts to
better conduct their activities. Analysts, they contend, are information intermediaries who use
corporate disclosures along with information from other sources to further inform the markets
about corporate activities. Likewise, they are likely to be associated with firms that disclose more
frequently, e.g., by way of quarterly reports. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
HI. The number of analysts following the firm is positively associated with quarterly
reporting."
Using the model below, we assess whether or not analyst following is associated with
quarterly reporting (QR). QR is the experimental variable, and the remaining variables control
for other influences that can also increase analyst following. NoA controls for online
announcements, presumably the most frequent form of disclosures of most firms, especially
after the introduction of online disclosures. ABSROE and PRFT control for the magnitude and
direction of profitability, respectively. Analysts are likely to pay more attention to finns with
large magnitudes of profit and loss and follow profitable finns more often. SIZE controls for
many missing variables, e.g., coiporate diversity and complexity, higher levels of activity, and
economies of scale for disclosure. Large firms are known to disclose more (Botosan, 1997).
INDM 9) controls for industry influences on analyst following. Finally, finns listing in the US
would have more analysts following them because they are likely to have a wider investor base.
AF = a + />,QR + /i
:
NoA + ftABSROE + />4 PRFT + /?5SIZE
+ P6USLST + Y I^ .diJND
e
lA (Model 1)
Where:
AF Logarithm of number of analysts following the firm in 2001.
QR Quarterly or semi-annual reporter (one for quarterly reporter and zero for semiannual
reporter).
NoA Logarithm of number of announcements by the firm on SGX website.
ABSROE Logarithm of absolute value of return on assets for 2001.
PRFT Sign of return on assets for 2001
.
SIZE Logarithm of 2001 end of year market value.
USLST Listed in the United States or has ADR in the United States.
We do not test for forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion as done by Lang and Lundholm ( 19%) because
many Singapore firms are either followed by one analyst or have no analyst following
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IND,| .),Nine dichotomous dummies for identifying a firm's industry using United States
NAICS Code.
3.1.2. Does quarterly reporting enhance trading in stocks?
Kim and Verrecchia ( 1 99 1 ) identify volume change as a proxy for different belief revision
of investors. Investors feel more certain about future outcomes of the firm's activities with
higher levels ofinformation (Leuz & Verrecchia. 2000). Cready and Hurtt (2002) show that
liquidity of stocks is higher in the presence of higher amounts of disclosure with earnings
announcements. Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004) demonstrate that frequent and prompt
release of material information in the form of conference calls can reduce the information
asymmetry of firms. They explain that timely disclosures make investors aware of private
information regarding future earnings of the firm. Such disclosures reduce the information
asymmetry between uninformed and informed investors. They show that regular release of
disclosures enhances the confidence of investors in the firm. Quarterly reporting being a
more timely and regular form of reporting also can make traders more confident about then
private valuations, encouraging them to trade more often using such valuations.
Also, because earnings-related information becomes more frequently available through
quarterly reporting, the information in annual earnings is anticipated sooner and reflected in stock
prices faster) Butler etal.. 2005). This, in turn, enhances the turnover ofshares ofa firm. Butler etal.
(2005) find higher liquidity levels for United States quarterly-earnings disclosers when quarterly
earnings disclosure was voluntary in the United States. Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
H2. The liquidity of a firm's shares is positively associated with quarterly reporting.
Our investigation involves the model shown below. All the information variables. QR. AF
ABSROE, NoA, and AR are likely to enhance liquidity. IND, ]1M controls influences such as
industry risk and industry concentration. USLST controls for the extra liquidity resulting from
being listed in a larger stock market, the United States market (Saudagaran & Biddle, 1995).
VOL = a + P' ,QR + P' 2AF + 0' 3ABSROE + /<' 4PRFT + /3' 5NoA
-I- /?' (1AR + /?' 7USLST +^ d, IND, (Model 2)
Where the additional variables are:
VOL The log of the ratio of total volume traded in 2001 to total outstanding stocks at the
end of 2001.
AR Annual returns in 2001.
3.2. Drawbacks of quarterly reporting
3.2.1. Earnings manipulation
Lobo and Zhou (2001 ) find a negative association between disclosure level and earnings
management using a sample of United States firms. An effective way for management to
influence reported earnings subtly is to manipulate accounting policies relating to accruals. We
adopt the definition of discretionary accruals of Kothari. Leone, and Wasley (2005) to measure
earnings management. We first determine a firm's total accruals for the year as the difference
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between operating cash flows and net income. The discretionary component of total accruals,
which does not depend on changes in business activities and the external economic climate, but
on the willful acts of management, is separated and identified using the following model
advocated by Kothari et al. (2005): 3
TAavMa. = aa + MM* + b2 AREVa,/Aax + />3PPEilvMa. + />4ROAlU + £,„
Where:
TAUA Total accruals for firm a in year x ( Income before tax less cash flow from operations)
AREV 1/( Revenues for firm a in year x less revenues for year (x—1)
PPE llv Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm a in year x
Am Total assets for firm a in year v
En, A residual term that captures discretionary accruals
The inclusion of AREV„, and PPE„ V is to account for non-discretionary accruals of current
assets and liabilities and the non-discretionary aspect of amortization and depreciation
expenses that is dependent on the firm's investment in capital assets, respectively. The
residual, i.e., t\„. is an estimate of the discretionary accrual of year x for firm a.
Although literature predicts lower levels of earnings management for firms with higher
levels of disclosure, the press in Singapore reported the concern that with more frequent
disclosures under a quarterly reporting regime firms will focus on short-term earnings and
engage in earnings management on a more frequent basis (The Business Times, 2
November, 2002b; The Business Times, 21 August 2002c). The belief here is that as firms
report quarterly they will have more opportunities to make changes in their accruals such as
receivables, payables, and inventory. To test this notion, we hypothesize that:
H3. Discretionary accruals are positively associated with quarterly reporting.
Following prior studies (e.g., Kim, Chung, & Firth, 2003), we use the following
Fama-McBeth 4 approach for testing this hypothesis:
DA = a + b' ,QR + fe' 2AF + 6' 3NoA + fo' 4USLST + b' 5SlZE
+ //„AIP + // 7LEV + V" </',IND, + t-DA (Model 3)Z—W =
1
Where the additional variables are:
DA Discretionary Accruals for 2001.
AIP Log of the ratio of book value of the firm's assets to market value of the firm's
assets in 2001
LEV Log of total debt to total equity in 2001
We could not use the modified-Jones model as it requires data on receivables, which we could not acquire for
a large part of our sample
4 The use of the Fama-McBeth approach implies the use of three factors that contribute to firm performance as
control variables. Following in Kim et al. (20031 and Kothari et al (2005), we control for the common
performance-related variables, si/e. growth (through AIP). and leverage. These variables, being performance;
related variables, can affect discretionarv accruals.
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We introduce USLST to control for the influence of United States listing. We expect the level
of DA to be less for United States listed firms due to the additional scrutiny in the United States
market. IND(! >,, is introduced as a control because the different industry cycles may create
different levels of DA,„. Also, the other information variables, AF and NoA, allow for additional
scrutiny, which would also reduce DA. Therefore, we control our model for these variables as well.
3.2.2. Slock price volatility
Another concern of the critics of quarterly reporting is that this more frequent form of
earnings reporting would increase price volatility of stocks. This presumably would occur due to
the short-term focus on earnings of the investors. The investors would engage in speculative
trading rather than focus on long-term performance (The Business Times, 2 November 2002b;
The Business Times, 21 August 2002c). Contrary to this Mew, the disclosure literature suggests
that more frequent disclosures reduce price fluctuations as more information would reduce
information asymmetry (Brown et al.. 2004; Welker, 1995). However, much of such literature is
based on the United States market, which is more transparent than the Singapore market
Additional sources ofinformation in Singapore are fewer, making it more likely for the investors
to rely on reported-earnings numbers. Likewise, for the Singapore market we hypothesize that:
H4. The stock returns volatility of quarterly reporters is higher than that of the semiannual
reporters.
We use the following model to test this hypothesis:
STDRET = d + <5,QR + 52AF + «53VOL + <54ABSROE + (55PRFT
+ <56NoA + (5-USLST + V'' </,iND, + eSTD (Model 4)
Where the additional variables is:
STDRET Standard deviation of absolute monthly returns. Absolute value of monthly
returns is used because QR can cause both upward and downward price
movements depending on the sign of the earnings.
Since price volatility can arise from the level of trading, we control for VOL. We control
for NoA and AF. as additional sources ofinformation. We also control for ABSROE. PRFT.
and USLST because better-performing firms and firms receiving the scrutiny of the United
States exchanges would have lower risk, and, therefore, lower price volatility. Industries
have different levels of risk, and we control such risks by introducing the dummies IND
( | g) .
3.3. Determinants of quarterly reporting (]\liat types o) firms would voluntarily adopt
quarterly reporting?)
To answer the question "what types offirms would voluntarily adopt quarterly reporting",
we identify the firm-specific factors that are associated with reporting frequency. Leftwich
et al. ( 1981 ) explore the association between firm characteristics and frequency of reporting.
Their findings indicate that the debt-equity ratios of semiannual reporters in the United States
'.are significantly higher than the corresponding ratios for the other reporting frequencies and
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assets in place, a proxy for information asymmetry. Butler et al. (2005) carry out a multivariate
analysis of the determinants of quarterly reporting. The results confirm the hypotheses that
larger firms in concentrated industries with more asymmetrically informed investors, higher
agency costs, and better performance tend to report more frequently.
Following But ler et al
.(2005 ), we identi fy five factors that are 1 ikely to affect reporting frequency
of companies: information asymmetry, agency costs, firm size, proprietary disclosure costs, and
firm performance. Further discussion ofeach variable and their hypotheses are presented below.
Generally, firms with greater future-investment opportunities benefit more from frequent
reporting as a firm with greater investment opportunities would have higher levels ofinformation
asymmetry with investors. These firms are also high-growth firms. We use assets-in-place to
determine the investment-opportunity set offirms. High assets-in-place represents low information
asymmetry and low growth prospects. Following Butler et al
.( 2005 ), we define assets-in-place as a
ratio ofbook value of the turn's assets to market value of the firm's assets. We hypothesize that:
H5. Quarterly reporting is negatively related to assets-in-place.
Agency costs are present due to the existence of information asymmetry between the
principal (shareholders) and the agent (management). To mitigate such costs, there is a need
for more frequent reporting (Butler et al., 2005). Highly leveraged firms with more debt
financing have higher agency costs and so they have a greater demand for external financial
reporting as a form of monitoring. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H6. Quarterly reporting is positively associated with debt-equity ratio.
Finn size is related to the level ofinformation asymmetry in firms (Botosan, 1997; Butler
et al., 2005). Large firms have higher political cost associated with non-disclosure and are in
a better position to expend additional funds on reporting. Consequently, we hypothesize that:
H7. Quarterly reporting is positively associated with firm size.
Disclosure of company information whether voluntarily or due to regulation can be a
potential threat to the company's viability. Competitors can make use of such information
and gain access to the firm's competitive advantage. Disclosure of company information
thus entails high proprietary disclosure costs, especially in concentrated industries where
there are a greater number of market contenders. In such a case, firms are more likely to
protect their market position by disclosing less frequently (Butler et al.. 2005). To measure
proprietary costs, the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) is adopted. This is defined as the
sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in the industry. Using S to denote total
sales for firms in a given Primary US NAICS industry, and s, to represent the sales of the rth
largest firm in the industry.
CR4
4
1=1
5
We, therefore, hypothesize:
H8. Quarterly reporting is negatively associated with proprietary costs of disclosure.
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Generally, most researchers believe that the frequency of disclosure is closely related to
firm performance. There is also support from recent empirical studies that better performing
firms, because they are more likely to exceed disclosure-cost thresholds, disclose at higher
levels (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Butler et al, 2005). Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H9. Quarterly reporting is positively related to firm performance.
Performance is measured by return on equity as defined earlier. We use absolute value of
ROE (ABSROE) and a profit dummy (PRFT) to represent performance. Absolute value ofROE
is used because the dependent variable is a disclosure variable that can be affected by both large
negative earnings and large positive earnings. Prior studies suggest that the relation between
disclosure and performance may not be linear. Skinner (1994) demonstrates that the level of
disclosure increases with an increase in losses because in such situations firms try to reduce
litigations from investors. Conversely. Miller (2002) shows that firms with increasing profits
increase discretionary disclosures.
Based on hypotheses 5 to 9, we are able to come up with the model below to test the
determinants of quarterly reporting. We use listing in the United States exchanges and having
ADR as a control variable. Companies that list in the United States have to prepare quarterly
reports. We also use industry dummies to control for any remaining industry influences such as
production or seasonal cycles that may encourage firms to disclose earnings on a quarterly basis.
QR = 7 + 7, A1P + 72LEV + 7,CR4 + 74SIZE + 7,ABSROE
+ 7hPRFT + 7',USLST + ]T'
=| T/iND, + eQR (Model 5)
Where the additional variables is:
CR4 Ratio of the revenue of the four largest firms in an industry to total revenue of the
industry in 2001
This model is estimated using binary logistic regression. Binary logistic regression is
similar to linear regression, but it is suited to models where the dependent variable is
dichotomous. In Model 5, QR is dichotomous.
4. Sample selection, data mesurement and descriptives
4.1
.
Sample selection ami data
Our base sample has 520 firms from one year, 2001, that were listed on the main-board
of SGX and SESDAQ and whose data were generally available in the Bloomberg database.
However, our sample size for each model varies, depending on the availability of data for
the specific variables of the model.
The data for each variable were procured in the following manner:
3R Firms were identified as quarterly reporters and semiannual reporters by observing
their reporting pattern in the SGX website in 2001. Finns making quarterly reports
were identified as quarterly reporters. All others were regarded as semiannual reporters.
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All listed firms in Singapore in 2001 were required to report on a semiannual basis.
A1P Book value and market value for A1P were procured from Bloomberg.
LEV Total debt and total equity were procured from Bloomberg.
CR4 The revenue data for CR4 were procured from Bloomberg.
SIZE Market value data were procured from Bloomberg.
ROE The retum-on-assets data were procured from Bloomberg.
ABSROE The absolute value of ROE for 2001
.
PRFT Sign of return on assets for 2001, 1 = Profit and = Loss.
USLST Listing information was procured from each company's annual report.
AF Analyst followings were analyst numbers on each company's Yahoo Finance
research report.
NoA The number of announcements data were procured from the SGX website
AR Annual returns were procured from Bloomberg.
VOL The total volume traded and total outstanding stock data for VOL were procured
from Bloomberg.
DA The data for the computation of Discretionary Accruals for the Kothari et al. (2005)
model were procured from Bloomberg.
STDRET Standard deviation of absolute monthly returns were computed from the
monthly returns data procured from Bloomberg
1ND
( i
9)Nine dichotomous variables, each representing an industry in the following
manner: 1 = industry membership; = other industries. Industry identification was
done using US NAICS Code. The data for this code were procured from OSIRIS.
The industry names are listed in Table 1, Panel B.
TA,, | For total accruals income before tax and cash flow from operations for firm a in year x
were collected from Bloomberg.
AREVuv Revenues for firm a in year x were procured from Bloomberg
PPE
C„ Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm a in year x data were procured from
Bloomberg
Aux Total assets for firm a in year x were procured from Bloomberg
If the amounts for any of the above items were in currencies other than the Singapore
dollar then the amounts were converted using the average exchange rates for 2001 provided
by the Economic Survey of Singapore (First Quarter 2002) of Statistics Singapore.
4.2. Descriptives
Table 1 panel A illustrates the descriptive statistics for the variables of all the models.
Because of uneven data availability, the sample size (N) for the variables varied between
292 and 497 firms. Some variables were skewed and had kurtosis. The measures for these
variables were transformed into logarithms. The useable number of cases (N) for each
model is stated at the end of the respective tables for the models.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that 66 (13.28%) out of the 497 firms for which reporting
information was available were quarterly reporters. The highest number of firms voluntarily
adopting quarterly reporting in any one industry was in the Technology industry (29.4% ofthe
firms). The highest mean number of announcements was in the Diversified industry (41
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Dependent and independent variables
Descriptive Statistics N Mean Std Dev 1% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
QR 497 0.133 34(1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 000 1 000
AIP 397 1 .070 0.405 (1243 420 (i 806 1 043 1 2X0 1X15 2.327
LEV 397 0.456 0.235 0.028 0.081 0.264 0.453 0.647 0.834 9|6
CR4 397 593 0. 1 73 (1 264 0.398 0.398 (16(14 0.718 0.892 0.998
SIZE 397 1.920 0.686 0.822 1.040 1 435 1.777 2.274 3 3 1
2
4 222
ROE 397 -2.023 31.080 -147.383 48 928 6.435 3 4(1(1 11.515 27 041 47632
ABSROE 397 0.940 0.543 -0.538 (Miss 0.589 1.005 1.335 1.728 2 168
PRFT 397 665 473 000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 Him 1.000 1 .000
USLST 497 0.050 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0(1(10 1.000 1 000
AF 494 1.075 0.137 1 .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1 079 1.447 1.544
NoA 489 1.499 242 1 .075 1.204 1.322 1.447 1.613 1 .96
1
2.363
AR 461 0.011 1149 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.041 117
VOL 443 1 . 1 S3 0.793 0.755 -0 1)95 0.676 1.172 1 7X2 2 399 2.815
STDRET 262 1 146 0229 0.670 0796 1 (1(14 1 121 1 2X1 1 2X1 1.817
DA 276 0.000 0.993 -2766 -0.166 -0.025 0.010 (1(154 1.012 1 245
Panel B: Industry-wise distribution of quarterly reporters in 2001
Industry (IND,
i 9)) Total No. Quarterly '< of Quarterly Mean No. of Mean Analysts
of Companies reporters reporters Announcements Followings
1. Basic materials 16 0.0 35.3 0.7
2. Communications 36 6 16 7 35 1 4.2
3. Consumer, cyclical 87 12 13.8 22.0 1.0
4. Consumer, non-cyclical 61 7 11.5 23 2 2.8
5. Diversified 12 0.0 41 45
6. Energy and utilities 2 0.0 23.5 0.0
7. Financial 59 14 23.7 380 59
8. Industrial 190 17 8.9 27.4 1.9
9. Technology 34 10 29.4 31 4 42
Total 497 66 13.3 28.6 2.7
QR= Firms were identified as quarterly reporters and semiannual reporters by identifying their reporting partem in
the SGX website in 2001. Any firm making quarterly reports was identified as a quarterly reporter. Otherwise it
was identified as a semi-annual reporter, as all firms are required to report on a semiannual basis.
I
AIP = Book value by market value.
;LEV=Total debt by total equity.
CR4 = Industry concentration.
SIZE = The log of market value.
;
ROE = The log of return on assets.
!-\BSROE = The log of absolute value of ROE for 2001.
PRFT=Sign of return on assets for 2001, one = Profit and zero = Loss.
JSLST= Listing information was procured from each company's annual report
\F=The log of analysts' following in Yahoo Finance research reports.
>JoA = The log of number of announcements in SGX website
\.R=Annual returns in 2001.
i'OL = Total volume traded divided by total outstanding stock
)A = Discretionary accruals.
TDRET = Standard deviation of absolute monthly returns
MD,
-Industry identification using United States NAICS Code.
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announcements) and the highest mean analyst following was in the Financial industry (5.9
analyst followings). There were large variations between firms (panel A, Table 1 ) and between
industries (panel B, Table 1) for both the number of announcements and analyst followings.
4.3. Bivariate analysis
Table 2 provides bivariate correlation statistics for the variables. It shows that QR is
positively correlated with SIZE, USLST. AF. NoA and STD_RET (p<0.01) and is
negatively correlated with AIP (p<.05). High bivariate correlations also exist between the
independent variables, suggesting multicollinearity problems for the multivariate analyses.
However, the VIFs for each of the independent variables, as reported in the tables for
multivariate analyses, are well below the statistically unacceptable level of 10. Therefore,
none of our multivariate tests are significantly affected by multicollinearity between the
independent variables.
5. Multivariate tests and results
5.1
. Benefits ofquarterly reporting
5.1.1. Do quarterly reporters have higher analyst following than semiannual reporters?
Multivariate results stated in Table 3 for Model 1 suggest that AF is positively associated
with QR (p < 0.05). The results support H 1 . However, the positive association for AF and NoA
(/;< 0.0 1 ) exceeds that between AF and QR. AF is also positively associated with the magnitude
of earnings (ABSROE), SIZE and USLST (/?< 0.01 ). suggesting that online announcement is a
strong competitor for quarterly reporting in the area offorms of frequent reporting.
/. Does quarterly reporting enhance trailing in stocks'.'
Table 4 provides the results for estimates ofModel 2. The results do not support H3 as QR
is not significantly associated with VOL. However, both NoA and AF have significant
positive association with VOL (/;<0.01). This clearly suggests that information variables
that allow for more frequent monitoring of firms than quarterly reporting increase liquidity in
stocks more than quarterly reporting does. Critics of quarterly reporting have argued that the
practice of disclosing vital events and developments instantaneously by corporations using
online announcements diminishes the relevance of interim reports (Carnegie, 2004; The
Business Times, 12 November 2005). In addition, other information variables, ABSROE,
and AR are also positively associated with VOL (/><0.01). From these results we can infer
that other forms of information are more associated with liquidity than quarterly reporting.
To examine how quarterly reporting affects intra-period timeliness of earnings, we
compute 15-month cumulative stock returns of the quarterly reporters and the control
group, semi annual reporters, respectively. To compute month cumulative stock returns,
the absolute value of the returns (MthRet) was taken because the impact of quarterly
reporting is observed through the movement in share prices regardless of whether the
change is a positive or adverse adjustment. We compute MthRet at the end of each month
[
(i=one to 15) as a percentage of the 15-month total returns (TotRet). We take the 15-month
total returns because the effects of the final quarter for the quarterly reporters would continue
for three months from the end of the year. The year from which the sample was taken had the
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Table 3
Multivariate test for determinants of analyst following (Model 1)
Dependent Variable: AF
Coefficients Beta Std Beta i Sig. Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 0.667 21.495 0.000
QR 0.025 0.062 1.879 0.030 0.903 1.107
NoA 0.083 0.143 3.815 0.000 0.704 1.421
ABSROE 0.031 0.122 3.523 0.000 0.826 1.210
PRFT 0.010 0.033 0.951 0.081 0.828 1 .208
SIZE 0.129 0.639 15.432 0.000 0.580 1.723
USLST 0.060 II 101 2.968 0.001 0.855 1 . 1 70
Basic materials -0.014 -0 019 -0.594 0.553 0.927 1.079
Communications 0.019 0.034 [.013 0.312 0.863 1.159
Consumer, cyclical -0.027 -0.076 -2.159 0.031 0.805 1.241
Consumer, non-cyclical 0.001 0.002 0.047 0.963 0.831 1.204
Diversified -0.048 -0.052 -1.578 0.115 0.913 1 .096
Energy and utilities -0.049 -0.025 -0.789 0.43
1
0.984 1.(116
Financial -0.015 -0.034 -0.902 0.368 0.712 1 .405
Technology 0.002 0.004 0.1 18 0.906 0.858 1.165
F statistic 44.913
P 0.000
Adj R : 0.611
N 382
Note: One-tailed results are reported for QR. NoA, ABSROE. PRFT, SIZE, and USLST.
Table 4
Multivariate test for liquidity effects of quarterly reporting (Model 2)
Dependent Variable: VOL
Coefficients Beta Std Beta r Sig. Tolerance VIF
(Constant) -0.710 -2.299 0.022
OR -0.092 -0.040 -0.861 0.195 0.892 1.121
AF 0.871 0.160 2.802 0.003 0.601 1.665
ABSROE 0.234 0.168 3.398 0.001 0.803 1.246
PRFT 0.079 0.050 1.028 0.153 0.847 1.181
NoA 472 0. 1 5
1
2.835 0.003 0.690 1 449
AR 0.039 (i 156 3 463 0001 0.968 1.033
USLST 0.167 0.052 1.074 142 0.831 1.203
Basic materials -0.182 -0.048 -1.040 0.299 0.926 1 .080
Communications 0.329 0.113 2.363 0.019 0.861 1.162
Consumer, cyclical -0.263 -0.137 -2.756 0.006 0.798 1.253
Consumer, non-cyclical -0.153 -0 065 -1.339 (l 182 0.840 1 190
Diversified -0 572 -0.114 -2.485 013 0.931 1.074
Energy and utilities 0.219 0.021 0.464 0.643 0.982 1 019
Financial -0 349 -0.145 -2.883 0.004 0.776 1.288
Technology 0.439 0.148 3.105 0112 0.864 1.158
F statistic
P
9.129
0.000
Adj /?- 0.240
Y 387
Note One-tailed results are reported for QR, AF. ABSROE. PRFT. NoA. AR. and USLST.
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annual (fourth quarter) announcement deadline three months from the year-end closing. The
plotted percentage of the 15-month total returns for every month i is:
Cummulative monthly return,
Total return
To observe the timeliness of quarterly reporting we examine how quickly the monthly
returns as a percentage of the 1 5-month total returns were earned over this 1 5-month period.
We took a sample of the 62 SGX-listed firms in 2001 : 31 of them being the experimental
sample of quarterly reporters and 31 a control group of industry and size-matched
semiannual reporters. Because we wanted to compare their pre - and post - quarterly
reporting effects on returns of the experimental group, we had a strict definition for the
experimental group. This group had to have quarterly reports in 2001 and but not in the
prior year. The 15-month stock returns of the experimental group were calculated for both
2000 and 2001 fiscal years.5
The group of semiannual reporters used for comparison purposes was found using OSIRIS,
which facilitated search by company grouping by industry and by size. The proxies for industry
were the US NAICS codes, while that for size were the amount of total assets and turnover.
The respective average cumulative monthly returns (y,) for the quarterly reporters before
and after adopting quarterly reporting and the control sample of semiannual reporters are
plotted in Fig. 1
.
It reflects the speed at which earnings information is reflected in share prices.
The continuous line represents they, plots of the quarterly reporters, the long-dashed line is the
y, plot of quarterly reporters in the year before their adoption of quarterly reporting, and the
small dashed line is for v, of the semiannual reporters. We find that although the quarterly
reporters' v, exceeds the semiannual reporters, and pre-quarterly y, for most months of the 1 5-
month span the differences are visible only between the fifth and the tenth months. This could
be because the market starts to make predictions ofannual earnings in the latter halfofthe year,
and quarterly reporting assists investors to make such predictions.
These findings are consistent with the findings in Butler et al. (2005) for United States
firms for the period 1950-73. Butler et al. (2005) find greater earnings timeliness for
quarterly reporters after they started releasing their quarterly reports voluntarily. The United
States study classifies quarterly reporters as voluntary and mandatory reporters. After
increasing their frequency, the voluntary reporters displayed significant improvements in
timeliness while the mandatory reporters, who did so as a response to reporting
requirements imposed by the SEC in 1970, displayed limited improvement.
Butler et al. (2005) use a permutation test to calculate the area under the curve in the
graphs. A test statistic which represents the differences between the returns of high- and
low-frequency reporters is computed. We use the independent sample Mest to compare the
difference between the average cumulative returns of quarterly reporters and semiannual
Reporters for each month, and between the average cumulative returns of quarterly reporters
oefore and after they start issuing quarterly reports for each month.
For instance. Amtek Engineering Ltd. has a fiscal year end on August 2001. As such, the pre-frequency
increase 15-month period would be from May 2000 to August 200 land the post-frequency increase 15-month
,
eriod would be from August 2001 to November 2002.
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Fig. 1. Cumulative monthly return timeliness.
The comparison between quarterly reporters and semiannual reporters (Table 5) shows
that the average cumulative monthly returns of quarterly reporters is greater than those of
semiannual reporters throughout the 1 5-month period. However, only results for the first and
third months are significantly different at the 10% level for the two groups.
As for the comparison of quarterly reporters' pre- and post-adoption of quarterly reports,
the results in Table 6 suggest that the rates at which earnings were impounded into monthly
returns are not significantly different between the two periods. Nevertheless, the means of
Table 5
Independent sample Mests (quarterly vs. semiannual)
Month t (2-tailed) Sig. Mean difference
First 0.947
Second (I 536
Thud 0.456
Fourth (1402
Fifth 0.211
Sixth (1447
Seventh 0.517
Eighth 0.509
Ninth 0.329
Tenth 0.073
Eleventh 0.116
Twelfth ii 100
Thirteenth (1(174
Fourteenth 0.057
Fifteenth 0.016
57 0.348 0.107
57 0.594 0.048
57 0.650 0.140
57 0.689 0.064
57 0.834 0060
57 0.657 0.389
57 0.607 0.235
57 0.613 0.400
57 743 0060
57 0.942 0.067
57 0.908 145
57 0.920 0.048
57 0.941 0.104
57 0.955 0.022
57 0.987 1
5
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Table 6
Independent sample /-tests (pre- vs. post-frequency increase)
Month T (2-tailed) df S.g. Mean difference
First 1.880 33.276 069 0.164
Second 1.495 30.527 145 0.170
Third 1.583 29.956 0.094 0.150
Fourth 1.548 29.685 0.132 125
Fifth 1.556 29.851 0.130 068
Sixth 1.333 29.300 0.193 0.467
Seventh 1.286 29.271 0.209 0.224
Eighth 1.342 29372 190 0.096
Ninth 1.366 29.383 0.182 0.071
Tenth 1.356 29.368 0. 1 85 0.137
Eleventh 1.382 29.390 0.178 0.139
Thirteenth 1.350 29 597 187 0.033
Fourteenth 1.368 29 564 1 S2 n T3
Fifteenth 1.373 29 543 0.180 0.104
the cumulative monthly returns of quarterly reporters' post-quarterly reporting period are
consistently greater than those of the pre-quarterly reporting period.
We also conduct some exploratory tests of the influence of quarterly reporting and other
competing sources ofinformation on the month-by-month turnover ofthe 62-firms sample used
in Fig. 1 . The plots for these comparisons are in Figs. 2, 3 and 4. In this regard, we find that for
all three information sources for the investor - quarterly reporting, online corporate
announcements, and analyst following - the volume of shares traded is higher for most
months for those having quarterly reporting, above the median number of online
announcements and firms with analyst following.
5.2. Drawbacks ofquarterly reporting
5.2.1
.
Earnings manipulation
Table 7 shows the results of Model 3 estimates. The results contradict H3 as QR is
lot significantly associated with DA. However, DA is significantly negatively
w
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Fig 2 Quarterly reporting and volume.
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associated with AF (p<0.01) and NoA (p<0.05). Likewise, we infer that discretionary
accruals are not significantly associated with more frequent periodic reporting such as
quarterly reporting, but are lower when there is greater scrutiny of analyst monitoring
and when a firm puts its results under greater scrutiny through more frequent online
disclosures of material events. Alternatively, since DA was computed on an annualized
basis, one could argue that quarterly reporters may be managing their earnings on a
quarterly basis rather than on an annual basis. However, this could be said about
semiannual reporters as well, as they may resort to earnings management on a
semiannual basis. We could not test these possibilities because of lack of availability
of detailed quarterly-accounting data for quarterly reporters and semi annual
accounting data for semiannual reporters.
140
co
^
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Time
-avg of firms without analyst avg of firms with analyst
Fig 4 Analyst following and volume
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Table 7
Multivariate test for earnings management (Model 3)
Dependent Variable: DA
Coefficients Beta Std Beta / Sig. Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 1.970 3.365 0.001
OR -0.253 -0.091 -1.578 0.058 0.858 1.165
AF -1.713 0.265 -2.923 002 0344 2 907
NoA (I44X -0.113 -1.714 0.044 0.650 1 534
USLST 0.368 >9 1.673 0.048 0.805 1,242
SIZE 0.210 146 1.573 0.059 (1 32N 3.051
AIP 0.412 0.169 2.670 (10114 0.709 1410
LEV -0.597 -0.141 -2.319 o o 1
1
0.764 1.304
Basic materials 0.285 05
1
0.932 o 352 430 1.075
Communications -0.733 -0 1X4 -3.213 (10(11 (ISM 1.157
Consumer, cyclical 0.123 0.049 0.817 0.4 1
5
0.788 1 .269
Consumer, non-cyclical -0.007 -0.002 -0035 0.972 0.808 1 238
Diversified -0.090 -0014 -0.259 0,796 0.913 1 (140
Financial 0.592 202 3.148 0.002 0.683 1 464
Technology -0.672 -0.177 -3.000 (MID- 0.813 1 230
F statistic 6.840
P 0.000
Adj R2 0.231
N 272
Note: One-tailed results are reported tor OR. AF. NoA. and USLST. SIZE. AIP. LEV.
5.2.2. Stock price volatility
The test results for Model 4 are shown in Table 8. The table shows a significant
association between STDRET and QR (p<.05). This finding supports H4. 6
5.2.2.1. Determinants ofquarterly reporting (Why dofirms voluntarily adopt the quarterly
form of reporting?). Table 9 provides the multivariate test results for determinants of
quarterly reporting based on Model 5. The Cox and Snell R Square is 0.089 and the
Nagelkerke R Square is 0.162 of the binary logistics regression. The variables that are
significantly associated with QR are AIP {p<0.05), SIZE (/)<0.01) and Technology
|(p<0.01). These results lend partial support to the findings in Butler et al. (2005). The
results for Technology indicates that firms in that industry disclose their financial
information more frequently. In the US context, Sengupta (2004) finds that technology
! firms have the least delays in reporting their quarterly earnings. He explains that high-
risk industries have more litigation risk, and, therefore, they disclosed more promptly.
On the whole, results are significant for AIP, SIZE and Technology. Therefore, we
construe that firms with high growth prospects, larger size, and technology orientation
ire likely to use quarterly reporting, even if quarterly reporting is not mandated by the
egulators.
Following United States studies, we conduct an additional test (results not reported! to see whether or not
nformation asymmetry (bid-ask spread) is negatively associated with QR. and find that there is no significant
ssociation between the two variables.
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Table 8
Multivariate test for price volatility and quarterly reporting (Model 4)
Dependent Variable. STDRET
Coefficients Beta Std Beta t Sig. Tolerance VII
(Constant) 1.079 8.702 0.000
OR 0.085 0.118 1.674 0.048 0.819 1.222
AF -0.064 -0.045 -0.494 0.311 0.500 2.002
VOL 0.075 0.234 3.007 0.001 0.673 1.485
ABSROE 0.037 0.089 1.196 0.126 0.730 1.370
PRFT 0.046 0.097 1.390 0.083 0.829 1.206
NoA 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.488 0.584 1.713
USLST 0.060 0.077 1 .073 0.142 0.794 1.259
Basic materials 0.075 0.059 0.890 0.374 0.928 1.078
Communications -0.048 -0.048 -0.688 ii 492 0.847 1.181
Consumer, cyclical -0.011 -0.019 -0.256 0.798 0.759 1.318
Consumer, non-cycl cal -0.041 -0.056 -0.786 0.433 0.811 1.233
Diversified -0.053 -0.039 -0.585 0.559 0.911 1.098
Energy and utilities' 0.000
Financial -0.002 -0.003 -(1042 0.967 0.716 1.396
Technology -0.035 -0.033 -0.471 0.638 0.832 1.202
F statistic 1.805
P 0.039
Adj R : 0.046
N 235
'' The variable was dropped because its tolerance was equal to zero.
Note: One-tailed results are reported for QR, AF. VOL, ABSROE, PRFT, NoA. and USLST.
A reason for LEV not being positively associated with QR could be that most Singapore
firms only seek debt from banks and, thus, have private debts. Private debt of this nature
does not necessitate the use of voluntary public disclosures. Butler et al. (2005) find a
positive association between leverage and quarterly reporting for the likely reason that in
the United States of America firms rely on both private and public debts. Butler et al. (2005)
is based on United States firms.
6. Conclusions
Based on five research questions arising from a debate on quarterly reporting in
Singapore, we examine the pros and cons of quarterly reporting and identify firm-specific
features that are associated with quarterly reporting. The disclosure environment in which
we conduct the research is voluntary with respect to quarterly reporting and reasonably
voluntary with respect to online reporting of corporate announcements. We infer from our
findings that quarterly reporters have higher analyst following, but at the same time
quarterly reporting is also associated with high price volatility. Additionally, results show
that if left to their own discretion, firms with high growth prospects, larger size, and in the
technology industry, (presumably high-risk companies), are likely to disclose earnings on a I
quarterly basis. We also find that online reporting is more positively associated with analyst
following than quarterly reporting, and is also positively associated with liquidity.
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Table 9
Multivariate test for determinants of quarterly reporting (Model 5)
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(fi)
AIP -1.163 (1 ^4S 3 782 1.000 0.026 0.313
LEV 1.208 0.818 2.182 1.000 0.070 3 547
CR4 -1.448 1 030 1 976 1 000 0.080 0.235
SIZE 0.553 0.245 5.094 1 .000 0.012 1.738
ABSROE -0.293 0.336 0.759 1 .000 192 0.746
PRFT -0 021 0.378 0.003 1 .000 0.47S 0.979
USLST 0.715 0.578 1.531 1 000 0.108 2.045
Basic materials IN 538 9793 (1 01)11 1 0.998 0.000
Communications 0.695 0.624 1 242 1.000 0.265 2.004
Consumer, cyclical 0.783 0.458 2 92? 1.000 0.087 2.188
Consumer, non-cyclical 0.573 0.574 0.997 1.000 0.318 1 "4
Diversified 19 532 12983 0.000 1 1111(1 0.999 0.000
Energy and utilities -18.608 28174 0.000 1 000 0.999 0000
Financial 0.888 0.581 2.337 1.000 0.126 2.430
Technology 1 434 0.536 7.171 i I) (lu- 4 196
i
Constant -1.744 1.130 2.385 1.000 ll 123 0.175
Cox and Snell R squared 0.089
Nagelkerke R squared 0.162
A 394
Note: One-tailed results are reported for AIP. LEV. CR4. SIZE. ABSROE. PRET. and L'SLST.
We encountered a few constraints during the course of this research. The sample of 66
quarterly reporters is a small portion of the population of 520 firms. This sample is further
reduced in different analyses due to the omission offirms with missing data for certain variables.
This may have reduced the strength ofsome ofour tests or generahzahility ofsome of the results.
Also, although it is important to test the usefulness of quarterly data per se, our paper
focuses on comparing the effectiveness of quarterly reporting with that of semiannual
reporting. Since annual data is prepared on a common basis for all firms, we rely mainly on
such data to draw several of our comparisons. In any case, detailed quarterly data are not
readily available for the quarterly reporters.
Furthermore, the data are from only one year. Although data for more than one year
could enhance the generalizability of the results, we decided not to include observations for
Bore than one year because data for online announcements are not available for prior years
md we would have to control for the effects of institutional changes that had occurred in the
/ears immediately prior to 2001.
In spite of the aforementioned shortcomings, we find results that can guide policy
nakers across different jurisdictions on whether or not to mandate quarterly reporting. A
>olicy implication of this study is that quarterly reporting could enhance analyst following,
i>ut in a less transparent market than that of the United States, it would come at a price of
increasing price volatility. Since under the more contemporary setting online reporting
'lays a better role of keeping the markets informed, policy makers could find it more
eneficial than quarterly reporting to enhance market transparency.
' Although our study was conducted in a fairly developed market setting, regions like the
1 U require further research as the level of development of capital markets varies between
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the countries of that region. Given the differences in results between our study and prior
United States studies, we feel that the varying levels of development can cause quarterly
earnings information to be variously interpreted in the market. Such has been the case for
annual accounting disclosures (Alford et al., 1993).
Three questions have not been fully answered in this study: Is quarterly reporting very
costly? Are quarterly earnings less credible than their annual counterparts? Will the
investors of small companies benefit from mandated quarterly information as such firms
disclose less through other means? We have considered proprietary disclosure cost in our
study and, indirectly, we have considered the direct preparation cost through the use of firm
size in our examination of the determinants of quarterly disclosure. Small firms find
additional reporting costly, so the smaller the firm, the more costly the additional reporting
will be. However, we know that size proxies for many variables. So, it may not be a very
effective proxy for disclosure-preparation cost. Direct measures of preparation costs may be
considered in future research.
Our results suggest that quarterly reports create returns volatility. Apart from the reasons
discussed earlier, perhaps this occurs because the quarterly reports in our research are not fully
audited. Unaudited information may lack credibility and, therefore, tend to make markets
unstable. Although audit-quality research may support this contention, there is a need for more
specific examination of the impact of unaudited frequent disclosures in the more contemporary
accounting setting. Although frequency can lead to more timely dissemination ofinformation,
lack of credibility of the disseminated information may make the information set less relevant.
As for smaller companies, we do find that they tend not to issue quarterly reports.
However, this may be due to those companies having fewer matters to disclose and/or they
may not have a large equity spread which requires greater disclosure. Given that smaller
firms have their own idiosyncrasies, we suggest that their and their investors' needs be
assessed through a separate study focused on their information setting.
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Growing globalization of capital markets drives the demand for internationally com-
parable financial reporting Information. However, despite investors' increased desire for a
single set of internationally accepted financial reporting standards, differences across
countries will remain with respect to rules governing markets and financial reporting for the
foreseeable future. This was, according to the authors, the central motivation for writing this
book, whose declared objective is "to educate investors about the nature and trends in
financial reporting in the major industrialized countries and, in particular, those that are
home to the largest capital markets in the world" (p. 4).
The work of Benston et al. follows, like other international financial reporting books,
both an issues and a country approach. It can be subdivided into three main parts starting off
with the three initial chapters which discuss selected financial reporting issues and provide
the basis for the second part, where the financial reporting regulations of four major
countries (United States, chapter 4; United Kingdom, chapter 5; Germany, chapter 6; Japan,
chapter 8) and the European Union (EU, chapter 7) are analyzed. This "country analysis"
ends with a comparative assessment of the different reporting regimes discussed (chapter
9). The last part of the book deals with the future of financial reporting by considering
amongst others the costs and benefits of a single versus a multiple set of accounting and
auditing standards as well as the establishment of an effective oversight and enforcement
regime (chapter 10). It ends by summing up the future challenges for standard setters and
charting suggestions as to how these challenges could be tackled (chapter 1 1 ).
The introductory chapter is used to discuss several threshold issues related to financial
reporting, including the benefits of equity-stock ownership and major trends in equity
investments around the world. Despite an increased interest in internationally comparable
financial reporting information resulting from the globalization and cross-border
integration of capital markets, inter alia, fostered by new trading technologies and internet
communication, the authors do not believe "that hannonized rules - which the authorities
currently feel committed to - are either desirable (because they are likely to lag behind
market developments by substantial margins) or are a stable outcome (because national
bodies are likely to depart from international norms in the meantime)" (p. 15). This
statement is further developed in later chapters.
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Chapter 2 discusses the usefulness of audited financial statements for financial statement
users (especially for non-controlling investors) and limitations of financial accounting
information. The chapter provides a broad overview over the shortcomings of financial
accounting information and touches on a variety of different issues, as for example,
limitations resulting from reporting economic values, and measuring net income. Due to the
subjectivity involved in reporting economic values the authors criticize the increased use of
fair values in accounting and the IASB's and FASB's move towards an "asset/liability"
model. Trustworthiness is emphasized as a major quality of useful financial reporting
information. The chapter ends with a discussion on the value of audits and the incentives
auditors have to render competent and truthful attestations.
Structures and regulatory regimes of accounting and auditing standards for meeting the
demands of financial statement users are very compactly examined in chapter 3. Beginning with
the benefits of promulgated auditing and accounting standards from the perspective of auditors
and financial statement users, the chapter continues with a discussion on the advantages and
disadvantages of private versus government standard setting. This is followed by a brief
overview over the arguments brought forward in the current debate on pnnciples-based versus
rules-based accounting standards and a clear pronouncement of the authors in favor of a
principles-based approach. The chapter concludes with other forms ofgovernment involvement
illustrating attempts to prevent the auditing profession from discouraging competition.
Chapters 4-8 review the financial reporting regimes ofthe United States, United Kingdom.
Germany, the EU and Japan. Though each chapter follows a different structure to meet
national peculiarities, all individual "country chapters" first provide a brief description of the
main characteristics of each country's financial system and the historical development of the
regulatory structure. The analysis then continues for each country surveyed with a description
of the key elements of the present regimes in force regulating the financial reporting of
companies including regulations and regulatory bodies governing accounting (also discussing
the role of Internationa] Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS). auditing, corporate
governance, and investor protection. Each "country chapter" ends with an assessment of
shortcomings and current issues related to the present regulatory financial reporting regime,
revisiting, in the U.S. chapter, inter alia, the debate on principles-based versus rule-based
accounting standards, for example. Chapter 7, dealing with the corporate financial reporting
regulation in the EU, applies a similar approach. It surveys the EU's initiatives to harmonize
i
financial reporting of companies across its member states and discusses the EU's old
regulatory settings as well as current issues and initiatives related to accounting (including the
adoption of IFRS), shareholder protection, auditing, and enforcement.
Chapter 9 summarizes and contrasts the key financial reporting regimes in the four
countries surveyed and the EU. The authors identify many similarities but reveal, also, major
differences between the regulatory regimes under study. Given the remaining differences,
despite the efforts put into harmonization and convergence the question is raised "does
(diversity matter, and how can it be dealt with?" (p. 206). After discussing various strategies
i for how companies and investors can cope with diversity, the authors conclude: "Financial
disclosure in a country emerges as one of a number of interacting factors that together make
jp the national financial markets and corporate governance regime. Changing just one of the
factors in this complex nexus, say financial reporting standards, may destroy an extant subtle
valance and result in a reduction of the efficiency of capital markets" (p. 21 1-212).
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Those who expect to receive details on current accounting and auditing principles in
force in the countries examined will be disappointed. Tailored to its targeted audience
(which is investors), the presentation of each country"s accounting and auditing regulations
is in this book - in contrast to other international accounting books - restricted to a
description of major principles; though a somewhat fuller analysis of the differences
between U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) and IFRS as well as
accounting rules of some other leading countries is provided in an appendix to chapter 9.
Recognizing the pressure from product and financial markets driving the requirement for
transparent, internationally comparable, high-quality financial reporting, on the one hand,
and continued supremacy of national rules governing corporate reporting, as revealed by
the countries surveyed in previous chapters, on the other hand, the authors analyze and
consider in chapter 10 to what extent globally uniform accounting and auditing standards
should be established. Given the remaining differences among the key countries analyzed,
the problems experienced in the convergence process of IFRS and US GAAP and the
difficulties involved in the uniform application and interpretation ofinternational standards,
the authors argue that a single set of unanimously agreed-on global standards is neither
likely to be developed and sustained nor regarded as desirable as the advantages of uniform
standards may be outweighed by the disadvantages of a monopoly standard setter.
Therefore, the authors believe "that 'constrained competition' within a small set of high-
quality standards offers the most feasible and flexible setting to cope with increasingly
global capital markets. This option would achieve some of the benefits of both competition
and standardization" (p. 242). With respect to auditor oversight and enforcement, Benston
et al. propose "upgrading rather than convergence" (p. 250) first, before international
harmonization should eventually be driven forward, beginning with more coordination of
national enforcement activities.
The authors end their book by reviewing their major arguments developed in previous
chapters and considering ways in which financial statements could be made more useful for
financial statement users. The asset/liability approach with the increasing use of fair values
and the FASB's and lASB's joint revenue recognition project are key issues examined.
Given the difficulties associated with the determination of trustworthy economic values of
assets and liabilities, the authors "prefer financial statements based on traditional amortized
historical cost based on actual market transactions, with revaluations grounded on reliable
prices that can be audited and verified" (p. 270). Founded on this preference, an alternative
approach to valuation is proposed including the usage of "current market prices and
professionally validated estimates of them ... where they reflect the economic values of the
film's resources and are objectively measured and verified (i.e., are trustworthy)" (p. 271),
the preservation of the traditional "revenue expense" approach based on the matching
concept and voluntary supplementary disclosure.
In summary, the book does a good job in providing an up-to-date description and com-
parison of the regulatory financial reporting regimes of the United States, United Kingdom,
Japan, Germany, and the European Union for its targeted audience of investors, which, one
assumes, are not intended either to be specialists in the financial reporting regimes and
regulations of the countries surveyed, or interested in a rigorous analysis of fundamental
theoretical issues. Accordingly, the authors' discussions and conclusions on key financial
reporting issues are well reasoned, without overwhelming the reader with academic research
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findings and theoretical issues. The proposals developed are not beyond controversy and,
therefore, should stimulate further discussions.
Brigitte Eierle
University ofRegensburg, Germany
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Corporate governance and accountability, Jill Solomon, 2nd ed.. John Wiley & Sons,
Chichester, UK(2007), xvi + 386 pages, £ 30.99. €48.11, $65.00, ISBN 0-470-03451-3
1. Introduction
The dynamic concept of corporate governance and its underlying themes and issues
continue to challenge practitioners and academics alike with its constant review and
reforms, at a national and international level. As the author points out the term corporate
governance is one of the most commonly used phrases in the current global business
vocabulary. The author presents a text which is well written, easily understood and
extremely informative. First published in 2003. this second edition of the book updates the
first and includes new features. The author's and colleagues' latest research is also
summarized and referred to within the text. The book will be useful to undergraduate and
masters students, as well as practitioners interested in critically thinking about their role
within a corporate-governance framework. It includes the key literature pertaining to
corporate governance, which is extremely useful for those undertaking research.
2. Overview
The book is divided into three parts, with 1 1 chapters. It provides an overview of corporate
governance. In Part I the author sets out the corporate-governance framework and mechanisms
with a clear U.K. focus before providing a summary of global corporate-governance systems
in Part II. The book concludes in Part III with an extremely interesting examination ofthe ways
that corporate governance has evolved to include stakeholder concerns as well as shareholder
accountability. The book, which is supported by the author's and colleagues' research,
includes an Enron case study and an analysis of Parmalat, the "European Enron". Particular
features of the book are the chapter summaries and questions for reflection and discussion,
which are extremely useful, not only for those studying corporate governance but also for
those delivering corporate-governance units at undergraduate and postgraduate level.
The author defines corporate governance as "the system of checks and balances, both
internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their ac-
countability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their
business activity" (p. 14). The main premise of the book is based upon the perceived shift from
the shareholder-based model ofcorporate governance, with attention being principally focused
on making companies more accountable to shareholders, to an increasing emphasis on meeting
the needs of a broad range of stakeholders. The author argues that theoretical frameworks that
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suggest companies should only be accountable to shareholders are not necessarily inconsistent
with theoretical frameworks, which favor stakeholder accountability. The author also observes
that this wider stakeholder approach, linked to social responsibility and to some extent an
ethical approach to business, is not necessarily inconsistent with corporate profitability. This
belief is, as the author states, founded "on a growing body of literature and empirical evidence
that suggests that corporate accountability, which takes into account a broad range of social,
ethical and environmental factors, is conducive to financial performance" (p. 29).
3. Part 1
Part I, which consists of chapters 1-6 deals with corporate-governance frameworks and
mechanisms. Chapter 1 first defines corporate governance before dealing with the
theoretical frameworks of agency, transaction cost, and stakeholders. The author compares
and contrasts these before noting that they are "different lenses through which the same
problems may be observed and analysed" (p. 23). Chapter 2 deals with corporate-
governance failure with particular reference to "Enron" and "Parmalat". The main focus is
the "Enron" case study which illustrates the dangers associated with weak corporate
governance and ineffective checks and balances. The author observes that while the U.S. and
Italian corporate-governance systems are very different, it is interesting to note that they are
equally vulnerable to similar forms of abuse and corporate-governance weaknesses. Chapter
3 focuses on U.K. corporate-governance reform, which the author states has, since the first
edition of the book, been subject to over-all fine tuning and refining ofcorporate-governance
mechanisms rather than dramatic changes and reforms. The chapter provides a useful
historic overview and summary of the corporate-governance reports from the Cadbury
Report ( 1 992 ) to present day. The chapter introduces the corporate-governance codes of
practice and policy documents and explains the U.K. self-regulatory/voluntary approach to
corporate governance, described as the "comply or explain" approach, aimed at encouraging
compliance with its associated "good" corporate-governance culture rather than strict
statutory code. This approach has not been adopted at a global level and many countries have
adopted a more legalistic and statutory approach. It also highlights the important link
between governance and financial performance, before concluding with the development of
corporate-governance ratings, which impact on shareholder wealth. Chapter 4 deals in some
detail with the role of the board of directors, focusing mainly on U.K. listed companies. The
chapter covers the main initiatives supported by academic literature from board structure to
the increasingly important role of the non-executive director. The board is compared to a
"healthy heart" that needs to be "healthy, fit and carefully nurtured for the company to run
effectively" (p. 77). The author outlines the corporate-community response to the Higgs
Report (2003) and considers the arguments put forward by the literature relating to whether
non-executive directors play a useful corporate-governance role. The chapter highlights the
initiatives to widen the non-executive "gene pool" recommended by Higgs (2003) and
Tyson (2003). It closes with a view that the board is subject to a complexity of dynamics
which leads to perhaps a need to consider not only an "agency theory, finance paradigm" but
also other disciplines, such as "management science" when seeking "understanding of board
as corporate governance mechanisms" (p. 104). Chapter 5 considers the role of the
institutional investor, highlighting the monitoring aspect in the context ofagency theory. The
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chapter explains how the ownership structure has become more concentrated in the hands of
a small group of large institutional investors and the related, complex web of ownership, as
exemplified by pension fund investment management. The chapter also deals with the
increasing activity of the institutional investor, with special reference to research into
institutional investor voting in the U.K. and the impact of shareholder activism on coiporate
performance and company value. Chapter 6 is dedicated to the way in which corporate
transparency contributes to corporate governance and the associated mechanisms by which
companies may become more transparent. A particular feature of this chapter is the section
dealing with the emerging areas of governance reporting and forward-looking narrative
reporting. Other key aspects of the chapter include the importance of risk disclosure and the
role of the audit in corporate governance linked to the agency problem.
4. Part II
Part II of the book focuses on the theme of global corporate governance. Chapter 7
introduces corporate-governance systems worldwide, based upon the main determinates of
ownership structure and legal frameworks while recognizing the impact of cultural and other
influences. The author acknowledges the difficulty associated with the categorization of a
country's corporate-governance system but adopts the accepted "insider" and "outsider" model
(p. 182), while offering the view that there is a real possibility that coiporate governance will
converge at a global level. Chapter 8 provides a reference dictionary of corporate-governance
systems of selected countries that seeks to illustrate the broad diversity arising from their own
legal frameworks, corporate ownership, structure, culture, and economic factors. This chapter
clearly meets its aim ofproviding a flavor of the rich diversity ofcorporate-governance systems
internationally. However, it could benefit from elaboration or even form the basis in its own
right of a comparative text on international coiporate-governance systems.
5. Part III
Part III broadens the debate on corporate governance by "extending the theoretical
paradigm from a narrow agency theory perspective to encompass a stakeholder theory
perspective" (p. 23 1 ). The author does this very successfully in chapter 9 by considering the
growth of coiporate social responsibility and highlighting the potentially strong impact of
coiporate behavior on a wide range of stakeholders. This is supported by a discussion of the
social, ethical, environmental, and sustainability disclosure which has the potential of
discharging their accountability to a wide range of stakeholders. The author notes the
importance of environmental and sustainability coiporate reporting in achieving wider
accountability to both shareholders and corporate stakeholders. This is supported by a
growing perception that "good management of social and environmental issues is a
reflection ofgood general management, which is helping to drive the sustainability agenda"
(pp. 263-264). The chapter concludes by considering the academic debate that exists over
the stakeholder engagement and its genuine success in promoting coiporate accountability.
Chapter 10 develops the theme of a broadening corporate-governance agenda through its
analysis of the role of institutional investors in driving coiporate social responsibility by
taking account of environmental, social, and governance factors in their investment
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decisions. This analysis extends to consideration of socially-responsible investment
strategies and investments and their drivers and profitability. The author reports upon the
increasingly sophisticated engagement and dialogue that is emerging between institutional
investors and their investee companies in the area of social and environmental information as
part of socially-responsible investment. The author offers the view that such issues are now
being integrated into the heart of corporate-governance concerns for the institutional-
investment community. The chapter concludes with the statement that "this represents a deep
change in the attitude of business and financial institutions towards social responsibility,
endorsing a broader remit than that encapsulated by pure agency theory" and that a "broader
agenda for corporate governance, which embraces a stakeholder theory approach, may no
longer be viewed as inconsistent with value creation in the long run" (p. 302). Part III
concludes with chapter 1 1 which provides a brief insight into the author's view of the future
direction ofcoiporate governance and accountability, which touches upon investor activism,
the global convergence in corporate governance, and corporate-governance reform.
In conclusion, it is fair to say that the author achieves the stated aims of this work in an
informative and easily-read format. The book not only provides a great deal of explanation
and detail on the topic of corporate governance and accountability for undergraduates and
practitioners alike, but also provides a very useful discourse on a range of associated
theories, with reference to key literature on corporate governance and accountability, for
postgraduates embarking on their research.
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Financial statement analysis and security valuation, Stephen H. Penman, 3rd ed.
McGraw-Hill/Irvvin, International edition (2007), xxix + 776 pages, £44.99, ISBN-
10: 007-125432-3
Penman's book is a well crafted volume, which offers plenty of content including
detailed material on "hands-on" financial statement analysis and valuation. It is com-
prehensive and such, the 2nd edition was widely adopted. The book provides a helpful
reference for students in economics and business, particularly for MBA candidates.
Penman's book also serves the needs of professionals who are confronted with valuation
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tasks in everyday life. The book is intended primarily as a book about doing. Hence, it takes
a pragmatic viewpoint and is suited as a standard textbook for courses that aim at a
preparation for practical valuation tasks. The 3rd edition has kept this intention as well as
the basic structure of the 2nd edition. While the book has gained somewhat in length, the
overall outline of the topics has kept its clarity.
Penman's 3rd edition is structured along five main parts with two introductory chapters.
These cover the basics of statement analysis and valuation (Part I, Chapters 3 to 6).
statement analysis with a focus on value generation (Part 11, Chapters 7 to 12), methods of
forecasting corporate payoffs (Part III, Chapters 13 to 15), quality aspects in accounting
(Part IV, Chapters 16 and 17) and finally risk considerations (Part V, Chapters 18 and 19).
While Parts II to V can be considered as electives. Part I forms the mandatory core part of
the book. It contains an introductory guide in the analysis of financial statements from the
U.S. perspective and provides a summary of financial market history, which includes results
on long run average returns on important asset classes. Part I then continues with a
discussion of accrual accounting and the application of important alternative valuation
models. These models include the method of multiples, dividend discounting, cash flow
discounting and the residual earnings model.
There are several introductory treatments of financial statement analysis and valuation.
The classic corporate finance textbook by Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2005). for example,
offers a compact introduction to security valuation in its 4th chapter. That chapter may well
serve for a bachelor's level course but also for an introductory master's level course
(especially when the program is not focused on fundamental valuation issues). More
comprehensive treatments of the subject within a full one-semester course surely ask for
more intense textbook treatments. One example to note is the textbook by Soffer and Soffer
(2003). The latter authors offer a book, which is relatively compact while it covers con-
tents in an elegant and consistent manner. A clear advantage of Penman's textbook is its
comprehensiveness and its richness in interesting practical examples. Most of them are
compact case studies drawn from recent real-world problems. This feature offers a great
amount of exercises and allows lecturers to choose their collection of favorite examples for
in-class discussion. Moreover, it offers plenty of training opportunities to students. Making
lecturing with the textbook an even more rewarding task. Penman has updated and extended
his set of "real-world" examples in the 3rd edition. In this sense, the book offers a unique
view of financial analysis.
Financial statement analysis surely has many limitations. At least some of them should
be noted on a textbook level. Also, putting a critical eye on valuation results is an important
skill. Penman does address these issues in the book. On page 8, for example, Penman refers
to the 1990s stock market bubble and points out examples of speculative financial analysis.
As an example, he gives a critical assessment of a valuation of America Online Inc. as done
in 1999. The 2007 valuation perspective is clearly other than the one in 1999, but Penman
j
shows with his examples how to develop sound and critical valuation skills. And with all
• that sound fundamental analysis. Penman does not neglect the psychological aspect of price
assessments during a potential period of exaggerated valuations: "In a bubble, investors
' behave as if they are joining a chain letter. They adopt speculative beliefs that are then fed
' on to other people" (p. 7). This critical perspective on valuation is kept throughout the book.
Another example is the case of MCI WorldCom on page 49, which points out to the (now
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better known) limits of financial statement analysis, which arise from potential balance
sheet manipulation. The book offers an intense discussion of accruals, which are known to
be particularly critical in valuation (see Part I). Chapter 17 is on statement quality and
includes special sections such as "Sensitive areas that are prone to manipulation" (Table
17.2. p. 643) and "Situations where manipulation is more likely" (Table 17.3. p. 644).
Considering the textbook for a class, which is taken in part by students in a finance
program. I have made the experience that it is advisable to use Penman's volume for a
course at an early stage where it will be more appropriate. Finance students at later stages
sometimes get confused with several terms and concepts, which they were taught in finance
classes as concepts are sometimes understood and used quite differently within Penman's
text. Examples are statements like "avoid trading at the wrong price" (p. 4), which may-at
least to some-indicate the operational risk of a mis-trade, while what is meant is of course
"avoid trading at the given market price when it deviates from a given subjective
fundamental value assessment". Also the question for an arbitrage opportunity due to the
potential mis-valuation of a single corporation (case on page 107) sounds a little odd to
those who understand the no-arbitrage concept in the sense of financial economics. Here, it
would be better to point out to portfolios of mis-valued assets and then use the notion of
(statistical) no-arbitrage in the sense of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). Also, empirical
evidence, such as the book-to-market anomaly, could be cited and would provide a sound
justification for the "activist approach" as taken in the book (p. 3-6). This would strengthen
the book's obvious perspective that real-world capital markets are inefficient. However, it
remains unclear in the book what the overall investment strategy in buying single •
fundamentally undervalued stocks would be and what its prospective performance could
be. To my knowledge, there is little evidence that fundamental analysis has led to consistent
superior performance except for a few exceptional investors. The appropriate argumen-
tation that-while obtaining ultimate diversification at low cost-"the index investor is in
danger of paying too much" (p. 5) would rather point out that diversified strategies may
work as a perfect synthesis of the advantages of indexing together with those from sound
fundamental analysis.
From the teaching perspective, it is a standard question how many different textbooks
should be used to accompany a course. Penman's textbook is surely very well suited to be
considered as a sole textbook source due to its richness as indicated above. Still, students
sometimes feel that the text is relatively long-not only overall, but also when referring to a
single subject matter-and hence ask for a more condensed outline of the subject. The
summary of formulas in the appendix at the end of the book as well as each "Analysts
Toolkit" at the end of each chapter both clearly help to focus on the major issues. Still, some
readers may have the impression that fundamental principles, which are relatively few and
non-technical, as well as their interaction appear less obvious due to the immense amount of
other information, sometimes repetitions or other verbal discussion in the book. This matter I
seems to be due to a fundamental, potentially hard to manage, trade-off between com-
prehensive and focused coverage of contents.
Penman's great job with the book is that-in many regards-it integrates finance theory
\\ ith accounting concepts. The obvious aim of his concept is to efficiently use disclosed
information for valuation purposes. Seen from the finance perspective, some readers may
ask for a textbook with more content on valuation models and their critical assessment.
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Asset pricing models are briefly noted on page 98 yielding the impression that there is only
"beta bashing" according to the CAPM and nothing else in the literature. The appendix to
Chapter 3 points out the APT and the Fama-French three-factor model. While any of these
asset pricing models is admittedly unreliable (leaving room for discussion about the
appropriate required rate of return as it is stated in the text, see p. 115-1 16), any unreliable
estimate of the rate of return will have a substantial impact on the reliability of the valuation
results as derived in the book (Chapter 1 8 on risk analysis hardly addresses this issue as it is
a summary on standard risk management tools in finance). Also, it is exactly models such as
the one by Fama and French, which would be the ones to close the gap between finance and
accounting. It would be helpful to find a related discussion in the text. In summary, a more
integrated treatment could contain more theory and empirical findings in terms of asset
pricing models and the cost of capital, thereby focusing on ways of practical model
implementation. Given results on model performance, this could finally be combined with
the cutting-edge valuation applications of the present textbook. To my knowledge, there is
no book to fill this gap to date. However, it could be a future line along which the book (or a
new issue) could be developed.
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Type of earnings management and the effect of
ownership structure, firm size, and
corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia
Sylvia Veronica Siregar*, Sidharta Utama
Department ofAccounting, Faculty ofEconomics, University q) Indonesia, Depok 16424, Indonesia
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether companies listed on the Jakarta Stock
Exchange (JSE) conduct efficient or opportunistic earnings management and to examine the effect of
ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on it.
Using multiple regressions, we find evidence that the type of earnings management selected by
JSE listed firms tends toward efficient earnings management. This evidence is inconsistent with the
common view that earnings management in Indonesia is opportunistic. Family ownership has a
significant influence on the type of earnings management selected. Finns with a high proportion of
family ownership and non-business groups are more inclined to choose efficient earnings
management than other types of firms. We find inconsistent evidence with regard to the impact of
institutional ownership, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on type of earnings
management.
© 2008 Published by University of Illinois.
Keywords: Type of earnings management; Ownership structure; Firm size; Corporate governance
1. Introduction
This study examines whether earnings management in public firms in Indonesia is
motivated by opportunistic behavior or efficient contracting. This study is motivated by the
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: sylvia.veronicafnui.edu (S.V. Siregar).
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common perception that earnings management by Indonesian public firms is opportunistic.
This study also investigates whether ownership structure, corporate-governance practices,
and firm size influence the type of earnings management selected.
There are two types of earnings management: efficient earnings management (i.e., to
improve earnings informativeness in communicating private information) and opportunistic
earnings management (i.e., management reports earnings opportunistically to maximize
his/her utility) (Scott, 2000). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Balsam, Bartov, and
Marquardt (2002) present evidence that is consistent with the opportunistic perspective. On
the other hand, Subramanyam (1996), Gul, Lung, and Srinidhi (2000), and Krishnan (2003)
conclude that the behavior of discretionary accruals (a proxy for earnings management) is
consistent with the efficient perspective, because discretionary accruals have a significant
positive relationship with future profitability.
There has been extensive research on earnings management; however, literature
concerning factors that influence the selection of a particular type of earnings management
is quite rare. Krishnan (2003) finds that external auditing is often used as a proxy for
corporate-governance practices and plays an important role in constraining opportunistic
earnings management. Other proxies are the proportion of an independent board and the
existence of an audit committee. Hence, these corporate-governance mechanisms could
also influence the type of earnings management uses. In addition, firm size and ownership
structure could also play important roles in restraining opportunistic earnings management.
However, the extant literature has not examined these possibilities.
Company size is used as a proxy for information asymmetry in the predisclosure
information environments, as managers of small companies are able to retain their private
information more successfully than their counterparts in large companies (Lee & Choi,
2002). Information on large firms usually is more publicly available and could be
obtained with lower costs than information on small firms (Bhattacharya, 2001). Because
larger firms are more easily scrutinized by investors or regulators than smaller firms, the
former type is expected to engage in less opportunistic earnings management than the
latter.
Ownership structure influences the monitoring mechanism a company uses, including
the monitoring of earnings-management activity. Balsam et al. (2002) state that institutional
investors, who are sophisticated investors, are more capable of detecting earnings
management than non-institutional investors because they have more access to timely and
relevant information. Existing literature only examines the effect of institutional investors
on earnings-management magnitude, while our study will examine the effect of institutional
investors on the type of earnings management.
Institutional investors have a greater monitoring role if the company's ownership
structure is widely dispersed. Wide-spread ownership structure only takes place in Anglo-
Saxon countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. In other developed
and developing countries, firms usually are controlled by founding families. La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), report that 85% of Spanish Anns have controlling
shareholders, compared to United States and the United Kingdom, which have only 10%
and 20%, respectively. Arifin (2003) also finds that the majority of public firms in
Indonesia is controlled by families. He suggests that agency problems in family-
controlled firms are not as serious as that in publicly-controlled firms or firms without
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controlling shareholders. In the former, there are fewer agency problems because the
conflict between principal and agent is less than that in the latter. However, as Claessens,
Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999) find, family-controlled firms, through pyramid ownership
structure and their business group, expropriate minority shareholders (i.e., the public). In
this study, we suggest that in family-controlled Anns with no business groups, the
motivation to expropriate minority shareholders is less and thus the earnings management
in these firms tend to be relatively more efficient.
Our sample consists of 144 firms for the years of 1995 to 1996 and 1999 to 2002. We
excluded the years 1997 and 1998 (the Asian financial crisis period) because Indonesia
experienced a heavy economic crisis in those years that resulted in financial statements for
most firms being highly distorted from the normal period.
Although our evidence regarding type of earnings management is mixed, it tends
to be more relatively efficient earnings management. This finding is inconsistent
with the usual view that earnings management (in Indonesia) is opportunistic. We
also find that family ownership has significant influence on type of earnings man-
agement; firms with a high proportion of family ownership and non-business groups
are more likely to adopt efficient earnings management efficient than other types of
firms. There is no consistent evidence that institutional ownership, firm size, and
corporate-governance practices have significant influence on earnings-management
type.
This paper contributes to the literature on earnings management in several ways. First,
the evidence in this paper suggests that firms largely owned by families and do not
belong to business groups are more likely to choose efficient earnings management
compared to firms with different ownership structures, thus, providing the first evidence
that family ownership and business group influence the type of earnings management
selected.
Second, we find no evidence that variables representing corporate-governance practices
(audit quality, the independence of the board of commissioners, and the existence of an
audit committee), influence on the type of earnings management. Our result is inconsistent
with the hypothesis that corporate-governance practices provide monitoring mechanisms
that constrain opportunistic earnings management. This finding may be due to the fact that
the regulation on corporate-governance practice in Indonesia is relatively recent, so its
effectiveness still remains to be seen.
2. Literature review
2.1. Corporate governance in Indonesia
A 1999 survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers, in which the respondents were institutional
investors in Singapore, finds that corporate-governance practices in Indonesia are relatively
inadequate (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999). The survey showed that among a dozen
countries in the Asia-Australia region, Indonesia ranked very low in the perceived standard
of disclosure and transparency (Kumiawan & Indriantoro, 2000). According to the survey,
Indonesia also ranked very low in other areas such as accountability to shareholders, board
processes, auditing, and compliance.
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To improve corporate governance in Indonesia, government and non-governmental
organizations have taken several initiatives (Kurniawan & Indnantoro, 2000):
1
.
Developing a national strategy for the reform of corporate-governance, including setting
up the National Committee for Corporate Governance (NCCG), recently changed to the
National Committee for Governance (NCG).
Established by the Decree of the Coordinating Minister of Economics, Finance, and
Industry in August 1999, the NCG's main responsibility is to recommend a national
framework for the implementation of good coiporate governance. This committee issued
the Code of Good Corporate Governance to be used as a reference for regulating various
corporate sectors, supporting professions, and training managers.
2. Conducting educational events on corporate governance for the public. The concept of
corporate governance is fairly new in Indonesia. To introduce the concept to the public
there have been several educational events conducted by several institutions (such as the
Indonesian Institute of Accountants (IIA) and the Indonesia Institute of Corporate
j
Governance (IICG)).
3. Conducting pilot projects to implement corporate-governance principles in the
industries. There are major publicly listed companies that have implemented
corporate-governance principles in Indonesia, such as:
- PT Astra, one of the biggest conglomerates in Indonesia.
- PT Indosat, a major telecommunication company.
- PT Timah, one of the largest tin producers in the world.
4. Carrying out regulatory reform within the capital market.
To improve corporate-governance regimes within the capital market, Bapepam (The
Capital Market Supervisory Agency), as the regulatory agency, has issued various rules
and regulations, including:
- A regulation requiring public companies to have independent directors and in-
dependent commissioners.
- Regulations about the method of voting shares.
- Comprehensive rules on the responsibilities for boards of directors and independent
commissioners.
- The role of auditors with regard to financial reporting and penalties for non-compliance.
- Regulations on disclosure of related-party transactions.
To complement BAPEPAM rules regarding independent directors and independent
commissioners, in the year 2000 the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) issued rules concerning
independent boards, ' audit committees, and corporate secretaries for public listed companies.
This rule - Decision Letter of PT Bursa Efek Jakarta No.: Kep-315/BEJ/06-2000, which was
later amended by Decision Letter No.: Kep-339/BEJ/07-2001 - stated that publicly listed
companies are obligated to fulfill the requirements by December 31, 2001 at the latest.
1
In Indonesia, the board structure follows a two-tier system: the board of commissioners and the board of
directors. The board of commissioners provides direction and supervises the board of directors in managing the
firm. In the remainder of the paper, unless stated otherwise, the term "board" refers to the board of commissioners,
"board of directors" refers to the board of directors in two-tier structure and "board," or "directors," refer to the
board of directors in a one-tier structure.
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According to this rule, the number of independent board members must be > 30% of the
board size, and the independent board members should be:
- Individuals who have no affiliated relationship with controlling shareholders in related
firms.
- Individuals who have no affiliated relation with company managers and/or board
members of related listed firms.
- Individuals who are not engaged as officers in other firms affiliated with related listed
firms.
- Individuals who understand stock exchanges rules.
An audit committee should have at least three members, one of whom must be an
independent board member, who will act as chairman of the audit committee, and the other
members should be independent external parties, at least one of whom has accounting and/
or finance skills.
2.2. Prior research on efficient and opportunistic earnings management
Several studies find evidence consistent with the opportunistic perspective. Burgstahler
and Dichev (1997) find that management engages in earnings management to avoid
reporting losses or earnings decline. Balsam et al. (2002) find a negative relationship
between unexpected discretionary accruals and stock returns around the earnings-
announcement date. This result indicates that the market views discretionary accruals as
opportunistic.
In contrast, other studies find evidence that is consistent with the efficient perspective.
Subramanyam (1996) concludes that discretionary accruals are efficient because they have
a positive, significant relationship with future profitability. This positive relationship
describes the ability that discretionary accruals have to communicate information about a
firm's future profitability to the public. Gul et al. (2000) and Krishnan (2003), following
Subramanyam (1996), also find consistent evidence.
2.3. Prior research on ownership structure
2.3.1. Family ownership
Wide-spread ownership structure is only found in the United States and the United
Kingdom. In other developed and developing countries, most companies are still controlled
by family ownership. La Porta et al. (1999), as cited in Arifin (2003), report that 85% of
Spanish firms have family controlling ownership. Compared to the United Kingdom and
the United States which have only 10% and 20%, family ownership, respectively. Thai
firms (Wiwattanakantang, 2000), Belgian firms (Crijns & De Clerck (1997), are cited in
Van den Berghe & Carchon (2001 )), Turkish firms (Sarac, 2002), Egyptian firms (Shahira,
2003), and Indonesian firms (Arifin, 2003), are also controlled by founding families.
Family-owned firms should be more efficient than publicly-owned firms because there
are less monitoring costs in family-owned firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983). McConaughny,
Matthews, and Fialko (2001 ), Yammeesri and Lodh (2001 ), Suehiro (2001 ). and Anderson
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and Reeb (2003) find that family-controlled films are valued higher or perform better than
other firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that minority shareholders in large U.S. firms
benefit from the presence of founding families.
Arifin (2003) finds that in his sample of publicly listed firms in Indonesia, family-
controlled firms, state-owned firms, or institutional-controlled firms have fewer agency
problems than publicly-controlled firms or firms without controlling shareholders." He
suggests that the agency problems in family-owned firms are fewer because there is less
conflict between the principal and agent. But, if there are minority interests in family-owned
firms, there is another agency problem, namely a conflict of interests between majority
(family) and minority ownership.
Claessens et al. (1999) find that higher cash-flow rights are associated with higher
market valuation, but higher control rights are associated with lower market valuation,
especially when cash-flow rights are low and control rights are high. This suggests
expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. They conclude that
family control is an important factor behind the negative relation between control rights and
market valuation.
If family ownership represents an efficient organizational structure, then in family-
owned firms opportunistic earnings management will be limited. However, in firms with
business groups (in Indonesia most publicly listed firms have business groups), this pattern
may not hold. For firms belonging to business groups, most of the owners' capital is not
invested in a single company, but rather is spread over several companies. If any portion of
that capital is invested in public firms, then expropriation of minority shareholders and thus
opportunistic earnings management is likely to occur, even if the company is controlled by
one family. This happens because public firms are exploited by the owners who use them to
collect funds from the public which are in turn transferred to other firms in the business
group. Kim and Yi (2005) find evidence that opportunistic earnings management is higher
in firms with business groups compared to firms without them. Their results suggest that
firms with business groups give their controlling shareholders more incentive to engage in
earnings management.
2.3.2. Institutional ownership
Institutional investors are generally expected to be able to use current information to
predict future earnings better than non-institutional investors (Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, &
Venkatachalam, 2002). According to the Financial Economists Roundtable Statement on
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (1999), increases in institutional
ownership is an entity provides strong incentive for an investor to actively monitor and
influence management's policy for that entity.
El-Gazzar (1998) and Bhattacharya (2001) conclude that institutional investors, who
have more wealth and resources to gather information than non-institutional investors, tend
to use more expensive and more value-relevant information in forming earnings
:
There are agency problems in state-owned firms, because the principal is the public. But the public in its role
as a principal cannot monitor management directly. Instead they are represented by the government. Since
government is not the genuine principal, it is less motivated to monitor management (including monitoring on
earnings-management activity), which finally will harm the public.
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expectations. Jiambalvo et al. (2002) find evidence that is consistent with the view that
institutional investors also use non-earnings information to predict future earnings.
Balsam et al. (2002) find evidence that market reaction arising from the behavior of
sophisticated investors (institutional investors) occurs earlier than that of non-sophisticated
investors. They argue that sophisticated investors have access to more information from
other sources, more timely information, and are also more capable of decomposing earnings
into discretionary and non-discretionary components. Bushee (1998) suggests that
institutional ownership has a monitoring role that pushes managers to take actions that
will not harm the company in the long run.
While in Indonesia context, Mitra (2002), Koh (2003), and Midiastuty and Machfoedz
(2003) find evidence that high institutional ownership constrain earnings management in
those firms. However, Darmawati (2003) does not find significant relationship between
earnings management and institutional investors.
2.3.3. Firm size
Finn size is often used as a proxy for information availability in the market. Information
for large firms should be more available in the market than for small firms. Albrecth and
Richardson (1990) find evidence that large firms have less incentive to smooth earnings
than small firms. Lee and Choi (2002) also find that firm size is a variable that could
influence a firm's tendency to manage earnings: smaller firms are more likely to manage
earnings to avoid reporting losses than larger firms. But, Moses (1987) finds evidence that
large firms have a bigger incentive to smooth earnings than small firms. Michaelson, James,
and Charles (1995) also find consistent evidence.
2.3.4. Corporate-governance practices
2.3.4.1. Audit quality. Several studies examine the association between audit quality and
earnings management. Becker, Defond, JiamBalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) and Francis,
Maydew, and Spark ( 1 999) find evidence that discretionary accruals in firms audited by Big
6 auditors are less than that in firms audited by non-Big 6 auditors. Krishnan (2003) finds
that discretionary accruals in firms audited by Big 6 auditors have a higher positive
relationship with future profitability than that of firms audited by non-Big 6 auditors. He
i
says that auditing has a significant role in constraining opportunistic earnings management.
However, Sandra and Kusuma (2004) find no significant evidence that audit quality has a
moderating effect on the relationship between earnings management and stock returns in
Indonesia. This result indicates that auditor size may not be a good proxy for audit quality in
Indonesia.
2.3.4.2. buiependent hoard. Indonesian corporate law stipulates that a corporation has to
follow a two-board system consisting of a board of commissioners and a board of directors.
> The function of the board of commissioners is to oversee and supervise how the board of
.directors conducts the company's operation. Members of the board of commissioners are
entirely different from the board of directors. However, being dominated by the majority
shareholders, the boards of publicly listed companies in Indonesia are controlled by these
i majority shareholders in substance and these boards are not independent from each other.
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To alleviate the potential expropriation of minority shareholders rights (i.e., the public
shareholders), Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal (or Bapepam/the Capital Market Supervisory
Body) acquires that at least 30% of the members of the board of commissioners must be
independent from the company and from the majority shareholders. The existence and
function of the so-called independent commissioners are similar to the non-executive
members of the board under the one-board system, as the following studies show.
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) find that firms whose CEO also chairs the board of
directors i are more likely to be subject to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC for
alleged GAAP violation. Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2000) also find that the probability of
income-increasing accruals decreases as the proportion of outside-directorsi increases for a
sample of U.K. firms. Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau (2001 ) find that independent board]
is constraining earnings-management activity. These studies are conducted for the one-
board system. Indonesia uses a two-board system. There are also several studies related to
the two-board system used in Indonesia. For example, Wedari (2004), who examines public
firms in JSE from year 1 994 to 2002, finds that an independent board constrains earnings-
management activity. In contrast, Parulian (2004) finds that independent boards for the
public firms in JSE have no significant influence on earnings management. Both these
studies define independent boards as those where members of the board of commissioners
are independent from the company and the majority shareholders.
2.3.4.3. Audit committee. Klein (2002a) finds that an independent audit committee and
j
active audit committee are associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals for U.S.
firms. Chtourou et al. (2001) find that income-increasing earnings management is •
negatively associated with a committee composed only of independent directors , that meet
more than twice a year.
In Indonesia, Wedari (2004) finds that discretionary accruals of firms with an audit
committee are significantly higher than that of firms with no audit committee. Parulian
(2004) shows that negative discretionary accruals of firms with an audit committee is
significantly lower than that of firms with no audit committee, but positive discretionary
accruals of firms with an audit committee is not significantly lower than that of firms with no
audit committee. But other studies find evidence that indicate the ineffectiveness ofan audit
committee as part of corporate-governance practices in publicly listed firms in JSE.
Mayangsari (2003) finds the presence of an audit committee associated negatively with
financial-statement integrity (proxied by the conservatism index). Nuryanah (2004) also
shows that audit committee does not have a significant association with the value of the firm.
3. Hypotheses development and research model
3.1. Hypotheses development
There are two types of earnings management: efficient and opportunistic. Earnings
management is efficient if managers use their discretion to communicate private information
about firm profitability, which is yet to be reflected in the historical cost-based earnings, while it
is opportunistic if managers use their discretion to maximize their utility, thereby garbling
earnings (Subramanyam, 1996). Therefore, we test whether earnings management is efficient
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or opportunistic by examining discretionary accruals' ability to signal future profitability. If
earnings management is efficient, then discretionary accruals (earnings-management proxy)
will have a significant positive relationship with future profitability. If opportunistic,
discretionary accruals will have a significant negative relationship or insignificant relationship
with future profitability. Since, the relation can go either way - positive ifearnings management
is efficient and negative if opportunistic - then the first hypothesis is non-directional
Hypothesis la. There is a relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability.
Family-controlled firms should be more efficient than publicly-owned firms because
monitoring costs are lower in family-owned firms (Fama & Jensen. 1983). Anderson.
Mansi, and Reeb (2003) show that although a founding-family ownership is quite prevalent
and significant in U.S. industrial firms, their results do not support the hypothesis that
continued founding-family ownership in public firms leads to minority shareholder wealth
expropriation. Instead, their results show that minority shareholders in large U.S. firms
benefit from the presence of founding families in the management. Arifin (2003) also says
that agency problems in family-controlled firms are fewer than in publicly-controlled firms
or firms without controlling shareholders.
Based on those results, we expect that family-controlled firms will constrain
opportunistic earnings management. But this efficient structure in family-controlled firms
is less likely found in firms with business groups — as we generally find in Indonesia. For
firms belonging to business groups, the owners' capital is not usually invested in a single
company. If any portion of that capital is invested in public firms, then expropriation of
minority shareholders and thus opportunistic earnings management will be likely to occur
even if the company is family-controlled. This is because owners exploit public firms by
using them to collect funds from the public which in turn is transferred to other firms in the
business groups. Kim and Yi (2005) find that earnings management in firms with business
groups is higher than in firms with no business groups.
By combining both arguments, we suggest that firms with high family ownership and no
business groups should be able to limit opportunistic earnings management, thereby
increasing the association between discretionary accruals and future profitability.
Hypothesis lb. The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is higher for
firms with high family ownership and no business groups than for other firms.
Institutional investors are generally thought to be sophisticated investor who can be able
to use current information to predict future earnings better than non-institutional investors
(Jiambalvo et al, 2002). According to the Financial Economists Roundtable Statement on
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (1999), large institutional ownership in
an entity provides strong incentive for investors to actively monitor and influence
managements' policy for that entity.
Bushee (1998) finds that institutional investors create less incentive for management to cut
research and development expenditures to attain short-term targets, a finding which also
indicates that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management behavior. Jiambalvo
(1996) finds that absolute discretionary accruals have a negative association with institutional
ownership. Balsam et al. (2002) conclude that because institutional investors have
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access to more timely and relevant information, they could identify earnings man-
agement faster and easier than non-institutional investors. The results of these studies
suggest that institutional ownership leads to a monitoring role, which in turn constraints
opportunistic earnings management. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis lc. The higher the proportion of institutional ownership, the higher the effect
of discretionary accruals on future profitability.
Company size is used as a proxy for information asymmetry in the predisclosure
information environment, as managers of small companies are able to retain their private
information more successfully than managers of large companies. As firm grows in size, the
information on that firm becomes more publicly available.
Further, investors and the public in general tend to follow and scrutinize large firms more
closely than small firms, making it more difficult for large firms to manage earnings
opportunistically than for small firms. Consistent with this view, Albrecth and Richardson
( 1 990) find evidence that larger firms are less motivated to smooth earnings than smaller firms.
Lee and Choi (2002) also find that company size appears to play a primary role in
discriminating between companies that do and do not manage earnings to avoid losses. Small
companies tend to manage earnings more frequently to avoid losses than do large companies.
Given that large firms have less information asymmetry and are more scrutinized than small
firms, we expect that they are less likely to manage earnings opportunistically, and eventually
will increase the association between discretionary accruals and future profitability.
Hypothesis Id. The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is higher for
firms with high market capitalization than for firms with small market capitalization.
We argue that the existence of corporate-governance practices in a firm will limit
opportunistic earnings management. In our study we employ audit quality, proportion of
members of the board who are independent, and the existence of an audit committee as
proxies for corporate-governance practices.
Audit quality according to DeAngelo (1981, p. 186) is a market-assessed joint probability
that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client's accounting system, and
(b) report the breach. This suggests that high audit quality should limit opportunistic earnings
management. Becker et al. ( 1998) and Francis et al. (1999) find that earnings management in
firms audited by Big 6 auditors is smaller than in firms audited by non-Big 6 auditors.
According to the Independent Commissioner Guidelines from the National Committee
for Governance (NCG), one of the independent commissioner's tasks is ensuring a firm's
financial statement's transparency and faithfulness. It implies that independent commis-
sioners should notice that management could engage in earnings management, either for
efficient contracting or opportunistic purposes. Chtourou et al. (2001) find that independent
board, will constrain earnings-management activity.
The board of commissioners of a public firm is required to establish an audit committee.
Overseeing the firm's financial-reporting process is one of the audit committee's tasks. It
meets regularly with the external and internal auditors to review the corporation's financial
statements, audit processes, and internal controls. Therefore, its existence will ultimately
induce the company to produce more accurate financial statements or, in other words, less
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opportunistic earnings management. Klein (2002b) concludes that a less independent audit
committee will increase discretionary accruals.
Based on the above explanations, we expect that the higher the audit quality, the higher
the proportion of independent board members, and the existence of an audit committee will
restrain opportunistic-earnings management and, eventually, will increase the effect of
discretionary accruals on future profitability.
Hypothesis le. The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is higher on
firms audited by Big 4 auditors than on firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors.
Hypothesis If. The higher the proportion of independent board members, the higher the
effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability.
Hypothesis lg. The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is higher on
firms with an audit committee than on firms with no audit committee.
3.2. Research model
Following Subramanyam (1996), to test Hypothesis la, we use the following research
model:
X„+[ = b + />iCFO„ + 62NDAC„ + fe3DAC„ + fc4DFAM„ + /> 5INST„
+ b6DS\ZE„ + fc 7AUDIT„ + /?sBOD„ + 6,AUDCOM„ + b i0D99i
+ /) M D00, + &12DOI, +e (la)
where:
X, .
1
future profitability, measured by each of the following variables: ( 1 ) CFO,+ 1,
or (2) NDNIM ,, or (3) AEARN/+1 . All scaled by beginning total assets.
CFO cash flows from operating activities
NDNI non-discretionary net income
AEARN change in earnings
NDAC non-discretionary accruals
DAC discretionary accruals
DFAM one if a firm has a proportion of family ownership > 50% and does not belong
to business groups and zero otherwise
INST proportion of institutional ownership
DSIZE one if a firm has market capitalization above mean and zero otherwise
AUDIT one if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise
BOD proportion of independent board members
AUDCOM one if a firm has an audit committee in accordance with JSE rules and zero
otherwise
t years 1995, 1999, 2000, 2001
t
-
1 years 1 996, 2000, 200 1 , 2002.
Earnings are decomposed into three variables: CFO, non-discretionary accruals
(NDAC). and discretionary accruals (DAC). DAC is the variable of interest and if the
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type of earnings management is efficient, the coefficient (b3) will be positive. Otherwise, it
will be either zero or negative. Other variables relate to firm size, ownership structure, and
governance practices and they are included as control variables.
Hypotheses lb— lg imply that the DAC coefficient (by) is influenced by the
hypothesized variables (family ownership, proportion of institutional investors, etc.).
Therefore, to test Hypotheses lb— lg, we use the following research model, which allows
the DAC coefficient to vary:
$,+1 = p + ftCFO,, + ftNDAC,, + ftDAC,, + ftDAC,, x DFAM,,
+ ftDAC,, x INST,, + ftDAC,, x DSIZE,, + ftDAC,, x AUDIT,,
+ ftDAC,, x BOD,, + ftDAC,, x AUDCOM,, + ft DFAM„
4- ft , INST,, + ft ;DSIZE„ + ft,AUDIT,, + ft 4BOD„
+ ft 5AUDCOM,-, + ft ftD99, + ft 7 D00,- + ft xD01, + e (lb)
Expectation: Hypothesis lb: ft>0. Hypothesis 1c: ft>0. Hypothesis Id: ft>0.
Hypothesis le: ft>0. Hypothesis If: ft>0. Hypothesis lg: ft>0.
As explained in hypothesis development, the effect of discretionary accruals on future
profitability is moderated by DFAM, INST, DSIZE, AUDIT, BOD, and AUDCOM. So, in
the research model (lb) each of six variables interacts with DAC. We use interacting
variables because the resulting coefficient will show the incremental effect of each variable
on the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability. For example, if
DFAM = zero, then the effect of the discretionary accruals on future profitability is ft, and if
DFAM = one, then the effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is ft +ft. ft is
the difference between DFAM = zero and DFAM = one, which is the interacting variables
coefficient.
Each of those six variables is also included as an independent variable to control the
possibility that each variable has a direct influence on future profitability. For example. Bushee
(2000) finds that the proportion offirm value reflected in future earnings is positively associated
with institutional investors. This indicates that a large capital investment in a firm will force
institutional investors to monitor management behavior to be sure they pursue long-run
profitability. Year dummy is used to control for the variation of future profitability over time.
To check whether there may be multicollinearity problem among the independent
variables. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is computed for each independent variable.
Generally, multicollinearity problems exist if any VIFs exceed 10.
3.3. Definition of variables
3.3.1. Future profitability
We measure future profitability by each of following variables:
1. CFO, + ! = one-year-ahead cash flows from operation
NDNI, = one-year-ahead non-discretionary net income (EARN -DAC)
3. AEARN,
|
= one-year-ahead change in earnings (EARN, .
,
-EARN,)
This approach has been extensively employed in the ERC literature (see for example Ghosh & Moon. 2005)
that investigates factors affecting ERC.
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Table 1
Correlation between discretionary accruals in year t and year 1+ 1
DAC,
DAC,», 0.382
0.0000'
Number in bold is the p value of the coefficient correlation.
t = years 1995, 1999, 2000, 2001
r+ 1 = years 1996, 2000, 2001, 2002.
a
Significant at IV
All variables are scaled by beginning total assets.
Our measures are based on previous research (Subramanyam, 1996; Krishnan, 2003),
which use three measures of future profitability (EARN, CFO, and NDNI). We do not
include EARN, but use AEARN, ,| instead because we believe EARN has inherent
weaknesses. Earnings has discretionary accruals in it, so if there is a positive and significant
relationship between discretionary accruals in year t and earnings in year t+\, it could be
due to management creating another discretionary accatals in year t + 1 and not an indication
of efficient earnings management. As Table 1 shows, there is a positive and significant
correlation between discretionary accruals in year t and year t+\, which supports our
opinion.
As a substitute for traditional earnings measures, we use change in earnings instead.
Because earnings and discretionary accruals tend to have a stationary nature, the use of
change in earnings will control for the stationary nature of discretionary accruals. Further,
we also use cash flows from operation and non-discretionary net income. Those two
measures do not have discretionary-accrual component, so they do not have the inherent
problems of earnings. Among these three measures, we believe NDNI and CFO are the
most reliable because they do not include any discretionary-accrual components.
3.3.2. Earnings management
Total accruals (ACCR) is calculated as the difference between earnings and cash flows
from operation (ACCR = EARN-CFO). Earnings (EARN) is defined as net income before
extraordinary items and cash flows from operation (CFO) is net cash flows from operating
activities reported in the Statement of Cash Flows.
Based on the adjusted R 2 , one of following models is selected to decompose total
accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary-accrual components:
1. Jones (1991):
ACCR,, = a„ + aizlREV,, + a : PPE„ + eit
where:
ACCR total accruals
AREV change in revenue from year /- 1 to year / (REV,- REV, _ ,)
PPE gross property, plant, and equipment in year /.
All variables are scaled by beginning total assets.
14 S. V. Siregar. S. Utama The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 1-27
2. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995):
ACCR,, = a + ai [zlREV,, - AREC,,} + a2PPE„ + e„
where:
AREC change in net accounts receivables from year t- 1 to year t (REC,-REC,_ i)-
All variables are scaled by beginning total assets.
3. Kasznik (1999):
ACCR,, = a„ + «| [zIREV,, - AREC,,} + a:PPE„ + a3JCFO,, + e„
where:
ACFO change in cash flows from operation from year t- 1 to year t (CFO,-CFO,- ,).
All variables are scaled by beginning total assets.
4. Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2002):
ACCR,, = a ft + a, [J REV,-, - (1 - k)AREC„] + a2 PPE„ + a3ACCR„_i
+ a5zlREV„ + i +e„
where:
A' slope coefficient from regression AREC on AREV
ACCR,- 1 total accruals in / 1 scaled by total assets in t-2
REV,
, ] change in revenue from year t to year r+1, scaled by revenue in year t
((REV, +
I
-REV,)/REV,).
Other variables are scaled by beginning total assets.
Nondiscretionary accruals (NDAC) are fitted values from the above models and
discretionary accruals (DAC) are defined as the residuals.
Following Subramanyam ( 1 996), we use a cross-sectional method, where each model is
estimated separately for each combination ofcalendar year and firm group (manufacturing and
non-manufacturing). Those models can be estimated separately from past time series for each
firm, but the research period is not long enough (1995- 1 996 and 1 999-2002), so this method
is not used.
3.3.3. Family ownership and business groups
Following Arifin (2003), family ownership is defined as all and firms whose listed
ownership (ownership>5%) does not include the state, financial institutions, or the public
(individuals whose ownership is not listed). Samples are classified as firms with high family
ownership (proportion of family ownership > 50%) and low family ownership (proportion of
family ownership < 50%).4
Wc employ a 50% cutoff, because m general ownership>50% entitles the investors to exercise control over
the company, including over earnings-management activity. Accounting standards regarding equity investment
also stipulate this cutoff to indicate the existence of control.
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Sample firms are further classified into belonging to business groups and not belonging
to business groups. For this purpose, we use information on Conglomeration Indonesia
(1997) and Top Companies and Big Groups in Indonesia (1995). These books provide a list
of business groups in Indonesia along with firms belonging to each group.
We hypothesize that firms in the category "high family ownership and no business
groups" are likely to engage in more efficient earnings management than the other three
categories (high family ownership and belonging to business groups, low family ownership
and not belonging to business groups, low family ownership and belonging to business
groups). To test the hypothesis, we make a dummy variable taking the value ofone for firms
with high family ownership and no business groups and zero for otherwise.
3.3.4. Institutional ownership
Institutional ownership is ownership by financial institutions, such as insurance
companies, banks, pensions, mutual funds, and investment banks (Koh. 2003).
3.3.5. Firm size
The natural logarithm of end-of-year market capitalization is used to measure firm size.
We rank samples based on end-of-year market capitalization, and divided samples equally.
After that, we make a dummy variable where one is used for firms in the upper half and zero
otherwise.
3. 3. 6. Corporate-governance practit < \
3.3.6.1. Auditor's size*. Auditor's size is used to measure audit quality, where one for
firms audited by Big 4 auditors (high audit quality) and zero for firms audited by non-Big 4
auditors (low audit quality).
3.3.6.2. Independent board. The proportion of independent board members is calculated
from the number of independent commissioners divided by the number of commissioners'
on the board.
3.3.6.3. The existence of an audit committee. This variable is measured as a dummy
variable, where one for firms with an audit committee and zero otherwise.
4. Sample selection
The sample for the study is comprised of all firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange
(JSE), excluding firms in financial, real estate, and telecommunication industries. The
J
In our research period, 1995-2002, there was a change in the number of big accounting firms. From years
1995-1998. there were six big accounting firms (Big 61, in years 1998 2002 there were five (Big 5), and since
2002 there have been four (Big 4). Our definition follows the change in the number of big accounting firms;
however, for simplicity, in this study we use the term "Big 4" for all big accounting firms during our research
period.
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Table 2
Sample selection procedure
Total number of firms listed in the JSE as of December 31, 1994
Firms in financial, real estate, and telecommunication industries
Delisting during period 1996 2002
Preferred stock
Firms with non-December 3 1 fiscal year
Incomplete data
Total sample firms
239
(74)
(15)
(3)
(1)
(2)
144
sample period is from 1995-1996. and 1999-2002. The following criteria are applied in
selecting firms for the sample:
1. Listed in JSE from 1994-2002.
2. The data on the variables used are available for each year in the sample period.
3. Financial, real estate, and telecommunication companies are excluded.
4. Firms have a December 3 1 fiscal year-end.
5. Stock listed is common stock.
Table 3
Evaluation of earnings-management-measurement models
Panel A: adjusted Rr
Measurement model Adjusted fr
1995 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
Jones ( 1 99 1
1
Dechowetal. (1995)
Kaszmk (1999)
Dechowet al, (2002)
Panel B: predicted sign
2005
0.1845
5221)
2455
0.0900
0.0625
05290
0.2000
0.0300
0.0250
0.4145
0.0920
0.0265
0250
0.1650
0.0480
1520
0.1240
0.3790
0.3000
0.0380
0.0345
0.1030
0.0895
0.0759
0.3521
0.1771
Predicted sign % Positive
Jones (1991)
AREV(+)
PPE(-)
Dechowetal. (1995)
AREV-AREC(+)
PPE (-)
Kaszmk (1999)
AREV-ARECM+)
I'l'l i i
AC'FO(-)
Dechow et al. (2002)
AREV-(I-A-)AREC(+)
PPE (-)
ACCR I i
AREV,.
,
(+)
91.67%
16.67%
75.00%
16.67%
83.33%
25.00%
0.00%
70.00%
10.00%
60.00%
60.00%
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
CFO,+ , 0.0756 0.0662 0.4307 -0.2905 0.1061
NDNI,., 0.0121 0.0114 0.3220 -0.3312 0.1052
AEARN,,, -0.0120 0.0024 0.8395 -0.9006 0.2565
CFO 0.0740 0.0644 0.5277 -0.3210 0.1257
NDAC -0.0527 -0.0583 0.2986 -0.4116 1087
DAC -0.0001 0.0007 0.3968 -0.3966 0.1158
INST 0.0659 0.0000 0.8423 0.0000 0.1420
BOD 0.0768 0.0000 0.7500
Proportion
Dummy=1
0.0000 0.1526
Proportion
Dummy =
DFAM 20.31",, 79.69%
DSIZE 50.00% 50.00%
AUDIT 88.02% [1.98%
AUDCOM 11.46% 88.54%
CFO, .
i
= cash flows from operation one-year-ahead. NDNI, .
,
= non-discretionary net income one-year-ahead.
AEARN,
.
i
= change in earnings one-year-ahead. CFO = cash flows from operation. NDAC = non-discretionary
accruals, DAC = discretionary accruals. DFAM = one if firms have high family ownership and do not belong to
business groups and zero otherwise, INST = institutional ownership. DSIZE = one if firm is in the 50% highest
market capitalization and zero otherwise. AUDIT = one if firm is audited by Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise,
BOD = proportion of independent board. AUDCOM = one if firms have audit committee and zero otherwise.
The sample selection procedure is summarized in Table 2. After applying the above
criteria, there are 144 firms in our sample.
5. Results
5.7. Evaluation of eanungs-management-measurement models
To determine which model to use in our main analysis, we evaluate the explanatory
power (adjusted R~) of each model. The results for each model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al.,
1995; Kasznik, 1999; Dechow et al., 2002) are presented in Table 3. Because Kasznik
(1999) shows the highest adjusted /?", we employ this model in our main analysis and the
others in sensitivity analysis.
Table 5
Family ownership and business groups
Business group
Part of business group Non-business group Total
Family
Ownership
Total
>50%
<50%
48.96%
27.08%
76.04%
20.31%
3.65%
23.W, t
69.27%
30.73%
100.00%
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In panel B of Table 3 we present the percentage of the coefficient for a predicted sign for
each model. The Kasznik model has a relatively greater proportion of coefficients that are of
a predicted sign.
5.2. Earnings management: efficient or opportunistic?
Descriptive statistics and their correlation are shown in Tables 4-6. On average, the
sample firms have positive future cash flow from operation and positive future non-
discretionary net income (CFO,
, i
and NDNI,
, ,). But from AEARN, ,,,we can see that,
on average, the sample firms have declining earnings. The majority of our sample firms are
audited by big accounting firms (88.02%) but only 1 1.46% have an audit committee in
compliance with the JSE rule.
Only 20.31% of our sample is in the category "high family ownership and not belonging
to business groups". Further examination of family ownership and business groups is
presented in Table 5. About 76% of our sample firms belong to business groups and 24%
are not members of any business groups. Consistent with Arifin (2003), the majority of our
sample is controlled by family (69%).
CFO has a negative and significant correlation with NDAC and DAC, which is
consistent with the smoothing nature of accruals. Future cash flows has a positive and
significant correlation with firm size, which means that large firms have high cash flows
from operation.
DFAM has a positive and significant correlation with CFO,, | and NDNIM |, which
indicates that firms with high family ownership that have no business groups have a higher
future profitability than other firms. A positive and significant correlation between AUDIT
and DSIZE shows that large firms tend to be audited by Big 4 auditors. A positive and
significant correlation between BOD and AUDCOM shows that firms with a high
proportion of independent board members tend to have audit committees. A majority of our
sample firms are non-DFAM firms and audited by Big 4 auditors.
The results from the regression of research model (la) are presented in Table 7.
Hypothesis la is supported (significant at the 1% level). The DAC coefficient is positive if
we use cash flows from operation and non-discretionary net income and it is negative if we
use change in earnings as a dependent variable. This result indicates that the type of
earnings management tends to be efficient contracting because two out of three DAC
coefficients are positive. This is not consistent with the common view that earnings
management in Indonesia is opportunistic.
Subramanyam (1996), Gul et al. (2000), and Knshnan (2003) also find evidence that
earnings management of listed firms in the United States is also efficient. But Burgstahler
and Dichev (1997) and Balsam et al. (2002) find opposite evidence. They conclude that
earnings management is opportunistic.
5.3. Ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices
Results from the regression of research model ( 1 b) are shown in Table 8. The VIFs for all
independent variables are below 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem.
Hypothesis lb is accepted and this indicates that earnings management in firms with high
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family ownership that do not belong to business groups is more efficient than that in other
firms.
For panels A and B, Hypothesis lc is not supported (/J5 is positive but insignificant).
This result suggests that institutional ownership does not significantly induce management
to adopt efficient earnings management. As shown in descriptive statistics in Table 3, the
average institutional ownership in our sample is relatively small and this could constrain the
ability of institutional investors to monitor management effectively. Hypothesis Id is also
not supported (/J(1 is positive but insignificant). This evidence could suggest that large firms
do not use efficient earnings management significantly more than small firms.
Hypothesis le is not supported, which show that firms audited by the Big 4 do not use
efficient earnings management more than firms audited by non-Big 4. This may suggest
that size of audit firms may not be a good proxy for audit quality.
Hypothesis If is also not supported. Two explanations for this result are: first,
independent boards have been shown to effectively monitor management in part because
Table 7
Regression of future profitability on discretionary accruals, other earnings component, and control variables
Variable Expected
sign
CFO,+ i
Coefficient p value
NDNI,-, AFARN,.,
Coefficient p value Coefficient p value
C 0.0224 0.1181 0.0212 0.0152 -0.0571 0.1508
CFO + (14945 0.0000*** 0.7191 0.0000*** 0.0759 0.2563
NDAC + 0.4015 0.0000*** 0.3019 0.0000*** 0.1626 0.1754
DAC +/- 0.1365 0.0003*** 0.1373 0.0000*** -0.2536 0.0489**
DFAM + 0.0218 0.0239** -0.0023 0.6242 0.0516 0.0353**
INST + -0.0374 0.8699 -0.0299 0.9240 0.0713 0.1900
DSIZE + 0.0047 0.2937 0.0007 0.4460 0.0525 0.0094***
AUDIT + 0.0227 0.0266** 0.0084 0.1303 0.0220 0.2798
BOD + 0.0160 0.3563 -0.0457 0.8944 -0.0208 0.5630
AUDCOM + -0.0283 0.9651 -0.0128 0.8540 0.0788 0.0454**
D99 0.0047 0.7056 -0.1495 0.0000*** -0.1157 0.0002***
D00 0.0417 0.0145* -0.0516 0.0000*4** 0.1208 0.0034***
D01 0.0150 0.4039 0.0076 0.5657 -0.0817 0.1009
N 553 558 550
Adjusted R: 0.2497 0.6848 0.0966
F-stattstic 16.3069 101.8418 5.8917
p value (/-"-statistic
)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
b + ft, CFO,, + ft;NDAC„ + ft, DAC,, + ft4DFAM„ + ftjINST,, + 66DSIZE„
+ ft8BOD„ + />„AUDCOM,, + bwD99i + 6,,£)00, + br D0\, + e
ft. AUDIT,,
Dependent variable: CFO,
,
,
= cash flows from operation one-year-ahead, NDNI,
,
,
= non-discretionary net
income one-year-ahead, AEARN,
,
,
= change in earnings one-year-ahead.
Independent variables: CFO = cash flows from operation. NDAC = non-discretionary accruals, DAC =
discretionary accruals. DFAM = one if firms have high family ownership and do not belong to business groups and
zero otherwise, INST = institutional ownership, DSIZE = one if firm is in the 50% highest market capitalization
and zero otherwise. AUDIT = one if firm is audited by Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise, BOD = proportion of
independent board, AUDCOM = one if firms have audit committee and zero otherwise.
.V after excluding outliers with criteria±3 times standard deviation.
•"Significant at 1%. "significant at 5%. *significant at 10% (two-tail).
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they have only been operating for a short period (2 years, from 2001 until 2002). Second,
publicly listed firms appoint independent boards only to comply with regulations; therefore,
independent boards are not utilized as a monitoring mechanism.
Hypothesis lg, which states that the effect of discretionary accruals on future
profitability is higher for firms with audit committees than for firms without audit
committees, is not supported in panels A and B of Table 8. The explanations for this result
Table 8
Regression of future profitability on discretionary accruals, discretionary accruals-ownership structure, firm size.
and corporate-governance practices interaction, other earnings component, and control variables
Variable Expected
sign
Panel A: CFO,
,
,
Coefficient p value
Panel B: NDNI,*, Panel C: AEARN,,,
Coefficient p value Coefficient p value
C 0.0251 0.0817* 0.0226 0.0234 -0.0557 0.1625
CFO + 0.4839 0.0000*** 0.7125 0.0000*** 0.0668 0.2711
NDAC + 0.3970 0(100(1*** 0.2997 0.0000*** 0.1893 0.1335
DAC +/- 0.1635 0.1190 0.1276 0.0660* -0 3205 0.2653
DAC*DFAM + 0.1556 0.0556* 0.1071 0.0317** 0.6365 0.0088***
DAC * INST + 0.1209 0.3256 0.0924 0.2547 -0.3609 0.6990
DAC* DSIZE + 0.0481 0.2620 0.0298 0.2661 0.0045 0.4920
DAC * AUDIT + -0.0910 0.8119 -0.0342 0.6915 -0.1563 0.7220
DAC* BOD + 0.0294 0.453 0.1025 02927 0.6298 0.2447
DAC * AUDCOM + -0.1424 0.8437 -0.1131 0.8541 0.7678 0.0475**
DFAM + 0.0171 0.0622* -0.0055 0.7741 0.0352 0.1179
INST + -0.0403 0.8878 -0.0313 0.9511 0.0993 0.1084
DSIZE + 0.0058 0.2527 0.0014 0.404
1
0.0572 0.0045***
AUDIT + 0.0200 0.0424** 0.0069 0.2102 0.0148 0.3466
BOD + 0.0282 0.2651 -0.037 8343 -0.0558 0.3336
AUDCOM + -0.0276 0.9632 -0.0125 0.8594 0.0791 0.0396
£W9 0.0047 0.7079 -0.1493 0.0000*** -0.1172 0.0002***
D00 0.0387 0.0215** -0.0534 0.0000*** 0.1231 0.0027***
DOI 0.0111 (i 5455 0.0050 0.7254 -0.0721 0.1638
N 553 558 551
Adjusted R~ 0.2492 0.6847 0.4473
F-statistic 11 1789 68.1855 25.7244
p value (/•"-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
A,, + , = Pa + j3,CFO„ + /i,NDAC„ + /J, DAC,, + j54DAC„ x DFAM,, + /J<DAC„ x INST,, + ft,DAC„
x DSIZE,, + /?7DAC„ x AUDIT,, + /?SDAC„ x BOD,, + /J,, DAC,, - AUDCOM,,
+ /S II)DFAM„ + /f||LNST„ + /SP DSIZE,, + /?,, AUDIT,, + /< l4BOD„ + /?,,AUDCOM,,
+ /J I6D99, + fS l7D00, + PKD0\, + e
Dependent variable: CFO,^| = cash flows from operation one-year-ahead, NDNI, .
,
= non-discretionary net
income one-year-ahead, AEARN, .
i
= change in earnings one-year-ahead
Independent variables: CFO = cash flows from operation, NDAC = non-discretionary accruals, DAC =
discretionary accruals, DFAM = one if firms have high family ownership and do not belong to business groups and
zero otherwise, INST = institutional ownership, DSIZE = one if firm is in the 50% highest market capitalization
and zero otherwise, AUDIT = one if firm is audited by Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise, BOD = proportion of
independent board, AUDCOM = one if firms have audit committee and zero otherwise.
N after excluding outliers with criteria±3 times standard deviation.
***Significant at 1%, "significant at 5%, 'significant at 10% (two-tail).
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are the same as for the independent boards. But in panel C, this hypothesis is supported and
significant. Control variables are not consistently significant over the three alternative tests.
5.4. Sensitivity analysis
To test the sensitivity of our main analysis results, we measure discretionary accruals
using the other three alternative models [Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), and Dechow
et al. (2002)]. Ifwe use change in earnings, discretionary accruals have a negative effect on
future profitability (although it is only significant ifwe use Dechow et al. (2002) to measure
discretionary accruals). Further, consistent with our main results, if we use cash flows from
operation and non-discretionary net income, we find that discretionary accruals have a
positive and significant effect. These results suggest that the evidence regarding earnings
management in the JSE tends to be efficient. Hypothesis lb is also supported, which is
similar to our main analysis results. This indicates that earnings management in firms with
high family ownership and no business groups is more efficient than in other firm
ownership.
To obtain a better measure of discretionary accruals, as suggested in Bernard and
Skinner (1996), Collins and Hribar (2002). and used by Xie (2001). discretionary accruals
is estimated after controlling non-articulation events (such as merger, acquisition, or
divestitures). Thus, observations with merger, acquisition, or divestitures are deleted. h This
sensitivity test also shows qualitatively similar results with our main results.
The effectiveness of institutional investors' role in the monitoring process depends on
the level of control they have over the company. These roles will be restricted if another
party holds a majority ownership (such as a founding family). We employ interacting
variables between institutional ownership and a dummy variable for majority family
ownership (one if the firm has a majority family ownership and zero otherwise) to test this
effect. This does not change the results in our main analysis.
We perform a sensitivity test using a dummy variable for firm size. We use a cutoff
40%:60%, where 40% of the sample firms with the highest market capitalization are large
firms and 60% of the sample firms with the lowest market capitalization are small firms.
These results also do not differ qualitatively from the results in our main analysis.
The research period for our main analysis is the non-crises period 1 995 through 1 996,
1999 through 2002. Years 1997-1998 are excluded because those are crises periods. To
examine the test results in a crisis period only, we repeat the test using observations in those
years. These results are similar to those from the non-crisis period, where the evidence
regarding earnings management tends to confirm the use of efficient earnings management.
Earnings management in firms with high family ownership and no business groups is more
efficient than that of other firms.
The JSE rule requiring publicly-owned companies to appoint independent boards and to
establish audit committees was released in June 2000 and effective as of December 31,
2001, at the latest. We repeat our test using 2001-2002 data only. BOD and AUDCOM are
Number of observations with merger, acquisition, and divestitures is 144 or 16.67% (144/864) of total
observations.
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consistently not significant. The results indicate that independent boards and audit
committees do not necessarily lead to more efficient earnings management
In our research model, we use several dummy variables (DFAM, AUDIT, DSIZE, and
AUDCOM). There is an inherent problem in using several dummy variables in one model.
It increases the number of cells (the number of cells is n , where n is the number ofdummy
variables) and thus decreases the average number of observations in each cell. Accordingly,
the reliability of the results is questionable. To overcome this problem, we break down
research model (lb) into several sub-models, with only one dummy variable in each. So, we
have the following model:
^r+i = An + AtiCFOa + &2NDAQ, + ft,DAC„ + ft4DAC„ x Dk„
+ $k5Dku + ft hD99, + ft 7D00, + ft sD0 l, + e ( 1 c
)
Expectation: Pk4>0
where: Dk=DFAM for k= 1, DSIZE for k=2, AUDIT for A = 3, AUDCOM for A=4.
The results of the above research model are qualitatively similar to our main analysis
results.
6. Conclusion and suggestions for further research
6.1. Conclusion
Our study finds that the type of earnings management favored by publicly listed firms on
the JSE tends to be efficient contracting. This result is not consistent with public perception
that these firms engage in opportunistic earnings management. We also find evidence that
earnings management in firms with high family ownership that do not belong to business
groups is more efficient than in firms with a different ownership structure. In contrast, we
do not find significant evidence that larger firms, firms audited by the Big 4, firms with a
higher proportion of independent boards, and firms with audit committees engage in
efficient earnings management.
6.2. Implications
6.2.1. For regulatory' bodies (Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory Agency and Jakarta
Stock Exchange)
We find sufficient evidence to suggest that earnings management in firms with high
family ownership that do not belong to business groups is efficient. This suggests that
control by a founding family seems not to harm minority shareholders, if those firms do not
belong to business groups. Given that a majority of publicly listed firms belong to business
groups, our finding could be interpreted by regulatory bodies as a need to place additional
monitoring on those companies.
We find that the effect of future profitability is lower (although insignificant) on firms
audited by Big 4 auditors on firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors. It means that big audit
firms do not necessarily restrict opportunistic earnings management. This finding could
24 SI' Siregar, S Utama / Vie International Journal of Accounting 43 (2008) 1-27
suggest that audit firm size is not a good proxy for audit quality in Indonesia. Another
proxy for audit quality is audit fee and audit hours. But these data are not available on
annual reports. The Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory Agency could issue
regulations that require publicly listed firms to disclose this information on their annual
report.
The existence of independent boards and audit committees do not significantly
affect a company's pursuit of more efficient earnings management. There are several
possible reasons for these results. First, public companies only appoint independent
boards and establish audit committees to comply with regulations. They do not use
those boards to monitor management. Regulators need to determine the best ways, not
only to enforce the rules, but also to disseminate information about the advantage of
having good corporate-governance practices. Second, the minimum requirement for
independent board membership is 30%. This proportion may not be high enough to
exert significant influence on board. If this is true, then regulators should consider
increasing the minimum proportion requirement (maybe >50%). Third, the regulations
about independent boards and audit committees were only started in 2001. Hence, the
short period for which data are available for our study may account for our negative
results.
6.2.2. For investors
Based on our results, investors can rely more on earnings figures reported by
companies with high family ownership that do not belong to business groups than on
other companies. Investors should also recognize that even though publicly listed com-
panies are audited by big accounting firms, there is still a strong possibility of earnings
management.
6.3. Limitations of the study
1. The ability of the Jones model and modified Jones model to accurately decompose
accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary components is still questionable.
Accordingly, there is a possibility of misclassification of non-discretionary and
discretionary accruals. If some components of non-discretionary accruals are mistakenly
classified as discretionary accruals, then this may explain the positive relation between
discretionary accruals and some measures of future profitability.
2. Due to a lack of data on corporate-governance indexes, we employ only audit quality,
independent board, and audit committee to measure corporate-governance practices in
publicly listed firms. Nowadays, there is no institution in Indonesia that has developed a
corporate-governance index for all publicly listed firms in the JSE. The only index
available is the Corporate Governance Performance Index (CGPI), which was issued by
IICG. But, most listed firms refused to participate in the survey. Only the indexes for the
top- 10 firms were published in SWA magazine while the indexes for the other
participating firms are kept confidential.
3. Public firms in Indonesia have been required to appoint independent boards and establish
audit committees only since 2001. Our research period only goes up to 2002. Therefore.
results on the influence of independent boards and audit committees on earnings-
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management type, may stem from this short period of data. In addition, the measures do
not indicate the activities of the independent boards and audit committees.
4. The size of an accounting firm may not be a good proxy for audit quality in Indonesia.
6.4. Suggestions for further research
1
.
Future research could develop a better discretionary-accrual model. It could develop a
particular model for each industry, so different in industry characteristics which
influence discretionary accruals could be included in the model. Also by developing a
particular model for each industry, further research could identify different earnings-
management patterns in each industry.
2. Future study could develop an instrument to compute corporate-governance indexes that
could be applied for all publicly listed firms in Indonesia. For example, the Indonesian
Institute for Corporate Directorship (IICD) is developing a corporate-governance index
based on publicly available data.
3. Further research could concentrate on boards of directors' and audit committees'
influence on earnings management over a longer period. Other measures of these
variables could also be developed, such as their background and their activities as
reported in the annual report.
4. Identify another proxy for audit quality, such as audit failures (Dang, 2004) and audit
fees.
5. In our study, we use cash flows from operation, non-discretionary net income, and
change in earnings as measures for future profitability. Our research is not intended to
identify which variable is the best measure. Future research could try to identify which
one is the best or identify another variable as a measure for future profitability.
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Abstract
We examine the association between corporate governance structures and incidences of listing
suspension from the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa. Using a matched-pairs research
design, we compare 81 firms suspended between 1 999 and 2005 to an equal number of control
firms matched in terms of time, size and industry. Employing a conditional logistic model, we
find that the likelihood of suspension is higher in firms with a smaller proportion of non-
executive directors, without an audit committee, and with greater block-share ownership and
higher gearing (i.e. leverage). Further analysis splitting block-share ownership into institutional
and non-institutional investors provides mixed results. While we find a positive association
between suspension and non-institutional investors, we observe no association with institutional
investors. No association is detected for board size, role duality, directors' share ownership,
auditor quality and return on assets. Given the paucity of studies examining listing suspension
from stock exchanges and corporate governance mechanisms, these findings contribute to the
literature. Additionally, the dearth of research on corporate governance in developing countries
suggests that our findings have important implications for policy makers in these countries as
they endeavor to improve corporate governance.
C 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
orporate governance: Listing suspension; JSE Securities Exchange; Developing countries: South
Africa
( Corresponding author. Accounting and Finance Group, Bradford University School of Management. Emm
lane. Bradford, BD9 4JL, UK. Tel: +44 1274 234340: fax -44 1274 235680.
E-mail address: m.mangena@bradford.ac.uk (M. Mangena).
0020-7CK isity of Illinois. All rights reserved,
doi: 10. 101 6 j. intact.2008.01 002
M. Mangena, /' Chamisa I The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 28 44 29
1. Introduction
This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the
suspension of listed firms by the JSE Securities Exchange (JSE) of South Africa (SA). The
financial scandals and failures in the 1 980s reignited debate on the most appropriate mechanisms
for making corporate boards more effective (Demirag, Sudarsanam. & Wright, 2000). Against
this backdrop, and from the early 1990s, an increasing number of developed, developing and
emerging market countries have published corporate governance guidelines and codes of best
practice (Demirag et al., 2000: Gregory, 2004; Mallin, 2004). However, in spite of this
development, the majority of empirical research on the efficacy of corporate governance
remains biased in favor of developed Anglo-Saxon countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Vafeas
& Theodorou. 1998). Although there is a growing literature on developing Asian countries (e.g.,
Baek, Kang, & Park, 2004; Hamffa & Hudaib, 2006), direct empirical research on the effec-
tiveness of corporate governance in Africa is almost non-existent (Okeahalam, 2004).
We contend (as do Demirag et al., 2000; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998) that due to country
differences,' it is desirable and warranted that "various governance structures should be sepa-
rately examined in each country" (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998:384). This would enable the
evidence on the efficacy of governance mechanisms to be generalized across countries, which
would in turn buttress the theories that are proffered and refute any suggestion that the existing
evidence is a consequence of the idiosyncrasies in the institutional, cultural, and regulatory
environments in developed Anglo-Saxon countries. In this context, we contribute to the literature
in two main ways. First, in a departure from extant literature, we examine the efficacy of
corporate governance mechanisms in SA, a developing country whose corporate governance
system is drawn from the Anglo-Saxon model. Thus, we address the question of whether
corporate governance structures established in developed countries are appropriate to cope with
the challenges presented in developing countries, particularly in Africa. Our choice of SA is
motivated by a number of factors. One, among developing and emerging economies, SA
pioneered the publication of corporate governance guidelines and codes of best practice in 1994
(Demirag et al., 2000; Mallin, 2004). Two, SA is Africa's largest economy with considerable
influence on the continent." Finally, there have been a number ofcorporate failures and financial
irregularities in SA, notably, Fidentia. JCI-Randgold. Masterbond, Leisurenet, MacMed, and
Regal Treasury Bank, some of which were blamed on weaknesses in corporate governance
structures (Sarra, 2004; World Bank, 2003).
Second, we examine the relationship between corporate governance and incidences of listing
suspension from the stock exchange, a setting in which the evidence is almost non-existent
internationally. According to the World Bank (2003). the JSE appears to have a high incidence of
firm suspension, thus providing us with an opportunity to examine the corporate governance
For example, stage of economic and capital-markels development, legal, socio-political, and economic environ-
ments. In Africa's context, Okeahalam (2004) also notes some factors that suggest that corporate governance structures
established in the developed world may be ineffective. These include business environment, protection laws, o\\ nership
structures, culture of corruption, lack of transparency, political interference, and the weak nature of institutions.
" In 1996. the JSE was ranked in terms of market capitalization as the 16th largest stock market in the world and
the third largest emerging market (JefTeris & Okeahalam 1999). Its influence is evident in Sub-Sahara Africa.
where, for example, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing Requirements (2002) require listed firms to adopt
corporate governance best practices as enshrined either in the SA code or the U.K. code.
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effects.
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Prior studies focus on examining the association between corporate governance
mechanisms and firm performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ho & Williams, 2003; Vafeas &
Theodorou, 1998), earnings management (Klein, 2002), management forecasts (Ajinkya,
Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005) and the quality ofdisclosure (Mangena
& Pike, 2005). However, these studies are criticized for equating the effectiveness of board
mechanisms with a firm's performance or reporting quality (Frankforter, Berman, & Jones,
2000 ; Kosnik, 1987). For example, Kosnik (1987: 163) argues that as long as management
decisions and actions "are consistent with shareholders' interest and promote the long-term
performance of the firm, any type of board (even a passive one) will appear effective."
We argue that better insights into the antecedents of effective corporate governance
mechanisms might be gained by studying situations where firms are experiencing financial
problems (Frankforter et al., 2000; Kosnik, 1987). In this context, there is a growing literature
that examines the relationship between corporate governance and bankruptcy (Daily & Dalton,
1994), takeovers (Kosnik, 1987; Shivdasani, 1993; Frankforter et al., 2000), and the pub-
lication of defective financial statements or commission of illegal acts (Beasley, 1 996; Peasnell
et al. 2001). However, none of these studies have considered listing suspension. Listing
suspension is important because it imposes significant costs on shareholders via a decrease in
the share price (Macey, O'Hara, & Pompilo, 2005) and, therefore, provides a good setting in
which to investigate whether corporate governance structures make a difference.
In our analysis we employ a matched-pairs research design of 8 1 firms suspended from the
JSE in the period 1999-2005 and 8 1 control firms and perform conditional logistic-regression
analyses. Our results show that corporate governance structures in suspended firms were
relatively weak compared to control firms. We find a significant negative association between
listing suspension and the proportion ofnon-executive directors and audit committee presence.
We also find that incidences of suspension were relatively high in firms with block-share
ownership. Further analysis splitting block-share ownership into institutional and non-
institutional investors provides mixed results. While we find a positive association between
suspension and non-institutional investors, we observe no association with institutional
investors. We detect no relationship between suspension and board size, directors' share
ownership and CEO/Chair role duality. These findings have implications for policy makers in
developing countries in their attempt to improve corporate governance.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the institutional
framework for corporate governance in SA, while Section 3 reviews previous literature and
develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the methodology used. The results are presented
and discussed in Section 5, with concluding remarks presented in Section 6.
2. The institutional framework for corporate governance in South Africa
In the developing world, SAwas the first to develop a corporate governance code of best
practice via the King Report of 1994 (Demirag et al, 2000; Malhn, 2004). The report, which
Suspensions are made for a number ofreasons, including ( 1 ) noncompliance with listing requirements. (2 ) when
the firm is under provisional liquidation or judicial management, (3) at request of the company, (4) takeovers, or
(5) when the JSE considers it to be in the public's best interest (JSE Listing Requirements, 2005).
In a contemporaneous study that was completed independently of our own, Charitou, Louka, andVafeas (2007)
also find a link between corporate-governance characteristics and the likelihood ofexchange delisting using U.S. data.
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was published by the King Committee on Corporate Governance, draws extensively from the
U.K. Cadbury Committee of 1992. The code was revised in 2002 necessitated by post- 1994
developments both locally (e.g., legislation such as the Employment Equity Act - No. 55 of
1998) and internationally (e.g., U.K. Combined Code of 1998). A conspicuous feature of the
King Report (2002) is its adoption of the "inclusive approach" to corporate governance. While
codes in other countries focus on shareholder-wealth maximization, the King Report
encourages firms to consider a wider community of stakeholders.
With regard to the board of directors, the King Report highlights the board as the focal
point of the corporate governance system. It recommends (a) a unitary board structure with a
balance between executive and non-executive directors (NEDs), preferably with a majority
ofNEDs, ofwhom a sufficient number should be independent; (b) a separation of the roles of
the chairperson (who should be an independent NED) and the chiefexecutive officer (CEO);
(c) that a substantial portion of the total remuneration of executive directors should be
performance-based; and (d) formation of at least audit and remuneration committees,
dominated and chaired by independent NEDs. Compliance with the King Report is generally
voluntary. However, the JSE Listing Requirements (2005) oblige listed firms to disclose
in their annual reports the extent of compliance with the King Report and reasons for
noncompliance.
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
Prior literature (Weir, Laing, & McKnight et al., 2002; Ho & Williams, 2003; Ajinkya
et al., 2005) contends that corporate-governance structures are associated with different
organizational outcomes. We draw from this literature to examine the relationship between
corporate governance and incidences of listing suspension by the JSE. Specifically, we
consider board characteristics (board size, board composition, CEO/Chair role duality, audit
committee presence) and ownership structures (directors' share of ownership, block-share
ownership).
3. 1. Board characteristics
Fama and Jensen ( 1 983) suggest that the board is the central control mechanism responsible
for minimizing agency costs that arise from the separation ofownership and decision control in
corporations. We, therefore, argue that a well-constituted board ofdirectors is more likely to act
in the best interests of shareholders, and, therefore, would constrain managers to engage in
activities that result in listing suspension.
Prior literature argues that board size is an important aspect of effective corporate
governance (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) and is related to firm performance (Baek et al.,
2004; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). A larger board is more likely to have a greater range of
expertise to monitor the actions of management effectively (Beasley, 1996; Karamanou &
Vafeas, 2005) and also in securing critical resources (Goodstein et al., 1994). In contrast,
Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that large boards may be less cohesive and
slow in making decisions, less candid in discussions of managerial performance, more
difficult to coordinate, and easier to control by the CEO, thus constraining the board's
effectiveness.
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In general, the literature (e.g.. Jensen. 1993: Karamanou & Vafeas. 2005) suggests that
boards must be small enough for true discussion and debate between members to take place
and large enough to have members with a mix of business judgment and experience. Both
Linck. Nerter. and Vang (2008) and Boone. Feild. Karpoff. and Raheja (2007) provide
evidence suggesting that firms structure their boards in a manner that reflects the costs and
benefits of monitoring the firm. In South Africa, the JSE Listing Requirements (2005)
specifies that the minimum number of directors for listed firms should be four, while the
King Report (2002) only recommends that the board should be of a size that allows for a
diversity of expertise and experience to be effective monitors. A Deutsch Bank (2002)
survey of 73 major South African firms revealed that board size ranges from five to 30
directors, with a mean directorship of 12.
Empirically, the evidence on the association of board size with different organizational
outcomes is mixed. Yermack (1996) finds an inverse relationship between board size
and firm performance, whilst Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report a positive relationship
with operating performance. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) also find a positive
relationship between board size and management earnings forecasts. In a study that
included SA. Ho andWilliams (2003) fail to detect a significant relationship between
performance and board size. We hypothesize the following:
H 1 . There is a significant relationship between board size and incidences oflisting suspension
from the JSE.
The King Report (2002 ) recommends that the board should have a balance of executive
and non-executive directors (NEDs), preferably with the majority being NEDs. ? A
number of studies (e.g.. Ho cv Williams. 2003: Weir et al.. 2002) argue that the effec-
tiveness of the board is enhanced by the inclusion of NEDs. NEDs are perceived to be
more independent of management (Ajinkya et al.. 2005: Peasnell et al. 2001) and are
unlikely to collude with managers to engage in actions that compromise shareholders"
interests (Fama & Jensen. 1983: Mangena & Pike. 2005). Additionally. NEDs have
incentives to maintain their reputation capital since the market for directorships prices
them according to their performance (Shivdasani. 1993). Well-performing NEDs are
likely to be rewarded with additional board opportunities and benefits, while poorly
performing NEDs are likely to be penalized by the loss in positions and benefits.
Therefore, the suspension of listing could have consequences for NEDs as it may be
perceived by the market as a failure by the NEDs to monitor management effectively.
The empirical literature generally supports the notion that a higher proportion ofNEDs
improves the ability of the board to monitor managerial performance. For example, studies
show that boards with a greater proportion ofNEDs are (a) more likely to resist payment of
greenmail (Kosnik. 1987). perform better (Weir et al.. 2002) or enhance management-
forecast quality (Ajinkya et al.. 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas. 2005) and (b) reduce the
Unlike other corporate governance codes (e.g.. Cadbury Committee. 1992). the King Report (2002) does not
stipulate the minimum number or percentage of non-executive directors.
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likelihood of financial fraud (Beasley. 1996: Peasnell et al.. 2001 ) or earnings management
(Klein. 2002). We therefore hypothesize the following:
H2. There is a significant negative relationship between the proportion of non-executive
directors and incidences of listing suspension from the JSE.
The King Report (2002: 24) regards role duality as undesirable and recommends that
there should be a separate role for the CEO and chairman in listed firms "to ensure a balance
of power and authority so that no one individual has unfettered powers of decision-
making." From an agency perspective, combining the positions of CEO and chairman
constrains the board's oversight role. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that role duality
portrays the absence of separation between decision control and decision management.
They suggest that combining these two important roles creates a strong individual power
base which could limit the board's ability to execute its duties. In contrast. Haniffa and
Hudaib (2006) argue that there are advantages in combining the two roles. For example, the
individual is more likely to develop a greater understanding and knowledge of operations,
which enables him her to direct the firm strategically with minimum board interference.
Empirically, the findings are mixed. Beasley (1996) finds no evidence that role duality
affects financial fraud. Similarly. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998). Weir et al. (2002) and
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report no significant relationship with performance. In contrast.
Peasnell et al. (2001) find a negative relationship with adverse rulings by the Financial
Reporting Review Panel (FRRP). In a saidy that included SA. Ho and Williams (2003 ) find
a negative relationship between role duality and firm performance. The results by Ho and
Williams (2003) are consistent with anecdotal evidence that indicates that role duality in SA
is problematic (see Sarra. 2004). We therefore hypothesize the following:
H3. There is significant positive relationship between role duality and incidences of listing
suspension from the JSE.
It is suggested (Cadbury Committee. 1 992: K.ing Report. 2002 i that the extent of board
monitoring is strengthened by the presence of an audit committee (AC). The AC is
assumed to monitor management, and both the internal and external auditors, in order to
protect the interests of shareholders (Cadbury Committee. 1992). The King Report (2002)
recommends that listed firms must ha\ e an AC whose primary role is to ensure the quality
and credibility of the financial-reporting process, as well as reducing fraudulent activities.
Empirical studies show a negative association betw een the presence ofan AC and financial
fraud ( Dechow. Sloan. & Sweeny, 1 996), earnings management (Klein. 2002). and incidences
ofadverse rulings by the FRRP (Peasnell et al.. 200 1 ). Karamanou and Vafeas ( 2005 1 find that
firms with ACs are more likely to make management forecasts. Similarly, we argue that
incidences of listing suspension should be lower in firms with an AC. To this end the AC helps
in ensuring compliance with listing reporting requirements of the stock exchange, as well as
preventing fraudulent activities that may lead to bankruptcy or liquidations i Klein
Peasnell et al.. 2001) Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H4. There is a significant negative relationship between audit committee presence and
incidences of listing suspension from the JSE.
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3.2. Ownership structure variables
Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) provide
some evidence that ownership structure is important in reducing agency costs. Agency
theory (Fama, 1980) suggests that share ownership by directors helps to alleviate the
conflicts of interest that exist between the directors and shareholders. Jensen (1993) argues
that directors who hold a large equity stake in the firm are more likely to have a greater
incentive to monitor managers in order to protect their investments. Empirical studies
generally support this notion. For example, evidence shows a positive relationship be-
tween directors' share ownership and firm performance (Short & Keasey, 1999) and
management forecasts (e.g., Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). We therefore hypothesize the
following:
H5. There is a significant negative relationship between directors' share ownership and
incidences of listing suspension from the JSE.
The Cadbury Committee (1992) emphasizes the role of shareholders in enhancing
corporate governance. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) suggest that block shareholders are best
suited for monitoring management due to their access to better information about the firm.
Weir et al. (2002) also argue that there is greater potential for agency costs related to poor
performance for blockholders, thus providing greater incentives to monitor. Similarly,
Shivdasani (1993) argues that blockholders have stronger incentives to invest in voting on
corporate issues than non-blockholders.
On the contrary, Ajinkya et al. (2005) argue that there are circumstances under which
blockholders behave as insiders. They suggest that blockholders may have undue influence
over management and, therefore, secure self-serving benefits that are detrimental to other
shareholders. This view is pertinent in the context of SA, because share ownership on the
JSE is relatively concentrated (Malherbe & Segal, 2001; Sarra, 2004; World Bank, 2003).
The controlling shareholders exert influence on management decisions through, in certain
cases, electing their own representatives to the board of directors (Malherbe & Segal, 200 1
;
World Bank, 2003). This problem, commonly referred to in SA as shadow directorship
(King Report, 2002; World Bank, 2003), causes inefficiencies in the monitoring process as
the controlling shareholders, though not directors per se, are able to exert influence on
board activities. Thus, rather than being involved in monitoring and assessing the
governance of the firms, shadow directors become involved indirectly in the running of the
firms (World Bank, 2003). This may lead them to have incentives to extract private benefits
that are not available to minority shareholders (Shivdasani, 1993).
The empirical evidence is mixed. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find a positive relationship
with firm performance, while Baek et al. (2004) report a negative relationship. Shivdasani
(1993) shows that blockholders who are affiliated with management increase, while
unaffiliated blockholders decrease hostile takeovers. Yet Weir et al. (2002) detect no
significant relationship. Hence, we hypothesize the following:
H6. There is a significant relationship between block-share ownership and incidences of
listing suspension from the JSE.
M. Mangena, E Chami.su The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 28—44 35
4. Methodology
4.1. Sample selection and data
To conduct our analysis, we employ a matched-pairs research design (Hosmer &
Lemeshow, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2001). The main advantage of this approach is that "it
provides a parsimonious means of controlling for certain potentially important confounding
(non-accounting) firm-specific characteristics" of targeted firms (Peasnell et al.. 2001 :297).
The data used in the analysis is drawn from annual reports obtained via the McGregor Data
System, firm secretaries, and the University ofCape Town library. The sample was selected
as follows. We submitted a request to the JSE for information about suspended firms and
received a list containing 538 firms suspended in the period 1999-2005. From this list,
annual reports were obtained for 114 suspended firms. Drawing from prior literature (e.g.,
Beasley, 1996; Peasnell et al., 2001), each of these firms was matched with a similar
unsuspended (control) firm in terms of industry, size (total assets), and time period. We
eliminated ten firms due to missing data and 23 because no suitable matching firms were
identified. The matching procedure resulted in a final sample of 81 paired firms.'' Table 1
presents the distribution of the suspended firms.
4.2. Regression model specifications
We use conditional logistic-regression analysis (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000) for two
main reasons. First, our dependent variable is dichotomous and, therefore, the ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression analysis is inappropriate for estimating the parameters
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). Second, according to Hosmer
and Lemeshow (2000), a conditional logistic regression is more appropriate because it
preserves the matched character of the sample. Thus, the following model is estimated:
SUSPEND = /}, BOARDSIZE + /J:PROPNED + /^DUALITY + /*4DSHARE ( 1
)
+/?5BLOCK + ft,ACPRES + /J 7CONTROL +
Where:
SUSPEND Listing suspension, measured as a dummy variable coded one if firm was
suspended, zero if it's a control firm.
BOARDSIZE Total number of board members.
' Each firm was matched using the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC) (which is the
narrowest industry classification by the JSE). Following Kaplan and Reishus (1990), a cut-off of +/-50% was
used. Each firm was first matched at the same sub-sector level and if no suitable firm was identified at the sub-
sector level, the same process was repeated at the sector and super-sector levels, respectively. Thirty-nine firms
were matched at the sub-sector level, 34 at the sector level, and eight at the super-sector level. Using a paired t-
test, we find no significant differences in terms of total assets between our suspended and control firms,
suggesting that our matching was successful.
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Table 1
Analysis of" sample of suspended firms by the JSE: 1999-2005
Type of analysis No %
Panel A: analysis by yew of suspension
2005 13 16.1
2004 12 148
2003 12 14.8
2002 18 22.2
2001 11 13-6
2000 11 13.6
1999 4 4.9
Total 81 100
Panel H analysis by industrial set tor
General retailers 1
1
13.6
Mining 11 13.6
Software and computer services 12 14.8
General financial firms 10 12.4
Electronic and electrical equipment 6 7.4
Equity investment instruments 6 7.4
Real estate 6 7.4
Travel and leisure 4 4.9
Industrials 8.6
Others 8 9.9
Total 81 100
Panel C analysis by reason lor suspension
Liquidation / winding-up / judicial management 35 43.2
Non-compliance with listing requirements'1 15 21.0
At the request of the directors 13 1 6.
1
Scheme of arrangements / takeover offers'1 12 12.3
Others 6 7.4
Total 81 100
* Of the 15 firms, 11 failed to submit annual financial statements and four failed to comply with other listing
requirements.
b
Takeover offers are in terms of Section 440K. of the Companies Act of 1973 as amended.
PROPNED Board composition, measured as the number of non-executive directors scaled
by total board members.
DUALITY Role duality, measured as a dummy variable with a value of one if the position
of chair and CEO are held by separate persons, zero if otherwise.
ACPRES Audit committee presence, measured as a dummy variable with a value of one if
the board has an audit committee, zero if otherwise.
DSHARE Directors' share ownership, measured as the number of shares held by all
directors of the board scaled by total number of shares.
BLOCK Block-share ownership, measured as the number of shares held by shareholders
with at least 5% holding scaled by total number of shares.
CONTROL Control variables: Type of auditor (AUDITOR), measured as a dummy
variable with a value of one if the firm is audited by one of the Big-4 audit firms,
zero otherwise. Gearing ratio (GEAR), measured as total debt scaled by total assets.
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and Return of assets ROA), measured as profit before tax scaled by total assets.
These control variables are drawn from prior literature (e.g., Peasnell et al., 2001 ).
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
The summary descriptive statistics for both suspended and control firms and the related
univariate tests are presented in Table 2. Panel A presents the statistics for continuous
variables, while Panel B provides the statistics for categorical variables.
Panel A reveals that suspended firms tend to have a smaller board of directors
(BOARDSIZE) than control firms. The mean (median) number of directors is 7.099 (6.000)
compared with 7.654 (7.000) for control firms. For board composition, we observe a lower
proportion of non-executive directors (PROPNED) for suspended firms, with a mean
(median) of 41.3% (45%) compared to 57.3% (60%) for the control firms. The mean
(median) director's share ownership (DSHARE) is about 20.4% (12%) for the suspended
firms and about 23.2% (18%) for the control firms, while the mean (median) block-share
ownership (BLOCK) is 61.1% (66%) for the suspended firms and about 50.1% (47.5%)
for the control firms. As for the control variables, the suspended firms tend to be highly
geared (GEARING) and less profitable (ROA), with a mean (median) of 86.2% (89%)
and -4.3% (4%) compared to about 46.6% (45%) and 3.8% (5.1%) for the control firms,
respectively. The Mann-Whitney U tests in Table 2, Panel A indicate that there are
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the sample
Panel A: continuous variables''
Variables'' Suspended firms Control firms Tests
Mean Median 25th 75th Std dev Mean Median 25th 75 th Std Dev Z-value
BOARDSIZE 7.099 6.000 5.000 9.000 2.905 7.654 7.000 6.000 9.000 2.647 -1.272
PROPNED 413 .450 .280 .565 .218 .573 600 .475 .710 .209 -4.784***
DSHARE .204 .120 .020 .361 .220 .232 .180 .030 .355 242 -.763
BLOCK .611 .660 420 .828 .267 .501 .475 .368 695 .258 2.075**
GEARING .862 .890 .530 1.130 .505 .466 450 .260 .650 .279 6.166***
ROA -.043 .040 -.140 .110 .347 .038 .051 -.015 .157 .351 -1.459
Panel B: categorical variables'
1
Variables'' Suspended firms Control firms Chi-square value
DUALITY Coded 1 64.2%
Coded 35.8%
ACPRES Coded 1 70.4%
Coded 29.6%
AUDITOR Coded I 67.9%
Coded 32.1%
59.3% .418
40.7%
85.2% 5 143**
14.8%
60.5% .967
39.5%
*. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Mann-Whitney U tests for the continuous variables; and chi-square test for categorical variables.
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systematic differences between the suspended and control firms only with respect to
PROPNED, BLOCK, and GEARING.
The results in panel B indicate that suspended firms are more likely than control firms to
have a combined role of chief executive officer and chairman (DUALITY). We also
observe that control firms are more likely to have an audit committee presence (ACPRES)
than suspended firms. Surprisingly, the results suggest that suspended firms are more likely
to be audited by a larger auditing firm than the control firms (AUDITOR). However, we
observe from the chi-square tests that there is a significant difference between suspended
and control firms in respect of ACPRES only.
5.2. Results of logistic-regression analysis
5.2.1. Correlation matrix and multicollinearity
A major concern in regression analysis is the problem of multicollinearity among the
independent variables. In Table 3, we provide the Spearman's rho correlations between
the independent variables to examine whether multicollinearity is problematic. The results
reveal several significant relationships (p < .05 ) among the independent variables. Although
the correlations are significant, all except BOARDSIZE and ACPRES (/•= 0.669) are below
0.40. As a rule-of-thumb, multicollinearity in regression analysis is considered harmful
only when correlations exceed 0.7 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). Additionally, we also
compute and examine the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each independent variable. In
all cases, except for BOARDSIZE and ACPRES, the VIFs are below two. The VIFs for
BOARDSIZE and DUALITY are 3.833 and 3.567 respectively, which are far below the
critical value of 10 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996), suggesting multicollinearity is not a
major problem.
5.2.2. Regression-analyses results
Table 4 presents the results of the conditional logistic-regression analyses of the
relationship between incidences of suspension from the JSE and corporate governance
mechanisms. In Model 1 , our measure for BLOCK is the aggregate shareholding of all
blockholders. However, given that institutional investors in South Africa are inactive
Table 3
Spearman's rho correlations among independent variables
Variable3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. BORADSIZE 1.000
2. PROPNED 277*** 1.000
3. DUALITY -.008 135 1.000
4 ACPRES .669*** .366***
.129 1.000
5 DSHARE -.095 -.081
.100 -.033 1.000
6 BLOCK -.065
.071 .086 .017 -.108 1.000
7. AUDITOR .262***
.002 -.058 .034 -.262*** .120 1.000
8. GEARING -.069 -.103
-.009
.026 .030 .012 .036 1.000
9. ROA .210***
.091 .095 .283*** -.056 -.036 .006 -.129 1.000
* Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed).
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Table 4
Conditional logistic-regression results of the association of corporate governance mechanisms with incidences of
listing suspension from the JSE Securities Exchange
Variables'
1
Predicted sign Model I Model 2
Coefficient Wald /; Coefficient Wald r
Corporate-governance variables
BOARDSIZE
PROPNED
DUALITY
ACPRES
DSHARE
BLOCK
BLOCK 1
BLOCK 2
Control variables
AUDITOR
GEARING
ROA
Number of pairs
Constant (-2LL)
Model yC
Pseudo R~
+/-
+/-
+/-
.049
.X INS
.233
2 312
524
2.944
.334
4.302
-.035
.093 -.130
10.562***
-6.854
134 .445
4.197** - 1 .992
158 1. 159
3.235**
-2.803
2.398
.303 1.174
12.344*** 3.165
.002 .317
81
112.290
-,, 2 ^)***
.626
.474
8.328***
.441
4.159**
.576
1.781
4.848**
2.245
7.445***
.121
81
112.290
72.717***
.647
***. Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed); **. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
(World Bank, 2003), they possibly have little influence over management decisions. 7
Consequently, in Model 2, we re-estimate the regression analysis using a definition that
splits block-share ownership into institutional investors (BLOCK 1) and non-institutional
investors (BLOCK 2).' Our rationale for this is to provide some insights into the class of
blockholders who are likely to be associated with incidences of listing suspension, and
possibly associated with the problem of shadow directorship. As Holderness and Sheehan
(1988) suggest, the two classes of blockholders may have different motivations for in-
fluencing management decisions.
The results in Table 4 indicate that the conditional logistic-regression models are
significant in explaining incidences of suspension by the JSE at the 0.05 level or better as
signified by the Model ye statistic. The model's Pseudo R~ is 62.6% for Model 1 and 64.7%
for Model 2, and the results are similar in both models. The coefficient of BOARDSIZE is
not significant, and thus inconsistent with our expectation in HI. However, the results are
As noted by the World Bank ( 2003 ), a striking feature of this inactivity is that few institutional investors actually
attend annual general meetings. Malherbe and Segal (2001) attribute this to the reluctance by SA institutional
investors to assume a powerful role in the corporate sector. They suggest that the reluctance derives from the concern
that it might draw government attention and possible obligations, particularly given the popular policy whereby the
government often prescribes investments for institutional investors.
We define institutional investors as insurance firms, banks, pension funds, and mutual funds, and non-
institutional investors as firms and individuals (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). For our non-institutional investors,
we were unable to use the finer blockholder variables that distinguish between affiliated (management friendly) and
unaffiliated (independent) blockholders (see Shivdasani, 1993), due to data limitations.
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consistent with prior literature (e.g., Peasnell et al., 2001) that also reports no significant
relationship between board size and incidences of adverse rulings by the FRRP. In a study
that included South Africa, Ho and Williams (2003) also fail to detect a significant rela-
tionship with performance. These results suggest that the size ofthe board does not influence
the quality of monitoring.
Our results indicate, in both models, that PROPNED is significantly and negatively
associated with incidences of suspension, thus accepting H2. This is consistent with Kosnik
(1987), who also reports a negative relationship between payment of greenmail and the
proportion of NEDs. The negative coefficients demonstrate that firms with a higher
percentage ofNEDs are less likely to be suspended from the exchange. This suggests that
NEDs are more effective in monitoring management activities (Beasley, 1996; Karamanou
& Vafeas, 2005 ), 9 thereby ensuring conformance with interests of shareholders and the
requirements of the stock exchange.
The hypothesis of the relationship between listing suspension and DUALITY (H3) was
not supported. However, the estimated coefficient is positive and thus consistent with our
prediction. The positive coefficient is contrary to prior similar studies (e.g., Beasley, 1996;
Peasnell et al, 2001 ; Ho & Williams, 2003), but consistent with anecdotal evidence in SA (see
Sarra, 2004). As for ACPRES, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant as
predicted. This result is consistent with Peasnell et al. (2001), but contradicts Beasley (1996),
who finds no significant association between audit committee presence and financial fraud. Our
results suggest that ACs may engage in actions that prevent suspension from the stock exchange.
The relationship between DSHARE and incidences of listing suspension is not
significant, and thus our hypothesis (H4) is not supported. 10 Our results suggest that
share ownership by directors does not influence the likelihood of suspension. These results
are consistent with Peasnell et al. (2001), but contradict Karamanou and Vafeas (2005).
In Model 1, the results indicate that the relationship between BLOCK and suspension is
significant, thus supporting H5. The coefficients are positive, suggesting that the likelihood of
suspension increases with BLOCK, which is consistent with the findings ofBaek et al. (2004).
Shivdasani (1993) also shows that blockholders affiliated with management increase, while
unaffiliated blockholders decrease, hostile takeovers. The results contradict McConnell and
Servaes (1990), who fail to support a relationship between firm performance and BLOCK.
Both Beasley (1996) and Peasnell et al. (2001) also report no relationship with fraudulent
financial reporting. Additionally, the results are not consistent with Daily and Dalton (1994),
who report a negative relationship with bankruptcy. The results suggest that blockholders are
not effective monitors of management. These results are important, particularly in the context
of SA, where the problem of shadow directorship is said to be more prevalent (Malherbe &
Segal, 2001; World Bank, 2003). Our results seem to support the view by the King Report
(2002) that no individual blockholder should dominate the board.
We were unable to make a distinction between grey non-executive directors and independent non-executive
directors owing to limited information. Although the King Report (2002) recommends a majority of independent
non-executive directors, this information is not available in the annual reports.
Other previous studies examine managerial share ownership rather than board of directors' share of ownership
(e.g., Peasnell et al., 2001). While the total percentage holding of the directors is provided in the annual reports,
the data on an individual directors' holding was difficult to determine from the annual reports of most firms in our
sample.
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Results of further analysis of the relationship between block-share ownership and listing
suspension (as shown in Model 2) are mixed. BLOCK 1 is not statistically significant,
although the coefficient is negative. This finding supports the argument that institutional
investors in South Africa are inactive monitors of management activities (Malherbe & Segal,
2001 ; World Bank, 2003). For BLOCK 2, the coefficient is positive and significant at the 5%
level, suggesting that the probability of suspension from the JSE is higher where share
ownership by block non-institutional investors is higher. This is consistent with non-
institutional blockholders having monitoring incentives that are geared towards their own
interests. It is possible that these blockholders are the "shadow directors" who exert influence
on management decisions.
For the control variables, the coefficients of GEARING are positive and significant,
suggesting that highly geared firms are more likely to be suspended. These results support
the findings of Peasnell et al. (2001 ). With regard to ROA, the coefficients are negative, but
not significant consistent with Peasnell et al. (2001 ). Finally, AUDITOR is not significant,
thus contradicting Peasnell et al. (2001 ).
5.2.3. Additional analyses
We perform additional analyses to check the robustness of our results. First, although the
analyses in Section 5.2.1 suggest that the correlations among the independent variables are
within suggested bounds (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996), we feel that the correlation
between BOARDSIZE and ACPRES (>•= 0.669) may be too high. Consequently, we re-
estimate our regressions by including these two variables in separate models. Our results as
reported in Table 4 are largely unaffected.
Second, the literature on board size (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005) and
directors' share ownership (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Short &
Keasey, 1999) suggests a non linear relationship between performance and board size as well
as directors' share ownership. Consistent with Mangena and Pike (2005), we include as an
additional variable, board size squared (BOARDSIZE") and rerun the regression models. The
results remain unchanged.
Finally, based on Morck et al. (1988), we introduce a number of zero-one dummy
variables for different levels of directors' share ownership and rerun the regression model
(less than 5%, 5% to less than 25%, and more than 25%). Again, we find that our results as
reported in Table 4 remain largely similar. Overall, these analyses suggest that our results
are robust.
6. Summary and concluding remarks
In this study, we examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms
and incidences of listing suspension by the JSE. We find a negative relationship between
proportion of non-executive directors and listing suspension. This is consistent with the
notion that non-executive directors are better monitors of management (Ajinkya et al.,
2005). It also implies that the King Report's (2002) recommendation that boards should
comprise a majority of non-executive directors is a step in the right direction. This is
particularly important in light of recent corporate failures in South Africa that have been
blamed on poor corporate governance structures (see Sarra, 2004).
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Another important finding of our study relates to block-share ownership. We find that
firms with block-share ownership are more likely to be suspended from the stock exchange.
Additional analysis splitting block-share ownership into institutional investors and non-
institutional investors, continues to support our finding. While we find no relationship
between suspension and institutional investors, the results for non-institutional investors are
significant and positive. These results have important policy implications for corporate
governance particularly given the "shadow directors" problems in the SA corporate sector.
The recommendations of the King Report (2002) that shadow directors should be dis-
couraged may be well founded. Furthermore, our findings buttress the call for an active role
in corporate governance by institutional investors who are said to be inactive (Malherbe &
Segal. 2001 ; World Bank, 2003). Given their high share ownership on the JSE, they are well
placed to constrain the self-servicing activities of block non-institutional investors.
Our results also suggest that the presence of an audit committee is negatively associated
with suspension. This is consistent with the notion that audit committees enhance the quality of
monitoring. Finally, we find no relationship between suspension and the remaining corporate
governance mechanisms (i.e., board size, role duality, directors' share ownership).
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance mechanisms and to the
corporate governance debate in SA, and indeed Africa as a whole and the rest of the world.
We find that corporate governance mechanisms are related to the suspension of listing from
the JSE. These findings are important due to the attention directed on corporate governance
around the world. In the context of Africa, these results show that the corporate governance
structures implemented in the developed world are important to the corporate sector in
Africa and should be considered seriously. Effective corporate governance structures could
improve the participation of foreign investors on stock exchanges of developing countries.
Our study also contributes to the literature by providing evidence in an African country,
where empirical research on corporate governance at the firm-level is almost non-existent.
While our results are important, they must be interpreted in the light of the following
limitations. First, our sample of 8 1 suspended firms could be considered small, although this is
not unusual in accounting studies of this nature (see for example, Peasnell et al., 2001).
Second, we only examine a small set of corporate governance variables constrained by the
sample size. Third, we do not make a distinction between internal and external block-share
ownership due to data limitations. Further research could address some ofthese limitations by
investigating different settings. For example, research could use a large sample size and
examine the link between corporate governance and measures such as earnings management,
disclosure, and performance. Such research could also distinguish between independent and
non-independent non-executive directors, internal and external block-share ownership and
also examine audit committee characteristics. Additionally, research could extend this study to
other countries given the paucity of studies examining listing suspension internationally.
Finally, other research could evaluate compl iance with the King Report's "inclusive approach"
to corporate governance and the effect of compliance on firm performance.
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Abstract
This study determines whether it is possible to distinguish between conventional and Islamic
banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region on the basis of financial characteristics alone.
Islamic banks operate under different principles, such as risk sharing and the prohibition of interest,
yet both types of banks face similar competitive conditions. The combination of effects makes it
unclear whether financial ratios will differ significantly between the two categories of banks. We
input 26 financial ratios into logit, neural network, and A-means nearest neighbor classification
models to determine whether researchers or regulators could use these ratios to distinguish between
the two types of banks. Although the means of several ratios are similar between the two categories
of banks, non-linear classification techniques (A-means nearest neighbors and neural networks) are
able to correctly distinguish Islamic from conventional banks in out-of-sample tests at about a 92%
success rate.
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1. Introduction
Since the establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975 as the world's first private
interest-free bank, the growth of Islamic banking world-wide has been phenomenal with
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assets under management generally growing at annual rates of 12% to 15% per year.
In Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan the entire banking industry has become Islamic and many
large international banks (e.g., HSBC, BNP Paribus, Commerzbank, and Citicorp) have
introduced Islamic divisions that offer separate Islamic or Sharia-compliant products within
an otherwise conventional banking structure. According to the Institute of Islamic Banking
and Insurance (IIBI) there were 277 Islamic banks and financial institutions operating in
over 70 countries in 2005.' IIBI estimated that Islamic banks managed assets worth about
2004) put the figure at $260 billion. Much of the initial growth in Islamic banking occurred
in South Asia; however, beginning in the 1990s the primary growth area and focus of
Islamic banking shifted to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. 2
Molyneux and Iqbal (2005) estimate that Islamic banks in the GCC region held about 74%
of Islamic banking system assets in 2002. Following the events of September 11, 2001,
a considerable amount of Arab money flowed out of western countries back to the
Middle East. This has further increased the dominance of the GCC region in Islamic
banking world-wide."
The principles guiding Islamic banks are significantly different from those for con-
ventional banks. Islamic banks are organized under and operate upon principles of
Islamic law (the Sharia) which requires risk sharing and prohibits the payment or re-
ceipt of interest (riba). In contrast, conventional banks are guided mainly by the profit-
maximization principle. If the differences between the two types of banks are not just
semantic (as some critics of Islamic finance have maintained), Islamic and conventional
banks should be distinguishable from one another on the basis of financial information
obtained from company balance sheets and income statements. However, since all banks
operate in the same competitive environment and are regulated in the same way in most
countries, it is possible that Islamic and conventional banks display similar financial
characteristics.
A sizeable body of research examines the structure, operation, and management ofbanks
in the GCC region [Turen (1995), Murjan and Ruza (2002), Islam (2003), Essayyad and
Madani (2003)], while another strand of literature explains general Islamic financial
principles to the non-Muslim reader [Siddiqui (1981), Bashier (1983), Khan (1985)]. With
the exception of Karim and Ali (1989) and Rosly and Abu Bakar (2003), researchers have
not examined the financial ratios of Islamic banks. Karim and Ali (1989) suggest that
Islamic banks prefer to obtain funds from depositors rather than shareholders during
expansionary periods in an economy. When combined with the requirement for risk
sharing, return on equity should be higher for Islamic than for conventional banks. Rosly
and Abu Bakar (2003) show that profitability (based upon return on assets, profit margin.
Data are obtained from the Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance website http://www.islamic-banking.
com/ibanking/statusib.php, last updated in 2005 (Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, 1995).
The GCC region consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
3 Hume's (2004) estimate of Islamic bank assets of $260 billion was likely based on 2002 year-end data. At that
time, GCC Islamic bank assets totaled $226 billion, or 87% of all Islamic financial system assets. To further
illustrate the relative size of the GCC Islamic banking industry, Rosly and Abu Bakar (2003) report that the assets
of Islamic banks in Malaysia (one of the initial predominant countries in Islamic banking) totaled [3].9 billion in
2000. In contrast, GCC bank assets in 2000 totaled US$145 billion.
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and net operating margin) was statistically higher for Malaysian Islamic banks during the
period 1996-1999 than for mainstream banks. Operating-efficiency and asset-utilization
ratios were smaller for Islamic banks, suggesting that there may be some financial and
operational differences between banks. However, they point out that in recent years Islamic
banks have chosen to behave more like mainstream banks instead of than strictly following
Sharia principles. In summary, the research to date leaves unresolved the question of
whether Islamic and conventional banks are operationally different outside of South Asia
and whether financial ratios can be used to meaningfully distinguish between the two types
of banks.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether Islamic and conventional banks in
the GCC region are distinguishable from one another on the basis of financial charac-
teristics alone. Specifically, we consider whether researchers or regulators could correctly
categorize a bank as Islamic or conventional using 26 financial ratios. Although many
studies have documented the usefulness ofaccounting information in predicting bankruptcy
and credit rating, no research has been conducted on the potential information value of
accounting data in distinguishing between Islamic and conventional banks.
We collected 237 observations, or bank-years of data, for 141 conventional and 96
Islamic banks operating in the GCC during the period 2000-2005. The sample includes all
GCC banks, but excludes international banks operating in the region. Our within-sample
analysis shows that a logit model distinguishes between conventional and Islamic banks at a
77.2% accuracy rate. Out-of-sample classification rates range from 85.4% (for logit) to
91.7% accuracy for non-linear classification techniques (A-means nearest neighbors and
neural networks).
This study proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on the differences
between Islamic and conventional banks. The GCC banking sector is discussed in Section 3.
Section 4 lists the hypotheses to be tested in this study. Section 5 describes the data and
defines the accounting ratios used in the study. Section 6 presents in-sample results and
interpretations, while Section 7 discusses results for the out-of-sample classification.
Section 8 concludes with a discussion of implications, limitations, and suggestions for
future research.
2. Islamic banking
In general. Islamic banks are governed and guided by Islamic laws (Sharia). Islamic
banks have several distinguishing features. The first and most important feature of
Islamic banks is the prohibition of interest (riba), regardless of its form or source. The
holy book of Islam (the Qui'an) prohibits both the receipt and payment of interest in all
transactions. The rationale is that the credit system involving interest leads to an
inequitable distribution of income in society. Riha is not a payment for taking risks, nor
is it the reward for a constructive activity. However, without some kind of reward.
Islamic banks could not operate. Although Islamic banks cannot charge fixed interest in
advance, they operate by participating in the profit resulting from the use of bank funds.
The concept of interest is replaced by profit and loss sharing, but a mark-up for delayed
payments and trade-financing commissions are allowed under the Islamic banking model.
Although riba is a fundamental concept in Islamic banking. Islamic religious scholars do
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not agree on an exact definition. Iqbal (2006, p. 3) notes that there are three distinct
views of riba:
"(The) Liberal view confines riba to usury only and, thus, does not recommend any
change in the modern financial system in which bank interest plays the pivotal role.
According to mainstream view, riba also includes bank interest. Therefore, it implies
a major restructuring of conventional financial system, though practically interest
has been replaced mainly with mark-up, which is quite similar to interest on
economic grounds. Mainstream jurists also emphasize deepening of capital markets
for the success of emerging interest-free system. (The) Conservative view further
extends the definition of riba to major forms of social injustice like contracting of
subsistence wages and profiteering. This view suggests a radical change in whole
economic system on the lines of Marxian philosophy."
The differing interpretations of riba mean that some Islamic banks may offer products
that other Islamic banks find unacceptable. 4 However, an examination of annual reports
indicates that Islamic banks in the GCC region operate similarly and offer a similar range of
products. Unfortunately, these annual reports do not provide a detailed discussion regarding
how riba is defined for each bank.
A second principle of Islamic banking is risk sharing, meaning that Islamic banks should
operate only using profit/loss sharing arrangements (PLS). The two most popular forms of
PLS are Mudaraba and Musharaka (see the Appendix A for definitions of the various
Islamic financial instruments). Islamic banks receive funds from the investing public on the
basis of Mudaraba (profit sharing). The bank is allowed to use the funds in any activity that
the management feels appropriate, so long as the activities are not forbidden by Islamic
laws/ Islamic banks find borrowers (entrepreneurs) who will use the funds for investments
that are approved by the bank (Musharaka). The entrepreneurs share the profit/loss with the
Islamic bank according to an agreed upon ratio. The bank then pools all profits and losses
from different investments and shares the profit with depositors of funds according to a
predetermined formula. Islamic banks are partners with both depositors and entrepreneurs
and they share risk with both.
Conventional banks use both debt and equity to finance their investments, while Islamic
banks are expected to depend primarily upon equity financing and customers' deposit
accounts, i.e., current, saving, and investment [Karim and Ali (1989)]. 6 The current account is
basically a safekeeping account. It is very similar to such accounts in conventional banks. No
interest is paid to depositors of current accounts. Depositors have instant access to those
accounts and are able to withdraw money any time they wish. Savings deposits are fixed-term
profit-sharing arrangements that cannot be cashed in before maturity date without a substantial
For example, the Sharjah Islamic Bank in the United Arab Emirates views a fixed charge based on the
maximum credit limit as Sharia compliant.
Forbidden activities include, but are not limited to: gambling, production or use of alcohol, and production or
consumption of pork products
" Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) argue that financial realities of the marketplace lead Islamic banks to use short-
term debt instruments so that their capital structure is similar to that of conventional banks. This behavior will
make it more difficult to distinguish between conventional and Islamic banks based on accounting ratios alone.
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penalty. The profit-sharing ratio of the savings-type deposits depends upon future profits, but
expected returns are similar to those of conventional savings deposits of the same maturity.
Islamic banks replace loans with investments that are generally riskier than secured interest-
bearing loans. Nevertheless, as shown in Appendix A, investment vehicles such as Musharaka
and Mudaraba help reduce the risk in Islamic banking. Entrepreneurs wanting funds under these
arrangements must document the feasibility of projects to be undertaken with these funds.
The cost of capital in conventional banks represents the cost of debt and equity. The cost
of capital in Islamic banks is replaced by profit and loss sharing by depositors and equity
holders in Islamic banks. Return on equity is more variable than for conventional banks, but
the default risk of not paying a return to depositors is eliminated under the Islamic banking
model. Nevertheless, the failure to reward depositors could lead to a substantial withdrawal
of deposits and the risk of bankruptcy.
Each Islamic bank in the GCC has established an in-house "Sharia Committee" to ensure
that the Islamic banks' transactions and activities are in compliance with the teaching of Islam
and the Sharia. The Sharia committee consists of individuals who are experts in the Islamic
Figh Almua'malat (Islamic commercial jurisprudence). According to Grais and Pellegrini
(2006, p. 1-2), the Sharia Committee should have five different activities: 1) "certifying
permissible financial instruments through fatwas, 2) verifying that the transactions comply
with issued fatwas, 3) calculating and paying Zakat, 4) disposing of non-5/;«//a-compliant
earnings and, 5) advising on the distribution of income or expenses among shareholders and
investment account holders". The committee also should issue a report to certify that all
financial activities and transactions are in compliance with Sharia principles.
3. The GCC banking industry
The GCC region has a rich history of banking going back to 1918 when the British first
opened a bank in Bahrain [Wilson (1987)]. The GCC banking industry has several features
that make it unique and different from the banking sectors in many other regions. First,
the sector is heavily dependent on oil sector activities. Second, the banking industry's
main lending activities are concentrated in construction, real estate, and consumer loans.
Third, the industry is heavily protected from foreign competition and dominated by the
government. Fourth, banking is one of the largest sectors in GCC economies and there are
more bank stocks traded in GCC stock markets than stocks of any other industry.
Several recent articles have examined the structure and performance ofthe banking industry
in the Middle East. For example, Karim and Ali ( 1 989) investigate the effect ofthe interaction
between environmental (competition) and financial strategies adopted by two Islamic banks
—
Faisal Islamic bank of Sudan and Kuwait Finance House—for the period 1979-1985 They
find that Islamic banks rely more upon depositors as a source of capital during periods of
economic boom and more upon equity financing in less prosperous periods. Islam (2003)
investigates the development and performance ofcommercial banks in Bahrain, Oman, and the
United Arab Emirates for the period 1998-2000. He uses several financial ratios to measure
bank performance and shows that GCC banks perform well relative to western banks. This
occurs even during a period when competition among GCC banks is increasing.
A second line ofresearch focuses on the profitability of the banking sector in one or more
countries. For example, Ahmed and Khababa (1999) study the effects of size, business risk.
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and market concentration on the profitability of 1 1 commercial banks in Saudi Arabia for the
period 1992-1997. They employ a regression model using three measures ofprofitability
—
return on assets, return on equity, and earnings per share—and show that business risk and
size generally explain bank profitability in Saudi Arabia. Murjan and Ruza (2002) examine
the competitiveness of commercial banks in nine Arab countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates). Using a Ross-
Poznan test for the period 1 993- 1 999, their study suggests that the banking industry in those
countries operates under conditions of monopolistic competition. Essayyad and Madani
(2003) examine the concentration, efficiency, and profitability of 10 commercial banks in
Saudi Arabia for the period 1989-2001. Their results indicate that the Saudi Arabian
banking industry is highly concentrated and has a four-firm concentration ratio ranging
between 69% and 87%. They also show that profitability rises with increases in bank
efficiency and that bank profits are positively related to oil revenues. Finally. Al-Tamimi and
Al-Amiri (2003) examine the service quality of two Islamic banks in the United Arab
Emirates (Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank and Dubai Islamic Bank) by distributing questionnaires
to 700 customers. About 350 responses were received and they reveal that customers are
very satisfied with the quality of services received from these banks.
4. Hypotheses to examine
An examination of previous studies, such as Karim and Ali (1989) and Rosly and Abu
Bakar (2003), suggests that GCC Islamic banks may be more profitable than other GCC
banks. However, it may be possible that shareholders in Islamic banks are willing to accept
a lower return on equity. Assuming that the first possibility is more likely, the following
proposition can be tested:
Hypothesis 1. Islamic banks are more profitable than conventional banks.
Based on Rosly and Abu Bakar (2003), we expect Islamic banks to be less efficient than
conventional banks. Also, Yudistira (2003) uses data-envelopment analysis to show that 18
Islamic banks (including a few GCC banks) are slightly less cost efficient than conventional
banks. The inefficiency may be due to lack of economies of scale due to the smaller size of
Islamic banks, or it may arise because customers of Islamic banks are pre-disposed to
Islamic products regardless of cost. The hypothesis is stated as:
Hypothesis 2. Islamic banks are less efficient than conventional banks.
Critics of current Islamic financial practices [e.g., Rosly and Abu Bakar (2003), Meenai
(2000)] suggest that Islamic banks have often just repackaged conventional products based
on semantics. Also, given that Islamic banks operate in the same competitive environment
as conventional banks, it is not clear that the two types of banks can be distinguished from
one another on financial characteristics alone. The testable propositions from this strand
of the literature include:
Hypothesis 3. Financial ratios can be used to distinguish between Islamic and con-
ventional banks in the GCC region over the period 2000-2005.
Hypothesis 4. Linear and non-linear models can be used to distinguish between Islamic
and conventional banks in out-of-sample analysis.
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Table 1
Number of banks in the sample
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total observations
Conventional [3 14 29 29 28 28 141
Islamic 12 14 18 18 IS 16 96
Total 25 28 47 47 46 44 237
Finally, the proposition from the forecasting literature that non-linear models generally
outperform linear models can be tested as follows:
Hypothesis 5. Non-linear techniques better classify banks as Islamic versus conventional
in out-of-sample analysis.
5. Data sources and accounting ratios
5.1. Data
Whenever possible, we downloaded annual reports from the websites of each GCC
bank. Otherwise, data were obtained from the Institute of Banking Studies (Kuwait).
These annual reports contained the income statement, statement of change in stock-
holders' equity, balance sheet, statement of cash flows, and the notes to the financial
statements.
As shown in Table 1, we collected 237 observations, or bank-years of data, for banks
operating in the GCC region for the calendar years 2000-2005. 7 Annual reports prior to
2000 were not readily available electronically and the annual reports for 2006 were not yet
available at the time our research was completed.
There are 141 observations for conventional banks and 96 observations for Islamic
banks. Our sample contains 25 banks (13 conventional and 12 Islamic) for 2000, 28 banks
(14 conventional and 14 Islamic) for 2001, 47 banks (29 conventional and 18 Islamic) in
both 2002 and 2003, 46 banks (28 conventional and 1 8 Islamic) for 2004, and 44 banks (28
conventional and 16 Islamic) for 2005. The data set excludes multinational banks (e.g.,
HSBC, Citicorp, and ABN-Amro) that operate in the GCC region, but includes all other
GCC banks.
5.2. Accounting ratios
Conventional banks in the GCC region have adopted the financial accounting rules
established by the International Accounting Standards Board, previously International
Accounting Standards Committee [Hussain, Islam, Gunasekaran, and Maskooki (2002)],
while Islamic banks use the financial accounting rules established by The Accounting
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). Those accounting
standards are derived from the faith of Islam. Each Islamic bank establishes a Sharia
Fiscal and calendar years for GCC banks are identical.
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committee to monitoi and ensure that all hank transactions arc in compliance with Islamic
laws, rhere are some differences between A A( Ml I standards and IAS standards, such as the
more stringent disclosure requirements imposed on conventional banks and prohibition of
some activities under AAOII standards However, all banks in the GCC region must
eomplv with the accounting rules and regulations of the country of their incorporation.
Since the Central banks in each GCC country have required all banks to follow IAS in
preparing financial statements, it should be possible to make meaningful comparisons
between the accounting ratios of conventional and Islamic banks. Also, comparing data
across these countries should not cause any particular problems.
The 26 financial ratios used in this study are defined in Table 2. They fall into five
general categories: profitability, efficiency, asset quality, liquidity, and risk. Previous
studies of the Middle Eastern banking industry have generally focused on profitability
and bank efficiency. For example. Rosly and Abu Bakar (2003) examine bank profitabil-
ity based upon return on assets (ROA), profit margin (PM). and return on deposits (ROD).
In addition to these ratios, our profitability measures include return on equity (ROE)
and return on shareholder capital (ROSC). Based on previous studies and as stated in
Hypothesis 1. profitability ratios should be higher for Islamic banks.
Demirgue-Kunt and Hi/inga (1999) and Essayyad and Madani (2003) focus on the
following measure of efficiency: interest spread = interest revenues - interest expenses. It
is similar to our net interest margin (NIM) and the interest income to expenses (IEE)
ratio. Other bank efficiency ratios for this study include operating margin (NOM), interest
income to expenses (IEE), operating expense to assets (OEA), operating income to assets
(01A), operating expenses to revenue (OER), asset turnover (ATO), net interest margin
(\1\1). and net non-interest margin (NNIM). From the literature cited above, and as
stated in Hypothesis 2. Islamic banks arc expected to be less efficient than conventional
banks.
1 he asset-quality indicators
—
provisions to earning assets (PEA), adequacy of provision
(as per Table 2) for loan (APL). and the write-off ratio (WRL)—indicate how banks
manage assets. Larger PEA or APL ratios indicate greater reserves for bad loans or
unforeseen emergencies and probably reflect lower risk. However, another possible
explanation could be that banks maintain allowances for loan losses in direct proportion to
expected losses. A priori, we expect that Islamic banks may be riskier than conventional
banks, but we have no strong expectations regarding how the asset-quality ratios vary
between Islamic and conventional banks.
The final five ratios- cash to assets (CTA), cash to deposits (CTD), loans to deposits
(LTD), total liabilities to equity (TLE). and total liabilities to shareholder capital (TLSC)—
are somewhat similar to the asset-quality indicators. If Islamic banks are riskier than
conventional banks, they may hold more cash relative to assets or deposits. Since Islamic
banks do not use debt financing, we would expect shareholder equity to be a larger source
of funds relative to conventional banks. Therefore, TLE and TLSC should be smaller for
Islamic banks.
We examined the notes section of the financial statements to determine whether each bank was in compliance
with IAS The two Islamic banks in Qatar did not complj with IAS prior to 2004, so these observations were
deleted from the sample
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Table 2
Definitions of 26 financial ratios
Bank profitability ratios
I. ROA = return on assets = NI'ATA = net income average total assets
2 ROE = return on equity =NI/SE = net income average stockholders' equity
3. PM = profit margin = NI/ 01 = net income operating income
4. ROD = retum on deposits = NI ATD=net income average total customer deposits
5. ROSC = return on shareholder capital = NI SC = net income /shareholder contributed capital
6. NOM = net operating margin = 01/ IN = operating profit or income / interest income
Bank efficiency ratios
7. IEE = interest income to expenses = (IN-IE| ATLA = (interest income - interest expenses) average total
loans and advances
8. OEA = operating expense to assets = OE'ATA=operating expenses /average total assets
9. OIA = operating income to assets = OI ' ATA = operating income average total assets
10. OER = operating expenses to revenue =OE/OI = operating expenses operating income (revenue)
II. ATO= asset turnover= IN /ATA = interest income /average total assets
12. NIM = net interest margin = (IN -IE)/ATA = (net interest income -net interest expenses ) average total assets
13. NNIM = net non-interest margin = (NIN - NIE) ATA = (net non-interest income - net non-interest expenses
)
average total assets
Asset-quality indicators
14. PEA = provision to earning assets=PLL/ATLA= provision for loan losses average total loans and advances
15. APL = adequacy of provision for loans =ALL ATLA = allowance for loan losses at the end of the year-
average total loans and advances
16. WRL = write-off ratio =WR ATLA = write-off of loans during the year average total loans and advances
17. LR = loan ratio=ATLA/ATA = average total loans and advances average total assets
18. LTD = loans to deposits = ATLA ATD = average total loans and advances average total customer deposits
Liquidity ratios
19. CTA=cash to assets=C / ATA = cash average total assets
20 CTD=cash to deposits =C ATD = cash average total customer deposits
Risk ratios
21. DTA = deposits to assets = ATD / ATA = average total customer deposits average total assets
22. EM = equity multiplier= ATA SE = average total assets average stockholders' equity
23. ETD = equity to deposits = SE ;ATD=average shareholders' equity /average customer total deposits
24. TLE = total liabilities to equity =TLSE = average total liabilities/average stockholders' equity
25. TLSC = total liabilities to shareholder capital = TL/SC= average total liabilities shareholder contributed
capital
26. RETA = retained earnings to total assets = RE ' ATA = retained earnings average total assets
Averages for any variable are the beginning of period value plus the end of period value divided by two. They are
defined the same way for both conventional and Islamic banks.
Net income for Islamic banks is conventional net income before taxes, plus Zakat.
Interest income and expenses are replaced by commission income and expenses for Islamic banks. Similarly.
investments in Mudaraba, Murabaha. and Musharaka are equivalent to loans and advances.
We have not yet explained how certain ratios are calculated for Islamic banks. Turen
(1995, p. 12) provides an excellent explanation of the differences between Islamic banks
and conventional banks. He suggest that "(T)he risk level of an Islamic bank is the
combined effect of the three new statutes governing the operations of the institutions,
namely deposit holders are replaced by equity holders, interest payments to depositors
are converted into profit and loss sharing and loans to customers are transformed into
capital participation". Most variables are defined the same way for both categories ofbanks.
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However, net income for Islamic banks includes conventional net income before taxes,
plus Zakat, which is a tax on idle wealth.
9
Interest income and expenses are replaced
by commission income and expenses. Finally, investments in Mudaraba, Murabaha, and
Musharaka are essentially equivalent to loans and advances and are treated that way in
calculating the financial ratios.
6. In-sample results and interpretation
6.1. Descriptive statistics
To begin the investigation of whether Islamic and conventional banks can be dis-
tinguished from one another on the basis of their financial characteristics. Table 3 presents
descriptive statistics for both types of banks. The last column of the table shows the
results of a f-test for equality of means between the Islamic and conventional group of
banks for each of the 26 financial ratios. The test statistic and degrees of freedom are
calculated assuming unequal, rather than equal, population variances because the var-
iances of about a third of the financial ratios are more than twice as large for one group of
banks than the other group. 10 Overall, 10 ratios have means that are statistically different
between the two types of banks. The mean values for ROA, NOM, ATO, and RETA
are significantly different at the 10% level between the two types of banks, while the
means of four ratios (ROE, NOM, ATO, and RETA) are also significantly different at the
5% level.
Consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 1, the six profitability ratios confirm the
work of previous authors that Islamic banks are more profitable than conventional banks.
For example, Rosly and Abu Bakar (2003) reported higher ROA for Islamic banks. In
this study the ROA of 2.4% for Islamic banks versus 2.0% for conventional banks is
significantly larger at the 10% level. ROE averages 18.2% annually for Islamic banks
versus 14.4% for conventional banks. The difference is significant at the 1% level. Karim
and Ali (1989, p. 193) state that Islamic banks "opt for an increase in investment deposits
rather than equity capital to fund their investments" under conditions of "high strategic
choice". During the financial boom experienced in the GCC in recent years, it makes sense
for Islamic banks to rely more upon deposits than equity. This explains the higher ROE for
Islamic banks. Another measure of profitability, the net operating margin (NOM), is more
Zakat is a mandatory religious levy imposed on all Muslims beginning with the year 624 AD. It is still in use
today and can be imposed at a 2.5% annual rate on idle wealth above some threshold level.
The test statistic (/) is approximately the same as for the simpler case of equal variance where both samples are
assumed to come from the same population. Hence, t =
v
' (r; I',)^,.,) , where jc, and x2 are the means of a financial
ratio for Islamic banks (group 1 ) and for conventional banks (group 2), 5, and s2 denote standard deviations, and
n, and n 2 are the number of observations for each group of banks. Degrees of freedom for the test statistic are
adjusted downward and critical values increase as the difference between the variances of the two samples
increases. Degrees of freedom (<//) are calculated as:
df : (n/"i
+s\/n2 )
2
(*?/«,) /(«,-!) + (4/»2) /(n2 - 1)
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for the 26 financial ratios
Variable N Mean Standard deviation Mest for equality
of means
Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic (-value /'-value
ROA 141 96 .020 .024 .016 .016 1.S89-1 .06
ROE 141 96 .144 .182 .106 095 2.883b .004
PM 141 96 .553 .526 .366 .333 -.589 .278
ROD 141 96 .037 .046 .039 .049 1.504 .234
ROSC 141 96 .464 .459 .413 .305 -.107 .903
NOM 141 96 1.064 2.415 1 044 3.993 3.241 b .002
IEE 141 96 061 .074 .144 .151 663 .508
OEA 141 96 .021 .024 .022 .024 .977 .331
OlA 141 96 .044 .050 .027 .029 1.608 11
OER 141 96 .486 .477 .319 .173 -.28 .309
ATO 141 96 .057 .040 .085 .017 -2.308b .022
NIM 141 96 034 .024 .074 .014 -1.564 .121
NNIM 141 96 -Oil .002 .077 .021 1.903a .055
PEA 126 75 .012 .009 .016 .007 -1.831" .069
APL 126 75 .084 .064 .098 .060 -1.795a .074
WRL 126 75 .011 .010 .024 .022 -.301 .764
LR 141 96 .527 .52 .203 .215 -.252 .801
LTD 141 96 .859 1 .032 .215 901 1.846a .068
CTA 141 96 .070 .060 .068 .062 -1.172 .243
CTD 141 96 .115 .157 .109 .317 1.249 214
DTA 141 96 .629 .639 .271 .196 .33 .743
EM 141 96 7.741 8.469 3.192 3.499 1.629 .105
ETD 141 96 .298 .332 .306 .402 .702 .239
TLE 141 96 6.755 6.833 3.000 3.743 .17 .864
TLSC 141 96 19.314 16.149 10.880 9.146 -2 42 h 016
RETA 141 96 .017 .007 .025 Oil -4.191" .000
The /-test for equality of means is based on the mean for Islamic banks minus that of conventional banks for each
financial ratio. The test is calculated assuming unequal sample variances.
J
Denotes significance at the 10% level.
Denotes significance at the 5% level.
than twice as large for Islamic banks relative to conventional banks and the difference is
significant at the 1% level.
Efficiency ratios differ somewhat between the types ofbanks, but not as dramatically as the
profitability ratios. The means oftwo efficiency ratios are significantly different between types
of banks. Asset turnover (ATO). which is interest or commission income divided by average
total assets, is significantly smaller for Islamic banks at the 5% level. The net non-interest
margin (NNDVl) is significantly larger for Islamic banks at the 10% level. These results occur
because conventional banks are dependent upon interest income earned on loans, while
Islamic banks are less dependent upon the Islamic equivalent fees and commissions. Islamic
banks obtain a larger portion of net income from non-interest equivalent sources.
The asset-quality indicators reveal some additional differences between Islamic and
conventional banks. The PEA (provision for loan loss divided by total loans) and APL
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(allowance for loan loss divided by total loans) ratios are significantly smaller at the 10°o
level for Islamic banks. Com entional hanks maintain higher reserves for loan losses, but
the interpretation is unclear. For example, [jara and \ anous Islamic leaseback schemes ma>
involve less risk than coin entional loans, so less resen e is needed. Alternatively, Islamic
banks may be operating with greater risk because they maintain smaller contingency
resen es for bad loan-like products.
The liquidity rarios are not significantly different between types of banks, but Islamic
banks keep more cash relative to deposits and less relative to assets than conventional
banks. In contrast, the risk ratios indicate some important differences in operational
characteristics. Islamic banks extend more loans or equivalents relative to deposits (LTD)
than conventional banks. The difference is significant at the 10% level and may suggest
greater risk for Islamic banks. Total liabilities to shareholder capital (TLSC) are sig-
nificantly smaller at the 2°o level for Islamic banks-perhaps because of the greater reliance
upon initial shareholder capital in Islamic banks. This makes the denominator larger and the
TLSC ratio smaller for Islamic banks. By itself, this ratio suggests that Islamic banks are
less risk} than conventional banks. The retained earnings to total assets ratio (RETA) has
the largest /-statistic for any of the ratios. It is statistically smaller for Islamic banks at
the .1% level. Islamic banks tend to distribute profits rather than retain them. In contrast to
the TLSC ratio. RETA suggests that Islamic banks may be nskier than com entional banks
Finally, note that the equity multiplier (EM) is larger for Islamic than for conventional
banks, but only significant at the 10.5% level. Since ROE =ROA x EM. this ratio illustrates
that Islamic banks use deposits as a type ofleverage to achieve a higher ROE. Higher equity
multipliers suggest higher risk, but this type of leverage means the risk is also shared with
depositors. The risk is reflected in a higher (but not statistically significant) return on
deposits (ROD) for Islamic banks. Even though Islamic banks do not raise capital with
debt, they may be riskier than conventional banks. Greater risk may explain the higher
profitability of Islamic banks.
6.2. Logii model
To further explore the relationship berw een the financial ratios for the two types ofbanks.
we run a logistic regression (logit) using the 26 financial ratios for all 237 observations in the
data set. The dependent variable to be predicted is a categorical variable taking on the value of
one for an Islamic bank and zero for a com entional bank. Some of the 26 variables are not
significant in distinguishing berw een type of bank, and some combinations of variables are
highly correlated with one another.'" Recognizing and adjusting for possible problems with
We examined the annual reports of Islamic banks and found no presence of Cash Waqfs. WaqJ is the locking
up of the title of an owned asset. A Waql asset cannot be disposed of and its ownership cannot be transferred Its
benefits are to be used for a specific purpose(s). which are mainly charitable in nature. Waqt is common in other
Islamic countries, such as Bangladesh. Indonesia, and Pakistan.
.ample, since net interest income plus net non-interest income equals net income, only one of the almost
perfectly collinear variables i\TM or NN'IM) can be included in any single logit regression model. Similarly, the
operating-income portion of PM. OIA. and OER creates problems when all three variables are included in any
single model.
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multicolinearity of variables, stepwise logit is used to form a parsimonious predictive model
that shows the probability (P,) from zero to one that a given bank (/'= 1. 2_... 237) is Islamic
rather than conventional For the 26 possible financial ratios 0=1, 2. 26). stepwise logit
selects the n statistically significant ratios or variables (I,) that help to distinguish between the
two categories of banks. At each observation, the logit probabilities are represented by:
Log\Pi/il-Pi)] = a + Y?j=l Pjrj-i (1)
where 3 is the constant term, and the f>} terms are the slope coefficients in the estimated logit
model.
The best explanatory model was selected using a variant of stepwise logit contained in
the XL Data Miner software An exhaustive search was performed across all combinations
of variables to find the best one-variable model, then the best two-variable model, etc. up to
the best 24-vanable model (inclusion of more than 24 variables led to estimation prob-
lems due to the presence of multicolinearity). Each of these 24 models was selected by
maximizing the log of the likelihood function. Then, these models were compared with the
results of backward and forward elimination using a 5% cutoff rule within stepwise logit.
'
Multicolinearity was deemed to be a problem if the addition ofa significant new variable to
a model noticeably reduced the explanatory power of a previously included variable; or
when working downward from large models, if the deletion of one significant variable
caused a previously significant variable to lose its significance. Forward and backward
elimination and comparison of the results from an exhaustive search eventually led to
following five-variable explanatory model:
Bank = +8. 17ROE +2.27OEA -49.54PEA -0.62TLSC- 10.08RETA+e. I
-
The /-statistics are shown in parentheses below their respective coefficients, subscripts for
individual banks (/) are omitted, and e is the error term for the regression. The success rate,
or classification accuracy, for this model is 77.2% (LLF = - 133.5). 14 These results are
consistent with Hypothesis 3—that financial ratios can be used to distinguish between
Islamic and conventional banks.
All coefficients m this five-variable model have the expected sign. The positive
coefficient for ROE confirms expectations that Islamic banks are more profitable and
therefore, reward shareholders with higher returns than conventional banks. Thi-
supports Hypothesis 1 . The positive coefficient for OEA confirms that operating expenses
to assets are higher for Islamic banks—supporting Hypothesis 2. The negative sign for PEA
reflects the smaller reserves for loan losses in Lslamic banks. This may suggest that Islamic
banks take on greater risk by maintaining smaller contingency funds for possible losses on
' Ignoring multicolinearity- and working upward from a one-variable model or downward from a 24-variable
model using a 5% cutoff rule leads to a 14-variable model with all coefficients significant at the 1% level. The
LLF = -86.5 and the in-sample classification rate is 88.2%. The variables included were ROE. ROA IEE. OEA.
OIA. ATO. CTA. CTD. ROSC. MM. PM. DTA. TLSC. and RET.A
No variables in this model are more than 28% correlated with one another. Allowing 50% correlations yields a
6-vanable model with an 80% in-sample classification rate.
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loan-like products. Alternatively, although perhaps less likely, lower reserves may reflect
lower probabilities of default for Islamic products. The negative sign on TLSC (which is
total liabilities relative to shareholder capital) arises because of the lack of debt financing in
Islamic banks. By itself, this ratio suggests that Islamic banks are less risky than
conventional banks because of their reliance on shareholder capital. Finally, the negative
coefficient on RETA arises because Islamic banks generally pay higher dividends to
shareholders and do not maintain high levels of retained earnings. It suggests that Islamic
banks may be riskier than conventional banks in the GCC.
7. Out-of-sample models and results
The true test of predictive power for any model should be based on out-of-sample
forecasting ability. That is, any classification model should be judged on the basis of the
success that it has when presented with new data that has not already been used to optimize
the in-sample classification rate. Most models perform noticeably worse out-of-sample than
within sample.
A substantial body of literature suggests that non-linear forecasting models outperform
linear techniques. For example, a survey article by Krishnaswamy, Gilbert, and Pashley
(2000) indicates that neural networks have enjoyed considerable success in forecasting
stock prices, currency movements, interest rate changes, and in developing trading systems.
Neural networks have performed particularly well in classification exercises such as
identifying financially distressed firms, for mimicking bond-rating classifications, or in
distinguishing good and bad credit risks. Similarly, Knez and Ready (1996) have shown
that non-linear, non-parametric regression techniques (such as kernel regression) out-
perform linear regression in certain situations. However, the superiority of non-linear
techniques has been refuted in some forecasting studies. Olson and Mossman (2001), for
example, find that linear regression performed better out-of-sample than either non-
parametric regression or neural networks.
The most common method of evaluating forecasting models is to divide the data set into
a training, or in-sample set of observations, and to use the remainder of the data as an out-
of-sample, or testing set. The forecasting model is optimized on the training data and tested
on the out-of-sample data. This procedure provides fair evaluations for linear forecasting
techniques, but not for non-linear methods in some situations. Neural networks and some
other non-linear techniques often suffer from problems of overfitting. The models can
usually be made complicated enough and trained long enough to obtain 100% within-
sample classification accuracy, but such overfitted models generally have little predictive
power out-of-sample. Numerous techniques exist to avoid overfitting—such as randomly
sampling blocks of data, stopping the convergence algorithms at higher levels of tolerance,
re-introducing error or bias after some specified number of iterations, limiting the number
of iterations, etc. Researchers often adopt one or more of these methods, but the problem is
that the training set usually provides little guidance as to which method to use.
Perhaps the best procedure for evaluating competing non-linear forecasting models is to
divide the data set into three separate groups of observations—a training set, a validation
set, and a testing set. Models are initially optimized on the training set and then applied to
the validation data. Feedback errors from the validation data set are used to recalibrate the
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parameters of the classification model. After the various models are optimized on the
validation data, the best of each type of model (e.g.. neural nets, nearest neighbors, or logit)
is compared to the other models using the testing data set. This procedure truly provides
out-of-sample tests of classification models.
In this paper, we randomly selected 50% of the 237 observations for the training data and
30% of the observations for the validation sample. Classification accuracy and model
comparisons are made using the remaining 20% of the observations. Experimentation by
randomly selecting 20% of the observations for the validation set and 30% for the testing set
led to nearly the same results as presented below.
7.1. Neural network models
A feed-forward back propagation neural network can be constructed for the same
classification problem shown in Eq. (1). The neural network corresponding to Eq. (2) can
be represented by
Bank, = a + £"
=| <t>hF(yh + £"=| j^V,) + e,-, (3)
where H is the total number of hidden units or neurons in the hidden layer between inputs
and outputs, yh are input threshold terms, fthj are weights from the data inputs to the hidden
layer, and the
<f> h parameters are weights from the hidden layer to the output layer. Non-
linearities are introduced by passing the financial-ratio variables through a hyperbolic
tangent-transformation function, as represented by F(). Denoting z = (ih + E"=i fty*>-ij in
Eq. (3), the hyperbolic transformation or activation function is F(z) = (e
:
-e
: )l(e: + e~ : ).
By iterating within sample and examining the error terms in Eq. (3), the neural network
readjusts the input weights (p]y ) and output weights (
/
h ) to maximize the classification rate
for classification models.
7.2. k-means nearest neighbors
The A--means nearest neighbor clustering algorithm is a non-linear, non-parametric
technique that essentially clusters together banks with similar financial characteristics. It
can be thought of as the categorical equivalent of the nearest neighbor regression technique,
which itself is similar to the kernel density non-parametric regression model. The A'-means
nearest neighbor classification algorithm selects scaling factors and pairs each data point
with one or more observations in the training set in order to minimize the Euclidian distance
function between any two banks (or groups of banks). This distance function is denoted by
d(Bank„BankA ) and the goal is:
Mir nize rf(Bank„ Bank;) =
x }] I], - (l/K)^ vjk\ (4 )
The function being minimized is a weighted average of the differences between the financial
ratios of Bank, and one or more other banks labeled as Bank*. V
tJ
represents one of the /;
financial ratios for Bank,, Vik represents the same ratio for bank k within a group of A' nearest
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neighbors. Finally, w,- is a weighting function for the importance of financial variable Vjk . The
values for w,- and the number of the K nearest neighbors is first optimized for the training set
and then recalibrated based upon maximizing the classification rates for the validation data.
7.3. Out-of-sample results
Each type of classification model was trained and then optimized on the validation data.
For out-of-sample tests, multicolinearity of variables is not a major problem unless it leads
to overfitting and poor generalization ability. Judging logit models based upon performance
in the validation sample, models with between 10 and 17 variables performed similarly. The
best model was obtained using a 10% cutoff rule in the training set, and led to the inclusion
of 15 variables. The best logit model achieved an in-sample classification rate of 87.3%,
85.9% for the validation data, and 85.4% (error rate= 14.6%) for the out-of-sample test
data.
' 5
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, a linear classification model can be used to categorize
banks as Islamic or conventional in an out-of-sample test.
Non-linear techniques performed similarly among one another for between 1 2 and 20
input variables. The best neural network model consisted of 15 input variables. The data
were normalized and the best back propagation model consisted of 25 nodes in each of two
hidden layers, with iterations stopped after 1000 epochs. It classified correctly 98.3% of the
training data and 90.1% of the validation data. Out-of-sample, the classification rate for the
testing data was 91.7% (error rate = 8.3%).
The best A'-means nearest neighbors model selected K= 1 as the optimal number of
nearest neighbors. It achieved an in-sample classification rate of 100% and 93.0% for the
validation data. Out-of-sample, its classification rate was the same as for the best neural
network model—91.7% (error rate=8.3%). In general, the A'-means classifier should be
preferred to the neural network classifier because it is much easier to use. It only needs to be
run once, whereas the neural network model may have to be run 1 to 20 times with various
parameter values to find the best model. Even then, the best neural network model only just
matches the performance of the A--means nearest neighbor classifier.
To determine whether the classification rates for the A-means, neural network, and logit
models are statistically significant, a directional accuracy test developed by Pesaran and
Timmermann (1992) is employed. The Pesaran-Timmermann (PT) statistic is based on the
percentage of correctly classified items minus the percentage correctly classified by chance
alone scaled by the difference in variances of these proportions. In the limit, as the number
of forecasts made (N) tends to infinity, the PT statistic is normally distributed with mean
zero and variance one. The PT statistic is given by:
PT=
,
{P ~ P* ]
(5)
V[var(p)- var (/?*)]
We also examined the forecasting performance of two models not expected to outperform their relative linear
and non-linear counterparts. Linear discriminant analysis (DA) provided an out-of-sample classification rate of
.2% for the best 15-variable model, versus 85.4% for logit. The best non-linear classification and regression
tree (CART) model yielded an out-of-sample classification rate of 87.5%, versus 93.7% for both the neural
network and the A-means models.
var(/?) =-p*(l- p*)/N and
var(p*) = (2Pi -1)>2(1 ~/>2 )//V + [lp
+4p 1^2(1 ~P l)(l - P2)/N2 .
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For this statistic, p is the proportion of times that the sign of the forecast is correct, or
in our case, the percentage of times that a bank was correctly classified. The proportion of
forecasts that would be correct due to chance alone \sp*=p\p2 +( 1 -p\)(\ ~p2 ), where /;>| is
the proportion oftimes that a bank is actually Islamic in the test data and/;2 is the proportion
of times that the bank is forecast to be Islamic. Similarly, the notation (1 -/>|) and (1 -p2 )
refers to actual and forecasted proportions for conventional banks. Sample variances are
obtained assuming that the number of correct sign predictions follows a binomial dis-
tribution, so that:
iyPi (l-pi)/N
The PT statistics are 4.63 for either of the non-linear techniques and 3.82 for the logit
classification model. Based on a one-tail test, the PT statistics are significant at the l"o
significance level. These statistics support Hypothesis 4, indicating that accounting ratios
can be used in new out-of-sample data to meaningfully distinguish between Islamic and
conventional banks in the GCC region.
Following Coats and Fant ( 1 993), a test of proportions can be used to determine whether
the forecasting accuracy of one classification model is significantly better than that of
another. Denoting pKM as the percentage of test cases correctly forecasted by A-means, pL
as the percentage of sample observations correctly identified by logit, and PL and PKM as
population proportions, the null hypothesis is that the population proportion correctly
forecasted by A-means is no larger than the proportion forecast correctly by logit, or that:
H(>: Pl^^rm-
A one-tailed test oftwo sample proportions is normally distributed and the test statistic is:
,_ (pkm~Pl)-0
4'-
(/'KM ( I -/'kSlV'LC
-A.))
N
The Z-statistic for A-means versus logit difference in proportions classified is .97. It is
not significant at even the 10% level. With only 48 out-of-sample observations, the
classification rate of 91.7% for A'-means or neural networks versus 85.4% for logit may
be important, but it is not statistically significant. 16 Our results provide mild support for
Hypothesis 5—that non-linear techniques are better classifiers than linear models. How-
ever, non-linear classification techniques do not significantly outperform the best linear
model in distinguishing between Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC region in out-
of sample tests. 17
If the same proportions between A-means and logit prevailed as sample size increased, an out-of-sample data
set of at least 144 observations would be needed to say that non-linear techniques out perform logit at the 5%
significance level. Also, relative to the 79.2% classification rate for the linear discnminant-analysis model (which
is known to not perform as well as logit). both A-mean nearest neighbors and neural network models provide
classification rates that are significantly better at the 5°o level- consistent with Hypothesis 5.
However, if logit is replaced by the older and the slightly inferior technique of linear discriminant analysis. Hypothesis
5 is supported. The classification rates for both A-mean nearest neighbors and neural network models relative to the 79.2%
classification rate for the linear discnminant-analysis model are significantly better at the 5% level.
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8. Summary and conclusion
The empirical results of this study indicate that measures of bank characteristics such as
profitability ratios, efficiency ratios, asset-quality indicators, and cash/liability ratios are
good discriminators between Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC region. Such
findings are consistent with the literature on corporate failure, credit rating, and assessment
of risk that also shows that accounting numbers are useful for classifying firms within
the same industry into two or more categories based on financial characteristics. Thus,
accounting information is useful not just in developed economies, but also in the de-
veloping countries of the GCC region.
An initial glance at the data reveals that most accounting ratios are similar for Islamic
and conventional banks. This result seems logical since both types of banks operate in the
same industry in the same region of the world. It is consistent with central-bank regulations
in the GCC region that impose similar regulations on all banks. For example, financial-
reporting rules and the Basel capital requirements are the same for all banks. Nevertheless,
some financial characteristics of Islamic banks are different from those of conventional
banks. The best logit model correctly classified about five out of every six banks in out-of-
sample tests, while non-linear classification technique correctly classified a bank as Islamic
or conventional in about 11 out of every 12 cases.
Results from our classification models imply that the operational characteristics of the
two types of banks may be different. Islamic banks are more profitable than conventional
banks, but probably not quite as efficient. Some of the higher profitability of Islamic banks
may be due to risk, while the remainder may be due to the greater reliance on deposits
for providing capital. Islamic banks voluntarily hold more cash relative to deposits than
conventional banks due to the risk of withdrawal of deposits, but they also maintain lower
provisions for possible loan losses (or losses from Ijara leasing and investments for Islamic
banks) than conventional banks. Favorable economic conditions in the GCC since the
advent of Islamic banking may have masked the unique risks faced by Islamic banks. If
these banks are indeed riskier, they may need more careful monitoring and perhaps should
be subject to different capital requirements than conventional banks. Such views have
also been expressed by Ainley (2000) in "A Central Bank's View of Islamic Banking"
where he notes that Islamic banks deal in new and unfamiliar forms of finance where
assets are long-term and illiquid. In response, regulators may need to impose higher
capital requirements on Islamic banks
—
particularly during the early years of Islamic bank
operations.
Each Islamic bank must currently establish a Sharia committee to ensure that it
complies with Islamic principles; however, these individual committees do not ensure that
Islamic banks as a group have prepared for the risks unique to Islamic banking. There
may be a role for central banks in the region to monitor Islamic banks separately from
conventional banks and to adopt specific regulations for Islamic banks. For example,
the central bank could establish a Sharia committee within an Islamic division to ensure
Sharia compliance nation-wide, and to advise banks on modes, procedures, law, and
regulations for Islamic banking. The central bank might arrange for an accounting firm
to conduct SVfan'a-compliant audits of Islamic banks, and to create a Sharia audit manual.
Flexible, but differential, regulation may increase the confidence of depositors and investors
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in Islamic banks, provide proper asset/liability management incentives, and maintain fi-
nancial stability in the GCC banking industry in the future.
The limitations of our study include the following. We did not include market-related
variables in distinguishing between Islamic and conventional banks. More and more GCC
banks are becoming publicly traded, so future research could incorporate market-based
accounting ratios to distinguish between types ofbanks. Another problem, common to most
prediction studies, is that the selection of the variables was not based on any economic
theory. Although this study considered six years of data, the time period of analysis is still
relatively short and only involves years during an economic boom in the GCC region.
As the Islamic banking sector matures, and given that 2006 and 2007 have witnessed
the possible bursting of a stock market bubble in the region, results might change as more
years of data are collected. Also, the scope of the analysis could be broadened to consider
banks in other Muslim countries and to make comparisons between Islamic banks across
countries. Finally, it would be interesting to examine whether the financial ratios presented
in this paper could be used for risk assessment, forecasting bank profitability, or providing
early warning signals of banking problems in various countries.
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Appendix A: Islamic investment vehicles
Mudaraba
An Islamic bank provides funds to a borrower (entrepreneur) who has ideas and
expertise to use the funds in productive activities. Profit is shared between the two parties
based on an agreed upon ratio. Loss is borne by the provider of the funds—in this case the
Islamic bank. The bank is a passive partner.
Musharaka
An Islamic bank provides part of the equity plus working capital for a specific project
and shares in profits and/or losses. The bank provides the funds and becomes an active, or
management partner. An Islamic bank finances the purchase of goods or commodities in
return for a share in the profits realized. Specifications are provided by the purchaser.
Murabaha
An Islamic bank buys an asset on behalf of its client and then sells the same asset to its
client after adding a mark-up to the purchase price.
Ijara
The Islamic bank purchases a piece of equipment selected by the entrepreneur and then
leases it back to him; he pays a fixed fee.
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Ijara wa iktina
The transaction resembles Ijara, except that the client is committed to purchase the
equipment at the end of the rental period.
But ui salam
A contract for sale of goods where the price is paid in advance and the goods are
delivered in the future.
Istisnu
A contract to acquire goods on behalf of a third party. The price is paid to the
manufacturer in advance and the goods are produced and delivered at a later date.
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Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to show the origin, growth and practice of accounting in Iran
plus analysis of influential factors such as financial markets, tax policies, privatization, membership
in the World Trade Organization, foreign investment, and legal systems. Documents of ancient Iran
show that in 550 B.C. (Achaemenid era), all records of public revenues and costs were kept soundly
and with remarkable accuracy. These documents display the relentless progress and development of
accounting in Iran up until now (pre-Islamic era, post-Islamic era, and contemporary era). Dunng the
past two decades, various measures have been adopted to promote and advance accounting in Iran
via harmonizing the domestic accounting practices with International norms and standards. Although
Iran has employed International Accounting Standards as the basis for developing its National
Accounting Standards, there are still some differences between Iranian and international standards,
and there are some certain International Accounting Standards that are not applicable in Iran. A host
of endemic factors, such as existing laws and rules, religious beliefs, culture, economic and political
conditions, have influenced the National Accounting Standards setting processes.
© 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Recent improvements in information and financial technology have focused attention on
the ideas of global business strategy and alliances. How well the outside world understands
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the business practices of a particular country could determine the difference between a
successful and a failed outcome—especially if the country is an emerging economy such as
Iran (Ashraf& Ghani, 2005). An essential part of this understanding is to determine how a
country's business entities measure, summarize, and finally report their economic
transactions to their stakeholders. This paper focuses on the origin and development of
accounting in Iran with emphasis on the factors that have influenced accounting disclosures
and practices.
Earlier research focused on the development, variety, and classification of accounting
practices of different groups of countries. ' A recent review of the accounting literature
reveals that the level of economic development, the nature of business enterprises and their
relationship with providers of capital, political and economic ties, legal system (common
vs. code law), tax laws, inflation levels, and level of education, are important environmental
factors that influence accounting practices."'
Islamic nations have been mostly left out of the research on accounting development
(Meek & Thomas, 2000). This study contributes to the literature by focusing on the
development of accounting in Iran, an Islamic Republic with a long history in accounting
and auditing. Because of its natural resources and new petrochemicals industries, for
example, Iran also offers ample investment opportunity to foreign investors who wish to
diversify their risks by investing in capital markets of other countries.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on social and economic indexes in
Iran. The paper next presents a history of accounting in Iran (Section 3) followed by a look
at the factors affecting the development of accounting in Iran (Section 4) including financial
markets, tax policies, privatization, membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and foreign investment. The history of accounting standards and the current standard-
setting processes in Iran is discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Islamic Republic of Iran — an introduction
Iran, a nation of more than 69 million people, is situated in west Asia, in a region
commonly referred to as the Middle East. Geographically, Iran's surface area is
1.648,195 km. Iran is a country with rich resources of oil and gas and other natural
reserves. However, it is considered a developing country. In recent decades, Iran's
population has been growing at an alarming rate and Table 1 shows the population and its
growth from 1978 to 2006.
The majority of Iran's population lives in urban areas, and relies on an oil-based
economy. Wheat, rice and date are the main agricultural products. At the time of the 1 979
Islamic revolution, Iran had already enjoyed almost two decades of rapid economic growth
as well as huge changes in her social structures. The country attracted a number of
multinational companies, some of which were listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).
After the Islamic revolution, Iran changed course considerably and established new social.
Such as DaCosta, Bourgeois, & Larson. 1978; Doupnik, 1987; Frank. 1979; Nair & Frank, 1980.
2 Such as Doupnik & Salter, 1995; Gemon & Meek, 2001; Meek & Saudagaran, 1990; Mueller, 1967.
3 The World Bank defines a "developing country" as one whose average per capita income did not exceed US S
9266 in 1999.
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Table 1
Panel A: Iran's population growth rates (in millions). Panel B: Population and population growth rate in Iran
(in thousands)
Panel A: Iran's population growth from 1978 through 2006
Year Population (in thousands) Growth Year Population (in thousands) Growth
1978 36,332
1979 37,730
1980 39,192
1981 40,718
1982 42,313
1983 43.979
1984 45,721
1985 47.541
1986 49.445
1987 50,650
1988 51,890
1989 53.167
1990 54,483
1991 55,837
1992 56,656
.038 1992 56.656
.038 1993 57,488
.038 1994 58,331
.039 1995 59.187
.039 1996 60.055
.039 1997 60.937
.039 1998 61,831
.040 1999 62.738
.040 2000 63,658
.040 2001 64,592
.024 2002 65.540
.024 2003 66,480
.025 2004 67,410
.025 2005 68,018
.015 2006 69,000
.015
.015
.015
.015
.015
.015
015
.015
.015
.015
.015
.015
.014
.010
.014
Panel B: Iran 's population during 1978-2006
80000
70000
In thousands
60000
50000
40000
30000
.
*
p*^
.'
1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Source: The site of Iranian's statistics information (http://www.sci.org.ir).
economic, and political structures. The overthrow of the Shah's government and the
installation of the Islamic Republic of Iran reflect instabilities in the direction of political
power. Under the Islamic system, Iran's government focused its policy on achieving the
multiple objectives of social justice, modernization, and Islamic institutions.
Gross national product (GNP) has increased during the last quarter of the past decade
(excluding changes in oil prices). However, if one considers oil prices, there is no increase
in GNP. Table 2 shows the related process after the Islamic revolution.
Because of its special economic structure, foreign trade has always been one of the most
important components of economic development in Iran. The people in charge of Iran's
economy have been trying to balance foreign export and import figures for years, but there
has been no agreement on a single plan for balancing foreign trade. Ever since the discovery
of oil in Southern Iran, a reduction of the country's dependence on "black gold" and an
increase of non-oil exports has been the subject of much debate and discussion. Numerous
plans have been proposed to that end. Although the foreign trade balance has been in deficit
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Table 2
Gross National Product (GNP) during last quarter from 19K0 201)5. In constant Rials- in billion Rials
Year GNP"
(without oil)
GNP-" Growth%
GNPa (without oil) GNPJ
1980 166.022 219,191 2.6 -7.4
1981 209.919 209,919 1.6 -4.2
1982 178.149 178,149 -2.4 -15.1
1983 170.281 170,281 -5.3 -4.4
1984 191.667 191.667 1.9 12.6
1985 212,786 212,786 129 11.1
1986 208,516 208.516 14 -2
1987 212.686 212,686 2 2
1988 193.235 193,235 -8.5 -9.1
1989 191.312 191,312 -3.1 -1
1990 180.822 180,822 - x -5.5
1991 160.255 191.503 5.7 5.9
1992 181.171 218,539 13 1 14,1
1993 202,426 245.036 11.7 12 1
1994 212,200 254,823 4N 4
1995 213.S44 258.601 .8 1.5
1996 217,760 259.786 1.8 .5
1997 224,805 267,534 3.2 2.9
1998 240.762 283,807 7.1 6.1
1999 251.005 291.769 4.3 2.8
2000 258.403 300.140 2.9 2.9
2001 265.420 304,941 2.7 1.6
2002 277.274 320.069 4.5 5
2003 292.512 330.565 5.5 3.3
2004 315.945 355.350 8 7.5
2005 334.516 379.009 5 9 6.7
Source: Reports of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Central Bank (http://www.cbi.ir/simplebst/latestEconomicData-fa.aspx).
* In Basis, price (total)
for a long time in Iran, imbalance in foreign trade has increased in recent years. Table 3
shows the import and export figures in the final quarter of the last decade.
Inflationary pressures assailed Iran's economy, especially in 1974 when oil revenues
increased fourfold, reaching their highest level in 1977. After the revolution, capital flight,
economic embargoes, imposed war, and a huge compression of capital in the service sector,
led to price increases. Inflation is mostly the result of high demand. Besides, variables in
economic demands, such as accumulation of cash by the private sector, credits assigned to
the private sector, components of governmental cost budgets, quantity and method of
budget-deficit recovery, and the population growth rate, were not on the right track and
have played a destructive role in Iran's economy. Table 4 shows the changes in inflation
rates during the last quarter of the past decade.
3. Accounting history in Iran
Accounting in the world has a background of 6000 years and the first accounting
documents were discovered 3600 years before Christ's birth. Documents of ancient Iran
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Table 3
Exports and imports and exchange rates during 1978-2005
Year Market exchange Official exchange Total merchandise Total merchandise Surplus
rate
J
rate" exports#a imports^ (deficit)
1978 79.99 70.62 23,974 18.917 5057
1979 91.1 70.48 16.203 13.872 2331
1980 [59.5 70.48 24.970 10.020 14,950
1981 234.25 70.62 12.293 13.441 -1148
1982 395 78.33 10.959 15.515 -4556
1983 475 83.6 22.082 14.345 7737
1984 403.58 86.36 21.507 20.603 904
1985 610.67 90.03 17.087 14.494 2593
1986 639.64 207.3 14.175 13.721 454
1987 815.17 217.5 7171 11.827 -4656
1988 1134.6 221 5 11.916 13,326 -1410
1989 954.17 237.1 10.709 11.696 -987
1990 1431.3 299.1 13.081 13.448 -367
1991 1525.8 394.3 19.305 18,330 975
1992 1535.2 511.7 18.661 25.190 -6529
1993 1624.5 686.2 19,868 23,274 -3406
1994 1968.8 1222.5 18.080 19,287 -1207
1995 2602.2 1750 19,434 12,617 6817
1996 4049.3 1750 18,360 12,774 5586
1997 4445.55 1750 22,391 14,989 7402
1998 4781.5 1752 18,381 14,123 4258
1999 6468.36 1752 13,118 14.286 -1168
2000 8657.68 1752 19,726 13.433 6293
2001 8188 1752 28,461 15,086 13375
2002 8008 1752 23,904 18.129 5775
2003 8019 28,237 22.036 6201
2004 8323 33,991 29.561 4430
2005 8747 44,403 36,639 7764
Source: Reports of Islamic Republic of Iran's Central Bank (http: www cbi lr simplelist.1atestEconomicData-fa.aspx).
Dollars in Rials-# Balances of payments.
show that in 500 B.C. (in Achaemenid era), all public incomes and costs were held and
kept, soundly and punctually. In this section, we discuss accounting history in Iran in three
different eras: pre-Islamic era, post-Islamic era (from the Abbasid to Qajar era), and
contemporary era.
3.1. Accounting in pre-Islamic era in Iran
According to historical documents, Iran has an illustrious history as greatest land and sea
trade leaders. As Motazed (1987) points out, Iranians became great traders. From the
beginning of Cyrus the Great's rule, trade was deemed a high priority. During the rein of
Darius, special attention went into road design and safety, which in turn contributed a great
deal to the development and enhancement of trade (Zarrinkub, 1996).
The economy in the Achaemenid era, especially during the rule of Darius the Great, like
all aspects and issues of government was well-regulated and organized. The economic
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Table 4
Panel A: inflation rates during 1978 2005. Panel B: population and population growth rate in Iran (in thousands)
Panel A: Inflation rates from 1978 -2005
Year Inflation rate (%)
1978 25
1979 9.2
1980 12.3
1989 29
1990 17.4
1994 22.9
1995 35.2
1996 49.4
2000 20.1
2001 12.6
2002 II 4
2003 15.8
2004 15.6
2005 15.2
Panel B: Inflation ratefrom 1978--2005
60
Inflation Rate(%)
50 _
40
30
20
4
10 . *
1978 1990
Year
2000 200^
Source: Reports of Islamic Republic of Iran's Central Bank (http://www.cbi.ff/simplelist/latestEconomicData-fa.aspx).
system was built upon satisfying the needs of people from all strata of life from the poorest
to the richest.
The plaques in the ruins of Persepolis4 (Takht-e Jamshid) reveal the revolution and
solidarity of the social and economic system. These plaques show the economic process
with respect to payment, reception of allotment and trade detailed report about the
exchanging of goods in different areas. In fact, the plaques chronicle the development of an
economy which can be traced from a primitive form, based on barter to a dynamic,
sophisticated one, based on coin and money.
We do not claim that the discovered plaques in the ruins of Persepolis explain all aspects
of the economic system related to that era, but the significant information extracted from
Persepolis was an ancient ceremonial capital of the second Iranian era, the Achaemenid Empire, situated some
70 km northeast of the modern city of Shiraz. To the ancient Persians, the city was known as Parsa. meaning the
city of Persians, Persepolis being the Greek interpretation of the name (FlepaEi; (meaning Persian) + iro\m-
(meaning city)). In contemporary Iran the site is known as Takht-e Jamshid.
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those plaques is the result ofthe secretaries and counselors" cflbrt in registering the financial
reports of those days.
Danus the (Ireat was the originator ofthe economic and financial affairs recorded on
those plaques, including the depiction of tax officers collecting tax. from those plaques we
learn about the nomination of tax collectors, the regulation of taxes — how they are
received and expended One person was in charge of dispatching the tax collectors.
supervising the entire process, and keeping track ofthe collected tax. Many people were
engaged in this process, including a large number of secretaries and counselors who were
responsible for registering all the economic reports anil who provided the plaques.
Today we know that the ancients archived documents in two forms — the Rampart
plaque and the treasury of Persepolis. Examining these plaques shed light on issues
important to the development of the accounting process. From them we learn that the
accounting processes and registration of reports were done quite accurately, based on basic
accounting principles as we understand them today. The careful figures recorded by the
accountants show the exact amount of goods or allotments similar to present-day
accounting. We also learn that the early accountants prepared "Balance Sheets". These
balance sheets usually covered a few years, and showed the exact date and exact financial
figures, that were in use at the end of the year.
The history of tax in ancient Iran is very interesting. Tax collection was customary
during the Achaemenid era and the Selcucid era (312 B.C.) which followed. Taxes were
collected from great property owners (like Darius), with a lesser share coming from the
smaller territories. There was no per capita tax during this period. During the Arsacid era
( 1 87 B.C. ) the main tax was territorial, received either in cash or goods. A per capita tax was
initiated in this era as was the Custom Toll.
3.2. Accounting in the post-Islamic era in Iran - from the Abbasid to Qajar eras
The study of government's history expresses the evolution of financial and taxation
concepts in the Samanid, Safavid and Qajar eras.
During the rein ofthe Samanids. the government's revenues came for the most part from
per capita and territorial taxes The word "Bureau -0 has its roots in this era. Bureau meant
bill and was related to the work ofthe accountant. The Bureau supervised the income and
expenditure forecasts. Government experts laid down all the rules pertaining to finance and
taxation which were recorded in a book, which was also called Bureau.
During this era, we saw the rise ofthe "Computation Bureau." which is still used in Iran.
In those days, this Bureau was responsible for organizing the income and expenditure —
i.e., the budget — ofthe country. Calculation ofthe courtiers' salary was also done under
the supervision ofthe chief in charge of this Bureau.
During the rein of Seljuks, different accounting methods were invented as required for
governance and economic activities. One of these methods was called Siagh accounting,
which was used to record public revenues and expenditures and the financial account of
businesses. Based on Siagh accounting, all the accounts of each tribe were recorded
separately in related pages.
D .mi Persian)
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In the Safavid era (Shah Ismail and Shah Abbas), Iran's economy improved greatly. One
of the most interesting innovations of the Shah Abbas era is the registration of trade records,
which were indeed parents of today's journals. All the traders' transactions, their payables
and receivables, were registered in these so-called trade records, which were valuable
documents to traders and judges. The fee charged for registration was 5% of each
transaction.
During the Qajar era, Iran's revenues came from four major sources: direct tax, property
income tax, customs, and lease revenues. The country's indirect revenues came from three
sources: confiscation of property, gifts related to Nowruz (the beginning of Iran's calendar
year celebrated as national holiday) and the Holy Prophet Mohammad's birthday (March
21), and extraordinary gifts such as bribes, etc. However, the main source of income was
property tax, which was paid in cash or other assets. The first Iranian governmental bond
was issued in 1 892 to replace funds lost when a fine imposed on a Tobacco Company was
revoked. At the beginning of the national parliament era, during the rein of Qajar, the
governmental budget was prepared and given to parliament for study and approval for the
first time in Iran's history. Looking at the early documents, it is evident that the budget
experts in parliament were aware of budgetary systems in other countries. When reviewing
different sections of this budget, we will point out the following terms: expenditures, public
debts, and income forecasting.
Some of the first rules of finance approved in the first and second Iranian national
parliament, were the auditing law and it's supplementary transportation, tenement and
tobacco tax laws; and public accounting laws and the accounting bureau.
Siagh accounting, which was introduced in the Samanid era, was completed during the
Ghajar era. "Five Books," which were used for the bookkeeping of main groups of accounts
were invented in this era.
Modem bookkeeping and accounting was introduced in Iran in 1900 in the face of
emerging industries and their products, and the introduction of foreign companies and
institutes. However, progress in this area has been slow due to the sluggish pace of
improvements in social and economic conditions (Molkaraee, 2004). Teaching of
accounting in Iranian universities started in Dar al-Funun
6
in 1911.
3.3. Contemporary era — from Pahlavi (1918-1978) until now
Auditing did not spring to life in Iran as a result of changes in the country's economy.
Neither the development of limited companies nor the functioning of capital market created
the need for auditing. Instead, the idea of auditing first came to light in the Income Tax Law
of 1949. The idea of controlling revenues and expenditures was the result of a constitutional
Revolution in Iran. The Certified Public Accountants Association was established
according to the Direct Tax Law in 1963. The Center of Iranian Official Accountants
was established according to the Direct Tax Law in 1966. Moreover, many other laws and
regulations have been found which are related to auditing functions and institutions such as
the Tehran Stock Exchange Law that requires companies registered on the Tehran Stock
Dar al-Funun the first modern school in Iran was established by Amir-Kabir (one of the most popular
politicians in the Ghajar dynasty).
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Exchange (TSE) to be audited. According to the Cooperative Companies Law, auditing is
required for Cooperatives too.
The Iranian Expert Accountants Association was registered in 1974. This association is
still operating and publishes the Monthly Journal ofAccounting.
With auditing being required by a number of laws, several of the largest foreign audit
firms chose the Iranian Official Accountants as their partners, established branches in Iran,
and took the responsibility for auditing large companies. The presence of these firms led to
a progressive flow in the accounting profession and education in Iran.
A bill, ratified by the Revolutionary Council after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979,
confiscated many enterprises or placed them under direct governmental supervision. To
audit and perform statutory examination of these enterprises, three audit firms were
established in the public sector: Nationalized Industries and Plan Organization Audit Firm
(1980), Mostazafan Foundation Audit Firm (1981), Shahed Audit Firm (1983).
In 1983, an act ratified by the Iranian national parliament merged these three audit firms
with the Audit Company (established in 1971 to audit government corporations) to
establish the Audit Organization. The Audit Organization's by-laws were approved by
Parliament in 1987 when the Organization was established as a legal entity with financial
independence. It is affiliated with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and
replaces the original audit firms and pursues the activities legislated in the Organization's
Act and by-laws.
4. Factors affecting the development of accounting in Iran
Mueller (1968) suggests that the stage of economic development, type of economy, and
growth pattern of the economy can affect a country's accounting practices. Doupnik and
Salter ( 1 995 ) argue that the stage of development affects the type of business transactions
conducted in a country and the type of economy determines which transactions are more
prevalent.
On similar conceptual lines, we can relate the evolution of Iran's accounting practices to
five economic issues—financial markets, privatization, tax laws, joining the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and legal systems, discussed below.
4.1. Financial markets in Iran
The idea of having a well-organized stock market and accelerating the process of
industrialization dates back to the 1930s in Iran when the Melli Bank undertook a study on
the subject. A report completed in 1936 worked out the details for the formation of a stock
market and laid the foundations for the plan. The outbreak of World War II and subsequent
economic and political events delayed the establishment of the stock exchange until 1967,
when the Stock Exchange Act was ratified. The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) opened in
April 1968. Initially only government bonds and certain state-backed certificates were
traded on the market. During the 1970s, the demand for capital boosted the demand for
stocks. At the same time, institutional changes, like the transfer of shares of public
companies and large monopolies to employees and the private sector led to the expansion of
stock market activity. The restructuring of the economy which followed the Islamic
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Revolution expanded public-sector control over the economy and reduced the need for
private capital. At the same time, the interest-bearing bonds were abolished. Because of
these events, the TSE experienced a period of standstill.
This stagnation ended in 1989 with the revival of the private sector through the
privatization of state-owned enterprises and the promotion of private-sector economic
activity based on the First Five-year Development Plan of the country. Since then the TSE
has expanded continuously.
4.2. Privatization in Iran
Post-revolution, Iran faced two different processes of structural change—nationalization
immediately following the 1979 revolution and privatization later in the 1980s. 7 Financial
reporting has gained importance in Iranian companies following international pressures from the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in connection with privatization.
Although the working of the stock market is essential to facilitate increased participation of the
private-sector in Iran's economic development and growth, the stock market has so far failed to
restore the role of the private sector. Akhavi-Pour (1994) explores the reasons for the failure of
the stock market in post-revolutionary Iran. He cites information asymmetries resulting from the
lack of adequate disclosure by companies as crucial factors, hi recent years, privatization of
economic entities in Iran has enhanced the need for publicly available financial information. If
firms want capital from the public, they need to provide adequate levels of disclosure in their
financial reports to inspire investor confidence.
Privatization in Iran started in 1991 based on ratification by the Ministers' Board. This
ratification considered the many issues involved with selling shares in governmental
companies to the public through the TSE. The results were hampered by some
shortcomings, such as a lack of relevant facilities for privatization, the absence of
comprehensive privatization laws, the lack of separation of social and economic aims of
privatization, and the lack of a suitable system for pricing the sectors, which undermined
the accomplishment of full privatization during that period. Table 5 presents the
privatization process in Iran from 1991-2002.
4.3. Tax policies in Iran
Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the importance of the taxation system
has been the subject ofmuch attention. Nevertheless, an efficient taxation system has not been
enforced in the country, which has led to governmental problems and has worsened the
imbalance of income distribution in society. The most important taxation law applied in Iran
today is the Direct Tax Law which is often used as a reference most of the time.
The current tax laws present a challenge for accounting standard setters. For example, they
impede the acceptance of fair values. And, since the tax laws are used as the main effective
measure of depreciation methods in financial reporting, it would be hard to replace them.
7
Nationalization is the transfer of ownership and management of large-scale established industries or services
to the state. Privatization is the transfer of a function and activity from the public to the private sector (Akhavi-
Pour, 1994).
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Table 5
The privatization process in Iran from 1991-2002
Year The privatization amount in public firms
Current costs Historical costs
1991 266 1435
1992 229 857
1993 288 840
1994 924 1996
1995 516 746
1996 1091 1280
1997 173 173
1998 726 645
1999 2348 1654
2000 1722 1078
2001 201 113
2002 3131 1520
Source: Reports ofthe Islamic Republic of Iran's Central Bank (http://wvvw.cbi.ir/suiiplehsl1atestEconomicData-fa.aspx).
4.4. Membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Joining the WTO would be a gradual, multi-step, and long process with considerable
impact on the trading environments of member countries. When about 97% of world trade
is conducted by such an organization, with its own rules and regulations, it should not be
ignored. It is a mistake to believe, as some in Iran do, that joining the WTO would not affect
the accounting and finance fields. Since accounting is the language of trade, it should
gradually adopt international standards. The mentioned fields are not separate from trade
and economics; there is. rather, a natural relationship between them. It is not possible to
compile and execute accounting standards and financial reports without considering the
environmental factors. On the other hand, financial reports affect the economic and
financial decisions. In fact, the decisions presented in financial reports are affected by the
economic and job environment. It is expected that the increase in competition, removal of
trade barriers, and satisfying other conditions of joining the WTO would lead to the
development of Iranian financial markets and accounting standards. According to Wolk and
Heaston (1992) there is a need for harmonization of international accounting standards
among nations because of:
1. The increasing globalization of business operations (e.g., the growth of a global market
economy including the rise of multinational firms),
2. The need to communicate financial accounting information to an international audience
by increasing improvements in information technology, and
3. A higher degree of comparability among financial reporting on an international basis.
4.5. Foreign investment in Iran
An increase in foreign investment results in the development of financial reporting in
accounting because investors and foreign lenders are interested in financial reporting
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related to the trade companies. Observing international accounting standards, makes the
reporting more useful to investors. To attract direct foreign investment in oil and
(especially) non-oil products, therefore, financial reporting should follow accepted
accounting standards. Table 6 presents foreign investment in Iran from 1993 to 2002.
This table shows that foreign investment in Iran is low. One of the ways to attract foreign
investment is to improve accounting standards and financial reporting.
For Iran's efforts to enter world trade by joining the WTO, to be successful, and to
encourage privatization, growth of the private foreign sector, and audit and accounting
standard setting in Iran must be greatly improved. In the part, auditing and accounting
standard setting in Iran was more based on legal laws and regulations, but the above
mentioned factors affect the academic and professional development of accounting too.
4. 6. Legal system in Iran
International accounting literature has long recognized that the prevalence ofa particular legal
system (common-law or code-law) in a country affects the accounting system followed (Berry,
1987; Fantl, 1971; Nobes, 1983). The literature recognizes that common-law countries are
inclined towards fair presentation, transparency, and full disclosure (known as the Anglo-Saxon
model). Standard setting is carried out in these countries by bodies in the private sector, and the
stock market is the dominant source of financing for corporate entities. In code-law countries,
banks or governments are the main sources of financing and financial accounting is geared
towards creditor protection (known as the continental model). Financial reporting, in these
countries, is characterized by low disclosures and an alignment of financial accounting with the
tax laws. In addition, governments exert a strong influence on setting accounting standards.
Recently, researchers have shown a renewed interest in empirically examining the relationship
between accounting systems and legal systems in various countries. La Porta, et al. (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Salines, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000), suggest that the type of legal system a
country has predisposes it towards a particular system of finance. That is, a common-law legal
framework emphasizes shareholders' rights and offers a stronger investor protection system as
compared to that of a code-law legal system. This linkage leads to the development of strong
Table 6
Foreign investment in Iran from 1993-2002 (In billion Dollars)
1 Year Foreign investment Growth rate
I 1993 20/3
i 1994 187/8 825
I
1995 251/2 34
| 1996 132/3 -47
1997 203/9 54
1998 72/9 -64
1999 1047/1 168
2000 491/1 -53/1
2001 620/9 26/4
2002 52/1 -91.6
Source: Reports of Islamic Republic of Iran's Central Bank (http://www.cbi.ir/simplelist/latestFiconomicData-fa.aspx).
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equity markets in common-law countries and weak ones in code-law countries. Consequently, in
code-law countries, debt rather than equity is the dominant source of financing.
Iran exhibits many of the characteristics of a code-law country. It has a weak equity
market, a strong preference for and use of debt as a source of financing (as against use of
outsiders' equity), and a general perception of low-quality financial reporting. Thus, it can
be argued that Iran should be considered a code-law country. This implies that the lack of
investor protection (e.g., minority-rights protection, insider-trading protection), judicial
inefficiencies, and weak enforcement mechanisms are more likely to explain the state of
financial reporting in Iran than are cultural factors. This insight has policy implications for
developing countries that are working hard to improve the quality of financial reporting for
their business entities.
4.6.1. Corporate governance in Iran
Although the stock exchange was established in early 1961, and the process of
instituting and controlling companies was mentioned in the Trade Law, particularly in the
amendment of April 1968, a modern conception of the corporate governance issue was
addressed in early 2000 for the first time. At that time, the managers of the Tehran Stock
Exchange (TSE), Islamic parliament Research Center, and a specialized committee of the
Economic and Finance Ministry began to conduct surveys on corporate governance in Iran.
These surveys find that the characteristics of corporate governance in Iran approximates
internal governance structures — systems where all the listed companies in country are
owned and controlled by a few, major shareholders. These shareholders are often divided
into different groups: the foundation group, the creditor banks (which are a small group),
other companies or the government. However, recent efforts to expand the capital market
show that Iran is interested in changing this system to external governance structures. For
instance, in the third and the fourth Economic Development plan, privatization of
governmental organizations is given a great deal of importance and is seen as an instrument
for changing to external control system. In fact, observation of companies and the stock
market in Iran shows that there are already some external control mechanisms in place, e.g.,
required legal supervision according to the Trade Law (especially clauses 144-156), stock
exchange laws, the Audit Organization statute, and the Iranian official Accounting society
rules.
The capital market in Iran is very new and somewhat inefficient. Pension funds, mutual
funds, and insurance companies now own more than half of the publicly held stock on the
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). The major shareholder's supervision depends on certain
activities such as buying controlling stock and the role of institutional investors. Minor
shareholders have no supervisory role. However, auditing the financial statements of
companies on the stock exchange is mandatory. But, there is no rating institutions in Iran or
any system for proper supervision of internal control mechanisms. Despite recent concerns
in the field about boards of directors' and other issues related to executive management,
such as dividing the responsibilities between executives and managers, the role of non-
executive managers is very weak in Iran and there is seemingly no concern about
supervising organizational morality.
Fortunately, in late 2004, the TSE Research and Development Center published the first
edition of the Code of Corporate Governance in Iran. The 22 clauses contain some
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necessary definitions, management, board, and shareholder responsibilities, financial
disclosures, accountability, and auditing concepts. This code was edited in 2005 based on
the ownership structure, the capital market situation, and the Trade Law. The second edition
of Code of Corporate Governance in Iran has 5 chapters and 37 clauses. This code was
announced via media and implemented by many companies. Appendix A, provides a
summary of the second edition of Code of Corporate Governance in Iran.
5. Codification of accounting standards in Iran
5.1. History of accounting standards in Iran
Prior to 1979, financial reporting in Iran was influenced heavily by Anglo-American
practices (Mirshekari and Saudagaran, 2005). There were no national accounting standards
and disclosure requirements were based on tax law, corporate law, and stock exchange
regulations. The tax law requires firms to prepare a balance sheet, income statement, and a
list of shareholders (with their holdings).
The tax law prescribes a set format for reporting tax-deductible expenses, computing
depreciation, and accounting policies related to certain expenses. The main disclosure
requirements of the corporate law were contained in Section X of the 1 969 Amendment to
the Commercial Code with Articles 232-242 specifying the rules for preparing financial
statements, disclosing any changes in accounting methods, contingent expenditure, and the
required methods of depreciation. In 1970, the tax law decreed that the Iranian Official
Accountants Institute and the Official Accountants were in charge of verifying the tax
liability reported in financial statements.
From 1966 to 1978, there were requirements to have corporate financial statements
audited. For example, the regulations of the Tehran Stock Exchange required that publicly
traded companies have their financial statements audited by the Official Accountants.
Therefore, all the Big Eight international accounting firms in Iran had Official Accountants
as their employees. In the 1960s and 1970s, then the Big Eight dominated the public
accounting profession in Iran. While there was an emerging cadre of local and Western-
trained Iranian accountants, the Big Eight tended to be dominated by expatriates from the
United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa. This contributed to accounting and
auditing in Iran being influenced by foreign practices. However, these developments were
ad hoc and there was no systematic structure in place either for setting national accounting
1 standards or for adopting international accounting standards.
Following the Iranian revolution, in 1980, an amendment to the Direct Tax Law
disbanded the Official Accountants Institute. The public sector's control and ownership of
previously private enterprises made necessary the establishment of audit enterprises for
managing business entities expropriated by the government. Therefore, during 1980-1982,
the government established audit enterprises and the Budget, Planning and National
Industries Organization. These new organizations recruited a large number of accountants
' who were previously employed with private auditing firms. In 1987, following the merger
of the public-sector audit entities, the Audit Organization was established as the sole auditor
;
of organizations with public ownership and as the only regulatory body for national
accounting and auditing standards. The Audit Organization is responsible for compiling
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and determining principles and rules of auditing and accounting in Iran. The Audit
Organization's main objectives are:
To provide the government with basic needs in the field of auditing and specialized
financial services for state owned and government supervised entities;
To set Accounting and Auditing Standards and Professional Ethics in compliance with
Islamic Rules as well; and
To research in scientific and practical methods of accounting to enhance accountancy
compatible with the country's needs.
The Audit Organization has operated well in compiling accounting standards. In 1992,
the Committee of Compiling the Accounting Declarations was assigned to codify
necessity guidance to provide consistency and remove the current incompatibility, based
on valid standards and environmental conditions. Considering the importance of the
assignment, the committee decided to take an opinion poll about accounting standards.
Drafts of nine accounting declarations and the framework for preparation and
publication of financial statements were supplied. Next, five other declaration drafts
were sent to public and other drafts were sent to some special groups in 1996. Using the
relevant public and professional suggestions, the committee published the first set of
accounting declarations in 1999.
Education programs held to introduce and execute the accounting declarations in the
field have met with great success. The name of that committee was changed to the
Accounting Standards Setting Committee. In response to feedback from the educational
programs, changes in international standards, and experts' opinions about managing the
compilation of accounting standards, the committee compiled the draft of the first
collection of accounting standards and presented it to the Technical Committee. After
examination and revision by the Technical Committee, these standards were passed onto
the board of the Audit Organization for final approval at the Audit Organization's public
convention.
Accounting standards 1 through 22 were issued after approval by the Audit
Organization's public convention, and applying them has been mandatory since 2001.
Next, the Accounting Standards Setting Committee added three other standards to its
work (joint ventures, pre-operation entity's reporting, and segment reporting). After
finalization, the committee assigned them to the Technical Committee. These standards were
studied by the Technical Committee and sent to the board. On the basis of the Audit
Organization's public convention approval, these new standards became mandatory in 2002.
Based on Article 4 of the Third Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan, the
Audit Organization's by-laws were revised and approved by the Council of Ministers in
2003 and the Organization's legal status changed to the State Owned Limited Company.
The Audit Organization is responsible for:
Audit and statutory examination
Financial and management consultancy services
Setting accounting and auditing standards
Training, research, and publications
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5.2. Accounting standards due process in Iran
During the past two decades, the Audit Organization has taken various measures to
enhance the profession of accounting in Iran. In order to harmonize accounting practices in
Iran with global standards the Audit Organization has studied translations of International
Accounting Standards (IAS), prepared and published a number of textbooks on the
accounting and auditing standards of developed countries, and published specialized sets of
accounting and auditing manuals, which has led to the issuing of accounting and auditing
guidelines at a higher level. The Audit Organization has also prepared and issued the
accounting and auditing standards and the code of ethics.
Accounting standards' due process includes different steps in Iran, as in other countries,
that provide standards at the present time, the Audit Organization is the official and legal
venue responsible for standard setting in Iran. The Organization recognizes the needs and
points of view of users. Some needs are identified by communication with the scientific and
industrial communities and some reflect the organization's responsibilities to external
auditing by considering financial reporting problems and defects and discussing them with
the management of related entities. Iran, like many countries, has accepted international
standards for more convergence. Therefore, in most cases, standard setting follows the
publication of new international standards.
The due process of accounting standards development may be summarized as follows:
1
.
Deciding on a subject for research. The Accounting Standard Setting Committee decides
on the topics to be considered by the Standard Setting Department.
2. Preliminary studies. After deciding on the subject, necessary research and studies are
carried out by the advisors of the Standard Setting Department. In this phase, the
accounting standards used internationally in countries such as the USA, the UK.
Australia, and Canada are examined in relation to the subject, and compared to
accounting practices in Iran. The law and all issues relating to the subject are
recognized, collected, and studied. The conclusion of this phase is the presentation of
study reports.
3. Deciding on the necessity of a standard development. The Standard Setting Committee
decides on the necessity of developing standards based on the result of preliminary studies.
4. Preparation of a primary draft. If the Accounting Standards Setting Committee requires
the development of a standard, the advisory group prepares a primary draft based on
study reports, after field studies and some meetings with professionals and constituents.
One of the main policies influencing accounting standards development is compliance
with International Accounting Standards. Therefore, if there is an International
Accounting Standard for the subject, it is used as the main source for the Iranian
standard development. The outcome of this phase is the primary standard draft.
5. Development of the standard draft, hi this phase, the Accounting Standards Setting
Committee presents the final standard draft, after as in depth and broad reviews and making
the necessary amendments. The outcome of this phase is a draft for the standard under
development.
6. Public comment. Every standard draft is made available to the public for comments in
different ways, including publishing them in professional journals, posting them on the
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7.
Internet (the Audit Organization Site), etc. In addition, depending on the subject, the standard
draft is sent directly to some professional authorities. The public comments are sifted and
presented to the Accounting Standards Setting Committee by the Standards Setting
Department. Based on this information, the Committee will make any necessary amendments
to the draft, which is then submitted to the Technical Committee for approval. The revised
standard draft is presented to the Board of Executives of the Organization.
Ultimate approval. The Board of Executives reviews the Accounting Standards, along
with any amendments, and sends them to the Board of Governors of the Organization for
ultimate approval. After approval by the Board of Governors, the final text of the
accounting standard is published and its observance becomes mandatory. Table 7 shows
accounting standard due process in Iran.
Table 7
Accounting standards due process
Process
Deciding on the Subject
The Accounting Standard Setting
Committee
Research Works
Advisors of Standard Setting
Department and Advisory Group
Deciding on Necessity of a
Standard Development
The Accounting Standard Setting
Committee
Development of Preliminary
Draft
Standard Setting Department and
Advisory Group
Development of Standard Draft
The Accounting Standard Setting
Committee
Publishing for Public Comments Standard Setting Department
Development of Final Draft
The Accounting Standard Setting
Committee
Review and Approval of Final
Text
Board of Executive and Board of
Governors
www.audit.org.
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Table 8 shows the list of Iranian National Accounting Standards (NASs) and similar
International Accounting Standards (IASs). Twenty-seven accounting standards have
already been issued and two more accounting standards are in process by the Audit
Organization. In addition, other tasks are in process in order to adjust the present standards
and new ones.
The influence of culture on national accounting systems has been a feature of international
accounting literature for several decades — the work of Gray (1988) and Hofstede's (1980)
social value dimensions. A critical facet of these enquiries is the notion that cultural values
influence accounting values and hence accounting practice (Foroughi, 1981; Hussein, 1996;
Jaggi and Low, 2000). Belkaoui ( 1991 ) argues that accounting is in fact determined by culture
which accounts for the lack of consensus across different countries as to what represents proper
accounting methods. Poorjalali and Meek ( 1 995) study change in Iran's culture before and after
the Islamic revolution and the impact on accounting values. The results conform to Gray's theory
and confirm the impact of culture on accounting values in Iran. However, Rezazadeh (2002), in
recent research, obtains different results. His results show that while masculinity is increasing in
Iran, the tendency to conceal is decreasing. Noravesh and Dianati (2003 ) find that Gray's opinion
has little explanatory ability in Iran.
Table 8
Iranian National Accounting Standards (NASs) and similar International Accounting Standards (IASs
NASs Num Subject IASs Num
3
4
S
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Presentation of financial statements
Cash flow statements
Revenue recognition
Accounting for contingencies (is deleted now)
Accounting for events after the balance sheet date
Reporting financial performance
Accounting for research & development costs
Accounting for inventories
Accounting for long-term contracts
Accounting for government grants
Accounting for tangible fixed assets
Related party disclosures
Accounting for borrowing costs
Presentation of current assets & current liabilities
Accounting for investments
Foreign currency translation
Accounting for intangible assets
Consolidated financial statement and investment in subordinate
Business combinations
Accounting for investments in associates
Accounting for leases
Interim financial reporting
Accounting for joint ventures
Financial reporting by development stage entities
Segment reporting
Agriculture
Retirement benefit plans
I
7
18
10
10
8
38
2
II
20
16
24
23
1
32,39
21
38
27
22
28
17
34
31
N/A
14
41
26
www.audit.org.
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6. Conclusion
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the origin, growth and development of
accounting in Iran and the factors that have influenced them. We trace the early days of
accounting in ancient Iran using documents from 550 B.C. (in the Achaemenid era), that
show that all public income and costs were held and kept properly and punctually. Then we
discuss accounting history in Iran in three different eras: pre-Islamic era, post-Islamic era
(from the Abbasid to Qajar era), and the contemporary era. For an emerging economy like
Iran, we argue that six important issues—financial markets, privatization, tax laws, joining
the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign investments, and the legal system are
important keys to improving the quality of financial reporting. Prior to 1979, financial
reporting in Iran was influenced heavily by Anglo-American practices (Mirshekari and
Saudagaran, 2005). There were no national accounting standards and disclosure
requirements were based on tax law, corporate law, and stock exchange regulations.
However, during the last two decades, Iran's Audit Organization has taken various
measures to harmonize the Iranian Accounting profession with global practices.
We also argue that Iran exhibits all the accounting hallmarks of a code-law country.
Those include lack of investor protection (e.g., minority-rights protection, insider-trading
protection), legal inefficiencies, and weak enforcement mechanisms and are critical to
understand the state of financial reporting in Iran. This insight has policy implications for
developing countries that are working hard to improve the quality of financial reporting of
their business entities.
In summary, special features of the operating environment, existing laws and rules,
religious beliefs, culture, and economic and political conditions have been considered in the
National Accounting Standards setting processes in Iran, as they are in other countries.
Appendix A. The Iranian Code of Corporate Governance (ICCG) — summary
*Chapter 1 (descriptions) — clause I
This chapter contains the descriptions and expressions used in this instruction manual,
including independent manager, non-executive manager, minor shareholder, controlling,
considerable dominance, stock trustee, stock services, major shareholder, important/large
companies, secret information holders or insiders, main/mother corporations, subsidiary
coiporations, affiliated corporations, dependent individual, subordinates, and main managers.
*Chapter 2 (board of directors) — clause 2-20
In this chapter, characteristics of the board of directors' such as selection method,
number, structure, and duties, are described. The most important issues in this part of the
instruction manual are:
1. The board of directors' qualifications and effectiveness.
.
The clear separation of responsibilities between board of directors and administrative
managers.
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3. The independence of the CEO from the board chair.
4. The number and composition of the board of directors.
5. The need for the majority of board members to be non-executive.
6. The necessity of meetings at least once a month.
7. The necessity of forming an auditing committee and delivering its responsibilities.
8. The necessity of having an effective internal control system for the safekeeping of
properties, appropriate reporting, and observing the rules, and the need for the annual
evaluation of that system.
*Chapter 3 (public-assembly) — clauses 21—30
In this chapter, the shareholders public society's characteristics and responsibilities are
discussed, some of the important issues in this chapter are:
1
.
The selection method of management boards for public shareholders.
2. The determination of compensation for each member of the board of directors.
3. The need for reports given by the board of directors, legal warden, and independent
auditors to be made at least 1 days before the public-assembly meeting.
4. The need for financial statements to receive a public declaration of approval within
10 days of the public-assembly meeting.
5. The need for a majority of the board of directors, independent auditors, legal
warden, and the representative of the stock exchange to attend the public-assembly
meeting.
*Chapter 4 (accountability- and disclosure) — clauses 31-36
In this chapter, mandatory disclosures are discussed, including annual financial
statements, six-month financial statements, information about stock transactions related to
the board of directors and top executive managers and their families, information related to
insiders, general information related to the organizational structure, products, human
resources, social responsibilities, and company environment, and information related to
corporate governance such as audit committees, the board of directors' characteristics, and
the dividends paid by company.
*Chapter 5 (frauds and penalties) — clauses 37-38
In this chapter, the managers' and companies' frauds and penalties are discussed.
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Global Dimensions of Corporate Governance, Yadong Luo, Paperback Edition,
Blackwell Publishing, Maiden, MA, USA (2007), (Oxford, UK, Carlton, Australia,
xvi+ 276 pages, £25.99, €34.50, US $44.95), ISBN-13: 978-1-4051-3707-2
This book is one of the six volumes of Blackwell Global Dimensions ofBusiness Series,
designed to provide comprehensive material on international business and management,
which is ideal for graduate students, executives, consultants, and academics. This particular
book aims to provide an in-depth analysis of corporate governance from a global perspective,
as well as discussions on why corporate-governance systems should be different for Multi-
National Companies (MNCs). Overall, the author succeeds in putting forward a convincing
proposition as to why MNCs must consider corporate-governance systems from a different
perspective, and provides a wealth of resources for the targeted audience.
The notion of corporate governance and the importance of good corporate-governance
systems are not new. Rather, the interest in the way today's global corporations are governed
has increased dramatically in the last decade, notably due to two major global business-related
events, one in developing economies (the 1997 Asian financial crisis) and the other, in the
United States (the collapse of high-profile corporations such as Enron and WorldCom). Both
practitioners and academics subsequently have considered various aspects of corporate
governance and how they may be associated with, among others, corporate performance,
earnings management, and fraudulent-financial reporting activities (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, &
Reeb, 2004; Klein, 2002; Sharma, 2004). There also has been an influx of book publications
regarding corporate governance, with a new book seemingly being published every other
week. The level and scope of interest has not been restricted to one particular economy either,
nor have the aspects of corporate governance, starting with the very basic mechanisms of
corporate governance such as the board of directors and their independence, to more con-
ceptual discussions based on agency, stakeholder and legitimacy theories, and how these can
be applied to governance mechanisms.
One of the major strengths of this book is that the author incorporates the current business
environment into the discussions ofcorporate-governance practices in different geographical
regions with varying cultural and economic backgrounds, and explains how these differences
can affect even the very basic governance mechanisms. These concepts are well supported by
a series ofreal-life case examples at the end ofeach chapter, linking the theory and practice in a
user-friendly manner. These cases deal with well-known global corporations and their
governance systems, which should be relevant and familiar to readers, tying neatly to the
book's objective of looking at the global dimensions of corporate-governance practices, and
thereby reinforcing the author's arguments in each chapter. While there are no discussion
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questions at the end of each case, this absence may not be an oversight given the advanced
level of the intended audience and the self-explanatory nature of each case.
The author also provides a comprehensive list of references and further readings at the
end of each chapter. Along with the case studies, they are valuable resources for readers,
especially for research students and academics. This is a must-read book for those wanting a
comprehensive understanding about corporate governance, especially in relation to MNCs
and global economies. The book has seven chapters, and is structured as follows:
Chapter 1 introduces the concept of corporate governance and how governance mecha-
nisms might differ between MNCs and domestic corporations. The author classifies
governance mechanisms into three categories: governance based on ( 1 ) market; (2) culture;
and, (3) discipline. There is one problem with this classification; the second category.
Governance Based on Culture, seems to refer only to corporate culture, not national
culture. Given that the emphasis of this book is on global dimensions of business, one
would expect to read about how differences in national culture may influence governance
practices of MNCs in this section. While there is no denying that corporate culture can
influence and be influenced by governance mechanisms, a commentary on national culture
associated with MNCs, as defined initially by Hofstede (1980), would have completed the
discussion regarding culture and governance.
Using the concepts introduced in the previous chapter, chapter 2 explains some of the
reasons behind why corporate-governance practices may differ in different countries. In
comparing governance practices of different countries, the author classifies countries from
the Anglo-Saxon system into one group, with continental Europe, Asia, and transition
economies being the other groups. While this theoretical framework intrinsically makes
sense, it would have been interesting to see some empirical evidence as to whether the
governance practices actually do differ according to this classification. That is, given the
differences between these groups in terms of their cultural philosophy, institutional
differences, legal systems, and political ideology, is there any evidence that MNCs from
each group would adopt different corporate-governance mechanisms? The author's argu-
ments might have been further strengthened if a summary table comprising groups of
countries and their similarities/differences was included in the chapter.
Chapter 3 considers whether corporate-governance mechanisms would be influenced by
global activities undertaken by MNCs. The author puts forward a series of propositions
about how firm-level characteristics, such as geographical dispersion, sales, and other
related global attributes, would influence the level of corporate-governance practices. The
propositions outlined in Fig. 3.1 (p.85) are well argued by the author using an array of
theories, and are ideal for academics as research questions to be empirically tested. They
might have been more impressive if, as a way of linking chapters 2 and 3 together, the
propositions regarding country-specific attributes (discussed in chapter 2) and their
influence on MNCs' governance practices were included as well.
In chapter 4, the author examines what is perhaps the most unique aspect of MNCs
compared to domestic corporations - the global relationship between the parent company
and its subsidiaries, and how the relationship can impact on corporate-governance
mechanisms. Typically, MNCs would have a parent company from developed economies.
Subsidiary MNCs would then venture into different markets to operate and, subsequently,
would need to deal with individual domestic markets and their idiosyncrasies. One potential
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improvement which can be made to this chapter in future editions is regarding the format
and volume of contents in the final section of the chapter, 4.3 Managerial Governance in
Global Business. Despite the author stating that '.'. .managerial governance is not the focus
of this book.." (p.l 14), this section is 10 pages long: due to the sheer volume of information
without sub-sections or headings, it is difficult to read and maintain interest.
Chapters 5 introduces a new concept of corporate accountability in MNCs in conjunc-
tion with corporate-governance mechanisms. The author points out why it is more difficult
to define, implement, and regulate accountability for MNCs and argues that there is more
emphasis on transparency regarding government policies and financial reporting (both
voluntary and mandatory) for MNCs than for domestic corporations. The author provides
an excellent review of how accountability supports corporate governance and how
corporate governance, in turn, promotes effective accountability. It is also a fitting prelude
to the following chapter, which considers one of the most important determinants of
transparency - the level of corruption.
Chapter 6 examines one aspect of the external environment linked to transparency in
government policies that cannot be avoided by MNCs, especially for those operating in
developing or transitional economies. The author presents well-argued reasons as to why
anti-corruption is important to corporate governance, and explains how different cultures,
both at the national and corporate levels, can affect what is considered corrupt behavior.
That is, corrupt behavior in one culture may be considered as the norm in another. The
chapter ends with suggestions regarding the ways in which MNCs can combat negative
consequences stemming from corruption, providing invaluable references to readers,
especially for executives and consultants.
The author uses the last chapter to summarize all the concepts and ideas put forward in
previous chapters. The notion ofcorporate social responsibility (CSR) is introduced as a way
of giving further credence to the importance of good corporate governance. CSR is an
important part ofcorporate governance since it can identify different stakeholders ofMNCs,
and their needs must be met in order to govern MNCs effectively and efficiently. The author
argues that MNCs bear greater CSR than their domestic counterparts, since the majority of
MNCs are scrutinized to see whether they cause and/or alleviate social problems in the
emerging economies they may operate in. The chapter ends with an informative section on
what should be done to improve the CSR of the MNCs operating in developing economies.
Once again, however, an inclusion of a table comprising current CSR practices of MNCs
originating in various countries would have been helpful in recapitulating the argument.
In summary, I believe that the book achieves what the author has set out to do; '.'. .to be a
pioneering initiative to delineate corporate-governance systems in international business" (p. xi).
The book provides detailed and up-to-date theoretical background information to the current
global corporate-governance environment, and considers firm-specific and country-specific
variables which may influence corporate-governance practices of MNCs. The book is indeed
ideal for readers from different spectrums and interests. Graduate students in particular, would
find the composition of each chapter very useful; each of the seven chapters contains an
executive summary and list of references for future readings, as well as up-to-date and relevant
case studies for further discussions. Further, many of the concepts and discussions are based on
well grounded theories, and the list of propositions regarding dimensions of corporate
governance would also be very useful to research students and academics.
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Comments by Paul Rosenfield on a Review by Professor George J. Benston in The
International Journal of Accounting (42 [2007] 216-219) of Rosenfield's book
Contemporary issues in financial reporting: A user-oriented approach
1. Overall comments
I suspect that a different kind of review would have been produced by someone with
fundamental positions on financial reporting that differ from those of the reviewer.
I can make the following comments:
• The review states that I define "current selling price reporting (CSPR)" as reporting
"assets and liabilities...continuously at their [current] selling...prices." However, I define
CSPR in the first sentence of Chapter 14 to refer only to assets, not to liabilities.
• The review states that I do not "discuss the FASB's current move towards restating assets. . .at
their fair values." I do discuss that, in the section on "Creeping In" at the end of Chapter 14.
• The review states that I do not show how to present one set of financial statements with
the numbers defined in terms of the consumer general purchasing power of the unit of
money. I do refer on page 263 to illustrations of how to do it, in AICPA, "General Price-
Level Changes," and SFAS No. 89.
• The review states that I don't mention work in progress in connection with CSPR. I do
refer to work in progress in that connection, on page 323.
• The review states that I haven't considered "the extent to which financial statements
prepared with exit values would be of value to investors." I have considered that, in the
section "CSPR and the User-Onented Criteria" in Chapter 14.
The review states that my use of quotations comprises a "substantial portion of the
book," as if that were a bad thing. It gives no recognition to my reasons for including the
quotations, among which were as follows:
92 Book reviews
• This is a textbook on many of the most important issues in financial reporting. I
considered it important to inform the students of the variety of opinions on the issues, not
merely by referring to them, but also by quoting typical passages in the literature stating
those opinions. I did this in place of including whole articles as many such books do
(except that I included one whole (short) article).
• The quotations are well stated and I believed they give the students insight into the
positions on the issues in addition to the way I state them.
• The review complains that I don't include supporting reasoning, example, or study with
the quotations. First, many of the quotations include such support. Moreover, I provide
the needed reasoning, examples, and studies in the material I provide introducing the
quotations.
• The review states that "since many assets. . .have no ready markets, accountants would
have to estimate the [current selling] prices'' and that "exit values might be estimated
with appraisals that could not readily be validated." It does not refer to my discussion of
evidence for the measurement and auditing of current selling prices on pages 311 to 3 14,
in which I discuss the difficulties that implementation of CSPR can cause and give
guidance for dealing with the difficulties.
The review reflects the view that I have failed to make my arguments stand on their own,
apart from the quotations: "it was difficult for me, at least, to discern just what Rosenfield,
himself, is critical of and. of greater importance, his reasoning and evidence for that criticism."
I challenge the reviewer to specify even one ofmy conclusions that is not stated clearly and is
not supported fully by the reasoning and evidence I present apart from the quotations.
2. Specific comments
The review ignores the real reasons I present for my position that the amounts in current
financial statements cannot be successfully audited, which are that
• The majority of the amounts in current financial statements result from systematic and
rational allocation and from thoughts of the issuers of the statements about future
events.
• The results of systematic and rational allocation do not purport to represent anything
outside themselves and thereby involve nothing that can be observed and verified by
independent observers.
• The thoughts of others cannot be audited; as Kam says, "we cannot be expected to read
people's minds."
The review states that it "found it quite difficult..to determine the specifics of [my]
complaints." I believe they are stated specifically, even forthnghtly (see page 6 in the book),
throughout. Because of space limitations, here are only a few examples of many such
conclusions:
• Pages 8 to 10: The 37 ideas listed on those pages, which in effect summarize many of
my complaints in a specific manner.
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• Page 33: "three ways in which financial reporting didn't evolve completely in
fundamental areas: ( 1 ) from accountability reporting to reporting for accountability and
economic decisions, (2) from venture reporting to time period reporting, and (3) to the
concept of the reporting entity as the sole focus of attention."
• Page 261: "Defining the unit of measure in terms of the debt-paying power rather than
the consumer general purchasing power of the dollar forces presentation of amounts
[that] violate the. . .criterion that the financial statements be understandable to the users."
• Page 304: "Current selling price is the only attribute of an asset measurable in terms of
consumer general purchasing power at [the current] date in the world outside of...
thinking [about the future] and outside of. . .preparation of a presentation of [the] current
situation in terms of consumer general purchasing power."
• Page 366: "A new section of the income statement on investments in prospects,
indicating amounts charged to expense spent to enhance prospects. . .could help the users."
"Entrance values" are "clearly" not "more meaningful to stockholders of going concerns
than exit values," because entrance values, defined as the prices at which the reporting
entity can currently buy assets it owns, don't exist, or, as the prices reporting entities would
have to pay to buy assets it doesn't own, are not part of the financial position or history of
the reporting entity. The latter are part of the buying opportunities of the reporting entity,
about which financial statements should not report, but, if necessary, disclose.
I think that Robert Herz and David Tweedie, the chairmen of the FASB and the 1ASB,
would not agree that my views "reflect, to a substantial degree, the thinking of FASB and
IASB policy makers."
Paul Rosenfield
Accounting Standards Division,
American Institute o/CPAs.
United States
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2008.01.006
Response by George J. Benston to comments by Paul Rosenfield on a review of
Contemporary issues in financial reporting: A user-oriented approach published in the
International Journal of Accounting (42 |2007| 216-219)
As an author of a recently published book, I am painfully aware of the effort and thought
necessary to organize and present a substantial manuscript. Paul Rosenfield clearly
expended this effort. To the extent that I have not been fair or accurate in reviewing his work,
he has the right to object and I commend the Editor for giving him this opportunity. It also
provides readers of the 1JA with a continuing debate on perhaps the most important issue
facing accounting - how should the reported numbers be stated: at their historical cost,
replacement (entrance) cost, or net disposal (exit) value?
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Rosenfield first lists five errors in my review. ( 1 ) He correctly points out that I wrote that he
defines his suggested current selling price reporting (CSPR), exit-value measure as applying to
liabilities as well as assets. I should have stated that his application ofCSPR is inconsistent, as
he applies it only to assets. (2) His "discussion" ofthe FASB's current move to fair-accounting
consists of a list of applications. 1 had hoped for an analysis and critique. (3) He does refer to a
paper showing how price-level adjustments might be made. (4) He mentions inventories
within a discussion of specialized assets, both of which he would write down to scrap value,
since the revenue they might generate is a gamble that might not pay off. (5) He does, indeed,
assert that CSPR-based financial statements would be relevant to users, because the numbers
reported would show the extent to which the firm is "increasing its current possession of or
access to consumer general purchasing power. (This is the central argument in this book in
favor ofCSPR) [p. 308]." CSPR is relevant if shareholders and creditors wanted to know what
they might get if the firm were liquidated and the assets and liabilities could be sold and
discharged at the amounts specified in the balance sheet. I submit (again) that this information
is of limited value to investors.
Rosenfield next objects to my implied criticism of his extensive use of short quotations.
If readers find this a useful way to learn about the opinions and observations of a large
number of authorities, they will appreciate his considerable effort to put these together in
one book. I did not find it helpful to get opinions and arguments in the form of assertions
and observations in the form of "sound bites."
Rosenfield's next "bullet point" relates to a very important issue - how the selling
prices of assets might be determined. In the three and a bit pages where he discusses this
issue, he presents eleven quotations. These writers and Rosenfield observe that both exit
and entrance prices are "fictions" - amounts that could be received or paid. He then
concludes: "If no reliable evidence is available ... the resource should be disclosed but not
reported as an asset." I now understand why he doesn't mention auditing problems,
because assets with no ready markets would be recorded at zero. Furthermore (as he states
next), there would be no allocations of costs over future period. The resulting statements, I
submit, would receive high marks for reliability, but low marks for relevance.
Among his "specific comments" Rosenfield says that I should have found his opinions
easy to discern, citing page 6, where he writes: "I have forthrightly stated my own views ...."
That paragraph is dominated by two quotes that give other people's views. The next pages
cited (8- 10) do indeed present a list of37 "ideas." Scattered throughout are many statements
that are more accurately described as aphorisms (e.g., financial statements should ... not
incorporate false assumptions, not affirm and deny the same thing, and obey the rules of
arithmetic; financial reporters shouldn't play tricks on the users, the map isn't the territory,
and issues that have long evaded solution in financial reporting should be solved or
reformulated). In the body of the book his conclusions do appear, as he says. I found them
difficult to dig out from the heaps of quotations.
Rosenfield summarizes his objection to entrance values in a way that illustrates my basic
conceptual concerns with his book. He dismisses present values because they are very
unreliable, an objection that I share. Entrance values, he points out, "don't exist ... [because]
they are not part of the financial position or history of the reporting entity." The same
objection, though, applies to exit values, since the enterprise's assets were not sold. Only
historical costs can meet this attribute of numbers that should be presented in financial
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statements. The key attributes, though, I submit, are "trustworthiness" and "relevance to
investors in going concerns," with the caveat that numbers that are not trustworthy are not, as a
result, relevant. Entrance prices for many important assets (e.g., inventories, securities, and
other assets that usually are replaced in kind) are trustworthy and relevant to investors in going
concerns. They could (and, I believe, should) be recorded at entrance values in the balance
sheet, with holding gains or losses reported in the income statement, consistent with the
matching concept. For example, if there were a realized loss on a derivative that hedged an
asset that increased in value by at least as much as the loss, the loss amount would be recorded
as a deferred expense or as an increase in the asset.
In contrast, the exit prices that Rosenfield and the FASB proposes not only often are not
trustworthy, but are not relevant to investors in going concerns. Furthermore, exit prices are
difficult to apply consistently and are subject to manipulation by opportunistic or dishonest
managers. Those problems are shown in an analysis of the illustrations offered in Appendix A
(Implementation Guidance) to the FASB's Statement of Financial Standards 157 (September
2006). I analyzed each ofthese examples that were chosen by the FASB staff(Benston, 2007).
Several of the examples use present values and entrance costs rather than the called-for exit
prices. Transactions costs are supposed to be, but occasionally are not, excluded. Most
importantly, in situations where there are not ready markets in which similar goods and
services are traded, managers are supposed to determine the prices that hypothetical firms
operating in hypothetical markets might offer. Considering that Rosenfield would have the
accounting profession adopt exit prices, I expected him to show, as did the FASB staff, how
this repricing could be implemented. Had he done so, I believe he would have recognized the
basic shortcomings of his proposed change.
Reference
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Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance. Thomas A. Lee, John Wiley and Sons,
Chichester, England (2006), xxi+ 286 pages, GBP 29.00, ISBN 10: 0-470-02681-2
Readers attracted by the title of the book because they are interested in the relationships
between financial reporting and corporate governance might be somewhat disappointed by
reading Thomas Lee's book. They will not find any in-depth analysis aimed at determining
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whether and how accounting figures and related disclosures can help mitigate corporate
governance problems. Despite its title, the book is primarily a text-book devoted to students and
practitioners with no accounting background "who need some understanding of accounting"
(p. xix). It is aimed at helping them "access financial statements without the fear, uncertainty, and
skepticism that too often causes financial results to be misinterpreted, misused and, more often,
ignored" (p. xix). In conformity with this goal, the book provides a presentation of the financial
reporting environment and process, a review of the purposes and contents of financial
statements, an explanation of the objectives and methods of corporate auditing, notably in the
context of creative accounting. The book provides at last an introduction to the basic tools of
financial statement analysis. Actually, the book title seems motivated by the fact that each topic
under study refers to subjects more or less directly related to corporate governance, financial
reporting being by nature one of the corporate governance instruments.
The material covered is organized in 10 chapters. The introductory one focuses on the
corporate environment and the various needs of financial statement users. Chapter 2 is the only
one specifically dedicated to corporate governance. It reviews the mechanisms used to ensure
that managers' decisions are consistent with shareholders' interests. Chapter 3 describes the
objectives of financial accounting. It focuses on the main accounting conventions, and on the
numerous legal or regulatory provisions governing the production of accounting information.
Each ofthe chapters 3 to 7 is devoted to a specific financial statement: income statement (chapter
4), cash flow statement (chapter 5). balance sheet (chapter 6), other corporate statements
(comprehensive income statement, shareholders' equity statement, and statement of accounting
policy. .
.) (chapter 7). These 4 chapters explain the main characteristics, uses, conventions and
regulations affecting each statement. Chapter 8 analyzes the nature and purpose of corporate
audit. It deals with the need for independent and competent auditors, the legal and regulatory
responsibilities of auditors, and the relationships between external auditors, internal auditors and
audit committee. Chapter 9 is less usual in textbooks introducing financial accounting. It is
entirely dedicated to the management ofearnings and financial statements. This chapter provides
the author with the opportunity to analyze both the flexibility inherent in accounting rules and
practices, and the motivation for creative accounting. It also points out the role of auditors in
validating the quality of financial report content. At last, chapter 10 shows how accounting
numbers can be used to gauge the financial position of a company.
A major strength of Thomas Lee's book comes from the clear presentation of the main
financial accounting issues. In addition to discussion questions, problems and related
additional literature, each chapter includes numerous examples aimed at illustrating the
practical aspects of the topics being addressed. As such, this book is a valuable resource for
those who wish to acquire skills in reading and interpreting financial accounting reports,
even though they will probably need complementary training before becoming definitely
familiar with accounting figures and practices, and with the financial reporting process.
Pascal Dumontier
HEC School of Management, University of Geneva, Switzerland
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The impact of the Multi-jurisdiction Disclosure
System on audit fees of cross-listed Canadian firms '
Joseph H. Callaghan*, Mohinder Parkash, Rajeev Singhal
Oakland University, United Slates
Abstract
The Multi-jurisdiction Disclosure System (MJDS), a treaty between Canada and the United States
(U.S.), was intended to facilitate the cross-listing of a firm's secunties in the neighboring country.
Under this system, eligible Canadian companies are allowed to use home-country documents to meet
U.S. disclosure requirements and these documents are generally not reviewed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). We posit that the single-reporting requirement and lower SEC
scrutiny may result in lower audit fees for MJDS firms. Based on audit-fee disclosures mandated by
the SEC rule-making authority granted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we find a negative
association between audit fees paid by U.S. cross-listed Canadian companies and their use of the
MJDS. This result suggests that the lower audit fees provide an economic incentive to use the MJDS.
Thus, our study provides evidence that the implementation of the MJDS may help facilitate cross-
border listings by reducing audit costs. Additionally, this study confirms, for Canadian firms, some
of the audit-fee determinants reported in earlier studies.
© 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: MJDS; Audit fees; Audit-fee determinants; Cross-listing; Cross-listed Canadian firms; Disclosure
systems
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1. Introduction
Canada and the U.S. implemented the Multi-Jurisdiction Disclosure System (MJDS) in
1991 to facilitate cross-listing of firms' securities in both countries (Securities and
Exchange Commission, 1991, 1993). A motivation for implementing the MJDS was to
reduce registration and reporting costs associated with cross-listings. Under the MJDS.
eligible U.S. cross-listed Canadian firms can use Canadian documents to meet standard U.
S. reporting requirements for foreign issuers. ' MJDS documents are generally not subject to
review by the Securities ami Exchange Commission (SEC). We posit that the single-
reporting requirement and lower SEC scrutiny may result in lower audit fees for MJDS
firms.
Regulators as well as researchers have questioned the benefits of the MJDS and there is
debate about whether to continue with the system (see the "Aircraft Carrier Release";
Houston and Jones, 1999). Based on a survey of Canadian firms, Houston and Jones (1999)
conclude that managers perceive no significant benefits of the MJDS for Canadian firms. On
the other hand, in a report to the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), Puri and Sen (2003)
find that using the MJDS to meet U.S. annual disclosure requirements results in some
financial savings. However, Puri and Sen do not observe substantial savings in accounting
and auditing fees for MJDS firms based on interviews with three Canadian MJDS issuers
and senior partners at an international accounting firm.
Canadian firms listed on U.S. exchanges are obligated to meet certain filing requirements
specified by the SEC. Under the rule-making authority granted to it by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of2002 (SOX), the SEC required cross-listed Canadian firms to disclose auditor-fee data."
These disclosure requirements present an opportunity to empirically investigate the nature
and determinants of audit fees for cross-listed Canadian firms. The limited evidence for
the determinants of audit fees for Canadian firms is both dated and based only on survey data
(Chung & Lindsay, 1988; Anderson & Zeghal, 1994). In this study, we examine the deter-
minants of audit fees based on fee data disclosed by Canadian companies listed in the U.S.
Specifically, we examine whether using the MJDS results in lower audit fees while controlling
for other known audit fee determinants.
Our sample consists of 118 Canadian firms cross-listed in 2002 and 2003, yielding
195 firm-year observations. Of these, 78 are MJDS firms, with 134 firm-year observations,
and 40 are non-MJDS firms, with 6 1 firm-year observations. We find evidence that audit
With the MJDS, the U.S. permits Canadian companies to issue securities in the U.S. under Canadian rules,
and Canada permits U.S. companies to issue securities in Canada under U.S. rules. Although the MJDS also
applies to U.S. firms cross-listmg then- securities on Canadian exchanges, this research is limited to Canadian
firms cross-listing in the U.S. Hereinafter, the MJDS refers to the system available to Canadian firms listing in the
U.S.
"" The SEC Final Rule of 2000 (File No. S7-13-0O) required these disclosures for SEC registrants filing proxy
statements on or after February 5, 2001. The SEC Final Rule of 2002 (File No. S7-49-02) required firms not
issuing proxy statements to include these disclosures in their annual filings included in Form 20-F and Form 40-F.
For Final Rule on "Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements", see http:/ sec.gov/rules/
final 53-7919.htm and for Final Rule on "Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence", see http://wvvw.sec.gov/niles/final/33-8 1 83.htm
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fees paid by MJDS firms are significantly lower than those paid by non-MJDS firms. This
result implies that Canadian firms utilizing the MJDS obtain significant economic benefits
in the form of lower audit fees. We also find that firm size, book-to-market ratio, reporting
lag, and overall industry effect are significant in explaining audit fees.
This paper makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, while SEC reporting
and disclosure requirements are costly barriers for foreign firms considering entering the
U.S. capital markets (Bhushan & Lessard, 1 992), there is debate as to whether the MJDS is
effective in facilitating cross-border listings. The lower audit fees for MJDS firms docu-
mented in this paper contributes to the debate and provides support for the continuation of
the system. Second, the results of this study may be useful for firms that are considering
cross-listing, for audit firms taking cross-listed firms as clients, and for regulatory autho-
rities. Third, DeFond and Francis (2005) in a recent paper argue in favor of more research
on the effects of alternative institutional arrangements on auditing. In this spirit, we
analyze and confirm some of the underlying determinants of audit fees for a new insti-
tutional arrangement. Finally, this study confirms for Canadian firms some of the audit fee
determinants reported in earlier studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and
presents the research hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research design and presents the
empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Background and research hypothesis
The MJDS allows eligible issuers to satisfy registration and reporting requirements by
providing the SEC with disclosure documents prepared under Canadian securities laws. At
the time the SEC adopted the MJDS, Canada adopted a parallel MJDS for U.S. issuers.
Together, the system provides that issuers in the U.S. and Canada are principally subject to
the specific disclosure requirements of only their home country. A Canadian issuer is
eligible to use the MJDS to make public offering of any security in the U.S. if it has a
minimum public float of $75 million (USD) and a minimum 12-month reporting history in
Canada. 34
Canadian firms utilizing the MJDS have to file Form 40-F with the SEC. Form 40-F is an
integrated form used both as a registration statement and as an annual report by eligible
Canadian issuers. It thus serves as a "wraparound" for the Canadian companies' public
reports. Canadian issuers submit annual reports prepared according to Canadian Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (CGAAP) to the SEC/ However, some Canadian
The "public float" of specified securities is defined as the market value of those securities held by persons
other than affiliates of the issuer. For this purpose, an "affiliate" of an issuer is anyone who beneficially owns,
directly or indirectly, or exercises control or direction over, more than 10% of the outstanding equity shares of the
issuer The determination of an issuer's affiliates is made as of the end of such issuer's most recently completed
fiscal year. See footnote 3 of Chifor (2001) for MJDS eligibility criteria.
There has been a recently proposed amendment to the MJDS that would increase the public-float requirement
from $75 million to $250 million (Chifor, 2001).
Although MJDS issuers submit annual reports prepared according to Canadian GAAP to the SEC, they are
still required to reconcile differences between Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP in Form 40-F.
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companies eligible to use the MJDS choose not to do so. h A Canadian company ineligible to
use the MJDS is required to file disclosure documents either as a foreign private issuer using
Form 20-F or as a U.S. domestic issuer using Form 10-K, which is based on U.S. GAAP.
Given these process and disclosure differences, these three regulatory possibilities may give
rise to differences in audit fees.
Simunic (1980) posits that audit fees are an increasing function of the level of audit effort
faced by an auditor. Effort differences between MJDS and non-MJDS audits may arise
from differential Generally Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAS), GAAP, and time
constraints to file annual reports with the SEC. Canadian issuers using Form 20-F and Form
40-F have to reconcile differences between Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP. The MJDS
allows Canadian GAAP financial statements, including the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, filed
with Form 40-F to be audited in accordance with Canadian GAAS. whereas financial state-
ments in Form 10-K and reconciliations in Form 20-F are audited according to U.S. GAAS
(Puri & Sen. 2003 ). Ifthe effort required to apply different G.AASs varies, then we would expect
to find differences in audit fees. The direction in effort of these differences is an empirical
question. Puri and Sen (2003) argue that "U.S. GAAS has different standards than Canadian
GAAS. ..as a result of different standards imposed by U.S. GAAS. there is an incremental cost
associated in moving from a Canadian GAAS audit under MJDS to a U.S. GAAS audit..." If
this argument hold.s. we would expect to find lower audit fees for MJDS firms.
The preparation of financial statements and any reconciliation, whether according to
Canadian GAAP or U.S. GAAP, is the responsibility of the filing firm's management.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that preparation of financial statements according to U.S. GAAP
may be cumbersome for Canadian firms. For example. Deloitte & Touche. LLP. an indepen-
dent registered chartered accounting firm based in Toronto. Canada, notes in its 2004 report to
the shareholders of Nortel Networks Corporation (a non-MJDS firm) that management has
recognized material weaknesses in the form of "lack of sufficient personnel with appropriate
knowledge, experience and training in U.S. GAAP and lack of sufficient analysis and
documentation of application ofU.S. GAAP to transaction. . .'" Such deficiencies may lead to
increased audit work and higher fees for non-MJDS Canadian issuers.
Additionally, while the SEC allows MJDS firms 1 80 days from the end oftheir fiscal year to
file Form 40-F. the time period allowed for Form 1 0-K filers is only 90 days. Iffiling in a shorter
period requires additional audit effort or costs. Canadian non-MJDS filers may have to pay an
audit premium. Furthermore, the SEC has implemented Regulation G. amending filing rules
and requiring public companies that disclose or release non-GAAP financial measures to also
include the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures in that disclosure or release. s
Some Canadian firms eligible to use the MJDS have filed Form 10-K as a U.S. domestic issuer Puri and Sen
(2003) point out that this may be because such foreign issuers want to look like domestic firms. Houston and
Jones ( 1999) note that (p. 239) •...firm files form 10-K because U.S. stockholder ownership hovers around 50%...
it files form 10-K even in years that ownership dips below 50° o when it could theoretically file other forms" Data
limitations do not permit us to infer why eligible firms choose not to utilize the MJDS
See annual report for the company at http: www.nortel.com corporate investor reports collateral'
2004annual_report.pdf.
See description of regulation G at http: www.sec.gov/rales/final/33-8176.htm.
J.H. Callaghan et al. The InternationalJournal o) Accounting 43 (2008) 99 113 103
Firms using the MJDS are exempt from this requirement. Ifthese additional disclosures require
audit, there may be more audit work and fees for companies not using the MJDS.
Simunic (1980) also posits that audit fees are an increasing function of expected
litigation losses faced by auditors. Pratt and Stice (1994) point out that auditors assess the
expected liability loss and may raise the level of effort to reduce it. It follows that audit-fee
differences may be observed when these factors vary across clients for a given audit period.
The SEC does not generally review Form 40-F, whereas both Form 20-F and Form 1 0-K are
reviewed by the SEC. Pincus, Holders, and Mock (1998) report that the SEC obtains
enforcement leads from different sources including reviews of SEC filings.'' Bonner,
Palmrose, and Young (1998) observe that enforcement actions by the SEC have resulted in
higher litigation by investors. The difference in the level of SEC scrutiny may give rise to
perceived reduction in litigation risk between a Canadian cross-listed firm using the MJDS
versus one using an alternative disclosure mechanism. The reduction in expected auditor
litigation loss with use of the MJDS may decrease audit fees.
In summary, utilizing the MJDS may result in lower expected litigation loss and less
audit effort leading to lower audit fees. This was not the findings of prior research, however;
Houston and Jones (1999) utilize data from a survey of Canadian mangers and report no
benefits of the MJDS for Canadian firms listing in the U.S. They observe no significant
increase in the U.S. cross-listing by Canadian companies following the implementation of
the MJDS and only a few of the firms that responded to their survey indicated that the
MJDS affected their decision to list on the U.S. exchanges. On the other hand, in a report to
the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), Puri and Sen (2003) find that using the MJDS to
meet U.S. annual disclosure requirements offers some financial savings. To do the cost-
benefit analysis of utilizing Form 40-F, instead of Form 20-F, they conducted extensive
interviews with numerous relevant stakeholders, including issuers, security lawyers, senior
public-accounting firm partners, and investment bankers. Additionally, Puri and Sen also
gather limited information from interviews of three Canadian MJDS issuers and senior
partners at an international accounting firm. Based on those interviews, they do not observe
substantial savings in accounting and auditing fees by firms using the MJDS.
Given the limitations inherent in prior research (such as using survey data), we want to
offer a more rigorous test of the cost differential for MJDS firms. We formulate the
following hypothesis (in the alternative form) to investigate whether there are any benefits
to firms utilizing the MJDS through the reduction in audit fees after controlling for other
known determinants of audit fees:
HI. After controlling for other determinants of audit fees, there is a negative association
between utilization of the MJDS and audit fees.
The minimum public-float requirement creates a selection system in favor of larger
firms. Any analysis of audit-fee differences between MJDS firms and non-MJDS firms
needs to mitigate the self-selection bias. We address this issue in Section 3.4 as part of
additional analyses.
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find significant association between restatements, in general, and litigation.
Palmrose. Richardson and Scholz (2004) point out that "The SEC sometimes requests a restatement after
reviewing company filings".
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3. Research design and empirical results
3.1. Research design
In this section we present an audit-fee model to test our hypothesis. The determinants of
audit fees are drawn from Simunic (1984), Palmrose (1996). Craswell and Frances (1999),
DeFond. Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) and Whisenant. Sankaraguruswamy,
and Raghunandan (2003) among others as follows:
LNAUD1T = xo + z,LNNAF + *2LNTA + a :!BIG4 + a4ROA
+ a5RETURN + aGVOLATILITY + a7LEV + asINVREC
+ *.,INSTIT_PCT + aioSPECIAL + a HBM + «12SQSEGS
+ ai3FOROPS + Xi jEMPPLAN + a15LAG + a lt;INITIAL
+ a17D2003 + aigMJDS + £ (1)
In Eq. ( 1 ), the independent variables represent agency costs, complexity of operations, size,
risk, performance, and the characteristics of the auditor. Consistent with earlier research, we
define the variables as follows:
LNAUDIT the natural log of the audit fees (S actual); 10
LNNAF the natural log of the sum of all nonaudit fees paid to the auditor (S actual);
LNTA the natural log of total assets (S thousands);
BIG4 an indicator variable equal to one when an auditor is a member of the Big 4, zero
otherwise;
ROA operating income divided by total assets:
RETURN the firm's raw stock return over the fiscal year;
VOLATILITY the variance of the residual from the market model over the current fiscal
year;
LEV total debt divided by total assets;
INVREC inventory plus accounts receivables divided by total assets;
INSTIT_PCT the percentage of institutional holdings;
SPECIAL an indicator variable equal to the absolute value of negative special items
divided by total assets, zero otherwise;
BM the book-to-market ratio;
SQSEGS the square root of number of segments:
FOROPS an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has foreign operations as indicated
by foreign currency adjustments to income, zero otherwise;
EMPPLAN an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a pension or post retirement
plan, zero otherwise;
LAG number of days between fiscal year-end and earnings announcement date;
INITIAL an indicator variable equal to one if the audit engagement is the initial two years,
zero otherwise;
If audit fees were reported in Canadian dollars, we converted audit fees to USD using prevailing currency-
exchange rates on the year-end dates. All other data obtained for this study were expressed in USD. Hereinafter,
all currency amounts are expressed in USD.
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D2003 an indicator variable equal to one if the Finn's current fiscal year is reported as
2003, zero otherwise;
MJDS an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm utilized MJDS, zero otherwise.
MJDS is our variable of interest and a significantly negative coefficient (a i8) will
confirm our hypothesis of a negative association between utilization of the MJDS and audit
fees after controlling for other known determinants of audit fees. Eq. ( 1 ) includes various
control variables to minimize the possibility that the experimental variable proxies for some
other effect. Prior research suggests that audit fees are positively related with client size
(Simunic, 1980), therefore we include LTNA to control for firm size with a predicted
positive sign. The extant literature also indicates that audit fees increase with audit
complexity. As in other studies we control for complexity by including INVREC, SQSEGS,
FOROPS, and EMPPLAN with predicted positive signs. The audit literature documents
that audit fees increase with audit risk and decrease with firm performance. As suggested by
Whisenant et al. (2003), we include ROA, RETURN, VOLATILITY, LEV, and BM to
control for audit risk and firm performance. As longer reporting lags are associated with
higher audit fees, we include LAG (Gul, 1 999). We include LNNAF to control for the effect
of nonaudit fees on audit fees (DeFond et al., 2002; Whisenant et al., 2003). BIG4 is
included as earlier studies have reported fee premia paid to larger audit firms (Whisenant et
al., 2003). As suggested by DeAngelo (1981), we include INITIAL to control for any
discounting of audit fees because of low-balling at the time of initial engagement of
auditors. Following DeFond et al. (2002) and Whisenant et al. (2003), we include
INSTIT_PCT and SPECIAL with positive predicted signs. Since we are pooling observa-
tions across two periods, we include D2003 to control for any period effect.
3.2. Sample
To construct our sample, we searched for auditor-fee data for all the 675 Canadian
incorporated firms (1350 firm-years for 2002 and 2003) present in the active and research
files of the Compustat database for the year 2003. ' ' We include data from 2002 and 2003 in
our analysis to increase the sample size and to assess the stability of parameter estimates.
We exclude observations with no Compustat data from our sample, thereby reducing the
number of observations to 498 firm-years. We use two sources to obtain the auditor-fee data
for our sample firms. First, we obtained auditor-fee data from the Compustat-provided audit
and nonaudit-fee database. Then, we searched the SEC Edgar database for proxy statements
and. Form 10-K and Form 40-F filings to obtain auditor-fee data for the remaining firms.
We could obtain fee data for 268 firm-years. For our analysis, we obtain firm-level
accounting data from Compustat, institutional holding data from Compact Disclosure, and
market data from the CRSP database. Excluding firms that have data missing from these
databases reduces the final sample to 195 firm-years. The final sample has 118 firms
(78 MJDS and 40 non-MJDS firms), yielding 1 34 firm-years for MJDS firms and 6 1 firm-years
The SEC Final Rule of 2002 requires U.S. cross-listed firms with fiscal yeai ending after December 15. 2003.
to implement provisions of SOX. including disclosure of auditor-fee data for the two most recent years
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Table 1
Sample selection from 2002 and 2003
Firm-years
Firm-years in 2004 version of Compustat for 675 Canadian firms
Less: Firm-years for inactive firms
Firm-years for active firms
Less: Firm-years with missing auditor-fee data
Firm-years with auditor-fee data
Less: Firm-years with missing institutional ownership data
Less: Finn-years with missing CRSP data
Less: Firm-years with missing Compustat data
Finn-years in final sample of 1 14 firms
Firm-years for MJDS firms
Firm-years non-MJDS firms
Number of observations common to 2002 and 2003
1350
(852)
498
(230)
268
(31)
(28)
(14)
195
134
61
82
for non-MJDS firms. Thus, as reported in Table 1 , our final sample consists of 1 95 firm-years
from fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for which we have complete accounting, institutional, and
market data. There are 82 firms with complete data for both years.
Table 2
Sample distribution of audit fees
Industry MJDS Non-MJDS Difference
Number of Median audit Number of Median audit /)-value
observations fees ($) observations fees ($) median test
Panel A Distribution of audit fees by disclosure system and imiustry
Mining and construction 25 282,000 4 157,550 0.32
Food - - 2 1,065.972 -
Textiles and printing 12 1,061,266 - - -
Chemicals 4 475,000 I 50,650 0.41
Pharmaceuticals 14 124,771 3 5 1 ,344 0.61
Extractive 9 689.655 8 245,640 0.01***
Durable manufacturers 24 531,965 14 270,159 0.18
Transportation 14 1,348,146 5 627.878 0.71
Utility 7 976.600 - - -
Financial 7 3.866.633 6 296.265 0.00***
Retail 2 189.471 2 380.500 0.08*
Services 12 632.376 4 833,602 1.00
Computers 4 263,500 12 486,588 0.26
Panel B: Audit Ices paid by disclosure system and auditor type
BIG4 124 561,489 57 368,281 0.02**
Non-BIG4 10 446,500 4 63.059 0.02**
Panel C: Audu fees paid by disclosure system and fiscal year
2002 59 537,425 36 239,235 0.04**
2003 75 593,752 25 484,176 0.01***
Change in Median ("„) 10.38 102.39
*** ** * Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.
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Table 2 shows ihe distribution of audit fees for MJDS and non-MJDS sample firms by
industry, auditor, and fiscal year. As reported in panel A of Table 2. two industries (durable
. :urers and mining and construction) have higher firm-year observations than other
industries. The mining and construction industry has the highest number (25 1 of MJDS
firm-year observations and relatively fewer non-MJDS firm-year observations (4). Firms in
: le and printing and utility, use the MJDS exclusively, while firms in one
ind_ d, are all non-MJDS. There are notable differences in median audit fees for
MJDS and non-MJDS dons in different industries. For three industries (retail.
.... . median audit fees are higher for non-MJDS observations than for
MJDS observations, whereas for all the other industries the opposite is true. Panel B of
Table 2 presents the composition of audit fees by type of auditor in different disclosure
terns. Median audit fees for MJDS firms are significantly higher (p-value<0.05) than
median audit fees for non-MJDS firms for both Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. Panel C of
Table 2 shows audit-fee composition by fiscal \ ear for the two disclosure systems.
Tab:; nep _ - ...-:nptive statistics for all variables of interest by disclosure system. The
median audit fees paid to auditors by MJDS firms is S56 1 .4S^. which is significantly higher
than it . of audit fees paid by non-MJDS firms. This max be attributable in part to
size dr~ . . ... een MJDS and non-MJDS firms. On average the total assets ofMJDS
firms are larger than those of non-MJDS by a factor of 4". We also find significant
different e disclosure systems in nonaudit fees, inventory and receivable intensity,
return volatility, reporting lag. fiscal year stock return, employee-benefit plans, and special
items. The higher new financing for MJDS firms may be the result of the relative ease with
which MJDS firms can issue equity and debt in U.S. financial markets in contrast to non-
MJDS firms. The higher reporting lag for non-MJDS firms may be an indication ofthe extra
time needed by auditors for non-MJDS firms to prepare additional disclosures. We find that
INITIAL. BIG4. and FOROPS are similar for MJDS and non-MJDS firms.
.-
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Eq. ( 1 ) using ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions with pooled data for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Pooling observations across
time may lead to dependence among observations. To mitigate this potential effect, we
include a dummy variable. D2003. We also separately estimate Eq. (1 ) for each year. To
control for possible industry effects, we include 12 dummy variables to represent
membership of 13 industry classifications (see panel A of Table 2). These results are
included in Table 4. The tests of overall model fits result in /"-statistics ranging from 16.79
5. all statistically significant (p-value<0.01). indicating that the variations in audit
fees are adequately explained by the set of independent variables included in the tested
models. We find adjusted-./?" ranging from 0.82 to 0.85 for the three regressions estimated.
The White (1980) test fails to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticiry in the data.
-port standard r-statistics. To test the possibility of multicollinearity. we
compute the IF I for each of our variables. The highest \ IF is
an 10. Kennedy (1992) indicates that VTFs of greater than 10 indicate a
llmeanty problem. Therefore, multicollineariry does not appear to be a problem
with our data. We also test the structural stability ofour model using the Chow test. We find
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Table 4
Audit-fee model
Predicted
sign
Years 2002 and 2003 j rar ; • ; Year 2
OLS estimate :srics OLS estimate
INTERCEPT 1 3 353 - . «* i 221 ... : : . - - -
LNNAF ::- « _" ...
LNTA - 0.501 I - •« - ;-...
SQSEGS - 24 0.93 " ' -
LEY - -0.161 -0.63 :: 57 57 - IV
INVREC - 0405 0.99 1
ROA 7 77 -0.010 1
[NSTTTJ'CT - -0.004 -0.00
1
-0.00" 57*
VOLATILITY - - .-
:
0.90 106
BM - 1 ... : " •**
LAG - 0.0O4 - 0.004 - 0.003 !
RETURN - 0.057 1.19 -0.130
"
.
INTTLAL - - - - •
BIG4 - 27 n - 1 - ;
EMPPLAN - -0.001 -0.01 -0.140 "• 0.106
FOROPS - 0.137 1.49* *7 - --... -0.060
SPECLVL + 22 -0.51 -0.133 . 57
D2003 121
MJDS - M -4.42*** - ...
MINE-CONS 9 -1.90* - - 2S
FOOD 0.88 - " 572
"
TEX_PRINT 87 57 •: -0.001 0.00
CHEMICAL -0 452 -1.19
"
24 57S -1.01
PHAR.\L\ -0.405 -130 -0.521 -1.20 -"•" - -
EXTRACT -224 -0.503 " -
DCR_MAN -0.147 52 -0.093 - "
TRANSP -0241 n -0-508 -1.14 -0.132 27
UTILITY -0.22 -0.62 0.41 --• .
FIN -0.094 -0.30 -0.150 - -0.062 -0.13
SER\TCES 0.174 056 0.102 23 :-
COMPUTER 1 0.005 0.02 -0.341 TA ;:
Observations 195 100
/-"-statistic i
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted fr 84 85 82
***. **.
'Significance at the 0.01. 0.05.
predictions, two-tailed tests otheru ise
and 0.10 levels. respecu\ el>. based on one-tailed tc^
no evidence of structural changes between 2002 and 20 ae=0.65). Our main
vanable of interest. MJDS. has a significantly negative coefficient (j»-vahie<0-05, one-
tailed) for the pooled data, as well as for individual years. This provides support for HI
indicating that the U.S. cross-listed Canadian companies utilizing the MJDS paj lower
audit fees than non-MJDS forms after controlling for other audit-fee determinants. The
lower audit fees paid b\ MJDS firms provide an economic advantage for those firms
availing themseh es of this cross-listing mechanism.
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We also find that the coefficients of LNNAF, LNTA, BM, and LAG are significantly
(p-value<0.05, one- or two-tailed) different than zero. The coefficient of LNNAF is
positively significant, using two-tailed tests, for pooled and individual year observations.
This result is consistent with prior research on the relationship of nonaudit and audit fees,
indicating possible knowledge spillovers (Simunic, 1984). The significantly positive
coefficient on firm size is consistent with earlier Canadian studies that found higher audit
fees for larger firms (Chung & Lindsay, 1988; Anderson & Zeghal, 1994). In contrast to
the results reported in DeFond et al. (2002) and Whisenant et al. (2003), we find the
coefficient on BM to be positively significant. The coefficient on LAG is positively
significant, indicating higher audit fees for longer reporting lags, which is consistent with
results reported in earlier studies (e.g., Gul, 1999). Even though MJDS firms are allowed a
longer time period to meet their filing requirements, we observe shorter reporting lags for
these firms (see Table 3), which may have an indirect effect on audit fees. The coefficient
of INITIAL is negatively significant (/rvalue <0. 10), indicating the low-balling discount
effect predicted by DeAngelo (1981).
We perform a partial F-test on the industry dummy variables and find significant
industry effect (/?-value<0.01). We find significant coefficient only on EXTRACT,
indicating that the extractive industry has significantly lower audit fees.
3.4. Additional analyses
The results in Table 3 indicate that firms utilizing the MJDS are significantly larger in
size. To test for possible model misspecification with respect to firm size and endogeneity
of MJDS choice, we perform three analyses. First, we calculate the correlation of the
residuals obtained from Eq. ( 1 ) with firm size (LNTA). We find no correlation implying the
independence of firm size and the error process. Second, to test for endogeneity of MJDS
choice, we model MJDS as a function of firm size and industry membership. We use
PROBIT regression to estimate the MJDS model and OLS regression for the audit-fee
model (e.g., see DeFond et al., 2002). Then, we employ the Hausman (1978) test to check
for endogeneity. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. Third,
although the Hausman test fails to detect endogeneity of MJDS choice, we use a two-stage
least-square estimation procedure to directly control for the possible misspecification. The
untabulated results are qualitatively similar to the reported OLS results. Based on preceding
analyses, our results are robust to possible model misspecification with respect to firm size
and endogeneity of MJDS choice.
The number of observations reported in Table 1 indicates that there are 82 firms in our
sample with complete data for both years. In order to ensure that the reported results are not
driven by differences in firm-year observations, we estimate Eq. (1) using only those
observations having data for both periods. Our main result is qualitatively similar to the
result reported in Table 4.
We use outlier detection and estimation methods of Huber (1973), Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984), Yohai
(1987), and Rousseeuw and Van Dnessen (submitted for publication). The four procedures resulted in
identification of three, five, one, and 10 outliers, respectively. The resulting estimated regressions are qualitatively
similar to OLS regressions reported in Table 4.
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The information in panel A of Table 2 indicates that the audit-fee distribution across
industries and disclosure systems warrants additional analyses to test the robustness of the
results. First, mining and construction has the highest number (25) of MJDS firm-year
observations and relatively fewer non-MJDS firm-year observations (4). Second, two
industries, textile and printing and utility, have firms that use the MJDS exclusively, while
one industry, food, has all non-MJDS. Third, for three industries (retail, services, and
computers) median audit fees are higher for non-MJDS observations than for MJDS
observations, whereas for all the other industries the opposite is true. We re-estimate Eq. ( 1
)
by: (i) excluding observations from mining and construction industry, (ii) excluding
observations from food, textile and printing, and utility industries, and (iii) excluding
observations from retail, services, and computers industries. The untabulated results remain
qualitatively unchanged from those previously reported.
In Table 4, we observe a positive association between audit and nonaudit fees. Earlier
research interpreted the observed association between audit and nonaudit fees as suggesting
knowledge spillover between these services (Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1996; Davis,
Ricchiute, & Trompeter, 1993; Bell, Landsman, & Shackelford, 2001). However, these
inferences were based on single-equation estimation of audit-fee and nonaudit-fee models.
Recent research proposes that audit and nonaudit fees may be simultaneously determined.
Therefore, the relationship between audit and nonaudit fees may be biased when single-
equation estimation is used (Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy, & Zhou, 2002; Whisenant
et al., 2003). u If simultaneously determined, both audit and nonaudit fees are endogenous
to a system of equations. Treating audit and nonaudit fees as endogenous does not
qualitatively change our results with respect to the effect of MJDS choice on audit fees. I4
4. Concluding remarks
We have extended prior research on the determinants of audit fees to consider the
influence of the MJDS on audit fees for U.S. cross-listed Canadian firms. The empirical
results provide support for the assertion that cross-listed Canadian companies utilizing the
MJDS pay lower audit fees than do non-MJDS firms, after controlling for other known
determinants of audit fees. This result implies that Canadian firms utilizing the MJDS
obtain significant economic benefits in the form of lower audit fees. Foreign firms
acknowledge that the SEC reporting and disclosure requirements are costly barriers to enter
U.S. capital markets. The implementation of the MJDS by the SEC as a bilateral agreement
13 For U.S. data. Whisenant et al. (2003) report no association between audit and nonaudit fees when the system
of audit and nonaudit fees equations is simultaneously estimated. In contrast, using audit and nonaudit data from
the United Kingdom, Antle et al. (2002) find evidence of a significant association between audit and nonaudit
fees.
14
The variables explaining nonaudit fees are identified from Parkash and Venable (1993). Firth (1997), DeFond
et al. (2002), Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) and Whisenant et al. (2003) and are LNAUDIT, LNTA, BIG4,
ROA, RETURN, LEV, rNSTIT_PCT, SPECIAL, BM, SQSEGS, FOROPS, EMPPLAN, INITIAL, MERGER,
FINANCE, SALES GROWTH, and MJDS. SALES GROWTH is growth rate in sales over the previous fiscal
year, MERGER equals one if the firm acquired another firm during the current fiscal year, zero otherwise, and
FINANCE equals one if the firm issues either equity or long-term debt in either the current or the subsequent
fiscal vear, zero otherwise.
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with Canadian regulatory authorities was an important step in facilitating globalization of
capital markets. By showing at least one advantage related to accounting and disclosure,
our study provides support for the policy adopted by the SEC. Only Canadian firms cross-
listed in the U.S. disclose auditor-fee data. Therefore, the results on determinants of audit
fees should be interpreted with caution, as they may not apply to other Canadian firms.
Finally, this paper does not address the issue of audit fees for U.S. firms cross-listed on
Canadian exchanges.
This paper does not specifically address the issue of all costs and benefits associated with
MJDS choice. Future research is required on this issue. Future research could also profitably
examine specific determinants ofMJDS choice, the potential for similar agreements with other
jurisdictions, and the influence of institutional arrangements on audit and accounting fees for
cross-listed firms. The study of the effects on audit fees resulting from specific changes in
institutional arrangements, like SOX and harmonization of international reporting standards,
may also enhance our understanding of audit-fee determination.
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Abstract
This study addresses how a stock market prices earnings components around a sudden and severe
economic downturn. In particular, the study examines the market valuation of discretionary accruals
for debt renegotiating Malaysian firms during the Asian financial crisis. Our analysis shows that
negative discretionary accruals for debt renegotiating firms are associated with higher market values
of equity and are not related to the firms' future earnings. These findings are consistent with
investors placing a positive value on the probability that negative accruals increase the likelihood
that concessions can be extracted from lenders during renegotiation. In contrast, discretionary
accruals for a control sample of non-debt renegotiating firms are not significantly associated with
stock prices but are positively associated with future earnings.
Crown Copyright © 2008 Published by University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
JEL classification M410; M210
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1. Introduction
Prior research confirms that accruals have incremental information content in explaining
share prices and that accruals ability to predict future cash flows is incremental to the predictive
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0020-7063/$30.00. Crown Copyright © 2008 Published by University of Illinois. All rights reserved,
doi: 10 101 6/j.intacc.2008.04.002
K. Ahmed el al. I The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 114-138 1 1
5
ability ofpast cash flows (Bowen, Burgstahler, & Daley 1 987; Dechow, 1 994; Dechow, Kothari,
& Watts, 1998; Pfeiffer, Elgers, Lo, & Rees, 1998). However, while the market values accruals
positively when managers convey a credible signal of their private information about firms'
future profitability, the market may value accruals negatively or ignore them if investors believe
that managers use accruals to disguise the underpinning economic performance of the firm
(Schipper, 1989; Holthausen. 1990; Healy & Palepu, 1993).
In this paper, we exploit a unique opportunity and database to investigate the capital
market perception of financially distressed firms' discretionary accruals during a sudden
and severe economic downturn. More specifically, we examine the market valuation of the
discretionary accruals of Malaysian listed firms that undertook debt renegotiations
following actual debt default during the Asian financial crisis and compare this with a set of
similarly poor performing firms that did not undertake debt renegotiations. The uniqueness
of the sample and the temporal and national setting limits the generalizability of our
findings. More importantly, though, it contributes to the internal validity of assessing
perceptions of capital market participants of financially troubled firms' discretionary
accruals when the general economic climate becomes suddenly and severely adverse.
Consistent with prior research, we debate two conflicting theoretical arguments. If
signalling theory applies, investors consider that discretionary accruals signal private
information regarding the firm's future performance and the association between discretionary
accruals and market value should be positive. An alternative view drawn from contracting
theory is that investors expect managers to manage earnings to extract concessions from the
lending agencies that might pull the firm out of its financial distress. In periods of poor
performance, managers are more likely to be concerned about their firms' survival in a sluggish
economy than with maintaining a reputation for credible communication (see Warner, Watts, &
Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995). Therefore, incentives such as
maximising concessions might dominate in these periods. If the market perceives that these
incentives are dominant, then the relation between market value and discretionary accruals
should be negative (Gul, Leung, & Srinidhi, 2000; Balsam, Bartov, & Marquardt, 2002).
Watts and Zimmerman ( 1 990) and Holthausen ( 1 990) explain the signalling perspective and
two contracting perspectives in detail to differentiate opportunistic and efficient contracting.
Although we describe the motivations for earnings management, we are more concerned with
its effects, which we do not necessarily attribute as being opportunistic or efficient because of
the empirical difficulty of distinguishing the contracting incentives. We also believe that it is
difficult to distinguish the opportunism and efficiency contracting perspectives because the
outcome could be consistent with one contracting perspective but managers' motivations might
be consistent with another (e.g.. ex ante, if managers aim to transfer funds from lenders to
shareholders this is opportunistic in relation to the debt contract.
Using a large sample of 21,135 firm-years over 1973-93, Subramanyam (1996) finds
that both stock returns and future profitability are associated with discretionary accruals.
Subramanyam's results are consistent with the signalling hypothesis that discretionary
accruals convey credible information and improve the ability of earnings to reflect firms'
economic value. Xie (2001) extends Subramanyam (1996) and reports that the market
overprices discretionary accruals relative to their association with one-year ahead earnings.
He concludes that the overpricing of discretionary accruals is attributable to placing value
on managerial discretion. However, neither study addresses whether the market responds
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differently to discretionary accruals under different circumstances. When Gul et al. (2000)
investigate this issue, they examine the valuation of discretionary accruals of high growth
and high debt U.S. firms. They report that discretionary accruals of high growth firms are
more predictive of future profits than the discretionary accruals of low growth firms. In
contrast, discretionary accruals of high debt firms are less predictive of future profits than
do the discretionary accruals of low debt firms.
Ahmed and Zhou (2000) find that U.S. firms' earnings multiples are significantly higher for
large income increasing discretionary accruals than for small discretionary accruals. However,
the effect of income decreasing discretionary accruals depends on the reporting firm's current
performance. For high-performing firms, earnings multiples are significantly lower for large
income decreasing discretionary accruals than for discretionary accruals. This is consistent
with investors viewing the income decreasing discretionary accruals as transitory. In periods of
low performance, however, earnings multiples are significantly higher for large income
decreasing discretionary accruals than for small discretionary accruals.
Our study contributes to this strand of literature by examining two distinct samples:
firms that have violated debt covenants due to financial distress and sought government or
lender concessions in renegotiated debt agreements, and firms that experienced similar
financial trouble without violating debt covenants. Our results show that discretionary
accruals during the debt renegotiation periods are generally negative and associated with
higher market values of equity for debt renegotiating firms, but not for non-renegotiating
firms. Together, these findings suggest that market participants perceive that managers
manage discretionary accruals to achieve government or lender concessions during debt
renegotiation, consistent with Giammarino (1989). Additionally, future net earnings of
these firms and their discretionary accruals are not significantly correlated during the debt
renegotiation period, suggesting that managers of renegotiating firms did not use discre-
tionary accruals to signal future earnings potential to the market.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the Malaysian
institutional setting during the Asian Financial Crisis. Section 3 discusses the incentives of
the managers of Malaysian firms undertaking debt contract renegotiations after violating
debt covenants and of those firms not undertaking debt renegotiation, and develops the
hypotheses. Research methods and data collection are described in section 4, followed by a
discussion of the descriptive statistics and correlation structure in Section 5. The empirical
results and the association between firms' discretionary accruals and their future
performance are presented in Section 6. Section 7 summarises and concludes.
2. Institutional background: financial crisis and corporate debt during the economic
crisis in Malaysia
Malaysia had an impressive record of economic performance during the 1980s.
However, the country's economy began to suffer badly with the Asian financial crisis
beginning mid 1997. The immediate impact was evident from a sharp decline in the value of
the Malaysian Ringgit, GNP and stock market (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2000). During the
crisis, total after tax earnings of listed non-finance-sector firms declined from
RM25.5 billion in 1996 to RM22.5 billion in 1997 and further to RM-11.41 billion in
1998, despite an increase in the number of firms listed on Bursa Malaysia (formerly Kuala
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Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE)). ' In light of an increasing number of firms facing
financial difficulty, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) was formed in
July 1998 to facilitate debt and corporate restructuring, and to avoid placing viable firms in
liquidation or receivership. However, only firms that had at least RM50 million total
borrowings were eligible to apply for CDRC assistance.
In June 1998, another body known as Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad
(Danaharta) was established by the government to remove non-performing loans (NPLs)2
from the banking system by purchasing NPLs representing outstanding borrowings of
RM5 million or more. Most small firms did not meet these criteria and hence undertook
debt restructuring directly with their lenders.
Defaulted firms that were ineligible to receive assistance from the CDRC or Danaharta
could also utilize an option to restructure their debt in accordance with provisions in Section
1 76 ofthe Companies Act, 1965. Section 176(10) enables a company to obtain a restraining
order from further proceedings by the creditors prior to reaching a compromise, or
proposing an arrangement until approval by the Court. These firms have to undertake debt
restructuring with their lenders directly.
3. Hypothesis development
Evidence indicates that secured bank lenders usually make arrangements with borrowers
to facilitate their financial difficulties during economic recessions (Asquith, Gertner, &
Scharfstein, 1994). Accordingly, managers may have incentives to take advantage of
information asymmetries and misrepresent their firms' values in order to extract maximum
concessions from lenders during debt contract renegotiations (Bergman & Callen, 1991;
Giammanno, 1989). DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) argue that corporate
managers oftroubled firms adopt income decreasing accounting practices to signal that they
are serious about streamlining their firms' operations. In each ofthe situations described
above, negative earnings management is considered "good news" for investors.
In contrast to their incentives to manage earnings downwards, managers are likely to
have personal incentives to manage earnings upwards. During threats to their job security,
combined with a managerial labor market slump, managers would have incentives to use
income increasing accounting techniques (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995).
To test investors' perceptions ofthe effects of earnings management we assess the value
relevance of discretionary accruals during a sudden and severe economic downturn using
firms that violated debt covenants. This context helps to test whether investors eliminate
1
There were 621 of firms on the board in 1996, 708 firms m 1997 and 736 firms in 1998.
" Non-performing loans mean loans which are in arrears for over 6 months as defined by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Refer to http://dsbb.imf.org/country/mys/aabmeth.htm for further information.
Following the purchase of NPLs, Danaharta appoints an administrator for the defaulted firm to help overcome
its operational difficulties and to develop a proposal for long-term viability. In this way borrowing firms become
indebted to Danaharta, and the appointed administrator remains responsible to it for operations and performance.
By the end of 1999. total non-performing loans bought by Danaharta were RM45.521 billion (Bank Negara
Malaysia, 2000).
4
Under the Section 176 alternative, a scheme has to be approved by 75% in value and a simple majority in
number of each class of creditors present and voting before a court sanction (restrainmg order) is sought.
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competing reporting incentives so as to focus on the effects of discretionary accruals on the
value of their equity.
During the Asian financial crisis, the Malaysian government instituted support
mechanisms to assist debt-ridden firms by facilitating debt restructuring and or refinancing
with lenders. Firms that were eligible to receive such support can be expected to minimize
their reported earnings to improve chances of acceptance or to obtain favorable refinancing
terms (JohL Jubb. & Houghton. 200r ). Those firms with no chance of qualifying for
government aid and that renegotiated with their lenders directly can be expected, similarly,
to reduce earnings in an attempt to extract maximum concessions from lenders. This
incentive may be particularly more important when lenders know that debt amounts exceed
the salvage value of the collateral (Shleifer & Vishny. 1992 1.
In summary, negative discretionary accruals of firms that violate debt covenants during
an economic downturn can signal to lenders and investors a willingness to acknowledge
and deal with the firm's problems. They may also assist managers involved in debt
renegotiations to minimize the cost or maximize the financial benefits of the renegotiations.
Positive discretionary accruals may help some managers to mitigate adverse attention to
their managerial performance. Nonetheless, we expect that investors will focus more upon
the direct impact upon equity values from debt concession.
Expect that the benefits to investors from downward earnings management would
dominate any benefits from upward earnings management. Prior literature suggests that the
government is likely to protect industries during a financial crisis (Peltzman. 1976). and
there is a history of government backed financial aid to firms in Malaysia (Gomez & Jomo.
1997; Johnson & Mitton. 2003).
.rail, in the context of this study, we also expect that investors would be aware of their
firms' debt covenant violations, and would perceive that an increased probability of debt
concessions from current period negative discretionary accruals would transfer wealth to
them. We predict that negative discretionary accruals are reflected in higher market values
for companies that violated their debt covenants and undertook debt renegotiation. This
gives rise to a negative relation between these firms' discretionary accruals and their market
value, as predicted in H 1
:
H,. The more negative their discretionary accruals, the higher was the market value of
equity for Malaysian firms that renegotiated their v iolated debt agreements during the Asian
financial crisis.
We test this hypothesis using a sample of firms that survived the financial cnsis. While
this particular sample survivorship bias increases the power of our analysis by focusing
upon firms most likely to benefit from negative discretionary accruals, it suffers from
selection bias that is not evaluated in this study.
During economic crisis, poor performing firms that have not violated debt covenants
may also engage in income reducing activity, albeit to a lesser extent, in order to report
The Government of Malaysia established the National Economic Action Committee (NEAC) on 7 January
act as a consultative bod .mment This committee recommended a portfolio of arrangements
itional Economic Recovery Plan fNERP) to deal with the current and short-term issues and to ensure
sustainable economic growth of the country.
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subsequently higher earnings and to blame the economic downturn for their current poor
performance (Johl et al.. 200"). Managers of these firms might expect the market to
condone managerial discretion to reduce income during an economic recession. Reducing
reported earnings may also signal to the market that managers are seriously streamlining
their operations with a view to improving performance. Alternatively, managers of non-
renegotiating firms also have incentives to manage earnings upwards to distinguish their
performance from that ofcoa enant-\ lolating firms' managers. These competing incentives
do not allow predicting or direction. Hence, our second hypothesis is null:
H
:
. There is no association between discretionary accruals and the market value of equity
for Malaysian firms that did not violate debt covenants and did not undertake debt
renegotiation during the Asian financial crisis.
Regardless of investors' perceptions, if managers use discretionary accruals to signal
their expectations of future performance, the following hypothesis should hold:
H3 . There is a positive association between discretionary accruals and the future operating
earnings of debt renegotiating and non-renegotiating Malaysian firms during the \m.\ii
financial crisis.
4. Research design and sample selection
4. 1. The valuation model
We apply a price model that uses the market value ofequity (MYE ) as the dependent \ ariable
and operating cash flows (OCF), non-discretionary accruals (NDAC). and discretionary
accruals (DAC) as the independent variables for testing hypotheses one and two. We also
include the book value ofequity (BYE) in the regression model, following Barth. Beaver, and
Landsman ( 1 908a), Barth. Goster. Clement, and Kasznik ( 1 9Q8b) and Collins. Pincus, and Xie
(1999). Following Easton (1998) and Ahmed and Zhou (2000). we deflate M\"E. OCF and
BYE by the book value ofequity at the beginning of the period to mitigate hereroscesdasticitx
Prior studies use other variables that affect discretionary7 accruals and which, in mm. may
affect the valuation of earnings. We include several control variables: audit qualifications
(AuditQ). changes in senior management (ChgMgt). leverage (Lev), size of the audit firm
(Big-5). profitability (ROD and managerial ownership (Mowner). Hodge. Martin, and Pratt
(2005) report that an income decreasing accounting change accompanied by an audit quali-
fication generates financial report user skepticism and affect users' assessment-- o\ firms'
current and future financial performance. K.nshnan. Percy, and Turned (2002) find that equity
valuation is positively associated with audit quality, as measured by w hether the firm belongs
to a big audit firm or not. Since our sample consists of distressed firm, w e include profitability
in the regression model. Chen. Guo, and Mande (2003) find managerial ownership has a
significant positne effect on the market to book ratio. However, prior studies find that the
positive effect of managerial ownership on performance decreases when debt increases
(McConnell & Servaes, 1995). We use leverage as a control variable following Mitton (2< | o2 1.
who investigated firm performance in five countries, including Malaysia, during the \sian
financial crisis.
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The model including control variables is stated below:
MVE„ = ao + 0,BVE„ + P2OCF„ + j33NDAC„ + /?4DAC„ + 5AuditQ
+ /?6ChgMgt + /?7Lev + /?sBig - 5 + /?qROI + /J, Mowner
+ /?,,Yrdum+ . (1)
Where:
MVE is the market value of equity 90 days after the balance sheet date,
BVE is the book value of equity,
OCF denotes operating cash flows,
NDAC is non-discretionary accruals,
DAC is discretionary accruals estimated using the established accrual models explained
later in this paper,
AuditQ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm receives going concern
audit qualifications during the year,
ChgMgt refers to a change in executive or managing director. It takes the value of 1 if there
is a new executive or managing director appointed,
Lev is total debt-to-total assets ratio,
Big-5 is firm-years with Big-5 audit firms,
ROI is return on total assets, measured by operating profits before taxes divided by
lagged total assets,
Mowner is the percentage ownership held by senior executives of the firm, and
YrDum is a dummy variable to control for a year effect, 1999 is 1 and 1998 is 0.
4.2. Computation of discretionary accruals
To estimate discretionary accruals, we first compute total accruals (TACF) calculated as
the difference between income before tax and extraordinary items (EARN) and operating
cash flows (OCF):
TACF,, = EARN,, - OCF,, (2)
We next estimate non-discretionary accruals using cross-sectional versions of the Jones
Model ( 1 99 1 ) and modified Jones Model ( 1 995 ) since recent evidence suggests that the cross-
sectional Jones and modified Jones Models have more power in detecting discretionary
accruals than other models (Jeter & Shivakumar, 1999; Bartov, Gul, & Tsui, 2001):6
TACF,,//!,,-! = a,(lM,_,) + a: (AREV„/^,,_,) + a3 (PPE,-,/^,7-i) + v„ (3)
(Jones, 1991)
TACF„M,_i = a,(l/4,_,) + a2 (AREV,-, - AREC,,)M,_, + a3 (PPE„/X_, ) + v„ (4)
(Modified Jones, 1991)
The original Jones model (Jones. 1991) requires tests of earnings management to have at least ten time series
observations for each firm for reliable results. Many studies use the cross-sectional version (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo,
1994; Rees et al., 1996) because of survivorship bias inherent in the original time-series version. In addition, the
assumption of time-series model stationarity of the data is almost certain to be violated during a financial crisis period.
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Where all variables in Eqs. (3) and (4) are scaled by one year lagged total assets (A,
i
).
TACF is total accruals,
AREV is changes in total revenue,
AREC is changes in accounts receivable,
PPE is property, plant and equipment, and
v„ is the residual.
We estimate the parameters using cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares regressions for
each industry-year portfolio, utilizing all firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia industrial
classifications (Rees, Gill, & Gore, 1996; Kasznik, 1999) other than debt renegotiating
firms. This enables us to mitigate industry-specific effects where the accaials behavior and
the impact of economic recession differ across industries.
Discretionary accruals are estimated as the prediction errors (u„) that are the difference
between the predicted accruals using the parameter estimates from the first process, and
reported accruals for each test sample firm-year. Specifically, discretionary accruals of
the cross-sectional Jones (1991) and modified Jones models (1995) are the prediction
errors of the total accrual model, where a,, a2, a-, are parameter estimates of ot|, a 2 , oe, in
(4) and (5):
u„ = TACF,-(M-,_, -[a 1 (lM-,_ 1)+a2 (AREV,fM,_ 1 )+a3 (PPE,(Mf_ I )], (5)
»,, = TACF,, /,)„_,
-[aKlMv-O + azCAREVa-AREC,-,)/^-, + a,(PPE lt /^„_, )] (6)
Our third and fourth approaches employ working capital discretionary accruals rather
than total discretionary accruals. These models use working capital movements from
the statement of cash flows (Hribar & Collins, 2002), which eliminates non-operating
changes in the current accounts shown on the balance sheet that may relate to mergers,
acquisitions, and divestments of discontinued operations. The estimation models are
similar to the original and modified Jones total accrual models except that the PPE variable
is excluded from the equations because working capital accruals do not include deprecia-
tion. Discretionary accruals estimation follows closely the described procedures for total
accruals.
We proceed with the parameter fitting process using all available firms' data. As all
independent variables exhibit a high standard deviation and skewed distributions every
year, particularly in 1999, we delete observations with DFFITS 7 of more than 2 (following
Jeter & Shivakumar, 1999) to obtain reliable and population representative parameter
estimates. We also require at least 10 observations to be in the estimation sample. In total,
we employ 3,514 firm-years in the parameter fitting process.
The DFFITS statistic is a scaled measure of the change in the predicted value for the /th observation. The
statistic was developed by Belsly et al. (1980). For linear models, F, = *' J- where Xo) is the /th value predicted
without using the /th observation. Large absolute values of F, indicate influential observations. A general cutoff
to consider is 2.
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Since our estimations are made according to industry-year portfolios, we compute Z-
statistics to aggregate /-statistics across all the portfolios.
s
This procedure eliminates
industry-specific effects where the accruals behaviour and the impact of economic
recession are different between industries. The year portfolio mitigates ( 1 ) economy-wide
effects on all firms in a particular year, and (2) recession-induced non-stationarity of data
in the time-series version of the original model. The results (not tabulated) show that the
estimates of the changes in revenue variable (ARJEVM,,- i) coefficient are generally
positive in both the total accruals and working capital accruals models. These results
are consistent with prior studies such as DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), although Jones
(1991) does not predict the sign of the coefficient.' Overall, the average adjusted R~ for
the total accrual model is 0.324, while for the working capital accrual model, it is slightly
lower (0.208).
4.3. Sample selection
To take managers' incentives into account when selecting our samples to identify
discretionary accruals (Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1996), we select our sample from the Bursa
Malaysia listed firms that undertook debt renegotiations with lenders in 1998 and 1999. To
identify these firms we search firms' announcements from the Bursa Malaysia website
using "CDRC", "debt", "restructuring", "Section 176", "renegotiations", "rescheduling",
"contract revisions" and their variation terms during the period when Malaysia experienced
severe financial crisis, 1997-2001. We analyse each announcement to classify internal
restructuring and external restructuring so that only firms that undertook external debt
restructuring are included in the initial sample.
We collect 1997-2001 financial statements from the Bursa Malaysia Research Infor-
mation Systems (Bursa Malaysia-RlS) database. ' To supplement that data, we also obtain
copies of the firms' annual reports held at the Bursa Malaysia library in Kuala Lumpur to
extract additional information to estimate discretionary accruals and to measure the
explanatory variables for the regression model. To obtain additional managerial ownership
data, we use the Corporate Handbook issued by the Bursa Malaysia.
These procedures yield 36 firms that restructured debt with supervision from the CDRC
(CDRC firms); 58 firms that restructured debt through direct renegotiations (Other Debt); and
There are 10 industry-year portfolios (5 industries * 2 years) with mean observations of 99 firms. Z statistics
are computed by aggregating the /-statistics across N portfolios as the following formula (/ is the /-statistic for the
portfolio/, k is the degree of freedom for the respective /-statistic in the portfolio/). The Z-statistic is assumed to
^_ T
have an asymptotic normal distribution. Z, = (1/vT) Yl (';/\A//(*/ ~ 2))-
;=1
The sign of the coefficient on revenues can be positive or negative depending on the net effect of changes in
working capital accounts such as accounts receivables, inventory (both positively correlated with accruals) and
accounts payable (negatively correlated with accruals).
This database only has key financial performance measures and does not contain full financial statements. The
disc is available for purchase from the 'KLSE Shoppe' by accessing web site: http://www.klse.com.my/website/
resource/pubshop.htm. In addition to firms' financial statements, this database also contains information about
their profile, subsidiaries, properties, current share price, directors in office and its history, directors shareholding,
ratio analysis, and past announcements.
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Table I
Sample selection and profile
Panel A: Number of firms according to groups # Firms
1 Debt renegotiating firms
• Finns under Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) 29
• Firm restructuring debt without government supervision (other debt) 51
3. Firms that do not restructure debt agreements (control) 59
Total 1 39
NB All firms have at least two consecutive years of negative earnings
Panel B: Sample firms by industry and groups
CDRC Other debt Control Total
Properties development & construction 9 16 II 36
Consumer products 3 7 II 21
Industrial products & technology 10 12 14 36
Mming & plantation 6 3 9
Trading and services 7 10 20 37
Total 29 51 59 139
1 3 firms with loans that were purchased by Danaharta. The firms underCDRC supervision, 1
9
(17), began renegotiations with lenders in the 1998 (1999) financial year. There are 27 (31)
Other Debt firms that began renegotiations with lenders in 1998 (1999). We exclude
Danaharta-assisted firms (13 firms) from the analysis because Danaharta purchases non-
performing loans from the lending institutions and appoints an administrator to operate the
firm. This system relieves the firms from debts owed to the banks/financial institutions, and
substitutes Danaharta as the new creditor.
'
' Further, we note that Danaharta-assisted firms
were subsequently suspended from the Bursa Malaysia and the financial information and
share return data ofthese firms are unavailable. We also exclude 14 firms for which necessary
data are not available, such as share price after 90 days and operating cash flows. Therefore,
the final debt renegotiating sample consists of 80 firms from 5 industries.
Comparing the survivors (80) and those 13 non-survivors (for which we could obtain
information for the year prior to their delisting) reveals that the failed (delisted) firms have, on
average, higher leverage, lower profitability and lower book value of equity. The differences
between the two samples are significant at the 5% level. Other variables such as audit quality,
changes in senior management, audit firm size and firm size are not significantly different
between the two groups, suggesting that failed firms had weak fundamentals.
Table 1 shows that the sample covers five major sectors: properties (25),
consumer products (10), industrial products (22), plantation and mining (6), and trading
and services (17). Our industry groups represent 31.25% (properties and construction).
12.5% (consumer products), 27.5% (industrial products), 7.5% (plantations and mining).
" It is impossible to assess the effect of any survivorship bias in the sample because the failed firms cannot be
matched to the debt renegotiating sample or the control group on industry, nor on performance.
'" DeAngelo et al. (1994) and Peltier-Rivest (1999) define distressed firms as firms that experience a decline in
dividend, and have at least three consecutive years of negative earnings. Using these criteria would reduce the
control sample to less than 10 firms
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and 21.25% (trading and services) of their industry groups in the total population at the
time.
We select a control sample from firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. Our control group is
matched on unrefined measures of financial performance and industry. Investigation into the
performance of the debt renegotiating firms reveals that these firms experience two years of
negative earnings prior to default. Hence, the control firms also have at least two consecutive
years of negative earnings. The control firms have not failed in debt repayment and have not
renegotiated their debts during the test period but are matched based on time, which is the
renegotiation year for the test sample. Since prior research indicates that firm performance
has a systematic relationship with accruals (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995), we focus on
the financial performance measures of control firms, such as earnings and operating cash
flows. We acknowledge that our samples are not exactly pair-matched, but we select these
firms from the same industry depending on the availability of data on the Bursa Malaysia.
The 59 control firms constitute the population of firms that meet the criteria set earlier. The
final sample of firms for our study thus consists of 1 39 firms from 5 industries.
5. Results
5.1. Analysis ofdiscretionary accruals
In Table 2 we investigate debt renegotiating firms' DAC behaviour three years prior to
and one year following their renegotiations. For all models, DAC are positive in the third
and second years preceding negative in the year immediately prior to debt renegotiation.
The mean DAC of debt restructuring firms are -0.189, -0.181, -0.123 and -0.119 for
models 1,2,3 and 4 respectively during year (negotiation period), and all are significantly
negative (p<0.01), consistent with Jaggi and Lee (2002). The negative DAC in the year
prior to debt renegotiation might be interpreted by lenders or investors as the reversal of
positive accruals (see Rosner, 2003, for the reversal of accruals in bankrupt firms) or due to
firms' poor performance. The same trend is observed in year 1 (post renegotiation), with
Table 2
Mean discretionary accruals in CDRC-assisted and other debt restructured firms ('debt renegotiating" firms) from
year -3 through + 1 (0 is the year of debt renegotiations)
=TACF„M„ |-[a,(lA4,, ,) + o. :(AREV„/.-J„ ,) + c<,(PPE :,/.4„ ,)]
=TACF„/^„-i-[ai(l/^,Y i)+a2(AREV„M 1 , ,-AREC,,.-),, |)+a3(PPE„A4„-,)]
=WCF„ A„ ,-,(1 a, ,)+a2(AREV,-, ,!„ ,)]
=WCF„ :A„ ,-[a,(\/A„ ,)+a2(AREV,-,M„ , - \REC„/A„ ,)]
(Model 1)
(Model 2)
(Model 3)
(Model 4)
Discretionary accrual models 1 H
h = 80 h = 80 Ml = 80 A'=80
i)„ Model 1
i
...
Model 2
V„ Model 3
i'„ Model 4
0.020 0.063 -0.135 -0.189 -0.045
0.031 0.078 -0.138 -0.181 -0.041
0.049 0.091 -0.042 -0.123 -0.012
0.061 0.101 -0 046 -0.119 -0.013
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negative DAC across all the four models, but the magnitude is much lower compared with
that of the renegotiation year.
5.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for both the debt renegotiating and control firms'
dependent and independent variables. DAC1 is estimated based on the total accruals Jones
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the variables''
Variables Mean Median Standard deviation 25% 75%
Panel A fdebt re negotiating firms. 80 observations)
MVE 0.627 0.838 2.042
BE 0.143 0.626 2.360
OCF 0.161 0.107 0.891
NDAC_1 -0.091 -0.088 0.179
NDAC_2 -0.065 -0.071 0.399
NDACJ -0.048 -0.054 0.346
NDAC_4 -0.039 -0.055 0.257
DAC_I -0.189 -0.134 0.223
DAC-2 -0.181 -0.153 0.225
DACJ -0.123 -0.056 0.125
DAC_4 -0.119 -0.060 0.263
AuditQ 0.200 0.000 0.403
ChgMgt 0.288 0.000 (1 455
Lev 0.950 0.922 1.169
Big-5 0.650 0.000 0.479
ROI -0.183 -0.115 0.194
Mowner 0.168 0.147 0.173
YrDum 0.550 1.000 0.501
EBT, + , -0.119 -0.099 0.304
EBT,. : -0.058 -0.067 0.211
Panel B (control sample: 118 observations)
MVE 1.937 0.936 2.685
BE 0. 1 39 0.813 3.685
OCF 0.482 0.117 1.841
NDAC_1 0.021 0.013 0.109
NDAC.2 0.032 0.016 0.115
NDAC_3 -0.059 -0.048 0.115
NDAC_4 -0.049 -0.046 0.108
DAC_1 -0.130 -0.103 0.173
DACJ -0.137 -0.103 0.188
DAC_3 -0.065 -0.039 0.105
DAC_4 -0.071 -0.043 0.110
AuditQ 0.068 0.000 0.253
ChgMgt 0.238 0.000 0.423
Lev 0.723 0.697 3.530
Big-5 0.717 1.000 0.451
ROI -0.125 -0.065 0.682
0.338 1.602
0.087 0.946
-0.153 0.452
-0.045 0001
-0.027 0.017
-0.019 0.001
-0.010 0.011
-0.281 -0.011
-0347 -0.022
-0.168 -0.010
-0.206 -0.111
0.000 1.000
0.000 1.000
0.768 1.433
0.000 1.000
-0.262 0.033
0.003 0.271
0.000 1.000
-0.099 -0.019
-0.067 -0.021
0.936 2.127
(1957 1.047
0.118 0.353
(io4: 0.069
-0.042 0.071
-0.132 0.014
-0.119 0.023
-0.215 -0.033
-0.249 -0.034
-0.100 -0.001
-0.103 -0.001
0.000 1.000
0.000 1 .000
0.568 0.827
0.000 1.000
-0.160 0.012
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 {continued)
Variables Mean Median Standard de\ iation 25% 75%
Panel H /control sample 118 observations)
Mownet 0.140 0.064 0.177 0.001 0.216
YrDum 0.500 1 00 ii 502 ii in ill 1.000
IHI -0.033 0.030 0.077 -0.071 0.015
EBT, .
,
-0.054 -0.021 0.015 -0.021 0.019
W=1I8 firms.
\l\ I is ihc market value of equit] three months aftei the fiscal scar end. BVE is book value of equity. OCF
denotes operating cash Sows I hese are scaled bj hook value ofequity at the beginning of the year. NDAC is non-
discretionary accruals, and I) \( is discretionary accruals Variable with suffix: 1 is measured based on the total
accruals cross-sectional Jones model. 2 is measured based on the total accruals cross-sectional modified Jones
model. 3 is measured based on the working capital cross-sectional Jones model and 4 is measured based on the
working capital cross-sectional modified Jones model Amino is a dunnm variable thai takes the value of 1 if the
linn receives qualified opinion during the sear, otherwise 0; ( hgMgt is ,i dummy variable that takes the value of I if
a new executive ot managing director is appointed in the renegotiation year, otherwise 0; Lev is total debt-to-total
assets ratio. Big-5 is a dummy variable thai lakes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a big-5 audit firm, otherwise
0. ROI is return on total assets, measured by operating profits before taxes divided by lagged total assets. Mownet is
die percentage ownership held by senior executives of the firm, YrDum is a dummy variable to control for year
effects where 1999 is I and 199X is 0. and EBT, .
,
and EBT,
.
; arc earnings before taxes anil extraordinary Hems
one-year and iwo-yeai ahead respectively, both variables sealed by one-sear lagged total assets.
model. DAC2 is based on the total accruals modified Jones model, DAC3 is based on the
working capital Jones model and DAC4 is based on the working capital modified Jones
model. All models use cross-section estimation.
The estimated discretionary accruals derived from the four cross-sectional mo-
dels depict high skewness and kurtosis (not tabulated). Non-normality in the residuals
is not unexpected because the sample is drawn from distressed/poorly performing
firms.
'
The table shows that there are consistencies across the four non-discretionary
accruals measures. The mean NDAC1 (Original Jones) is -0.091 while the mean
NDAC2 (Modified Jones) is -0.065. The NDAC3 and NDAC4 mean values are -0.048
and -0.039 respectively. The median values are also all negative. The four discretionary
accruals mean (and median) values arc all negative as stated earlier. The mean BVE is 0.143
with a standard deviation of 2.360. The mean ofOCF is 0.1 61 with a standard deviation of
0.891.
lor the control sample, the means for DAC1 and DAC2 are -0.130 and -0.137
respectively, and are less negative for DAC3 and DAC4 (-0.065 and -0.071 respectively).
The difference between the renegotiation and control groups is significant (/-statistics
are - 1.962, -2.137, -2.434 and -2.581 for the four models. The magnitude of the mean
DAC1 and DAC2 across the samples (ranging from -0.189 to -0.130) is similar to that
We find se\ eral significant outliers by plotting the residuals and we w insorize the I )AC lo the point equivalent
lo the top and bottom l".i level of the ranked residuals (Kothari, I aguerre. & I.eone, 2002) We also winsorize
BVE and OCF used in the regression model \\ insorizing does not eliminate outliers, hul it limits their influence,
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obtained by Johl et al. (2007). who report an average DAC between -0.144 and -0.187 in
Malaysia using the modified Jones model. 14
The significant difference in working capital discretionary accruals between the
renegotiating and non-renegotiating suggest that renegotiating firms may, on average, have
used non-current asset accruals such as depreciation or asset write-downs to reduce
earnings relatively more than their counterparts.
To investigate this issue, we examine the annual reports of both the renegotiating and
control firms. We note 53 occurrences of intangible asset write-offs out of 80 firms in the
debt renegotiation category (66.25%), compared with 58 occurrences out of 1 17 firm-years
(49.57%) in control firms. This difference in the frequency of intangible asset write-offs is
significant Of = 5.372, /><0.05). Fixed asset write-downs occur for 53 of the 80 debt
renegotiating firms (66.25%) and 67 of the 1 17 control firms (57.26%) (x
2
= 3.98,p<0.05).
The mean (median) of intangible assets write-off magnitudes is not significant at the 5%
level. However, the magnitude of fixed asset write-offs as a percentage of lagged total assets
is significantly higher in debt renegotiating firms (mean = 0.0 10, median = 0.002) compared
to control firms (mean = 0.004, median = 0.001) in year (/= 1.989, p<0.05).
The mean MVE and OCF of control sample are 1.937 and 0.482 respectively, which are
higher than those of the renegotiating firms. However, the mean BVE is 0. 1 39, which is slightly
lower than that of the renegotiating firms. Non-discretionary accruals of Models 1 and 2 are less
negative for the control firms, while Models 3 and 4 non-discretionary accruals are more
negative. This is consistent with the role of non-current asset write-offs. Total accruals (NDAC +
DAC) for the debt renegotiating group are more negative for each model than for the control
sample, and the absolute values ofthe accruals are greater for the renegotiating firms, as expected.
Total accruals for the debt rerenegotiating sample range from 16% to 28% of lagged total
assets. This is approximately double the range for the control group. The fact that we observe
persistently large negative accruals surrounding the negotiation periods raises questions
about the reasonableness of the magnitude of earnings management. DeAngelo et al. (1994)
suggest that such large abnormal accruals may be related to sample firms' ongoing
difficulties.
?
It is also possible that the magnitude of negative discretionary accruals has
been accentuated due to the reversal of some past income increasing discretionary accruals
in the years prior to debt defaults.
Since our sample consists of distressed and poorly performing firms during an economic
downturn, we estimate all models by including operating cash flows to mitigate the concern
that firm performance is correlated with DAC (Kasznik, 1999). We find no materia!
difference from results presented in Table 2. 16
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 show that 20% of debt renegotiating firms
received going concern audit qualifications and about 29% had changes in senior
management. The mean leverage, measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets, is 0.95
and 63% of the firms were audited by one of the Big-5 accounting firms. The mean ROl
Johl et al. (2007) use a sample of 596 healthy firm-year observations and poorly performing firm-year
observations during 1994-1999.
DeAngelo et al. (1994) report abnormal accruals of about 15% of lagged shareholders' equity during the year
of dividend reduction by 76 distressed firms Note that our DAC are expressed as a ratio of lagged total assets.
Detailed results are available from the authors.
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is - 18.25% and the median value is - 1 1.53%, with a standard deviation of 0.194. About
7% of the control sample received audit going concern qualifications, about 24% had
changes in senior management and 72% were audited by Big-5 accounting firms. The mean
(median) leverage is 0.723 (0.697) which is lower and the mean (median) ROI of- 12.5%
Table 4
Relations between market value of equity and components of earnings3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Debt renegotiating firms (n = 80)
Intercept 1.399** 1.456** 1.323** 0.930**
(3.110) (3.015) (3.560) (2.976)
BVEb 0.251* 0.269* 0.315* 0.255*
(2.262) (1.985) (2.454) (2.663)
OCFb 0.253* 0.289* 0.459* 0.540*
(2.059) (1.999) (3.058) (2.608)
NDACb -0.394 -0.321 -0.214 -0.684
(-0.925) (-1.024) (-0.844) (-1.604)
DACb -0.559* -0.601* -0.799* -0.739*
(-2.319) (-2.132) (-2.317) (-1.996)
YrDum 0.360 0.432 0.263 0.412
(0.868) (1.037) (0.640) (1.013)
Adj-Zf2 21.6% 19 5",, 23.3% 21.9%
Model sig 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
/•-value 5.350 4.829 5.800 5.431
Highest VIP 1.042 1.312 1 131 1.504
Panel B Conli nl firms (n = 116)
Intercept 1 140** 1.128** 1.122** 1.106**
(2.876) (2938) (2.802) (2.761)
BVE" 0.175** 0.177** 0.177** 0.176
(5 594) (5523) (5.704) (5.664)
OCFb 0.52N** 0.517** 0.506** 0.508**
(4619) (4 534) (4.441) (4.432)
NDACh -1.110 1.303 1.224 1.161
(-0 520) (0.372) (0.623) (0.535)
DACb -0.943
-0.213 -0.767 -0.656
(-0.309) (-0.401) (-0.766) (-0.748)
YrDum 0.343 0.483 561 0.552
(0 734) (1.027) (1.202) (1.190)
Adj-R2 31.5% 31.6% 32.1% 31.9%
Model sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
/•"-value 11.649 11.743 11.957 11.934
Highest VTP 3.347 3.427 1.139 1.417
MVE„=ot +ai BVE„ + a :OCF„+a,NDAC„ + c!4 DAC„+ YrDum +e„.
MVE is measured as the market value of equity divided by the prior period's book value of equity. Figures in
parentheses are /-statistics except as otherwise stated. *. "Denotes significant at 0.05 and 0.0 1 based on two-tailed test.
OCF denotes operating cash flows. NDAC is non-discretionary accruals and DAC is discretionary accruals. OCF and
BVE are deflated by prior year's book value of equity to mitigate heteroscedasricity problem (Easton, 1 998). YrDum is a
dummy variable to control for the year effect where 1 999 is 1 and 1 998 is 0. NDAC and DAC variables in Models 1 to 4 are
measured according to total accruals cross-sectional Jones model, total accruals cross-sectional modified Jones model,
working capital cross-sectional Jones model and working capital cross-sectional modified Jones model respectively.
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(-6.5%) is higher than that of the renegotiating firms. Managerial ownership is slightly
lower at 14% compared with debt renegotiating firms (16.8%). In summary, the debt
renegotiating firms received more qualified audit opinion, have higher LEV, used more
non-big-5 auditors, have lower ROI and have higher managerial ownership.
The correlation structure among the independent variables for the debt renegotiating
firms (not tabled) suggests that cash flows (OCF) are positively associated with the book
value of equity (BVE) (p = 0.22). As expected, all DACs and NDACs are significantly
associated with each other but correlations between DACs and NDACs included in the
same regression are only significant for Model 2 (p = - 0.484) and Model 4 (/) = 0.404).
The only high correlation coefficients for the debt renegotiating firms is -0.431
(/? = 0.000) between AuditQ and ROI, suggesting the less profitable firms received more
qualified audit opinions within the debt renegotiating firms. Overall, the levels of
correlation are not significant enough to cause multicollinearity as is evident from
computed Variance Inflation Factors (VIF, Neter, Wasserman, & Kunter, 1983).
5.3. Regression results
Table 4 reports the regressions of MVE on the components of earnings, book value of
equity and operating cash flows without the control variables. The /-statistics are based on
White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.
Panel A shows that discretionary accruals ofdebt renegotiating firms are negatively associated
with MVE in each of the four models. The coefficients on DAC1, DAC2, DAC3 and DAC4
are -0.559, -0.601, -0.779 and -0.739, respectively, all being significant at the 5% confidence
level. In contrast, non-discretionary accruals are not associated with equity market values. Further,
to test whether the components ofearnings have incremental explanatory power in addition to the
book value of equity, a stepwise procedure was used. The results show that OCF and DAC have
increased the model's explanatory power significantly, which is consistent with our results
presented earlier. Similarly, the coefficient on OCF is significant in all of the four models,
suggesting that market participants value operating cash flows positively. With the highest VTF
statistic being 1.504 (model 4), there is no evidence of significant multicollinearity. The four
models are all significant (p<0.01), with the adjusted R" ranging between 19.5% and 23.3%.
For our control sample, we find that the market value of equity is significantly associated
with OCF, more so than for the renegotiation sample. As hypothesized, we do not find any
significant association between the market value of equity and discretionary accruals.
Similarly, the NDAC coefficient is not statistically significant in any model. The results in
Panel B suggest that the market ignores accruals, both discretionary and non-discretionary,
in the valuation of firms that are in financial trouble but have not violated debt covenants.
Obtaining significant negative relationship between equity market value and the
discretionary accruals for the debt renegotiating firms, but not for the non-debt renegotiating
firms supports hypotheses one and two.
Table 5 (Panel A) reports the debt renegotiating firm regressions results with control variables
included. The DAC coefficients are negative (p<0.05) in Models 1-4, and are not materially
different from those reported in Table 4. Among the control variables, managerial ownership
(Mowner) is significant (p<0.05) in three of the four models. This is consistent with the
McConnell and Servaes (1995) argument that the association between performance and
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Table 5
Relations between market value of equity and components of earnings after controlling for other factors"
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
U-stat.) U-stat.) U-stat.) (r-stat.)
Panel A Debt renegotiating firms (n = 80)
Intercept 0.454* 0.376* 0.994 0.739*
(2.201) (1.958) (1.724) (2.381)
BVEb 0.235* 0.233* 0.261* 0.264*
(2.231) (2.199) (2.547) (2.531)
OCFb 1.028** 1.057** 1.136** 1.136**
(4.0911 (4.085) (4.515) (4.571)
NDACb 0.206 -0.167 0.191 0.164
(0.844) (-0.342) (1.238) (1.257)
DACb -0.542* -0.655* -0.846* -0.434*
(-1.980) (-1.968) (-1.996) (-2.010)
AuditQ 0.826 0.858 0.747 0.765
(1.435) (1.468) (1.292) (1329)
ChgMgt 0.188 0.208 0.182 0.235
(0.377) (0.415) (0.370) (0.468)
Lev 664 -0.735 -0.636 -0.609
(-1.377) (-1.469) (-1.310) (-1.234)
Big-5 45S 0.477 0.303 0.322
(1.039) (1.056) (0.683) (0.719)
ROI I 313 0642 -0.053 -0.356
(1.649) (1.329) (0.721) (0.610)
Mowner 1 357 1.129* 1.580* 1.446*
(1.949) (1.959) (2.078) (2.078)
YrDum 323 0.458 0256 0.434
(0762) (1.078) (0.595) (1.018)
Adj-fl2 23 7% 21.5% 23.2% 22.3%
Model sig 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004
F-value 3.514 2.850 3.754 3.129
Highest VIF 3 376 3.607 2.802 2.698
Panel B: Control firms (n = 116)
Intercept 1.427* 1.301* 1.329* 1.226
(2.524) (2.481) (2.434) (2.395)
BVEb 0.177** 0.177** 0.178** 0.176**
(5.705) (5.632) (5.716) (5.635)
OCFb 0.452** 0.439** 0443** 0.443**
(3.611) (3.568) (3 614) (3.602)
NDACb 0.402 -0.410 -0.181 -0.275
(-0.244) (-0.209) (-0.601) (-0.304)
DA(
-1.012 -1.122 - 1 .062 -1.065
(-0.413) (-0.474) (-0.686) (-0.781)
AuditQ -0.236
-0.272 -0.245 -0.265
i 0.282) (-0326) (-0.289) (-0.317)
ChgMgt -0.196
-0.176 -0.202 -0.187
(-0.385) (-0.348) (-0.405) (-0.381)
Lev 1 086 1.056 1.062 1.017
(1.319) (1.309) (1.062) (1236)
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Table 5 (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(/-stat.) (/-stat.
)
(/-stat.) (/-stat.)
Panel B: Control films (n --116)
Big-5 -0.182 -0.119 -0.123 -0.112
(-0.425) (-0.220) (-0.228) (-0.280)
ROI 0.930* 1.003* 0.908* 0.988*
(2.124) (2.266) (1.989) (2.083)
Mowner 1.061 1.587 1.406 1.489
(1.298) (1.285) (1.203) (1.206)
YrDum 0.281 0.379 0.382 0.379
(0.591) (0.789) (0.795) (0.794)
Adj-R2 34.1% 34.5% 34.4% 34.9%
Model sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
/•"-value 6.009 6.087 6.072 6.792
Highest VIF 4.270 4.868 3.051 3.368
MVEj, = a„+ai BVE„ + a,OCF„ + a,NDAC„+a4 DAC„+o5jAuditO + a„ChgMgt+a 7Lev + a8 Big-5 + a s ROI
+ ot9 Mowner+YrDum+e,,.
Ia
Figures in parentheses are /-statistics based on White Heteroscedasticity Consistent Standard Errors and
Covariance except otherwise stated. *. "Denotes significant at 0.05 and 0.01 based on 2-tailed test. BVE„ is the
book value of equity, OCF„ denotes operating cash flows. NDAC,, is non-discretionary accruals, and DAC„ is
discretionary accruals estimated using four established accrual models explained below. OCF and BVE are deflated
by prior year's book value of equity to mitigate heteroscedasticity problem (Easton. 1998). AuditQ is a dummy
variable that will takes the value of 1 if the firm receives an audit qualification during the year; ChgMgt refers to a
change in executive or managing director, will takes the value of 1 if a new executive or managing director is
appointed in the renegotiation year; Lev is total debt-to-total assets ratio; and Big 5 is a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 ifthe firm is audited by a big-5 audit firm, otherwise. ROI is return on total assets, measured by operating
profits before taxes divided by lagged total assets, Mowner is the percentage ownership held by senior executives of
the firm, and YrDum is a dummy variable to control for year effect where 1999 is 1 and 1998 is 0.
managerial equity ownership is more significant in poorly performing firms. It is also consistent
with investors perceiving that managers remaining in firms that renegotiate debt during a period
ofsevere economic downturn will act in the interests of investors. Investors are likely to hold this
view because managers have demonstrated loyalty by remaining with the organization.
However, as managerial ownership increases the incentive for alignment with shareholders at
the expense of debtholders also increases. To test whether managers of the distressed firms
reduce earnings more via discretionary accruals to extract benefits during renegotiation
with a view to increase shareholders' wealth, we incorporate an interaction variable between
discretionary accruals and managerial ownership (DAC* Mowner) and re-estimate the models
in Eq. ( 1 ). As expected, DAC * Mowner coefficients are all negative but only two of these are
significant {p<0.05).
For our control sample (non-renegotiating firms), results are similar (Table 5, Panel B) to
those reported in Table 4 (Panel B). DAC is insignificant in any model and OCF and BVE
are highly significant in all models (/?<0.01). ROI is only significant (positive) suggesting
1
Another interpretation is that investors perceive that managers of their defaulting firms have been unable to
secure better employment, and are beholden to investors for future income, and thus are likely to act in investors'
interests.
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Table 6
Relations between market value of equity and components of earnings after controlling for other factors3
Sample: Debt renegotiating firms and control firms combined (« = 1 96)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(f-stat.) («-stat) U-stat.) (r-stat.)
Intercept 1.191* 1.194* 1.217* 1.183*
(2.0X6) (2.082) (2.044) (2.008)
BVEb 0.347** 0.353** 0.354** 0.353**
(5.033) (5.01S) (5.130) (5.074)
OCFh 0.291** 0.294** 0.286** 0.285**
(3.309) (3.338) (3.279) (3.270)
NDACb 0.845 0.476 0.694 0.937
(0.413) (0.989) (0.813) (0.848)
DAC 1' -0.760 -0.822 -1.167 -1.991
(-1.806) (-0.419) (-0.949) (-0.751)
AuditQ 0.272 0.281 0.305 0.296
(0.512) (0.531) (0.577) (0.577)
ChgMgt -0.176 -0.182 -0.189 -0.175
(-0.444) (-0.465) (-0.485) (-0.448)
Lev -0.087 -0.072 -0.144 -0.136
(-0.190) (0.119) (-0.321) (-0.339)
Big-5 -0.123 -0.117 -0.093 -0.087
(-0.340) (-0.320) (-0.259) (-0.241)
ROI 0.259* 0.220 0.147 0.162
(1.956) (1.624) (1.413) (1775)
Mowner 0.300* 0.332* 0.456 0.450*
(1.988) (2.185) (1.476) (2.005)
YrDum 0.501 0.543 0.582 0.604
(1.461) (1.568) (1.683) (1.733)
Nego - 1 .040* -1.049* -1.149** -1.177*
(-2.305) (-2.347) (-2.708) (2.545)
Nego*DAC -1.198* -0.617* -0.198 -0.365
(-1.955) (2.210) (1.895) (1.780)
Adj-tf2 26.4% 26.8% 26.4% 29.1%
Model sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
/-"-value 6.046 6.587 6.229 7.092
Highest VIF 5.449 6.868 2.678 4.570
Figures in parentheses are /-statistics based on White Heteroscedasticity Consistent Standard Errors and
Covariance except where otherwise stated. *, "Denotes significant at 0.05 and 0.01 based on two-tailed test.
BVE„ is the book value of equity, OCF„ denotes operating cash flows, NDAC,, is non-discretionary accruals, and
DAC,, is discretionary accruals estimated using four established accrual models explained below. OCF and BVE
are deflated by prior year's book value of equity to mitigate heteroscedasticity problem (Easton, 1998). AuditQ is a
dummy variable that will takes the value of 1 if the firm receives an audit qualification during the year; ChgMgt
refers to a change in executive or managing director, will takes the value of 1 if a new executive or managing
director is appointed in the renegotiation year; Lev is total debt-to-total assets ratio; and Big 5 is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if the firm is audited by a big-5 audit firm, otherwise, ROI is return on total assets,
measured by operating profits before taxes divided by lagged total assets. Mowner is the percentage ownership
held by senior executives of the firm, YrDum is a dummy variable to control for the year effect where 1 999 is 1 and
1998 is 0. and Nego* DAC is the interaction term between DAC and Nego.
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that profitability becomes a more important factor for poorly performing firms not
undertaking debt negotiation. However, managerial ownership is not significant.
5.4. Additional tests
The value relevance literature is not specific as to which deflator should be used to
reduce possible heteroscedasticity in the residuals. Easton (1998) suggests the use of
owners' equity book value at the beginning of the period and Barth et al. (1998b) advocate
number of outstanding ordinary shares as deflator. Further, Easton, Sommers, Akbar, and
Stark (2003) suggest "management has discretion over the number of shares outstanding",
and can decrease or increase this number without corresponding change in the economic
characteristics of the firm (such as splitting shares without affecting cash flows). Firms that
have large values for price per share, book value per share and earnings per share can
unduly influence the estimated regression coefficients. To assess the robustness of our
results due to the use of alternative deflators, we estimate the model on a per share basis
suggested by Barth et al. (1998a,b). We find that the coefficients on OCF, BVE and DACs
are significant at below 5% and the adjusted R~ is reduced slightly to 1 7%. However, we
note that the distribution of the variables is highly skewed and the coefficients on DACs are
high with associated large standard errors compared with models that used lagged book
value of equity as deflator. Further, since there are few negative book value of equity, we
also deflate the variables by lagged total assets and find that results do not change
materially. Thus we conclude that our results are robust with respect to the use of deflator.
'
s
Our debt renegotiating firms consist of two groups: one group undertook renegotiation
with the CDRC support and the other group renegotiated with the lenders directly. We
repeated the estimation by including a dummy variable ( 1 =CDRC and otherwise) in the
regression models. The four discretionary accruals coefficients are negative (p<0.05) and
the dummy variable is insignificant, suggesting no change in the above noted results. 19
The findings, in general, indicate that the market perceives the discretionary accruals in
distressed firms as being attempts to ( 1 ) transfer wealth from lenders or government to
investors; or (2) otherwise distort the true performance, position or prospects of the firm.
Both interpretations support hypothesis 1 (Table 6).
6. Discretionary accruals and future performance
Consistent with Subramanyam (1996) and Gul, Leong and Srinidhi (2000), we test our
third hypothesis concerning whether future earnings are associated with the current period
discretionary accruals of our financially distressed firms. In our tests, we regress one-year
and two-year ahead operating incomes before taxation and regress them, separately for both
the renegotiating and control samples in the following model
EBT,+A- = a + jJ,BVE„ + iS,OCF„ + |8,NDAC„ + /?4DAC„ + s,
A-= 1,2
Full results can be obtained upon request.
Additional robustness tests were earned out but are not reported in this draft.
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Table 7
Relation between discretionary accruals and future earnings
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(i-stat.) ((-stat.) (r-stat.) (r-stat.)
Panel A: Debt i enegotiating firms («=80); EBT,
, i =a+/3|BVE„+ftOCF„+ftNDAC„+/34DAC„+e 1
Panel A EBT,,
,
(dependent variable one-year tihead earnings before taxes & extraordinary items, 80 firms)
Intercept -0.160** -0.117** -0.162** -0.300**
(-4.360) (-3.108) (-3.758) (-3.880)
BVEb 0.164* 0.105 0.122 0.119
(2.052) (1.304) (1.563) (1.434)
OCFb 0.198 0.146 0.129 0.119
(1.736) (1.267) (0.914) (0.633)
NDAC* -0.336 0.222 0.392 0.333
(-0.946) (0.574) (0.675) (-0.575)
DACb -0.46 0.132 0.125 0.112
(-0.360) (0.883) (0.583) (0.486)
Highest VIF 3.083 3.575 2.592 4.346
Adj-R2 6.5% 6.3% 6.1% 5.8%
Panel B: debt r, negotiating firms (n =80). EBT,
,
.
.,
= a + P,B VE„ + p:OCF„ + p,NDA C„ + p4DA C„ + E,
Intercept -0.084* -0.079* -0.040 -0.038
(-2.160) (-2.212) (-1.157) (-1.013)
BVEb 0.002 0.008 -0.079 -0.075
(0.638) (0.846) (-1.043) (-0.990)
OCFb -0.157 -0.158 -0.119 0.110
(-0.871) (-0.880) (0.606) (0.575)
NDACb -0.310 -0.310 0.106 0.237
(-0.834) (-0.904) (0.171) (0.396)
DACb -0.030 -0.050 0.350 0.342
(0.223) (0.360) (1527) (1.430)
Highest VIF 3.083 3.575 3.609 4.346
Adj-fi2 1.8% 1.9% 1.7% 2.4%
Panel C
k=l,2
Intercept
Control firms (n = 118); EBT,, i a+l3,BVEll + P;OCF„ + l3jNDAC„ + l34DAC„ + t>,
-0.039** -0.037**
-0.039** -0.040**
(-4.873) (-4.783) (-4 345) (-4.512)
BVEb 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0010*
(2.152) (2.149) (2.256) (2.319)
OCFb 0.182* 0.203* 0.153* 0.157*
(2.651) (2.975) (2.366) (2.414)
NDACb -0.023
-0.088 0.034 0.019
(-0 308) (-1.193) (0.555) (0.084)
DACb 0.050* 0.046* 0.055* 0.055*
Highest VIF (2.640) (2.652) (2.336) (2.386)
2.249 1.973 1.532 1.554
Adj-fi2 8.4% 10.6% 8.0% 8.4%
Panel D: Control firms In = 118); EBT,
, :
= a+ P,BVE„ + P:OCF„ + p_,NDAC„ + pjDAC„ + e,
Intercept -0.067**
-0.063**
-0.057** -0.062**
(-4.623) (-4.418) (-3.394) (3.698)
K. Ahmed el al. / The International Journal of Accounting 43 (2008) 114-138 135
Table 7 (continued )
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(/-stat.) (r-stat.) (f-stat.) (f-stat.)
Panel D
BVEb
Contr )l firms (n = 118); EBT,,
0.029**
,
= a+P,BVE„ + p:OCF„
0.030**
+ P,NDAC , + l}JDAC„ + E,
0.030** 0.031**
OCFb
(3.504)
0.255*
(3.644)
0.272*
(3.480)
105
(3.511)
0.107
NDACb
(1.960)
-0.317*
(2.0X9)
-0.342*
(0.831)
0.192
(0.840)
0.131
DACb
(-2.292)
0.041
(-2.522)
0.050
(1.659)
0.071*
(1.039)
0.071*
Highest VIF (1.178)
2.256
(1.562)
1.986
(2.307)
1.549
(2.268)
1.570
AdyR2 14.6% 15.8% 9.4% 8.2%
*, "Denotes significant at 0.05 and 0.01 based on two-tailed test EBT,
, ,
and EBTM 2 are earnings before taxes
and extraordinary items one-year and two-year ahead respectively. BVE,, is the book value of equity, OCF„ denotes
operating cash flows, NDAC,, is non-discretionary accruals, and DAC„ is discretionary accruals estimated using
four established accrual models explained below All variables are deflated by one year lagged total assets.
Where
EBT = operating earnings before taxes. Other variables have been defined earlier.
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 show that for the debt renegotiating firms
the mean and median earnings are negative one and two years after debt negotiation. The
regression results reported in Table 7 demonstrate that discretionary accruals are not
generally associated with earnings either one year or two years ahead. This implies that
either (a) economic benefits arose from negative discretionary accruals (e.g., due to lender
concessions), or (b) managers' use of discretionary accruals distorted the firm's future
earnings prospects regardless of whether or not concessions were obtained. Coefficients on
BVE and OCF are not generally significant, suggesting that the current earnings and book
values are not good predictors of future performance in the economic circumstances facing
the renegotiating and control firms. It is also likely that extreme financial distress resulted in
distorting cash flow pattern.
The relativity better average performance of the non-renegotiating control firms is not
surprising since they did not default on loan repayment. However, on average, earnings are
also negative both one-year and two-years ahead. The regression results reported under
Panels C and D of Table 7 show that the coefficient on BVE and OCF are significant in
most regressions of one and two years ahead. The coefficient on DAC is significant in all
four models at the conventional 5% level in one year ahead, and in Models 3 and 4 for two-
years into the future. This suggests that discretionary accruals of non-renegotiating firms
are predictive of earnings than is the case for renegotiating firms.
7. Summary and conclusions
In this study, we use a unique Malaysian context to examine how the market prices
discretionary accruals oftwo types of firms; ( 1 ) financially distressed firms that renegotiated
debt, and (2) financially distressed Malaysian firms that did not renegotiate their debt
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contracts during a severe economic downturn. Based upon prior studies such as
Subramanyam (1996) and Gul et al. (2000), we argue that discretionary accruals would
be negatively associated with equity returns if the market perceives the (negative)
discretionary accruals as either (a) an attempt to transfer wealth from the government or
lenders to investors; or (b) an opportunity to take a "bath" to clear the decks for future
emergence from their financial distress as managers work towards that goal. That is, negative
DAC would be associated with positive equity values. Alternatively, if investors perceive
that managers use discretionary accruals to signal private information about the firm's
production7investment potential, we expect that negative discretionary accruals to be
associated with lower market value of equity. Using four established methods of estimating
discretionary accruals, we find negative associations between discretionary accruals and
equity value for the debt renegotiating sample. The results do not change after controlling for
audit qualifications, changes in senior management, leverage, audit firm Big-5 designation,
return on investment, or managerial ownership in our regression models.
Our results for the debt renegotiating firms support the view that investors either (a) value
managers' attempts to transfer wealth from governments or lenders to shareholders during
financial distress; or (b) expect that managers will use the economic adverse conditions to
distort firms' earnings. The contemporaneous regression results do not support the
signalling explanation for discretionary accruals during the year of renegotiation as the
market appears to expect turn around by these firms. The fact that discretionary accruals and
earnings (two years after the renegotiation period) are not correlated in the regressions
indicates that either interpretation is plausible.
For our control sample (financially distressed firms that did not renegotiate debt
contracts), we find no evidence of an association between equity market value and
discretionary accruals. Rather, we find that market participants place weight on the book
value of equity and operating cash flows.
The conclusions noted above are subject to several limitations. First, we note that both
debt renegotiating and non-renegotiating firms exhibit large negative discretionary accruals
during economic recession. The discretionary accruals reported in our study maybe subject
to estimation error and might have been inflated due to using of abnormal estimation model
that are developed for normal economic setting. Second, according to Young (1999),
established models for estimating discretionary accruals contain significant measurement
error due to misspecification of the accounting proxies, despite controlling for known
potential sources of such error such as operating cash flows. Finally, there are omitted
variables, as is evident from low values of adjusted R~ and the Ramsey test for omitted
variables.
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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the impact of the implementation of a set of new auditing standards in
19% on the information environment in the emerging markets in China. Because the implementation of
such standards can increase the quality and/or quantity ofaccounting disclosures, it can be conceptualized
as an improvement in the information environment ofpublic companies. We investigate the improvement
in accounting disclosure and information environment from both the market perspective and the
accounting perspective. First, consistent with the information economics literature (e.g., [Holthausen, R.,
& Verrecchia, R., (1990). The effect of informedness and consensus on price and volume behavior. The
Accounting Review, 65, 191-208]), we find that companies experience a significant increase in trading
volume and price volatility subsequent to the implementation of the standards. Second, consistent with
the literature on earnings management (e.g., [Chen, C. W. K., & Yuan, H. Q., (2004). Earnings
management and capital resource allocation: evidence from China's accounting-based regulation of right
issue. The Accounting Review, 79, 645-665, Jian, M., & Wong, T. J., (2004). Earnings management and
tunneling through related party transactions: evidence from Chinese corporate groups. Working Paper,
Nanyang Technological University and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology]), we find a
decrease in earnings management and, hence, an increase in quality of earnings. Finally, we find a
decrease in the synchronicity of stock prices and, hence, an increase m the quality of firm-specific
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information available to investors, which is consistent with the literature on price synchronicity (e.g.,
[Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Yu, W., (2000). The information content of stock markets: why do emerging
markets have synchronous stock price movements? Journal ofFinancial Economics. 58,
2
1 5-260] ). Our
results have significant implications for standard setters, regulators, researchers, managers, and investors
in general and those in the emerging markets in particular.
© 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Issues related to audit quality continue to be of major interest to accounting researchers,
practitioners, and policy makers. For instance, the Enron scandal has led U.S. policy makers to
confront issues related to improvement in audit quality. Meanwhile, the International Federation
of Accountants (IFAC) commissioned the Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in
Financial Reporting (Credibility Task Force) in October 2002 to look at ways of restoring the
credibility of financial reporting. Given the continuing consideration of stricter auditing
standards from an international perspective, the question of whether higher quality auditing
standards have potential economic consequences is important. To shed light on the economic
consequences of the implementation of new auditing standards, we investigate the Chinese
emerging market where a set of auditing standards was introduced in a situation where,
previously, no auditing standards existed with the exception of a few guidelines from the
sponsoring governmental agencies.
The literature indicates that increased accounting disclosure improves the information
environment of listed companies (e.g., Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Greenstein & Sami, 1994).
However, there is little empirical evidence on the relationship between auditing standards and the
information environment of listed companies. ' Based on the information economics literature
(e.g., Holthausen & Verrecchia, 1990), we investigate the role of auditing standards in increasing
disclosure and improving the information environment through its informedness and consensus
effects in an emerging market." Furthermore, based on the earnings-management literature in
China (e.g., Chen & Yuan, 2004; Jian & Wong, 2004), we propose that implementing new
auditing standards will result in a decrease in earnings management and, hence, an increase in the
In information-system literature, the information environment can be defined as the aggregate of individuals,
institutions, or systems that collect, accumulate, process, disseminate, or use information. We use this general
meaning throughout the present paper. The information environment of public companies consists of public
companies and their information users such as investors, creditors, policy makers, and regulators also included is
information itself, in particular, public disclosure.
Throughout this paper. \v c use the term "increased accounting disclosure" or "increased disclosure" to mean
increased qualm and or quantity of accounting disclosures due to the implementation of the new auditing
standards. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) used a similar term. They defined "increased levels of disclosure" as
"either an increase in the quantity of disclosure or an increase in the quality of disclosure (or both)" (footnote I,
42 1 Although auditing standards might affect the quality of accounting disclosure more directly than the quantity
ot disclosure, requirements of new auditing standards might motivate auditors to ask their clients to disclose
necessary information when clients fail to do so. Therefore, in this paper, we assume these two effects are present
simultaneous!) and do not try to isolate them.
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quality of earnings. Finally, consistent with the pnee-synchronicity literature (e.g., Morck,
Yeung, & Yu, 2000), we hypothesize a decrease in the synchronicity of stock prices, hence, an
increase in the quality of firm-specific information available to investors.
So far, few studies in accounting literature have directly investigated whether auditing
standards enhance the disclosure quality and/or quantity and hence improve the information
environment of listed companies. One reason might be that a relatively rich disclosure
environment - a feature of the samples of U.S. companies used in most accounting-disclosure
studies - obscures the effect of a company's commitment to increased disclosure (Verrecchia.
2001 ). Another reason might be that new auditing standards in a developed market are intended
to modify or clarify issues rising from previous standards, which makes its impact on the market
too subtle to detect. However, in an emerging market, a direct study on the impact of the
implementation of new auditing standards (thereby, a change in the auditor regulatory
environment) on the information environment is subject to these limitations to a much lesser
degree. Auditing standards are implemented to "protect the legitimate rights of investors and
other interested parties" and to "safeguard the public interests of the society" (The Ministry of
Finance, 1995, Preface to Independent Auditing Standards, PIAS, Ch. 1 , Section 2). In addition,
in the information environment of an emerging market such as China, where the accounting
disclosure was criticized for its low quality and quantity, the economic consequences of
increased accounting disclosures due to the implementation of a set of auditing standards should
be significant.
Auditors in China were required for the first time to follow a series of new standards. These
covered a variety oftopics ranging from the general auditing standard to the specific standards on
audit of financial statements, engagement letters, planning, sampling, evidence, working papers,
and audit reports. In particular, they were required to issue a qualified opinion for any GAAP
violation, scope restriction and inconsistent GAAP application and an unqualified opinion with
an explanatory paragraph when necessary (Gul, Sun, & Tsui, 2003). In addition, to enforce the
new auditing standards, auditors are subject to stricter disciplinary rules and stricter monitoring
and sanctions by the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) and the Chinese
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Gul et al.. 2003; DeFond, Wong, & Li, 2000).
'
Consequently, because the Chinese market went from virtually no auditing regulation to
significant regulations, it provides an ideal setting for observing the incremental impact of
increased audit quality on the information environment. Not surprisingly, DeFond et al. (2000)
find a significant increase in the frequency of qualified audit opinions subsequent to the
implementation of new auditing standards in China and Haw, Park, Qi and Wu (2003) that
qualified audit opinions have a significant effect on the timing of the annual report of Chinese
public companies.
The change in auditing practice should be classified as from "little auditing" to "plenty of auditing" rather than
"no auditing" to "auditing" whereas the change in auditing standards should be classified as from "no auditing
standards" to "have auditing standards." The auditing practice resumed in the 1980s as a result of privatization of
state-owned enterprises and the separation of government from enterprises. However, the major providers of
auditing services were state-owned auditing bureaus performing the required government audits of state-owned
enterprises before the emergence of a demand for independent auditing services due to public offerings in the
1990s. The guidance was mostly the regulatory documents issued by the government before the evolution of
auditing standards. Please see our discussion in the following section and Gul et al. (2007) for further discussion
on auditing practice in China.
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To investigate the impact on information precision (environment), we conduct a cross-
sectional study to investigate whether Chinese companies experienced any increase in trading
volume and price volatility after controlling for the level of free float, firm's systematic risk, firm
value, and inclusion in a market index. The results of both ordinary least squares and two-stage
least squares regressions show that the trading volume and price volatility increased subsequent
to the implementation of the new set of auditing standards, which is consistent with our
hypotheses.
In an investigation of the impact of the implementation of auditing standards on earnings
quality, we find a significant decrease in earnings management, which implies an improvement
in earnings quality. Finally, we find a significant decrease in the synchronicity of stock prices in
the market subsequent to the implementation of auditing standards, indicating that there is an
improvement in the quality of firm-specific information available to investors.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides support for regulators'
assertions that higher quality, accounting and auditing standards, improve market liquidity and
benefit investors by providing enhanced comparability offinancial information about investment
choices (Cox, 2006; Levitt, 1998). Second, the empirical results support Lev's ( 1988) contention
that one of the social benefits of increased accounting disclosures is a thicker market with
improved liquidity. Third, our paper is among the few (Hagigi, KJuger, & Shields, 1993;
Swaminathan, 1 99 1 ) that address the relationship between disclosure, trading volume, and price
volatility within the context of informedness and consensus suggested by Holthausen and
Verrecchia ( 1990).
4
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to systematically
examine the impact of new auditing standards on the information environment, including
information precision, earnings quality, and the quality of firm-specific information for Chinese
public companies.
The results have significant implications for standard setters and regulators in general and
those in emerging markets in particular. In investigating the impact of mandatory auditing
standards on the stock market, this paper provides evidence on the economic consequences of
accounting regulation. Regulators usually state that high quality accounting and auditing
standards "result in greater investor confidence, which improves liquidity, reduces capital cost,
and makes market prices possible" (Levitt, 1 998, 8 1 ). While these notions are not easy to
document in rich disclosure settings because the commitment to increased levels of disclosure in
such settings is incremental (Verrecchia, 2001), the emerging-market environment provides an
ideal setting to detect the incremental effects because such changes in accounting and auditing
regulations are of a "revolutionary" nature. In addition, the findings of the study have
implications for the decision making of managers and investors. Our results indicate that
managers are less likely to manage earnings when the auditor starts to apply auditing standards to
their auditing procedures and investors can obtain a higher quality of assurance service from
auditors when unprecedented auditing standards take effect. Finally, our findings have
theoretical implications for the literature by showing first-hand evidence that in emerging
In Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990), the informedness effect reflects the extent to which investors become
more knowledgeable about firm value at the time of information release, suggesting an increase in both volume
and price volatility; while the consensus effect reflects the extent of agreement among investors at the time of
information release, suggesting a decrease in volume and an increase in price volatility. Please see more detailed
discussions in the literature review section.
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markets the implementation of new auditing standards could increase both trading volume and
price volatility, suggesting a dominating infonnedness effect rather than a dominating consensus
effect.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional settings of
the emerging Chinese market leading to the motivation for our study. We review prior research
and develop our hypotheses in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the research design and Section 5
presents the empirical results. The final section concludes the paper.
2. Institutional background of Chinese stock markets and disclosure practice
The Chinese stock markets - Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange - are
characterized as emerging markets. The rapid development of the Chinese securities exchanges,
which were established in the early 1 990s, stimulated the regulation of disclosure practices. To
standardize disclosure, two important documents were issued - The Accounting System for
Companies with Listed Shares (1992) and The Accounting Standard for Enterprises - General
Standards (ASFE 1992), which represented the first step in bringing Chinese accounting in line
with international accounting disclosure practice (Sami and Zhou, 2004)/ However, these
regulations were no detailed guidelines for disclosures.
During the period 1949-1980, there was no independent auditing practice in the former
planned economy, because all enterprises were owned and managed by the state and accounting
practice simply focused on reporting compliance with state economic plans, using a set of
accounts especially structured on the sources and uses of funds (Graham, 1996). Resulting from
decentralization of state-owned enterprises and separation of government from enterprises,
auditing practice resumed in the early 1980s as an institutional outcome flowing from the
transformed economy (Xiang, 1998). However, before the 1990s, the major providers of
auditing services were state-owned auditing firms or auditing bureaus (Gul, Sami, & Zhou,
2007), performing required government audits of state-owned enterprises. The CPAs provided
independent auditing services only to companies with foreign investment, which were only a
handful of companies.
With the emergence of public companies, auditing firms expanded their services to the realm
of independent auditing. To improve the audit quality in this area, the sponsor of auditing firms,
the State Administration of Audit (SAA), issued a series of regulations on independent auditing
These accounting policies introduced the accounting concepts from western countries, such as assets,
liabilities, and stockholders' equities, to the domestic companies and information users for the first time. Unlike
many previously issued regulatory accounting rules that focused on the source and distribution of funds (every
enterprise was treated as a unit of the government), these policies adopted the framework of international
accounting standards. However, there were some differences. For instance, Chinese GAAP has more restrictive
accounting policies on bad debt, depreciation, inventory, and investment. For details, please also see Sami and
Zhou (2004) and Xiang (1998).
In 1992, the local governments of Shanghai and Shenzhen issued regulations on accounting disclosure of
listed companies, including regulations on the content of accounting disclosures such as footnotes to financial
statements and management discussions and analyses. However, there were no uniform, detailed regulations at
the country level before 1995. Although CSRC issued several temporary guidelines on the format and content of
public disclosure of public companies in 1994. these could not improve the disclosure because these regulations
were too basic to provide any detailed guidance and there were no accounting standards to guide public
companies to prepare reliable and sufficient information (Lin and Su. 1998).
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services (Gul et al.. 2007). The SAA also sponsored the Chinese Association of Certified Public
Auditors (CACPA, 1992-1995). which provided certificate programs to auditors employed in
auditing firms. In the meantime, the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA.
1 988-present), sponsored by the Ministry ofFinance (MOF), regulated public accounting firms
and their members.
7
In 1995, the CICPA and CACPA merged and this brought auditing and
accounting firms under the umbrella of the regulations of the CICPA, and the Certified Public
Accountants (CPA) program emerged as the only certificate program available to independent
accountants.
1
" The reform of regulatory bodies, however, could not mitigate the negative effects
ofgovernment affiliation at the level ofCPA firms, since the CPA firms were still associated with
sponsoring government agencies or state-owned institutions (Gul et al., 2007). Consequently, the
disclosure behavior of companies did not received sufficient and effective control during this
period, and was widely criticized.
Moreover, auditors played the role ofgovernment agents and bore little responsibility for any
improper behavior (Xiang, 1 998). Because it was common practice to have a company audited
by an auditing firm affiliated with the same level of government, auditors bent the rules under
pressure from local government officials and company managers to pursue their own interests
(Xiang, 1998; Graham, 1996). Additionally, there was no litigation against auditors (Graham.
1996; DeFond et al., 2000; Gul et al., 2003). Thus, auditors usually were affiliated with their
clients and lacked motivation to be independent from them.
In response to the criticisms, following other regulations,"
1
the first set of auditing standards
was issued in 1995 (see summary in Table 1). These auditing standards included the General
Independent Auditing Standards and Specific Independent Auditing Standards on the audit of
financial statements, engagement letters, planning, sampling, evidence, working papers, and
audit reports.
During the period of implementing new auditing standards, government regulators
strengthened their enforcement of auditing regulations and demonstrated their abilities and
willingness to impose penalties on errant auditors. For example, the Chinese High Court issued
Document no. 56 in 1996 emphasizing auditor's legal liabilities at the national level (Gul et al..
2003). hi addition, the CSRC issued a series of enforcement letters to warn and or penalize
companies and their auditors who made material misstatements, such as the Shandong Bohai
affair, the Sichuan Electronic affair, and the Qiongmingyuan scandal— all in 1 996 (Lin and Su.
1998). The Qiongmingyuan scandal was of particular note; it resulted in the CPA firm being
suspended from practice for six months. Given this background, an important empirical issue is
Although competition contributed to the rapid growth of both auditing and accounting firms, the inconsistency
in auditing regulation resulted in variations in the quality of audits. Clients suffered from repeated audits by
different auditors sponsored by different government agencies, such as the audit bureau, taxation authority,
finance department, and state banks. For details, please refer to Graham (1996).
Hereafter, the CPA firms are used to refer to both accounting and auditing firms.
During this period, there were a series of scandals in which managers issued fraudulent financial statements to
mislead investors on purpose, such as the Yuanye scandal in 1991. the Wangfujing scandal m 1993. the Jianfeng
scandal in 1993, and the Nantong Machine Tool event in 1995 (Lin and Su, 1998).
For instance, the first nationwide uniform-accounting-disclosure regulation, the Bylaws of Information
Disclosure for Publicly Traded Companies (issued in 1993, by the Chinese Securities Regulation Commission,
hereafter CSRC) and the Content and Format of Annual Reports (issued in 1994 and revised in 1997, by the
CSRC) were issued. The Act of People's Republic of China on CPAs (1993) and the Act of Listed Companies
(1993) provided more legal regulations for auditing practice.
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Table 1
The first batch of auditing standards in the Chinese emerging market
Title Date of Effective
issuance dale-
Preface to independent auditing standards
General independent auditing standard
Specific independent auditing standard No 1 -audit of financial statements
Specific independent auditing standard No.2-audit engagement letters
Specific independent auditing standard No3-audit planning
Specific independent auditing standard No.4-audit sampling
Specific independent auditing standard No.5-audit evidence
Specific independent auditing standard No.6-audit working papers
Specific independent auditing standard No 7-audit reports
Independent auditing practice pronouncement No. 1 -verification of capital
contributions
Source: www.china-cpa.com (as of September 30. 2004)
whether the implementation of auditing standards affected the information environment of the
market.
Several studies have investigated accounting and auditing issues in the Chinese market.
For instance, DeFond et al. (2000) investigate the impact ofnew auditing standards on audit
opinions and audit-market concentration. By comparing the periods before and after the
implementation of new standards, they find that the frequency of qualified audit opinions
was higher subsequent to the issuance of the new auditing standards. Using a sample of
listed Chinese firms from 1995-1999, Haw et al. (2003) observe that both audit opinions
and earnings surprises have significant effects on the timeliness of annual-earnings
announcements after controlling for firm size, the presence of losses, financial distress,
auditor switches, and the implementation of CRSC's decree on timing of annual disclosure
in 1997. They also find a significant interaction effect between audit opinions and earnings
surprises (i.e., positive earnings surprises with modified audit opinions are announced
significantly later than unqualified negative earnings surprises).
Sami and Zhou (2004) investigate the difference in the value relevance of accounting
information prepared under Chinese domestic GAAP for A-share investors and under the
international accounting standards (IAS) for B-share investors. ' Their results show that
accounting information is relevant in the pricing of both A-shares and B-shares. Using
companies issuing both A- and B-shares, they find that the B-shares' accounting
In addition to shares issued to domestic investors (called A-shares), companies were allowed to issue shares to
foreign investors (called B-shares) through the two national exchanges or through other exchanges (such as H-
shares traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange!. Both A and B (or H) shares convey equal rights to the same
company, although, they are different in terms of ownership. However, A-share investors receive accounting
information prepared under Chinese GAAP and mostly audited by local CPA firms, while B-share (or H-share)
investors receive accounting information prepared under IAS (or Hong Kong GAAP) and mostly audited by
international accounting firms. In this study, we focus on the impact of auditing regulations on the information
environment of public companies. Therefore, we only examine the A-shares where there are direct impacts from
the new auditing standards in China.
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information is more value relevant than the A-shares'.
'
2 Zhou (2007) uses bid-ask spreads to
investigate the impact of increased disclosure on information asymmetry. Using a
simultaneous equation approach, she finds that Chinese companies experienced a significant
reduction in bid-ask spread subsequent to the implementation of new auditing standards. In
addition, after controlling for the concurrent effects of trading volume and price volatility,
her time-series intervention analyses show that the reductions in the bid-ask spreads were
significant and permanent. Therefore, Zhou (2007) concludes that the implementation of
new auditing standards helps reduce information asymmetry in an emerging market.
To the best ofour knowledge, no empirical study has investigated the impact ofnew auditing
standards on the information precision manifested in trading volume and price volatility,
earnings quality (level of earnings management), or the quality of firm-specific information. To
investigate these issues, in this paper, we examine: (1) whether the implementation of new
auditing standards is associated with increases in the precision of financial information available
to investors; (2) whether the new standards put more pressure on auditors to curtail the earnings-
management behavior of their clients; and (3) whether the new auditor regulation is associated
with higher quality of firm-specific information available to investors.
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
The literature on information economics has documented various aspects of infonnation
content in public announcements. Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) analyze two aspects of
information content: the informedness effect and the consensus effect, which are also referred to
as the effects of information precision in Swaminathan (199 1).' 3 The informedness effect
reflects the extent to which investors become more knowledgeable about firm value at the time of
information release, suggesting an increase in both volume and price volatility. This happens
because as investors become more knowledgeable and attempt to update their portfolios,
investors' demand changes, which in turn, drives up trading volume and price variability. The
consensus effect reflects the extent of agreement among investors at the time of information
release, suggesting a decrease in volume and an increase in price volatility. This occurs because
trading volume declines when investors interpret infonnation releases homogeneously and
Some studies investigated this type of market from a different perspective. For instance. Kinnunen, Niskanen
and Kasanen (2000) use a sample from the Helsinki Stock Exchange to analyze the information content of dual
disclosures of IAS (International Accounting Standards) and LAS (Local Accounting Standards! earnings. Using
market-adjusted stock returns measured from the 50-week period ending in the week of financial statements
release, they find that restating local GAAP earnings according to the IAS helps to meet foreign investors'
information needs, but is of limited use to domestic investors.
In addition to these effects. Lev (1988) argues that increased accounting disclosure has an impact on
infonnation asymmetry, another aspect of information content in a public announcement. The effect on
information asymmetry is similar to the informedness effect and reflects the amount of knowledge a specific
investor (or a group of investors) has compared to that of another investor (or another group of investors) (Ameen
and Guffey. 1994). Similar to the informedness effect, the information asymmetry effect implies an increase in
volume and price volatility at the time of information release. The literature has documented the economic link
between increased accounting disclosure and reduced information asymmetry using bid-ask spread as a major
proxy for information asymmetry (e.g., Greenstein and Sami, 1994: Healy et al . 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia,
2000. Zhou. 2007). Our paper extends this line of research by investigating the impact of increased accounting
disclosure on the information precision with a focus on the effects on informedness and consensus.
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because investors' residual errors are more correlated and less uncertainty is resolved through the
market aggregation process.
I4
In general, information release can both inform investors (informedness) and reduce the
diversity of their opinions (consensus). When the informedness effect dominates, both the
trading volume and price volatility increase; when the consensus effect dominates, the trading
volume decreases but the price volatility increases. The accounting literature indicates that
accounting numbers are interpreted heterogeneously, causing an increase in trading volume
(Bamber, 1987) and also reinforcing the effect of informedness on price volatility
(Swaminathan, 1991). However, an increase in consensus coupled with an increase in
informedness has a countervailing effect. For instance, the consensus effect was found to
dominate the informedness effect when information on auditor switches was announced
(Hagigi et al„ 1993).
For increased accounting disclosure due to new auditing standards in the emerging Chinese
markets, the informedness effect is expected to dominate the consensus effect. First, the
informedness effects of the increased disclosure requirement may involve volume and price
volatility because trading volume and price volatility reflect the changes in investors' beliefs to
a certain degree (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1990). These effects could be much more
significant in the emerging Chinese markets because of the lower disclosure levels compared
to the U.S. markets. Thus, to the extent that regulation through auditing standards should
provide higher assured-quality information and/or make more previously undisclosed
information available to the public, the level of informedness of the investors in the market
should permanently increase.
Second, the issuance of an audit opinion may also convey information to the market
because it might confirm prior expectations ofthe market, implying a consensus effect. That is,
the market may become aware ofpending lawsuits, affiliated party transactions, problems with
suppliers, credit problems, or other economic conditions prior to the announcement of the
audit opinion (Ameen and Guffey. 1994). The audit opinion provides the market with an
independent assurance of the economic transactions and events disclosed in financial
statements of public companies. Therefore, the announcement of the audit opinion could
increase the consensus among investors. This consensus effect could be small, however, for
the following reasons: investors may not be familiar with the content ofthe audit reports since
the new standards are regulating the types of auditors opinions for the first time; and investors
may not be able to expect a type of auditor opinion for a particular company because of the
tightened regulation on the auditing industry. We therefore, expect the informedness effect of
the increased disclosure to be larger than the consensus effect. That is, we expect an increase in
both the trading volume and price volatility, hence the following two hypotheses.
IJ
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) examine the effects of information precision on price variability and
divergence of beliefs. In their model, each agent in the market is assumed to receive a public information signal
that has a noise term common to all agents and an idiosyncratic term unique to each agent. Using a Walrasian
market model, they show that a decrease in the idiosyncratic noise term (i.e., increase in consensus) increases
price variability and decreases divergence of beliefs.
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Hypothesis 1. (in alternative form): Trading volume increases subsequent to the
implementation of new auditing standards.
Hypothesis 2. (in alternative form): Price volatility increases subsequent to the imple-
mentation of new auditing standards.
Our next hypothesis investigates whether the implementation of auditing standards
make auditors act more independently in deterring earnings management behavior by
managers, hence, improving earnings quality. Goldman and Barlev (1974) discuss the
importance of auditor independence in providing audit assurance service on public
information issued by firms to their shareholders. They argue that auditors are typically
involved in three types of conflicts of interest: (1 ) auditor-client firm conflict of interest, (2)
investor-management conflict of interest and (3) self-interest-professional standards
conflict of interest. Accounting and auditing standards help to improve auditor
independence by reducing all three types of conflicts of interests. Davis, Soo and
Trompeter (2006) provide empirical evidence in support of the inverse relationship between
earnings management and auditor independence. Managers tend to engage in aggressive
reporting of accruals that inflate earnings. Therefore, companies with higher accruals face
higher agency costs than companies with lower accruals (Krishnan, 2003). Auditors play an
important role in mitigating these agency costs by deterring the opportunistic management
of earnings. Under the new auditing standards, auditors are more likely to negotiate with
management when aggressive earnings management exists and, hence, are more likely to
deter or reveal earnings management behavior by managers. DeFond et al. (2000) find that
the implementation of new standards results in a higher frequency of nonstandard audit
opinions. Based on these discussions, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3. (in alternative form): Earnings quality (management) increases (de-
creases) subsequent to the implementation of new auditing standards.
Finally, we investigate whether the quality of firm-specific information improved
following the implementation of new standards. Roll (1988) provides evidence on the
inverse relationship between price synchronicity and the amount of company-level relative
to market-level information that is impounded in stock prices. Morck et al. (2000) find that
stock prices move together more (are more synchronous) in emerging economies than in
developed economies. In other words, if the market has a poor information environment and
investors are more oriented toward short-term trading gains or speculations, investors are
more likely to be sensitive to political events and rumors. As a result, they are more likely to
follow the market and be more susceptible to insider trading. This suggests a positive
relationship between the protection level for public investors and the extent to which firm-
specific information is impounded in stock prices, hence an inverse relationship between
increased protection and the price-synchronicity level.
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) describe an audit as a monitoring device to protect
shareholders. Subsequent to the implementation of new standards, auditors should have
better tools for deterring and revealing any earnings misreporting, which should help them
provide better quality service for the public interest and better protection for the property
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rights of investors. Consequently, the price synchronicity level should be reduced. Thus, in
this study, we also test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. (in alternative form): Price synchronicity decreases subsequent to the
implementation of new auditing standards.
4. Research design
In this paper, we examine the impact of the first set of auditing standards, which took
effect on January 1, 1996, in China. Correspondingly, the annual reports of fiscal year 1995
were the first group of reports to be audited under these specific auditing standards. The
sample selection started with the entire population of companies issuing A-shares
(including those that issue both A and B-shares) that are listed on either the Shanghai Stock
Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange as of January 1995. The sample companies were
selected on the basis of the following screening criteria: (1) companies issue A-shares (2)
daily last-bid price, daily last-ask price and closing-price data, since January 1995, were
available from the Taiwan Economic Journal Database (TEJ); (3) annual reports' dates were
available from the TEJ database or annual reports; (4) annual reports were available for
fiscal years 1994 and 1995; (5) trading volume and the number of publicly held shares were
available. This screening procedure resulted in 542 company-period observations (271
companies, 162 companies from the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 109 companies from
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange) for our analyses (see Table 2).
4.1. Investigating the impact on the information precision
4.1.1. Trading volume model
According to the literature on trading volume, both the level of informedness and
divergence of traders' beliefs affect trading volume (Karpoff, 1987; George, Kaul, &
Nimalendran, 1994). Typically, the market comprises rebalancing trades (nonevent-related
trading as investors trade the market portfolios of stocks back and forth) and abnormal
trades (e.g., informed trading and liquidity trading, for details see Tkac, 1999). The former
is related to market-wide information, while the latter is associated with information on
Table 2
Sample selection
Sample selection procedure Number of companies
Companies that issue A-shares whose stock price data are available since January 1995 287
Less: annual reports' dates are not available from the TEJ database or annual reports 10
Less: companies bid or ask price data are not available from the TEJ database 6
Total number of companies available for analysis 271
Including
Companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 162
Companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 109
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individual companies. Hence, a theoretical function between the disclosure regulation and
trading volume is:
Trading volume = rebalancing trades + abnormal trades
= f(disclosure regulation, other market-wide information)
+f(company disclosure, company characteristics, other factors)
The literature shows that company characteristics such as major stakeholders'
ownership, company size, and inclusion in a market index contribute to (abnormal)
trading volume (Bessembinder, Chan, & Seguin, 1996; Tkac, 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia,
2000). Trading volume is also associated with price volatility (Karpoff, 1987). Accordingly,
we examine the following trading volume model for both the long and short windows:
TURNOVER, = a,, + a, PERIOD + a2MVj + a3VAR, + ot4NFLOAT,
+ a5INDEX + e, (1)
where
TURNOVER=average weekly (daily) share turnover in the pre-adoption period or post-
adoption period. Share-turnover is defined as the total shares traded divided by the total
outstanding shares. For the long window, the pre-adoption (post-adoption) period is defined
as 50 weeks before (after) the release of the fiscal year 1995 annual report, which was the
first to be audited under the new auditing standards, while for the short window, the pre-
adoption (post-adoption) period is defined as seven days around the date of the annual
report release for fiscal year 1994 (1995);
PERIOD =one if the observation is from post-adoption period and one otherwise;
MV=average weekly (daily) market value of company's equity in the pre-adoption period
or post-adoption period (in logarithm);
VAR=average weekly standard deviation of returns (standard deviation of daily returns) in
the pre-adoption period or post-adoption period;
'
5
NFLOAT=percentage of shares held by the top ten shareholders according to the annual
report;
INDEX =one if the stock is included in the composite share index on the Shenzhen stock
exchange or SHI 80 index on the Shanghai stock exchange and otherwise; and
e=the error term.
We expect a positive sign for VAR and a negative sign for the stakeholders' ownership
(NFLOAT), a measure of insider trading and an inverse measure of free float, since earlier
research finds that price volatility and the level of free float are both positively related to
trading volume (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).
For the long window, weekly standard deviation of returns is calculated as the standard deviation of daily-
returns during each week and then averaged over 50 weeks before after the release of the 1995 annual report:
while for the short window, standard deviation of daily return is based on the daily returns during the seven days
around the annual release date in the pre/post-adoption period
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The sign for MV is ambiguous (Tkac, 1999). On the one hand, larger companies
experience trading related to market information (versus individual firm-specific
information), therefore, they may have a higher trading volume than smaller companies.
On the other hand, larger companies have a larger analyst and media following and thus, are
subject to more publicity, which reduces the amount of private information that can be
profitably traded on (the informed trading), hence, they may have a lower trading volume
than smaller companies.
The sign of the coefficient for INDEX could be ambiguous too. Informed trading tends
to account for less trading activity of index stocks, which makes index stocks trade closer to
or under the expected level (Tkac, 1999). However, the use of market-timing portfolios and
portfolio-insurance strategies may cause more trades on these stocks than on others. For
example, Bessembinder et al. (1996) find that the trading volume of S&P 500 companies
responds more strongly than others to market-wide information, indicating that this may be
due to the fact that the S&P 500 companies are used in index-arbitrage trading. Finally, the
sign on PERIOD in the trading volume model is expected to be positive (negative)
depending upon whether informedness (consensus) dominates.
4.1.2. Price volatility model
The accounting disclosure literature documents the impact of increased accounting
disclosure on price volatility (e.g., Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999; Swaminathan, 1991 ). To
explore the relationship between increased disclosure and price volatility, we investigate the
determinants of price volatility and its simultaneous variation due to increased disclosure as
well. The theoretical model can be derived from the theoretical model of disclosure
suggested in Verrecchia (200 1 ), in which the relationship between a mandatory disclosure v
and the change in an asset price from time T— 1 to time 7" is:
PT -Pr_ l= X + P(y- m ) + yQ + * (2)
where a, fi, y are parameters, m is the mean of a company's uncertain value, Q are
variables other than y that are related to firm value, hence, the change in price, and \
represents variables unrelated to firm value (e.g., noise). If v and Q are independent, then
dividing by PT- i on both sides of the equation gives us:
R T = (PT - PT-x)/Pt-\ = «/Pt-\ + My - m)/PT-i + yQ/Pr-i + Q (3)
and Var(/?7-) = orVar(l/Pr_,) + /?
2
Var(( v - m)/PT -\ ) + "/2Var(fi/Pr_
,
)
+ Var(£) (4)
where R T represents the stock return at time T. To simplify it:
Price volatility = /(disclosure, other factors influencing volatility in share price).
Consistent with the theoretical model, empirical studies indicate that price volatility is
associated with disclosure level (Swaminathan, 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), which is Var
{iy-m)IPT- i) in Eq. (4). In addition, empirical studies (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) show
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that price volatility is positively associated with major stakeholders' ownership and a company's
systematic risk - part of Var(Q/Pr ~ , ) in Eq. (4), but negatively associated with market value -
part ofVar (
1
IPT- , ) in Eq. (4). Accordingly, we estimate the following price volatility model for
both short and long windows:
VAR, = a + «, PERIOD + a:MV, + a,NFLOAT, + a4BETA, + e, (5)
where
VAR=average weekly standard deviation of returns (standard deviation of daily returns) in
the pre-adoption period or post-adoption period. For the long window, the pre-adoption
(post-adoption) period is defined as 50 weeks before (after) release of the fiscal year 1995
annual report, which was the first to be audited under the new auditing standards, while for
the short window, the pre-adoption (post-adoption) period is defined as seven days around
the date of annual report release for fiscal year 1994 (1995);
PERIOD = one if the observation is from the post-adoption period and zero otherwise;
MV = average weekly (daily) market value of company ;'s equity in the pre-adoption
period or post-adoption period (in logarithm);
NFLOAT = percentage of shares held by the top 10 shareholders according to the annual
report;
BETA = systematic risk of company i, estimated with weekly returns in the pre-adoption
period or post-adoption period for the long window, while for the short window it is
estimated with weekly returns over 50 weeks before the annual report release; and
c = the error term.
Because price volatility decreases with company size and increases with beta and major
stakeholders' ownership (Swaminathan. 1991; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia,
2000), the sign on MV in the price volatility model is expected to be negative, while those
on BETA and NFLOAT are expected to be positive. According to the second hypothesis, we
expect the sign on PERIOD in the price volatility model to be positive.
Because Eqs. (
I ) and (5) might be dependent on one another, we use the simultaneous
regression method (i.e., two-stage least squares, 2SLS) to estimate those equations in
addition to an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Moreover, both trading volume and
price volatility have been used as proxies for information content in the literature (e.g.,
Swaminathan, 1991; Healy et al.. 1999). In particular, Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990)
present an economic rationale for examining both price and volume effects showing that
informedness and consensus effects affect both the variance of price change and volume.
Therefore, examining these factors simultaneously helps to provide more insights into the
economic benefits of increased accounting disclosure.
4.2. Investigating the impact on earnings quality
The earnings management literature usually uses discretionary accruals as a measure of
earnings management. Commonly, the cross-sectional modified Jones model is used to
estimate discretionary accruals (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Guay, Kothari, & Watts,
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1996). However, Chen and Yuan (2004) argue that the proper earnings management measure
in China is noncore earnings (net income minus core operating earnings). First, the tradition of
rule-based accounting in China permits limited opportunities for manipulating accruals.
Second, the CSRC set a clear benchmark for return on equity (ROE) for stock issues and
trading. For instance, publicly listed companies were required to have a minimum of 10%
ROE for each of three consecutive years prior to any public offering before 1998 (DeFond
et al., 2000; Jian and Wong, 2004). This was later modified to a minimum of 10% average
ROE and a minimum of 6% ROE (CSRC Notice No. 12, 1999). '"
Under such circumstances, a typical way to manipulate earnings by Chinese listed
companies is noncore operating items. Many studies have provided empirical evidence on
earnings management via noncore operating income (see Jian and Wong. 2004; Chen and
Yuan, 2004). Regulators also regard non-operating items as potential earnings-management
items. For instance, since 1999, the CSRC has been adopting a different method that
excludes infrequent items, such as gains and losses from the investment and sales of fixed
assets, from the calculation of ROE. Therefore, following the literature on this emerging
market, we use noncore operating income (NROE) as a measure ofearnings management.
'
7
We conduct both univariate and multivariate tests in analyzing NROE. The univariate
test is used to check whether there is significant difference in the noncore operating income
between the pre-adoption and post-adoption periods. The multivariate test, on the other
hand, regresses the noncore operating income on the dummy period (indicating post-
adoption period) and other financial-health variables identified in the literature (Dopuch,
Holthausen, & Leffwich, 1987; DeFond et al., 2000) using the following model:
NROE = a, + c, PERIOD + c2EX + c,EX*PERIOD + ^FOREIGN
+ C5LSIZE + c6DETRAT + oCURRAT + e (6)
where
NROE=noncore operating income divided by year-end total equity; ls
PERIOD =a dummy variable indicating the effect ofnew auditing standards, coded as one if
the observation is from the post-adoption period (fiscal year 1995) and zero if from the pre-
adoption period (fiscal year 1994);
EX=the stock exchange where the share is listed, coded as 1 if listed on Shanghai Stock
Exchange and zero if listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange;
FOREIGN=a dummy variable for companies also issuing H-shares or B-shares;
LSIZE=the log of the average daily market value of firm's equity over the seven-day window;
DETRAT=total long-term debt divided by total equity at the end of each year;
CURRAT=current debt divided by current assets at the end of each year; and
e =the error term.
6
This change in benchmark for ROE for stock issues and trading took effect after our sample period and, hence,
does not affect our results and conclusions.
1
Additional tests using the cross-sectional modified Jones Model does not yield any significant results, which
is consistent with the justification of the use of noncore operating income by prior research in this market.
IS We conducted a sensitivity test using the beginning of the year equity. The results were qualitatively the same
as those reported.
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We estimate this model for the pooled sample of companies. A negative coefficient on
the dummy variable for period is consistent with Hypothesis 3. We include foreign
ownership (FOREIGN), company size (LSIZE), and debt ratios (DETRAT and CURRAT)
as control variables, because the earnings-management literature indicates these factors
might affect the motivation of managers in manipulating earnings. We also include a
dummy variable to control for stock exchange.
4.3. Investigating the impact on the quality offirm-specific information
A measure of the quality of firm-specific information content perceived by investors is
synchronous stock-price movement, which reflects the relative importance of firm-specific
information compared to the general market information in the pricing process of stocks.
Following Morck et al. (2000), stock-price synchronicity is measured by the ^-squares of
regression statistics from the following linear regression:
R„ = a, + b,R„„ + e, (7)
where R„ is stock fs return in week t, and R„„ is a market index return.'
1
' A high /\-square
in this regression model indicates a high degree of stock-price synchronicity. We estimate
the model for each of the sample companies in the pre-adoption (post-adoption) period
based on the 50-week observations prior (subsequent) to the implementation of auditing
standards. Then a univariate analysis is performed to test whether there is a lower
synchronicity in the period subsequent to the implementation of new standards.
To further examine whether the reduction in synchronicity. if detected, is due to the
implementation of auditing standards and not macroeconomics variables, we use a control
group of B-shares. The prices of these shares are less likely to be affected by the new
auditing standards since companies' reports issued to B-shareholders is prepared under
international accounting standards and audited under international auditing standards after
which new standards were modeled. While we expect a reduction in the synchronicity level
due to the implementation of auditing standards for our experimental group (A-shares),
there is no such expectation for the control group (B-shares).
5. Empirical results
5.7. The impact ofincreased disclosure on information precision
5.1.1. Long window tests
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the long window
analyses. The descriptive statistics show that, subsequent to the implementation of new
We use the Shenzhen A-share index and the Shanghai A-share index rather than their overall market index to
calculate the association between individual share returns and market returns As a sensitivity test, we delete the
largest 10 companies and find qualitatively similar results as those reported, indicating that our results based on
market index return is not affected by the potential impact of large firms
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics of regression variables in trading volume and pnee volatility models: long window
Variables Sample Number Mean Median Std. Dev
TURNOVER All 542 2 431 2.241 2.230
PERIOD = 271 1.351 1.024 1.041
PERIOD= 1 271 4 Ml*** 4.291*** 1.967
VAR All 542 3 03
1
3.017 0.712
PERIOD = 271 2.506 2.416 0.458
PERIOD =1 271 3555*** 3.502*** 0.505
MV All 542 6.970 6.824 0.807
PERIOD=0 271 6.741 6.587 0.749
PERIOD= 1 271 7.199*** 7.126*** 0.799
NFLOAT All 542 0.603 0.614 0.149
PERIOD=0 271 0.605 0.622 0.155
PERIOD =1 271 0.602 0.609 (1 14?
BETA All 542 0.999 0.993 0.210
PERIOD = 27| 1.001 1.016 0.232
PERIOD=l 271 0.998 1.013 0.188
INDEX All 542 0.244 0.000 0.430
PERIOD=0 271 0.244 0.000 0.430
PERIOD =1 271 0.244 0.000 0.430
Definition of Variables: PERIOD = one if the observation is from post-adoption period and zero otherwise For the
long window, the pre-adoption (post-adoption) period is defined as 50 weeks before (after) the release of the fiscal
year 1995 annual report, which was the first to be audited under the new auditing standards; MV = average weekly
market value of the firm's equity over 50 weeks before and 50 weeks after the annual report release (in logarithm);
TURNOVER = average weekly share turnover over 50 weeks before and 50 weeks after the annual report release
(share turnover is defined as the trading volume divided by total shares outstanding); VAR = average weekly
standard deviation of returns over 50 weeks before and 50 weeks after the annual report release; NFLOAT=the
percentage of shares held by top 10 stockholders according to the annual report. INDEX = one if the stock is
included in the composite share index on the Shenzhen stock exchange or SHI 80 index on the Shanghai stock
exchange (and zero otherwise); BETA = systematic risk of firm i, estimated with weekly returns over 50 weeks
before and 50 weeks after the annual report release.
***• **• * significant at 0.01. 0.05. 0.10, respectively.
auditing standards, companies had significantly higher share turnover than in the previous
period. The average (median) share turnover (TURNOVER) for the pre-adoption period is
1.351 (1.024), while that for the post-adoption period is 4.51 1 (4.291). According to the t-
test (Wilcoxon test) the change in the mean (median) of share turnover is highly significant.
As to price volatility, the descriptive statistics show that, subsequent to the
implementation of new standards, the companies had significantly higher price volatility
than in the pre-adoption period. The average (median) price volatility (VAR) for the pre-
adoption period is 2.506 (2.416), while that for the post-adoption period is 3.555 (3.502).
The t-test (Wilcoxon test) further indicates that the changes in the mean (median) are
significant.
Table 3 also shows that during the sample period, companies experienced a significant
increase in their market values (MV). This suggests the importance of controlling for
company characteristics such as firm size to isolate changes due to the implementation of
the new auditing standards from changes in the individual companies per se. Table 3 does
not show significant changes for other variables.
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Table 4
Pearson correlation coefficients for variables in trading volume and price volatility models: long window
Variables PERIOD TURNOVER VAR MV NFLOAT BETA INDEX
PERIOD 1 000
TURNOVER 0.748
0.000
1 .000
VAR 0.774 0.901
0.000 0.000
MV 0.162 0.095
0.000 0.027
NFLOAT -0.011 -0.021
0.808 0.630
BETA -0.038 -0.079
0.380 0.065
INDEX 0.000 -0.039
0.999 0.365
1 000
0.071 1.000
0.099
0000 0.118 1.000
0.993 0.006
0.048 -0.014 0.036
0.265 0.749 0.402
0.070 0.318 -0.094
0.104 0.000 0.029
1.000
-0.026 1.000
0.543
See definitions in Table 3.
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the long
window analyses. PERIOD is highly correlated with VAR, with r equal to .774 and
TURNOVER, with r equal to .748. The signs are consistent with the results of the univariate
tests reported in Table 3. According to Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990), trading volume and
Table 5
Cross-sectional regression of trading volume and price volatility models: OLS-long window
Variables Sign Coefficient Std. Dev. ^-statistic p-value
Panel A. Trading i'olume model
TURNOVER,=a fa, PERIOD + a. MV, +txy VAR,+aj NFLOAT, + a, INDEX + e,
Constant -5.308 0.446 -11.91 <.0001
PERIOD ? ii 4H3*** 0.125 3.21 0.0008
VAR + 2.599*** 0.086 30.15 <0001
MV ? 0.065 0.061 1.05 0.2926
NFLOAT - -0.491** 0.292 -1.68 0.0464
INDEX ? 0.030 0.108 0.27 0.7840
ff-square 81.7% F value 477.45
Adjusted /J-square 81.5% Pr>F <0001
Panel B Price volatility model
VAR, = oc„+a, PERIOD + a : MV, + a, NFLOAT, + a4 BETA, + e,
Constant 1.927 0.199 9.70 <0001
PERIOD + 1.063*** 0.041 25.78 <0001
MV
-0.026 0.026 -0.98 0.1633
NFLOAT + 0.069 0.137 50 0.3069
BETA + 0.712*** 094 7,59 <0001
R-square 58.8% F value 191.89
Adjusted fl-square 58.5% Pr>F <0001
See definitions in Table 3.
**• **• * significant at 0.01. 0.05. 0.10. respectively (one-tail for variables with an expected sign and two-tail
otherwise).
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Table 6
Cross-sectional regression of trading volume and price volatility models: 2SLS-long window
Variables Sign Coefficient Std. Dev /-statistic p-value
Panel A. Trading volume model
TURNOVER, = a„+ a, PERIOD + 3 : MV, + a, VAR + cc, NFLOAT + a5 INDEX +e,
Constant -1.595 0.945 -1.69 0.0460
PERIOD ? 1 409*** 0365 5.23 • .0001
VAR + 1 1S1 *** 334 3.53 II 00112
MV 7 0.026 0.072 0.36 0.7228
NFLOAT - -0.331 0.355 -0.93 0.1757
INDEX 7 0.059 0.113 0.53 0.5978
System weighted X-square 44.8%
Panel B Pruc volatility model
VAR, = a„ + ai PERIOD + a : MV, l-«3 NFLOAT, + a4 BET\ ,
Constant 1.927 ii 199 9.70 <0001
PERIOD + 1 063"* 041 25.78 <0001
MV - -0.026 026 -0.98 0.1633
NFLOAT + (1069 0.137 0.50 0.3069
BETA + 0.712*** 0.094 7.59 - .0001
System weighted /(-square 44.8%
See definitions in Table 3.
*** ** * significant at 0.01, 05. 10. respectively (one-tail for variables with an expected sign and two-tail
otherwise).
price volatility are positively correlated when the informedness effect dominates the
consensus effect, and are negatively correlated when the consensus effect dominates the
informedness effect. As shown in Table 4, VAR and TURNOVER are highly correlated, with r
equal to .90 1 . This positive correlation indicates that the increased accounting disclosure has a
dominating informedness effect over consensus effect. There is no other correlation coefficient
in excess of .318, indicating multicoHineariry is not a serious problem.""
Panel A ofTable 5 reports the results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of
the trading-volume model for the long window. The model is highly significant and explains
about 82% of the variation in share turnover. The dummy variable for the post-event period
is significantly positive indicating that the implementation of new auditing standards helps
build a thicker market, one of the social benefits of increased accounting disclosure argued in
Lev (1988). All other coefficients have the expected signs. The sign on the coefficient for
price volatility is consistent with Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). It suggests that price volatility
increases with trading volume due to the dominance of the informedness effect.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of the price volatility model. Also, the
model is highly significant and explains about 59% of variation in price volatility. The post-
event dummy has a positive and significant coefficient, which is consistent with the second
"' In addition, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values in our regressions are all less than 10. again indicating
that multicollineanty is not a serious problem in our study. Also, for all of our multivariate analyses, we conduct a
White (Chi-squarel test and find no evidence of heteroscedasticity problem.
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Table 7
Univariate analysis and cross-sectional regression of trading volume and price volatility models: short window
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of regression variables
Variables Sample Number Mean Median Std. Dev.
TURNOVER All 542 2.682 1.717 2.752
PERIOD=0 271 1 .459 1.037 1.452
PERIOD=1 271 4.282*** 3.585*** 3.942
VAR All 542 3.844 2.810 2.749
PERlOD=0 271 2.701 2.571 1.163
PERIOD=l 271 5.239*** 4.955*** 4.142
MV All 542 6.744 6.610 0.760
PERIOD=0 271 6.755 6.571 0.769
PERIOD =1 271 6.782 6.659 0.750
NFLOAT All 542 0.603 0.614 0.149
PERlOD=0 271 0.605 0.622 0.155
PERIOD= 1 271 0.602 0.609 0.143
BETA All 542 1.005 1.011 0.168
PERIOD = 271 1.011 1.016 0.143
PERIOD =1 271 0.999 1.010 0.189
INDEX All 542 0.244 0.430
PERIOD = 271 0.244 0.430
PERIOD=l 271 0.244 0.430
Panel B. Correlation matrix
Variables PERIOD TURNOVER VAR MV NFLOAT BETA INDEX
PERIOD 1.000
TURNOVER 0.483 1.000
0.000
VAR 0.502 0.775
0.000 0.000
1.000
MV 0.051 -0.029
0.237 0.503
-0.025
0.556
1.000
NFLOAT -0.016 -0.004
0.711 0.920
0.032
0.450
0.247
0000
1.000
BETA -0.019 -0.026 -0.007 -0.046 0.074 1.000
0.665 0.541 0.874 0.281 0.085
INDEX 0.000 -0.066 -0.089 0.362 -0.072 0.043 1.000
1.000 0.124 0.038 0.000 0.093 0.314
Panel C. Multivariate analyses — OLS estimates
Trading volume model: TURNOVER, = a,, + a, PERIOD + a 2 MV,+a3 VAR, <-a4 NFLOAT,
+
a 5 INDEX +e,
Variables Sign Coefficient Std. Dev /-statistic p-value
INTERCEP 1.322 0.906 1.459 0.073
PERIOD ? 1 .193*** 0.206 5.796 0.000
VAR + 0.654*** 0.031 20.799 0.000
MV ? 0.183 0.142 -1.290 0.196
NFLOAT - 0.007 0.006 -1.158 0.124
INDEX ? 0.060 0.242 0.248 0.806
ft-square 55.51% F value 133.732
Adjusted ft-square 55.09% Pr>F 0.000
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel C. Multivariate analvses — OLS estimates
Price volatility model: VAR, = a +a,PERIOD+cc ; MV, + a, NFLOAT, + a4 BETA, + e,
Variables Sign Coefficient Sid Dev /-statistic />-value
INTERCEP 1.849 1.445 1.280 0.101
PERIOD + 2.582*** 0.262 9.870 0.000
MV - -0.147 0.180 -0.819 0.207
NFLOAT + 0.014* 0.009 1.629 0.052
BETA + 0.977 7S1 1 2^: 0.102
^-square 15.74% F Value 25.075
Adjusted R-square 15.11% ?T>F 0.000
Panel D. Multivariate malyses — 2SLS estimates
Trading volume model TURNOVER^ a„ + a|PERIOD + a : MV, + o, VAR.+ "'. NFLOAT, + a_, INDEX + £•,
Variables Sign Coefficient Std De\ /-statistic /'-value
INTERCEP 2553 1.951 1.309 0.096
PERIOD ? 2.799* 2.026 1.382 0.168
VAR + 0.024 0.788 0.031 0.488
MV 7 -0.148 0.192 -0.768 (1444
NFLOAT - -0.001 0.011 -0.110 0.457
INDEX ? -0.506 0.777 -0.652 0.516
System weighted R square 15.47%
Price volatility moc el: VAR, =« +ot PERIOD + a2 MV, + a, NFLOAT, + a4 BETA, + e,
INTERCEP 1.849 1.445 1.280 0.101
PERIOD + 2.582*** 0.262 9.870 0.000
MV - -0.147 0.180 -0.819 0.207
NFLOAT + 0.014* 0.009 1.629 0.052
BETA + 0.977 0.781 1.252 0.102
System weighted R square 15.47%
Definition of Variables: PERIOD = one if the observation is from post-adoption period and zero if from pre-
adoption period. For the short window, the pre-adoption (post-adoption) period is defined as the seven-day
window, from day -3 to day 3 around the release of fiscal year 1995 (fiscal year 1994) annual report;
TURNOVER= average daily share turnover over the seven-day (day -3 to day 3) short window around annual
release where share turnover is defined as the trading volume divided by total shares outstanding; MV = average
daily market value of the firm's equity over the short window (in logarithm); VAR = standard deviation of daily
returns over the short window; NFLOAT = the percentage of shares held by top 10 stockholders according to the
annual report. INDEX = one if the stock is included in the composite share index on the Shenzhen stock exchange
or SHI 80 index on the Shanghai stock exchange and zero otherwise; and BETA = systematic risk of firm i,
estimated with weekly returns over 50 weeks before annual report release.
***, **. * significant at 0.01. 0.05. 0.10. respectively (one-tail for variables with an expected sign and two-tail
otherwise).
hypothesis and suggests that accounting disclosures under the new auditing standards
convey new information to the market. These results are in line with the findings by Leuz
and Verrecchia (2000) and Swaminathan (1991).
To check whether companies with infrequent trading in their stocks are driving the
results (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), we ran regressions separately for companies with
infrequent trading and those with frequent trading, whose share turnovers are larger/smaller
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than the overall mean, respectively. The results show that both groups have significant and
positive coefficients for the post-event dummy, although, the coefficient is smaller for
companies with frequent trading than for companies with infrequent trading. Therefore, our
results are consistent with the effects of information precision (informedness effect) as
proposed in Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Table 6 reports the results of 2SLS estimation for the long window. The coefficient for
the dummy variable indicating the post-event period in the trading volume model (Panel A)
remains highly significant even after controlling for the simultaneous effects of increased
accounting disclosure on trading volume and price volatility. The coefficient for price
volatility is significant and positive, consistent with the OLS results. All other coefficients
arc insignificant. Panel B of Table 6 reports the estimates of the price-volatility model from
the simultaneous equations method, which is similar to panel B of Table 5. Overall, these
2SLS estimates indicate increases in trading volume and price volatility and suggest the
dominance of the informedness effect of new standards over the consensus effect, which is
consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2.
5.1.2. Short window tests
Table 7 reports the results of the univariate and multivariate analyses using Eqs. (1) and (5)
estimated on a short window. We examine both trading volume and price volatility over a
seven-day window around annual report releases for 1994 (pre-adoption period) and 1995
(post-adoption period). Panel A presents the results ofunivariate tests ofthe changes in trading
volume and price volatility around the annual report releases for both years. The results show
that, subsequent to the implementation of the new standards, companies experienced
significant increases in the trading volume and price volatility. These results hold for both the
mean (Mest) and median (Wilcoxon test). The results for other variables are not significant.
Panel B ofTable 7 shows correlations that are generally consistent with those reported for the
long window in Table 4 and point to the dominance of the informedness effect over the
consensus effect. Also, the VIF values in our regressions are all less than 1 0. indicating that
multicollinearity is not a serious problem.
The results of multivariate regressions are summarized in Panels C and D ofTable 7. Panel C
indicates that both trading volume and price volatility increased significantly over the post-
adoption window, while controlling for company size, systematic risk, stakeholders' ownership,
and index inclusion. Considering the simultaneous effects of disclosure on trading volume and
price volatility, we also perform a 2SLS regression. The 2SLS results, presented in Panel D of
Table 7, indicate that the increase in trading volume during the post-adoption period, although
not significant, is approaching significant even after controlling the simultaneous effects of
increased disclosure on trading volume and price volatility. In addition, for the price volatility
model, the coefficient of the dummy variable (PERIOD) remains highly significant. Overall,
these results indicate significant increases in trading volume and price volatility and suggest the
dominance of the informedness effect of the new standards over the consensus effect. 21 These
One may argue that the change in liquidity trading (nothing to do with information at all ) could increase the
trading volume. This topic is beyond the framework of informedness and consensus concepts by Holthausen and
Verrecchia (1990). However, Wu and Li (2006) provide empirical evidence that liquidity trading increases trading
volume but decreases price volatility. Therefore, our results are not driven by simple liquidity trading, as both
trading volume and price volatility increase over both long and short windows in our study.
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Table 8
Univariate and multivariate analyses of the impact of increased disclosure on earnings quality
Panel 1 Univariate test
Variable Mean Std. Dev Std. Error T-test Prob >| 71
ROE
PERIOD=0 0. 1 1
1
0.097 0.007 -0.320 0.7489
PERIOD=l 0.114 0.079 0.005
COREROE
PERIOD=0 0.092 0.119 0.008 -1.089 0.2769
PERIOD=l 0.103 0.089 0.005
NROE
PERIOD = 0.031 0.062 0.004 2.007** 0.0456
PERIOD=l 0.021 0.046 i
LSIZE
PERIOD=0 6.702 0.768 0.046 -1.372* 0.0853
PERIOD=l 6.791 751 0.045
DETRAT
PERIOD=0 0.050 0.080 0.006 -1.278 0.2021
PERIOD=l 0.059 0.073 0.004
CURRAT
PERIOD=0 765 0353 0.025 1.070 0.2852
PERIOD=l 0.730 0.364 0.022
FOREIGN
PERIOD=0 0.235 0.425 0.031 0.266 0.7901
PERIOD=l 0.225 0.418 0.025
Panel B Multivariate aiti ilysis
NROE = c„+c, PERIOD + c2EX+c3 EX* PERIOD+C4FOREIGN+C5 LSIZE +c„DETRAT + C7CURRAT
+
e
Variables Sign Coefficient Std. Dev. (-statistic />-vaIue
INTERCEP 0.023 0.024 0.973 0.176
PERIOD - -0.016** 0.008 -1.951 0.026
EX ' -0.021*** 0.008 -2.785 0.006
EX* PERIOD ? 0.019* 0.011 1.802 0.072
FOREIGN - 0.001 0.007 0.132 0.448
LSIZE - 0.002 0.004 426 0.335
DETRAT + -0.033 0.034 -0.973 0.166
CURRAT + 0.013** 0.007 1.709 0.044
^-square 2.8% F value 1.760
Adjusted ^-square 1.2% Prob V 0.094
Definition of variables: ROE = operating income divided by year-end total equity; COREROE = core operating
income divided by year-end total equity; NROE = noncore operating income divided by year-end total equity;
PERIOD = a dummy indicating the effect of the implementation of new auditing standards, coded as one if the
observation is from the post-adoption period (annual release of fiscal year 1 995) and zero if from the pre-adoption
period (annual release of fiscal year 1994); EX = the stock exchange where the share is listed, coded as one if
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and zero if listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange; FOREIGN = a dummy
variable for companies also issuing H-shares or B-shares; LSIZE = the log of a company's average daily market
value over the seven-day window (day -3 to day 3) around the annual report release; DETRAT = total long-term
debt divided by total equity; and CURRAT = current debt divided by current assets.
***. **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05. 0.10, respectively (one-tail for variables with an expected sign and two-tail
otherwise).
162 H Sami. H. Zhou The InternationalJournal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 1S9-169
results are consistent with those for the long window and provide further support for Hypotheses
1 and 2.
5.2. The impact on earnings quality
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of a univariate analysis testing for the difference
in noncore operating incomes, measured by NROE, between the two auditing regimes. It
shows that, on average, NROE decreases from 0.03 1 in the pre-adoption period to 0.02 1 in
the post-adoption period. This reduction in NROE is significant at/? = .05. However, there
is no significant change in either return on equity (ROE), ROE based only on core
operating income (COREROE), or other control variables except for company size
(LSIZE), which increases from the pre-adoption period to the post-adoption period.
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results of the regression model (6) testing Hypothesis 3
regarding the impact of the implementation of auditing standards on earnings quality.
The dependent variable is noncore income (NROE). Besides the control variables, the
independent variables include a dummy indicating whether the observation is from the
post-adoption period or not (PERIOD). We expect the coefficient estimate of this dummy to
be negative because the implementation of new auditing standards should put more
pressure on auditors to detect any earnings management behavior via noncore operating
earnings. The results in panel B show that the coefficient on the PERIOD dummy is
significantly negative at p = 0.026. This suggests that earnings management by the
companies is decreasing and less likely to occur in the post-adoption period.
5.3. The impact on the qualit}' offirm-specific information
Table 9 reports the comparison of the quality of firm-specific information available to
investors, measured by stock-price synchronicity, before and after the implementation of
the new auditing standards. Panel A reports that the mean synchronicity level in the A-share
market during the post-adoption period is less than that during the pre-adoption period. The
mean difference in the level of synchronicity between the pre- and post-adoption periods is
statistically significant z\ p = 0.0001, indicating that stock returns are less synchronous in
the period subsequent to the implementation of the new auditing standards. These results
hold when we analyze the observations from the two Chinese exchanges separately. Hence,
we conclude that there was an increase in the quality of firm-specific information. In
addition, the magnitude of synchronicity levels is comparable to that reported in Morck
et al. (2000), which is 0.453 estimated with the weekly data of 308 Chinese stocks covered
in the Data Stream in 1995.
We did not test for the impact of changes in macroeconomic variables on synchronicity
levels as in Morck et al. (2000) because the companies in our sample are from the same
country. However, since GDP per capita and the number of stocks shares listed in each
market are the primary factors that explain cross-country stock-price synchronicity, further
evidence is required to identify the plausible explanation for the reduction in price
synchronicity. That is, can the change in price synchronicity be due to changes in
macroeconomic factors or to a change in institutional regulation (implementation of
auditing standards)? To address this issue, we use a control group of B-shares, which are
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Table 9
The Impact of increased disclosure on the quality of firm-specific information: T-test on changes in the
synchronicity level
PERIOD N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error T-test DF Prob>|71
Panel A. Synchronkin' levels in Ashore marker, pre-adoption period vs. post-adoption period
A-shares
512.2 0.0001
320 0.0005
271 0.597 0.150 0.009 7.4352***
1 271 0.487 0.191 0.012
SH A-shares
162 0.615 0.138 0.011 3.5118***
1 162 0.559 0.149 0.012
SZ A-shares
109 0.569 0.164 0.016 7.7383***
1 109 0.380 196 0.019
209.5 0.0001
Panel B Synchronicity levels in B-share market pre-adoption period vs. post-adoption period
B-shares
57 0.068 0.112 0.015 -1.9469*
1 57 0.103 0.075 0.010
SH B-shares
30 0.043 0.061 0.011 -3.7277***
1 30 0.107 0.073 0.013
SZ B-share
27 0.098 0.148 0.030 -0.0015
1 27 0.098 0.078 0.015
93.7 0.0545
56.2 0.0005
35.6 0.9988
PERIOD is a dummy indicating the effect of the implementation of new auditing standards, coded as one if the
observation is from the post-adoption period and zero if from the pre-adoption period; SH represents the Shanghai
Stock Exchange, while SZ represents the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
***, **. * significant at 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, respectively.
less likely to be affected by the new auditing standards. Panel B of Table 9 presents the
descriptive statistics of the synchronicity variable and the Mest of difference in means
between the pre- and post-adoption periods for the B-shares. We find no evidence in
support of a reduction in the synchronicity of B-shares. In fact, the results show a somewhat
significant increase in the level of synchronicity for B-shares, which suggests that the
reduction in the synchronicity in the A-share market is associated with the implementation
of auditing standards.
5.4. Robustness check
To investigate whether our results of trading volume and price volatility are driven by the
macroeconomic factors in the emerging markets in China, we examine the changes in
trading volume and price volatility of companies issuing B-shares. Since companies that
issue B-shares to foreign investors (B-shareholders) already prepare their financial
statements under international accounting standards and have them audited under the
international auditing standards upon which the new auditing standards are modeled, the B-
share market should be less influenced by the implementation of new auditing standards.
We conduct the same analyses on trading volume and price volatility in the B-share market
as those reported in Tables 5. 6, and 7 for the A-share market (the results for the B-shares are
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not reported here). In the long-window analysis, we find a slight upward shift in trading
volume (0.198 from the OLS regression and 0.023 from the 2SLS regression, both ofwhich
are not significant) and price volatility (0.723 from both regressions which are significant),
which are much less than those for the A-share market. In fact, based on OLS and 2SLS, the
increase in trading volume and price volatility is significantly larger in the A-share market
compared to the B-share market. In addition, the short-window analysis yields no
significant results for the B-share market at all. These results suggest that the significant
increases in trading volume and price volatility for the A-shares are associated with the
implementation of the new auditing standards but not macroeconomic factors. In addition,
we separately test firms issuing only A-shares and firms issuing both A-shares and B-shares
and find both groups have significant increase in trading volume and price volatility in the
A-share market. This might indicate that the A-share investors may have limited access to
information accessible to B-share owners, which is consistent with Sami and Zhou (2004)
on the market segmentation in China.
To address whether our results on trading volume and price volatility are due to any time
trend, we conduct the following additional analyses. We investigate the trading volume and
price volatility in the year following the current event year (current event year is the first
year auditing standards are implemented) and find that both trading volume and price
volatility significantly decrease after the annual disclosures in the following fiscal year.
However, both the univariate and multivariate tests show that trading volume and price
volatility for the year following the current event year are significantly higher than those
prior to the implementation of new standards, indicating the persistence of the effect of
implementation of the new auditing standards. All these results indicate that our reported
results are not due to a time trend.
Another plausible explanation might be that increasing trading volume and price
volatility could be a feature of emerging markets, because there are important policy
changes to accelerate the privatization and securitization of the state-owned enterprises,
which lead to increases in trading volume and price volatility. If this is true, then one would
expect that the trading volume and price volatility of our sample firms would increase all
the time rather than around the implementation of new auditing standards. However, the
results mentioned above, which show significant decreases in trading volume and price
volatility ofour sample firms in the year following the implementation compared to the year
of implementation, suggests that our results are not driven by the underlying nature of
emerging markets.
To ascertain whether our results are driven by any other events, we conduct a search on
accounting and auditing regulations in the sample period. However, we do not find any other
significant changes in accounting rules and regulations during that period, except those related
to the new auditing standards. One direct change in the disclosure regulation was a trivial
revision ofdisclosure guidance issued in December 2005. However, the impact ofthis revision
was not significant, as discussed by Lin and Su (1998): In January 1994, the CRSC released
Content and Format ofDisclosures of Public Companies No. 1 -6 (temporary), which provided
detailed descriptions of the accounting disclosures required on the balance sheet, income
statement, statement of changes in financial status, footnotes, summary of accounting and
business data, management's analysis and discussion, changes in stock shares and
shareholders, significant events, and related parties. All companies followed these regulations
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in their annual reports for fiscal year 1994. Content and Format of Disclosures of Public
Companies No. 2 issued in December 1995 was a trivial revision, which provided direction to
public companies on the format of disclosure. Further modifications were issued in December
1998, December 1999, August 2003, and December 2005. Based on the development of
accounting-disclosure regulations in China (Lin and Su, 1 998), the biggest change introduced
by the Content and Format of Disclosures of Public Companies, should appear in the annual
reports for fiscal year 2004 rather than fiscal year 1995. Therefore, the impact of the 1995
revision on the annual reports for fiscal year 1995 could be minimal.
Prior studies show that there were a significant number of initial public offerings (IPOs) and
stock rights offerings in 1996 and 1997, which experienced significant earnings management
through noncore earnings (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Haw, Wu, & Wu, 2005). To examine
whether these market developments affected our results, we check the dataset of initial public
offering dates and stock right offerings provided by the Taiwan Economic Journal database
(TEJ), and find only three A-share companies in our sample with stock right offerings during
our sample period. Further, our sample does not include any IPO firms, since we require that
sample firms have equity price data from January 1 , 1 995, and we use this fixed-firm sample in
both the pre-adoption and post-adoption periods. In addition, the effect of IPOs and stock right
offerings, ifany, would bias the data against our results, which show that firms are less likely to
manage earnings in their fiscal year 1995 annual reports than in fiscal year 1994. Therefore,
our results could not have been driven by IPO and stock right offerings.
Our earnings-management measure reflects the level of noncore operating income
deflated by year-end equity. We perform a robustness check to determine whether our
results are driven by using this level of noncore operating income rather than an abnormal
measure (e.g., industry adjusted measure of noncore operating income). We re-estimate our
models using the industry adjusted NROE and our results are qualitatively the same.
In this study, we obtain the data for companies listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange
or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. To check whether results differ by exchange, we perfonn
both univariate and multivariate analyses separately for each exchange and find that the results
are qualitatively the same across the two markets. Thus, our results are not affected by any
potential heterogeneous problems introduced by using companies listed on different exchanges.
In our trading-volume model we use share turnover as a proxy for trading activity. An
alternative specification is the dollar amount of trading volume (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).
We re-estimate the models using the alternative measure and find that the alternative
specification yields qualitatively the same results. Another alternative measure of trading
volume is abnonnal trading volume. We calculate the mean ofshare turnover over days -250 to
-4 relative to the test period for the short window and over weeks - 50 to - 1 relative to the test
period for the long window. We then calculate the abnormal share turnover over the short (long)
window as the difference between these daily (weekly) means and those over the test windows.
We re-estimate the models using these alternative measures and find that, with a minor
exception, the results are qualitatively the same. The exception is that over the short window,
using the 2SLS, the coefficient ofPERIOD is positive but not significant. To control for general
changes in the market, we also use market-adjusted measures for price volatility, which are
Nevertheless, we could not totally eliminate the information content conveyed in a new format of annual
disclosure.
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calculated as the mean of weekly standard deviation of share return divided by the weekly
standard deviation of market return. The results are qualitatively the same as those reported.
A possible missing control variable in the analysis might be auditor type. For instance,
Schauer (2003) finds that companies audited by the former Big-Six have lower information
asymmetry risk, measured by bid-ask spreads, than those audited by small (non national)
firms. The information environment of companies audited by large audit firms may be better
than that audited by small audit firms because large audit firms are believed to offer a higher
quality audit (e.g., Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998). Consequently, the
new auditing standards may have a different impact on the information environment between
the companies audited by large audit firms and those audited by small audit firms. We re-
estimate the cross-sectional models with control for auditor size (AUD), coded one if a
company is audited by one of the largest 10 accounting firms ranked on the basis of clients'
assets and zero otherwise. We find no significant results ofthe audit-type variable and all other
results are qualitatively the same.
6. Conclusions and implications
In this paper, we investigate the impact of increased accounting disclosure on the
information environment following the implementation of the first set of auditing standards in
an emerging market (China). Because the implementation of new auditing standards can
increase both the quality and quantity of accounting disclosure, it can be conceptualized as an
improvement in the information environment. Thus, the precision of information regarding a
firm's value, earnings quality, and the quality of firm-specific information are expected to
increase following the adoption of new standards. Therefore, we propose that Chinese
companies would subsequently experience: ( I ) a significant increase in trading volume and
price volatility, (2) a significant reduction in earnings management, hence, an improved
earnings quality, and (3) a significant decrease in price synchronicity reflecting more
capitalization of firm-specific information relative to general market information.
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that trading volume and price volatility increase
subsequent to the implementation of the new standards. These results indicate that the
informedness effect dominates the consensus effect when companies release public information
under new auditing standards in an emerging market. In addition, our analyses show a decrease
in earnings management, implying an increase in earnings quality. Finally, we find a decrease in
the synchronicity of stock prices, suggesting an increase in the quality of firm-specific
information available to investors. Our results hold after we control for changes in
macroeconomic factors that affect the trading in different stock exchanges, auditor type, and
other factors (alternative explanations) through sensitivity tests.
These results have significant implications for standard setters, regulators, researchers,
managers and investors in general and those in emerging markets in particular. The results
support policy makers' expectation and regulators' assertion that auditing standards, with
higher quality, improve market liquidity. In addition, our results imply that the informedness
effect and the consensus effect could have different dominating status with different disclosure
settings, which calls for further studies in the future and a theoretical model in particular. Last
but not least, the findings of the study have implications for the decision making of managers
and investors, since managers are less likely to manage earnings and investors can rely on a
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higher quality of assurance service from auditors after unprecedented auditing standards take
effect.
As with all event studies, it could be difficult to isolate the effects ofan event. Using B-share
firms as a control group and observations in other non event periods in the sensitivity tests, we
have tried to mitigate the effect of extraneous events. To the extent our study has not properly
screened out or controlled for such events, our conclusions can be limited. For example, the
increases in trading volume and price volatility found in this study for the experimental group -
A-share firms - might be caused by an increase in press coverage, or in the sophistication level
of domestic investors, or in the understandability of annual reports under the new format
introduced by the revision of disclosure guidance, or in a combination of these factors. These
possibilities are not examined in this study; however, our sensitivity tests indicate that there are
no such increases in trading volume and price volatility in the year subsequent to the
implementation of the new auditing standards. Thus, a continuous and gradual change in the
information environment, such as an increase in press coverage, is most likely not a driving
force.
In this paper, we find evidence of the dominance of the informedness effect over the
consensus effect. However, we did not attempt to address the impact of increased accounting
disclosure on the trading volume sensitivity to changes in price volatility. Recent studies
(Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam, & Welker, 2002; Kim and Verrecchia, 2001) indicate
that a firm's commitment to increased accounting disclosure could result in a significant
reduction in the slope coefficient on trading volume in the returns (prices) models. Future
studies may extend this line of research by examining the impact of increased accounting
disclosures due to the implementation of new auditing standards on the trading-volume
sensitivity to price changes.
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1. Introduction
Sami and Zhou (2008) (hereafter, SZ) investigate whether the new Chinese auditing
standards implemented in 1996 improve the information environment of listed Chinese
firms. They use the interesting setting of China's emerging market to study the impact of
changes in regulation. To provide evidence on this question, SZ compare trading volume,
price volatility, noncore earnings, and return synchronictty between 1995 (pre-adoption
period) and 1996 (post adoption period). They find that companies experience a significant
increase in trading volume and price volatility, but a decrease in earnings management and
the synchronicity of stock prices in 1996, and attribute these favorable changes to the
implementation of the new auditing standards. Prior research focuses on how the
governance variables, such as legal institutions, ownership structures, external auditing,
and analyst following shape the information environment. SZ expand this focus by
recognizing that auditing standards also significantly improve the accounting disclosure in
emerging markets. The SZ study is interesting and important for understanding the
"economic consequences" of new auditing regulations, especially in emerging markets.
However, I have several concerns about the SZ study. The first concern is whether
standards alone are likely to affect managers and auditors in China without the presence of
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other proper incentives. The second is whether the study sufficiently disentangles the effect
of new auditing standards from other regulatory and market changes in China, which have
coincided with the test period. Other concerns are related to the research design and
empirical results of the study. 1 discuss each point below.
2. Do auditing standards matter in China?
The authors argue that auditing standards affect the behavior of auditors, which in turn
affects firms' disclosures. However, standards alone may not be likely to affect auditors
unless there are also proper incentives and effective monitoring mechanisms. Prior studies
suggest that incentives are important in explaining the quality of financial reporting (see,
for example. Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003, on a cross-country study; Ball, Robin & Wu,
2000; DeFond, Wong, & Li, 2000 on China). Ball (2001) further states that actual
accounting practice is a function of corporate governance, corporate ownership and
control, political factors, the legal system, the training and independence of auditors, and
the relation between financial reporting and taxation, as well as accounting standards.
Ball, Robin et al. (2000) find that earnings reported by Chinese firms are not conservative,
and argue that broader institutional factors are predominant in determining financial
statement properties. Changing one element alone (such as auditing standards) may not
be effective, unless it is accompanied by a wide range of complementary changes in
infrastructure.
Corporate governance systems are less effective in China's markets than those in the
West. In the government-controlled economy of China, managers of listed state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) are frequently appointed by the government, who is the controlling
shareholder. Recent studies show that such ownership structures adversely affect the
information environment of these firms, which results in a high level of information
asymmetry and a low level of informativeness of accounting earnings (Fan and Wong,
2002; Haw, Hu. Hwang, & Wu, 2004). The managers of listed Chinese firms, where state
and legal-entity (mostly SOEs) ownership dominate, are strongly motivated to act m the
best interests of the government and its representative organizations, and have less
incentive to report high-quality accounting information or seek quality auditing for their
financial reports (Ball, Kathari, & Robin, 2000). Until 1998, all domestic auditors were
public employees, and there was little incentive for high-quality audits, while litigation for
audit failure was infrequent." In such an environment, it is doubtful whether auditing
standards could be effectively implemented.
DeFond et al. (2000) find that the implementation of new Chinese auditing standards
results in a higher frequency of non standard audit opinions, but large auditors, normally
regarded as high quality, lose market share in terms of both clients and assets audited.
" There are three types of auditing firms in China: government-affiliated audit firms, university-affiliated audit
firms, and audit firms that operate as part of a joint venture with an international CPA firm, usually a Big 4 firm.
Government-affiliated auditors are affiliated mostly with agencies of the Ministry of Finance and Audit Bureau or
with SOEs. University-affiliated auditing firms are part of universities. Neither government- nor university-
affiliated audit firms are independent. However, they had all become independent legal entities by the end of 1998
{Securities Times, January 5. 1999).
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subsequent to 1994. They interpret the large decline in the market share of independent
auditors as a "flight from quality," which is consistent with the argument that Chinese
managers avoid auditors that are more likely to issue a modified opinion. Prior studies
find that larger auditors in China have stronger incentives to maintain the quality of
audits, presumably because they have more to lose if their malfeasance is discovered
by the market or regulators (DeFond et al., 2000; Wang, Wong, & Xia, 2005). Thus,
the impact of new auditing standards would be stronger among large auditors in China,
if such an impact is indeed present. However, the SZ study reports no significant
difference in the disclosure-quality improvement between firms audited by large and
small audit firms. The lack of cross-sectional variation in the improvement of disclosure
quality indicates a possibility that such an improvement may not be necessarily due to
new auditing standards but likely caused by some economic factors that affect all firms
simultaneously.
3. Are increased trading volume and price volatility the result of the new auditing
standards?
SZ investigate whether the implementation of new auditing standards improves the
disclosure quality of listed firms in China in 1996, which is the year of the first
implementation. Like other studies, which examine the impact of new regulations (e.g.,
Schipper & Thompson, 1985), the authors face a difficulty in research design as the event
window for the entire sample cluster is in the same limited calendar time, and many
economic factors that affect the firms' information environment cannot be randomized.
While the authors attempt to address this issue, the approaches used here are not sufficient
for inferring the "causal" relationship between new auditing standards and economic
consequences.
As an economy in transition, the Chinese government made a series of regulatory
changes to accelerate the privatization and securitization of SOEs. Several important events
that affected the information environment and empirical results of the study coincided with
the test period. For instance, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued
The Contents and Format ofAnnual Report on December 21, 1995 (CSRC No. 2), which
formalized disclosure standards for the first time and required more public disclosures (such
as MDA and footnote information in the annual report). In June 1996, the CSRC issued
Disclosure Standard No. 3 on the Content and Format of Interim Reports (CSRC
Pronouncement No. 72). This standard requires listed Chinese firms to release semi-annual
interim reports by the end of August. Other changes include 17 new Specific Independent
Auditing Standards (No. 8 to 24), which are related to subsequent events, related parties,
and disclosure and six Independent Auditing Practice Pronouncements (No. 2 to 7) that
were issued in 1996 and 1997. All of these regulatory changes could enhance the
information environment and disclosure quality from 1996, leading to increased trading
volume and stock return volatility.
In addition, there were other macroeconomic factors that affected the trading volume.
For example, when the People's Bank of China stopped providing the inflation-adjusted
saving service on April 1, 1996, the dramatically reduced interest rate helped money flow
from banks to the stock markets and increased the trading volume and volatility of stock
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prices. The Shanghai A-share turnovers increased from 13.9 billion yuan in March to
44.1 billion yuan in April (Shanghai Slock Exchange Statistics Annual, 1997). On
September 24, 1996, the Shanghai Stock Exchange lowered the commission and handling
fee on the stock market, which influenced the trading volume and volatility of stock prices.
For the year of 1996, the trading volume on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges
increased 1,053% and 183%, respectively, and the monthly turnover rate reached 100%
(January 2, 1997, Securities Times). All these concurrent developments could affect both
the long- and short-window tests of the current study.
4. Is a decrease in earnings management due to the new auditing standards?
The authors use the noncore ROE (NROE) as a proxy for earnings quality. The NROE
comes from below-the-line transactions, such as tax refunds, government subsidies, and
sales investments or other assets. This assumes that firms primarily use NROE to inflate
bottom-line earnings. This is consistent with prior studies, which find that Chinese firms
manage earnings upwards to meet regulatory benchmarks (to apply for stock-rights
offerings or to avoid reporting consecutive losses and the possibility of being delisted)
(Chen and Yuan, 2004; Haw, Qi, Wu & Wu, 2005). SZ hypothesize and find that NROE
decreases after the implementation of the new auditing standards. However, there are
alternative explanations to their results. One is the potential impact of IPO firms on the post-
issue period. Aharony, Lee, and Wong (2000) find that Chinese firms manage accounting
accruals upward during the process of financial packaging, while accruals decline after the
IPO. Since the Chinese stock markets were reactivated in the early 1990s, a significant
portion of the sample firms in the SZ study were likely to go public during 1993 and 1994.
It is unclear, then, whether the decreased earnings management in the current study reflects
the implementation of the new auditing standards or the reversal of upward-earnings
management made before the IPOs.
Another potential explanation is related to the lack of control for differences in the firm's
operating performance. Aharony et al. (2000) report a significant post issue earnings
decline for unprotected-industry firms, which represent a majority of the sample firms in the
current study. Prior literature suggests the importance of controlling for a firm's
performance in an earnings-management study (Kothan, Leone & Wasley, 2005), and
shows that the NROE of Chinese firms is significantly and negatively correlated with
operating performance (before earnings management) (Haw et al., 2005). Furthermore, the
validity of the SZ study could be enhanced if some type of expectation model was built-in
to separate NROE into earnings management and "normal" business operation. The extant
literature finds that Chinese managers use NROE as well as accounting accruals to manage
earnings (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Haw et al., 2005). It would be interesting to check
whether NROE and accruals have been "permanently" reduced after the 1996 auditing
regulation. In addition, there are other earnings-quality measures to consider. Ball et al.
(2000) find that both earnings reported under Chinese GAAP and International Accounting
Standards (IAS) are not conservative for Chinese firms issuing A-shares and both A- and B-
shares. A recent study by LaFond and Watts (2008) shows that changes in information
asymmetry lead to conservatism and conservatism reduces information asymmetry by
restricting the manager's ability to manipulate financial reporting. Thus, it could be
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Fig. I . Market indices for Shanghai A- and B-shares. (Source: the Trading Database of CSMAR, China Stock
Market and Accounting Research).
interesting to see whether conservatism has improved after the implementation of new
auditing standards.
5. Can the B-share market serve as a control for the A-share market?
To control for other economic factors, the authors use B-share firms (which are available
only for foreigners during the sample period) as a control.
4
The rationale was that the B-share
firms prepare IAS-based financial reports rather than Chinese-GAAP based reports, and are
audited by international auditors. Thus, the authors argue that the new auditing standards
should have little impact on their reports, and any difference in the post-event changes in the
disclosure quality between A- and B-share firms would imply the effects of new auditing
standards, since both groups of firms are equally subject to other economic factors that affect
disclosure quality. However, the B-share firms are not likely to be an ideal control sample.
It is well known that the B-share market (characterized by its illiquidity) is entirely
segmented from the A-share market (a primary domestic market) during the sample period of
this study. Thus, changes in economic factors in the A-share market cannot be assumed to be the
same as those in the B-share market. Fig. 1 shows the market indices for the A- and B-shares in
the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1993 to 2000. Overall, the B-share market appears to be
The authors use a dummy variable EX for firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The coefficient on
EX'PERIOD (panel B, Table X) is significantly positive and larger than the PERIOD coefficient This indicates
that for firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. NROE essentially increased for the post-event period.
The B-share market has been open to the Chinese domestic investors since 2001.
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China Stock Market and Accounting Research).
much less volatile than the A-share market, and more importantly, the co-movement between
the two markets is weak/ This suggests that economic factors and market conditions affecting
the A-share market could be different from those affecting the B-share market.
The SZ study's pre-event period roughly covers from March 1995 to February 1996, and
the post-event period from March 1996 to February 1997 (assuming that firms release annual
reports three months after the required fiscal year-end of December). The percentage of
market-index changes were - 14.8% for A-shares and -8.4% for B-shares during the pre-
event period, and 89. 1% for A-shares and 33. 1% for B-shares for the post-event period. While
the performances ofthe two markets are similar during the pre-event period, the increase in the
A-share index is substantially higher than that in the B-share index for the post-event period.
The development of the B-share market for foreigner investors has been less impressive than
that ofthe A-share market, possibly due to its segmentation from the primary domestic market.
To the extent that changes in economic factors are less influential in the B-share market,
changes in disclosure quality among the A-share firms may not be entirely attributable to the
presence ofnew auditing standards in the A-share market. The bull market experienced by the
A-share firms might also imply that these firms have more good news to disclose to investors,
compared with the B-share firms. To the extent that A-share firms have more disclosures in the
post-event period than B-share firms, this could be due to the differential market conditions
between the two markets, rather than the new auditing standards per se.
The other major change taking place during the period of interest is the significant increase
in the number ofnew stocks listed in the Chinese Stock Exchanges. Fig. 2 depicts the number
of stocks listed at the end of each year in the A- and B-share markets. From the end of 1995
The pattern is similar for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
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(close to the pre-event period) to the end of 1996 (close to the post-event period), the number
of listed stocks increased by 65.3% and 2 1 .4% for the A- and B-share markets, respectively.
The increased number of listed stocks could also affect price synchronicity. In a market where
the number of stocks is smaller in 1995, the market index is more likely to be affected by
individual stocks, implying a higher synchronicity and a lower disclosure quality. With an
increase in the number of listed stocks, the effect of individual stock returns on market returns
should become smaller. Again, we expect this phenomenon to be less apparent on the B-share
market. Thus, the changes in the information environment among A-share firms may not be
entirely attributable to the new auditing standards.
The authors also use short-window analysis to control for other economic factors. While
this increases the power of the test, this method may not help mitigate the influence of
economy-wide factors. Since the sample firms' observations in the short window cluster in
the same calendar time, thus are still subject to the influence of different economy-wide
factors and market environments between 1995 and 1996.
My last comment is related to stock-return synchronicity. Hypothesis 4 predicts that price
synchronicity decreases subsequent to the implementation ofnew auditing standards. This is
consistent with a recent study by Jin and Myers (2006), which indicates that price
synchronicity is associated with corporate transparency. However, Chan and Hameed (2006)
find that stock return synchronicity is significantly and positively related to trading volume,
suggesting the importance of controlling for the difference in trading volume between 1995
and 1 996. Interestingly. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Gassen, & LaFond (2005) claim that synchronicity
is not a good measure of firm-specific information in international markets and develop an
alternative measure of firm-specific information based on the percentage of zero return weeks.
6. Summary of discussion
SZ address interesting and important research questions from China's emerging markets and
test whether the new auditing standards implemented in 1996 improve the information
environment of listed Chinese firms. They find that Chinese firms experience a significant
increase in trading volume and price volatility, but a decrease in the synchronicity of stock
prices and earnings management in 1996. The SZ study contributes to enhancing our
understanding of the "economic consequences" of new auditing regulations in emerging
markets.
However, the authors face a difficulty in research design similar to other previous studies.
because implementation of the new regulations takes place in the same calendar year, which
cluster the sample. As a transitional economy, the Chinese government made a series of
reporting, auditing, and market regulation changes, which coincided with the test period. All
of these concurrent developments affected the firms' information environment and stock
market performance in the test period and. thus it is difficult to tease out the effect of new
auditing standards. Another difficulty arises from the lack of proper incentives for Chinese
managers and auditors as well as weak corporate-governance structures in China. Thus, the
documented empirical evidence in the SZ study would suggest an indirect linkage between the
new auditing standards and the information environment, rather than "causality." While the
authors provide a sensitivity test, it is still unclear whether the impact of the new auditing
standards on information environment has been temporary or permanent.
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The SZ study provides interesting avenues for future research on emerging markets.
Additional research will shed more light on how new auditing standards affect the monitoring
role ofan audit, the quality ofauditing, auditor litigation, and the enforcement ofaudit standards
in a period when the Chinese government has been striving to enhance corporate-governance
structure.
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1. Introduction
Professor Haw offers a number of valuable comments and helpful suggestions in his
discussion of our paper. His comments substantively fall into two groups: possible alter-
native explanations of our results and the appropriateness of our control sample. We thank
Professor Haw for his insightful review and respond to his comments below.
2. Do auditing standards matter in China?
The discussant argues that auditing standards alone may not be likely to affect auditors in
the absence of proper incentives and effective monitoring mechanisms. He opines that
actual accounting practice is a function of corporate governance, political factors, the legal
system, the competence and independence of external auditors, the relationship between
financial reporting and taxation, as well as accounting/auditing standards (Ball, 2001).
Therefore, he believes that changes in accounting practice result from a wide range of
complementary changes in the overall infrastructure rather than a change in one element
alone (such as auditing standards). We agree with the assertion that changes in auditing
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standards alone would not be effective without proper and effective implementation. In the
Introduction and Institutional Background sections of our paper, we mention the stricter
disciplinary rules, monitoring, and sanctions imposed by the Chinese Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (CICPA) and the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
to effectively enforce the new auditing standards. Realizing that the effects of the standards
cannot be separated from implementation forces in practice, our paper focuses on the
incremental impact of increased audit quality (due to the implementation of new auditing
standards) on the information environment, rather than on whether auditing standards alone
affect auditors' behavior and, hence, the disclosure practice of audited firms.
The discussant points out that less effective corporate governance systems (characterized
by dominant state and legal-entity ownership) and relatively low litigation risk in China's
markets (compared to those in the West) could provide opportunities for managers of listed
Chinese firms to act in the best interests of the government and its representative orga-
nizations rather than report high-quality accounting information or seek quality auditing of
their financial reports (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000). Thus, the discussant is concerned
whether auditing standards could be effectively implemented. While we agree that the
Chinese markets are emerging markets, where accounting disclosure tends to be low in
quality and quantity, as we mention in our introduction, we also believe that in such markets
the economic consequences of increased accounting disclosures due to the implementa-
tion of a set of auditing standards should be significant. In addition, our paper provides
empirical evidence which implies that auditing standards could be effectively implemented.
The institutional background, especially the corporate governance features of the emerging
markets, makes it important to implement the auditing standards and interesting to study
whether there is an incremental impact of increased audit quality (due to implementation of
new auditing standards) on the information environment.
The discussant argues that any impact of the new auditing standards would be stronger
among large auditors in China. Contrary to this argument, we find that the impact might be
less for large auditors. Since the information environment of companies audited by large
audit firms is already thought to be better than those audited by small audit firms, because
large audit firms are believed to offer a higher quality audit (e.g., Becker, DeFond,
Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998), the incremental impact of implementing new standards
might be smaller for firms with large auditors than for those with small auditors.
DeFond, Wong, and Li (2000) find that the implementation of new Chinese auditing
standards results in a higher frequency of non standard audit opinions; but, subsequent to
the implementation of new standards, large auditors lose market share in terms of both
clients and assets audited. They interpret the decline in the market share of large
independent auditors as a "flight from quality." which is based on the assumption that large
auditors provide better audit quality. However, the nature of the emerging stock market and
emerging audit market could provide an alternative explanation. When companies go
public (IPO firms), they are more likely to retain their original auditors rather than to engage
large auditors. Given that the audit market is an emerging market and a significant number
of IPOs increases the number of firms in such a market, it would result in a decrease in the
market share of top auditors. This is different from those cases in which IPO firms switch
from large auditors to small auditors, resulting in a smaller market share for large auditors.
Note that during the sample period these switches were very sporadic in China (DeFond
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et al., 2000, p.291, footnote 15), which support our alternative explanation above. We
believe that our results help readers obtain a broader picture of the impact of new auditing
standards on the information environment in emerging markets that is not addressed in the
prior literature.
3. Are increased trading volume and price volatility the result of new auditing
standards?
The discussant suggests that several important events, such as The Contents and Format of
Annual Report (CSRC No. 2), The Content and Format ofInterim Reports (CSRC No. 3,
mentioned as CSRC Pronouncement No. 72 in the discussant comment), and other successive
sets ofnew auditing standards, could affect the information environment and empirical results
of our study. In the Robustness Check section of our paper, we discuss this issue, particularly
regarding CSRC No. 2. As a trivial revision of Content and Fonnat of Disclosures ofPublic
Companies No. 1-6 (temporary), which was implemented in January 1994, the impact of
revised CSRC No. 2 and No. 3 was not significant because all public companies followed the
regulations in annual reports for their fiscal year 1994, as indicated by Lin and Su (1998).
Based on the development ofaccounting disclosure regulations in China ( Lin & Su, 1 998), the
biggest change introduced by Content andFormat ofDisclosures ofPublic Companies, if any,
should appear in the annual reports for fiscal year 1 994 rather than fiscal year 1 995. Therefore,
the impact of the 1995 revision on the annual reports for fiscal year 1995 would be minimal.
Hence, contrary to the discussant's claim, these changes should impact the 1994 annual
reports, which would work against finding any results in our study. Finally, the successive new
Specific Independent Auditing Standards (Nos. 8 to 24) and Independent Auditing Practice
Pronouncements (Nos. 2 to 7) were implemented in January 1997 and July 1999, which are
beyond our sample period and would not affect our results.
The discussant speculates that other macroeconomic factors, such as the changes in the
interest rates and commission and handling fees in the stock markets, might have affected
the trading volume. In the Robustness Check section of our paper, we address this issue as
follows: we calculate the mean of share turnover over days -250 to -4 relative to the test
period for the short window and over weeks -50 to - 1 relative to the test period for the
long window. We then calculate the abnormal share turnover over the short (long) window
as the difference between these daily (weekly) means and those over the days (weeks) of the
test windows. We re-estimate the models using these alternative measures and find that,
with a minor exception, the results are qualitatively the same. The exception is that over the
short window, using the 2SLS, the coefficient of PERIOD is positive but not significant. In
addition, we use market-adjusted price volatility, which is calculated as the mean of weekly
standard deviation of share return divided by the weekly standard deviation of market
return. As we note in the Robustness Check section of our paper, the results are qualitatively
the same as those reported.
4. Is the decrease in earnings management due to the new auditing standards?
The discussant provides alternative explanations for the decrease in non-core operating
income (NROE) subsequent to the implementation of the new auditing standards. One is the
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potential impact of IPO firms on the post-issue period. The discussant wonders whether the
decreased earnings management reflects the reversal of upward earnings management
made before the IPOs. As we mentioned in the Robustness Check section of our paper, our
sample firms do not include any observations of IPO firms (remember that the calculation
of beta for the pre-implementation period requires 50 weeks' observations on share returns
before the annual report release for fiscal year 1994). Since there is no existing evidence
indicating a decreasing pattern for the magnitude of the reversal of upward earnings
management, our results could not be simply attributed to the IPO firms. In addition, we
focus on NROE, which is different from accruals whose reversal feature has been
documented by prior literature (e.g., Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000). Given that there is
limited evidence on the reversal of most below-the-line items, we would like to leave this
for future research.
The discussant points out the lack of control for differences in firms' operating
performance, which could be another potential explanation for our results. In our paper, we
perform a robustness check to determine whether our results are affected by industry using an
abnormal measure (e.g., industry adjusted measure of non core operating income). As we
report in the paper, our results are qualitatively the same. We do not include operating income
in our model because this variable leads to a serious multicollinearity problem. Also, as we
indicate in the Robustness Check section of our paper, we perform the analysis ofNROE for
the two local markets, separately, and find that our conclusion holds in each market.
We concur with the discussant that it would be interesting to investigate whether NROE
and accruals have been "permanently" reduced after the introduction of auditing regulation.
In addition, future researchers could expand our study by examining whether conservatism
improves after the implementation of new auditing standards.
5. Can the B-share market serve as a control for the A-share market?
The discussant believes that B-share firms are not likely to be an ideal control sample
because the B-share market appears to be much less volatile than the A-share market and
the co-movement between the two markets is weak. We agree that economic factors
affecting the A-share market could be different from those affecting the B-share market.
However, the difference between the two groups does not prohibit our using the B-share
market as a control group.
On the other hand, the discussant argues that the percentage of market index changes are
roughly the same during the pre-event period but different for A-shares and B-shares during
the post-event period. Actually, this is consistent with our findings that the implementation
of new auditing standards has a different impact on the two types of markets. If these two
markets had been totally driven by different forces, as the discussant argues, the market
index changes during the pre-event would have been different as well. In addition, as we
mention in the Robustness Check section of our paper, we used abnormal trading volume to
control for other market factors. To control for the general changes in the market, we use
market-adjusted measures for price volatility, which is calculated as the mean of weekly
standard deviation of share return divided by the weekly standard deviation of market
return. As we indicate in our paper, these results are qualitatively the same as those we
report.
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The discussant indicates that the market index, which is affected by an increase in the
number of listed firms, affects stock price synchronicity\ He speculates that the changes in
price synchronicity in the A-share markets may be entirely attributable to the new auditing
standards. We agree with his suggestion that market return could vary with the composition
of the market index, while noting that the effect of such a change in the number of stocks
could be endogenous in any event study of price synchronicity We strongly support the
discussant's call for more rigorous studies to evaluate the impact of change in the com-
position of the market index on price synchronicity and explore better measures of firm-
specific information.
The discussant recommends that we use trading volume as a control in the analysis ofstock
price synchronicity. We realize that recent research papers have examined stock return
synchronicity using firm-level variables (e.g.. Chan & Hameed. 2006) rather than country-
level variables (e.g.. Jin ev Myers, 2006: Morck. Yeung. &c Yu. 2000). We agree that a
multivariate analysis of firm-specific information could yield more powerful conclusions than
the univariate tests used in our paper, while noting that the research in this area demands a
rigorous theoretical investigation of stock-return synchronicity. As a sensitivity test we
perform a regression of stock-return synchronicity on the PERIOD dummy and trading
volume, which yielded qualitatively similar results as those reported in our paper. We also find
that trading volume is significantly and positively related to stock-return synchronicity. This
indicates that although the discussant is nght in expecting a relationship between trading
volume and price synchronicity. our results are robust with regard to inclusion of such a
variable in a multivariate model. Future researchers could explore the determinants of stock-
return synchronicity (e.g.. analyst following, firm size, trading volume, price volatility, free
float institutional ownership, and corporate governance), as well as its relation to the quality' of
accounting information. In addition, we concur with the discussant that the issue ofmeasuring
firm-specific information could be a fruitful avenue for future research (Ashbaugh-Skaife.
Gassen. & LaFond. 21
6. Conclusion
We appreciate Professor Haw's helpful suggestions. We concur with him that the
research design we use in our paper faces similar difficulties as in other previous studies.
because the implementation of new regulations for the entire sample could cluster with
other events and news in the same calendar year to show results. However, the robustness
checks we perform for alternative explanations and influential factors support our
conclusion. We strongly support the discussant's call for additional rigorous research on
how the new auditing standards affect the role of audit, audit quality, auditor litigation, and
the enforcement mechanism in a penod when the Chinese government has been striving to
enhance the corporate governance structure.
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Abstract
This paper adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analyze risk
reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. Given its inherent discretion, risk reporting depends
on disclosure incentives. To assess these incentives the analytical models consider risk reporting as an
endogenous feature, thereby providing a benchmark to discuss regulatory attempts. Particularly, dis-
cretionary disclosure models refer to verified disclosure, e.g., on risk factors or risk management, whereas
cheap talk models refer to unverified disclosure, like managerial forecasts on the impact of risk factors.
This provides an analytically-based framework for discussion. Unlike pnor literature, which focuses
on disclosure cost, I argue that uncertainty of information endowment and issues of credible commu-
nication can explain restricted risk reporting observed empirically. Linking regulatory attempts to these
restrictions implies that regulation may mitigate the incentives-dnven restrictions to some extent, but can
have adverse effects on risk reporting. I particularly discuss the link between effective risk monitoring
and the precision of risk reporting; the ex post assessment and usefulness of managerial forecasts on
impacts of risk factors; the claimed decreasing cost of capital by mandatory risk reporting; and the threat
of self-fulfilling prophecies. While the discussion has implications for both specific risk reporting
requirements and empirical research, overall results suggest that we should not overestimate the
informativeness of risk reporting even in a regulated environment.
< 200S University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: D82; K20; M41; M42
Keywords: Cheap talk; Discretionary disclosure models; Incentives; Regulation; Risk management; Risk reporting
E-mail address dobler(S Imu de
0020-7063 $30.00 i 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2008.04.005
M. Dohler The International Journal ofAccounting 4} Const 184 206 185
1. Introduction
In recent years, risk reporting has gained interest in financial reporting practice, regulation,
and international research. It is no longer a particularity of the banking and insurance sectors
which currently reassess the role of risk reporting for market discipline (BCBS, 2001; IAIS.
2002; Dardis, 2002; Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Crumpton, Linsley, & Shrives, 2006). Changing
economic and regulatory environments, more complex business structures and risk
management, increasing reliance on financial instruments and international transactions,
and prominent corporate crises gave rise to risk reporting in non-financial sectors. In general
terms, risk reporting shall allow outsiders to assess the risks of an entity's future economic
performance (Schrand & Elliott, 1998; Linsley & Shrives, 2006). Based on an uncertainty-
based definition of risk, a risk management perspective, and a review of two major strands of
analytic models, this paper analyzes incentives for risk reporting and their relation to regu-
latory attempts. The paper defines risk reporting as risk-related disclosures, which imply
information on the distribution of future cash flows. 1 It covers both verifiable risk reporting,
e.g., on risk factors and risk management, and non-verifiable risk reporting, e.g., direct
managerial forecasts on the distribution.
Apart from the financial sectors, published research on risk reporting has to date been rather
limited. Most efforts are empirical and the assertions are diverse. Parts ofthe literature consider
risk reporting as largely beneficial for disclosing entities, assuming both lower cost of capital
(ICAEW, 1999; Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 2000) and disciplining effects on risk
management and governance (Linsley & Shrives, 2000; Jorion, 2002). While this implies
prevalent incentives to voluntarily report on risk, empirical research documents poor volun-
tary risk reporting on average (Beretta & Bozzolan. 2004; Mohobbot, 2005). Given this
observation, parts of the literature also infer that (some) managers have limited incentives of
disclose private risk information and recommend extending risk reporting requirements
(Carlon, Loftus, & Miller, 2003; Lajili & Zeghal, 2005a). However, empirical studies find
large variations and deficits in risk reporting even in the presence ofdisclosure rules (Rajgopal.
1999; Kajiiter & Esser. 2007). What emerges is in line with recent accounting research
findings (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005): Incentives matter even in the
presence of regulation. This is particularly likely when considering risk reporting, because it is
subjective and partly non-verifiable, which inherently allows for discretion. Yet, there is very
little work on risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation, in general, and even less
going beyond the question of whether or not to impose mandatory disclosure, in particular.
This paper addresses this gap. Particularly, it adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure
models and cheap talk models to analyze risk reporting incentives and their relation to
regulation. Given room to exercise discretion, both strands of analytic models consider
disclosure as endogenous and investigate whether and how managers disclose private
information possibly available to them due to strategic interaction with other parties, i.e..
without an exogenously imposed duty to disclose through mandates. Mandatory disclosure
refers to the existence of disclosure regulation. While any disclosure in a voluntary
The reference to the distribution follows from the concept of risk, while the focus on cash flows is consistent
with both regulatory intention (AICPA, 1987; Schrand & Elliott. 1998; ICAEW, 1999; GAS 5.9) and the
connection of cash flows and firm value (Dve. 2001 ).
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disclosure regime is discretionary, discretion in risk reporting is given in mandatory
disclosure regimes as well. The latter stems from disclosure rules allowing for the choice of
quality of information disclosed (Combes-Thuelin, Henneron, & Touron, 2006) and, more
fundamentally, from the discretion inherent in risk reporting. Basically, discretionary
disclosure models assume verified and credible disclosure and consider a manager's
incentives to disclose or withhold information about which he may have knowledge
(Verrecchia, 2001). Cheap talk models assume unverified (covering non-verifiable)
disclosure. These models analyze how much, if any, information can be credibly disclosed
when direct, plain communication is cheap, i.e., costless and non-binding (Crawford &
Sobel, 1982). Refining risk reporting to imply that information on the distribution of future
cash flows of the reporting entity acknowledges its forward-looking and probabilistic nature
and is useful for adopting the models. Particularly, I review discretionary disclosure models
that feature verified disclosures which imply either the variance or the level of future cash
flows, and cheap talk models that consider unverified disclosure, particularly noisy and
interval forecasts, in single- and multi-period settings." While Linsley and Shrives (2000)
suggest other strands oftheory to explain voluntary risk reporting, the two strands chosen for
this study consider risk reporting as an endogenous feature and, thus, are motivated from
risk management and game setting perspectives. They capture the fundamental properties of
risk information and yield an analytically-based framework for discussion.
Although few ofthese models formalize regulation (e.g., Jorgensen & Kirschenheiter, 2000,
2003), they assess the inherent and incentives-dnven restrictions of voluntary risk reporting
and thereby provide a benchmark for discussing various regulatory attempts that go beyond
imposing mandatory disclosure. Particularly, the analytic models imply three major reasons
why a manager may not report on risk. These stem from ( 1 ) uncertainty of risk information
endowment; (2) unverified (including non-verifiable) and thus possibly non-credible reporting;
and (3) the threat of economic disadvantages. Regulation addresses these restrictions directly
by (1) requiring adequate risk management systems; (2) enforcement mechanisms, like audit
and liability; and (3) mandating risk reporting (Solomon et al., 2000; Dobler, 2004). This
allows for a combined analysis. Additionally, the analytic models yield implications for
specific risk reporting rules, which are only partly addressed by recent disclosure requirements.
My main results confirm that regulation cannot overcome incentives in risk reporting at
each level of analysis. If a manager does not report because he has no risk information or
pretends not to have any, requiring a minimum level of information endowment through
risk management benchmarks the margins for discretion, but cannot eliminate them even in
case of verifiable information. For both verified and unverified disclosure, more precise
information held by the manager does not necessarily imply more precise risk reporting.
This is partly due to both the restrictions to credible disclosure and the possibility of
misreporting private risk information when considering unverified disclosure. Particularly,
as neither ex post nominal/actual value comparisons nor audit can significantly contribute
to credibility, but may have adverse effects on disclosure, I dispute, for example, the use-
fulness of managerial forecasts on the impact of risk factors. Within the given framework,
I find that disclosure cost, including an increasing cost of capital, is consistent with
managers' opposition to strictly mandatory risk reporting. However, given discretion even
This paper does not consider contracting issues. For a review see Lambert (2001
)
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in mandatory disclosure I argue that the threat of commercial drawbacks is likely to be
mitigated, thereby reaffirming prior literature, which suggests extending mandatory dis-
closure for information purposes. While presenting implications for specific risk reporting
requirements, I conclude that the informativeness of risk reporting should not be overstated
even in a regulated environment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background to motivate the analytic
framework. Section 3 reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models. Section 4
discusses the implications of risk reporting incentives as they relate to regulatory attempts,
followed by conclusions that involve implications for future empirical research.
2. Background
2.1. Characterization of risk reporting
Notions of risk encompass an uncertainty-based and a target-based view. The former
defines risk as randomness or uncertainty of future outcomes that can be expressed
numerically by a distribution of outcomes (Knight, 1921). The latter defines risk as the
potential deviation from a benchmark or target outcome (Borch, 1 968 ). Either way, risk relates
to a distribution of future outcomes (Corby, 1 994; Doherty, 2000). Risk information, thus, can
be defined as risk-related information on that distribution. While this paper relies on the
uncertainty-based definition, the supplemental target-based view is necessary to distinguish
potential loss and potential gain, referred to as downside risk and upside risk, respectively.
In a business context, risk can be driven by various external and internal risk factors or
sources. The risk factors comprise, for example, politics, regulation, and market, as well as
finance, business process, and personnel. Any and all of them potentially affect an entity's
future performance. From a portfolio perspective, some of the risks arising are systematic, i.e.,
non-diversifiable, while others are non-systematic and diversifiable by measures of risk
management. Corporate risk management continuously aims at identifying risk factors,
analyzing and evaluating their potential impact on future outcomes, and addressing the
distribution by means of risk handling where appropriate. The phases apart from risk handling
constitute a risk monitoring system (Williams, Smith, & Young, 1 998). Given an effective risk
management system, a manager can be assumed to hold more risk information on risk factors,
corporate risk management, and their potential impact on the entity's future performance, than
outsiders, who have no access to internal information sources. Thus, disclosure of risk
information can reduce this information asymmetry (Linsley & Shrives, 2000; Lajili &
Zeghal, 2005a). It shall satisfy an information function and more specifically an early-warning
function for outsiders.
Risk reporting shall provide risk information that allows outsiders to assess the risks of an
entity's future economic performance (Dobler, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006). Particularly,
regulators refer to information to "assess the risks and uncertainties concerning a business
enterprise's future cash flows" (AICPA, 1987, p. 3; also Schrand & Elliott, 1998; ICAEW,
1999; GAS 5.9). Put in formal terms and consistent with risk analysis approaches based
on Hertz (1964) and Mallinson (1974), risk reporting shall help assessing the distribution of
future cash flows of the reporting entity or parameters of the distribution. This broad view
covers disclosures (1 ) on risk factors of all categories; (2) on risk management or phases of it;
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Table 1
Comparison of risk reporting requirements in the United States of America, according to IFRSs, and in Germany
USA IFRSs Germany
Regulatory
approach
Piecemeal approach Piecemeal approach Comprehensive approach
Major regulation SFAS 5, 131, 133;
SOP 94-6
SEC Regulations,
FRR48
IAS 1. 37;IFRS 7 •§§ 289(1), 315(1)
Commercial Code
Professional standards
GAS 5, 20
Reporting
instruments
Notes
• SEC forms, MD&A
Notes
Management commentary
proposed
Separate risk report in the
management report
Few note disclosures
Notion of risk Various, mainly
uncertamty-based
Various, mainly
uncertainty-based
Upside and downside risk,
GAS 5 focusing on
downside risk
Risk management
disclosures
Mainly concerning use
of financial instruments
Mainly concerning use
of financial instruments
Covering entire corporate risk
management
Focus of risk
disclosures
Financial and market risk,
contingencies
Financial and market risk,
contingencies
Risk of any category,
financial risk highlighted
Disclosure of
risk concentrations
Financial risk, major
customers and other
Mainly financial risk Any nsk concentration
Disclosure of
going-concern
uncertainties
Required only by audit
standards (SAS 59)
Required in notes Required in nsk report and
in notes
Risk quantification Required for financial
risk, for contingencies,
where practicable
Required for financial risk,
for contingencies, where
practicable
Required for any risk, where
practicable, financial risk
highlighted
Disclosure of
risk forecasts
Not required,
encouraged in MD&A
Not required Required
Negative reports Not required Not required Not required
Special opt-out clause No Yes (IAS 37.92) No
and (3 ) ofnsk forecasts, i.e., direct managerial forecasts of the distribution offuture outcomes or
their parameters as long as they can be scaled in terms of future cash flows. ' These elements of
nsk reporting differ in their ex ante verifiability when disclosed. Disclosures on risk factors and
risk management systems including the means ofnsk handling when implemented are generally
verifiable. In contrast, risk forecasts are not. The distinction of venfiable and non-verifiable risk
information has fundamental implications. Verifiable risk information can be disclosed verified
or not, while non-verifiable risk information can only be disclosed unverified. While verified
risk reporting is credible in itself, unverified risk reporting may or may not be credible. This
finally defines whether discretionary disclosure or cheap talk models apply.
While financial and market risk can be directly expressed in terms of cash flows, in the end virtually all risks,
».. political, regulatory, business process, and personnel risks, affect the distribution of cash flows and may be
put in these terms (Schrand & Elliott, 1998).
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Corporate risk management determines risk reporting in two major ways. First, as risk
monitoring and management are the information source for risk reporting (Solomon et al.,
2000), the possible information content of risk reports is linked to the information endowed by
corporate risk management. Second, and less considered in the literature, risk reporting can be
used as an instrument for risk handling if there is room for discretion, in the sense of reporting
choices concerning disclosure, its format, or precision. Given incomplete foresight and the
subjective and the partly non-verifiable nature of risk reporting, a manager can report on risks
in different ways. If these reporting alternatives induce different decisions and actions, the
manager can direct the users' reactions and particularly manage "derivative" risks arising from
such reactions to some extent. This characterizes risk reporting as a means of risk handling.
2.2. Disclosure rules
While some discretion is inherent in the nature of risk reporting, regulation may limit
discretion compared to voluntary reporting by mandating risk disclosures by type and format.
Most regimes follow a piecemeal approach. They mandate selected risk-related disclosures
referring to specific categories of risks as opposed to requiring comprehensive risk reporting.
A notable exception is Germany that has a separate standard GAS 5 on comprehensive
risk reporting (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Dobler, 2005; Mohobbot, 2005). To illustrate
the variation in disclosure regulation, Table 1 compares three regimes: ( 1 ) the United States
ofAmerica as a typical case law country with reporting requirements according to U.S. GAAP
and by further SEC rules; (2) lFRSs as an international financial reporting system; and
(3) Germany as a typical code law country which is assigned a forerunner role in compre-
hensive risk reporting regulation.
Risk reporting requirements of U.S. GAAP and IFRSs are roughly comparable.
Particularities concern the disclosure ofgoing-concern uncertainties (IAS 1 .25 ) and the special
opt-out clause in IAS 37.92. The opt-out clause allows omitting some disclosures required
about contingencies "in extremely rare cases" where disclosures "can be expected to prejudice
seriously the position of the entity in a dispute with other parties". Both regimes use various
notions of risk, but do not mandate risk forecasts. Disclosures are located in the notes and focus
on contingencies (SFAS 5; SOP 94-6; IAS 37), financial and market risks, and their
management (SFAS 133; 1FRS 7). German regulation, mainly set out in GAS 5, differs in all
these respects.^ It mandates a comprehensive and self-contained risk report located in the
Following IAS 1.7, I refer to IFRSs as the entire system of International Financial Reporting Standards,
including standards (IAS and IFRS) as well as interpretations (SIC and IFRIC) adopted by the IASB. For a brief
survey of risk disclosures required by IFRSs also see Combes-Thuelin el al (20061.
" Since 1998 the German Commercial Code has been requiring German middle-sized corporations, large private
firms, and groups to report on the risks of their future development in the annual management reports accompanying
their financial statements. The German Accounting Standard (GAS ) 5, issued in 200 1 , specifies the legal risk reporting
requirement. Irrespective of whether the entity prepares financial statements under U.S. GAAP, IFRSs. or German
Commercial Code, GAS 5 applies for group risk reporting and its application is recommended for individual risk
reporting (Dobler. 2005). GAS 5.9 defines risk as "the possibility of a future negative impact on the economic
position," where "economic position encompasses the ... ability to generate net positive cash flows in the future."
"Risks shall be quantified where this can be done with reliable and recognised methods" (GAS 5.20|.
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management report, a reporting instrument largely comparable to the MD&A in the U.S. or the
management commentary proposed by the IASB (2005). While the scope of GAS 5 is more
comprehensive, covering risks of all categories, the entire corporate risk management and
forecasts, its disclosure requirements are rather general and less specific and less detailed than
those of U.S. GAAP and IFRSs.
The comparison is consistent with the notion that a piecemeal approach relies on voluntary
risk reporting beyond specific mandatory disclosures, whereas a comprehensive approach is
inevitably more flexible to allow for entity-specific adoption of risk reporting requirements
(Schrand & Elliott, 1998). As either approach allows for managerial discretion, incentives are
likely to play a major role in risk reporting, even in a (partly) regulated disclosure regime.
2.3. Empirical evidence
A growing body of published empirical studies aims at risk reporting. A considerable
strand of North American research, including Rajgopal (1999). Roulstone (1999), Hodder,
Koonce, and McAnally (200 1 ), Jorion (2002) and Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam, and
Welker (2002), addresses mandatory market risk disclosures according to FRR 48. The
studies find evidence consistent with an impact of risk disclosures on capital markets. Yet,
the particular impact depends on the reporting format chosen. Further research surveyed by
Combes-Thuelin et al. (2006) documents restricted risk disclosures in special settings with
large political and environmental risk exposure. Other studies address risk reporting more
comprehensively. Apart from questionnaire survey results by Solomon et al. (2000)
documenting a preference for voluntary risk reporting assumed to be useful for investment
decisions among UK institutional investors, the studies on comprehensive risk reporting rely
on content analysis of annual or management reports. Table 2 summarizes these studies.
Despite piecemeal evidence so far and reliance on risk reporting quantity rather than quality
(Botosan, 2004), empirical findings are consistent with the size effect but, overall, document
limited risk reporting comprising mainly qualitative disclosures. Risk reporting largely varies
across entities in both voluntary and mandatory reporting regimes. If a manager has access to
risk information, e.g., by means of risk management systems, deficits in voluntary risk
reporting imply managerial incentives to withhold private information. Diverse application of
requirements and non-compliance in a mandatory risk reporting regime are consistent with
(some) managers actually exercising the discretion given by reporting choice or by weak
enforcement. The results highlight the role of risk reporting incentives even in (partly)
regulated regimes.
3. Discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models on risk reporting
3.1. Characteristics and structure
Since a manager is likely to hold more risk information relevant to assess the distribution of
future cash flows and can exercise discretion in disclosing it, rational outsiders will try to assess
the manager's risk reporting strategy as a means ofrisk handling and respond to it accordingly.
As the manager anticipates the outsiders' reaction strategy, a disclosure game setting emerges.
This provides a rationale to assess risk reporting by discretionary disclosure and cheap talk
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Table 2
Empirical studies on comprehensive risk reporting
Method and sample Main results
Bungartz Content analysis
(20031 -117 management reports of
German listed companies (2000)
Large variation in mandatory risk reporting
before implementation of GAS 5
• Risk reports mainly qualitative; poor disclosures
on interrelations of risk factors; few risk forecasts
Carlon et al. Content analysis
(2003) 54 annual reports of Australian
mining companies (2000)
Large variation in voluntary risk reporting
Diverse application of risk reporting requirements
related to financial instruments
Kajiiter and • Content analysis
Winkler 247 management reports of German
(2003) listed companies (1999 2001)
• Large variation in mandatory risk reporting
Risk reports mainly qualitative; poor disclosures on
risk assessment; few nsk forecasts
• Increasing quantity of risk disclosures over time,
but non-compliance with GAS 5 requirements
Fischer and Content analysis; GAS 5-based
Vielmeyer disclosure index
(2004) 346 management reports of German
listed companies (1999-2002)
1 Results consistent with Kajiiter and Winkler (2003)
1 Own disclosure index unaffected by size effect
Beretta and Content analysis; disclosure index
Bozzolan and regressions
(2004) 85 annual reports of Italian listed
companies (2001)
• Voluntary risk reporting mainly qualitative; few
disclosures on interrelations between risk factors and
their potential impact
Own disclosure index unaffected by size effect
Lajih and Content analysis
Zeghal • 300 annual reports of Canadian
(2005a) listed companies (1999)
Large variation, particularly in voluntary risk reporting
• Risk reporting mainly qualitative, few disclosures on
risk assessment; few risk forecasts
Lajih and Content analysis; disclosure index
Zeghal and regressions
(2005b) 230 annual reports of Canadian
listed companies (2002)
Results consistent with Lajili and Zeghal (2005a)
Positive association of risk disclosure quantity
and characteristics of corporate governance
Mohobbot • Content analysis; disclosure index
(2005) and regressions
90 annual reports of Japanese listed
companies (2003)
Large variation in voluntary risk reporting
Risk reporting mainly qualitative; few risk forecasts
Evidence consistent with size effect
Linsley and Content analysis; disclosure index
Shrives and regressions
(2006) 79 annual reports of UK listed
companies (2000)
Large variation in risk reporting, particularly
few quantitative disclosures
Evidence consistent with size effect
Negative association of risk disclosure quantity and
environmental risk exposure, but not with other proxies
for the level of corporate risk
Kajiiter and Content analysis
Esser 92 management reports of German
(2007) listed companies (2005)
Large variation in mandatory risk reporting (on both upside
and downside risk), particularly few quantitative
disclosures
Evidence consistent with size effect
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models (Verrecchia, 2001; Dye, 2001). The models consider disclosure as an endogenous
feature arising in the course of strategic interaction with outsiders, e.g., shareholders or
competitors, as opposed to exogenously imposed strictly mandatory disclosure.
Concerning endogenous disclosure, the unraveling principle implies full disclosure (e.g.,
Akerlof, 1970; Milgrom, 1981). It relies on a manager who aims at maximizing firm value,
which is consistent with maximizing cash flows in the case of the firm's liquidation
assumed in this framework. 6 The manager will always fully reveal his private information if
three major conditions are met cumulatively: First, disclosure is not associated with cost,
which is amended if risk reporting causes direct cost, e.g., by publishing, or indirect cost,
e.g., by harmful reactions of competitors upon disclosure (Corby, 1994; Linsley & Shrives,
2000). Second, it is common knowledge that the manager has information of the type under
consideration, which is particularly unlikely for emerging risk factors or much of forward-
looking information (Dye, 2001; Verrecchia, 2004). Relying on verified disclosure, dis-
cretionary disclosure models analyze the impact violations of these assumptions on the full
disclosure result. To cover risk reporting, in particular, I synthesize models featuring the
disclosures that imply information on the variance or the level of future cash flows. The
third condition assumes that if a manager discloses, disclosure is verified. This particularly
does not hold for risk forecasts, which are non-verifiable (Ijiri, 1975; Dobler, 2004). To
assess how unverified (covering non-verifiable) disclosure affects risk reporting and its
credibility, I synthesize both single-period and multi-period cheap talk models.
Although these features acknowledge the discretion as well as the probabilistic and
partly non-verifiable properties of risk reporting, the models discussed rely on assumptions
that limit their coverage (Wagenhofer, 2004). They capture neither all facets of risk
reporting, e.g., risk categorization, nor all incentives for disclosing or withholding private
information, e.g., personal reputation of the manager.
3.2. Discretionary disclosure models on verified risk reporting
3.2. J. Disclosure cost
Relying on informed managers and verified disclosure, a major strand of discretionary
disclosure models analyzes how disclosure cost amends the full disclosure result. As a
manager will disclose his private risk information if the entity's valuation or future cash
flow is higher compared to non-disclosure, his disclosure decision depends on the infor-
mation endowed and the cost related to risk reporting.
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) use a setting in which managers can disclose the firm-
specific variance offuture cash flows to risk-averse investors at a fixed cost. They find that only
variances below a tlireshold level, i.e., favorable information for risk-averse investors, will be
disclosed. There is a non-disclosure (full disclosure) equilibrium if costs are sufficiently large
(low). For intermediate levels of cost, partial-disclosure equilibria are obtained and the
threshold increases as the cost or the investors' risk aversion increases. Since in partial-
disclosure equilibria only low variances are disclosed, an entity will have a higher value when
the manager discloses than when the manager withholds the variance. It should be noted that
' The assumption that an entity's manager aims at a high firm value rules out major agency problems. Share-based
payment or striving for reputation provides a rationale for managers to behave in the described way (Verrecchia. 2001)
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other models, featuring the disclosure of information on the level of future cash flows, show
that a manager's reporting strategy is not necessarily linked to a single threshold when
disclosure costs are not fixed (for survey see Verrecchia, 2001; Dye, 2001).
Specifically, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) find that imposing strictly mandatory
disclosure (non-disclosure) of the variance decreases (increases) the expected firm value at an
ex ante stage compared to a voluntary disclosure regime. In a multifirm context, they show that
the CAPM holds in partial-disclosure equilibria. If a manager discloses the variance, the
market risk premium, the firm's beta and the firm's risk premium increase in the published
variance. In consequence, a firm's beta and risk premium are lower if the manager withholds
than if he discloses the variance. A broad interpretation of this result qualifies a common
hypothesis by Barry and Brown ( 1 985 ) who argue that higher dispersion in the investors' prior
beliefs results in a higher risk premium. The weakly increasing risk premium and cost of
capital in a mandatory compared to a voluntary reporting regime provide a rationale for
managers to oppose the implementation of strictly mandated risk disclosures in the given
setting.
3.2.2. Uncertainty of information availability
Uncertainty about whether the information considered is available to the manager
technically works like disclosure cost. In such settings, a probability (above zero but below
one) that the manager is informed is common knowledge. An uninformed manager cannot
disclose anything, not even the fact of being uninformed. An informed manager can choose
to reveal his private information. Even anticipating this behavior, outsiders cannot fully
unravel the manager's private information. If no disclosure is observed, the outsiders are
uncertain whether the manager is informed and withholds unfavorable information, or
whether the manager is not informed and has nothing to disclose (Jung & Kwon, 1988).
Given incomplete foresight, this setting is pertinent when considering risk reporting.
Modifying their setting, discussed in the last section, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter
(2000) show that only variances below a threshold are disclosed. The higher the probability
of information availability is, the more unfavorable, i.e., larger variances will be disclosed.
Similar results are obtained if an uninformed manager can invest at some fixed cost in an
information source which generates perfect information about the firm-specific variance.
Introducing strictly mandatory disclosure and investment in the risk monitoring system will
only lead to more risk disclosure compared to partial-disclosure equilibria in a voluntary
reporting regime if the cost is sufficiently high. That is, imposing mandatory risk reporting
does not change equilibria if there are sufficient incentives for disclosure.
Further models refer to the level of future cash flows. Jung and Kwon (1988) show that an
informed manager is more likely to disclose when the outsiders' prior beliefs are less
favorable or as the probability of being informed increases. Dye (1998) finds that the
threshold decreases as the probability that an outsider knows that a manager is informed
increases. Both models demonstrate that incentives for risk reporting depend on information
already available to the outsiders. More particularly, Dye and Sridhar (1995) analyze a
multifirm setting and assume that receipt of information is positively related among firms.
Under certain conditions, disclosure occurs in herds. If a minimum number of entities
disclose the information under consideration, the other entities will follow. This herd effect
can apply to economy-wide or to industry-wide risks.
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Considering incomplete information probably held by the manager, Penno (1997) finds that
the ex ante information quality and the ex ante probability that a manager will disclose
voluntarily are not necessarily positively related. Consistent with Penno ( 1 996) and Richardson
(2001 ) in different settings, but contrary to the popular notion, this implies that higher-quality
information endowed by risk management systems is not necessarily accompanied by more
precise risk reporting. Shin ( 1994) analyzes a managerial information system which provides
a set of information partitions. He documents favorably biased interval disclosures and finds
that the firm's valuation rises as the firm's (publicly known) information system becomes finer.
That implies managerial incentives to establish a high-quality risk monitoring system and to
convince the outsiders of its existence.
3.3. Cheap talk models on unverified risk reporting
3.3.1. Single-period cheap talk
Credibility is an inherent problem of non-verifiable risk disclosures. Particularly, risk
forecasts cannot be judged to be true when disclosed (Ijin, 1975). While the manager can
utilize this fact to misreport private information, a rational outsider doubting its credibility
will ignore the disclosure. Cheap talk models consider disclosure, which is non-verifiable
or unverified and not necessarily linked to the manager's private information. Disclosure
only affects payoffs if the receivers respond to it (Aumann & Hart, 2003). In non-trivial
settings multiple equilibria occur, some of which represent credible and informative
communication due to rival reporting incentives of almost equal weight. Single-period
models impose rival disclosure incentives by simultaneously sending one message to two
audiences with diverse concern, usually shareholders and competitors (Newman &
Sansing, 1993; Gigler, 1994; Wagenhofer, 2000). Credible communication is only possible
in partitions (Crawford & Sobel, 1982). In such partition equilibria, the manager sends a
message that reflects his private information with some noise by stating an interval forecast
of possible outcomes covering the outcome implied by his private information, while the
outsiders can assess the forecast as credible given common knowledge on the setting.
Newman and Sansing ( 1 993 ) model an entry game. They assume that the manager seeks to
correctly pass his private information to a shareholder, while trying to pass unfavorable
(possibly biased) information to a potential competitor to deter his costly entry in the product
market. Full disclosure of private information is no part ofan equilibrium. There are multiple
partition equilibria in which the manager disclosures interval forecasts which are informative
and assessed to be credible. These are intervals implying unfavorable outcomes, the disclosure
of which deters the competitor's entry, and intervals implying favorable outcomes, the
disclosure ofwhich leads the competitor to enter the market. Credible communication requires
some noise. This prevents a manager whose utility function equals the one of the shareholder
from exactly revealing his private information endowed by risk management systems and is
consistent with later evidence provided by Gigler (1994) and Wagenhofer (2000). Favorable
forecasts may be disclosed more precisely than unfavorable ones, which suits empirical
evidence (Healy & Palepu, 2001). The result implies that a manager cannot credibly and
exactly disclose the most unfavorable risk forecasts, e.g., concerning a future corporate failure.
Considering imperfect information available to the manager, Fischer and Stocken (200 1 ) also
show that ex ante forecast precision does not always increase in the precision of the manager's
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private information. Consistent with Pernio (1997) in the context of verified disclosure, this
implies that precise information endowment through high-quality risk management systems
does not always lead to more precise risk reporting.
The single-period cheap talk models show that risk forecast must be noisy to be credible
and informative. Among the equilibria with credible and informative interval forecasts, the
finest and most informative equilibrium with the smallest intervals is not necessarily
obtained (Newman & Sansing, 1993; Fischer & Stocken, 2001 ). 7 Although even very
imprecise risk forecasts observed empirically can suit the mechanism to impose credibility,
credible and informative risk forecasts do not necessarily occur. If so, the result relies
on outsiders that can perfectly assess the manager's rival reporting incentives in a multi-
audience setting.
3.3.2. Multi-period cheap talk
Unlike their single-period counterparts, multi-period approaches do not rely on a
manager acting in the interest of (current) shareholders. Models impose conflicting reporting
incentives by assuming moral hazard but limiting the manager's self-serving disclosure by
providing the outsiders with a monitoring system that allows for punishing a "misreporting"
manager (Benabou & Laroque, 1992; Stocken 2000; Morris, 2001 ). The imperfect moni-
toring system is usually formalized by an ex post nominal/actual value comparison, i.e.,
comparing the disclosed and the realized values. If no material deviation is detected, the
disclosure is classified as truthfully reflecting the manager's private information. Otherwise
misreporting of private information is assumed.
While there is no credible disclosure in a single-period context, Stocken (2000) derives
conditions for credible disclosure in repeated games. Each period, a manager endows
private, imperfect information on future cash flows from investments and can disclose a
noisy forecast to a representative investor implying favorable or unfavorable future out-
comes. After receiving the noisy forecast and assessing its credibility, the investor decides
whether to provide further capital to the manager. At the end of each period, information in
annual reports allows for an ex post nominai/actual value comparison with some noise. A
manager can build reputation and trust by having past forecasts being classified ex post
as truthful. The repeated game results in equilibria in review phases. Unlike Benabou and
Laroque (1992). documenting that truthful disclosure of private information is an excep-
tional equilibrium strategy and Morris (2001), documenting that truth telling is not an
equilibrium strategy, Stocken (2000) finds a perfect public equilibrium in which a manager
nearly always truthfully discloses his private information as a risk forecast.
This result assumes several conditions. They include ( 1 ) that a manager is not purely short-
term focused; (2) that review phases and. thus, interaction be sufficiently long; and (3) that
annual reports provide sufficient information to assess prior forecast disclosure ex post.
Manager fluctuation, short-term speculation, or severe going-concern uncertainties are
empirically documented factors providing incentives for misreporting (e.g. Headlock &
These equilibria cannot necessarily be organized according to the Pareto criterion (Newman & Sansing. 1993).
However, the Pareto criterion is inadequate to assess the "usefulness" of perfect Bayesian equilibria as long as it is
focused on players who are exclusively interested in their own payoffs. Then, possible Pareto improvements do
not induce a change in individual behavior.
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Lumer, 1997; Nyman 2005). This evidence challenges conditions (1) and (2) in an envi-
ronment where corporate risk exposure tends to be large. While condition (3) relies on specific
accounting items to conduct the nominal/actual value comparison, the mechanism per se is
questionable as discussed in Section 4.3. Overall, cheap talk models imply that credible risk
forecasts are hardly obtained in an unregulated environment.
4. Implications and discussion
4.1. Incentives versus regulation revisited
Discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models provide a distinctive analytical perspective
on risk reporting incentives and allow us to assess them in relation to regulation. Particularly,
they yield a benchmark for assessing the effect of regulatory attempts, even if regulation is
only partly formalized in these models.
As a general result, incentives for risk reporting do not appear as prevalent as suggested by
some authors. Prior risk reporting literature has focused on disclosure cost including the threat
of litigation to explain why managers do not disclose private risk information (Linsley &
Shrives, 2000, 2006; Lajili & Zeghal, 2005a). The above review qualifies this view. While true
when considering verified disclosure, single-period cheap talk models show that "cost" is the
key to credible, unverified, risk reporting. Moreover, the analytical models imply three major
explanations for restricted risk reporting observed empirically. ( 1 ) A manager may not report
because he does not or pretends not to hold risk information. This relates to models of
uncertainty of information availability. (2) A manager may not report available risk infor-
mation either because he cannot credibly do so or chooses to misreport. This level is mainly
captured by cheap talk models, particularly in connection with forecasts. (3) A manager may
not report risk information because he fears creating disadvantages for the firm. That relates to
the cost factor that is formalized in both discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models.
Regulators may respond to each of these levels of restrictions. Regulators may ( 1 ) require
adequate corporate risk management systems to address managerial information endowment;
or (2) impose enforcement mechanisms to address the credibility ofrisk reporting. While these
measures apply to both voluntary and mandatory disclosure, regulators may (3) mandate risk
reporting. The proceeding sections will investigate how these attempts relate to incentives for
verified and unverified risk reporting. Although the analytic models only provide limited
assistance in reasoning specific disclosure rules ( Verrecchia, 2004; Wagenhofer, 2004), I will
eventually discuss their implications for particular risk reporting rules.
4.2. Endowment of risk information
Managerial endowment of risk information by risk management systems determines the
maximal infonnation content of risk reporting. While there are various incentives to set up
effective risk management systems (e.g.. Shin, 1994), models featuring uncertainty of
information availability provide an innovative framework to analyze their link to risk reporting.
Adopting basic models on uncertainty ofinformation endowment allows us to interpret the
probability that a manager is informed as a measure for the quality of his risk information and
control system. As this probability rises, margins for withholding unfavorable information
M. Dobler/ The International Journal oj Accounting 43 (2008) 184 206 197
narrow when considering verified disclosure (Jung & Kwon, 1988). This does not hold for
non-verifiable information that may be misrepresented as shown in cheap talk models
Contrary to prior notions (Solomon et al., 2000), more precise risk information endowed does
not necessarily lead to more or more precise risk reporting, irrespective ofwhether considering
verifiable or credible non-verifiable information (Penno, 1996, 1997; Fischer & Stocken.
200 1 ; Richardson. 200 1 ). Although there are exemptions even apart from disclosure cost and
specific agency problems, the models imply as a general rule that a better informed manager is
more likely to disclose if outsiders can imperfectly assess his information status. This is
consistent with findings of experimental studies such as King and Wall in ( 1996).
Regulators may exploit this link and address managerial risk information endowment by
requiring adequate information and control systems as is the case under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in the U.S. and the German Companies Act (Dobler, 2004). Along the lines of models on
uncertainty of information availability, such regulation can be seen as imposing a minimum
probability that a manager is informed. Assuming adequate enforcement, this minimum
probability is reliably known by the outsiders and may provide a benchmark for the manager's
flexibility in withholding the risk information gathered. While different types ofrisk factors and
risks may relate to different probabilities of information endowment, any minimum probability
below the level being required allows for withholding sufficiently unfavorable risk information.
This implies that the most unfavorable information will not be disclosed even when available to
the manager, thereby challenging the early-warning function of risk reporting.
4.3. Enforcement of risk reporting
Enforcement relates to both voluntary and mandatory risk reporting. While enforcement of
voluntary risk reporting refers to truthful and credible disclosure, it also covers compliance with
disclosure requirements in a mandatory disclosure regime addressed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
Since discretionary disclosure models assume verified disclosure, they allow considering a
setting in which verifiable information can be disclosed as verified at some cost, e.g., cost ofan
audit. Models then imply withholding of sufficiently unfavorable risk information unless there
is an exogenous duty to disclose the information verified (Verrecchia, 2001; Jorgensen &
Kirschenheiter, 2003). That is, withholding private risk information can be a substitute for
unverified disclosure (Wagenhofer, 2000). Imposing mandatory costly verification suggests
ambiguous effects. The proportion of verified and thus credible risk reporting may increase,
while some unverified information, that might be informative, will be withheld.
Non-verifiable risk information implies that the cost of verification is infinitely high and
can only be disclosed unverified. This establishes the issue of credibility, particularly
inherent in risk forecasts which are often regarded as the most useful information for users of
financial reports (AICPA, 1994; ICAEW, 2002; IASB, 2005). While empirical research
documents capital-market reaction on published forecasts (Lev & Penman, 1990; Clement.
Frankel, & Miller, 2003), it is not clear whether this response arises from credible disclosure,
naive heuristics, or from other factors.
s Cheap talk settings imply that credible disclosure is
This advises caution to empirical studies which tend to draw inferences from risk reporting quantity to its
quality (Botosan. 2004). Including a risk forecast in a risk report ceteris paribus increases disclosure quantity,
while the quality of incremental disclosure is difficult to assess.
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possible, but is linked to restrictive conditions. Relying on noise to impose credible
disclosure, single-period cheap talk models yield boilerplate disclosures in the limiting case
and imply that a manager may not (fully) disclose his private information simply because he
cannot do so credibly. In contrast, multi-period cheap talk models as well as parts of the
regulatory or empirical literature including Arnold and Hope (1974), Lev and Penman
(1990) and Schrand and Elliott (1998), rely on nominal/actual value comparisons ex post to
assess forecast credibility. This approach uses deviations between forecasted and realized
values to assess past forecast bias and to anticipate future deviations (Rogers & Stocken,
2005).
In doing so, the approach faces two major problems. First, it addresses forecast accuracy
ex post rather than forecast credibility, which is an ex ante concept. It is inappropriate to
assess whether or not a forecast reflects managerial private information. This is because a
deviation detected ex post can follow from intentional bias or from other factors impacting
the forecast arguments. Vice versa, detecting no deviation does not allow concluding that a
forecast reflects managerial private information (McDonald, 1973). Additionally, there are
problems extrapolating past deviations into the future, particularly if data for a sufficiently
long period of time are unavailable. Stocken (2000) considers this by requiring a minimum
length of review phases in his reputation-based setting.
9
Yet, the nominal/actual value
comparison ex post does not allow assessing future forecast credibility. The mechanism,
thus, appears to be heuristic.
Second and more particular to risk forecasts, even if a user was interested in assessing
accuracy, there are technical problems in conducting the nominal/actual value comparison.
Interval or noisy forecasts, as featured by cheap talk models require determining the
nominal value. In the limiting cases, it might be a single value like the mode or the expected
value in a range forecast, or the range itself. The choice of the nominal value is likely to
affect the likelihood and the size of ex post deviations. Specifically, suppose a manager
states that a threshold amount of future cash flows will be reached or exceeded with a
positive probability below one. In turn, this implies that future cash flows are expected to
fall below the threshold with the positive, complementary probability. Neither realization
directly allows for assessing the accuracy of this forecast. On the other hand, the actual
value, e.g., of cash flows from a certain project, may be subject to managerial discretion. If
it is neither publicly observable nor disclosed by the manager, the comparison cannot be
conducted. Even if an actual value is disclosed, earnings management research implies that
managers bias reported numbers towards the forecasted values (Dutta & Gigler, 2002;
Matsumoto, 2002). Thus, there is room and incentives for ex post manipulation to avoid
unfavorable deviations and, in rum, this highlights the importance of enforcement of
accounting rules. The disclosure of the variance of future cash flows as formalized by
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2000, 2003) provides an example for a setting in which the
actual value is unavailable. The only ex post assessment may be an indirect one. Similar to
the above example, it requires calculating a confidence interval using the forecast, i.e., since
the expected value and the variance are disclosed, a range of nominal values can be created.
For further reputation considerations outside the scope of cheap talk models see Mahon and Wartick (2003)
and Rogers and Stocken (2005).
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If the realized cash flow falls within the confidence interval, this can be seen as an indirect
confirmation of the accuracy of the forecasted variance. However, such assessments remain
vague and depend on the choice of confidence intervals. In conclusion, the results suggest
considerable limitations of the use of nominal/actual value comparisons.
Regulation can impose audit and threats of litigation to contribute to credibility. Some
forms of enforcement system is in place for financial reporting in virtually all countries and
put cost on managers whose disclosures are classified as misrepresentations (Ijiri, 1975;
McConomy, 1998). While enforcement is inherently imperfect for large parts of risk
reporting, due to inherent discretion, it is of interest whether and how far regulatory
enforcement can further risk forecast credibility. Considering an audit as a nominal/actual
value comparison it may apply ex post as discussed above or ex ante, comparing the private
information against the forecast. Strict and tort liability builds upon these audits.
While possibly useful as a costly signal to users, the audit of a forecast (at an ex ante
stage) technically lacks an observable nominal value. Given this limitation it has to revert to
an assessment of the adequacy, completeness, and consistency of forecast arguments and
methods. In consequence, it reduces to a test of plausibility eager to detect an arbitrary or
strongly biased forecast (Dev, 1973; Dobler, 2004). '" Since including an auditor may yield
dependence and further agency problems, even this limited contribution to forecast
credibility can be eroded (Carmichael, 1973; Ewert, 2004). Particularly, an auditor is
unlikely to enforce the disclosure of unfavorable risk forecasts if he is threatened to be
replaced by another auditor or by self-fulfilling prophecies, both of which impair his quasi
rents (Tucker & Matsumura, 1998). This implies that the disclosure of unfavorable risk
forecasts is unlikely to be well-enforced, thereby supplementing a manager's incentives to
withhold, misrepresent or bias as shown in cheap talk models.
Liability systems differ in their assessment of misreporting. Tort liability requires default
on the part of the manager, which can be seen as a disclosed forecast misrepresenting his
private information. This technically equals having an audit. Since the assessment of a
forecast remains vague, tort liability has two adverse effects (Ronen & Yaari, 2001 ). It can
prevent managers from releasing their private forecast information because its truthful
disclosure might be assessed as a misrepresentation (first-order error). And it cannot fully
prevent untruthful forecast disclosure because misrepresentations are not detected with
certainty (second-order error). Apart from default, strict liability punishes a manager as
misrepresenting if the forecast is not realized. Given the above critique, this mechanism is
inadequate to contribute to risk forecast credibility. Consistent with empirical evidence
(Bamber & Cheon, 1998; Healy & Palepu, 2001), strict liability imposes incentives to
disclose noisy risk forecasts in order to reduce the likelihood of ex post deviations. In either
system, fully revealing private information is not necessarily a manager's dominant strategy
to prevent or reduce expected litigation cost.
In conclusion, regulatory enforcement cannot significantly contribute to risk forecast
credibility as imposed by market mechanisms, but may give rise to adverse disclosure
incentives. While managers may try to exploit heuristics as well as signaling and reputation
effects to lend credibility to risk forecasts, the issue of credibility reaffirms most standard-
setters (apart from the German) not to mandate risk forecasts.
1
For a related discussion of Value at Risk-disclosures see Woods. Dowd. and Humphrey (200X)
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4.4. Mandating risk reporting
Even in the presence of regulation on risk information endowment and enforcement, a
voluntary risk reporting regime that relies purely on disclosure incentives tends to yield
poor risk reports. Given restricted disclosure in practice, academic literature has
recommended that mandatory risk reporting be imposed (Schrand & Elliott, 1998; Lajili
& Zeghal, 2005a). Several models, including Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2000), imply
that strictly mandatory risk reporting might encourage more effective risk monitoring,
thereby potentially yielding more effective risk management as assumed by Linsley and
Shrives (2000) and Jonon (2002). In the limiting cases, however, mandating risk reporting
will have little or no effect either if there are sufficient incentives to disclose voluntarily, or
if it is not or cannot be well-enforced. The reasons for mandating risk reporting still depend
on the costs of preparers and the benefits to users.
Concerning both verifiable and non-verifiable information, opponents to mandatory risk
reporting raise concerns of disclosure cost. While risk reporting can be associated with direct
and indirect cost (Abdel-khalik, Graul, & Newton, 1986; FASB, 2001), the concern must be
analyzed on two fronts. First, assuming that costs of risk reporting arise with certainty, like
direct cost of preparing, auditing, and publishing risk reports, the models discussed imply that
mandatory risk disclosure harms those entities that withhold risk information in a voluntary
disclosure regime. Particularly, and contrary to the common view (ICAEW, 1999; Solomon
et al., 2000), Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) show that an entity's cost of capital will
weakly increase if disclosure of firm-specific variances of future cash flows becomes man-
datory. While this suggests why managers may oppose mandatory risk reporting, restricted
voluntary risk reporting per se does not necessarily recommend mandatory risk reporting from
a regulator's point of view. This specifically applies if regulation focuses on maintaining
resources and protecting entities and their current shareholders. However, considering the
information function assigned to risk reporting mitigates this assessment.
Second, opponents pretend the threat of self-fulfilling prophecies, which particularly
concern risk forecasts as non-venfiable information (Boritz, 1991; Baetge & Schulze, 1998;
Solomon et al., 2000) is real. The argument is based on Thomas' theorem: "If men define
situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (op. cit. Merton, 1948. 193). Opponents
claim that risk reporting would induce reactions by outsiders that cause the realization of the
risk disclosed. Considering only downside risk, disclosure is associated with unfavorable
outcomes harming the disclosing entity, i.e., with indirect disclosure cost. However, the self-
fulfilling prophecy argument is speculative. Risk reporting cannot define future situations as
real, unless it is misinterpreted. As the cost arising is not known, models featuring disclosure
cost do not apply without qualification. Moreover, there is little empirical evidence consistent
with self-fulfilling risk reports. Referring to going-concern disclosures, empirical audit
research rather documents the nonexistence of, but a strong belief in self-fulfilling prophecies
(Mutchler, 1 984; Louwers, Messina, & Richard, 1 999; Citron & Taffler, 200 1 ). It appears that
the fear of self-fulfilling risk reports combined with other managerial incentives to withhold
information drives managers to oppose mandatory risk reporting. This result suggests
neglecting the self-fulfilling prophecy argument when weighing costs and benefits in
regulatory decisions. If a mandatory risk reporting regime is imposed, the result specifically
supports arguments put forward to oppose opt-out clauses, such as IAS 37.92 (Linsley &
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Shrives, 2000; ICAEW, 2002). Once imposed, a permissive application of opt-out clauses
might lead to similar disclosures observed under a voluntary reporting regime. This challenges
the information and particularly the early-warning function of risk reporting and finally the
aim of risk reporting regulation. When weighting costs and benefits to decide on mandatory
disclosures, the nature of risk information suggests that mandating risk disclosure may not be
too harmful for preparers given the inherent discretion. This discretion is likely to allow
managers disclosing private risk information in a less crucial way thereby, however, impacting
the information content of risk reporting.
4.5. Specific risk reporting requirements
While formalizing general types of risk disclosures providing verified or unverified
information on the distribution of future outcomes, the analytic models yield some specific
implications for risk reporting requirements. These relate to disclosure incentives that the
models indicate or neglect and which can be exploited by regulation.
Considering verified risk reporting, uncertainty of information availability yields at least
three important implications. First, models of this strand rely on the impossibility of
credibly disclosing not to hold risk information of a certain type. However, consistent with
empirical evidence (e.g., Kajiiter & Winkler, 2003; Kajiiter & Esser, 2007), there are
incentives to disclose this fact to mitigate doubt among outsiders and benefit from a higher
firm valuation. Regulation could exploit this mechanism and mandate negative reports
indicating that a manager is not informed about a risk of a certain type or extent. If such
negative reports are credibly disclosed, full disclosure will be obtained under the unraveling
principle. To date, neither the U.S., nor the IFRSs, nor Germany requires negative reports.
Second, and in a similar vein, disclosures on risk monitoring and management systems
can help outsiders assess the probability that a manager is informed. While there are
incentives to disclose such information for the sake of higher firm valuation, as shown by
Shin ( 1 994), they are eager to benchmark the room for managerial discretion. This reaffirms
both prior literature generally assuming risk management disclosures to be useful for
outsiders (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zeghal, 2005b) and their compulsory
disclosure (SFAS 133.44-45; IFRS 7.31-32; GAS 5.28-29).
Third, and more generally, the herd effects documented by Dye and Sridhar (1995) rely
on comparable risks reported in a comparable format among entities. Exploiting herd effects
suggests requiring formalized rules on risk categorization, quantification, and disclosure
format as opposed to following a pure management approach. This relates to comparability
of financial reporting in general (IASB F.39-41; CON 2.111-119) and reaffirms prior
literature recommending more formalized risk reporting rules (Schrand & Elliott, 1998;
Lajili & Zeghal, 2005a). Given recent regulation, this comparability is likely to be obtained
to some degree for risk disclosures in the notes but not in management reports.
A final implication concerns the credibility of risk forecasts. It has long been argued that
providing supplemental disclosures on forecast arguments and methods further forecast
credibility (Dev, 1973; Mallinson, 1974). As such disclosures are partly verifiable, this
reasoning substantiates along the lines of both an audit and nominal/actual value compar-
isons ex post as formalized in multi-period cheap talk models. Ex ante, supplemental
disclosures can help outsiders to assess the distribution of future cash flows using verifiable
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disclosure and to evaluate the plausibility ofa risk forecast disclosed. Since these disclosures
partially commit a manager to a certain way to meet the risk forecast, they reduce the
discretion to manage ex post outcomes. Consistent with recent empirical findings, both are
eager to prevent arbitrary risk forecasts (Hutton, Miller, & Skinner, 2003; Baginski, Hassell,
& Kimbrough, 2004)." While most reporting regimes do not require risk forecasts,
supplemental disclosures are merely encouraged (AICPA, 1994; IASB, 2005). A notable
exception is Germany, where both risk forecasts and supplemental disclosures are
compulsory (GAS 5.9-10, .18, GAS 15.83-91).
Yet, given discretion even in the presence of rather strict risk reporting rules and
particularly when considering risk forecasts, neither regulation is eager to overcome the role
of incentives in risk reporting. This implies that we should not overestimate the information
and particularly the early-warning function of risk reporting.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I review discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to assess risk
reporting incentives and their relation to regulatory attempts. While largely neglected in risk
reporting literature so far, these disclosure models can be motivated by a risk management
perspective, which acknowledges the imperfection of risk information and discretion in its
disclosure. The approach chosen covers verified and unverified risk reporting by referring to
discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models, respectively, as well as the probabilistic nature
of risk reporting, by referring to the distribution of future cash flows or parameters of it.
Considering risk reporting as an endogenous feature, this approach provides a benchmark
for assessing exogenous regulatory attempts and, thus, an analytically-based framework for
discussion.
My results imply that incentives for risk reporting are less prevalent than partly suggested
by the extant literature and can explain limited risk reporting as documented by empirical
studies even in regulated regimes. First, a manager may not report because he has no risk
information or pretends not to have any. Requiring adequate risk management can bench-
mark but cannot eliminate the room for managerial discretion, while more precise risk
information endowed does not necessarily lead to more precise risk reporting. Second, a
manager may not report non-verifiable risk information available because he cannot credibly
do so or chooses to misreport. Audit and liability can have limited use to further risk
reporting credibility, but may impose adverse disclosure incentives as well. Third and partly
consistent with prior assertions, a manager may withhold risk information available due to
threats ofcommercial drawback, i.e. cost. Although cost can be the key to credible but noisy
disclosure of non-verifiable risk information, mandating risk disclosure can have unfavorable
effects for the firm and the economy. Findings also suggest the use of negative reports on
certain risks, disclosures on corporate risk management, comparable and formalized reporting
formats, and supplemental disclosures on risk forecasts, which are only partly considered by
current regulation.
Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2007) provide evidence that disaggregating forecasts works in a similar
vein Considering risk forecasts in particular, this is consistent with risk analysis approaches based on Hertz
(1964) and Mallinson (1974).
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My overall results have major implications for empirical research. Most noteworthy, they
yield testable hypotheses on the association of determinants of risk reporting and (1) risk
exposure; (2) risk information endowment; (3) enforcement mechanisms; (4) mandating
disclosure; (5) imposing comparable disclosure requirements among firms; (6) supplemental
disclosures on risk forecasts. Further, the findings may explain why disclosure precision
may not increase or why cost of capital may not decrease when extending risk reporting
requirements.
In conclusion, the implications of this study should be interpreted in the framework
applied and as one first approach to assess incentives for risk reporting. Given this
framework, analytic findings are subject to the underlying assumptions, covering neither all
facets of risk-related disclosures nor all incentives for risk reporting. As suggested by
Linsley and Shrives (2000), other approaches include agency, legitimacy, political cost, and
signaling theory. These theories might alter, support, or supplement the implications of this
study, leaving risk reporting a fertile area not only for empirical but also for conceptual and
analytical research.
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Financial reporting and global capital markets — A history of the International
Accounting Standards Committee, 1973-2000, Kees Camfferman, Stephen A. Zeff
(Eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (2007). xxiii + 676 pages, £75.00,
$140.00, €107.45, ISBN: 978-0-19-929629-3
This book traces the history of the IASC. According to the Foreword by Sir David
Tweedie, it "was conceived at IASC's farewell dinner in December 2000" (p. xvii) and
"will be the definitive history of the IASC from its inception to its transformation from a
part-time to a full-time organization" (p. xvii).
The authors' aim is "to tell the story of the formation and evolution of the IASC from
1973 to 2000" (p. 2). This story is not told in a strictly chronological fashion. Instead, there
is a focus on three main aspects: the IASC's standards, the individuals involved in its work,
and external, economic, regulatory or political influences on the IASC and its role. Thus the
emphasis is on the development of the IASC and its technical output as well as on the
causes and effects behind its progress, its political dimensions, and the motivations of the
individuals involved.
The authors' methods consist of archival research and interviews. Sources were IASC
documents from the lASB's archives, documents made available by individuals, and
archival material of other accounting associations, most notably those of the Koninklijk
Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, Amsterdam, the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, and
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. The authors were also able to draw on
published sources in a number of languages, as well as translations from languages they
were unable to access personally. In addition, they conducted more than 135 interviews
with former IASC board members, members of committees and working parties, support
staff and individuals who came into contact with the IASC through their work for
regulatory authorities, stock exchanges, the World Bank, IFAC, FEE, and UEC (Union
Europeenne des Experts Comptables, Economiques et Financiers).
The book will be relevant to anybody interested in international accounting. As the authors
suggest, an understanding of the IASC's history and work aid in understanding the IASB's
processes, role, and output, as well as problems facing the IASB. The book is meticulously
researched and contains a wealth of detailed background information not previously in the
public domain. As such it provides a welcome reference source for researchers, who will also
benefit from the frequent citations of sources and reference materials. The amount of detail
provided can occasionally make it hard to follow the story lines. The authors' solution to this
problem is to dedicate certain chapters to descriptions of factual information, such as, for
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example, the structure and financing of the IASC or information referring to officials
( for example in sections 4. 1 or 8. 1 ) or delegations. Other chapters are almost entirely dedicated
to the IASC's technical output, and yet others follow the development of the Committee by
exploring its political influences and challenges. This is particularly well done in Chapter 13.
While most readers will be familiar with the outline of the IASC's history - in particular the
somewhat dramatic developments of its final years - there is still room for surprise in learning
more about the underlying influences and roles played by individuals and about political
influences within and outside the Committee, about the vested interests represented in the
negotiations and the compromises forced.
The book has three parts and 13 chapters. Additional detail, such as lists of chairmen and
senior staff, of members of the delegations to the IASC, of IASC technical output, and of
the individuals interviewed by the authors, is provided in seven appendices. Six tables
throughout the text list inter alia IASC membership, revenue and expenses, standards
revised during the Comparability and Improvements projects, and the Core Standards work
program. There are further 20 photographs, mainly of prominent IASC functionaries, of
delegates and of IASC staff throughout the years.
Chapter 1 provides an Introduction and Overview (synopsis). Part I (Chapters 2 and 3)
covers the developments leading to the creation of the IASC, and the foundation itself in
1973. It begins by examining the economic and political factors which emerged in the
1950s and 1960s and which contributed to the IASC's creation. This part examines the
significance of the Accountants International Study Group (AISG), created in 1966, which
the authors see as a "lineal predecessor" (p. 22) of the IASC, and the role and influence of
Sir (later Lord) Henry Benson, who initiated the foundation ofboth the AISG and the IASC,
and was the first chairman of the latter. We are then introduced to the newly founded body's
objectives, processes, and financing, as well as the motivations of key players and initial
reactions by and relationships with other organizations. Membership represented
accountancy bodies from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the
Netherlands, the U.K. and Ireland and the U.S.. with other bodies joining as associate
members, but excluded from full membership.
Part II (Chapters 4-7) covers the period from 1973 to 1987. It focuses on the individuals
involved in the IASC's early history and on its structure (Chapter 4); on the early standards
(Chapter 5); on the IASC's efforts in gaining international recognition (Chapter 6); and on
its political environment (Chapter 7). It soon emerged that the IASC faced a number of
problems. Its first standards were relatively basic and contained many options (Chapter 5 is
aptly titled "Compromise to Harmonise"), although the authors take issue with the
allegation that the IASC was aiming for the "lowest common denominator" (p. 142).
Instead, the examination of the development of the early standards shows they eliminated
undesirable but not uncommon practices. However, as explored in Chapter 6, compliance
was a problem; member bodies were unable or unwilling to enforce their use, and the
standards were more successful in the countries represented by some of the IASC's
associate members than by the full members. Chapter 7 examines challenges to the IASC's
exclusivity, which was gradually relaxed, in terms of countries and organizations
represented. On the one hand, the IASC was subject to pressures to merge with IFAC,
on the other hand its authority was challenged because it represented only accounting
associations and not financial-statement preparers and users. Its Constitution was revised in
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l )S2. and a closer link with the IFAC" was established. The IASC now had 13 seats on the
standard-setting board for accounting associations and four for other organizations. In
addition, in l l'Sl a Consultative Group was created, which represented further
organizations with an interest in harmonization. According to the authors (p. 9), "(tjhese
changes were sufficient to free the IASC from significant pressure from IFAC, the UN, and
the OECD, but not sufficient to ensure widespread compliance with its standards."
[mpro\ mg the standards and convincing accountants and regulators of their quality was
therefore the next challenge. These issues are addressed in Part III (Chapters 8-13), which
covers the period from 19S7 to 2000. It examines further changes in terms of individuals
involved, structure and funding (Chapter 8); the development of the Framework and the
Comparability and Improvements Projects (Chapter 9); negotiations with IOSCO and the
SEC (Chapter 10); the Core Standards Project (Chapter II); reactions and gradual
acceptance within and outside Europe (Chapter 1 2 ); and finally, the restructuring (Chapter 1 3).
In 1987 IOSCO agreed that, if the quality of the lASC's standards could be sufficiently
improved. IOSCO would consider endorsing the standards. That meant it would recommend
to its member bodies to accept financial statements prepared on the basis ol IAS( standards.
However, the lASC's first initiatives the Framework Project and the Comparability Project
(which aimed to reduce the number of options) were not sufficient to satisfy IOSCO, nor was
the Improvements Project a major revision of 10 standards, completed by 1993. While
Chapter 9 is dedicated to the technical content of these projects. Chapter 10 provides a useful
exploration of the lASC's political struggles to win the endorsement of its standards by
IOSCO and the SEC.
The remaining chapters cover well the increasingly dramatic developments leading up to
the restructuring. They show how, in spite of the failure to win IOSCO's approval, the
lASC's standards had begun to obtain greater international recognition, not only by leading
continental European companies, but also by the European Commission, which was
beginning to consider an alternative strategy to its company-law directives. After further
changes to its operations, procedures, funding, and board membership and after the further
improvement often key standards, the "Core Standards" project (the technical aspects of
which are explored in Chapter 1 1 ). a limited endorsement by IOSCO was finally achieved
in 2000, but without effecting any change in the SEC's position, which still demanded a
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. The book illustrates well how the lASC's due processes and
structure became the major focus of debates between the LASC, IOSCO, the G4 and,
increasingly, the SEC, which favoured a model based on the FASB — against the wishes of
the European Commission and of governments of non-G4 members. Eventually,
recognizing the need for SEC support, the IASC accepted a "non-negotiable
recommendation" by the SEC on a new structure, leading to the replacement of the
IASC by its successor, the IASB in 2001 . As is well known, shortly afterwards the EU made
the new IASB's standards central to its financial-reporting requirements.
The authors acknowledge a number of limitations. One of these was lack of access to
IOSCO resources not on public record, a lack of understanding of all national backgrounds
of IASC participants, as well as linguistic limitations. The latter meant that they were better
able to understand and assess the roles of actors and influences from English-speaking
countries, France. The Netherlands and Germany, than from other countries. Further, the
authors acknow ledge that the book's main focus is on perspectives from the U.K. and U.S.
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because these countries provided the richest sources and because they were of "primary
importance" (p. 3).
The authors were commissioned to research and write this book by the IASB, but were
given complete editorial freedom. Their enthusiasm for the 1ASC is apparent and
acknowledged. Other researchers, if they have access to suitable resources and language
skills, may wish to examine more closely the influence of and impact on other constituents,
or may wish to take a less descriptive and more critical focus in assessing the history and
politics of the IASC. However, this would require a work with less emphasis on
comprehensive coverage. Given the constraints implicit in the authors' stated intentions,
underlying assumptions and limitations, this is a valuable and interesting book indeed and
achieves its aim well.
Lisa Evans
Department ofAccounting and Finance, University of Stirling. UK
E-mail address: lisa.evans(2>stir.ac.uk.
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Joseph F. Hair, Arthur H. Money, Mike Page, & Phillip Samouel (Eds.), Research
Methods for Business, John Wiley & Sons, West Sussex, England (2007),
448 pages, £31.99, €48.00, $66.41, ISBN: 978-0-470-03404-0
The authors offer this text distinguished by its framework, the managerial decision-
making context, as a practical alternative to more established textbooks on business
research methods. The book uses a relatively simplistic threaded case, applied consistently
and repeatedly throughout to demonstrate key concepts and techniques that would
emphasize the author's underlying intent of making legitimate research a reachable
foundation for all business decision makers. Recognizing that corporate failures are often
linked to executives' misguided behavior, they present ethics early on (chapter 3) shortly
after presenting the history of, and current trends in, applied research in the introductory
chapter. The importance they place on ethics is reinforced in every chapter by way of
explicit discussion of relevant issues and/or ethical dilemmas for students to reconcile.
Technology is also recognized via inclusion of Internet exercises (URLs provided) that
typically require visiting websites and downloading reports or datasets, and by inclusion of
frequent SPSS-generated "how to" inserts in the chapters ( 1 1 through 14) pertaining to data
collection, review, and analysis.
Content-wise, the text is organized using the standard approach: research design,
sampling and data collection, data analysis, interpretation of results, and communication of
results. While all appropriate terminology is utilized (and accurately defined in the Glos-
sary), explanations in simpler everyday language and business terms are frequently used to
help the reader understand what may be new and perhaps difficult statistical concepts. The
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case that runs throughout the text, Samouel's and Gino's Restaurants, is simple enough to
avoid confounding business-related issues - certainly a useful approach for undergraduate
education. Some may find it too simplistic, however, for graduate and professional-level
audiences, preferring all the environmental complexities that typically surround research
processes in the business domain. The authors maintain a reasonable and consistent balance
between technical discussion and practical application throughout, reducing any propensity
for alienating readers or students who might lack in analysis/synthesis abilities or
experience.
Section II, Beginning the Research Process, covers the continuing evolution of research
methods, primarily driven by emerging data availability, technological capabilities, new
business processes (for example, customer relationship management), and a frank
discussion of theory versus business (practicality) and scientific methods versus business
research. Chapter 2, Overview ofthe Research Process, emphasizes the need for scientific
rigor despite the pragmatism of business. This is a critically important perspective; the
availability of data, the dissemination of information, and the ease of executing software
continually challenge the former. Chapter 3 presents strong arguments for ethical
responsibility: social and market; organizational, professional, and individual; and decision
maker, researcher, and participant. These perspectives are well organized using simple,
direct lists, guidelines, and examples to facilitate clear understanding and expectations.
Coverage of existing literature (in chapter 4) is excellent. The authors emphasize a process
approach beginning with developing and expanding research possibilities through thorough
familiarization with the most recent developments. The step-by-step summary (Exhibit 4-2
on page 97) is simple, comprehensive, and direct. The authors utilize this format repeatedly
throughout; it is highly effective and precludes the clutter and complexity of "catch all"
graphical depictions prevalent in some other business research texts.
Section III, Research Design, Sampling and Data Collection, begins with a clear and
comprehensive process for collecting secondary data backed up by informative definitions,
source-format-type breakdown (simply yet effectively depicted in Exhibit 5-1, p. 119), and
lists of sources organized by URLs and their administrators. Chapter 6 addresses model
conceptualization and definition including variables and constructs, hypotheses and
relationships, and basic research designs, organized into a comparative table. Even readers
with only a basic understanding of related statistical concepts will find these approaches to
sampling accessible. Primary data issues (organized as qualitative or quantitative) are
likewise handled effectively without drowning the reader in statistical jargon or theory. The
presentation of measurement scales makes use of ample examples and emphasizes practical
considerations when developing them. They explain reliability and validity, offer several
useful summaries in table format, and confirm several indicators by way of SPSS-executed
examples. Again, a step-by-step scale-development process anchors their treatment. The
final chapter in this section. Questionnaire Design, provides business-related examples and
is sensible in its discussion.
Typically, a challenging element of business research, especially for managers, is data
analysis and interpretation. The authors incorporate frequent examples, usually
accompanied by SPSS output and/or instructions. Maintaining segmentation by qualitative
versus quantitative data, they proceed efficiently through the major approaches for each:
phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory, and case studies, for the former; and
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descriptive statistics, frequency distributions and histograms, t-tests, analyses of variance,
and regression analyses, for the latter. Organization by chapter includes appropriate
procedural and statistical considerations interspersed with graphics, lists, and examples and
continuing the threaded-case applications. In most cases, the knowledge gained from a
legitimate business statistics course will suffice as background for using this book because
the authors are especially adept at providing unambiguous and understandable explanations
of some sophisticated, statistical procedures (for example, multivariate analysis of variance
or multicollinearity). Beyond its process approach and logical order, this is a key strength of
this text - - presenting statistical requirements for legitimate empirical research in ways that
are understandable, unintimidating, and practical. A legitimate caution, of course, is
whether or not the capability to execute such procedures may lead to inappropriate
application.
The final section of the text presents useful guidelines for written and oral
communication of results and recommendations. While not detailing specific instructions
for creating graphs, tables, etc., in any particular software, it does provide extremely
simple-to-understand-and-apply guidelines for technical writing, research proposals and
reports, and oral presentations.
This text provides a functional, introductory treatment of research methods useful in
business contexts for a wide audience including managers and researchers who have limited
experience, perhaps new users of these techniques, or even more experienced professionals
seeking to refresh their skills or learn new ones, as well as undergraduate students and
graduate students in non specific programs (for example, MBA). While friendly to these
audiences, the book does not provide the coverage of topics and depth of discussion
necessary for more rigorous graduate studies or sophisticated technical research (for
example, pharmaceutical). The extensive and/or explicit treatment of certain topics
typically included in business research textbooks, such as design of experiments and non-
parametric significance tests, are omitted. Maintaining accessibility for the audiences
described above may explain these omissions. The authors reinforce applications with
numerous calls for Research in Action throughout the text; many provide access
information (URLs) for further exploration. Review Questions, Discussion ami Application
Activities, and Internet Exercises offer a wide array of introspective and application-
oriented learning opportunities. An especially useful and unique aspect of this text is the
Chapter Summon: Rather than simply restating key points from chapter material, summary
paragraphs are organized by Learning Outcomes identified at the beginning of each
chapter. This feature concisely closes the learning process for each chapter followed by the
aforementioned array of supplemental activities/assignments to confirm and extend
learning outcomes.
John R. Grandzol
Bloomsburg University ofPennsylvania, Bloomsburg, PA, USA
E-mail address: jgrandzo@bloomu.edu.
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2008.04.007
2 1
4
Book reviews
Behind closed doors — What company audit is really about, Vivien Beattie, Stella
Fearnley, Richard Brandt Palgrave (2001), xxii + 309 pages, US$105.00, £75.00, ISBN
0-333-74784-4
The title, "Behind closed doors — What company audit is really about," creates the
expectation that this book will reveal insights not previously communicated to the public.
And I think the book delivers enough to meet these expectations. In particular, the book
presents a number of interesting stones about the interplay between auditors and clients as
financial statements are about to be finalized. The book is likely to be of interest for both
auditing students and academic scholars.
1. Organization of the book
The book is divided into three parts. Part one contains a review of the related literature for
several topics including the demand for audits, audit quality, auditor independence, and
corporate governance. The literature on economics-based theories of auditing, as well as studies
based on marketing and psychology, are also reviewed, hi fact, the authors address a broad
research area in a limited number of pages and perhaps for that reason the ideas and the
contributions ofsome ofthe articles discussed remain somewhat unclear. However, the literature
review provides a good starting point for students and scholars who would like an overview of
the auditing area. The insights provided herein can then be supplemented with a study of the
articles in question and other reviews. The fact that the book only covers articles until the end of
the 90s makes it even more important for readers to seek out supplemental material.
The first part of the book also includes a summary of the results from a questionnaire
undertaken by the authors. The purpose of the questionnaire was to find out which issues
related to the production and audit of financial statements were most frequently discussed by
the auditor and the auditee. The chapter also includes results from a study of the frequency of
accounting changes resulting from discussions and negotiations between the auditor and the
auditee. Results from the questionnaire are presented in more detail in Beattie, Fearnley and
Brandt (2000).
Part two of the book presents six case studies for which the audit-engagement partner
(AEP) and the finance director (FD) were interviewed. These case studies occupy more than
half the pages ofthe book and were selected based on the questionnaire previously mentioned.
These results, are also presented in Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (2004). In each case a number
of "interactions" between the AEP and FD are described and analyzed. Most of these
interactions are related to financial-reporting issues, including stock-obsolescence provisions,
reorganization costs, useful lives of assets, leasing as well as accounting for assets on disposal
and acquisition of businesses. Examples of other interactions studied are the changing role of
the audit committee, negotiations over fees, and control problems.
The case studies demonstrate that there are numerous negotiations taking place
between the AEP and the FD. Negotiations take place over financial-reporting issues,
audit fees, going-concern problems, as well as a number of other issues. In most of the
cases, the outcome turns out well but the authors also report evidence on cases in which
the compliance with accounting rules was poor. For example, on pp. 103-107 the authors
describe a case in which the inventory was over-valued and the agreement was to write off
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the over-valuation over a three-year period instead of immediately. Consequently, the
inventory was not stated at the lower of cost or net realizable value as required by
accounting standards.
In light of the fact that the cases deal with sensitive issues, the respondents seem to have
provided surprisingly detailed information on the issues studied. In most cases it is possible
to get fairly good insights into what was really going on, but in some cases the readability is
impaired by the complexity of the financial-reporting issues. In those cases more detailed
information about the rules in accounting standards, as well as the proposed accounting
treatments, would have been useful. The fact that U.K. standards were employed by the
companies makes it even more difficult for readers from other countries to understand the
accounting issues.
The third part of the book includes an analysis of the cases and conclusions. The authors
use grounded theory as the starting point for their analyses. Grounded theory refers to the
process ofbuilding theory inductively through a qualitative analysis of the data. The analysis
ends in a classification of the interaction outcomes (e.g., financial-reporting matters) on the
following two dimensions: the quality of the outcome and the ease of agreement. The
interactions— issues of interest in the negotiations between the auditor and the firm— were
then assigned to clusters ranging from a good outcome that was attained easily to a poor/
creative-compliance outcome attained with some degree of difficulty. The over-valuation of
the inventory, discussed above, is an example ofan interaction assigned to the poor/creative-
compliance category. The analysis also includes a classification of the audit-engagement
partners into four categories ranging from so called "crusaders" to "trusters." "Crusaders" are
auditors who have an extremely high professional and personal integrity and "trusters" are
characterized as having moderate professional integrity and who may unknowingly permit
rules to be bent.
The final part of the book includes some policy implications, a few of which are radical.
For example, the authors point out the potential harm to investors when small issues ofpoor-
quality accounting do not come to their attention because these issues are deemed to be
immaterial. The authors suggest two solutions for this: First, currently accepted materiality
levels should be radically changed. Second, a lesser type of sanction than a qualified audit
report should be introduced for less serious breaches (see p. 287). The authors also give some
advice on the appropriate allocation of audit partners to clients in the final part of the book.
For example, they point out that it is not a good idea to assign a young, inexperienced partner
to a client where the FD is much older and the chief executive is dominant as it may put the
partner in a weak bargaining position.
2. For whom is the book of potential interest?
The findings and conclusions are probably ofsome interest to practitioners, but I think the
main reader categories are accounting/auditing students and scholars. The cases presented
give students some insights into what auditing is really about at the manager/partner level.
The cases can also serve as a starting point for students planning to write a case-based
Master's thesis. Indeed, students might have problems accessing personnel at the AEP and
FD level but, for example, studies of different issues related to the interplay between audit
assistants and clients might be a fruitful are for them. The book is naturally of interest to
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scholars who are planning to write case-based studies. Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt propose,
at the end of the book, some areas for future work based on the grounded theory approach.
Most of the existing body of auditing research has its origins in economics, psychology,
and other related areas. However, this book might also be of interest for scholars using
economics- based and other approaches. This is likely to be the case particularly ifone focuses
on tests and applications of theories instead of theory development. Tufano (2001 ) points out
that case-based research can have the following roles in addition to theory development: (i) to
test theory, (ii) to apply theory in real-world settings, and (iii) to communicate theory.
Applications of economics-based theories on negotiations between auditors and clients
could give new insights about the behavior of both parties. The authors describe several such
situations in which economics-based theories could contribute to the explanations about the
behavior of auditors and clients: The TJ pic case, for example, describes the relationship
between the AEP and the FD in a small family-controlled company. The company had
experienced a loss of market share, a reduction in profitability, and it was eventually sold
(pp. 82-114). The relationship between the audit-engagement partner and the financial
director is characterized in the book as weak and the chief financial officer is a "grudger."
(A "grudger" sees little value in the audit, is unhelpful and a cost minimizer.) However, it is
possible that the behavior of the FD and chairman was totally in line with economics-based
reasoning. One could assume that a clean audit report was very important, but at the same time
the management wanted to maximize their possibilities to use aggressive accounting policies
until the company was sold.
To conclude, I think the book can serve as stimuli for case-based research for scholars
with different methodological backgrounds.
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The effect of globalization and legal environment on
voluntary disclosure
Kimberley A. Webb a
,
Steven F. Cahan h '*, Jerry Sun c
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Abstract
We examine how interactions with foreign capital, product, and labor markets affect the disclosure
•practices of non-U. S. multinational firms. Drawing on literature related to multinationals, country-level
i legal institutions, and accounting disclosures, we expect that the relation between globalization and
voluntary disclosure will be conditioned by the legal environment in a firm's home country. Specifically,
while firms from countries with a strong legal environment (e.g., common-law countries) already face
pressure for good disclosure, globalization can increase the benefits associated with good disclosure to
firms from weak legal environments (e.g., civil-law countries). We use a self-constructed voluntary
disclosure index and hand-collected disclosure and foreign activity data for 643 non-U. S. firms from 30
countnes for 2003. We find a significant interaction between globalization and the legal environment.
This indicates that for the same level ofglobalization, there is more voluntary disclosure for firms based in
weak legal environments. Our results suggest that globalization is an important variable that has been
overlooked in much of the previous cross-country research.
C 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Weywords: Voluntary disclosure: Globalization; Legal environment
1. Introduction
There is an expanding literature that examines whether a country's legal and judicial
institutions afifect disclosures and other accounting properties across countries (e.g.. Ball,
* Corresponding author. Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Auckland Business School,
Private Bag 92019. Auckland. New Zealand. Tel.: +64 9 373 7599x87175.
E-mail address: s.cahan@auckland.ac.nz (S.F. Cahan)
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Kothari, & Robin. 2000; Jaggi & Low, 2000; Hung, 2001; Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Hope,
2003a, 2003b; Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006). However,
for the most part, these studies do not consider the role of globalization; i.e.. they ignore the
fact that many firms operate and raise funds in multiple countries. At the same time, a few
studies (e.g., Gray, Meek, & Roberts, 1995; Cahan, Rahman, & Perera, 2005) find that
voluntary disclosures increase with globalization, but these studies do not control for the fact
that multinational firms operate in countries with different legal environments. This study
provides the missing link by exploring the relationship between globalization and the legal
environment as it relates to disclosure.
Specifically, we examine how a firm's voluntary disclosures are affected by its degree of
international diversification and by the legal environment in its home country. We argue that
globalization creates a demand for voluntary disclosure because multinational firms are likely
to have greater information asymmetry as a result of their greater scope and complexity.
However, in addition to increases in voluntary disclosures resulting from globalization, we
expect that the effect will be larger for firms based in countries with weak legal environments
than for firms based in countries with strong legal environments. That is, we expect that the
former will provide more disclosures as a result of their weak legal and judicial institutions at
home. Using a sample of 643 non-U. S. firms from 30 countries, a self-constructed index of
voluntary disclosure, and hand-collected disclosure and foreign activity data, we find evidence
that is consistent with our expectations—that the interaction between globalization and the
legal environment is significantly associated with voluntary disclosures.
Our study contributes to several areas of research. First, we contribute to an emerging
line of research that examines the accounting consequences of foreign firms interacting
with the United States markets. For example, Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) find
that non-U. S. firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. have earnings properties that are more
like U.S. firms compared to other firms in their home countries; Bradshaw, Bushee, and
Miller (2004) find a positive relation between U.S. GAAP conformity of non-U. S. firms
and ownership by U.S. institutions; and Khanna. Palepu. and Srinivasan (2004) find that
non-U. S. firms are more likely to use U.S. disclosure practices as involvement with U.S.
markets increases. Since we do not limit our tests to interactions with U.S. markets, we
provide more general evidence on the effects of interacting with foreign markets.
Second, we add to the growing literature that uses country-level institutional features, such
as legal origin or investor protection, to explain cross-country differences in accounting
properties. For example, Jaggi and Low (2000), Hope (2003b), and Francis. Khurana, and
Percira (2005) find that country-level institutional factors matter in explaining disclosure
levels. Further, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find that earnings management is related to
a country's investor protection. Ball et al., (2000) find that the accounting properties of
timeliness and conservatism vary between common-law and civil-law countries. Ball et al.
(2003) find that country-level institutional factors can dominate accounting standards, and
Hope (2003a) finds that a measure of legal enforcement is related to analysts' forecast
accuracy. However, none of the prior studies have considered how globalization affects their
results. We suggest that globalization may be an omitted variable in these tests.
Third, we contribute to the voluntary disclosure literature. Most prior international sftidies
have used the CIFAR scores or, more recently, the transparency and disclosure index
developed by S&P However, as Bushee (2004) suggests, these indexes are not without
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problems, and he notes that "the biggest payoff" to future researchers will likely come to those
who construct their own disclosure indexes" (p. 524) and use hand-collected data. We use a
voluntary disclosure index based on Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008) and hand-collect
disclosure data for 643 firms from 30 countries. This allows us to provide more powerful tests
of firm-specific disclosure incentives and allows us to complement prior studies that use
broad-based, externally developed disclosure indexes.
'
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on globalization and multinational firms. Most of
this research focuses on U.S. multinationals. For example, Duru and Reeb (2002) find that in
the U.S. analysts' forecast accuracy is inversely related to globalization. Callen, Hope, and
Segal (2005) find that for U.S. multinationals, the variance of unexpected stock returns is
related more closely to domestic earnings than foreign earnings. One reason why prior studies
have not considered the effects of globalization for non-U. S. firms is that foreign-activity data
for non-U. S. firms are not widely available on databases like Compustat Global. Here, we
augment data from Compustat with hand-collected data on foreign activity. Thus, we are able
to examine the effects of globalization for a large, diverse sample of non-U. S. firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature
review. Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample, model and variables
used in the study. Section 5 provides descriptive statistics and discusses the results of the
empirical tests. Section 6 is the conclusion.
12. Literature review
Several recent studies examine interactions with U.S. markets. Lang et al. (2003)
rexamine the accounting properties of non-U. S. firms that are listed in the United States
compared to firms that are not cross-listed, they find cross-listed firms are less likely to
manage earnings and are more likely to have earnings that are timely and conservative.
Their results also indicate that some of the differences arise in the post cross-listing
I
period. Bradshaw et al. (2004) examine whether conformity with U.S. GAAP affects the
Plevel of U.S. institutional ownership for non-U. S. firms. They rate U.S. GAAP conformity
Iby examining 13 accounting-method choices and find that greater levels (changes) of U.S.
GAAP conformity are related to greater U.S. institutional ownership.
Khanna et al. (2004) argue that non-U. S. firms with more involvement in U.S. capital,
product, and labor markets will adopt U.S. disclosure practices. They use a variety of firm-
ilevel and country-level variables to proxy for involvement in U.S. markets." Further, they
use S&P's transparency and disclosure index which is based on a checklist of 98 disclosure
'items. They argue that higher scores represent more conformity with U.S. disclosure
Dractices. and, using a sample of 794 firms from 24 countries, they find positive relations
3etween most of their U.S. market measures and the S&P disclosure scores. Khanna et al.
2004) is important because it shows that the capital market is not the only market that may
See Bushee (2004) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the different types of disclosure
indexes.
Khanna et al. (2004) use a U.S. listing variable and country-level variables related to U.S. equity investment
ilind U.S. direct investment to measure involvement in U.S. capital markets, firm-level measures of U.S. exports,
Jid U.S. operations, and a country-level measure of U.S. trade to proxy for U.S. product market interactions, and
country-level measure of business travel to the United States to represent U.S. labor market involvement.
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affect a multinational firm's disclosure policy. Instead, product market and labor market
forces also can exert pressure on firms to increase disclosures even in the absence of capital
market forces.
Together, these studies suggest that interactions by foreign firms with capital, product, and
labor markets in the United States matter. Our intention is to take a broader perspective—we
examine the effects of interactions with markets around the world. We argue that firms may
disclose more as globalization increases because more exposure to the capital, product, or
labor markets increases the demand for better disclosure. However, we also argue that this
effect will be most pronounced for firms based in weak legal environments since these firms
face weak demand for good disclosure at home and because their disclosures are likely to
be viewed as less credible. Thus, we examine whether there is an interaction between
globalization and the legal environment that affects disclosure.
3. Hypotheses
5.7. Globalization and voluntary disclosure (HI)
We draw on several streams of literature to explain why expansion into foreign markets
can increase the demand for more disclosure. Though these studies focus on capital market
forces, similar to Khanna et al. (2004), we see these arguments extending to the product and
labor markets as well.
Prior literature on the home bias suggests that investors overweight (underweight) their
portfolios with firms based in their home (foreign) countries. Merton's (1987) analysis
suggests that information costs can create indirect barriers that lead investors to hold stocks
they are familiar with, and prior research suggests that the home bias can arise from
insufficient or inadequate information about the firm (e.g., Kang & Stulz, 1997; Ahearne,
Griever, & Wamock, 2004; Bradshaw et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2005). This suggests that
expansion into new markets creates information issues.
Further, there is evidence that suggests that investors and analysts have difficulty in
interpreting or understanding information about multinational firms. Dura and Reeb (2002)
find that analysts' forecast accuracy for U.S. firms is negatively related to their globalization,
and they interpret this as evidence that the forecasting task is more complex when foreign
operations are more extensive. Thomas (1999) and Callen et al. (2005 ) find that U.S. investors
place less value on foreign earnings relative to domestic earnings. These authors suggest that
their results might be due to poor disclosures.
Analytical research (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983)
suggests that firms have incentives to improve the information set available to investors
because this can reduce information asymmetry, and can increase liquidity and lower the cost
of capital. At a practical level, McKinsey & Co. (2002) reports that 70% of global investors
rate accounting disclosures as being important when evaluating foreign investments. Also,
Globalization could also affect disclosure through firm complexity. That is, global firms may disclose more
because they have more complex operations or financing arrangements that require greater disclosure. We design
our tests to minimize this complexity effect. Specifically, rather than examine disclosures that are specifically
about international activity (e.g.. geographic segment disclosures), we use a measure of overall disclosure.
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empirical evidence suggests that better financial reporting and disclosure can help in an
international context. For example, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001 ) find that analysts' forecast
accuracy is higher after firms adopt IAS, and Hope (2003a) finds that analysts' forecast
accuracy improves when firm-level disclosure increases. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find that
German firms switching to U.S. GAAP reporting have lower information asymmetry than
firms that continue to report under German GAAP, which is a lower disclosure-reporting
regime.
The preceding arguments are largely couched in terms of capital markets, but the main
issue - information asymmetry - also applies to users in the product and labor markets, and
as Khanna et al. (2004) suggest, interactions with foreign product and labor markets can
also create a demand for information and better disclosure from multinational firms. For
example, they argue that customers require financial information to evaluate a foreign
firm's long-term viability, and suppliers use financial statements in evaluating a foreign
firm's creditworthiness. Likewise, employees and prospective employees can use financial
disclosures in assessing employment opportunities with a foreign firm. These arguments are
supported by Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) who argue that implicit contracts can
affect a firm's accounting choices. These implicit contracts are relational contracts that
depend on the firm's reputation. Given the unfamilianty of firms when they enter foreign
product or capital markets, multinational firms have incentives to provide additional
information in order to establish and maintain a reputation. This can reduce costs associated
with these relational contracts in the long-run.
Gray et al.. (1995) and Cahan, Rahman, and Perera (2005) provide evidence that
voluntary disclosure increases with globalization, but neither of those studies control for
legal environments. Thus, we examine the following hypothesis:
HI. Controlling for legal environment, the level of voluntary disclosure for a firm is posi-
:ively associated with its level of globalization.
4
. Globalization, legal environment, and voluntary disclosure (H2)
Prior research provides ample evidence that country-level legal and judicial institutions
iffect voluntary disclosures and other accounting properties (e.g.. Ball et al., 2000; Jaggi &
,ow, 2000; Hope, 2003a,b; Leuz et al., 2003; Bushman et al., 2004). This literature builds
>n La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
Jhleifer and Vishny (1998) who find that common-law countries have stronger investor
ights." However, a shortcoming of the prior cross-country research is that it largely ignores
tie role of globalization. These studies implicitly assume that accounting outputs are
While H 1 predicts that multinational firms would have incentive to voluntarily disclose more information, we
:cognize that firms may have proprietary reasons for not disclosing information (e.g.. Dye, 1986). Ultimately,
nether voluntary disclosure is increasing in globalization is an empirical question.
Based on this body of literature, our maintained assumption is that the legal environment matters in the
pntext of disclosure and reporting decisions. Hence, we do not develop a separate hypothesis for the effect of
'gal environments on voluntary disclosure. However, since we want to examine the interaction between
obalization and the legal environment, we include a legal environment variable in our regression models to
ipture its main effects. The full model is described in Section 4.4.
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affected only by the legal environment in a firm's home country. One exception is Klianna
et al. (2004). but their results are specific to U.S. markets and they do not consider the more
complex issue of how incentives arising from foreign market involvement and the legal
environment interact. The main contribution of our study is that we examine whether the
interaction between globalization and the legal environment affects voluntary disclosures.
We contend that the impact of globalization on voluntary disclosures will be more
pronounced in weak legal environments than in strong legal environments for two reasons.
First, prior research establishes that accounting quality is generally lower when legal and
judicial institutions are weak. For example. Jaggi and Low (2000) and Hope (2003b)
provide evidence that disclosure levels are lower in civil-law countries. Thus, globalization
can increase the benefits of disclosure for firms from weaker legal environments by
exposing them to new markets where disclosure is more highly valued. Second, in weak
legal regimes, investors and other market participants are likely to have less trust because
they believe their rights will not be protected. For example. Dumev and Kim (2005) argue
that a lack of trust among investors can lead to a higher cost of capital for firms in weak
legal environments. Thus, in weak legal environments, firms with external financing have
incentives to provide more extensive accounting disclosures in order to build trust and
enhance their reputation. Similarly, implicit contracts depend on reputation so firms in weak
legal environments also have incentives to improve their accounting disclosures to gain the
trust of product and labor market participants such as customers, suppliers, and employees.
This will increase the value of the firm's implicit contracts, leading to a higher firm value.
While Dumev and Kim (2005) suggest an interaction between globalization and legal
environments, they do not test for it. We contribute to the literature by examining whether
the interaction between globalization and legal environment affects voluntary disclosures.
Formally, we hypothesize:
H2. The effect of globalization on voluntary disclosure is greater for firms based in
countries with weak legal environments than for firms based in countries with strong legal
environments.
4. Research design
4.1. Voluntary- disclosures
We use a self-constructed measure of voluntary disclosures based on Francis et al.
(2008). This is in contrast to other recent cross-country studies that use externally developed
measures of total disclosures, e.g., Hope (2003b) who uses CIFAR ratings and Khanna et al.
(2004) who use S&P's transparency and disclosure scores. Though externally developed
indexes have the advantage of being objective and comprehensive, they also have
disadvantages (e.g., Bushee. 2004; Francis et al.. 2008). For example, these indexes
capture total disclosures that include both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Further,
externally developed indexes offer lower construct validity since they were not created with <
specific research question in mind, and they can restrict the researcher to nonrepresentative
samples that may be motivated by commercial interests of the organization that prepared the
index. Bushee (2004) argues that using a self-constructed index and hand-collected data is
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likely to yield bigger payoffs for future researchers who want to examine disclosures
internationally. In our case, using a self-constructed index allows us to isolate voluntary
disclosures and more closely examine firm-level reporting incentives for a relatively large and
diverse sample of international firms.
Francis et al. (2008) develop a voluntary disclosure index for U.S. firms in a study
examining the effect of voluntary disclosure on the cost of capital. While they base their
index on Botosan (1997), they note that their index differs in two important ways. First,
they only consider "disclosure categories and elements which are clearly voluntary in
nature" (Francis et al., 2008, 12), and second, they expand Botosan's index to include non-
GAAP measures of financial performance (e.g., free cash flow, residual income). Francis
et al. (2008) rate their sample firms based on 25 items divided into four categories, i.e.,
historical results, other financial measures, non-financial measures, and projected
information, and examine whether the disclosure scores are related to the firm's cost of
capital. However, they find that their results are driven by disclosure scores in two of these
categories—other financial measures and non-financial measures. As a result, we use these
two categories to measure voluntary disclosures.
We recognize that Francis et al. (2008) developed their index for U.S. firms. We use then
index for a sample of non-U. S. firms because our goal is to identify a set of disclosures that
is voluntary in all countries and that has economic significance. Since the United States is
generally seen as having the most rigorous reporting and disclosure standards in the world
(e.g., Reese & Weisbach, 2002), items that are disclosed voluntarily in the United States are
very likely to be voluntary in other countries as well. 6 Further, Francis et al. (2008) show
that the items they disclose affect the firm's cost of capital. This indicates that the items they
include in their index have economic significance; in other words, these disclosures are not
trivial.
We score the 2003 annual reports for our sample firms using an 1 1 -item index that
includes three other financial measures and eight non-financial measures. Table 1 lists these
items.
7 We expect that the three financial measures - free cash flows, economic profit, and
cost of capital - will be important in the context of global firms because of the huge start-up
Nonetheless, similar to Francis et al. (2008), we still conduct exhaustive checks to ensure that each disclosure
item is actually voluntary in every country in our sample using the following procedure. For every country and for
every disclosure item, we conducted three Google searches using the following key words: ( 1 ) "accounting
standards [country name] [disclosure item]", (2) "company disclosure requirements [country name] [disclosure
item]", and (3) "stock exchange listing requirements disclosure [country name] [disclosure item]". We also
conducted two sets of further searches—one for international accounting standards (i.e.. "international accounting
standards [disclosure item]") and one for European Union reporting requirements (i.e., "European Union
company reporting requirements [disclosure item]"). We did not identify any instances where one of our
disclosure items was required. Additionally, for a selected sample of English speaking countries (i.e., Australia,
'New Zealand, and Canada), we examined the local accounting pronouncements to see if any of the 1 1 items were
required. However, because of language barriers and resource constraints, we were not able to do this for all
countries. To the extent that our Google searches are not adequate, this is a limitation of the study.
Our 1 1-item index is similar in terms of number of items to other international studies that use self-constructed
(indexes. For example. Hung (2001 ) uses an 1 l-item index related to the use of accrual accounting. Ashbaugh and
Pmcus(2001) use a 12-item index related to differences from IAS, and Bradshaw et al. (2004) use a 13-item index
related to U.S. GAAP conformity. The first two are country-level indexes while Bradshaw et al. (2004) is a firm-
evel index.
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Table 1
Coding scheme used to compute VD1SC
1
.
Other financial measures
a. Free cash flow (or cash flow other than that reported in the Statement of Cash Flows)
b Economic profit, residual income type measure
c. Cost of capital (WACC, hurdle rate, EVA target rate)
2. Non-financial measures
a. Number of employees
b. Average compensation per employee
c. Percentage of sales or services designed or introduced in past 3-5 years
d. Market share
e. Units sold (or other output measure, e.g., production, customers sen iced)
f Unit selling price (or other price measure, e.g.. hourly rate)
g. Growth in units sold (or growth in other output measure)
h. Growth in investment (expansion plans, number of outlets, etc.)
Based on Francis et al. (2008).
costs and ongoing investments that global firms face in entering and operating in multiple
geographic markets. We expect that the eight non-financial measures are useful for global
firms because they remove the currency (i.e., translation) effects and they focus on
measures of real activity which are not as easy to distort. Following Francis et al. (2008), we
rate each item on a binary scale. If a firm discloses an item, we give it a score ofone for that
item. We refer to these scores as item scores. Thus, a firm's voluntary disclosure score,
VDisc, is the sum of the 1 1 item scores.
Additionally, we employ a modified version of Francis et al. (2008) rating system. For each
of the 1 1 items, we also give every firm a quality score based on the extent and richness of their
disclosures. We rate the quality of the disclosure for each item as low, medium, or high. Ifthe
disclosure is rated as "low," it is given an item score of one; if it is rated "medium," it is given
an item score of two; and if it is rated "high," it is given an item score of 3 (as before, a zero
score is given for nondisclosure). We define VDiscQ as the sum of the quality scores for each
of the 11 disclosure items. Since scoring VDiscQ require some subjectivity, we believe the
results for VDiscQ should be interpreted in conjunction with VDisc.
As pointed out before, our intention is to measure voluntary disclosures at a broad level.
Thus, we are not specifically interested in disclosures about the firm's international
activities (e.g., geographic segment information). There are two reasons for this. First, our
To expand on our quality categories, low quality (i.e.. a score of one) indicates that the firm disclosed the item
but did not provide any additional discussion: medium quality (i.e., a score of two) indicates that the firm
disclosed the item and provided some additional discussion but did not compare their own results to an industrial
average or to the results of competitive firms; and high quality (i.e.. a score of three) indicates that the firm
disclosed the item, provided some additional discussion, and compared their own results to an industrial average
or to the results of competitive firms. To reduce subjectivity, we use the following procedures: 1 ) For each
disclosure item, a predefined list of key words is used to search in annual reports. 2) If a disclosure item is found,
the evaluator would read a few neighboring paragraphs containing the key words to determine whether zero, one,
two or three should be given. 3) In assigning a score, we define "discussion" to mean that the annual report listed
a breakdown of the required disclosure item, or listed or commented on the firm's previous years' figures or
changes of the disclosed item.
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hypotheses are not about a particular type of disclosure; we predict a firm's overall
disclosures will be affected by globalization and the legal environment. Second, we want to
minimize any supply-side effects. Global firms may disclose more since they have more
complex operations or financing arrangements that require greater disclosure. Since our
focus is on a market-based explanation, we specifically exclude disclosures related to
international activity in order to minimize any complexity effect.
4.2. Test variables
We measure globalization as a single concept which is consistent with the literature on
multinationals (e.g., Duru and Reeb. 2002). While our measure reflects interactions with
foreign capital, product, and labor markets, we do not try to measure the effects of each of
these markets separately. Instead, we take the view that globalization can involve a variety
of interrelated activities (e.g., a firm that operates in Australia may hire locals, have
interactions with Australian customers, and raise funds from Australian creditors). Thus,
measures of globalization will be highly correlated.
We use a composite measure of globalization that is based on three measures. Based on
Duru and Reeb (2002), we use the foreign sales ratio (FSales) and the number of foreign
subsidiaries (FSubs). 9 Similar to Hope (2003a), we use the number of foreign exchanges
that a firm is listed on (FList). We factor analyze the three variables and use the factor scores
from the first factor to measure globalization (Global).
We use hand-collected foreign activity data to augment data from Compustat because
foreign activity data are available for only a limited number of non-U. S. firms on
Compustat and other widely used databases. 10 Specifically, we hand-collect data on foreign
sales and foreign subsidiaries from the annual report, and we identify foreign listings by
[i reviewing members of stock exchanges in each of our 30 countries using information from
Datastream. As a result, we are able to examine the effects of globalization for a larger and
more diverse sample of non-U. S. firms than prior studies have used.
Lang et al. (2003) point out that there is no single, universally accepted measure of legal
environment. For our main tests, we use the most basic measure of legal environment, i.e.,
legal origin. As La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and subsequent research have shown, legal
origin is powerful enough to explain differences in country-level characteristics such as
investor protection, financial development, and ownership patterns. We use a binary
variable. Legal, that is coded one for common-law countries and zero for civil-law
countries to measure legal origin. In additional tests, we use two alternative measures of
legal environment. First, we use a measure of investor protection from Leuz et al. (2003).
They identify three levels of investor protection from a cluster analysis based on nine
Duru and Reeb (2002) use the number of geographic segments rather than number of foreign subsidiaries. We
use foreign subsidiaries because this reflects not only the extent of foreign operations but how they are organized.
Duru and Reeb (2002) also use the foreign-asset ratio, but we exclude this since it would have significantly
i
reduced our sample size. Only 72% of firms in our sample report foreign assets.
We are able to obtain some foreign-activity data using the geographic-segment data provided on the
Compustat North America database. This is potentially available only for firms that are cross-listed in the United
IStates.
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institutional variables from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)." Second, we use a measure of
securities law from Bushman and Piotroski (2006) that is based on measures of private and
public enforcement of securities law from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2006).
12 Bushman and Piotroski (2006) use the arithmetic sum of the two indexes and
classify countries as having either high or low enforcement.
4.3. Control variables
To control for other factors that might affect the level or quality of voluntary disclosures,
we include controls for firm size, firm growth, financing needs, firm profitability, analyst
following, and innate accrual quality. We include firm size to control for disclosure costs,
incentives for private information acquisition, and legal costs (e.g., Lang & Lundholm.
1993) where firm size is measured using the log of the market value of equity (InMVE)
(market value, MVE, is adjusted share price times adjusted shares outstanding from
Compustat Global Issue). We control for firm growth using the log of the book to market
ratio (lnB,\f) (6A/is Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial #146/MVE) (e.g., Bamber &
Cheon, 1998)). Capital intensity (Capiat) (#76/#89) and the leverage (Lev) (#106/#89) are
included to control for financing needs, and we control for firm performance using the
return on assets (ROA) (#32/#89) (e.g., Bushee & Leuz, 2005)). Further, following Hope
(2003a) and others, we control for analyst following (Analysts) calculated from IBES.
Based on prior literature, we expect a positive coefficient for each of these control variables.
In addition, Francis et al. (2008) find a complementary relation between innate
information quality and voluntary disclosures using U.S. data. That is, as the fundamental
quality of the information improves, managers provide more voluntary disclosure. They
suggest that since innate accrual quality is a primitive construct of voluntary disclosure,
tests that ignore innate accrual quality are likely to be confounded. Further controlling for
earnings quality in an international context can be important because prior studies such as
Hung (2001) find that accounting quality can differ between countries. Consequently, we
also control for innate accrual quality.
We adopt an approach developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002)
and estimate the following regression:
CmAce,/A, = a + ^CFO^/A, + p2CFO,/A, + p3CFO,+ } /A, + PAAREV,/A,
+ P5PPE,/A, + s (1)
where CurAcc is total current accruals in year t (change in current assets [Compustat
Global Industrial /Commerical#75] - change in current liabilities [#104] -change in cash
The nine variables are related to stock market capitalization, number of listed domestic firms relative to the
population, number of IPOs relative to the population, ownership concentration, antidirector rights, disclosure,
efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, and corruption.
La Porta et al., (2006) measure of public enforcement is based on four indexes related to supervisor attributes.
investigative powers, stop and do orders, and criminal sanctions. Their measure of private enforcement is based
on two indexes related to disclosure and burden of proof (the disclosure index used by La Porta. Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) is based on disclosure requirements related to issuing securities and is not a measure
oi accounting disclosures)
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[#60] + change in short-term debt [#94]); A is average total assets in year t and t— 1 (#89); CFO
is cash flow from operations in year /, which is net income (#32) less total accruals (TAC)
(change in current assets [#75]-change in current liabilities [#104]-change in cash [#60] +
change in short-term debt [#94] - depreciation [# 1 1 ]). AREVis change in revenues (#1 ) in year
t- 1 to year /. PPE is gross value of property, plant, and equipment (#77) in year f. 13
We estimate Eq. ( 1 ) on a time-series basis for each firm based on data for the period
1993-2004, the maximum number of years available on the Compustat Global database.
Because computation of the lagged CFO requires two lag years and because computation of
the year-ahead CFO requires one lead year, we use 9 years ( 1995-2003) to estimate Eq. ( 1 ).
We take the standard deviation of the residuals for firm i over the 9 years as an estimate of
total accrual quality (TAQ).
Following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2008), we regress TAQ on a
series of innate factors, i.e.:
TAQ = a + ft Size + />>CFO + fttrSales + ftOpCyc + ftNegEarn -I- 8 (2)
where Size is the log of average total assets (89); ctCFO is the standard deviation of CFO,
scaled by total assets; aSales is the standard deviation of sales revenue (#1 ), scaled by total
assets; OpCyc is the average of the sum of accounts receivable days and inventory days
(based on #1, #4, #63, #66); and NegEarn is the number of years of negative earnings
(#32). We then use the predicted values from Eq. (2) as estimates of innate accrual quality
(IAQ). Since large values of IAQ indicate poorer innate accrual quality, we expect a
negative relation between IAQ and VDisc (VDiscQ).
\4.4. Model
We estimate the following regression model to test HI and H2:
VDisc(VDiscQ) = a + ft Global + ft Legal + ftGlobal*Legal + ftlAQ
+ ft/nMVE + ft/nBM + ftCapInt + ftLev + ftROA
+ /?,„Analysts + £ (3)
where ft and ft test H 1 and H2 respectively. We expect a positive coefficient for ft and a
negative coefficient for ft.
4.5. Sample
We select our sample in a two-step process. As a first step, we identify all firms on the
Tompustat Global database that have data for all the variables in our tests except for data on
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Francis et al., 2005, Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005). throughout our
inalyses, we winsonze all distributions to the 1 and 99 percentiles.
Francis et al. (2008) find that the significance of most of their traditional control variables (e.g.. firm size, log
i'f the book-to-market ratio) decreases when innate accrual quality is included in a regression model explaining
' oluntary disclosure. They argue that innate accrual quality subsumes the explanatory power since innate accrual
uality is based on similar characteristics. Since not much is known about innate accnial quality in an
;iternational context, we include both innate accnial quality and the traditional control variables in our models.
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foreign sales, foreign subsidiaries, and foreign listings (we collect the bulk of our foreign
activity data from other sources, primarily annual reports). We find that 854 firms from 49
countries satisfy this criterion. The data requirement for IAQ is by far the most limiting since it
requires 1 1 years of data. Thus, our sample consists of long-lived, surviving firms. While we
acknowledge that this introduces a bias that can reduce the generalizability of our results, it
also helps us in two ways: (1) It increases homogeneity in our sample which reduces the
possibility of omitted variables (e.g., start-up firms or younger firms may be fundamentally
different from our firms), and (2) it increases the likelihood that at least some ofour firms will
be highly globalized since establishing an international presence takes time.
As a second step, we search the Internet for usable annual reports for the 854 firms. We
use the 2003 annual report, but in 39 cases the 2003 report was not available so we use the
2002 (20 firms) or 2004 (19 firms) report instead. Thus, we are able to obtain annual reports
for 750 of the initial 854 companies. Of these, 49 were not in English, and these were
deleted.
15
Clearly, this also affects the generalizability of our results. At best, our results can
only be extended to companies that report in English. Further, we delete another 58 firms
that did not have data on foreign sales available through Compustat Global or through their
annual reports.
16
After deleting the non-English reports and firms without foreign sales
data, we have a final sample of 643 firms from 30 countries.
One consideration with hand-collected disclosure data is that because the process is time
intensive, sample sizes are often small. For example, Botosan ( 1997) uses hand-collected data for
a sample of 1 22 manufacturing firms, and Guo, Lev, and Zhou (2004) use hand-collected data for
a sample of 49 biotech firms. 17 Our sample size compares favorably with Francis et al. (2008)
who with 681 firms have one of the largest samples with hand-collected disclosure data.
Further, our sample also compares favorably with recent cross-country studies that use
externally developed indexes. For example, KJianna et al. (2004) use a sample of 794 firms
from 24 countries, Francis et al. (2005) use 672 firms from 34 countries, and Dumev and
Kim (2005) use two samples—one of 494 firms from 24 countries that are included in the
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia governance ratings and another of 573 companies from 16
countries that have S&P's transparency and disclosure scores. Thus, even though we use
hand-collected data, we do not have to compromise on sample size.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the sample by country. Our sample includes firms from
30 countries, 11 common-law countries and 19 civil-law countries. While the number of
Of the 49 non-English reports. 38 were in Japanese, five in Portuguese, five in Spanish, and one in French.
In the final sample, we have 565 firms with foreign activity data from the annual report and 78 firms with
foreign activity data from the Compustat North America database (as pointed out in footnote 12. the Compustat
data are potentially available only for firms cross-listed in the United States). When we have both annual report
and Compustat data, we use the annual report amounts to verify the Compustat amounts. In a few cases where
amounts were not the same, we use the annual report amounts in our tests.
We recognize lhat both Botosan ( IW) and Guo et al. (2004) collect more extensive data for each firm than
we do
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Table 2
Sample firms by country
Country Frequency "n
Argentina
Australia'
1
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada3
Chile
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Hong Konga
India
Ireland'
Israel
3
Japan
Korea
Malaysia'
1
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand'
Philippines
Singapore3
Sweden
Thailand3
Taiwan
South Africa3
Spain
Switzerland
United Kingdom' 1
Total
47
1
2
14
97
3
3
7
19
is
43
6
6
4
37
4
56
1
5
7
4
28
4
40
1
5
I
16
161
643
0.47
7.31
0.16
0.31
2 IS
15.09
0.47
0.47
1.09
2.95
2.79
6.69
0.93
0.93
0.62
5.75
0.62
8.71
0.16
0.78
1.09
0.62
435
0.62
6.22
0.16
0.78
0.16
2.49
25.04
100.00
Denotes common-law country. Country classifications are based on La Porta et al. (1998).
common-law countries is less, common-law countries are represented by more firms in our
sample than civil-law countries. Overall, we have 494 firms from common-law countries
(76.8% of the sample) and 149 firms from civil-law countries (23.2%). Also, 40.1% of the
sample comes from just two common-law countries, i.e., the United Kingdom (25%) and
Canada (15.1%). To address concerns that these countries might be driving our results, we
report sensitivity tests with the U.K. and Canadian firms omitted.
Table 3, panel A provides descriptive statistics for VDisc and VDiscQ. VDisc has a
mean of 3.484 and a median of three. The minimum is zero which indicates that none of the
1 1 disclosure items were disclosed. The maximum is nine which indicates that nine of the
11 items were provided. Thus, based on our index, generally the level of voluntary
disclosure is modest, but some firms disclose at high levels. Further, the mean (median) for
our voluntary disclosure quality index, VDiscQ, is 5.961 (5.000). The maximum for
VDiscQ is 17 from a theoretical maximum of 33 (i.e., 11 items times a maximum of three
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum
VDisc
VDiscQ
3 4X4
5.961
1.867
3.690
Panel B Frequencies by item for VDisc and VDiscQ
0.000
0.000
3.000
5.000
9.000
17.000
VDisc
Item = 1
VDiscQ
= 1 =2 = 3
33 70
6 23
15 22
184 379
244 169
13 9 1
60 79 28
66 226 12
24 98 8
34 190 6
16 225
Free cash flows 540
Residual income 614
Cost of capital 606
Number of employees 80
Avg. compensation 230
Percentage in last 3-5 years 620
Market share 476
Units sold 339
Unit price 5 1
3
Sales growth 413
Investment growth 402
103
29
37
563
413
23
167
304
130
230
241
Panel C. Distribution of firms by VDisc score
Item N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
Total
27
40
166
121
96
97
56
26
8
6
643
4.2%
6.2%
25.8%
18.8%
l k9%
15.1%
8.7%
4.0%
1.2%%
0.9%
0.0%
(Mr.,
Part D. Descriptive statistics for other variables
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum
Legal 0.770 421
Globalization variables
FSale 0.398 0.378
FSub 17.456 34.040
FList 1.409 1.672
< 'ontrol variables
IAQ 0.019 0.011
0.000 0.302 1.000
0.000 5.000 218.000
0.000 1.000 7.000
0.002 0.016 0054
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Table 3 (continual
)
Part D. Descriptive statistics for other variables
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum
Control Variables
InMVE 6.415 2.162
InBM -0.515 1.050
Caplnt 0.355 0.226
Lev 1 44 0.129
ROA 0.037 0.082
Analysts 8.238 9.813
1.571 6.381 1 3 292
-6.261 -0.422 1.373
0.007 0.332 0.867
0.000 0.135 0.500
-0.383 0.040 0.259
0.000 5.000 45.000
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the two alternative dependent variables which are defined as follows:
VDisc = sum of item scores for 1 1 voluntary disclosure items shown in Table 1 where an item score is zero for
nondisclosure, one for disclosure;
VDiscQ = sum of item quality scores for II voluntary disclosure items shown in Table 1 where an item quality
score is for nondisclosure, one for disclosure of low quality, two for disclosure of medium quality, and three for
disclosure of high quality.
VDisc and VDiscQ are based on the 2003 annual report except in 39 cases where the 2003 report was not available.
In these cases, the 2002 (20 firms) or 2004 (19 firms) report is used instead.
Panel B provides frequencies for the disclosure items on an item-by-item basis. The "=0" column represents the
number of firms (out of643) that did not disclose that item The "= 1 " column represents the number of firms (out of
643) that did disclose that item.
Panel C provides a breakdown of sample firms by VDisc score (defined as above). The maximum score for VDisc
is nine out of a theoretical maximum of 1 1 . No firms in the sample have a score of 10 or 11.
Panel D presides descriptive statistics for the other individual variables used in the study. The variables are defined as
follows:
Legal = one, if firm is based in common-law country; zero, if based in civil-law country where country classifications
are based on La Porta et al. 1998);
FSale = foreign sales/total sales (hand-collected from annual report or Compustat Global Issue);
FSubs = number of foreign subsidiaries (hand-collected from annual report);
FList = number of foreign stock exchanges that a firm is listed on (from Datastream);
IAQ = innate accrual quality which is estimated as described below;
InMVE = log of market value of equity (adjusted share price x adjusted shares outstanding, from Compustat Global
Issue) at the end of 2003 in U.S. dollars;
InBM = ratio of log of the book value of equity (Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial #146) to market value of
equity at the end of 2003:
Caplnt = net plant, property, and equipment (#76) total assets (#89) at the end of 2003;
Lev = total debt (#106) total assets (#89) at the end of 2003;
ROA = net income (#32) total assets (#89) at the end of 2003;
Analysts = number of analysts following the firm (from IBES) at the end of 2003.
We compute IAQ as follows. We first estimate the regression:
CurAcc,//!, = a + /}, CFO,_ ,/A, + fUCVQ./A, + /3,CFO,+ l //f, + PAAKEV,/A, + Pf PPE,/A, + c
where CurAcc is total current accruals in year ; (change in current assets [Compustat Global IndustriaL'Commercial
#75] -change in current liabilities [#104] -change in cash [#60]+change in short-term debt [#94]);.-) is average total
assets in years / and t- 1 (#89); and CFO is cash flow from operations in year t is net income (#32) less total accruals
(HOI change in current assets [#75] - change in current liabilities [# 1 04] - change in cash [#60] + change in short-term
debt[#94]-depreciation[#U]). AREVischangeinrevenues(#l)inyear/- 1 to year t. PPE is gross value ofproperty,
plant, and equipment (#77) in year t. Using data for the period 1 995-2003, we estimate the above equation on a time-
series basis for each firm. The standard deviation ofthe residuals for firm i is used as an estimate of total accrual quality
(TAQ). We then regress TAQ on firm size (#89), CFO scaled by total assets (#89), standard deviation of sales revenue
(#1 ), operating cycle (i.e.. the sum ofaccounts receivable days and inventory days [based on #1 . #4, #63, #66] ), and the
number of years with negative earnings (#32). We use the predicted values from the second regression as a measure of
innate accrual quality (IAQ) where high values of IAQ indicate poor innate accrual quality.
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per item) which suggests that none of the firms in our sample are achieving both a high
quantity and high quality of voluntary disclosures.
Table 3, panels B and C provide more detail on the composition and distribution of
VDisc. Panel B shows the frequency of disclosure by item. The most commonly disclosed
items are number of employees (disclosed by 87.6% of firms), average compensation
(64.2%), and units sold (47.2%). The least common are the percentage of items sold that
were designed or introduced in the last 3-5 years (3.6%). residual income (4.5%), and the
cost of capital (5.8%). Table 3, panel C contains a breakdown of the sample by VDisc. The
largest percentage of firms have disclosure scores of two (25.8%), followed by 18.8% with
a score of three.
Table 3, panel D presents descriptives for the remaining variables. Ofparticular interest are
the globalization variables. The mean (median ) for FSale is 0.398 (0.302) which indicates that,
on average, almost 40% of sales for our sample are foreign sourced. The mean for FSub is
1 7.456 foreign subsidiaries, but this is influenced by outliers as the median for FSub is five.
Also, the mean (median) for FList is 1.409 (1). While most firms have at least one foreign
listing. FList varies from zero-seven so some firms have numerous foreign listings.
Table 4 contains results ofthe factor analysis of the three global variables. Table 4, panel A
shows that the three globalization variables are positively correlated with rs ranging from
0.350 to 0.397. Table 4, panel B indicates that there is one common component with
significant explanatory power (i.e., an eigenvalue exceeding one), and we use the factor score
Table 4
Results of factor analysts of three global diversification variables
Panel A. Pearson correlation matrix
FSales FSubs FList
FSales
FSubs
FList
1.000
0.378
0.350
1.000
0.397 1.000
Panel B Total variance explained
Component Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative %
1.668
0.708
0.623
55.616
23.613
20.771
55.616
79.229
100.000
Panel C. Factor loadings for Global
Variable Loading
FSales
FSubs
FList
0.723
0.739
0.775
Panel A provides Pearson correlations for three measures of globalization. FSales, FSubs, and FList which are
defined in Table 3.
Panel B provides results from a factor analysis of the three measures. Three components are extracted with only one
component with an eigenvalue in excess of 1 . Factor scores for the first factor are used as a composite measure of
globalization, and this variable is labelled Global.
Panel C provides the factor loadings for Global.
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from this component to i epresenl globalization, ( rlobal. Final loadings ( lablc 4. panel C) show
that this factor loads most heavily on I- List, but all loadings arc similar and exceed 0.723.
I able 5 provides the pairwise correlations for the independent variables. Based on the
Pearson correlations (the Spearman correlations are similar). Legal is negatively and
significantly related to Global. InMVE, and Analysts. This indicates that civil-law firms in
the sample are more internationally diversified, are larger, and have a larger analyst
following than common-law firms in the sample. To an extent, this is because the civil-law
sample contains fewer firms per country, which suggests that civil-law firms in the sample
will be the bigger, more established ones in those countries. On the other hand, Cilobal is
positivel) and significantly correlated with InMVI . I ev, Analysts, and is negatively and
significantly correlated with InBM and Caplnt. Thus. linns with greater foreign
involvement arc larger and have more leverage, a larger analyst following, higher growth,
and lower capital intensity than firms with less foreign involvement. Also, it is worth noting
that firm size is significantly correlated with all of the other independent variables.
5.2. Regression results for HI and 112
We use Eq. (3) to test the validity of the two hypotheses simultaneously. Table 6 presents
the mam results using two alternative dependent variables. VDisc and VDiscQ. Both models
have reasonable explanatory power with R2 s of 20.3% and 20.9%, respectively. Since the
results for the two models are similar, we discuss them simultaneously. In both models. Global
is positiv e and significant at least at the 0.05 level based on a one-tailed test. Consistent with
III, voluntary disclosure is increasing in globalization. This is consistent with the view that
foreign involvement creates incentives for firms to improve their disclosures.
Consistent with 112, we find that the interaction between globalization and the legal
em ironment, i.e., Global * Legal, is significant at the 0.01 level and negatively signed. This
indicates that, for the same level of globalization, there is less (more) voluntary disclosure
Table 6
Regression results
Model: VDisc(VDiscQ) = 2 + /^Global i /.' I egal • />\(ilobal*LegaI + j84IAQ 4 ft/nMVE * /J„/hBM +
/)'
-C'aphu • /'. 1 c\ ,/i'KOA + /fm Analysts + s
Variables VDisc VDiscQ
Intercept 0.752 1 39 0.584 0.55
HI. Global i
I
0.307 2.33**' 0.560 2.16**
' 0.055 0.31 -0.277 -0.79
H2. Global 'Legal (-) 0.402 2 53*** -1.073 3.43*<i
[AQl i 199 0.02 5.873 0.33
InBM ( • I (l [93 2.27** 0.422 2.52***
InMVI i i ii J] 1 4.97*** 4.89***
< aplni - i 1.015 3.27*** 2 521 4 12***
Lev (+) 1 364 2.47*** 2 595 2.38***
ROA | 2 092 23** 4 : ig 2 29***
Analysis ( • ) 0.012 1.45* 0.032 1.98**
» (.43 643
Adjusted A" ()2i)\ 0.209
/•""-statistic 17.33*** 17.98***
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for firms based in common-law (civil-law) countries. This supports two nonmutually
exclusive views: either globalization increases the benefits of disclosure for firms from
weak legal-environment countries by exposing them to new markets where disclosure is
more highly valued or that firms from weak legal environment countries need to disclose
more to overcome concerns about the weak laws and institutions that they face at home.
Based on our coding, the coefficient for Global represents the incremental effect of
globalization on voluntary disclosures for civil-law based firms. The combined coefficients
for Global and Global * Legal represent the incremental effect of disclosure for common-
law-based firms. When VDisc is the dependent variable, the combined coefficient (i.e.,
0.307 + [-0.402] = -0.095) is not significant (/=- 1.13), which indicates that globalization
has no effect on voluntary disclosure in common-law countries. This is consistent with the
view that common-law firms already face pressure to disclose at a high level. When
Notes to Table 6
This table provides estimates from the regression of voluntary disclosure on globalization, legal environment, the
interaction of globalization and legal environment, and control variables. The results in columns 2 and 3 are based
on a model where VDisc is the dependent variable. The results in columns 3 and 4 are based on a model where
VDiscQ is the dependent variable. Variables are defined as follows:
VDisc = sum of item scores for 1 1 voluntary disclosure items shown in Table 1 where an item score is zero for
nondisclosure, one for disclosure;
VDiscQ = sum of item quality scores for 1 1 voluntary disclosure items shown in Table 1 where an item quality
score is zero for nondisclosure, one for disclosure of low quality, two for disclosure of medium quality, and three
for disclosure of high quality;
Legal = one, if firm is based in common-law country; zero, if based in civil-law country where country
classifications are based on La Porta et al., 1998);
IAQ = innate accrual quality which is estimated as described below.
InBM = ratio of log of the book value of equity (Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial #146) to market value of
equity at the end of 2003;
InMVE = log of market value of equity (adjusted share price x adjusted shares outstanding, from Compustat Global
Issue) at the end of 2003 in U.S. dollars;
Caplnt = net plant, property, and equipment (#76)/total assets (#89) at the end of 2003;
Lev = total debt (#106 (/total assets (#89) at the end of 2003;
ROA = net income (#32)/total assets (#89) at the end of 2003;
Analysts = number of analysts following the firm (from IBES) at the end of 2003.
We compute IAQ as follows. We first estimate the regression:
CurAcc,/.4, = a + /?,CFO,-,/A, + /l2 CFO,/A, + P} CFO, + ,/A, + ftJREV/.-l, + /1,PPE,/A, + e
where CurAcc is total current accruals in year / (change in current assets [Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial
#75]-change in current liabilities [#104]-change in cash [#60] + change in short-term debt [#94]); A is average
total assets in year / and t- 1 (#89); and CFO is cash flow from operations in year / is net income (#32) less total
accruals (TAC) (change in current assets [#75] -change in current liabilities [#104] -change in cash [#60] + change
in short-term debt [#94] - depreciation [#11]). AREV is change in revenues ( # 1 ) in year / - 1 to year /. PPE is gross
value of property, plant and equipment (#77) in year I. Using data for the period 1995-2003, we estimate the above
equation on a time-series basis for each firm. The standard deviation of the residuals for firm i is used as an estimate
of total accrual quality (TAQ). We then regress TAQ on firm size (#89). CFO scaled by total assets (#89). standard
deviation of sales revenue (#1). operating cycle (i.e.. the sum of accounts receivable days and inventory days
[based on #1, #4, #63, #66]), and the number of years with negative earnings (#32). We use the predicted values
from the second regression as a measure of innate accrual quality (IAQ) where high values of IAQ indicate poor
innate accrual quality.
*, **. and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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VDiscQ is the dependent variable, the combined coefficient for common-law firms is
significant but negative (i.e., 0.560 + [- 1.073] = -0.613, t=— 2.50). It is not clear to us why
the quality of voluntary disclosures for common-law firms might decrease as globalization
increases. We suggest this as an area for future research.
We also compute the F-statistic to test the joint explanatory power of Global and
Global * Legal. The /-"-statistic is 3.468 for the VDisc model which is significant at the 5%
level (two-tailed). The ^-statistic is 5.983 for the VDiscQ model which is significant at the
1% level (two-tailed). Together, this shows that Global and Global * Legal are not redundant
Table 7
Regression results using alternative measure for legal origin
Panel A. Investor protection
Model: VDisc(VDiscQ) = -x + ^, Global + />\InvPro + [l. Global*InvPro + §iIAQ + P5lnMVE + PJnBM +
/>'-CapInt + /SgLev + /)'„ROA + /)',,,.Analysts + e
Variables VDisc VDiscQ
Intercept 1.424 2.61 2.510 2.34
HI. Global ( + ) 0.415 1.92** 1.002 2.35***
InvPro (+) -0.182 -1.65 -0.866 -3.98
H2. Global *InvPro(-» -0.211 -1.63* -0.660 -2.59***
IAQ(~) -0.390 -0.04 2.793 0.15
InBM (+) 0.216 2.17** 0.503 2.56***
InMVE (+) 0.272 4.25*** 0.511 4.05***
Caplnt (+) 0.978 3.08*** 2.503 4.00***
Lev (+) 1.088 1.92** 2.283 2.05**
ROA (+) 2.150 2.20** 4.002 2.07**
Analysts
I
i 0.015 1.81** 0.042 2.52***
n 611 611
Adjusted Rr 0.192 0.207
/-"-statistic 15.53*** 16.95***
Panel B. Securities law
Model: VDisc(VDiscQ) = x + /?, Global + /J ; SecLaw + /?,Global*SecLaw + /J4IAQ
+ ft/nMVE + /S6/nBM + /J-Caplnt + /!s Lev + /juROA + /J l0Analysts4-£
Intercept 0.870 1 65 0.695 0.67
HI. Global (+) 0.309 2.19** 0.393 1.41*
SecLaw i - i -0.050 -0.28 -0.367 -1.04
H2. Global * SecLaw (-) -0.372 -2.27** -0.727 -2.24**
IAQ(-) 0.644 0.07 6.823 0.38
lnBM( + | (I 202 2.39*** 0.469 2.80***
InMVE (+) 0.309 5.03*** 0.616 5.07***
Caplnt ( + ) 0.969 3.13*** 2.340 3.83***
1.335 241*** 2.457 2.25**
ROA(+) 2 (INN 2.22** 425" 2.29***
Analysts I 1 I (1014 1.72** 0.038 2.33***
n 643 643
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.201
/-statistic
1
_ 24*** 17.15***
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Notes to Table 7
Panel A provides estimates from the regression of voluntary disclosure on globalization, legal environment.
the interaction of globalization and legal environment, and control variables. The results in columns 2 and 3
are based on a model where VDisc is the dependent variable The results in columns 3 and 4 are based on a
model where VDiscQ is the dependent variable. Panel B provides estimates from the regression of voluntary
disclosure on legal environment and control variables. The results in columns 2 and 3 are based on a model
where VDisc is the dependent variable. The results in columns 3 and 4 are based on a model where VDiscQ is
the dependent variable. Variables are defined as follows:
VDisc = sum of item scores for 1 1 voluntary disclosure items shown in Table 1 where an item score is zero for
nondisclosure, one for disclosure;
VDiscQ = sum of item quality scores for 11 voluntary disclosure items shown in Table 1 where an item quality
score is zero for nondisclosure, one for disclosure of low quality, two for disclosure of medium quality, and three
for disclosure of high quality;
InvPro = based on Leuz et al. (20031 who perform a cluster analysis on nine variables related to investor
protection at the country-level. The nine variables are related to stock market capitalization, number
of listed domestic firms relative to the population, number of IPOs relative to the population, ownership
concentration, anti-director rights, disclosure, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, and corruption.
Leuz et al. (2003) identify three clusters of investor protection. We code InvPro equal to two for firms
from countries in their high investor protection cluster, equal to one for firms from countries in
their medium investor protection cluster, and equal to zero for firms in their low investor protection
cluster;
SecLaw = based on Bushman and Piotroski (2006). Their measure is the arithmetic sum of two indexes of
securities law enforcement developed by La Porta et al. (2006); one measuring public enforcement and the other
measuring private enforcement. La Porta et al. (2006) measure of public enforcement is based on four indexes
related to supervisor attributes, investigative powers, stop and do orders, and criminal sanctions. Their measure of
private enforcement is based on two indexes related to disclosure, and burden of proof. SecLaw is a binary
variable that is coded one for strong enforcement countries. Our values are from Bushman and Piotroski's(2006)
Appendix 2;
IAQ = innate accrual quality which is estimated as described below;
InBM = ratio of log of the book value of equity (Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial #146) to market value of
equity at the end of 2003;
InMVE = log of market value of equity (adjusted share price x adjusted shares outstanding, from Compustat Global
Issue) at the end of 2003 in U.S. dollars;
Caplnt = net plant, property, and equipment (#76)'total assets (=*M| at the end of 2003;
Lev = total debt (#106)/total assets (#89) at the end of 2003;
ROA = net income (#32)/total assets (#89) at the end of 2003;
Analysts = number of analysts following the firm (from IBES) at the end of 2003.
We compute IAQ as follows. We first estimate the regression:
CurAcc,/.4, = a + /?, CFO,_, /A, + P2 CFO,/A, + /?,CFO,+ l /A, + AAREV, /.-I, + /? 5 PPE,/.-I, + z
where CurAcc is total current accruals in year t (change in current assets [Compustat Global Industrial 'Commerical
#75]-change in current liabilities [#104]-change in cash [#60] + change in short-term debt [#94]); A is average
total assets in years / and /- 1 (#89); and CFO is cash flow from operations in year t is net income (#32) less total
accruals (TAC) (change in current assets [#75] -change in current liabilities [#104] -change in cash [#60] + change
in short-term debt [#94] - depreciation [#11]). AREV is change in revenues (# 1 ) in year I- 1 to year /. PPE is gross
i value of property, plant and equipment (#77) in year/. Using data for the period 1995-2003, we estimate the above
equation on a time-series basis for each firm. The standard deviation of the residuals for firm i is used as an estimate
of total accrual quality (TAQ). We then regress TAQ on firm size (#89). CFO scaled by total assets (#89). standard
deviation of sales revenue (#1), operating cycle (i.e., the sum of accounts receivable days and inventory days
[based on #1. #4, #63, #66]), and the number of years with negative earnings (#32). We use the predicted values
from the second regression as a measure of innate accrual quality (IAQ) where high values of IAQ indicate poor
innate accrual quality.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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variables and that they provide explanatory power that is incremental to Legal and the other
control variables.
For the control variables, all are significant and correctly signed except for Legal and
1AQ. Thus, voluntary disclosure, whether measured based on quantity only (VDisc) or
quantity and quality (VDiscQ), is positively related to growth, firm size, capital intensity,
leverage, ROA, and analyst following. This is consistent with most of the prior research. On
the other hand. Legal is not significant in either model. Thus, other things equal, voluntary
disclosures do not differ between common-and civil-law-country firms. This is contrary to
Jaggi and Low (2000) and Hope (2003b) who find that disclosures are higher in common-
law countries. However, both of these studies use the CIFAR ratings which include
mandatory and voluntary disclosures so their results may be capturing differences in
mandatory disclosures across countries. Including mandatory disclosures in the index is
inappropriate because mandatory disclosures and legal origin will be highly correlated
since mandatory disclosures reflect accounting standards and common-law countries have
more rigorous accounting standards. Also, our results are different from Francis et al.
(2008) who find that IAQ is more highly related to their voluntary disclosure measure than
their control variables which include firm size, growth, analyst following, and ROA. 18
5.3. Additional analyses for legal environment
We consider whether our results are sensitive to the way we measure legal environment.
As mentioned above, we use two alternative measures for legal environment, i.e., a measure
of investor protection from Leuz et al. (2003) and a measure of securities law enforcement
from Bushman and Piotroski (2006). Table 7 provides the results. For Table 7, panel A, we
code investor protection {InrPro) equal to two if the firm's home country is in Leuz et al.
(2003) high investor protection cluster, equal to one if the firm's home country is in their
medium investor protection cluster, and equal to zero if the firm's home country is in their
low investor protection cluster. The results are similar to our main results. Whether we use
VDisc or VDiscQ, Global is positive and significant which supports HI, and
Global *InvPro is negative and significant which supports H2.
For Table 7, panel B, we code securities law enforcement (SecLaw) equal to one if a
firm's home country is listed as a high securities law-enforcement country using data
provided in Bushman and Piotroski (2006, Appendix 2). Our results are again similar to the
main results. Both H 1 and H2 are supported. Combined, the results in Table 7 indicate that
our results are robust to different definitions of legal environment.
We also consider the possibility that the legal environment in the firm's host country
might matter since, in addition to the home country's legal environment, the legal
One reason for the difference is that accrual quality may not be a good measure of earnings quality (Wysocki.
2005). Wysocki (2005) argues that the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure, which is used by
Francis et al. (2008), is dominated by a negative contemporaneous correlation between cash flows and accruals
and that it randomly decomposes accruals. Alternatively, it is possible that the problems Wysocki (2005) identifies
are intensified when using cross-country data, making IAQ a much noisier measure when used in an international
context (Francis et al. (2008) only examine U.S. firms).
We find the coefficient for InvPro has f-values that reach statistical significance based on two-tailed tests, but
since they are incorrectly signed, they are not significant in our one-tailed tests.
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Table 8
Regression results controlling for legal em ironment in primary host country
Variables VDisc VDiscQ
Intercept 0.766 1.41 0.634 0.59
HI. Global (+) 0.287 2,3** 0.483 1.86**
Legal (+1 0.067 0.38 -0.231 -0.66
H2. Global * Legal (-) 0.408 -2.56*** -1.096 -3.50***
IAQ(-) -0.313 0.03 3.999 0.23
InBM (+) 0.190 2.23** 0.411 2.45***
InMVE (+) 0.307 4.83*** 0.583 4.67***
Caplnt (+) 0.991
y in*** 2.432 3.96***
Lev (+) 1.333 2.40*** 2 47M 2.2'***
ROA( + ) 2.043 2.17** 4059 2.19***
Analysts (+) 0.011 1.36* 0.029 1.82**
Host (+) 0.126 0.74 0.463 1.39*
n 643 643
Adjusted Br i) 202 0.210
/•"-statistic 15.79*** 16.55***
This table provides estimates from the regression ofvoluntary disclosure on globalization, legal environment, the
interaction of globalization and legal environment, and control variables. The results in columns 2 and 3 are based
on a model where VDisc is the dependent variable. The results in columns 3 and 4 are based on a model where
VDiscQ is the dependent variable. All variables, except Global and Host, are defined in Table 3. Global is defined
in Table 4. Host is defined as:
Host = one, if firm is cross-listed in at least one common-law country; zero, otlieru ise
*. **. and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and l°o levels, respectively (one-tailed).
environment in the host country may have an impact on voluntary disclosures as well. To
examine this, we include an additional control variable, Host, which captures the legal
environment in the firm's host country (or countries). Host is equal to one if a firm is cross-
listed in at least one common-law country and zero otherwise. Thus, this variable controls
for the possibility that a strong legal environment in the host country could be driving our
results.
Table 8 contains these results. When VDisc is the dependent variable. Host is not
significant. When VDiscQ is the dependent variable. Host is positive and significant at the
0.10 level. Thus, this suggests that while the host country's legal environment does not
affect the level of voluntary disclosures, it does have a positive impact on the quality of
those disclosures. More importantly, our results for H 1 and H2 are unchanged when Host is
included. Thus, controlling for Host, we continue to find that voluntary disclosures increase
as the firm becomes more global and that this increase is more pronounced for firms based
in civil-law countries.
5.4. Robustness checks
We conduct additional robustness checks. First, we include an additional control
variable for a U.S. listing since FList does not differentiate between U.S. and other foreign
listings. There is a considerable literature that examines the effects of cross-listing in the
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United States (e.g., Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Lang, and Lundholn, 1993; Lang et al..
2003; Doidge, 2004), and Khanna et al. (2004) find that a U.S. listing is positively related to
the S&P's disclosure ratings for their sample of non-U. S. firms. Thus, we examine whether
our globalization variable is simply proxying for a U.S. -listing effect. Second, to consider
whether our results are driven by unspecified industry factors, we estimate Eq. (3) with
fixed industry effects. Third, because financial firms have different disclosures from non-
financial firms and because their disclosures are highly regulated, we re-run our tests with
the financial firms omitted. Our results for these analyses (untabulated) are qualitatively the
same as our main results. Fourth, we noted before that over 40% of the sample is composed
of U.K. firms (25%) and Canadian (15.1%). Thus, it is possible that our results might be
driven by country effects involving one or both of these countries. Thus, we estimate
models based on two reduced samples, one where we delete the U.K. firms and one where
we delete both the U.K. and Canadian firms. Again, our results are similar to the prior
results; even with 40.1% of the sample omitted, we continue to find support for HI and
H2.20 Fifth, since our dependent variables are positive by design and are constrained to a
specific range, it is possible that the assumption of normality may be violated. If so, our
OLS estimates may be inconsistent and inefficient. We find our results (untabulated) are
robust when we estimate our main models using Tobit.
6. Conclusion
This study uses hand-collected data on disclosures and foreign activity for a sample of
643 non-U. S. firms from 30 countries. We find that voluntary disclosures are positively
related to the degree of globalization and are negatively related to the interaction between
globalization and the legal environment in the firm's home country. Our research suggests
that globalization is an important variable that has been largely overlooked by prior cross-
country studies that examine the effects of country-level institutions. This has significant
implications for future research since firms are becoming increasingly global and markets
are becoming more integrated.
Our results indicate that the effects of globalization are most pronounced for firms from
weak legal environments. There are two non-mutually exclusive explanations. First,
globalization can increase the benefits of disclosure by exposing firms from weaker legal
environments to new markets where disclosure is more highly valued. Second, as firms
from these countries globalize, they need to provide better disclosures to build trust and
enhance their reputation. That is, because users unfamiliar with the firm may have concerns
about the weak laws and institutions in the firm's home country and the poorer quality of its
financial reporting, firms from weak legal environments have incentives to provide better
disclosure to alleviate these concerns as they become more international.
We offer a few caveats. Most notably, our sample is biased toward long-lived surviving
firms that report in English. This affects the generalizability of our results. Further, because
ot the labor intensity of collecting the data, we only can provide evidence from one period.
As a result, we cannot be sure that our results are not time-specific. Finally, even though we
We also examine the effect of countries with small representations by re-estimating our models with countries
with five or fewer firms omitted. Our results are qualitatively unchanged.
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conduct extensive searches, we cannot be certain that every item in our voluntary disclosure
index is voluntary in every country in our sample.
Our research could be extended in several ways. First, our design could be extended to
other types of investor-focused communications such as media releases or conference calls.
Second, using a time-series analysis would help develop a stronger causal link between
globalization and voluntary disclosures. Third, if finer proxies can be developed, one could
explore the relative effects of capital, product, and labor market involvement on voluntary
disclosures. Fourth, and perhaps most important, globalization could be included in other
tests that use cross-country differences in legal environment as an explanatory variable. For
example, it would be worth examining whether accounting properties such as conservatism
are a function of both legal environment and globalization
Acknowledgements
We thank Eric Press, Robert Knechel, David Emanuel, and Jilnaught Wong and the
seminar participants at the University of Auckland for their helpful comments. We also
thank Winnie Tse for providing valuable research assistance. Funding assistance was
provided by The University ofAuckland Business School. The views presented in the paper
are those of the authors and, in particular, do not represent the views of KPMG.
References
Ahearn, A., Griever. W„ & Warnock. F. (2004). Information cost and home bias: An analysis of U.S. holdings of
foreign equities. Journal of International Economics, 62. 313-336.
Ashbaugh. H
. & Pincus. M. (2001 ). Domestic accounting standards, international accounting standards, and the
predictability of earnings. Journal ofAccounting Research. 39. 4 1 7-434.
Ball. R.. Kothan. S. P., & Robin. A. (2000). The effects of international institutional factors on properties of
accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 29. 1-51
Ball. R
.
Robin, A., & Wu, J. S. (2003). Incentives versus standards: Properties of accounting income in four East
Asian countries. Journal o) Accounting and Economics, 36, 235-270.
Bamber. L, & Cheon. Y. (1998). Discretionary management earnings forecast disclosures: Antecedents and outcomes
associated with forecast venue and forecast specificity c choices. Journal of Accounting Research. 36. 167-190.
Botosan, C. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review, 72, 323-349.
Bowen. R. DuCharme. L., & Shores, D. (19951 Stakeholders' implicit claims and accounting method choice.
Journal ofAccounting and Economics. 20. 255—295.
Bradshaw, M.. Bushee. B
.
& Miller. G. (2004). Accounting choice, home bias, and U.S. investment in non-U.S.
firms. Journal ofAccounting Research. 42. 795-841.
Bushee, B. (2004). Discussion of disclosure practices of foreign companies interacting with U.S. markets. Journal
ofAccounting Research, 42, 509-525.
Bushee, B
, & Leuz. C. (2005). Economic consequences of SEC disclosure regulation: Evidence from the OTC
bulletin board. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 39, 233—264.
Bushman, R
.
& Piotroski, J. (2006). Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting: The influences of
legal and political institutions. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 42, 107-148.
Bushman. R., Piotroski. J., & Smith, A. (2004). What determines corporate transparency? Journal ofAccounting
Research. 42, 207-25 1
.
Callen. J., Hope. O. -K., & Segal. D. (2005). Domestic and foreign earnings, stock return variability, and the impact
of investor sophistication Journal ofAccounting Research, 43, 377-412.
Cahan. S. F.. Rahman. A. R , & Perera. H. (2005). Global diversification and corporate disclosure. Journal of
International Accounting Research, 4. 73-93.
244 K.A. Webb et al. / The International Journal oj Animating 43 (2008) 219-245
Chan. K.
.
Covig, V, & Ng, L. (2005). What determines the domestic bias and foreign bias? Evidence from mutual
fund equity allocations worldwide. Journal of Finance, 60, 1495-1534.
Dechow, P., & Dichev, I. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors The
Accounting Review, 77, 35-59 Supplement.
Doidge. C. (2004). U.S. cross-listings and the private benefits of control: Evidence from dual-class firms. Journal
ofFinancial Economics, 72, 519-553.
Dumev, A. & Kim. E. (2005). To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment, and valuation. Journal of
Finance. 60. 1461-1493.
Duru, A.. & Reeb, D. M. (2002). International diversification and analysts' forecast accuracy and bias. The
Accounting Review, 77, 415-433.
Dye, R. (1986). Proprietary and non-proprietary disclosures Journal ofBusiness, 59, 331-336.
Francis, J., Khurana. I., & Pereira, R. (2005). Disclosure incentives and effects of cost of capital around the world.
The Accounting Renew, SO. 1 125- 1 162
Francis, J., La Fond, R , Olsson, P., & Schipper, K. (2005). The market pricing of accruals qualify. Journal of
I, , ounting ami Economics, 39, 295-327.
Francis, J.. Nanda, D., & Olsson, P. (2008). Voluntary disclosure, information quality, and cost of capital. Journal
q) Accounting Research, 46, 53-99.
Gray, S., Meek. G„ & Roberts, C. ( 1 995 ). International capital market pressures and voluntary annual report disclosure by
U.S. and U.K. multinationals Journal of International financial Management & Accounting, 6, 43-68.
Grossman, S., & Hart, O. ( 1980). Disclosure laws and takeover bids. Journal of Finance, 35, 323-334.
Guo, R. J., Lev, B., & Zhou, N. (2004). Competitive costs of disclosures of biotech IPOs. Journal ofAccounting
Research, 42, 319-355.
Hope, O. K. (2003). Disclosure practices, enforcement of accounting standards, and analysts' forecast accuracy:
An international study. Journal ofAccounting Research, 41. 235-272.
Hope. O K (2003) Finn-level disclosures and the relative roles of culture and legal origin. Journal of
International Financial Management anil Accounting. 14. 218-248.
Hung, M. (2001). Accounting standards and value relevance of financial statements: An international analysis.
Journal of Accounting and Economics. 30, 401-420.
Jaggi, B., & Low, P. Y. (2000). Impact of culture, market forces, and the legal system on financial disclosures.
International Journal oj Accounting. 35. 495-519.
Kang, J., & Stulz, R. (1997). Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio equity ownership in Japan.
Journal of Financial Economics. 46. 3-28.
Khanna. T, Palepu. K. G
.
& Srinivasan, S. (2004). Disclosure practices of foreign companies interacting with US.
markets Journal ofAccounting Research. 42. 475-508.
Kothari. S.. Leone. A., & Wasley, C. (2005). Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 39. 163-197.
La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Visliny. R. (1997). Legal determinants of external finance.
Journal of Finance. 52. 1131-1150.
La Porta, R
,
Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny. R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political
Economy, 106. 1113-1155.
La Porta. R
,
Lopez-de-Silanes. F., & Shleifer, A. (2006). What works in securities law'.' Journal of Finance, 61,
1-32
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993), Cross-sectional determinants of analysts ratings of corporate disclosures.
Journal ofAccounting Research, 31, 246-271.
Lang, M., Raedy, J., & Yetman. M. (2003). How representative are firms that are cross-listed in the United States?
An analysis of accounting quality. Journal o/ Accounting Research, 41, 363-396.
Leuz, C, Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P D. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: An international
comparison. Journal of Financial Economics. 69, 505-527.
Leuz. C, & Verrecchia, R. (2000). The economic consequences of increased disclosure Journal of Accounting
Research. 3,S. 91-124 Supplement.
McKinsey & Co. (2002). Global investor opinion survey: Key findings. Retrieved from: http://www.mckinsey.
com'clientsenice/oiganizationleadership/service/corpgovernance/pdf/ GlobalInvestorOpinionSurvey2002.pdf
McNichols, M. (2002). Discussion of The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors.
The hamming Review. 77, 61-69 Supplement.
K.A Webb et al The International Journal o) Accounting 43 (2008) 219-245 245
Merlon. R. (1987). A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information- Journal of
Finance. 42, 483-510.
Milgrom, P. (1981). Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. Bell Journal of
Economics, 72,380-391.
Reese. W„ & Weisbach, M. (2002). Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in the United States.
and subsequent equity offerings. Journal ofFinancial Economics. 6ft. 65-104.
Thomas, W. (1999). A test of the market's mispricing of domestic and foreign earnings Journal ofAccounting and
Economics. 28. 243-267.
Verrechia. R. ( 1983). Discretionary disclosure. Journal oj Accounting and Economics. 5. 365-380.
Wysocki. P.. (2005). Assessing earnings and accruals quality: U.S. and international evidence. Working paper, MIT
Sloan School of Management.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
C/-j/aj-|/-pD[|-pi~|- International
"*-cl-" 1
Journal of
ELSEVIER The International Journal of Accounting 43 (2008) 246-267
The
ri
Accounting
Capitalization ofR&D costs and earnings management:
Evidence from Italian listed companies
Garen Markarian 3 , Lorenzo Pozza
b
,
Annalisa Prencipe b *
" Department of Accounting Finance and Management Control. Instituto de Empresa, Spain
b
Universita L. Bocconi, Accounting Department, Via Rontgen 1-20136 Milan. Italy
Abstract
The capitalization of research and development (R&D) costs is a controversial accounting issue
because of the contention that such capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings.
Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, this study examines whether companies' decisions to
capitalize R&D costs are affected by earnings-management motivations. Italy provides a natural
context for testing our hypothesized relationships because Italian GAAP allows for the capitalization
of R&D costs. Using a Tobit regression model to test our hypotheses, we show that companies tend
to use cost capitalization for earnings-smoothing purposes. The hypothesis that firms capitalize R&D
costs to reduce the risk of violating debt covenants is not supported.
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1. Introduction
In the current era of globalization, a highly relevant issue facing regulators, academics,
and practitioners is the determination of an appropriate accounting treatment for research
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and development (R&D) costs. International Accounting Standards discuss accounting for
R&D costs in IAS No. 38 "Intangible Assets" (IASB, 2004a,b). Paragraph 54 of this
standard states that no intangible asset arising from research (or from the research phase of
an internal project) shall be recognized as an asset; and that research expenses shall be
expensed in the income statement when they are incurred. Concerning development costs,
paragraph 57 states that an intangible asset arising from development (or from the
development phase of an internal project) shall be recognized if, and only if, an entity can
demonstrate all of the following: (a) the technical feasibility of completing the intangible
asset so that it will be available for use or sale; (b) its intention to complete the intangible
asset and use or sell it; (c) its ability to use or sell the intangible asset; (d) how the intangible
asset will generate probable future economic benefits; (e) the availability of adequate
technical, financial, and other resources to complete the development and to use or sell the
intangible asset; and (f) its ability to measure reliably the expenditure attributable to the
intangible asset during its development. Although IAS 38 allows companies to capitalize
development costs, the inherent subjectivity of the validation process permits management
to exercise discretion in deciding whether the conditions of IAS 38 have been satisfied. In
essence, IAS 38 gives management considerable flexibility regarding the treatment of
development costs.
US GAAP takes a stricter approach to the issue. SFAS No. 2—Accounting for Research
and Development Costs (FASB, 1974)—requires that all R&D expenditures be expensed in
the current period. The only exception to the full expensing rule is stated in SFAS No. 86.
The exception relates to the capitalization of software development costs (FASB, 1985). At
the international level, certain national accounting standards (e.g., those of Italy) allow
flexibility for the capitalization ofR&D costs when some conditions are satisfied. These are
conditions similar to those required by IAS.
The capitalization of R&D costs has always been a controversial accounting issue.
Supporters of capitalization report results suggesting that R&D is a long-lived asset that
influences future profitability (e.g., Bublitz & Ettredge, 1989; Sougiannis, 1994; Ballester,
Garcia-Ayuso, & Livnat, 2003). Also, R&D costs are positively related to market value
(Hirschey & Weygandt, 1985; Shevlin. 1991; Sougiannis, 1994) and yield value-relevant
information to investors (e.g., Aboody & Lev, 1998; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Healy, Myers,
& Howe, 2002; Monahan, 2005).
Supporters of expensing are fewer. They stress the lack of reliable evidence of future
economic benefits (e.g., FASB, 1974; AIMR, 1993; Kothan, Laguerre. & Leone, 2002) or
refer to the benefits of consistency and comparability, pointing out that such benefits trump
the costs identified by the supporters of capitalization. Additionally, reliability and the risk
of earnings-management policies are underscored by supporters of the most conservative
accounting treatment. In particular, expensing is preferable to capitalization because it
increases the objectivity of financial statements. That is, it eliminates the opportunity for
managers to capitalize costs of projects that have low probabilities of success or to delay
impairment of R&D assets (Nelson, Elliott, Tarpley, & Tarpley, 2003; Schilit, 2002).
The debate surrounding the most effective accounting method for R&D costs supplements
other literature that examines the trade-off between relevance (i.e., the predictive ability) and
reliability (i.e., the representative faithfulness) of accounting information (FASB. 1980;
AICPA, 1994; IASB, 2004a,b). Thus far, empirical research on R&D costs has focused mainly
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on the relevance side of the trade-off, while little has been written about the reliability side that
is, the possibility that R&D costs are subject to earnings management.
However, a few studies have indeed shown that R&D expenditures are subject to real
earnings management. In short, this means that companies cut their R&D investments in
order to achieve their earnings goals (e.g., Perry & Grinaker, 1994; Bushee, 1998; Mande,
File. & Kwak, 2000). But there is still a paucity of research that explores the motives behind
the accounting treatment ofR&D costs within a setting where flexibility is allowed. Testing
whether companies engage in earnings management through R&D cost accounting can
significantly contribute to the debate around the best treatment for such costs. This debate
has recently been raised within the convergence project by US GAAP and IAS/IFRS.
Illustrating that R&D cost capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings
would support the current U.S. GAAP position, which does not allow the capitalization of
such costs. On the contrary, showing that companies do not use R&D cost accounting for
earnings-management purposes would support the approach now stated by IAS/IFRS, in
which capitalization is allowed under certain conditions.
This study contributes to this debate by providing empirical evidence on the motivations
for R&D cost capitalization. We hypothesize that the decision to capitalize R&D
expenditures is related to two primary motivations: income smoothing and debt contracting.
We test our hypotheses using a sample of firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange.
Multivariate results indicate that firms use capitalization of R&D costs to smooth earnings,
while there is no support for the debt-covenant hypothesis. These results are robust within a
variety of firm characteristics, such as firm size, risk, opportunities for growth, profitability,
governance characteristics, industrial membership, and time control.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces accounting in Italy and the
institutional background relating to R&D accounting. Section 3 discusses the previous
literature. Section 4 presents the hypotheses and is followed by the research methods in
Section 5. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes the study.
2. R&D accounting in Italy
Italian accounting regulation has always allowed for some flexibility in the capitalization
ofR&D costs. This allowance is similar to that of IAS. Accounting for intangibles, including
R&D costs, is regulated by Principio Contabile n. 24 (Accounting Standard No. 24). This
standard distinguishes three different types of R&D costs as follows:
1
)
"Basic research," which consists of studies, surveys, and experiments that do not refer to
a specific project; this type ofR&D cost is normally carried out for the general utility of
a company (e.g., market research, updating, etc.);
2) "Applied research," which consists of studies, surveys, and experiments that refer to
specific projects; and
3) "Development," which consists of the application of research results to specific
materials, tools, products, and processes preceding production.
The costs for basic research are to be expensed in the income statement. However, costs
related to applied R&D can be capitalized if the following conditions are met: a) the costs
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refer to a project for the realization of a clearly defined product or process; b) the costs are
identifiable and measurable: c) the project to which the costs refer is technically feasible; d)
the company owns the necessary resources to complete and exploit the project; and e) the
costs are recoverable through the revenues generated by exploiting the project.
It is evident that the conditions stated by the Italian accounting standards are similar to
those stated by IAS for development costs. In fact, the definition of applied research under
Italian standards also fits into the definition of development costs provided by IAS 38. The
Italian standards differ from IAS in that they do not require R&D capitalization when the
abovementioned conditions occur, leaving flexibility in the hands of the companies.
However, this difference is more formal than substantive. Given the subjectivity in
assessing the occurrence of some of the conditions, it seems that, even under IAS,
companies that prefer immediate expensing can easily justify this approach—even when
the aforementioned conditions are met.
Concerning the amortization ofR&D costs, the Italian accounting standards require that
the amortization be carried out over a period of no longer than five years beginning from the
moment the outcome (product or process) is ready to be used. The Italian Civil Code (art.
2426) states that the capitalization of R&D costs shall be authorized by the collegio
sindacale (statutory auditors) and that it is not possible to pay dividends until there are
enough retained earnings to cover the carrying amount of the capitalized R&D costs. This
stipulation limits the incentive to capitalize R&D costs for the purpose of increasing the
amount of dividends paid. The Civil Code also requires that R&D activities be discussed in
the relazione sulla gestione (management discussion and analysis section); however, there
is no clear requirement as to what quantitative or qualitative disclosures should be relayed
with regard to the capitalization of R&D costs. Finally, the Civil Code states that
information regarding the amortization schedules of such R&D costs be provided in the
explanatory notes of the financial statements.
3. Earnings management and specific accruals
Earnings management is defined as a "purposeful intervention in the external financial-
reporting process, with the intent ofobtaining some private gain" (Schipper. 1989, p. 92). In
generally accepted terms, earnings management occurs "when managers use judgment in
financial-reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to
influence contracUial outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers" (Healy &
Wahlen. 1999, p. 368).
The large amount of research carried out thus far indicates that managers exercise
discretion and manage earnings using a wide variety of methods, ranging from carrying out
special transactions (so-called real earnings management) to the manipulation of accruals.
Several of the main incentives for earnings management include debt covenants, bonus
plans, and income smoothing. The debt-covenant hypothesis suggests that managers have
an incentive to manage earnings in order to avoid violating covenants in debt contracts,
which are typically stated in terms of accounting numbers or ratios. The bonus-plan
hypothesis suggests that managers manage earnings in order to maximize compensation.
Healy ( 1985) shows that managers tend to reduce earnings if they fall either above or below
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bonus-plan bounds. In contrast, they tend to increase earnings when they fall between the
two bounds. Finally, the income-smoothing hypothesis suggests that firms aspire to reduce
earnings fluctuations.
Empirical earnings-management studies find support for the abovementioned motives in
a variety of contexts. Many of these studies test the relationship between aggregate accruals
and incentives for earnings management (e.g., Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991;
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). As an alternative approach, other studies focus on
single items, suggesting that income from specific accruals is related in a systematic way to
earnings-management incentives. Among these latter studies, McNichols and Wilson
(1988) show that companies manage their bad-debt provisions according to the bonus-plan
hypothesis (Healy, 1985). Zucca and Campbell (1992) examine discretionary asset write-
downs, showing that companies use these accruals either for "big bath" strategies or for
earnings smoothing. Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) confirm that earnings-manage-
ment incentives play a significant role in explaining goodwill write-offs and restructuring
charges. Other studies focus on allowances for deferred taxes (e.g.. Miller & Skinner, 1998;
Schrand & Wong, 2003). These studies provide mixed results. Finally, Dowdell and Press
(2004) analyze the in-process R&D write-offs, but they do not find evidence to support their
bonus-plan hypothesis.
In line with the aforementioned studies on earnings management and specific accruals,
this study aims at testing whether the decision to capitalize or to expense R&D costs (when
flexibility exists) is affected by earnings-management motives.
4. Hypotheses development
Previous research investigates three main incentives for earnings management: earnings
smoothing, debt covenant, and bonus-plan incentives. In this study, we focus on the first
two since disclosure of data on the existence and structure of bonus plans by Italian
companies is limited. 1
The income-smoothing hypothesis suggests that a manager's accounting discretion is
driven by his or her desire to reduce income-stream variability (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995).
The process of smoothing serves to moderate year-to-year fluctuations in income by
shifting earnings from peak years to less successful periods. This process lowers the peaks
and makes earnings fluctuations less volatile (Copeland, 1968).
Income smoothing has been viewed both as a positive strategy, whereby managers
transmit private information to investors (e.g., Gordon, 1964; Beidleman, 1973; Ronen &
Sadan, 1981; Tucker & Zarowin, 2006), and as a manipulative practice driven by
opportunistic aims (Gordon, 1964; Imhoff, 1977; Kamin & Ronen, 1978). In this study, we
do not intend to argue for either one of these two views. Rather, we test whether R&D cost
capitalization is used for purposes of earnings smoothing.
Several explanations for earnings smoothing have been posited by prior studies. Some of
these explanations are related to capital-market incentives. Several authors suggest that
since current earnings are used as predictors for future earnings, managers have an incentive
Under the Ilalian regulation, companies have to provide only very general and aggregate figures regarding
executive compensation—hence our inability to examine this potentially interesting incentive.
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to smooth income as a signalling technique in order to deliver private information to the
market (Ronen & Sadan, 1981; Chaney & Lewis, 1995; Hunt, Moyer, & Shevlin, 1996).
Other authors stress that a primary motivation for earnings smoothing is to reduce perceived
risk by investors. Earnings variability is interpreted as an important measure of the overall
risk of a firm and has a direct effect on investors' capitalization rates—and thus has an
adverse effect on the value of a firm's shares (e.g., Wang & Williams, 1994; Barth,
Landsman, & Wahlen, 1995; Gebhardt, Lee, & Swaminathan, 2001).
Other explanations for income smoothing have been related to the existence of contracts
linked to accounting numbers. Trueman and Titman (1988) suggest that income smoothing
practices reduce debtholders' perceptions of a firm's risk of bankruptcy, and thereby
translate into a lower cost of capital for the firm. Political costs are also considered to be an
important motivation for earnings smoothing (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Wong, 1988;
Cahan, 1992; Godfrey & Jones, 1999). Income smoothing averts attention from "excessive"
high earnings that might attract adverse political attention. It also avoids concerns which
arise from low operating profits. Such concerns could come from employees concerned
about future employment prospects, from suppliers and customers assessing future stability,
or from governments that are investigating unviable industries.
Another primary explanation for earnings smoothing has been related to managers'
compensation and concerns over job security. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) predict that
income smoothing occurs because the manager boosts the reported income in bad times in
order to raise the probability of keeping his job and tends to decrease reported income in
good times since "information decay" causes good current performance to be weighted less
in future performance. This expectation partially contradicts Healy's (1985) hypothesis on
bonus plans, according to which managers tend to decrease earnings (i.e., "take a big bath")
when they are below the lower bound stated by the plans. However, more recent empirical
studies have contradicted the validity of Healy's hypothesis (Gaver, Gaver, & Austin, 1995;
Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995; Dowdell & Press, 2004), 2 suggesting that the
existence of bonus plans does not significantly affect the earnings-smoothing incentive.
The empirical evidence provided so far generally supports the existence of earnings
smoothing (e.g., Ronen & Sadan, 1981; Moses, 1987; Young, 1998; Chaney, Jeter, &
Lewis, 1998; Buckmaster, 2001). For empirical purposes, the income-smoothing
hypothesis has usually been characterized as the propensity of managers to choose
accounting policies that increase (decrease) reported earnings when current period pre-
managed earnings are below (above) the profitability measure of prior years. Consistent
with earlier studies ( Bamea, Ronen, & Sadan, 1 976; Moses, 1987; Godfrey & Jones, 1 999 ),
we use operating profitability as the income-smoothing target.
While there is general support for the hypothesis that companies use accruals to smooth
earnings, there is no clear evidence about the use of R&D cost capitalization for such
purpose. However, a survey by Nelson et al. (2003) shows that cost capitalization is one of
the most common earnings-management strategies. Therefore, we expect companies tend
toward the capitalization of more R&D costs when their operating profitability (before
For possible explanations regarding the lack of empirical support of the bonus-plan hypothesis, see Dechow
and Schrand (2004).
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R&D capitalization)3 is below the level of the past years, while they tend toward expensing
R&D costs when their operating profitability is above the level of that of past years. We
formulate the following hypothesis:
H 1 . There is a negative relationship between change in firm profitability and R&D capitalization.
The second hypothesis is based on implications of the literature regarding agency theory
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This literature suggests that contracts between debtholders and
owner-managers contain covenants restricting management behavior in order to prevent actions
from being taken that may negatively affect the debtholders' wealth position. Many such debt
agreements rely on the accounting numbers. To the extent that the accounting standards allow
flexibility in the choice of accounting methods, managers have an opportunity to choose those
procedures that allow them to avoid violating restrictive debt covenants—specifically methods
that increase income. Even if default cannot be avoided by manipulation of accounting
information, managers are still expected to make asset- and income-increasing accounting
choices in the hope ofimproving their bargaining position in the event ofrenegotiation (DeFond
& Jiambalvo, 1994). Extant empirical evidence on the debt-covenant hypothesis is mixed (e.g.,
,
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1994: Sweeney, 1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994).
The most frequently used proxy to test the debt-covenant hypothesis is the leverage ratio
(e.g.. Hunt, 1985: El Gazzar, Lilien. & Pastena, 1986; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986;
,
Rusbarsky, 1988). A number of studies are specifically dedicated to test whether the
leverage ratio is able to reliably proxy for debt-covenants tightness (Duke & Hunt, 1990;
Press & Weintrop. 1990). The majority of these studies support the use of the leverage ratio. !
The debt-covenant hypothesis suggests that managers ofmore leveraged companies have
,
stronger incentives to make income-increasing accounting decisions, e.g.—in our case—to
capitalize more R&D costs. Such capitalization "loosens" debt-covenant restrictions in two
ways. First, if debt covenants are based on measures of profitability, then capitalization will
increase earnings. Second, if the debt covenant is based on the ratio of total debt to assets,
then capitalization will lower this ratio. Of course, this is true under the assumption that
lenders do not adjust a firm's earnings and total assets by excluding the effects of the
capitalization (Duke & Hunt, 1990). Thus, our second hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H2. There is a positive relationship between a company's financial leverage and its R&D
capitalization.
5. Research methodology
5.1. Sample selection
Under Italian disclosure rules, all firms that undertake R&D activities during a fiscal
year have an obligation to report such activities in the management's discussion and
B> "before R&D capitalization." we mean before the effects ofthe capitalized R&D costs, net ofthe related amortization.
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analysis section (MD&A) of their annual reports. Therefore, we searched the annual reports
of all non-financial firms listed on the Borsa Valori di Milano (Milan Stock Exchange) that
disclosed R&D activities for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. We hand-collected and
analyzed the original financial statements since electronic databases did not report all the
information required for our analysis.
4
Unfortunately, even using the original documents,
we were unable to collect the complete set of information needed. This was because many
companies did not specify the amount of total R&D expenditures or R&D capitalization, or
they provided only aggregate data for R&D and advertising expenditures. 5 We found a total
of 130 firm-years that disclosed data needed for our statistical analysis across the sample
period (43, 43, and 44 firms for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively). In our
regression model (discussed in section 6.2), we require lagged data to be available for each
firm. Hence, in our statistical tests, we use 86 observations related to 43 unique firms.
5.2. Variables
For each firm in our sample, we calculated a number of variables to be used in the
statistical tests. Our variable of interest is the R&D capitalization variable. Capitalization,
which is calculated as total R&D capitalization (net of the yearly depreciation) divided by
the total assets of the firm.'
1
To test our first hypothesis, we use ChROA, which is the change
in return on assets over the average of the previous two fiscal years. Later, we also report
results on a simple year-to-year change in ROA. 7 What we test is whether the accounting
treatment ofR&D is used—in conjunction with other techniques—to reach earnings goals.
To test our second hypothesis (i.e., the relationship between firm debt and
Capitalization), we calculated Leverage, which is a firm's total debt divided by total
assets (calculated before the effect of R&D capitalization). Additionally, in order to
examine the effects of earnings-management incentives on capitalized R&D costs, we
included in our statistical tests a number of control variables that had previously been linked
to R&D capitalization (see Aboody & Lev, 1998). Our first control variable is the total
amount of R&D expenditures undertaken by the firm divided by total assets in the current
fiscal year, R&Dtotal. It is reasonable to expect a relationship between the amount of total
We could not collect data prior to 2001 since full annual reports for most Italian companies are available only
for the last five years.
" According to Italian law. capitalized R&D costs and advertising costs are included on the same item in the
legal balance sheet format.
The choice of total assets as a deflator is due to a number of reasons. First, it provides for a direct relationship to
firm leverage (a variable of interest in this study); it also is in line with other earnings-management studies, as the
original Jones ( 1 99 1 ) study deflates accruals by total assets. A possible alternative could be deflating by income in
order to provide a clearer relationship with firm earnings. However, this tactic would require the exclusion of firm-
years with negative earnings, which could bias the results. Finally, to deflate by total R&D expenditures is not
theoretically desirable, since a firm that capitalizes a large (small) percentage of its R&D might lead to no significant
(a large) impact on earnings. An example of this is large, non R&D intensive firms capitalizing most of their R&D
expenditures. In this case, the percentage of R&D capitalized would be high while impact on earnings would be
small. Later, we include the total expenditures in R&D as a control variable in our model.
In the calculation of ChROA, current ROA is assumed "pre-managed" (that is to say, the ROA before the
effects of R&D capitalization). We are aware that companies use several earnings management mechanisms (not
solely R&D cost capitalization) in order to reach their goals. Therefore, we do not assume that our "pre-managed"
ROA is unaffected by other earnings-management policies.
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R&D investments undertaken by the firm and the amount of capitalization. On one side, the
higher a firm's total R&D investments, the higher the probability that a larger portion of the
undertaken R&D meets the conditions stated by the standards. But it should be pointed out
that the standards allow flexibility in this decision—even when all the above-mentioned
conditions are present. Moreover, for companies undertaking a large number ofR&D projects
(which companies are typically those that have a higher R&Dtotal), checking whether the
conditions required by the standards are met is more difficult than for companies undertaking
only a few small projects. Therefore, we included R&Dtotal as a control variable—without
having any ex ante prediction concerning its relationship to Capitalization.
Our second control variable is related to the profitability of the firm. Current profitability
can be considered an indirect control for the existence of the economic resources necessary
to complete and exploit the project. It should be pointed out, however, that the relationship
between current profitability and the extent of the capitalization of R&D costs can be at
least partially affected by earnings-management purposes. Companies can be motivated to
capitalize R&D costs when their current profitability is either negative or low in order to
improve their accounting performance. Similarly, companies with high profitability can be
motivated to expense R&D costs in order to reduce political costs. These two effects
suggest a negative relationship between current profitability and the level of R&D cost
capitalization. On the other hand, current profitability can also be considered a proxy for
expected future profitability (see McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Francis et al., 1996; Miller &
Skinner, 1998). Expected future-operating profitability can be considered a strong rationale
for the company to successfully recover its capitalized costs. We expect that the higher the
future profitability, the higher the probability that the last condition required by the
accounting standards—that companies can recoup the capitalization through expected
increases in revenues—will be met. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between
future-operating profitability and the extent of capitalized R&D costs. In order to control for
all these effects, we introduced ROA as a control variable of a firm's profitability, measured
as the firm's operating income (before R&D capitalization) divided by the firm's total assets.
We use firm size as a control for firm visibility, political costs and media attention (Watts
& Zimmerman, 1986; Bhushan, 1994). We proxy for firm size by calculating the natural
logarithmic form of the firm's total assets, Logassets. We also control for the materiality of
the capitalization by calculating High-Capitalizer: a dummy variable equal to one if the
amount capitalized (normalized by the absolute value of earnings) is above the median for
capitalizing firms. Moreover, we control for the amount of capitalized R&D during the prior
year by calculating LagCapitalization, 8 which is equal to Capitalization of the prior year. 9
Not controlling for the prior year's capitalization represents a serious, correlated, omitted
variable. Therefore, in our statistical analysis, we eliminated all firms that do not have
capitalization data for the prior year, reducing our final sample size to 86. We also
calculated MB, which is the market value of equity divided by its book value, as a control
for future growth opportunities. Beta is included in our multivariate analysis as a control for
The Durbin Watson statistic and the calculated first-order autocorrelation indicate that we do not have
problems of serial correlation between Capitalization and LagCapitalization.
Results remain unchanged if we use a I/O dummy variable.
10
For a similar treatment, see Boone, Field. Karpofif, and Raheja (2007).
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Table 1
Comparison of selected characteristics of sample firms to all firms available through Datastream for the year 2003
Sample
42
firms All firms
182
Difference
Mest
Pr>t
Wilcoxon
# Observations
Variable Mean Mean Pr>z
ROA 0.046 0.018 0.028 0.13 021
ChROA -0.060 0.008 0.068 0.45 0.68
Assets 913 mil lion 364 million 549 million 0.09 0.02
Leverage 0.624 0.631 0.007 0.82 0.84
ROA is measured as the firm's operating income divided by the total assets of the firm. ChROA is the change in
return on assets over the average of the prior two fiscal years. Assets is the total assets of die firm at fiscal year-end.
Leverage is total debt divided by total assets.
firm risk. Finally, all multivariate analyses include controls for years and for industrial
membership based on the Milan Stock Exchange classification.
6. Data analysis and results
6.1. Sample statistics, descriptives, and univariate analysis
In Table 1 , we compare our sample firms to the population of non-financial firms listed
on the Milan Stock Exchange to see whether our sample firms are biased on certain
dimensions.
We compare our sample firms for the year 2003 with all firms whose data are available
through Datastream." We see that both sample firms and control firms are of about equal
leverage, profitability, and change in profitability. The only difference is that our sample
firms are larger in size. This difference in size of sample firms is an expected occurrence, as
we are studying R&D issues. Since size is the only firm characteristic that is different
between our sample firms and the population of firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange,
and since we specifically control for firm size in our statistical tests, selection bias does not
appear to be a concern. Also, in our tests, we control for a variety of additional firm and
institutional characteristics (e.g., governance and ownership structure, firm risk and growth
opportunities, etc.).
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample of 86 firms. Mean Capitalization
is 0.19%, with 0.69% being capitalized at the final decile (ninetieth percentile). In general,
'firms spend an equivalent of2.1% of their total assets on R&D, with the largest decile being
5.2% for the most research-intensive firms. Comparing Capitalization to R&Dtotal, we find
hat firms capitalize roughly 10% of their R&D expenditures. In general, the firms are
profitable, with an average ROA of about 4.4% and with a decrease in their profitability
rom the average of the prior two years to about -4.7%. The firms are levered at about 50%,
We make comparisons for 2003 only, since including 2001 and 2002 would bias the comparisons by
xamining data across multiple years. Using Datastream data for both the sample and the other companies avoids
le risk of inconsistent calculations between the two samples. In relation to year 2003. Datastream reports data on
1
2 out of 43 sample firms and on a total of 182 firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange.
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rable 2
Descriptive statistics on selected variables
Variable Mean Median SD P10 P90
Capitalization 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.007
R&Dtotal 0.021 0.013 0.023 0.001 0.062
ROA 0.044 0.045 0.076 -0.018 0.120
ChROA -0.047 -0.046 0.061 -0.120 0.004
Leverage 512 0.559 0.157 0.281 0.714
Assets 1.33 billion 513 million 2.68 billion 62 million 67 billion
P10 (P90) signifies the tenth (ninetieth) percentile of the variable distribution. Capitalization is total R&D
capitalization (net of the yearly depreciation) divided by the total assets of the firm. R&Dtotal is the total
investment in R&D undertaken by the firm divided by total assets. ROA is measured as the firm's operating income
(before capitalization) divided by the total assets of the firm. ChROA is the change in return on assets (before
capitalization) over the average of the prior two fiscal years. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets (before
capitalization). Assets is the total assets of the firm at fiscal year-end.
indicating that debt financing is a prime source of funds. As concerns their size, the firms
are relatively large, with about 1 .3 billion euros in assets.
Since we examine R&D capitalization as a means of earnings management, we provide
descriptive statistics disaggregated by industry in Table 3. Since our sample-selection
procedure involves gathering data on all firms that report R&D activities, our sample
contains a broad representation spread across many industries. The majority of R&D
activity is conducted by new economy, electronics, and automotive firms. A smaller
amount of R&D transpires in utilities firms. In terms of capitalized R&D, the plants &:
machinery and automotive industries have larger capitalization rates as compared to the
textile industry.
1 ""
In Table 4 we conduct both parametric /-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests in order to examine differences between capitalizing and non-capitalizing firms. We
see that at the univariate level, without controlling for multivariate effects, capitalizing and
non-capitalizing firms have similar levels of change in profitability and firm size while they
have different levels of leverage. In particular, capitalizing firms are more highly levered.
R&Dtotal is larger in the non-capitalizing group (statistically significant at 0.01 and 0.10 in
the /-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively). This is an interesting observation because it
indicates that capitalization is not a simple function of a firm's R&D activities. This result,
combined with results in Table 3, suggests that alternate underlying motivations could be
involved.
Table 5 presents the table ofcorrelations (Pearson). Here, we see that ChROA is negatively
related to Capitalization, even though the level of significance is not particularly high
(P< 0.10), while Leverage shows no significant correlation. Capitalization is also not related to
R&Dtotal, and is only marginally and negatively related to Assets. The only variable showing
a significant correlation is ROA, which is negatively related to Capitalization (/><0.01). In
Inspecting Table 3 is interesting because there are two main patterns that can be observed. Examining means i
and medians, we find a large variability between industries in terms of both the R&D undertaken and the ensuing
capitalization. This finding provides confidence that our ensuing statistical analysis is not driven by industrial
patterns
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Tabic 3
Descriptive statistics on R&D capitalization variables, by industry
Industry N Variable Mean Median SD
Automotive 8 R&Dtotal 0.022 0.022 0.005
Capitalization 0.007 0.004 0.010
Chemicals 14 R&Dtotal 0.015 0.018 0.013
Capitalization 0.000 0.000 0.000
Electronics 1-4 R&Dtotal 0.024 0.019 0.023
Capitalization 001 0.000 0.002
Media 6 R&Dtotal 0.003 0.004 0.001
Capitalization 0.000 0011 0.001
Metals and oil 2 R&Dtotal 0.015 0014
Capitalization 0.006 0.007
New Economy 14 R&Dtotal 048 0.059 0.034
Capitalization 0.003 0.000 0.006
Plants and machinery 8 R&Dtotal 0.003 001 0.004
Capitalization 0.020 0.012 0.021
Textile 4 R&Dtotal 0.008 0.011 0.007
Capitalization 0000 0.000 0.000
Utilities 8 R&Dtotal 0.002 0.002 001
Capitalization 0.000 0.000 oooo
Miscellaneous 8 R&Dtotal 0.007 0.004 0.010
Capitalization 0.011 0.006 0.010
Capitalization is total R&D capitalization (net of the yearly depreciation) divided by the total assets of the firm.
R&Dtotal is the total investment in R&D undertaken by the firm divided by total assets.
sum, we see that at the univariate level, there is some (even if not overtly clear) support for H
1
and H2, as Capitalization is negatively related to ChROA, while Leverage is higher for
capitalizing firms in the Wilcoxon and /-tests. However, these results should be interpreted
with caution as at the univariate level we do not control for cross-correlations (e.g., size is
significantly related to three ofour variables), and we do not control for industry membership,
etc. Therefore, we next turn our attention to the more formal multivariate regressions.
Table 4
Univariate small-sample tests examining differences among capitalizing and non-capitalizing firms
Variable Non-capitalizing
Mean
firms Capitalizing
Mean
firms Difference /-test
Pr>t
Wilcoxon
Pr>:
R&Dtotal 0.027 0.014 0.013 0.01 0.07
ROA 0.052 0.035 0.017 0.28 0.45
ChROA -0.052 -0.041 -0.011 0.30 0.25
Assets 111 billion 1.17 billion 59 million 0.80 0.60
Leverage 0.469 0.573 0.104 0.01 0.01
#ofobs. 44 42
R&Dtotal is the total investment in R&D undertaken by the firm divided by total assets. ROA is measured as the
firm's operating income before capitalization divided by the total assets of the firm. ChROA is the change in return
;on assets over the average of the two prior fiscal years. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets before
.capitalization. Assets is the total assets of the firm at fiscal year-end.
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Table 5
Pearson correlations among selected variables
Capitalization R&Dtotal ROA ChROA Leverage
R&Dtotal 0.054(0.61)
ROA -0.362 (<0.01) -0.291 (<0.01)
ChROA -0.178(0.09) 0.103 (0.33) -0.786 (<0.0I)
Leverage 0.069 (0.50) -0.119(0.36) 0.008 (0.90) 0.072 (0.46)
Assets -0.194(0.06) -0.323 (<0.01) 0.276 (<0.01) -0.151 (0.32) 0.243 (<0.05)
Correlation coefficient is reported in each cell, significance level is in the parenthesis.
Capitalization is total R&D capitalization (net of the yearly depreciation) divided by the total assets of the firm.
R&Dtotal is the total investment in R&D undertaken by the firm divided by total assets. ROA is measured as the
firm's operating income before capitalization divided by the total assets of the firm. ChROA is the change in return
on assets over the average of the prior two fiscal years. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets (before
capitalization). Assets is the total assets of the firm at fiscal year-end.
6.2. The regression model
Since Capitalization is a left-truncated variable— i.e. companies that don't capitalize
R&D have Capitalization = 0, while companies that capitalize have a positive value of less
than one—we use a Tobit regression for our analysis (see Kennedy, 2003). ' The statistical
equation has the following general form (the subscript i denotes each firm in our sub-
sample, as does t for multiple time periods):
Capitalization, = bo + biChROA, + b^L&verage., + b^R&Dt.otali + b4ROA,
+ b^Logassetts, + bbMB, + biBeta, + b%HighCapitalizer
x
+ bgLagCapitalization-, + Industry Controls
+ Year Dummies + uu
Per H 1 and H2. we expect the coefficients on b\ and bz to be negative and positive, respectively.
Model 1 of Table 6 presents the tests on HI and H2. We see that, as predicted by HI,
ChROA is negative and significant, indicating that the higher (lower) the profitability this
year compared to the average of the previous two years, the smaller (larger) the amount of
capitalized R&D expenditures. For H2. we see that, inconsistent with our predictions.
Leverage is not significant. A possible interpretation of this result is that debt covenants are
structured so that companies are not motivated to capitalize costs in order to avoid
covenants violation. Actually, debt covenants are often designed so that reported earnings
and total assets are adjusted to eliminate the effects of particular accounting treatments,
such as cost capitalization (see Duke & Hunt, 1990).
Regarding our control variables, we find that R&Dtotal is insignificant (P<0.96),
indicating that the amount of capitalized R&D is not a function of a firm's R&D
expenditures. This insignificant relationship between R&D expenditures and capitalization
indicates that a firm's decision to capitalize is independent of its R&D functions; rather, it
could signify that the decision to capitalize is related to other firm characteristics
Concerning ROA. we find a significant negative relationship with Capitalization, indicating
ing OLS regression instead of the Tobit model does not qualitatively affect our inferences.
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Table 6
Tobit regression analysis examining the relationship between R&D capitalization and hypothesized variables
Dependent variable: Capitalization
Parameter Model 1 Model 2
Estimate Pr > \l\ Estimate Pr>\l\
Intercept 0.004 0.42 0.005 0.30
ChROA -0 021 0.01
ChROA-2 -0.023 0.01
Leverage -0.002 0.27 -0.002 026
R&Dtotal 0.001 0.96 0.003 0.84
ROA -0.027 0.01 -0.010 0.065
Logassets -0.000 0.37 -0.000 0.32
MB 0001 0.04 0.000 0.12
Beta 0.001 0.22 0.001 0.17
High-Capil alizer 0.007 0.01 0.008 0.01
LagCapitalization 0.180 0.01 0.190 0.01
N 86 86
Schwartz Criterion -707 -706
Pseudo R-i;quared 0.73 0.67
Capitalization is total R&D capitalization (net of the yearly depreciation) divided by the total assets of the firm.
ChROA is the change in return on assets (before capitalization) over the average of the prior two fiscal years.
ChROA-2 is the change in return on assets (before capitalization) over the previous fiscal year. Leverage is total
debt divided by total assets (before capitalization). R&Dtotal is the total investment in R&D undertaken by the firm
divided by total assets. ROA is measured as the firm's operating income before capitalization divided by the total
assets of the firm. Logassets is the logarithmic transformation of the total assets of the firm at fiscal year-end. MB is
the market value of equity divided by the book value. Beta is the sensitivity of the asset's returns to market returns.
High-Capitalizer is a dummy variable equal to one if the amount capitalized (normalized by the absolute value of
earnings) is above the median for capitalizing firms. LagCapitalization is equal to Capitalization of the prior year.
Dummy variables for year and industry membership are not reported.
that more profitable (unprofitable) firms capitalize less (more) of their R&D expenditures.
If we considered ROA as an indicator of the financial health of the company and of the
availability of economic resources necessary to complete and exploit the project, or
alternatively as an indicator of future expected profitability, we would expect a positive
relationship. Instead, it seems that R&D cost capitalization is used to counterbalance high
or low earnings, which indirectly confirms that such capitalization is used for earnings-
smoothing purposes, as stated by HI. An alternative possible explanation is that companies
tend to reduce political costs arising from too high or too low profitability, or that more
profitable companies tend to invest in higher risk development projects, which typically do
not meet one or more of the conditions required for the capitalization, while less profitable
companies tend to invest in projects whose result is more predictable and less risky and,
therefore, more likely to meet the conditions stated by the standards. In relation to the other
control variables, we note that firm size is not related to R&D capitalization and that
opportunities for firm growth are positively related to R&D capitalization, indicating that
firms that are expected to grow are more likely to capitalize
—
perhaps because they face
more pressure to provide a positive outlook on firm performance or because growth firms are
more likely to meet the conditions of capitalization. High-Capitalizer, as expected, is
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positively related to Capitalization, possibly due to a mechanical effect or because the higher
the effect of capitalization on earnings, the more likely that a capitalization decision will be
made. LagCapitalization is also positively related to Capitalization, since firms are expected
to take capitalization decisions with uniformity, and firms that previously capitalized are
more likely to capitalize again, otherwise risking a dip in reported performance. Regarding
the statistical diagnostics, we see that the Schwartz Criterion is -707, indicating that the
Tobit algorithm has converged and our model is well specified. The pseudo /?-squared of
73% indicates that the dependent variable is explained well by our regressors.
In Model 2, we utilize an alternative specification of change in profitability: ChROA-2.
This is calculated as the year-to-year change in profitability. We perform this action because
managers (or the market) could perceive change in profitability either as a change of "base"
profits (calculated as the average of the prior two years) or as a change from the last
earnings figure. ChROA-2 is still highly significant. However, the adjusted /?-squared
drops by about six percentage points, providing some evidence that changes over a "base"
profit number calculated as the change in profitability over the average of the prior two
years are more important in the income smoothing decision as opposed to the yearly change
in profitability. All in all, the results in Table 6 provide support for HI but not for H2. The
results are especially robust because in a small sample—after controlling for year and
industrial effects, for the materiality of the capitalization and for the prior year
capitalization—the change in profitability is consistently significant and is in the expected
direction.
In Table 7, we undertake a number of robustness tests in order to supplement our main
findings. Our first test introduces a dummy variable that tests for earnings thresholds.
Specifically, it controls ifR&D capitalization is able to turn a negative ROA into a positive
one. Our second test replicates our main regression model (Table 6) with the addition of a
number of variables that control for characteristics of firm corporate governance. Finally,
our last robustness test involves a larger sample drawn from Datastream and is limited to the
variables available on that database. In each of the above tests, our results indicate that our
income smoothing hypothesis is robust to earnings thresholds and various governance
characteristics, it is not idiosyncratic to our sample and it is extended over multiple years.
More specifically, in Model (1) of Table 7 we replicate our multivariate analysis with the
addition of a new variable. Manage, which is a dummy variable equal to one if
capitalization helps a firm achieve a positive change in ROA from a negative one. We carry
out this analysis because a firm could expense R&D even if it is below its target, i.e., it is
below the average earnings level of the prior two years. This could be the case when
achieving an increase in profitability is not attainable. We expect this dummy variable to
have a positive relationship with Capitalization, since prior research identifies benchmark
beating as a motivation for earnings management (e.g., Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997).
Controlling for Manage enables us to test whether the inability to beat the benchmark
affects the income-smoothing motivation, allowing a better test of H 1
.
As expected, our results indicate that Manage is significantly and positively related to
Capitalization, indicating that a firm's decision to capitalize is motivated by profitability
concerns, that is to increase profit. Additionally, our original performance variable ChROA
is significant (P<0.04) in the hypothesized direction, indicating that the incentive to;
smooth earnings still holds after controlling for benchmark-beating ability.
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Table 7
Tobit regression analysis examining the relationship between R&D capitalization and hypothesized variables and
other control variables
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Estimate Pr>\t\ Estimate Pr>\t\ Estimate Pr--\,\
Intercept 0.001 0.77 0.003 0.70 -0.000 0.85
ROA -0.023 0.01 -0.012 0.14 0.005 0.09
ChROA -0.014 0.04 -0.037 0.01 -0.016 001
Manage 0.008 0.01
Leverage -0.002 025 0.002 0.71 0.002 0.17
R&Dtotal -0.007 0.62 -0.059 0.06
Logassets 0.000 0.96 -0.000 0.27 -0.000 0.77
MB 0.001 0.04 0.000 0.41
Beta -0.000 (IDS 0.002 0.38
High-Capitalizer 0.007 0.01 0.009 0.01 0.010 001
LagCapitalization 0.087 0. 1
6
0.193 0.07 0.495 0.01
BoardSize 0.000 1142
Family -0.002 006
BIndependence 0.005 0.07
Largest-Owner -0.000 0.93
N 86 86 890
Schwartz Criterion -719 -213 -3431
Pseudo ^-squared 0.71 0.69 0.66
Model (1) Controls for die ability to reach positive earnings through capitalization. Model (2) adds a number of
control variables related to corporate governance characteristics. Model (3) tests the hypothesized variables on a
larger sample drawn from Datastream. using Capitalization-2 (which is an approximation of Capitalization) as the
dependent variable.
Capitalization is total R&D capitalization (net of the yearly depreciation) divided by the total assets of the firm.
ChROA is the change in return on assets (before capitalization) over the average of the prior two fiscal years.
Manage is a dummy variable equal to one if capitalization helps a firm achieve a positive change in ROA (from a
negative one). Leverage is total debt divided by total assets (before capitalization). R&Dtotal is the total investment
in R&D undertaken by the firm divided by total assets. ROA is measured as the firm's operating income before
capitalization divided by the total assets of the firm. Logassets is the logarithmic transformation of the total assets
of the firm at fiscal year-end. MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value. Beta is the sensitivity of
the asset's returns to market returns. High-Capitalizer is a dummy variable equal to one if the amount capitalized
(normalized by the absolute value of earnings) is above the median for capitalizing firms. LagCapitalization is
equal to Capitalization of the prior year. BoardSize is the number ofboard members. BIndependence is the fraction
of independent directors sitting on a board. Largest-Owner is the fraction of shares owned by the largest owner.
Family is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is family controlled or family influenced, zero otherwise. Dummy
variables for year and industry membership are not reported.
In Model (2) of Table 7, we explicitly control for firm-governance characteristics.
Specifically, we control for firm-ownership structure, whether a firm is family controlled,
the proportion of independent directors on the board, and board size. We control for
ownership structure by calculating the percentage of shares owned by the largest
shareholder (Largest-Owner). This is done because concentrated ownership by a single
dominant shareholder creates a unique set of agency problems; this characteristic is
prevalent in the Italian capital market system. Brunello, Graziano, and Parigi (2003,
p. 1029) document that "in more than half of listed firms (on the Milan Bourse) one
shareholder owns the absolute majority of common shares." Concentrated ownership
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makes the agency relationship between owners and managers less critical, but raises a new
agency problem between the controlling shareholders and the minority ones. Fan and Wong
(2002) argue that concentrated ownership limits the flow of accounting information to
outside investors, and that this limitation translates into greater opportunities for earnings
management. Introducing Largest-Owner as a control variable allows us to control for this
potentially relevant governance characteristic.
We also control for family ownership by employing a dummy variable, Family, ifthe firm is
majority owned (or heavily influenced) by a family. u This action is taken since several Italian
firms are controlled (or strongly influenced) by one or more closely related families. This
characteristic presents a unique situation that also extends to financial-reporting decisions.
Prior studies (Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2005; Wang, 2006) found that family ownership,
ceteris paribus, is associated with higher earnings quality. This association is attributed
both to the ability of family firms to monitor and curtail opportunistic management's behavior
and to the stronger demand for higher quality earnings from outsiders. Therefore, Family
allows us to further control for this relevant governance characteristic.
Finally, we calculate the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board,
Blndependence, and the size of the board, BoardSize. Both of these characteristics have
been associated with the effectiveness of shareholder monitoring. In particular, a higher
level of board independence is related to higher levels of monitoring (Dechow, Sloan, &
Hutton, 1996; Klein, 2002), and smaller and more compact boards are better monitors
(Vafeas, 2000; Yermack, 1996). As a consequence, Blndependence and BoardSize have
been associated, respectively, with a lower and higher extent of earnings management.
Controlling for both of these factors allows for better tests of our hypotheses.
Model (2) of Table 7 presents results on our income-smoothing variable controlling for
firm governance characteristics. We see that ChROA is negatively related to Capitalization
(P<0.01), indicating that the income-smoothing hypothesis still holds with the inclusion of
firm-governance characteristics. Two of the governance variables (Largest-Owner,
BoardSize) are not significant, indicating that in the Italian capital market system, these
governance structures are not related to the decision ofR&D cost capitalization. However,
Family and Blndependence are weakly significant, indicating that these governance
characteristics are related to the R&D capitalization decision. Finally, ROA is no more
significant, which could indicate that controlling for governance structures, only the change
in profitability is related to R&D cost capitalization. In sum. Model (2) of Table 7 indicates
that governance variables play a marginal role in the capitalization decision; however, the
profitability results are not affected.
We also conduct several additional tests (results unreported), in which we control for:
bank ownership in firms (as a proxy for monitoring); whether the CEO is also the chair of
the board (as a further indicator of board independence); and the percentage of independent
directors on audit committees (as a measure of audit quality). These variables are not
significant and their inclusion does not change our primary findings.
In the last robustness test (Model (3), Table 7), we extend our sample over multiple years
in order to show that our results are not year- and sample-specific. Given that R&D-related
In order to distinguish family-controlled or -influenced companies from the others, we use the classification
proposed b\ Corbetta and Mimchilli (2005).
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disclosures are difficult to find prior to 200 1 , we are not able to extend our hand-collection
in order to obtain a larger sample size and to conduct more powerful statistical tests. In
order to sidestep this problem, we use data available through Datastream. Unfortunately,
Datastream reports R&D and advertising capitalized costs as one data item and does not
report total R&D investments and amortization expenses related to the capitalized costs.
Nevertheless, we calculate Capitalization-2 as an approximation of our original dependent
variable based on the assumptions that follow. First, we consider all the capitalized costs to
be related to R&D. We believe this to be a realistic assumption since, based on our hand-
collected sample, we observe that capitalized advertising costs are rare in Italian companies
due to the strong limits of such capitalization set forth by the Italian accounting standards.
Second, we estimate the amortization ofR&D costs by assuming a useful life of five years,
which is the maximum time allowed by the Italian accounting standards and the most
common policy among the companies in our hand-collected sample. Therefore,
Capitalization-2 is calculated as capitalized costs minus estimated annual amortization
divided by total assets.
We draw Datastream data from 1995 to 2004 for all the firms listed on the Milan Stock
Exchange that belong to the same industries as those from our hand-collected sample (in
order to reduce the risk of selecting companies not performing R&D activities). Our final
sample contains 890 observations. In Model (3) of Table 7, we see that ChROA is still
negatively related to our estimate of R&D cost capitalization (/5 <0.01) and, similar to
before, we do not find evidence for our leverage hypothesis. These findings confirm the
robustness of the results obtained in the prior tables, strengthening our smoothing
hypothesis by applying it to a larger sample and a longer period of time.
We perform additional tests on our original sample to control for other occurrences that
might affect income smoothing by introducing two dummy variables (results unreported).
We first test the big-bath hypothesis (see Huson, Wiedman, & Wier, 2003) where we
control for changes in top management (whether the CEO or chair of the board changes
during the year being observed); results remain unchanged. Then, we control whether the
firm had an IPO in the year being observed or in the year prior to it. Results still remain
unchanged.
Consequently, our findings indicate strong support for our income-smoothing
hypothesis, given our results in Tables 6 and 7. This result is robust to alternate measures
of change in profitability and to various covariates such as firm size, risk, growth
opportunities, profitability, industrial membership and time controls, governance
characteristics, and other extraordinary issues that could affect income smoothing (e.g.,
IPOs and executive turnover). Finally, we augment our results by an approximation method
by which an estimated R&D capitalization variable is utilized in order to confirm our results
over a longer period of time and on a larger dataset.
Throughout all of our analyses, we do not consider real-earnings management.
As discussed before, earlier studies show that R&D costs are subject to real earnings-
management policies (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Perry & Grinaker, 1994; Bushee, 1998).
This finding could partially affect our results and should be kept in mind when
interpreting them. Our study shows that—over and above real earnings-management
strategies—companies use accounting flexibility to affect earnings through accruals. The
existence of real-earnings management can weaken the relationship between the
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capitalization of R&D costs and the variables related to earnings-management incentives,
since some companies may prefer to reduce the R&D expenditures more than they do the
related expenses through capitalization. Notwithstanding this effect, we find empirical
support for our hypothesis and, from this, our conclusions are strengthened regarding the
existence of accrual-earnings management as it relates to R&D costs.
7. Conclusions and limitations
This study examines the relationship between the choice of R&D cost accounting and
earnings-management incentives. We hypothesize that the decision to capitalize R&D costs
is related to a firm's change in profitability. Our results indicate that firms that have a lower
return on assets (compared to the average of the previous two years) are more likely to
capitalize R&D expenditures, while firms that have improved performance are more likely
to expense, consistent with the earnings-smoothing hypothesis. We also hypothesize that a
firm's level of debt financing is related to capitalizing decisions. We do not find support for
this prediction
—
probably due to the fact that financial institutions tend to adjust reported
earnings by eliminating the effect of any cost capitalization in order to limit the risk of
misleading manipulation.
Our income-smoothing-related tests are robust to the introduction of a number of control
variables and to a lengthening of the time period under analysis.
Our results have several policy implications. The convergence project recently started by
IASB and FASB has raised a debate surrounding what constitutes an optimal accounting
standard for R&D costs. Currently, the two bodies have different positions on this issue and
the limited empirical research carried out thus far does not help in finding a common solution.
This study contributes to this debate by providing empirical evidence on the use ofR&D cost
capitalization for purposes of earnings management. The results indicate that managers use
R&D cost capitalization in order to smooth earnings. To the extent that earnings smoothing is
considered an opportunistic strategy, our conclusions move in favor of the current FASB
position, which does not allow for flexibility and requires all R&D costs to be expensed. On
the other hand, we should not forget that earnings smoothing can also be an effective and
efficient way to signal and communicate important information to the market and that prior
literature generally supports R&D cost capitalization in terms of relevance for those who
utilize financial statements. Therefore, whether the best accounting treatment for R&D costs
is full expensing or capitalization (subject to some conditions) remains a controversial
accounting issue that again leads us to the traditional relevance/reliability trade-off.
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Abstract
This study investigates the moderating effects that an organizational unit's hierarchical level and
control systems have on the relationship between budgetary participation and performance. Using
moderated regression analyses, we find a three-way interactive effect on performance between
hierarchical levels, types of control systems, and budgetary participation. Further analyses reveal that
at the high level of a hierarchy, budgetary participation has a positive relationship with performance
and this relationship is stronger for organizational units that use output control than for those that use
behavior control. By contrast, at the low level of a hierarchy, budgetary participation has a negative
The survey instrument is available upon request from the corresponding author. We gratefully acknowledge the
valuable comments and suggestions made by Robert Pakpahan, Imam Ghozali. Hamdy Hady, Hadori Yunus, Alan
Webb, and participants at the 2007 Canadian Academic Accounting Association Conference, Halifax, Canada. The
paper has also benefited from comments and suggestions from Sue Haka (Co-editor) and the two anonymous
reviewers of this journal. We would also like to thank the government units and their representatives for their
generosity to provide data used in this study.
* Corresponding author. Nanyang Technological University, Nanyang Business School. Block S3, Nanyang
Avenue, Singapore 639798, Singapore. Tel: +65 6790 4979; fax: +65 6791 3697.
E-mail addresses: jjermias@ntu.edu.sg, jjermias@sfu.ca (J. Jermias), poppyts@hotmail.com (T Setiawan).
' Tel.: +62 21 391 8925; fax: +62 21 391 8929.
0020-7063/$
- see front matter © 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
doi: 10.101 6/j.intacc.2008.06.009
J. Jermias. T. Setiawan I The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 268-292 269
relationship with performance and this relationship is stronger for organizational units that use output
control than for those that use behavior control.
© 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Many scholars believe that the participative system ofmanagement and decision making
is the ideal approach to governing organizations. They contend that this popular system
enhances performance through increasing employee's input, level of commitment, and
capacity to make choices and transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes
(Ashmos, Duchon, McDaniel, & Huonker, 2002; Argyris, 1998; Kren, 1992; Brownell &
Mclnnes, 1986; Collins, 1997). Jaques (1990) asserts that hierarchical organizations that
rely on a complex system of highly prescribed rules, formalized control, and obedience to
authority seem anachronistic and even dysfunctional in comparison to those that employ the
participation system.
Researchers have found, however, that even when managers have embraced a rhetoric of
participation, empowerment, and democracy, they have still been reluctant to share power,
grant autonomy, disclose information, or include subordinates in substantive decision
making (Cunningham & Hyman, 1999; Marsh, 1992). Furthermore, Argyris ( 1998) reports
that subordinates have been reluctant to participate in decision making when it has led to
greater task ambiguity and increased accountability for outcomes.
The question of whether budgetary participation has positive consequences such as
increased motivation, greater commitment, more job satisfaction, and better performance
has received tremendous attention in the accounting literature (e.g., Brownell, 1981;
Brownell & Mclnnes, 1986; Brownell & Hirst, 1986, Chenhall & Brownell, 1988; Murray,
1990; Brownell & Dunk, 1991; Kren, 1992). Yet, studies aiming to answer this question
have for the most part generated mixed results (Greenberg & Nouri, 1994; Murray, 1990).
Kerr (2004) argues that the mixed results may be due in part to the assumption that as a
method of governance and decision making, participation can be applied to all organiza-
tional settings. He asserts that this system is sometimes not feasible for an organization
because lower level employees do not have the information, experience, understanding, and
perspective to participate meaningfully in the decision-making process. Furthermore, par-
ticipation might distract lower level employees' attention from maximizing efficiency and,
given their typically limited access to information, they might not be able to fully understand
the organization-wide implications of a particular decision (Simons, 2000). Kerr (2004) also
suggests that participative decision making should be matched with types ofcontrol systems
and levels of hierarchies in order to affect performance positively. He proposes that the
relationship between participation and performance varies across types of control systems
and that the two-way interaction between control systems and participation does not
generalize across levels of hierarchies.
One limitation to past research is that many of the empirical studies on budgetary parti-
cipation have focused their investigation on manufacturing companies in developed countries
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such as the United States and Australia. Few studies, if any, have looked at its impact on
performance in the public sectors and/or in developing countries. Our study will address this
gap in the research. Its purpose is to investigate the moderating effects ofhierarchy and control
systems on the relationship between budgetary participation and performance for govern-
mental units in Indonesia.
The impact of budgetary participation on performance might be different in this setting
for three reasons. First, most budgets in public sectors and/or developing countries are
prepared in response to political pressure rather than careful analyses (Uddin & Hopper.
2001). Political interventions in staff recruitments, budget preparations, and budget exe-
cutions are very common in this environment (Hoque & Hopper, 1994). As such, the
benefits of participation might not be fully realized.
Second, top management often treats employees unfairly due to the lack of recognition/
protection of human rights and high unemployment rates. For instance, employees might be
fired without the right to challenge the decision and to be compensated properly. As a result,
employees might participate in the budgeting process not because they want to make
meaningful contributions, but simply because of their fear of being punished (Uddin &
Hopper, 2001).
Third, top management is often reluctant to share information with subordinates due to
fear ofmanipulation and misinterpretation ofinformation by their subordinates. Many senior
managers are politicians and they like to maintain power distance with their subordinates
( Alam. 1 997 ). They often fear that budgetary participation may create opportunities for their
subordinates to challenge their decisions, and. in mm, may jeopardize their reputation.
We hypothesize that level ofhierarchy and control systems will moderate the relationship
between budgetary participation and performance in such a way that organizational units
that use output control and organization units that use behavior control will demonstrate a
different relationship pattern at the high and low levels of a hierarchy. We argue that at the
high level of a hierarchy, tasks tend to be more difficult and uncertain and budgetary
participation will therefore have a positive relationship with performance. In contrast, at the
low level of a hierarchy, tasks tend to be routine and budgetary participation will therefore
have a negative relationship with performance. However, the positive (negative) relationship
between budgetary participation and performance will be moderated by the types of control
systems used.
Examining the moderating effects of hierarchical levels and control systems on the
relationship between participation and performance is important because of the increased
popularity of the participative approach as a system of management and decision making in
organizations. In addition. Burton. Lauridsen and Obel (2002) argue that it is empirically
important to investigate the impact of organizational structures, control systems, and
decision-making styles that are mismatched because this mismatch may have negative
performance implications and pose a challenge to managers.
This study contributes to the existing literature on budgetary participation in three ways.
First, as has been stated, it attempts to fill a gap in the literature by conducting research in
the public sector and in the developing nation of Indonesia. Second, it endeavors to provide
a better understanding of the extant research in this area by investigating the moderating
effects of hierarchical levels and control systems on the relationship between budgetary
participation and performance. Third, it suggests that budgetary participation should not be
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treated as a panacea for improving performance. Rather, this study indicates that budgetary
participation should be matched with levels of hierarchies and types of control systems to
positively affect performance.
The next section of this paper reviews the literature that has been used to develop our
study's hypotheses and introduces these hypotheses. The second section describes the
research method, and the third analyzes the data and presents the results. Finally, the
concluding section discusses the study's major findings and limitations, as well as recom-
mends a direction for future research.
2. Related literature and hypotheses
2. 1. Budgetary participation and performance
There is a widely-held belief that budgetary participation benefits organizations by
facilitating improved communication, more commitment, greater job satisfaction, and in
turn, higher performance. However, the numerous empirical studies examining the effects of
budgetary participation on various measures of outcome variables such as motivation, job
involvement, and performance have yielded "extremely inconsistent results on the efficacy
of participation" (Greenberg & Nouri, 1994, P. 1 17). Mia (1989) attributes the mixed results
partly to inadequate recognition of the role that moderating variables play in impacting the
relationship between budgetary participation and performance.
Shields and Young ( 1993) reach a similar conclusion. Based on their extensive review of
studies investigating the effects of budgetary participation on performance, these authors
report that "there were 24 tests of hypotheses in which the inferential statistic was significant
(p<0.05), 35 hypothesis tests in which the inferential statistic was not significant and/or the
sign was not as predicted (2)" (p. 266).
Brownell and Mclnnes (1986) investigate the relationship of budgetary participation to
motivation and performance among middle-level managers in three manufacturing com-
panies. They found that budgetary participation has a positive and significant effect on
performance. Brownell (1981), Brownell and Dunk (1991), Kren (1990), and Dunk (1993)
are among those other studies that report a positive and significant relationship between
budgetary participation and performance. However, Brownell and Hirst (1986) were unable
to corroborate this result and concluded that their findings' failure to support a positive
relationship between budgetary participation and performance was perplexing. Brownell
and Dunk (1991) subsequently conducted a follow-up study using data from manufacturing
organizations in Sydney, Australia in order to re-examine the results reported by Brownell
and Hirst ( 1 986). This later sftidy found that budgetary participation interacts with budgetary
emphasis and task uncertainty to positively affect performance. Its results allowed the
authors to conclude that budgetary participation has a positive impact on performance only
when the level of task difficulty is high.
Other studies have reported that budgetary participation has a negative effect on various
measures of performance such as role ambiguity (Chenhall & Brownell, 1988), job related
tension (Kenis, 1979), slack (Onsi, 1973), and managerial performance (Mia, 1988). For
example, Mia (1988) conducted a survey among the middle and lower level managers of a
diversified company in Australia. This author reports that budgetary participation was found
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to have a negative effect on the performance of managers who exhibited a less favorable
attitude or lower degree of motivation. Conversely, it had a positive effect on the perfor-
mance of managers with a more favorable attitude or higher degree of motivation. This
author calls upon researchers to consider theoretically justified moderator variables when
investigating the relationship between budgetary participation and performance, since this
relationship may vary from one situation to another.
2.2. Hierarchy, budgetary participation, and performance
Jaques ( 1 990) contends that work is organized in a hierarchical fashion not only because
tasks have lower and higher degrees of complexity, but also because they reflect sharp
discontinuities in complexity that separate them into a series of steps or categories: these
discontinuities point to the need to employ different control systems for the work that is
performed at different levels of the hierarchy. At the low level of a hierarchy, tasks tend to be
repetitive and can be standardized. In the environments where such tasks are performed,
efficiency is critical and participation might have a negative effect on performance. In
contrast, tasks tend to be complex and unstructured at the high level of a hierarchy. In this
case, participation will affect performance positively because it promotes an exchange of
ideas and gives employees the discretion they require to modify tasks in response to changes
in the environment.
Even though there are some drawbacks associated with organizational hierarchies, such
as their capacity to squash initiative, crush creativity, slow down decision making, and
decrease motivation, both research and practice reveal that managerial hierarchies are not only
a very natural structure for large organizations to assume, but also highly efficient (Kerr. 2004;
Jaques. 1990). Kerr (2004) argues that a properly-structured hierarchy can function to release
energy and creativity, rationalize productivity, and actually improve morale. Furthermore,
Jaques (1990) asserts that organizations need to understand how managerial hierarchies
function and how to use them in order to deploy talent and energy more effectively.
Managerial hierarchies exist because the tasks to be performed and the capability required
to complete these tasks are very different for high level managers as compared to low level
managers (Ouchi, 1 978). For example, tasks performed by top management are more difficult
and uncertain than those encountered by managers on the shop floor. Top management must
deal with not only a wide range of often unstructured and constantly changing data, but
also with variables so tightly interlinked that they must be unra\ eled before they will yield
useful information. In contrast, low level managers tend to perform tasks that are routine and
predictable.
Researchers have argued that the effect of participation on performance varies syste-
matically as a function oftask difficulty (Brownell & Dunk. 1 99 1 ). task uncertainty (Gresov,
1989; Brownell & Dunk. 1991) and information-processing capabilities (Scon. 1992;
Jaques. 1990). Brownell & Dunk 1 1 99 1 i. for example, find that organizational units which
deal with high task difficulty benefit more from the participative decision-making approach
as compared to organizational units which deal with low task difficulty. They argue that
when the tasks to be performed are repetitive and the goals are clear, management should
malize operating procedures and require little participation from their subordinates. In
contrast, when the tasks to be performed are difficult and a considerable amount of thinking
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is required to complete them, management should exchange ideas with their subordir.
give them opportunities to participate in the decision-making process, and allow them to
exercise the discretion needed to modify tasks in response to situational demands.
Previous discussions are consistent with the \ lew that participative budgeting is more
beneficial when tasks are difficult because information asymmetry between superior and
subordinate tends to be higher when tasks are more difficult." This view is based on the
assumption that subordinates know better about their task and task environment than their
superior (Shields & Shields. 1998). Participative budgeting also enables superiors to leam
about the interdependences of various tasks performed by their subordinates enabling the
superiors to coordinate the tasks better (Kanodia. 1993). Pnor discussions indicate that
budgetary participation helps superiors not only to plan and coordinate but also to execute
the plan. Brownell and Hirst ( 19S6). for example, argue that budgetary participation may
pro\ ide opportunity for managers to introduce new and better means to address tasks.
Budgetary participation also allows managers to incorporate the knowledge shared by
subordinates in executing the budgets I Hopwood. 1 lJ 7
In summary, since organizational units at the high level ofa hierarchy handle more difficult
and loosely structured tasks, and managers at this level possess more capability to process
unstructured and vast amounts of data, these units will benefit from participative d
.
making. In contrast, since organizational units at the low level ofa hierarchy perform tasks that
are repetitive and can rely on standardized operating procedures, the participation approach
will cause inefficiency."
2.3. Control system, budgetary- participation, and performance
Ouchi (1978) describes the control mechanisms used by organizations as a process
monitoring, evaluating, and providing feedback. He argues that there are tv
organizational control: behavior control, which involves top-le\ el managers observing their
subordinates and counting the number of times that they engage in any particular behavior
and output control, which is less obtrusive and involves managers monitoring the after-
effects of behavior as the outputs of the productive process. For instance, managers might
monitor the activities performed by their subordinates during office hours (behavior
control), or managers might ignore the activities and choose to monitor the number of
completed reports produced by their employees (output control).
Ouchi ( 197S) points out that it is appropriate to use output control when the tasks to be
performed are complex and unstructured. In an environment characterized by such tasks,
the "proper" behavior is not recognizable so observations of actual behavior are of no value
for control purposes and behavior control cannot be used. By focusing instead on the
concrete outcomes ofbehavior, superiors allow subordinates to have more leeway in terms
of deciding how they perform their tasks. Consequently, the use of output control will have
We are indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers of this journal for much of the content of this pan
The prior literature has shown that other variables such as uncertainty, budget e:: . nvironmental
volatility might also interact with budgetary participation to affect performance. Th.
-
relatively constant in our setting (i.e., Indonesian governmental unitsV Therefore, we did not include these
variables in our studv
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a positive impact on the relationship between participation and performance at the high
level of a hierarchy.
Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) propose that behavior control is appropriate when
means-ends relations are well understood and the desirable behavior can be identified and
is easy to observe (Ouchi & Magmre. 1975). Superiors can then control their subordinates
bv observing whether these workers" actual behavior conforms to what is seen as the
desirable behavior. A formalized system is expedient in such an environment and gives
managers a relatively free hand to focus an organization's resources on its preferred
objectives (Simon*. 2000 1. Therefore, we predict that the use ofbehavior control will have a
negative impact on the relationship between budgetary participation and performance at the
low level of a hierarchy.
A different stream of research (from the one adopted in this paper) on control systems
focuses on investigating how managers use controls to help managers ensure that their
organization's strategies and plans are earned out (e.g.. Simons 1991. 1995. 2000: Bisbe &
Otley. 2004 >. This stream ofresearch classifies control systems as diagnostic control systems
(which focus on monitoring and rewarding the achievement of a firm's key performance
variables) and interactive control systems (which focus on constantly changing information
that senior managers consider potentially strategic). Diagnostic control systems are usually
described as information-feedback systems in which goals are set in advance, outcomes are
compared with preset objectives, and significant variances are reported to managers for
remedial action and follow-up (Anthony & Govindarajan. 2006). Diagnostic control
systems are often called management by exception (Simons. 1991 ). In contrast, interactive
control systems are driven by top management vision and are used on a day-to-day basis by
top management to intervene m organizational decision making (Simons. 1991 ).
Since we are interested in the types of controls used and not the manner in which the
controls were used, we believe that it is appropriate for our study to distinguish control
systems in terms of output and behavioral control. The categorization of controls in terms
of diagnostic and interactive might be more appropriate when researchers investigate
the performance implications of control systems for firms pursuing different competitive
strategies. For example, Simons (1995) argues that firms pursuing a strategy of cost
efficiency will benefit more from diagnostic control systems due to this strategy's emphasis
on standardized products and processes. In contrast, firms pursuing a strategy of innovation
will benefit more from the use of interactive control systems due to the more dynamic
competitive environment in which these firms operate. Although we did not classify the
types of controls into interactive and diagnostic systems, the use of participative budgeting
may indicate that managers use more interactive than diagnostic control systems.
2.4. Hierarchy, control systems, and participation: a three-way interaction
Kerr (2004) proposes that organizations may benefit both from participation and for-
malized systems depending on their lev els of hierarchy and the types of control systems
they use. Budgetary participation may provide more advantages when it is used at the high
level of a hierarchy, particularly if it is combined with an output control system. By contrast,
the formalized decision-making approach may be more beneficial at the low level of a
hierarchy when it is used in combination with a behavior control system (Ouchi. 1978).
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Snell and Youndt (1995) propose that in a behavior control system, responsibilities are
standardized and imposed top-down with the primary concern being for procedures and
methods. Accordingly, appraisals are based on superiors' observation of behavior, and
employees are accountable for their actions regardless of the results (Liao, 2006). Snell
(1992) suggests that behavior control is appropriate to be used when tasks are routine since
superiors have sufficient knowledge of means-ends relationships. Since tasks at the low
level of a hierarchy tend to be routine, low level managers" performance will be more
efficient and productive using standardized operating procedures (e.g.. job description) in
planning, investigating, coordinating, supervising, staffing, negotiating, and representing.
For instance, standard operating procedures make the planning and supen [sing acti\ ities
quicker and highly efficient due to their emphasis on ensuring that the procedures are
carried out as specified (Khandwalla, 1973).
Kerr (1985) suggests that in an output control system, results are standardized and
subordinates ha\ e discretion o\ er the process the\ use to achieve the outcomes. Rather than
standardizing behavior to maximize efficiency, output control focuses on goal accomplish-
ment (Hofstede. 1978). Under this approach, superiors provide opportunities for sub-
ordinates to contribute in the decision-making processes (Michael. 1973). As Mich, this
approach is appropriate to be used when tasks are complex and unstructured such as those
performed by managers at the high level of hierarchies (Kerr. 1985). For example, the
quality of plans will improve with inputs from subordinates who have better know ledge of
the task environment Similarly, the likelihood of achieving the goals will increase due to
the ability of subordinates to make adjustments in response to the changing environment
(Jaeger & Baliga. 1985).
Previous discussions indicate that the relationship between budgetary participation and
performance vanes across hierarchical lev els and types of control s\ stems. There is. therefore,
a need to investigate the effect that the three-way interaction among hierarchical levels, control
Budgetary
Participation
Performance
Hierarchy
Control Systems
Causal link
Moderating effect link
Fig. 1. Hierarchy ami control systems as moderator variables of the relationship hero ecu budgetary participation
and performance
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systems, and budgetary participation has on performance. Fig. 1 shows the proposed rela-
tionship between these variables.
This figure indicates that hierarchical levels and types of control systems will moderate
the relationship between budgetary participation and performance. Hence, the following
hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 1. Hierarchical levels, control systems, and budgetary participation will have a
three-way interactive effect on performance.
We use the following moderated regression model to test Hypothesis l 4 :
Perform, = yu + 7, Hierarchy, + y: Control, + -^Participation,
+ 74Control,*Hierarchy, + y5 Control,*Participation,
+ 76 Hierarchy,*Participation,
+ 7 7Control,*Hierarchy,*Participation, + e, (1)
Where,
Perform, = performance of organizational unit i.
Hierarchy, = levels of a hierarchy. An indicator equal to one for organizational units
at the high level of a hierarchy and zero otherwise.
Control, = types of control systems used. An indicator equal to one for organiza-
tional units that use output control and zero otherwise.
Participation, = level of participation in decision making.
Hypothesis 1 will be confirmed if the estimated coefficient on Control * Hierarchy *
Participation is significant.
Previous discussions also suggest that at the high level of a hierarchy, budgetary parti-
cipation will have a positive effect on performance and the use of output control (behavioral
control) will enhance (mitigate) the positive effect. As Kerr (1985) points out, output control
tends to focus on goal accomplishment and subordinates have discretion over the process
to influence the outcome. In contrast, behavior control tends to focus on procedures and
methods in which responsibilities are standardized and imposed top down (Snell & Youndt,
1 995). On the one hand, when subordinates are allowed to participate in the decision-making
process and the control system encourages subordinates to have discretion when performing
their tasks (i.e., output control), the positive effects of participation on performance is likely
to be stronger. On the other hand, when subordinates are allowed to participate in the
decision-making process but the control system focuses on standardized procedures to
promote efficiency (i.e.. behavior control), the positive effects of participation on perfor-
mance is likely to be weaker. Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 2. At the high level of a hierarchy, budgetary participation will have a positive
relationship with performance and the relationship will be more positive for organizational
units that use output control than for those that use behavior control.
Cohen et al (2003), suggest thai in a three-way interaction model, all lower-order terms must be included in
the regression equation to prevent from drawing conclusions of the existence of a three-way interaction when, in
fact, such an effect is due to lower-order effects
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In contrast, at the low level of a hierarchy, budgetary participation will have a negative
effect on performance and the use of behavioral control (output control) will mitigate
(exacerbate) the negative effect. As discussed earlier, at the low level of a hierarchy, tasks
tend to be routine and can be standardized to promote efficiency. In such an environment,
participation is likely to be counterproductive (Jaques, 1990). The negative effect of par-
ticipation on performance, however, will be influenced by the types of control systems used.
On the one hand, when the control system focuses on standardized operating procedures (i.e.,
behavior control), low level managers' performance on routine tasks is likely to improve.
Therefore, we expect that for organizational units in the low level of a hierarchy that use
behavior control, the negative impact of participation on performance will be weaker. On the
other hand, when the control system allows subordinates to have discretion over the process to
influence the outcomes (i.e., output control), low level managers' performance on routine
tasks is likely to be less efficient. Therefore, we predict that for organizational units in the low
level of a hierarchy that use output control, the negative impact of participation on per-
formance will be stronger. Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 3. At the low level of a hierarchy, budgetary participation will have a negative
relationship with performance and the relationship will be more negative for organizational
units that use output control than for those that use behavior control.
To test the pattern of relationship (Hypotheses 2 and 3), we rearrange Eq. (1)) to show
the regression of budgetary participation on performance using different types of control
systems and at different levels of hierarchies, as suggested by Aiken and West ( 1 991 ). This
method yields the following simple-slope expression:
Perform, = (73 + -y5 Control, + ^Hierarchy, + 7 7Control,*Hierarchy, )Participation,
+ (7d + "Yi Hierarchy, + 7iControl,- + 74Control,*Hierarchy/ ) + e,
(2)
Since hierarchy and control are binary variables, Eq. (2)) can be rewritten to show the
impact of budgetary participation on performance at the different levels of a hierarchy that
use different types of control systems:
For the high level of a hierarchy, Eq. (2)) can be rewritten as follows:
Perform,
hi + 7s + "rV. + "^Participation + -y,, + 7, + 7, + 7, + 6
For the high level of a hierarchy! Hierarchy = 1 (that uses output control (Control = 1). (a)
<7.< + 7„ (Participation + 7 + 7, + £
For the high level of a hierarchy( Hierarchy = 1 Jfhat uses behavior control (Control = 0). (b)
(3)
For the low level of a hierarchy, Eq. (2) can be rewritten as follows:
Perform, =
(73 + 7< ) Participation + 7,, + 7, + e
For low level of a hierarchy! Hierarchy = 0)that uses output control) Control = 1). (a)
7 ; Participation + -y„ + £
For low level of a hierarchy! Hierarchy = 0)that uses behavior control( Control = 0). (b)
(4)
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The predicted pattern of relationship between participation and performance using dif-
ferent types of control systems and at different levels of hierarchies will be confirmed if the
regression line of Eq. (3a) is significantly more positive than the regression line of Eq. (3b)
and the regression line of Eq. (4a) is significantly more negative than the regression line of
Eq. (4b).
3. Research method
3.1. Sample
Government offices in three main Indonesian cities were selected. A survey questionnaire
was administered to a sample of government employees in the upper level of the hierarchy
(department heads) and the lower level of the hierarchy (section heads)." The need to obtain
access to these individuals as well as time and funding constraints prevented us from using a
random sampling technique. However, given that all government units tend to be organized in
a relatively similar fashion, there is no reason to suspect any systematic bias in the findings of
this study.
Government organizations provide an appropriate setting for studying the impact of
hierarchical levels, control systems, and budgetary participation on performance. These
organizations are characterized by a hierarchical and bureaucratic structure, strict regulations,
established routines, and formal procedures. Lines of communication are embodied in or-
ganizational charts and official ranks of authority are reflected in job descriptions (Breton,
1995). All these characteristics play a dominant role in structuring the work ofemployees, and
subordinates must thoroughly understand their limits in terms of exercising discretion before
they can engage in budgetary participation confidently and creatively within those boundaries
(Gresov, 1989).
In our study, for example, the tasks performed by the department heads include developing
long-term plans, formulating policies and procedures, coordinating interorganization acti-
vities, developing performance-evaluation criteria and procedures, and evaluating the per-
formance of section heads. These tasks tend to be difficult and unstructured requiring more
thinking and exchange of ideas to complete the tasks (Van de Ven, Delbecq & Kownig, 1 976).
In contrast, the tasks performed by the section heads are more routine include preparing daily/
monthly reports, monitoring employees' attendance, maintaining departments' logistics,
providing technical support, monitoring the implementation of policies and procedures,
disseminating information, evaluating lower level employees' performance, and coordinating
intraorganization activities. These routine tasks can be completed well using standardized
procedures (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985). Furthermore, department heads have to manage
Two pilot studies were conducted prior to administering the questionnaires to the respondents. The first study
used ten respondents (university colleagues) to investigate the degTee of understanding of the questionnaires. As a
result, some clarifications and simplifications were made to the original questionnaires. The second study used five
respondents (two department heads and three section heads from different government units from the units used in this
studs
)
to obtain preliminary results related to the hypotheses developed in this study and to investigate any necessary
changes before the final survey was conducted. The two pilot studies and the actual survey used questionnaires that
were written in the Indonesian language.
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Fig. 2. Organizational structure of directorate of tax audit, investigation and collection.
larger number of employees as compared to section heads. Fig. 2 shows the organizational
structure ofone ofthe government units in our study. As shown in Fig. 2, the directorate of tax
audit, investigation, and collection has five departments. Each department has three sections.
Each section usually has three to four teams consisting of four to five members in each team.
Therefore, a department head has to manage about 36 to 60 employees while a section head
has to manage about 12 to 20 employees.
We contacted the top management personnel of the organizational units we selected in
order to obtain their commitment to participate in this study. We also asked them to nominate
survey coordinators who would be responsible to distribute and collect the questionnaires and
to provide a list ofdepartment heads and section heads. Respondents who were selected from
this list delivered their completed questionnaires to the survey coordinators over a predeter-
mined two-week period. We distributed 463 questionnaires, giving 92 of them to department
heads and the remaining 371 to section heads. Two hundreds and four valid responses were
obtained from the 463 questionnaires distributed (a response rate of 44%). These valid
responses came from 43 department heads (a response rate of 47%) and 161 section heads
(a response rate of 43%).
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3.2. Variable measurement
Appendix A contains an abbreviated version of the questionnaire used to measure the
variables in this study.
3.2. 1 . Performance
The measurement of performance was based on an instrument first developed by
Mahoney, Jerdee, and Carroll ( 1 965) and later used in previous studies such as Kren (1992),
Frucot and Shearon (1991). and Brownell and Hirst (1986). The performance indicator
consists of nine items. We asked respondents to rate their achievement on a seven-point
Likeil-type scale (1 = significantly below average; and 7 = significantly above average) in
regard to: planning, investigating, coordinating, evaluating, supervising, staffing, negotiat-
ing, and representing. We then assessed the overall achievement scores and responses to
the nine items were combined into one construct to represent the organizational unit's
performance.
3.2 2. Budgetary- participation
The level of budgetary participation was measured by asking respondents about their
degree of influence on the decisions that could affect the performance of their units. The
instrument we used to measure budgetary participation is based on the scale for participatory
decision making developed by Vroom and Mann (1960).° This instrument has four items
and responses were given on a seven-point Likert-type scale ( 1 = strongly disagree; and
7 = strongly agree). An overall measure of participation in decision making was obtained by
summing up responses to the four individual items divided by four. Therefore, the highest
possible score is seven and the lowest possible score is one.
3.2.3. Types of control systems
The measurement oftypes of control systems was based on the eight items developed by
Ouchi and Maguire (1975). We asked respondents to indicate the relative usage of output
control and behavior control on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; and
7 = strongly agree). Responses to the eight items were combined into a single item in which
low scores represented behavior control and high scores represented output control. 7 We
then used a mean-split approach to dichotomize the item into behavior control and output
control. Units that scored greater than the mean of the eight items were classified as using
output control, while those that scored lower than the mean were classified as using
behavioral control. To validate whether our approach to combine output and behavior
controls into a single continuum is appropriate, we sum the scores of the behavior control
* Since we are interested in investigating the degree of influence (not the frequency of participation) the
respondents have on the decisions that could affect respondents' performance, we adapt the participatory decision
making measure of Vroom and Mann (1960) in favor of Milam's (1975) scale for budgetary participation (see
also discussions in Abdel-Halim (1983) related to the difference between the degree of influence and the
frequency of influence that subordinates have on the decision making process).
Reverse coding was performed to questions two, three, and six to ensure that low scores represent behavior
control and high scores represent output control.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of performance, participation, level of hierarchy and types of control systems''
Variables Mean Standard Median Minimum Maximum Skewness 1 ' Cronbach's
deviation alpha
Performance 6.135 0.907 6.333 2.000 7.000 -2.610 0.95
Participation 2.078 1.669 2.000 1.000 7.000 0.319 0.92
Hierarchy 0.210 0.409 0.000 0.000 1 000 N/Ae N/A
Control systems 0.392 0.489 0.000 0.000 1 .000 N/A 0.98
Control * Hierarchy 113 0.317 0.000 0.000 1.000 N/A
Control * Participation 1 744 2.250 0.000 0.000 7.000 N/A
Hierarchy * Participation 1.174 2.287 0.000 0.000 7.000 N/A
Control * Hierarchy * Participation 0.626 1.765 0.000 0.000 7.000 N/A
" Performance is the organization unit's performance. Control is the type of control used (an indicator equal to
one for output control and zero otherwise). Hierarchy is the level of hierarchy (an indicator equal to one for high
level of hierarchy and zero otherwise). Participation is the level of budgetary participation. Control * Hierarchy is
the interaction term between control system and hierarchy. Control* Participation is the interaction term between
control and budgetary participation. Hierarchy * Participation is the interaction term between hierarchy and
budgetary participation. Control* Hierarchy* Participation is the three-way interaction between Control system,
hierarchy, and budgetary participation.
b We tested for normality of the data using the Kolmogorov -Smirnov test. The results of these procedures
indicate that only the performance variable violates the normality assumption (z*=3.495,/7<0.01). Consequently,
we transformed the performance variable using a logarithmic function when conducting the statistical analyses.
1
Since hierarchy and control systems are dummy variables, the measure of skewness is not appropriate for these
variables and the interaction terms with these variables.
items and the output control items and then correlate these two sums. The Pearson cor-
relation between the two sums is negative and statistically significant (/•=- 0.952,
p<0.001 ). The negative and significant correlation between the two sums confirms that the
control system is a homogeneous construct.
3.2.4. Level of hierarchy
The level of hierarchy is a dummy variable based on the structural position of the
respondent.
8 We coded one for the high level of a hierarchy (department heads) and zero for
the low level of a hierarchy (section heads).
4. Data analysis and results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. The average
performance of the organizational units is 6.14 with a minimum of 2.00 and a maximum of
7.00. The reliability coefficient computed for this construct is 0.95. For budgetary parti-
cipation, the average score is 2.08 with a minimum of 1.00 and a maximum of 7.00; the
reliability coefficient computed for this construct is 0.92. Twenty-one percent of our
Although most previous studies mvestigating the effect of budgetary participation on performance focus their
investigation on the relationship between managers at the upper level of a hierarchy and shop floor employees, some
studies have investigated this relationship at different levels ofhierarchies (e.g.. Ouchi & Maguire. 1 975; Ouchi. 1 97S).
282 J. Jermicis, T. Setiawan I The International Journal of
Accounting 43 (2008) 268-292
6
§ 1
§ JO X
2 -
U X
O a.
h
-:
o
«5
r i C
o
d
H 0U
— o S
- o ^ o ^i
*© o "* o *° o
£j § 2 o jq o
_- d So So s
SSs§sS s 8
?°o°oSo£
> .2
«-, g^ga-gajo^o0S0S0S0S0S
ce ;J -* _. — 5 2? 6 ^° o 5 o
s - g - ^ p ? n s p a °
o ^o o ^
r*-| o
— q ti Zi * _
00 * 3:t-24soS;oo g r^ 2 p 2 P
e
a
a.
S =
3 -
U o
oU
3 o § .S
-= '5 c
c w £- o.
o — o
£ I II
3D.* M
s".s g
"§
i- t: to -°
o ra c
_
.a ~° §
c £ Si «
rt cj to rt
„ -a
—
u g»g go
BB % ra
« § £ o
^ tS •£
•S ^ S «
rf — u >,
t- o *-* C1
— w C b
^ 'S § 3 -ff
**
_ c g 3
to j= o .. ra
g .2?-° .£ £
-. w S
.O u - S
---co
I § 3o
,5 5 o. £
'3
«i
o « j ? ;& g..s s fr
'5 S >- 8| -2 •§' o
c -a ». |a "
'2 C ,) 5J I)
N C M X >
C rt fli £c S o
oo >^ X
o 3 o o. 'to
^ *- i: r> u*- iu ^ .y CO
o ^ ° ^ S
g
°° &.I
a > « a §5 « E S
*
I * % 1 iC i» — -o **
-c '" ^ _ u
"B £ % 1 "
3j H o -2
.2 2
w
"5 c
° £ u c —S 3- «3 o 5
=o o 5 _ a
•a -2 ° g C
u > r- a) rab C > 0u
a o & -° -e
o .a
rt
-beg
u N g. " -
a "^ c x
§ ™ IT B —
E o « a 1
^E^l §U O 3 c r°.
J. Jermias, T. Setiawan / The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008} 268-292 283
respondents are department heads (high level of a hierarchy) and 79% are section heads (low
level of a hierarchy). In terms of control systems, 39% ofour respondents use output control
and 69% use behavior control. The reliability coefficient for this construct is 0.98.
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlations between the variables used in this study. The
results indicate that budgetary participation negatively affects performance (r=— 0.193,
/><0.01). However, the positive and significant correlation between level of a hierarchy
and control systems suggests that organizational units at the high level of a hierarchy use
more output control than organizational units at the low level of a hierarchy (r=0. 15 1,/?<0.05).
The correlation between hierarchy * participation and performance is positive and significant
(r= 0.194, p<0.01). Furthermore, the correlation between control * hierarchy * participation
and performance is also positive and significant (/=0.196, /;<0.01). The positive and signifi-
cant relationship between hierarchy * participation and performance, and control * hierarchy *
participation and performance provide early support for the hypotheses developed for this study.
4.2. Hypotheses testing
We begin our analyses by performing a simple linear transformation of the participation
scores that render zero on the participation score meaningful. Following the approach sug-
gested by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), we center participation by subtracting the
mean score of participation from each observed participation score. Without this trans-
formation, the interpretation of the lower-order coefficients in the moderated regression
analysis will be problematic since the regression coefficient of one independent variable
Table 3
Regression results of performance on hierarchy, control systems, and budgetary participation using dichotomous
and continuous measures of control systems
Variables Prediction Dichotomous control Continuous control
Coefficient p-values Coefficient /7-values
Intercept 0.801 0.000 0.930 0.000
Participation ? -0.146 0.036 -0.016 0.127
Hierarchy ? 0.206 0.002 0.160 0.008
Control ? -0.051 0.000 -0.034 0.006
Control * Hierarchy + 0.292 0.000 0.049 0.017
Control * Participation - -0.172 0.012 -0.006 0.158
Hierarchy * Participation + 0.215 0.001 0.019 0.004
Control * Hierarchy * Participation + 0.658 0.000 0.114 0.018
Adjusted Rr 0.285 0.391
F-statistics 17.819 0.000 22.296 0.000
Sample size 204 204
Performance is measured as the logarithmic function of the organization unit's performance. Control is the type of
control used (an indicator equal to one for output control and zero otherwisel. Hierarchy is the level of hierarchy (an
indicator equal to one for high level of hierarchy and zero otherwise). Participation is the level of budgetary
participation centered toward the mean. Control * Hierarchy is the interaction term between control systems and
hierarchy. Control* Participation is the interaction term between control and budgetary participation. Hierarchy*
Participation is the interaction term between hierarchy and budgetary participation. Control * Hierarchy * Participation
is the three-way interaction between control system, hierarchy, and budgetary participation.
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represents the regression of the dependent variable on the independent variable when the other
independent variables are zero (Jaccard et al., 1990). Hartmann and Moers (1999) acknowl-
edge that the lower-order effects in a moderated regression analysis cannot be easily
interpreted. However, they argue that this does not imply that the coefficients of the lower-
order effects in an interaction model are lacking all meaning because they signify the main
effect ofthe variable when the value ofthe other variable(s) is zero. Since the variables used in
this study are measured using interval scales, the scale origins and thus the linear transform-
ations of variable scores are arbitrary, and have no substantive meaning. Jaccard, Turrisi, and
Wan (1990) assert, however, that if the variables are centered on their respective means, the
zero values obtain a specific meaning. Furthermore, we also transform the performance
variable using a logarithmic function since this variable violates the normality assumption
(Skewness=-2.610, Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z=3.495,/?<0.01). The result of the log tran-
sformation is that the negatively skewed performance variable is transformed into a more
symmetrical data distribution (Fox, 1997).
Table 3 reports the results of the moderated regression analyses of the effect that
hierarchy, participation, and control systems had on performance using dichotomous and
continuous measures of control systems. Since the results are, in general, consistent across
both specifications, we will discuss only the results based on the dichotomous measure of
control systems.
10
The F-statistics for the regression is significant (F= 17.819, p<0.001. Adjusted R =
0.285). Hypothesis 1 predicts that hierarchical levels, control systems, and budgetary
participation will have an interactive effect on performance. This three-way interaction
hypothesis was tested with the estimated coefficient on Control * Hierarchy * Participation.
The significant coefficient on Control* Hierarchy* Participation (/3= 0.658, /;< 0.001) con-
firms the hypothesis that hierarchy and control systems moderate the relationship between
budgetary participation and performance.
To examine whether budgetary participation has a positive relationship with performance
at the high level ofa hierarchy, and whether the relationship is more positive for organizational
units that use output control than for those that use behavior control, we compare the re-
gression line based on Eq. (3a) and (3b). Specifically, we compare between the simple
slopes for the high level of a hierarchy that uses output control (Participation + Hierarchy*
Participation + Control * Participation + Control * Hierarchy * Participation) and the high level
of a hierarchy that uses behavior control (Participation + Hierarchy*Participation). As pre-
dicted, the results indicate that the sum of the coefficients on Participation and Hierarchy*
Participation is positive although not significantly different from zero (-0. 146 + 0.2 1 5 =0.069;
t= 1.094, p=215). The sum of the coefficients on Participation, Hierarchy* Participation,
To assess the linearity of the participation-performance relations, we performed the Lincheck procedure via
Regress command in STATA. The results indicate that the pattern of relationship between participation and
performance is consistent across the four quartiles, suggesting that the participation-performance relations are linear.
The control systems are dichotomized because this categorization has substantial advantages over the use of a
continuous variable for the understandability of the regression outcomes and the statistical power of the
moderated regression analyze (Arnold, 1984). Although dichotomization results in a loss of explanatory power,
Hartmann and Moers (1999) suggest that these advantages are especially important for analyses that incorporate
higher than two-way interactions.
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Control * Participation, and Control* Hierarchy* Participation is more positive and signifi-
cantly different from zero (-0.146 + 0.215-0.172 + 0.658=0.555; r=4.124,/?<0.001).
To examine whether the correlation for the high level of a hierarchy that uses output
control is statistically different from the correlation for the high level of a hierarchy that uses
behavior control, we conducted a r-test proposed by Chen and Popovich (2002). ' ' We obtained
ar-score of 1 .69, which is greater than the critical value of 1 .64 for an a-level of 0. 1 but smaller
than the critical value of 1 .96 for an a-level of 0.05. ' This result indicates that the correlation
between budgetary participation and performance for organizational units at the high level of a
hierarchy that use output control is significantly more positive than for those at the high level of
a hierarchy that use behavior control. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2.
To test whether the relationship between budgetary participation and performance at the low-
level ofa hierarchy is more negative for organizational units that use output control than for those
that use behavior control, we compare the regression line based on Eqs. (4a) and (4b). Spe-
cifically, we compare the simple slope for the low level of a hierarchy that uses behavior control
(Participation) and the simple slope for the low level of a hierarchy that uses output control
(Participation + Control * Participation). As predicted, the results indicate that the coefficient on
Participation is negative and significantly different from zero (-0.146; ?=-2.101,/? = 0.036).
The sum of the coefficients on Participation and Control * Participation is more negative and
significantly different from zero (-0.146 + (-0.172)=-0.318; r=3.432,/?<0.001).
To examine whether the correlation between budgetary participation and performance
for organizational units at the low level of a hierarchy that use output control is statistically
different from the correlation for those at the low level of a hierarchy that use behavior
control, we conduct a --test proposed by Chen and Popovich (2002), as described above.
We obtain a z-score of 6.408, which is greater than the critical value of 2.58 for an a-level
of 0.01. I3 This result indicates that the correlation between participation and performance
for organizational units at the low level of a hierarchy that use output control is significantly
more negative than the correlation for those at the low level of a hierarchy that use behavior
control.
14 The results are consistent with Hypothesis 3.
The moderating effects of hierarchical levels and control systems on the relationship
between budgetary participation and performance can be better understood by using
graphical terms. Cohen et al. (2003) suggest that a three-way interaction model can be
broken down into a more interpretable form by considering the interaction of two of
Chen and Popovich (2002) propose that to examine whether the correlation in subgroup A differs from that in
subgroup B, a r-test can be performed using the following formula z = . -"T~;t where both Z
ra and Zrb are
V ' "a-3)+] f(ni-3)
the Fisher's Z-values for subgroup A and subgroup B. respectively, and n„ and nb are sample sizes of subgroup A
and subgroup B, respectively.
'" Alternatively, we test whether (7.1+75 + 76+77) is greater than (73 + 7^). The results are qualitatively similar
to those based on the procedures proposed by Chen and Popovich.
13 See footnote 12.
We performed subgroup analyses to assess whether the slopes in the regression of performance on participation
for the high-level managers and the low-level managers are significantly different from zero when behavior control
is used. The results indicate that for the high-level managers, the slope is not significantly different from zero
(t= 1.42,p= 1 .63), and for the low-level managers, the slope is only marginally significantly different from zero (t
=
_ 1.7I;p<0.10). The results indicate that the impact of budgetary participation on performance is only marginal
(insignificant at the high-level of a hierarchy) when there is little output-based control.
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the variables at different values of the third variable. To plot the three-way interaction
as a two-way interaction (Control* Participation) at different hierarchical levels, we use
Eqs. (3)-(4). The results are shown in Fig. 3.
u
-
-=_-
Participation
-Behavior Control Output Control
Participation
-Behavior Control Output Control
Fig. 3. The moderating effects of hierarchy and control systems on the relationship between budgetary participation and
performance. Panel A: High level ofhierarchy1'. bAt the high level ofhierarchy, the performance values for organizational
units that use output control are the sum ofthe estimated coefficients for the intercept. Hierarchy. Control, Participation,
Hierarchy 'Participation, Control * Hierarchy, Control * Participation, and Control 'Hierarchy 'Participation. The per-
formance values for organizational units that use behavior control are the sum of the estimated coefficients for the
intercept, Hierarchy, Participation, and Hierarchy * Participation. Panel B: Low Level of hierarchy1 . ''At the low level ofa
hierarchy, the performance values for organizational units that use output control are the sum of the estimated coefficients
he intercept, Control. Participation, and Control * Participation. The performance values for organizational units that
;e behavior control are the sum of the estimated coefficients for the intercept and Participation.
Participation 3.29 82.25
Control systems 5.27 65.89
1.691 2\ 14
Performance 6.73 89.72
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Table 4
Results of factor analyses on budgetary participation, control systems, and performance
Factor Eigenvalue Percent of variance explained Cumulative percentage
82 2^
87.03
89.72
The factors were generated using factor analysis with vanmax rotation. Factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1 .00
were retained.
Fig. 3 depicts the predicted values of performance for organizational units at the high
(panel A) and low (panel B) levels of a hierarchy as a function of control systems and
budgetary participation; these values are based on the regression estimates reported in
Table 3. The pattern of relationship between budgetary participation and performance as a
function of control systems differs depending on hierarchical level, indicating the presence
\ of a three-way interaction between hierarchy, control systems, and budgetary participation.
I For organizational units at the high level of a hierarchy, budgetary participation has a
positive effect on performance. The strength of the positive relationship between budgetary
participation and performance depends upon the type of control system used; the former has
a stronger effect on the latter for organizational units that use output control as compared to
those that use behavior control.
In contrast, for organizational units at the low level of a hierarchy, budgetary
participation has a negative effect on performance. The strength of the negative relationship
again depends on the type of control system used. Although budgetary participation affects
performance negatively, organizational units that use output control show a more negative
effect as compared to those that use behavior control.
4.3. Robustness checks
In this section we discuss the results of a robustness check pertaining to the development
of the constructs used in this study. We use factor analysis to investigate the research
questions related to budgetary participation, types of control, and performance. 15
As shown in Table 4, participation has one factor (82% of the variance explained), types
of control systems have two factors (87% of the variance explained),"1 and performance has
one factor (75% of the variance explained). These results confirm that the multi-item
questionnaires have dimensions that are consistent with the proposed constructs used in this
study.
We use principal components factor analysis with Vanmax rotation. In applying this procedure, factors with
Eigenvalues greater than 1 .00 were retained.
To obtain a clear pattern of loadings, we use Varimax with Kaiser Normalization rotation method. The results
!
ndicate that the first factor is marked by high loadings on the behavior-control items and the second factor is
narked by high loadings on the output-control items. The results confirm that the control system, as measured by
he questionnaire, is composed of two aspects: behavior and output-control systems.
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5. Discussion, limitations and direction for future research
Argyris (1998) asserts that while managers love the participation model in theory, the
command-and-control model is what they trust and know best. He further claims that
organizations have found implementing the participative approach frustrating because they
have assumed that it can be applied to all organizational settings. More research is therefore
needed to clarify which types of organizational settings best suit the participative approach.
Towards this end, Mia (1988) suggests that researchers need to consider theoretically
justified moderating variables when investigating the effects of budgetary participation on
performance in order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between these two
variables.
Overall, the results are consistent with the three-way interaction hypothesis that the level
of a hierarchy and the type of control system moderate the relationship between budgetary
participation and performance. On the one hand, the results indicate that budgetary
participation has a positive relationship with performance at the high level of a hierarchy;
this relationship is more positive for organizational units that use output control than for
those that use behavior control. On the other hand, budgetary participation has a negative
relationship with performance at the low level of a hierarchy and is more negative for
organizational units that use output control than for those that use behavior control.
The positive relationship between budgetary participation and performance at the high
level of a hierarchy is consistent with the relationship reported by Brownell and Mclnnes
(1986). These authors found that budgetary participation has a positive impact on
performance only when task difficulty is high (i.e., managers at the high level of a hierarchy
handle more complex tasks than those at the low level of a hierarchy). Their results
reinforce the need to consider theoretically justified moderating variables when investi--
gating the effect of budgetary participation on performance.
The results of this study, however, should be interpreted in light of three limitations.
First, while data collected from survey questionnaires enables researchers to explore rich
data that are based in reality by obtaining information that is not publicly available, it must
be acknowledged that responses to the questionnaires are subjective and could be biased by
respondents' inclination to give socially desirable responses. Kren (1992) recognizes that
the use of self-rated performance scores has the potential for bias in terms of higher mean
values when compared to the use of objective performance measures. However, he argues
that this bias may not be consequential since there is no reason to suspect a systematic
relationship with the independent variable.
Second, the results of this study might have been influenced by both public sector
characteristics and Indonesian national culture. Previous studies investigating the relation-
ship between budgetary participation and performance were conducted mostly on private
sector manufacturing companies in the United States and Australia, whereas this study wasi
conducted using a survey of governmental units in Indonesia. Governmental units are
hierarchical, bureaucratic and structured according to a formal system of authority (Breton.
1 995 ). As such, they are characterized by strict regulations, established routines, and formal
procedures for performing tasks (Gresov, 1989). Furthermore, Hofstede (1991) find thai!
Indonesian culture is characterized by less individualism, power distance, uncertainf;
avoidance, and masculinity than western cultures such as those of the United States anc
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Australia. However, a more recent study by Heuer. Cummings, and Hutabarat (1999) find
that the differences in the cultural dimensions of Indonesian and American managers were
significantly narrower than was indicated by Hofstede's 1991 findings. This finding
suggests that our results might reflect more contemporary Indonesian cultural values and
hence be comparable to those of previous studies conducted in the United States and
Australia. Nevertheless, future research might extend our study by using data from public
sectors in other developing countries.
Finally, this study only investigates the moderating effects of hierarchical levels and
control systems on the relationship between participation and performance. Other variables
such as technology may also exert a significant effect on the relationship between partici-
pation and performance, and merit further investigation.
Appendix A. Abbreviated research questionnaire
A.I. Budgetary participation
Please indicate the typical influence you have in affecting the outcome of each decision
that could affect your organizational unit's performance:
Ql: I participate in setting the budgets for my organizational unit (1 =strongly disagree;
7 = strongly agree).
Q2: I have the authority to decide the activities necessary to achieve the budgets set for
my organizational unit ( 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
Q3: My opinion is an important factor in executing the budgets for my organizational unit
(1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
Q4: My organizational unit has the authority and responsibility given by the top-level
management to execute the budgets ( 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
A. 2. Types of control
Please indicate whether the following statements reflect your actual approach to mana-
ging your organizational unit
Ql: When I am evaluating my subordinates for raises or promotion, I always consider
their output records (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
Q2: I always monitor the people who report directly to me ( 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly
agree).
Q3: I always observe the way my subordinates perform their tasks (1 = strongly disagree;
7 = strongly agree).
Q4: I always consider the output of the activities in evaluating my subordinates ( 1 = strongly
disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
Q5 : When evaluating my subordinates, I put more weight on outcomes and less weight on the
way my subordinates perform the activities ( 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
Q6: The activities should be performed by my subordinates according to the procedures
and prescribed rules (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
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Q7: My organizational unit does not have standard operating procedures to perform
activities (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
Q8: My organizational unit puts more emphasizes on the output than on the process of
obtaining the output ( 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
A. 3. Performance
Please rate the performance of your organization unit on the following tasks ( 1 =
significantly below average; 7 = significantly above average).
1. Planning
2. Investigating
3. Coordinating
4. Evaluating
5. Supervising
6. Staffing
7. Negotiating
8. Representing
9. Your overall performance
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Abstract
There is compelling evidence from both the United States and United Kingdom suggesting that
R&D investment is positively related to operating and/or market performance. This study extends
prior research on R&D and valuation by further examining the sustainability or persistence of
operating growth and market performance as a result of R&D investments.
We use a large dataset of U.K. companies during the period 1990-2003 and our findings confirm
the relation between R&D intensity and consistent growth in Sales and Gross Income, but only in the
cases when a firm needs to engage in R&D activity because of the industry in which it operates.
Moreover, our evidence indicates not only a positive relation between R&D intensity and subsequent
risk-adjusted excess returns among firms that engage in R&D as testified by prior literature, but we also
show that R&D intensity improves persistence in excess stock returns: the highest R&D-intensify firms
are found to earn higher nsk-adjusted excess returns more consistently than the sample median return,
compared to lower R&D-intensity firms, as well as firms with no R&D. We interpret this finding as
consistent with at least some form of market mispricing.
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1. Introduction
There is strong empirical evidence from the U.S. market that identifies investment in
Research and Development as a factor that relates positively to the future level of operating
and market performance (e.g. Sougiannis, 1994; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996, 1999; Chan,
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 200 1 ; Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson, 2002; Penman and
Zhang, 2002; Lev. Sarath, and Sougiannis, 2005; Eberhart, Maxwell, and Sidique, 2004).
Other evidence from the United Kingdom also testifies that R&D contributes to market
performance (Green, Stark, and Thomas, 1996; Al-Horani, Pope, and Stark, 2003). The
rationale for the significant positive relation between R&D and future operating perfor-
mance relates to the economic consequences of possible positive results of the investment.
On the other hand, the significant positive relation between R&D intensity and subsequent
market performance has been considered by prior literature to be the result of either market
mispricing for R&D-intensive firms and/or a compensation for another risk dimension
associated with R&D, e.g., scientific innovation risk (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis,
2001; Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson, 2002; Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis, 2005). This
risk is perceived to be unaccounted for by traditional market factors, such as beta, and book-
to-market of firm size, and thus results in excess returns for R&D-intensive firms.
At the same time, Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2003) find indirect evidence to
suggest that R&D intensity is linked to persistence in operating performance: they find that
technology firms display strong persistence in growth rates of operating performance. Chan
et al. (2003) though do not examine directly the association between R&D and persistent
growth, since they look only at one sector and not at the impact of R&D on the
sustainability of growth across all sample firms. Therefore, the sustainability of the
relationship between R&D and future performance, both operating and market, is an issue
that remains unexamined by the literature on R&D and future performance.
The main purpose of this paper is to extend prior evidence on R&D and subsequent
operating-valuation by examining directly the impact of R&D investment on the siistain-
cihilih- of operating performance growth. We expand prior research on R&D and operating
performance with the assessment ofthe resilience or persistence aspect of corporate growth as
a result of R&D. We view that the possibility of a link between R&D and operating-
performance persistence may provide insights into the quality ofR&D undertaken by firms to
the users of financial statements. We argue that when R&D investments have a successful
economic outcome, this will be reflected in the persistence of the growth rates of operating
performance. At the same time, we predict a positive relation between R&D intensity and
persistent operating growth, based on the economic characteristics of the R&D intangible
investments. Intangible investments such as R&D are characterized by inherent non-rival use
and scalability, and they benefit from economies of network a great deal more than tangible
investments (Lev, 2001). Investments in intangibles have also been empirically linked to
economies ofscale (Hand, 2003). Therefore, ifthe outcome ofthese investments is successful,
they are expected to work in a way that favors consistency in operating-performance growth.
At the same time, we argue that the existence of possible evidence of persistence in
operating performance should ease investors' uncertainty about the quality of recent R&D
investments. As already discussed, one of the explanations proposed in the literature on the
ationale for the positive relation between R&D and future market performance is market
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mispricing. Ifevidence on persistence in growth resulting from R&D investments can reduce
investor uncertainty about the economic consequences ofR&D for corporate resilience, this
in turn may have direct repercussions on the expectations of market participants and,
inevitably, subsequent market valuation.
In this context, the second purpose of this paper is to extend prior evidence on R&D and
subsequent market valuation by examining directly the impact of R&D investment on the
sustainability of market performance. We expand prior research on R&D and market valuation
by examining persistence in stock returns as a result of significant R&D investments.
At this point, we view that the examination of the sustainability of market performance
resulting from R&D should contribute to the discussion on the rationale of the relation
between R&D and stock returns for two main reasons. First, we expect that any evidence on
R&D and persistent growth should reduce investor uncertainty, thereby influencing market
valuation, by making mispricing more difficult. At the same time, though, we do not ignore
the possibility that persistence in operating performance may be linked to excess returns in a
manner similar to the way momentum has been shown to relate to news that affects expected
earnings or earnings growth. Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Jackson and
Johnson (2006) provide evidence that markets respond gradually to new information on
corporate operating performance; evidence of this kind is supportive of market mispricing
based upon inefficient market response. Second, in an efficient market, there should not be
any persistent excess returns since all factors which affect returns should be controlled for.
Therefore, the direct assessment ofpersistence in returns as a result ofR&D, after controlling
for other risk factors which influence returns, could also in its turn provide some insights into
the discussion on whether R&D-related excess market performance is attributed to
compensation for R&D-related risk or market mispricing.
The paper extends prior research on R&D and subsequent operating and market
performance by assessing directly whether this performance is sustainable or not. Prior
research on R&D and operating and market performance has not examined whether this
relationship is sustainable, as it has focused on assessing the existence of the trend of this
relationship under different research designs. As discussed above, we argue that evidence on
R&D and resilience in operating growth could ease users of financial statements uncertainty
about the economic outcome of R&D, with possible market-valuation implications. We also
argue that possible evidence on persistent excess returns due to R&D could provide insights
into the ongoing discussion on the rationale for R&D-related market-excess performance. At
the same time, the examination of persistence in operating growth together with the
examination of persistence in market performance permits us to assess the possible market
implications of operating-growth persistence that stems from R&D. It, therefore, makes
possible the assessment of the relation between R&D and market performance after having
gained specific knowledge of how R&D influences operating-growth persistence.
Leaving aside the persistence issue for a moment, the paper also represents the first
attempt to assess R&D and operating performance in general for the U.K. market. It also
provides for the first time a complete characterization of the U.K. pattern of growth and
persistence of sales, gross earnings, and earnings per share across the whole spectrum of
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Alternative Investment Market
(ATM). In addition, in the process of assessing persistence in stock returns as a result of
investments in R&D, the study provides an assessment of the relation between R&D and
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returns in general \\ itfa the use ol risk-adjusted returns. Tlic three topics just mentioned have
ahead) been examined in the U.S. context [in that sense, in the process of expanding prior
e\ ulenee on R&D and valuation by examining the impact of R&D on operating growth and
sioek return persistence]. Our study replicates prior evidence found for the United States
for the United Kingdom an important market within the global economy, and presents a
comprehensive assessment of operating performance together with market performance, as
well as their sustainability in this market [from the moment some results are replicated in
the process of examining the new research questions, it would be wise to report the major
differences m the U.K. market context that relate to R&D, and what valuation implications
these differences may make].
Although the accounting treatment of R&D is broadly similar in the United Kingdom and
United States, R&D spending appears more pervasive in the United Stands; for example, only
about 30% of the U.K. firms report R&D spending in comparison to more than 50% in the
United States (Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson, 2002); furthermore, R&D spending in the
United Kingdom is concentrated mainly in larger firms compared to United States firms.
Corporate R&.\) activity in the United Kingdom has significantly increased in importance
during the time period examined in this study, starting with a total value of firm R&D expense
for our sample firms of £5135 million in L990, to more than double that amount
(£1 1.351 million) in 2003. The two observations that could influence operating and market
performance associated with R&D are probable interactions ofR&D with firm size and/or the
way that the market has learned to capitalize on R&D (given the small percentage offirms that
actually undertake R&D activities). Although these differences are not perceived to be verj
large, they still may account for the different impact ofR&D in the United States and United
Kingdom [in the extent to which some analyses previously made for the U.S. are replicated
with U.K. data in the process of assessing the main research questions].
Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that although R&D does not appear to
be associated with a wide spectrum of the sample firms' improvement in persistence in
operating growth, it does play a role in operating-growth persistence among firms that
engage in R&D because of the sector they belong to. This finding applies mainly to
measures of operating performance that we find in the higher steps of the income statement
(Sales and Gross Income GI). This constitutes the first evidence of a direct relationship
between R&D intensity and persistence in growth, given that the evidence of Chan et al.
(2003) indicate increased persistence only in an R&D-intensive sector compared to other
sectors, without examining whether R&D directly plays a role in persistence in growth.
Second, we document lor the first time for the United Kingdom a positive and significant
relation between R&D intensity and future growth in Sales, Gl, and EPS after controlling
for a number of other relevant factors including industry effects, consistent with prior
evidence relative to the United States
Third, consistent with prior evidence for the United States as well as the United
Kingdom, in the case of stock returns, we observe a positive relation between R&D
intensity and subsequent risk-adjusted excess stock returns among firms that engage in
R&D. We further expand prior literature by finding that R&D intensity also improves
persistence in excess stock returns: this is expressed as achieving excess returns above
the market median excess return for consecutive years. More specifically, we show that the
highest R&D - intensity firms earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns than the sample
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median return more consistently, compared to lower R&D - intensity, as well as zero-R&D
firms. This finding represents the first direct evidence that R&D is positively associated
with persistent excess stock market returns, for 1 year after another, for a consecutive
number of years, after controlling for risk differences among firms arising from firm size
and the book-to-market factor.
Overall, we find evidence of a positive association between R&D and subsequent
persistence in operating growth only after taking the industry sector into account. In the case
of R&D-intensive industries, we find that R&D-intensive firms which belong to R&D-
intensive industries do achieve persistent growth. In the case ofmarket performance, though,
after controlling for risk differences arising from firm size and the book-to-market factor, we
find that R&D intensity plays a role for persistent excess stock returns for each sample,
across all sample firms, which in turn do not appear to be industry-specific. Taking the two
previous findings on operating and the persistence of market performance into account, we
do not observe uniform behavior of operating as opposed to market performance as a result
of R&D. In other words, evidence on operating-performance persistence does not appear to
ease investors' uncertainty about the quality ofR&D [with this increased transparency to be
reflected in market performance]. The pattern of behavior for market-performance
persistence does not appear to be connected to operating-growth persistence behavior. At
the same time, having made use of stock returns adjusted for risk arising from differences in
firm size and the book-to-market factor, persistent excess returns are still observed for R&D-
intensive firms for a number ofyears after R&D investments. In an informationally efficient
market, in theory, excess returns should in theory, not persist after accounting for all the
factors which affect returns. Combining the evidence on differences in the patterns of
behavior between operating and market-performance persistence as a result ofR&D, along
with the existence of persistent excess stock returns for a number of years after initial R&D
investment is undertaken, the weight of our evidence is consistent with some form of
mispricing related to inefficient market adjustment to the slowly emerging evidence of
significant enhancement in operating performance following recent R&D investment.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the sample-selection process
and a draft of the methodology used. Sections 3 and 4 contain the empirical results for
operating and market performance, respectively, while Section 5 concludes by including
references to some limitations of the study.
2. Sample and methodology
The sample ofcompanies used in this study is based on all U.K. listed (in both the London
Stock Exchange and the Alternative Investment Market) nonfinancial firms during the
period 1990-2003. As the revised SSAP 13, which makes mandatory the disclosure of the
amount ofR&D expensed on the income statement, was introduced in the United Kingdom
for accounting periods beginning on or after the 1st of January 1989, we take 1990 as the
starting year in our analysis. Firms have been identified through the London Share Price
Database (LSPD-Version 2003). Accounting figures have been taken from the Worldscope
database, and information on stock returns and market values from Datastream. For a firm to
be included in the study, it must have data on the (positive) book-to-market ratio (BM),
market market-value-of of-equity (MVE), sales and Total Assets (TA) at year-end. Given
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that accounting years end at different times during the calendar year in the United Kingdom,
we use accounting year-ends for accounting data, and calendar year-ends for market-based
data. For example, for a company whose accounting year-ends are on September 1 990, use
the MVE at the end of December 1 990, and for the BM ratio, we use the book value at
financial year-end divided by the MVE at the end of December 1990. Sales and TA are the
ones for the accounting year 1990. Firms are classified according to the FTSE Actuaries
industry classification.
For purpose of this study, we use the R&D expense taken from the income statement.
Although in the United Kingdom SSAP 13 allows the conditional capitalization of devel-
opment costs, the dominant practice in the United Kingdom is for R&D to be immediately
expensed. Previous studies on R&D for the United Kingdom (e.g.. Green, Stark, and Thomas,
1996: Al-Horani, Pope, and Stark, 2003) have also relied solely on the R&D expense that
appears on the income statement, and therefore the methodology that we use also permits
comparability of our studies with previous work. In our sample of companies only 3.3% of
firm-year observations report capitalized development costs on the balance sheet, and 2.7% of
firm-year observations report amortized development costs on the income statement (8.5%
and 6.9% of firms, respectively). The magnitude of the yearly amounts of development costs
amortized is also very much lower than the amounts of R&D expensed on the income
statement. ' This way, it is unlikely that relying solely on income statement R&D should result
in much loss of information."
The above sample-selection process results in a total of 15,488 firm-year observations
(2182 firms) for the period 1990-2003, out of which 31.4% report R&D (4851 firm-year
observations and 770 firms). Increased R&D reporting is observed in the sectors where one
would expect significant R&D activity, such as IT Hardware and Pharmaceuticals, with
percentages close to 80% of firm-year observations. Electronics and Engineering also exhibit
high rates of R&D activity with 69.5 and 54.5%, respectively. It is worth noting that only
54.7% of Software and Computer Services companies report R&D, compared to a
significantly higher percentage for Hardware companies. Not surprisingly, firms in Retailing,
Household Goods, Leisure, Media and Support Services are engaging in limited R&D activity.
R&D intensity is generally defined in two ways: first, as R&D expense from the income
statement divided by annual sales, and second, as R&D expense divided by firm Total
Assets. There has not been any extensive market-based measure of R&D intensity used in
Given that Worldscope. which is used in the study for accounting data, does not provide separate items for the
amount of Capitalized Development Costs as well as Development Cost Amortization, we have used the items
EX.FixedAssetsDevelopCostsGross and EX FixedAssetsDevelopCostsAmort from the Extel Database which
provides the relevant items separately. The data described in this paragraph are not included in this paper but are
available upon request.
We do not make use of R&D capital calculation since this would make necessary the use of lagged R&D
values, and our sample period starts in 1990 and only covers 13 years. Therefore we have applied the
methodology first used by Al-Horani, Pope, and Stark (2003) by estimating Pearson correlation coefficients
between yearly R&D expense and estimated R&D capital for the period 1994-2003. Given the high Pearson
coefficients that we get, it is assumed that yearly R&D expense is a good proxy for R&D activity and, therefore,
we don't make use of calculated R&D capital In addition, when dividing the sample into quartiles according to
R&D intensity, we observe that on average, more than 75% (top) and more than 60% (bottom) of firms fall into
the same quartile for the next 1 and 2 years. This way. the R&D activity that a firm undertakes over time appears
to exhibit a certain degree of stability
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our tests on R&D and operating-growth persistence, such as for example R&D/MVE, since
the analysis has a great focus on operating performance. There are advantages and
disadvantages for each R&D-intensity proxy: for example. R&D/TA uses TA for scaling
purposes, but to what extent is TA a representative size proxy for an R&D-intensive firm
which does not capitalize R&D investments? Or. one could argue that R&D/MVE, which
does not depend on accounting-related size measures, could easily be driven by the
volatility of the denominator. In order to make the analysis as thorough and unbiased as
possible, we have used more than one R&D-intensity proxy.
3. R&D and operating performance
3.1. Growth and persistence characteristics
Table 1 shows summary statistics on the R&D/Sales and R&D TA ratios for the sample
firms throughout the sample period 1990-2003. by reporting quintile breakpoint values,
and also gives the median values for each variable in the middle of the quintile breakpoints
for each year. The R&D/Sales and R&D/TA ratios have increased steadily from around
1.2% (median values) in 1990 to slightly higher than 4% in 2003. Despite this increase, the
R&D-intensity ratios observed for the United Kingdom fall behind the median R&D Sales
and R&D/TA ratios in the United States, with values around 6% and 1 5%, respectively, in
the late 1990's (Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson. 2002), indicating a much less intense
R&D activity in the United Kingdom. We also observe a high increase in the value of the
top R&D-intensity quintile breakpoints as we move towards the end of the sample period:
for both R&D/Sales and R&D/TA ratios, the breakpoint for the top 20% of firms started
right above 3% for 1990 to end at above 20% for R&D/Sales and almost 1 5% for R&DHA
at the end of the sample period. It is also interesting to note the increase in R&D intensity
after 1999, which overlaps with the years of the New Economy. This increase in R&D
intensity for the United Kingdom after 1999 underlines the importance of the fact that our
Table 1
R&D intensity for the period 1990 2003
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
R&D/Sales
Low 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.3 2.0 2.9 2.6 2.6
Median 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 II 1.3 1.4 14 1.8 1.8 3.2 5.3 4.9 4.4
1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.4 3.0 5.5 9 4 9.2 6.4
High 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.6 4.1 4.4 4.7 5.7 6.8 7.8 17.9 29.3 25.4 20.6
R&D/TA
Low 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.9
0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 11 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.6 2.4 2.6 2.6
Median 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.7 3.4 4.1 4.1
1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 3.2 3.4 3.9 5.2 6.0 6.1
High 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.3 4.8 5.6 6.1 6.6 8.4 7.7 8.5 12.4 13.8 14.8
The table reports the quintile breakpoint values for the R&D/Sales and R&D/Total Assets (TA) ratios for Ihe simple
film for the period 1990-2003. Median values for the ratios are reported in the middle.
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paper, unlike previous papers for the United Kingdom covers this period. Increased R&D
intensity during the end of our sample period may have particular valuation implications
arising from these higher R&D investments.
Before moving on to the persistence question. Table 2 provides evidence on the growth
rates in sales, positive Gross Income (GI), positive EPS, and Total Assets (a proxy for firm
size) per share (quintile breakpoints and median growth values) for some years during the
sample period 1990-2003. The number of shares used to calculate growth per share has
been adjusted for splits.
We observe from Table 2 that the median growth rates in sales, GI, and TA start from
slightly negative values during the first years of the sample period, to generally positive
after 1992, reaching their peak around 1994. Therefore, the median growth rates in the
measures of operating performance used tend to behave in accordance with the general
economic trends for the United Kingdom in the 1 990s, where a slow-down in the economy was
Table 2
Growth rates per share during 1990-2003 for Sales, Gross Income. EPS and Total Assets
90-91 92-93 94-95 96-97 98-99 00-01 02-03 Average
Sales
Low -17.8 -11.6 -4.1 -7.5 -10.7 -8.5 -12.7 -10.7
-6.0 -0.6 5.1 1.2 1.6 4.3 -0.7 0.6
Median growth rate -2.4 3.2 8.1 4.6 5.5 9.0 3.9 4.5
High
1.3
12.5
6.6
15.0
11.5
22.7
8.3
20.0
9.3
23.3
14.9
33.9
8.4
23.5
8.4
21.0
GI
Low -25.2 -16.7 -7.1 -8.4 -13.6 -16.3 -14.7 -14.6
-9.6 -0.8 4.4 2.5 1.6 2.0 0.0 0.1
Median growth rate -4.8 3.1 S7 7.0 6.5 7.6 5.3 4.9
0.9 7.5 13.2 II 4 109 13.1 9.3 9.7
High 14.0 20 26.5 25.9 24.5 35.0 28.5 24.7
EPS
Low -44.0 -179 -11.6 -19.1 -31.3 -36.4 -30.4 -25.9
-20.9 4.6 8.5 5.9 0.4 -6.6 3.2 0.1
Median growth rate -10.8 12.0 15.4 13.6 7.7 3.9 11.2 8.6
-0.5 18.0 22.0 20 5 15.3 13.0 20.7 16.4
High 16.2 45.2 51.1 48.4 39,5 37.0 61.7 43.1
TA
Low -13.7
-12.6 -3.6 -7.0 -8.0 -15.4 -18.2 -111
-4.3
-1.7 3.4 0.5 2.4 -2.2 -5.2 -0.8
Median growth rate -0.8 1.5 6.0 3.5 5.8 1.9 -1.2 2.9
2.1 4.5 8.5 7.0 9.8 6.1 3.0 6.4
High 11.7 12.7 17.2 17.1 25.8 20.1 14.4 17.3
The table reports the quintile breakpoint values of the growth rates per share for Sales, positive Gross Income
(GI — Sales minus Cost of Goods Sold), positive earnings per share (EPS) and Total Assets (TA) for some years
between 1990 and 2003. EPS represents profit after tax, minority interest, and preferred dividends, excluding
extraordinary Hems prior to 1993 and including them after that year due to the implementation of FRS3. Median
values for the growth rates are reported in the middle of the quintile breakpoints. Average breakpoint values for the
whole sample period are also reported. Growth rates per share have been adjusted for stock splits.
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observed in the early years of the decade. Between 1992 and 1994, the median growth rates in
sales reach their highest values and range between 3% and 9%. Interestingly, median growth
rates in TA return to negative after 200 1 , which is not the case for either sales or GI growth rates,
and the growth rates for TA are the lowest ones compared to the rates for the other variables, with
an average of the sample period median values of 2.9%. Growth rates in GI are generally larger
than growth rates in sales, both in terms ofaverages of median values (4.9% for GI and 4.5% for
sales) as well as quintile breakpoints. The highest values for all growth rates are achieved around
1999 to 2001, with values around or even greater than 6% for Sales, GI, and TA. The growth
rates in terms of EPS exhibit the most volatile behavior, ranging from values above 15% in the
mid-90s to below 5% around year 2000-2001, and show the highest average median value of
8.6% during the sample period, compared to the other variables.
To proceed with thepersistence in growth question, we define and measure persistence as
in Chan et al. (2003), i.e., as achieving growth rates, on a per share basis, in the measures of
operating performance used, above the median of the overall sample for up to 5 years ahead
from each base year. We use three measures of operating performance. Sales, Gross Income
(defined as Sales minus Cost ofGoods Sold), and EPS (profit aftertax, minority interest, and
preferred dividends, excluding extraordinary items prior to 1993 and including them after
that year due to the implementation ofFRS3 ). Thus, we estimate how many times a company
can achieve growth rates per share in measuring the of operating performance in question
above the median of the overall sample for up to 5 years ahead from every base year. Then
the number of firms with growth rates above the sample median growth rate for the next 1 to
5 years is divided by the total number of firms that survive for the next 1 to 5 years. Median
growth rates are calculated using all the available firm observations in a particular year.
Regarding the EPS measure of operating performance, it is the only one among the three
measures used that measures operating performance after the expensing of the R&D figure.
It can, in this way, be heavily influenced and distorted by this procedure of immediate
expensing, especially in the presence of significant R&D. At the same time, this very fact of
assessing the persistence in growth behavior of a profit measure after the expensing ofR&D
may provide us with valuable information about how different measures of performance in
growth may be affected by the expensing ofR&D in terms of persistent growth.4
When GI or EPS is negative in any base year, in order not to discard a whole sequence of observations, we
follow a methodology suggested by Chan et at (2003) (footnote on p. 653). We calculate growth as ((Income-GI
or EPS),,
i
- Income,)/Stock Price at I and for firms with a negative income value in the base year, we assign a
percentile rank for each growth observation. We look up the corresponding percentile value from the distribution
of growth rates of firms with positive income in the base year, and this latter growth rate is assigned to the firm
with the negative mcome in the base year. This growth-rate value for the firms with negative income in the base
year is thus imputed. As in Chan et al. (2003), we do not report descriptive statistical data in Table 2 based on
imputed growth rates, and therefore the growth rates reported on this table are only realized ones, excludmg firms
with a negative income - GI or EPS - in any base year. In the previous versions of the paper we did not follow
growth m GI or EPS in case the operating result in the base year was negative and this led to small changes in the
results compared to the ones we report in this version, which are discussed in the relevant parts of the text.
For example, if firm achieves a growth rate for sales above the median growth rate for 1990-1991 (e.g., —2.4%
according to Table 2), it is included in the "persistence" sub-sample. If it achieves a growth rate above the median
growth rate for 1 99 1 - 1 992, given that it was above the median for 1 990- 1 99 1 . it is also counted up to 1 994- 1 995
for the base year 1990.
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Table 3 presents the average percentage of firms with growth rates above the sample
median growth rate for t+ 1 to /+ 5 from every base year, for the whole sample, for R&D and
zero-R&D firms, then for the R&D firms according to R&D/Sales and R&DATA quartiles. On
average, 5.2% ofthe sample firms achieved sales growth above the median in the 5 years after
each base year. This percentage becomes 4.8% for Gross Income and 4.7% for EPS. The U.K.
results for both sales and GI, are close to Chan et al. (2003) estimates for the U.S. market for
their five five-year window, i.e. 6.3% for sales and 3.6% for GI. As one would expect,
intuitively, the percentages for sales are slightly higher compared to the ones for GI and EPS,
given that a firm has to translate growth in sales into growth in GI and then EPS. Interestingly,
the average percentage of firms that achieve a growth rate above the median in EPS 5 years
after portfolio formation is quite high at 4.7% compared to just 2.6% for the United States.
This finding could be related to survivorship bias; i.e., of the surviving and hence more
successful firms, there are positive growth rates in EPS. It could also be received influence by
Table 3
Persistence in operating growth according to R&D intensity
Sales GI EPS
1 2 3 4 5 1 J 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Sample 50.0 27.7 15.8 9.2 5.2 50.0 26.9 14.7 8.3 4.8 50.0 25.5 13.1 7.6 4.7
R&D 46.2 23.7 12.0 6.0 2.6 46.0 22.9 11.3 5.8 2.4 47.7 22.0 9.5 4.7 2.1
Zero R&D 51.9 29.8 17.8 10.9 6.5 52.0 28.9 16.4 9.7 6.0 51 .1 27.3 14.9 9.0 5.9
R&DfEA
Low 45.9 23.7 11.6 6.3 3.4 46.3 23.1 11.3 6.4 3.6 44.4 17.2 7.1 3.3 1.4
40.7 18.6 8.7 3.6 0.6 40.8 18.5 8.1 3.7 1.1 45.7 18.4 5.8 1.7 0.3
45.5 22.1 11.9 6.1 2.1 45.6 21.3 11.5 5.5 1.6 48.3 22.9 10.8 5.6 2.1
High 52.7 30.4 15.8 7.7 3.9 51.8 29.3 144 7.5 3.2 53.0 29.7 14.0 8.0 4.2
R&D/Sales
Low 422 20.4 9.9 5.7 2.7 43.0 19.9 8.7 4 1 1.9 44.5 16.9 7.8 3.8 1.7
41.5 19.7 9.8 4.4 1.4 42 2 20.7 11.0 6.5 3.4 46.3 20.8 7.0 2.1 0.5
46.9 23.6 124 5.5 2.1 46.6 21.8 10.3 3.9 0.8 47.0 199 8.4 3.9 1.3
High 54.2 30.8 15.9 8.3 4.0 52 6 29.8 15.3 8.6 3.6 53.2 30.3 14.5 9.0 4.5
The table reports the average % of firms with growth rates in Sales. Gross Income (GI — Sales minus Cost of
Goods Sold) and earnings per share (EPS) above the sample median for the next I to 5 years, first for the whole
sample, then for R&D and zero-R&D firms, and finally for the R&D firms only according to R&D'Sales and R&D/
Total Assets (TA) quartiles (from low to high). EPS represents profit after tax. minority interest, and preferred
dividends, excluding extraordinary items prior to 1993 and including them after that year due to the
implementation of FRS3. Market values are taken at calendar year-ends e.g., December 1990. In case GI or EPS is
negative in any base year, in order not to discard a whole sequence of observations, we follow a methodology
suggested by Chan et al. (2003) (footnote on p.653). We calculate growth as ((Income -GI or EPS) ,+ , - Income,)/
Stock Price at / and for firms with a negative income value in the base year, we assign a percentile rank for each
growth observation. We look up the corresponding percentile value from the distribution of growth rates of firms
with positive income in the base year, and this latter growth rate is assigned to the firm with the negative income in
base year. This growth-rate value for the firms with negative income in the base year is thus imputed. As in
:han et al. (2003), we do not report descriptive statistical data in Table 2 based on imputed growth rates, and.
:torc, the growth rates reported on this table are only realized ones, excluding firms with a negative income —
GI or EPS in any base year.
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the fact that we use imputed EPS growth rates when earnings in a base year get negative values
(footnote 3).
On average, zero-R&D firms exhibit more persistent growth rates compared to the R&D
firms for sales, GI, ad EPS for every time window from t+ 1 to / + 5. For zero-R&D firms,
6.5% of firms achieve a growth rate in sales above the sample median growth rate 5 years
after portfolio formation (6% for GI and 5.9% for EPS), compared to 2.6%, 2.4% and 2.1%
for R&D firms in the respective measures of operating performance. Limiting the analysis
within the R&D sample only, the top R&D-intensity quartile clearly exhibits the best
persistence results, in terms of Sales, GI, and EPS - no matter which proxy for R&D
intensity is used (R&D/Sales or R&D/TA), with percentages around 4% for Sales, 3.5% for
GI, and 4% for EPS of firms - to show growth rates above the median after 5 years.
Generally persistence in growth tends to improve as R&D intensity increases, with the two
highest R&D-intensity quartiles exhibiting improved persistence results compared to the
lower ones, but, even the top R&D-intensity firms show, for some time windows, worse
persistence in growth compared to zero-R&D firms overall.
Next we assess persistence in growth for R&D firms, R&D-intensive firms, and zero-
R&D firms matched according to firm size, using MVE as the proxy for size, and the book-
to-market ratio. The fact that we perform MVE-BM matching and then assess the
performance of firms that differ in terms of R&D intensity implies that we expect that
information on the future performance of a firm contained in its degree ofR&D intensity is
neither captured by MVE nor by BM. This argument relates to the very core of our research
hypothesis (and all relevant research on the association between R&D and future operating
performance), that R&D investments are intangible investments of a scientific nature and
we, therefore, expect that they are able to produce externalities that will influence future
operating growth. In addition, the book value included in the BM-ratio calculation does not
generally include R&D investments due to current accounting treatment. In this context,
when comparing two firms of the same size and BM characteristics but of different R&D
intensity, we expect that the possible externalities inherent in R&D investment should
contain more information than we would get from firm size or the BM multiple.
The sample firms are divided into two MVE portfolios, using the median MVE as of the
end ofDecember in each year. Then the firms in each of the two MVE portfolios are divided
into three book-to-market (BM) portfolios: one containing the lower 30% values for BM,
another one with the middle 40%, and finally, a portfolio containing the top 30% of the BM
ratios. This results in six size-value portfolios (two by three size-BM portfolio analysis).
Portfolio breakpoints are rebalanced every year, and the average percentages of firms with
growth rates in Sales, GI, and EPS above the sample median growth rates, for t+ 1 to t+5
from every base year is calculated, for the R&D and zero-R&D firms, as well as for firms
with R&D/TA ratios above the sample median every year (the R&D-intensive firms), which
belong to each portfolio. The relevant results are reported on Table 4.
A casual comparison of the persistence patterns between R&D and zero-R&D firms, is
sufficient to suggest that R&D investment does not enhance consistency in all of the six
portfolios for Sales, GI, and EPS. and the zero-R&D firms generally exhibit higher
persistence in growth compared to the R&D and R&D-intensive firms. However, when we
focus only on the R&D population, on average, the R&D-intensive firms show a higher
percentage of improved persistence in operating growth compared to the general population
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Table 4
Persistence in operating growth for R&D, zero-R&D and R&D-intensive firms matched according to MVE and BM
Sales
1 2 3 4 5
GI EPS
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
RAP firms MVE BM
Low-low 51.6 27.3 14.1 7.0 4.2 53.3 27.0 11.7 7.9 4.3 57.0 27.2 13.0 10.5 8.8
Low-mid 41.0 19.0 8.1 3.0 0.4 42.2 20.0 7.9 3.3 0.9 49.5 27.7 12.3 8.2 4.6
Low-high 34.2 13.5 5.0 2.6 0.7 34.2 13.1 4.3 0.5 0.7 54.1 31.4 11.6 3.6 0.0
High-low 56.3 31.5 18.1 10.2 44 55.1 30.4 16.7 8.0 2.8 50.5 24.3 10.3 3.4 0.9
High-mid 45.7 22 4 11.0 5.2 20 44.1 19.4 8.9 4.2 1.4 42.0 16.4 7.7 3.8 1.0
High-high 39 i 20.9 10.4 5.1 2.8 39.5 22.1 12.7 8.0 4 3 429 18.9 7.2 3.2 2.0
Zero-R&D j•irms MVE-BM
Low-low 62.5 38.6 25.9 17.7 13.3 57.4 31.8 18.9 10.9 8.4 55.5 32.8 18.8 12.5 9.1
Low-mid 51.9 2d 2 14.2 8.9 4.7 48.4 25.9 12.7 6.6 3.8 49.8 25.4 14.4 8.2 4.9
Low-high 39.6 19.3 10.3 5.1 1.4 40 2 2115 9.9 5.7 2.5 50.1 29.1 14.8 8.1 4.2
High-low 65.1 41.3 25.7 16.7 11.6 62.8 38.1 23.2 13.8 8.4 55.1 28.7 15.3 8.4 6.3
High-mid 58.9 34.7 19.9 10.5 5.2 57.3 32.3 19.0 10.9 6.2 49.0 24.0 11.7 6.4 2.4
High-high 48.5 27.9 16.6 10.8 6.5 48.7 26.6 16.2 11.0 7.7 48.1 25.2 15.4 11.2 9.5
R&D/TA above median /irms MVE-BM
Low-low 52.3 27 2 12.5 5.7 3.1 55.6 29.2 13.3 10 1 5.5 59.2 30.5 144 12.1 9.3
Low-mid 42.8 20.0 8.9 3.4 0.0 45 3 22 1 9.5 3.8 0.9 54.0 32.8 15.5 10.0 5.6
Low-high 40.3 21.8 9.3 3.4 0.0 37.1 20.8 9.9 0.0 0.0 55.1 41.1 16.6 4.5 0.0
High-low 58.9 34.3 19.7 11.3 5.5 56.0 31.6 18.4 8.6 3.0 51.3 25.7 11.6 3.8 0.9
High-mid 45.5 22.7 12.5 6.3 3.1 43.5 20.5 9.9 4.9 1.2 39.1 190 10.3 6.5 2.0
High-high 31.6 15.7 6.9 1.4 0.0 30.1 13.7 4.6 2.9 IN 46.8 28.2 22.9 20.1 18.8
The sample firms are divided into two market-value-of-equity (MVE) portfolios, using the median MVE as of the end of
December in each year. Then the firms in each of the two MVE portfolios are divided into three book-to-market (BM
MVE for BM ratio taken at calendar year-end I portfolios: one with the lower 30% values for BM, another with the
middle 40%, and one with the top 30% ofBM ratios, resulting in MVE BM annually rebalanced portfolios. The table
reports the average % of firms with growth rates in Sales, Gross Income (GI — Sales minus Cost of Goods Sold), and
earnings per share (EPS) above the sample median for the next I to 5 years for the R&D, zero-R&D and R&D-intensive
firms that belong to each of the six portfolios. R&D-intensive firms are defined as the ones with R&DATotal Assets (TA)
above the sample median R&D/TA ratio for a particular year. EPS represents profit after tax, minority interest, and
preferred dividends, excluding extraordinary items before 1993 and including them afterwards due to FRS3
introduction. In case GI or EPS is negative in any base year, in order not to discard a whole sequence ofobservations, we
follow a methodology by Chan et al. (2003 ) We calculate growth as ((Income - GI or EPS) , .
,
- Income,)/Stock Price at
I and for firms with a negative income value in the base year, we assign a percentile rank for each growth observation.
We look up the corresponding percentile value from the distribution ofgrowth rates of firms with positive income in the
base year, and this latter growth rate is assigned to the firm with the negative income in the base year.
of the R&D firms. This result holds when R&D intensity is expressed either in terms of the
R&D/TA and the R&D/Sales ratio (untabulated data). An interesting observation is that in
the case of EPS growth, persistence in growth appears to be particularly strong for some
portfolios for high R&D/TA firms, in contrast to the relevant results for sales and GI. We
attribute this finding to the methodology used when earnings in the base year get negative
values, and imputed growth rates are used (as explained in footnote 3) so a whole sequence
ot observations can be retained. This method is especially useful when a bad year is followed
by particularly good performances in the years that follow. When only realized growth rates
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are used (i.e., not following growth in the negative base year (untabulated results)), there is
no sign for persistence in growth for high R&D firms for either Sales. GI, or EPS and this
result also appears to hold true for every single time window used, particularly for the five-
year time window.
The above size-BM matching analysis, performed for the whole sample, lacks controls
for possible industry effects, which could pose significant limitations to the analysis. Thus,
in addition to size-BM matching, we repeat the above analysis for three separate industries,
with enough firm-year observations to permit meaningful portfolio construction for R&D.
zero-R&D and R&D-intensive firms. According to FTSE Actuaries classification, these are:
Information Technology (that group, the sectors of Information Technology Hardware and
Software and Computer Sendees). Genera! Industrie* (which includes Aerospace and
Defense. Diversified Industrials. Electronic and Electrical Equipment. Engineering and
Machinery), and the Health and Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology sectors grouped
together (called Pharma onwards). The Pharma grouping does not correspond to a specific
FTSE Actuaries Industry definition, but we chose to group them together given the closeness
of their operations.
We perform a 2 * 2 MVE-BM portfolio construction within each ofthe three industry groups
defined. First, within each industry, the firms are divided in two MVE groups (employing MVE
as of the end of December), using the median industry MVE. Each MVE portfolio is then
divided into two annually rebalanced BM Portfolios. We then assess the persistence in growth
results for the R&D firms, zero-R&D firms, and R&D-intensive firms (firms with R&D/TA
ratios above the industry median) that belong in each of the four MVE-BM portfolios.
Table 5 (Panels A. B and C) show persistence estimates for IT, General Industries, and
Pharma, respectively. In sharp contrast to the previous table, we now observe for the three
industry groups more persistent growth rates in sales and GI for the R&D-intensive firms, in
comparison to the zero-R&D firms and R&D firms in general. This result is not consistent
within each of the four MVE-BM portfolios, but for the majority of the portfolios in each of
the three industries it is more pronounced for the three-year window. This result underlines
the positive influence of R&D for performance consistency within an R&D-intensive
industry.
More specifically, in the case ofInformation Technology and with the exception of the
low MVE-low BM portfolio for both sales and GI. the R&D-intensive firms within the
industry generally exhibit the most persistent growth rates, followed by the R&D firms in
general and then by the zero-R&D firms. This result is repeated for General Industries,
where R&D-intensive firms generally exhibit the best persistence in growth results for all
four portfolios, compared to the R&D firms overall and the zero-R&D firms. Finally, the
same results are more or less observed fox Pharma. with the exception of the low MVE-low
BM portfolio (which was the case for the IT industry) and zero-R&D firms had the most
persistent growth in sales and GI. As a general comment, the R&D-intensive firms within
each industry show exceptionally strong persistence in growth in the three three-year time
window. The previous results hold when dropping the use of imputed growth rates in case
GI is negative in the base year, and using only realized growth rates, by not following
growth when GI in the base year is negative (untabulated results).
When examining persistence in EPS within these R&D-intensive industries, there are
again signs for high R&D firms to exhibit improved persistence in terms of EPS growth
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Table 5
Persistence in operating growth for R&D, zero-R&D and R&D-intensive firms matched according to MVE and
BM within their industry
Sales GI 1 PS
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Information technology
R&D firms MVE-BM
Low-low 41.3 12.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 50.7 22.0 4.1 2.5 0.0 57.2 18.0 7.6 6.3 14.3
Low-high 47.6 22.6 9.2 3.3 0.0 47.4 29.0 12.3 6.8 2.8 62.9 41.2 21.7 14.5 9.4
High- low 59.5 41.1 26.5 12.3 3.7 56.3 35.3 22.0 8.8 3.7 56.7 36.0 21.5 4.2 0.0
High-high 46.8 26.0 20.2 12.9 5.5 50.0 26.1 15.6 7.6 3.2 51.5 26.2 12.2 9.7 7.1
Zero-R&D firms
Low-low 50.4 29.5 22.3 21.2 16.8 59.1 31.8 23.4 24.1 21.6 61.3 31.0 18.9 12.5 3.7
Low-high 38.1 21.1 12.7 10.3 5.6 37.9 22.3 7.5 3.7 4.2 60.1 45.5 26.7 12.5 0.0
High-low 57.9 37.6 23.3 11.2 4.4 62.7 33.7 17.1 7.8 2.2 64.9 36.5 19.9 13.9 0.0
High-high 47.4 28.5 17.6 7.5 5.6 53.7 27.6 12.9 3.3 0.9 49.5 40.0 28.1 16.4 17.1
R&D/TA above median firms
Low-low 36.0 13.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.0 21.7 4.5 0.0 0.0 60.0 20.2 15.0 14.3 16.7
Low-high 50.7 26.4 18.2 10 0.0 54.5 31.3 18.5 111 0.0 61 1 43.8 28.8 25.0 20.4
High-low 59.7 46.1 31.2 5.0 0.0 56.2 38.5 28.9 5.0 0.0 66.1 48.7 29.8 0.0 0.0
High high 48.3 28.5 23.5 13.3 0.0 54.4 31.2 18.2 11.7 0.0 51.1 30.1 24.1 21.4 16.7
Panel B General Industries
MVE-BM R&Dfirms
Low- low 44 1
Low-high 33.2
High- low 56.4
High-high 34 5
Zero-R&D firms
Low-low 45.1
Low-high 34.4
High-low 54.4
High-high 39.6
R&D/TA above median firms
Low-low 46.8
Low-high 37.6
High-low 58.3
High-high 36.9
21.5 11.4 4.7 2.4 45.1 20.5 10.3 7.4 5.3 48.1 25.6 16.9 13.9 7.4
13.1 6.1 2.1 0.0 35.3 13.3 4.3 0.7 0.0 49.7 26.9 13.2 3.9 3.2
31.0 16.1 10.0 7.2 55.1 30.6 15.6 8.2 2.6 43.9 18.2 7.4 2.8 0.5
15.8 7.6 3.6 0.9 36.9 17.3 9.3 4.7 2.6 44.2 19,3 8.5 6.6 2.7
22.1 12.7 5.7 0.4 50.0 22.5 12.4 4.1 0.0 54.7 29.5 17.6 120 8.4
19.4 9.7 5.1 1.4 37.4 19.2 9.2 4.9 1.5 48.2 23.1 9.6 3.8 3.0
26.1 8.9 4.3 2.5 54.3 27.6 5.3 5.0 0.7 55.5 21.4 8.2 4.7 2.2
16.4 6.8 2.5 0.9 41.3 15.5 7.0 2.8 0.0 41.5 15.3 6.3 1.7 0.0
254 13.3 6.0 3.2 49.7 25.0 15.7 11.3 8.1 51.8 30.6 19.6 14.4 8.7
193 115 6.2 0.0 36.1 18.5 10.5 1.7 0.0 563 33.5 17.0 5.8 3.7
35.1 20.6 15.1 10.7 54.4 31.9 17.1 10.6 3.8 44.6 19.6 8.8 2.7 0.0
17.5 4.5 0.7 0.0 38.4 16.8 7.2 2.7 11 51.3 28.4 19.2 14.4 9.3
Panel C Health. Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology (Pharma)
R&D firms
Low low 62.4 34.4 23.4 22.3 11.1 60.5 31.5 26.8 16.0 5.9 49.6 24.9 5.2 3.7 3.1
Low high 52.2 32.1 14.0 5.8 3.7 51.7 31.9 9.7 5.8 0.0 56.5 34.0 12.0 5.8 0.0
High-low 63.9 39.8 19.1 10.3 3.4 61.8 34.6 16.6 6.0 4.1 50.3 22.1 9.3 3.3 0.0
High high 50.0 24.2 10.4 5.4 4.2 52.7 28.7 17.2 15.6 6.6 48.0 27.0 10.0 6.5 2.8
Zero-R&Dfirms
Low low 69.7 43.9 30.8 19.3 16.5 55.4 34.7 22.7 18.9 14.8 47.5 13.0 1.4 00 0.0
Low-high 48.9 29.3 19.1 9.3 1.1 53.3 28.9 11.9 4.3 1.2 37.7 17.6 9.5 3.5 0.0
High-low 46.2 18.1 4.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 34.8 25.0 9.5 5.6 27.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
High-high 53.0 33.0 13.7 6.4 5.6 57.7 33.1 16.4 2.5 2.8 47.2 25.0 11.7 6.7 5.6
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Table 5 {continued}
Sales GI EPS
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Panel C: Health. Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology (Pharma)
R&D/TA above median firms
Low-low 50.9 24.1 18.0
Low-high 57.7 38.3 12.4
High-low 62.6 37.2 10.8
High-high 68.5 36.0 17.0
6.7 5.6 60.0 38.3 44.0 41.7 10.0 49.0 27.4 5.9 2.5 0.0
0.0 0.0 65.0 41.7 14.3 0.0 0.0 62.5 42.9 38.9 20.0 0.0
7.5 2.8 55.1 32.0 15.2 5.3 7.4 50.1 25.7 8.3 0.0 0.0
5.8 3.7 63.3 29.5 15.0 12.5 0.0 55.1 35.4 21.2 15.0 14.3
A total of four MVE-BM annually rebalanced portfolios were created for three industry groups: Information
Technology (IT), General Industries and Health grouped together with Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology
(Pharma). by dividing the sample firms into each industry group into two market-value-of-equity (MVE)
portfolios, using the median MVE as of the end ofDecember in each year, and then dividing the firms in each of the
two MVE portfolios mto two book-to-market (MVE-BM for BM ratio taken at calendar year-end) portfolios. The
table reports the average % of firms with growth rates in Sales. Gross Income (GI — Sales minus Cost of Goods
Sold) and EPS above the sample median for the next 1 to 5 years for the R&D. zero-R&D and R&D-intensive firms
that belong to each of the four portfolios for a particular industry. R&D-inlensive firms are defined as the ones
with R&D Total Assets (TA) above the industry median R&DTA for a particular year. EPS represents profit
after tax, minority interest, and preferred dividends, excluding extraordinary items prior to 1993 and including
them after that year due to the implementation of FRS3 In case GI or EPS is negative in any base year, in order
not to discard a whole sequence of observations, we follow a methodology suggested by Chan et al. (2003)
(footnote on p. 653). We calculate growth as ((Income-GI or EPS) ,.
i
- Income,) 'Stock Price at t and for firms
with a negative income value in the base year, we assign a percentile rank for each growth observation We look up
the corresponding percentile value from the distribution of growth rates of firms with positive income in the base
year, and this latter growth rate is assigned to the firm with the negative income in the base year. The results for IT.
General Industries and Health grouped together with Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology are reported in panels A.
B, and C. respectively.
compared to zero-R&D firms and R&D firms in general. Interestingly though, when we
abandon the use of imputed growth rates in case EPS is negative in the base year, and we
use only realized growth rates, by not following growth when EPS in the base year is
negative (untabulated results), there appears to be no evidence to suggest that R&D
intensity is related to persistence. In that case, most R&D-intensive firms appear to exhibit
improved persistence in EPS only in the case of General Industries. The highly R&D-
intensive firms in/7~and Pharma, do not exhibit signs of improved persistence in EPS, and
thus the trend observed in persistence in sales and GI growth, does not hold for EPS as well.
Finally, the results on Table 5 hold true when we replace R&D/TA with R&D/Sales in order
to define R&D-intensive firms (untabulated data).
In short, our findings from Tables 4 and 5 suggest that R&D intensity plays a role for
persistence only within industry sectors that are intensive in R&D by definition due to the
very nature of their operations; all four industry groups included in the industry-matching
analysis present high percentages of R&D reporting as has been discussed previously.
Although we do not imply that "R&D investments are a proxy for industry membership"
(Al-Horani, Pope, and Stark, 2003), we expect that R&D activity will be more important for
firm operations in maintaining a competitive advantage in certain sectors only. In the first
stage of our MVE-BM portfolio matching analysis, when all the sample firms were used
without industry matching, the sample also included a large number of observations from
the Support Services, Media, and Leisure sectors, all of which report very little R&D.
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These sectors have been generally successful during the 1990s, and we would expect that
R&D activity can be less crucial in these sectors than it is for example IT. It could,
therefore, be the case that the very good persistence results for the sectors that do need to
engage in significant R&D activity are actually driving the persistence results in favor of the
zero-R&D firms when we perform a simple MVE-BM matching without a control for the
industry. In the second case, though, when we compare the performance amongst firms in
the same sector and we assess persistence within industries that require the involvement in
R&D for a firm to remain competitive, the R&D investment appears to play a much more
important role for persistent growth.
Consideration of median R&D/TA ratios for IT, General Industries, and Pharma for the
period between 1990-2003, at 7.5, 2.2, and 9.5%, respectively (7.1, 1.6 and 4.8 for R&D/
Sales), is particularly interesting, since IT and Pharma are significantly more R&D-
intensive sectors than General Industries. EPS is the only item after the expensing ofR&D
that we use, and thus it can very well be "understated" by the amount ofR&D involved in a
particular year, especially in the case of R&D-intensive firms. When we make use of
imputed growth rates for firms with negative EPS in the base year as is done in Table 5,
there are signs for persistent growth in EPS as in Sales and GI for R&D-intensive firms
within the R&D-intensive industries examined. If we make use of actual growth rates, by
discarding a whole sequence of observations if EPS in the base year is negative
(untabulated results), there are no signs for persistence in EPS for R&D-intensive firms
within R&D-intensive industries. This way, a trend observed in measuring operating
growth before expensing ofR&D, appears to be reversed in the case ofvery R&D-intensive
industries, such as IT or Pharmaceuticals. We attribute the inconsistency in the findings for
EPS persistence, when imputed as opposed to realized growth rates are used for negative
EPS base-year firms, to the observation that the use of imputed EPS growth rates can
account for the cases where operating results are unfavorable for a certain year, but they are
followed by particularly good performance in subsequent years. By not eliminating a whole
sequence of observations if EPS in the base year is negative permits us to capture
persistence in EPS growth for these R&D-intensive firms with such reversals in their
performance, and thus justifies the inconsistency in the results described. 5
3.2. Regression results
Leaving our basic R&D and persistence in growth research question aside for a moment,
for reasons of completeness of our analyses, we examine the relationship between long-
term growth rates of operating performance and other possible effects ofR&D intensity in
Information on the number of firm-year observations for Tables 3, 4 and 5 was included in a previous version
of the paper in the Appendix. In addition, a self-built limitation of this type of study on persistence is that it only
uses the firms that survive for the next 1 to 5 years from each base year. This way, the analysis is only based on
i Ik- growth rates of the surviving, and, therefore, probably more successful firms. Thus, by including the growth
i.iics oi more successful firms, the persistence results could be biased upwards. We, therefore, performed a control
similar to one used by Chan et al. (2003). by calculating the persistence results for the next 1 to 3 years, for those
I inns that survive for a full five-year period after each base year, and for the firms that do not survive for more
than 3 years. As one would intuitively expect, firms that survive exhibit improved persistence results over the
three three-yeai window, compared to non survivors (untabulated data).
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the United Kingdom. We build on the same basic model of Chan et al. (2003) with some
modifications in the right-hand side variables on the treatment of possible econometric
problems. The examination of the impact of R&D on operating growth represents a
replication ofsome modifications ofa similar model applied by Chan et al. (2003) to the U.S.
sample. However, we proceed with this type of analysis for reasons ofcompleteness in order
to assess the general impact ofR&D on growth for the U.K.. leaving aside for a moment our
main research question which relates to the assessment of the influence of R&D on per-
sistence in growth.
Our first addition to the Chan et al. (2003) model is to include a dummy variable to assess
the influence of past persistence. Furthermore, Chan et al. (2003) take the right-hand side
variables at time zero and the dependent-growth variables cover growth in the next 1 to
5 years. In this case, though, something has changed in the company fundamentals during that
time, it will not be reflected in the right-hand side variables and, consequently, this information
will not be used in the model estimation. For example, if a firm undertook R&D activities in
year three from the base year of the analysis U + 3) and we regress operating growth over the
next 1 to 5 years (from t to t+5), we will have missed the information that this firm has
actually taken up R&D activities in the time period that the dependent variable covers, just
because the firm had no R&D spending at time zero. In order to overcome this problem, one
could use averages of the independent variables during the time period. However, ifone chose
to use averages in such a way, explanatory variables would be measured contemporaneously
with operating performance and, it would thus be difficult to distinguish whether R&D
investment is driving operating performance, or vice versa. Thus, either way, the regression
this model specifies appears problematic. We choose a solution in the middle of these two
methods, using static versus contemporaneous, with the dependent right-hand side variables:
We use averages of the independent variables only until the year immediately previous to the
final year of the time period, which the dependent variable covers. Taking all the right-hand
side variables at time zero, as in Chan et al. (2003 ), serves the objective ofdrawing conclusions
about the predictive power of these variables for future growth in operating performance. Our
objective is to assess the overall impact of R&D intensity, among other control variables, on
the future growth rates in Sales, Gross Income, and EPS, and at the same time to avoid as much
as possible the problem of not distinguishing between whether the regressor is influencing the
dependent variable or vice versa. We choose to pursue it by making this model choice appear
less problematic with respect to all the issues raised above.
The following regression is run with OLS using panel data for the whole sample for the
period 1990-2002:
GR = /?,, -t- /?,RD + /?2MV + /?,BM + /?4PERSDUMMY + /?5PASTR + e„ (1)
Where:
GR — Cumulative growth in a) Sales, b) Gross Income (Sales -COGS) or c) EPS (profit
after tax, minority interest, and preferred dividends, excluding extraordinary items
prior to 1993 and including them after that year due to the implementation of
FRS3) for the next 1 to 5 years from each base year. Firms with a negative value of
GI and EPS in the base year are excluded.
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RD - Average R&D/Sales or R&D/Total Assets until the year immediately previous to
the final year of the time period the dependent variable covers. For example, when
we assess operating growth from year f to t+ 1 , we take static R&D/Sales or R&D/
TA as of year I. When we assess operating growth from year t to t+5, we use the
average R&D/Sales or R&D/TA of the years t to 7+4.
MVE - - Average MVE until the year immediately previous to the final year of the time
period the dependent variable covers.
Table 6
R&D and the rate of growth in funire Sales, Gross Income, and EPS
Growth in MVE RDSALES BM PASTR PERSDUMMY Constant Adj R2 F statistic
t. «+]
Sales 0.0017 0.0048 -0.0304 0.4855 0.0000 0.0082 0.0223 48.8009
(1.2447) (4.6382) (-7.0556) (7.0453) (0.004 1
)
(1.2803) (0.0000)
GI 0.0011 0.0043 -0.0331 0.3587 -0.0210 0.0066 0.0113 23.8764
(0.6033) (3.2082) (-6.3659) (4.1766) (-2.9193) (0.7762) (0.0000)
EPS -0.0095 0.0013 -0.0690 2410 -0.0679 0.0345 0.0100 16.1247
(-2.4830) (0.4463
)
(-7.6806) (1.2378) (-5.4250) (1.8562) (0.0000)
r, f+2
Sales 0.0050 0.0120 -0.0601 0.4526 -0.0139 0.0041 0.0259 48.5838
(2.0349) (7.1297) (-9.1451) (4.2497) (-1.4831) (0.3668) (0.0000)
GI 0.0065 0.0134 -0.0704 0.1818 -0.0412 -0.0039 0.0207 37.1279
(2.1747) (6.6371) (-8.8370) (1.4518) (-3.6623) (-0.2886) (0.0000)
EPS -0.0087 0.0136 -0.1096 -0.1074 -0.1106 0.0940 0.0189 23.5552
(- 1 .6234) (3.7212) (-8.6687) (-0.4322) (-6.4738) (3.5476) (0.0000)
t,t+3
Sales 0.0057 0.0145 -0.0718 0.5190 -0.0240 0.0209 0.0228 35.6196
(1.7359) (6.6135) (-7.9323) (3.7738) (-1.9253) (1.4062) (0.0000)
GI 0.0073 0.0165 -0.0722 0.3634 -0.0238 0.0165 0.0173 26.0426
( 1 8809) (6.6643) (-6.9234) (2.2403) (-1.6669) (0.9164) (0.0000)
EPS -0.0137 0.0211 -0.1377 -0.0487 -0.1434 0.2136 0.0281 27.5588
(-2.1314) (4 9233) (-9.1796) (-0.1701) (-6.9360) (6.6773) (00000)
;, t+4
Sales 0.0063 0.0188 -0.0630 0.7492 -0.0320 0.0539 0.0189 24.6334
(1.5136) (6.8382) (-5.3942) (4.2868) (-2.0467) (2.8629) (0.0000)
GI 0.0100 0.0198 -0.0729 0.4201 -0.0311 0.0350 0.0150 18.9693
(2.0425) (6.3407) (-5.4557) (2.0154) (-1.7442) (1.5575) (0.0000)
EPS -0.0299 0.0232 -0.1537 -0.8712
-0.1823 0.3954 0.0384 29.4511
( -3 8405) (4.5681) (-8.1919) (-2.3172) (-7.2637) (10.2614) (0.0000)
t, 1+5
Sales 0.0040 0.0218 -0.0721 0.6089 -0.0529 0.0841 0.0168 18.2407
(0.7922) (6 6577) (-4.9867) (2.6991) (-2.7992) (3.7655) (0.0000)
GI 0.0074 0.0212 -0.0760 0.1358 -0.0366 0.0681 0.0111 11.9251
(1.2554) (5 6181) (-4.6697) (0.5270) 1 1 "032) (2.5197) (0.0000)
EPS -0.0410 0.0290 -0.1775 -1.3943 -0.1694 0.5298 0.0487 29.2108
(-4.6306) (4.9595) (-7.454-) (-3.1365) (-5.6404) (12.3874) (0.0000)
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BM - - Average book-to-market ratio until the year immediately previous to the final year
of the time period the dependent variable covers.
PERSDUMMY Dummy variable taking the value of one if the company exhibited
persistence in the measure of operating performance that GR represents each time
(Sales or Gross Income or EPS), over the past 2 years (achieved growth rates
above the sample median in each of the past 2 years), and zero otherwise.
PASTR - The stock's 6 month prior to year end (t) compound rate of return (geometric
mean).
Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates and values of /-statistics (in parentheses) that
have been estimated by running the panel data Eq. (1), when the dependent variable GR
equals the growth in sales or GI or EPS for the next 1 to 5 years. The regression is run using
OLS and White's heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
According to the results reported on Table 6 for the /, t + 1 time window, all regressors except
for the past-persistence dummy and MVE variables appear statistically significant for the Sales
regression; this is also the case for the GI regression, with the persistence dummy being also
statistically significant. In the case of the EPS regression, the R&D-intensity variable is positive
but not statistically significant, and neither is the past-return variable. All variables are positive in
the Sales regression, with the exception of BM, a fact that is quite intuitive. In the GI and EPS
regressions, the persistence dummy, in addition to BM, is also negative, providing another
indication of mean reverting profitability. The constant term is positive and not statistically
significant. The MVE variable is positive in the Sales and GI regressions, but turns to negative in
the EPS one, and is significant at all times. We observe that, even after controlling for other
variables, the R&D/Sales variable is positive and statistically significant at 1% significance level
in the Sales and GI regressions, but not in the EPS one.
Regarding the results for the t, f+2 until the t, 1+5 time windows, the past-persistence
dummy variable PERSDUMMY has in every case a negative sign. The coefficient of the past-
returns variable PASTR has a positive sign and is statistically significant in the Sales and GI
regressions and a negative sign in the EPS one, but is of limited overall significance in the EPS
regression. The coefficient for BM is negative as intuitively expected, and exhibits very strong
significance almost in every regression. It is in every case, statistically significant for all of the
Notes to Table:
The table reports the coefficient estimates and values of ^-statistics (in parentheses) estimated by running the following
panel-data regression with OLS: GR^. +^iMV+ftRDSALES + ftBM+ftPASTR +ftPERSDUMMY + c,,
(Eq. (1 )). The dependent variable GR equals cumulative growth in a) Sales b) Gross Income (GI — Sales-Cost of
Goods Sold) ore) EPS over the next 1 to 5 years, MVE, BM, RDSALES equal the average market market-value-ofof-
equity. book-to-market ratio, and R&D/Sales, respectively, until the year immediately previous to the final year of the
time period which the dependent variable GR covers, PASTR equals the stocks prior to the end of / six month
compound rate of return. PERSDUMMY is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the company achieved a
growth rate in Sales or GI or EPS above the sample median in each of the past 2 years, depending on which measure of
operating performance that GR represents each time ( Sales or GI or EPS ), and zero otherwise. MVE is taken at calendar
year-ends. EPS represents profit after tax, minority interest, and preferred dividends, excluding extraordinary items
prior to 1 993 and including them after that year due to the implementation of FRS3. Firms with a negative value of GI
and EPS in the base year are excluded. We used White's heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. All variables have
been transformed by using natural logs, and observations above the 98 and below the 2 percentile for growth rates,
MVE. RDSALES, BM and PASTR were eliminated. The F statistics and their /rvalues appear in the last column.
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Sales, GI, and EPS regressions. The behavior of the MVE variable is not consistent across
regressions: it has a negative sign for the EPS regression, positive for both sales and GI, but it is
generally statistically significant only in the EPS regressions. 6
More important, the coefficient for the R&D/Sales variable appears positive and significant at
5% in all regressions. This fact is in accordance with the relevant results from the /, /+ 1 time-
window regressions, with the exception of the EPS regressions where the R&D/Sales coefficient
is not statistically significant. Replacing R&D/Sales with R&D/TA (data does not appear on the
table), causes no changes in the results in Table 6. However, the coefficients for R&DATA are
slightly lower than the ones for R&D/Sales, and the same applies to the values of the /-statistics.
This shows that R&D intensity, even after having controlled for other variables, remains an
important determinant for growth in future Sales, GI. and EPS, as was found by Chan et al.
(2003) for the U.S. market. As already explained, this evidence constitutes a replication of prior
evidence found for the United States within the United Kingdom in the process-operating growth
and stock-return persistence. Still, it represents the first evidence on a positive association of
R&D and subsequent operating performance for the United Kingdom. The R&D-intensity
variable appears to have no impact on short-term EPS growth only. The results are robust to the
addition of industry dummy variables, time-period effects and fixed/random effect estimation. 7
We finally observe that the adjusted R-squares get very small values, with percentages below 5%
" A possible limitation of the regression is that when we employ growth rates over the next 2 to 5 years as the
dependent variable, a number of companies are lost as we move on to future years. In order to adjust for sample-
selection bias arising from this survivorship issue, we have repeated the analysis by using Heckman's two-step
selection-correction estimation, as described in Hecknian ( 1 979 ) and Greene ( 1 98 1 ). In these cases, before running
the actual regressions, we estimate a probit model with panel data in order to estimate the likelihood of a company
being included in the sample survivors for the next 2 to 5 years: Selection = a,, + a|SP + aiPASTSA+E„, where
Selei imn equals one ifwe have an observation for Sales or GI or EPS growth for the next 2 to 5 years, depending on
the regression, and zero otherwise. SP equals the sales-to-pnce ratio at the end ofyear I and PASTSA equals the sales
growth over the 2 years prior to year t (geometric mean). In a second stage, we ran Eq. ( 1 ) with panel data by adding
an extra regressor j3j„X, where A is the Heckman correction, included as a control and obtained from the first step.
We observed no qualitative changes in the direction of the results by using the Heckman two-step selection model,
which was extensively presented in a previous version of the paper, especially regarding the sign and significance of
the R&D-intensity variable.
Robustness checks include the addition of industry dummy variables (simple and multiplicative with R&D)
for four industries that are perceived to be as intensive in R&D activity: Information Technology, Chemicals,
General Industries and Health grouped together with Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology. In order to control for
time-period effects, we repeated the regressions in Table 6 by excluding the New Economy base years from 1998
to 2001, also run the regressions for the whole sample period by including a time-period dummy to account for
the years 1998 2001 and 1999-2001. and found no qualitative difference in the direction of the results
(untabulated data). We also used year dummies for all regressions, again with no qualitative change in the
direction of the results, especially regarding the R&D-intensity variable. We also repeated the analysis in Table 6
by using averages of the BM, MV, and R&D/Sales or R&D/TA variables, and the R&D-intensity variable was
found to be a positive and statistically significant in every single regression (untabulated data). The results on the
significance of the R&D intensity variable were strongest under this estimation scenario. Finally, we repeated the
analysis for the t, (+2 to t, f+5 time windows by using static BM, MV, and R&D/Sales or R&D/TA variables as
of the base year, along with the Heckman modification, again with no great qualitative changes in the direction of
the results (untabulated data). In the case of the EPS regressions, given the accounting changes imposed by the
implementation of FRS3 for accounting years ending on or after the 22nd of June 1993, we repeated the EPS
regressions only for the period 1994-2002 with no gTeat qualitative change in the direction or significance of the
results Robustness checks finally include running the regressions for the t. 1+ 1 time window with time-period
fixed and random effects, with no qualitative change in the direction of the results.
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in every case. This finding is in accordance with the relevant values in the results by Chan et al.
(2003). and underlines the low predictability of growth. The results on the significance of the
R&D-intensity variable are robust when using completely static regressors for all time windows,
and also when using the Heckman (1979) two-step selection model to account for survivorship
biases (untabulated results) so we do view possible survivorship bias problems to be influencing
the direction of our results qualitatively.
The overall findings on the relation between R&D and consistency in subsequent
operating-performance growth, indicate that, after controlling for firm size and the book-to-
market factors, there appears to be a positive relation between R&D and consistent growth,
but only in the cases when a firm needs to take on R&D activity as a result of the nature of
its operations. On average, an R&D-intensive firm does not show more persistent growth
compared to a non-R&D firm. When one compares firms that engage in R&D based on
their industry sector, R&D intensity seems to play a role in persistence. This finding applies
to measures of operating performance that we find in the higher steps of the income
statement: e.g.. Sales and Gl, since the evidence that R&D plays any role for persistent
growth in EPS for R&D-intensive industries is actually weaker and exists only when
imputed growth rates are used in when EPS for a base year is negative. Finally, judging
from the results about the significance of the R&D-intensity variable in the sales, GI and
EPS regressions, after controlling for other factors, R&D intensity is strongly linked to
future growth in sales and GI, and particularly long-term EPS.
4. Persistence in stock returns
4.1. Calculating risk-adjusted returns
To assess long-term stock market perfonnance we calculate cumulative risk-adjusted
abnormal returns (CARs) calculated using reference portfolios, similar in terms of finn size
(MVE) and value (BM). Sample firms are divided into two size portfolios, using the median
MVE as ofthe end ofJune in each year /\ Then the firms in each of the two portfolios are divided
into three BM portfolios: one containing the lower 30% of values for BM, another with the
middle 40%, and finally, a portfolio containing the top 30% of BM ratios. The BM ratio is
calculated using the book value at the end of the accounting year / - 1 and the MVE at the end of
December of t - 1 . hi order to allow for financial data to be made public, the first month for which
returns are calculated is July at year /. This results in six size-value portfolios, for which the
breakpoints are rebalanced every year. The abnormal return for a finn for a specific month equals
its return for the month, minus the equal-weighted return of the corresponding size-value
reference portfolio for the specific month. Total returns, which include dividends, are used.
We then calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each firm and for the reference
portfolios for a particular time window and compute the abnormal return for a firm as the
difference of these two values. Table 7 shows the average equal-weighted CARs over the next
1 to 5 years from each base year for the whole sample, then for the R&D versus the zero-R&D
firms and, finally, according to R&D-intensity quartiles, expressing R&D intensity as R&D/
TA, R&D/Sales and R&D/MVE. The values of the /- / statistics of the returns in brackets
below the returns are also reported. Zero-R&D firms exhibit slightly lower returns compared
to R&D firms over the five-year window (-2.4% versus -0.4%), which are not statistically
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Table 7
Average, equally weighted, cumulative abnormal returns (nsk-adjusted) for the whole sample, R&D, zero R&D
firms, and according to R&D intensity
1 2 3 4 5
CAR
Sample 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -1.3 -2.0
(0.132) (-0.260) (-0.450) (-1.687) (-1.760)
R&D firms 1.2 1.1 15 1.0 -0.4
(1455) (0.865) (0.948) (0.763) (-0.296)
Zero-R&D firms -0.4 -0.6 -11 -2.3 -2.8
(-0.673) (-0.876) (-1.130) (-2.479) (-1.913)
CAR R&D/TA
Low -0.6 -2.4 -5.0 -7.4 -12.4
(-0.718) (-1 690) (-2.553) (-2.758) (-4.236)
-4.2 -8.4 -10.5 -14.2 -17.4
(-0.882) 1-4.664) (-4.456) (-4.263) (-4.676)
4.4 4.4 4.0 0.3 -4.6
(2.9%) (2.111) (1349) (-0.884) (-1.393)
High 6.4 13.8 20.6 29.8 37.8
(3 205) (4 658) (6.142) (7.964) (8.045)
XS[> S',;/,a
Low -1.5 -3.8 -5.5 -10.0 -17.0
(-1.615) (-2.581) (-2.822) (-4.464) (-5.592)
-1.0 -3.8 -5.2 -6.4 -8.1
(-0.993) (-2.245) (-0.083) (-1.497) (-2.149)
3.2 3.2 1.3 -3.1 -5.4
(2.003) (1 589) (0.342) (-1.286) (-1.568)
High 46 10.8 17.1 27.0 32.3
(2 440) (3.636) (5.086) (7.410) (7.013)
R&D/MV
Low -2.0 -4.9 -5.4 -6.8 -8.8
(-1.958) (-3 115) (-2.923) (-2.191) (-3.074)
-4.0 -5.9 -7.9 -10.7 -16.9
(-3.411) (-3.231) (-3.239) (-3.571) (-4 5531
1.9 1.0 1.5 -1.8 -1.9
(1.271) (0.300) (0.368) (-1.052) (-0.607)
High 10.1 17.6 21.5 28.8 31.9
(5.133) (5.95N) (5.963) (7.473) (6.629)
The table reports the average, equally weighted, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the next 1 to 5 years for the
whole sample. R&D firms. zero-R&D firms, and R&D firms divided mto R&D-intensity quartiles, according to R&D/
Total Assets (TA. R&D/Sales and R&D/market market-value-of of-equity (MVE taken a calendar year-ends). CAR
have been calculated with respect to the monthly equal-weighted returns of six annually rebalanced market-value-of-
equity-book-to-market (MVE-BM) portfolios. These portfolios are created by dividing sample firms into two size
portfolios, using the median MVE as of the end ofJune in each year f. Then the firms in eacli of the two portfolios are
divided into three BM portfolios: one with the lower 30% ofvalues for BM, another one with the middle 40%. and one
with the top 30% ofBM ratios. The BM ratio is calculated using the book value at the end of the accounting year t- 1
and the MVE at the end of December ofI- 1
. In order to allow for financial data to be made public, the first month for
which returns are calculated is July at year t. This results in six size-value portfolios, for which the breakpoints are
ebalanced every year We also report the values of the r-statistics of the returns in brackets below the returns.
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significant at the 5% significance level. When calculating returns among R&D firms only,
returns increase with R&D intensity, whatever the proxy for R&D intensity used, with
cumulative returns of above 30% for the top R&D-intensity portfolio in terms of R&D/TA,
R&D/MVE and R&D/Sales, following steady increases every year. The returns for the top
R&D-intensity portfolios are highly significant statistically, which is not always the case for
the returns of lower-intensity portfolios in the sample, including R&D firms and zero-R&D
firms in general.
8
Overall, before examining persistence in returns resulting from R&D
investments, the results on Table 7 indicate that consistent with prior literature findings, high
R&D firms exhibit abnormal excess returns which are also statistically significant.
4.2. Persistence in stock returns
Persistence in stock returns is defined as achieving excess cumulative stock returns (risk-
adjusted) above the median excess CAR (risk-adjusted) of the overall sample, for up to
5 years beyond each base year. This measure of persistence is comparative, assessing
persistence with respect to the performance of other firms in the sample.
CARs are calculated on a yearly basis, using monthly datafrom July atyear t until June at
t + 1. July at I + 1 until June at t + 2. and finally Jul) ' at t + 4 until June at t + 5for thefive-year
window. We then measure how many times (for.* years up to 5 years ahead from the base
year), a company in the overall sample can achieve an excess return above the median yearly
excess CAR. The number of firms with returns above the median is then divided by the total
number of firms that show returns in the 5 years. We then calculate the average number of
firms with returns above the median, the average number of firms with returns, and finally, the
average percentage of firms with returns above the median return, which is the figure reported
in our tables. Median CARs are calculated using all the available firm observational data in a
particular year, from July until next June. If a firm delists during that period, data from the last
month for which there is a return, is retained. The excess, risk-adjusted CARs of the sample
firms, and subsequently the median excess risk-adjusted CAR for the overall sample, used as
reference returns in defining persistence in market performance, have been calculated with
reference to the monthly equal-weighted returns of six MVE-BM portfolios.9
Table 8 shows the average percentage of risk-adjusted CARs above the median, for the
whole sample, the R&D firms. zero-R&D firms, and R&D firms with R&D firms divided
into R&D-intensity quartiles according to R&D/TA. R&D/Sales and R&D/MVE. On
average, 4.1% of the sample firms can achieve an excess CAR above the median CAR of the
When we switch from equal-weighted to value-weighted returns (rebalancing the value weights on a monthly
or a yearly basis — untabulated data|, R&D firms outperform the whole sample, including zero-R&D firms.
Excess returns in this case too, are higher for the top R&D-intensity portfolios, whatever the proxy used for R&D
intensity. In addition, when we calculate excess returns with respect to the va/i/e-weighted returns of the reference
portfolios, we observe no qualitative change in the direction of the results, nor do we when we replace CARs with
abnormal buy-and-hold returns (results for BAHRs were included in a previous version of the paper).
We also calculated the persistence results using risk-adjusted CARs calculated with respect to the value-
weighted returns of the six annually rebalanced MVE BM portfolios, with no qualitative differences in the
direction of the results (untabulated data). Finally, we calculated the persistence results using risk-adjusted buy-
and-hold excess returns, calculated with reference either to the equal or value-weighted returns of the reference
portfolios, again with no qualitative difference in the direction of the results (results for BAHRs were included in
a previous version of the paper).
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Table g
Persistence in returns for the sample, R&D. zero-R&D and R&D firms according to R&D intensity
1 2 3 4 5
CAR
Sample 50.0 264 14.1 7.7 4.1
R&D firms 50.8 26.1 13.6 6.9 3.3
Zero-R&D firms 49.7 26.7 14.4 8.1 4.5
CAR R&D/TA
Low 48.5 22.0 9.7 4.6 1.7
46.8 22.4 11.0 5.3 1.8
53.7 28.6 15.2 7.8 4.4
High 553 33.2 19.7 11.4 6.5
R&D/Sales
Low 48.2 23.6 10.4 5.2 1.9
48.3 22.2 11.6 5.2 2.5
52.0 26.2 13.1 6.9 3.7
High 55.2 33.5 20.0 11.3 6.1
R&D Ml
Low 46.6 21.2 9.2 4.1 1.7
48.1 24.6 12.9 6.7 2.9
52.9 26.3 14.2 6.6 3.5
High 56.8 33.8 19.2 11.3 6.2
The table shows the average % of firms with risk-adjusted returns (Cumulative abnormal retums-CAR) above the
sample median for the next 1 to 5 years for the whole sample, the R&D firms, zero-R&D firms, and R&D firms
divided into R&D-intensity quartiles according to R&D/Total Assets (TA). R&D'Sales and R&D market-value-of
of-equity (MVE — as at calendar year-ends) (from low to high). CAR are calculated on a yearly basis, using
monthly data from July at year t until June at t+ 1. July at 1+ 1 until June at r+2. and finally July at r+4 until June
at t+5 for the five-year window. CAR are calculated with respect to the monthly equal-weighted returns of six
markel-value-of-equity-book-to-market (MVE-BM) annually rebalanced reference portfolios, calculated as
follows: We first divide the sample firms into two size portfolios, using the median MVE as of the end of June in
each year /. Then the firms in each of the two portfolios are divided into three BM portfolios: one with the lower
30% ofvalues for BM, another one with the middle 40%, and one with the top 30% ofBM ratios. The BM ratio is
calculated using the book value at the end of the accounting year / - 1 and the MVE at the end of December of / - 1
.
In order to allow for financial data to be made public, the first month for which returns are calculated is July at year t.
This results in six size-value portfolios, for which the breakpoints are rebalanced every year.
sample. 5 years after portfolio formation. As in the case for operating-performance
persistence, the zero-R&D firms are the ones that exhibit higher persistence in returns,
compared to the R&D firms, with 4.5% versus 3.3% of firms achieving returns above
median after 5 years. When persistence is assessed after dividing the R&D firms into
quartiles according to R&D intensity, using all of R&D/Sales, R&D/TA, and R&D/MVE as
proxies for R&D intensity, persistence generally improves as R&D intensity increases. Most
interestingly, no matter whether R&D/Sales, R&D/TA, or R&D/MVE is used as a proxy for
R&D intensity, the firms with highest intensity R&D portfolios exhibit by far the highest
percentages of returns above the median, and thus show the highest consistency in CARs
compared to the zero-R&D firms. The two higher R&D-intensity quartiles steadily
outperform the lower-intensity quartiles, in terms of persistence in returns, with around 6%
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of firms achieving excess returns above the sample median for five consecutive years after
portfolio formation, following strong persistence in the previous years before reaching the
five-year horizon.
The finding just mentioned is consistent with the previous observation that the top high-
intensity R&D firms exhibit the highest cumulative abnormal returns. In this case, though,
we go one step further and find that these firms can earn consistently higher risk-adjusted
excess returns than the sample median, for up to five consecutive years, compared to the
zero-R&D firms. The empirical evidence that firms with very high R&D intensity can earn
superior returns also holds in terms of performance persistence: R&Dfirms can cam higher
risk-adjusted excess returns for I year after another.
Finally, to account for the possible interaction amongst variables that may have an
impact on market performance, we have regressed 12 month, risk-adjusted CARs, from
July of year / until June of year t+ 1 , on R&D/MVE and four industry dummy variables that
represent R&D-intensive industries. These are Information Technology, Chemicals,
General Industries, and Health grouped together with Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology
(untabulated data). Our regression results indicate that the R&D-intensity ratio is both
economically and statistically significant for cumulative abnormal returns. The coefficients
for the industry dummy variables get negative signs in every case, apart from the coefficient
for IT. With the exception of the Chemicals industry, for which the dummy variable is
statistically significant at 5%, the other three industry dummy variables are generally not
statistically significant at any reasonable level of significance Overall, the inclusion of the
four dummy variables in the regression (both simple as well as multiplicative with R&D —
untabulated data), does not cause qualitative changes in the statistical and economical
significance of the R&D-intensity variable. 10
To summarize, we find a positive relation between R&D intensity and subsequent risk-
adjusted excess stock returns. Extending prior literature in the field, we take the finding on
the relationship between R&D and subsequent stock returns one step further and show that
high R&D intensity also improves persistence in stock returns, expressed as being able to
achieve returns above the median excess return of the sample, for a consecutive number of
years: the highest R&D-intensity firms are found to be earning consistently higher risk-
adjusted excess returns than the sample median, compared to lower R&D intensity, as well
as zero-R&D firms. This constitutes evidence on persistent excess returns for high R&D
firms for 1 year after another.
The main research question of this paper is not to identify whether R&D-related market
performance is a result of market compensation for risk or market mispricing as argued in
previous literature in an attempt to justify the empirically testified positive relationship
1 between R&D and subsequent market performance. However, in order to be consistent with
prior literature, this study adjusted stock returns for risk arising from differences in firm size
The regression described at this point was included in a previous version of the paper. As a final robustness
' check, in order to control for time-period biases, we also repeated the analysis by excluding the New Economy
,
base years from 1998 to 2000, and ran the regressions for the whole sample period by including a time-period
: dummy to account for the years 1998-2000, with no qualitative difference in the direction of the results. In
I addition, we used year dummies, again with no qualitative change in the direction of the results, especially
[
regarding the significance of the R&D-intensity variable. The results are also robust to replacing R&D/MVE with
R&D TA as a proxy for R&D intensity.
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and the book-to-market factor. Having performed this adjustment, persistent excess returns
for R&D-intensive firms in the years following the initial R&D investments are still
observed. These excess returns should not in theory exist after risk adjustment in an
efficient market. Therefore, we interpret the evidence as consistent with at least some form
of market mispricing. The fact that the found relationship between R&D and persistence in
market performance is observed at the sample level independent of industry factors, when
the positive association between R&D and persistent operating growth was only observed
at the industry level, gives further weight to the mispricing interpretation. In other words,
the pattern of behavior of market-performance persistence appears to be somehow not
connected to the one of operating-growth persistence, which in turn contributes to our
interpretation of the results — that they indicate at least some form of market mispricing.
5. Conclusions
In this study, we extend prior U.S. and U.K. evidence that suggest that R&D investment is
positively related to operating and/or market performance by further examining the
sustainability or persistence of operating growth and market performance as a result of
R&D investments. Chan et al. (2003) find indirect evidence which suggest that R&D intensity
is linked to persistence in operating performance, but they do not examine directly the
association between R&D and persistent growth. First we first expand prior research on R&D
and operating performance by assessing the persistence in corporate growth as a result ofR&D
investments. We argue that the possibility for a positive link between R&D and operating-
performance persistence may provide insight into the quality ofR&D undertaken by firms to
the users offinancial statements, and we predict a positive relation between R&D intensity and
persistent operating growth resulting from the economic characteristics of the intangible
investments ofR&D. In order to testify whether possible evidence on persistence in operating
growth provides clarifications to investors on the economic consequences ofR&D investment
for firm performance, we additionally expand prior research on R&D and market valuation by
also examining persistence in stock returns as a result of high R&D. Putting aside the
persistence issue for a moment, the paper also represents the first attempt to assess R&D and
operating performance in general for the U.K. market.
We use a sample of all U.K. listed nonfinancial firms for the period 1990-2003 and we
first show that R&D appears to be associated with improvement in persistence in operating
growth but only among firms that engage in R&D because of the sector they belong to. This
finding, that R&D intensity appears to relate positively to operating-growth persistence
within R&D-intensive sectors, constitutes the first evidence of a direct relationship between
R&D intensity and persistence in growth. At the same time, consistent with prior U.S.
evidence, we document for the first time for the United Kingdom a positive and significant
relation between R&D intensity and future growth in Sales, GI, and EPS after controlling
for a number of other relevant factors including industry effects.
Second, consistent with prior evidence for the United States as well as the United
Kingdom, we observe for our sample a positive relation between R&D intensity and
subsequent risk-adjusted excess stock returns among firms that engage in R&D. At this
point, we extend prior evidence by finding that R&D intensity improves persistence in
excess stock returns: we show that the highest R&D-intensity firms consistently earn higher
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risk-adjusted excess returns than the sample median return, compared to lower R&D
intensity, as well as zero-R&D firms. This finding represents the first direct evidence that
R&D is positively associated with persistent excess stock market returns, for 1 year after
another, for a consecutive number of years, after controlling for risk differences among
firms arising from firm size and the book-to-market factor.
Overall, we find evidence of a positive association between R&D and subsequent
persistence in operating growth only after taking the industry sector into account. In the
case of market performance, we find that R&D intensity plays a role for persistent excess
stock returns across the sample, which does not appear to be industry-specific. These two
findings indicate a non-uniform behavior of operating as opposed to market-performance
consistence as a result ofR&D. At the same time, having made use of stock returns adjusted
for risk arising from differences in firm size and the book-to-market factor, persistent excess
returns for R&D-intensive firms for a number of years after R&D investments are still
observed, which should in theory not exist in an efficient market. We, therefore, interpret
the weight of this evidence as consistent with some form of mispricing related to inefficient
market adjustment to the slowly emerging evidence of significant enhancement in operating
performance following recent R&D investment.
A limitation that exists in construction of this type of study has to do with the existence
of possible survivorship biases: when assessing persistence in growth or stock returns for
the next 1 to 5 years, only the firms that survive during this time period are taken into
account and, given that they survive, these firms could be more successful. By including the
growth rates and returns of the surviving firms, we could be including the rates and returns
of the more successful firms, and, thus, the growth rates and returns could be biased
upwards. This problem is also recognized by Chan et al. (2003) as a limitation of their study
on persistent growth. This problem, although recognized appears to be self-built in studies
on persistent performance, and, therefore, the study is undertaken despite recognize a
limitation it contains by construction.
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The purpose of this collection of previously unpublished essays is to develop the thesis
that corporate governance, as well as governance at other levels, should be restructured to
promote sustainabiliry. The volume addresses the theoretical and practical implications of
the social and environmental degradation caused by economic activity for the governance
of modern corporations.
The essays draw on the disciplines of organization studies, sociology, law, and political
science. Readers trained in accounting, economics, finance, engineering, and/or the
physical/biological sciences may struggle with some of the terminology. However, cross-
fertilization of thinking is particularly important in the areas of corporate governance and
sustainability and readers from most fields will benefit from the collection. The book should
be most beneficial to scholars, graduate students, and policy makers. Corporate executives
and undergraduate students may not take the time to parse, or have the patience for, the
academic presentation in this collection, but the concepts have broad relevance. A person
could read one or two of the essays without reading the entire collection, but the volume is
designed to be read as an integrated whole for maximum benefit. The editors refer to the
individual essays as chapters, which indicates that they view the collection as a single work.
The eleven essays are grouped into three sections. Part I consists of two essays that
provide a conceptual introduction to the topics of governance and sustainability. Part II
contains four essays that describe the nature and limitations of existing models of corporate
governance. Part III comprises two corporate case studies that illustrate the implementation
of sustainability principles, and three essays on redesigning corporate governance for
sustainability. The volume is well organized and includes a helpful introduction by the
editors. Each essay is clearly written and itself begins with a substantive introduction. The
editors, Benn and Dunphy, wrote four of the pieces in the volume and were obviously
engaged in the development of the entire collection, which supports the central theme.
Benn and Dunphy wrote the first essay in Part I, an essay which provides a discussion of
relevant concepts from political theory and management theory. The authors argue that
traditional hierarchical organizations based on top-down authority must be replaced by
adaptive and flexible systems of governance for both corporations and government.
Emphasis should be placed on long-termism rather than short-termism, and interdepen-
dence and mutuality rather than organizational competition.
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The second essay in Part I by Russell, Haigh, and Griffiths suggests that individuals in
different organizations and industries have different understandings of sustainability. The
researchers conducted a series of one-on-one interviews to investigate how people
understand corporate sustainability.
The essays in Part II of the collection take issue with what the authors perceive to be the
dominant model of governance, which is rooted in economic liberalism, market
fundamentalism, and agency theory. The essays see economic liberalism as limiting
corporations' ability to address sustainability. Wheeler and Davis, in the first piece in Part
II, argue for a sustainable resource-stewardship model for corporate governance. A large
portion of their essay addresses an empirical analysis of the correlation between various
measures of the corporate governance and the market capitalization of some of the
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The authors interpret the empirical
evidence both as an argument against governance scores being guides to the future market
value of the shareholders' position and as support of their view of corporate governance
practice.
In the second essay of Part II, Benn, Dunphy, and Griffiths suggest that corporate
sustainability is promoted by a concept known as total responsibility management, an
internal governance system that consists of a set of values-based and interdependent
managerial practices that incorporate social responsibility and sustainability. The authors
discuss three cases that illustrate the type of governance systems they advocate. At the heart
of these systems is the need for significant changes in pluralist democratic political systems
and social structure.
In the third essay of Part II, Martin, Benn, and Dunphy describe a case study of an
Australian community-based organization designed to address environmental damage to
land. The central point of this essay is that governance for sustainability must concentrate
more on change and on the acquisition of new knowledge through innovation,
reconciliation, creativity, and adaptability.
Readers with backgrounds and interests in finance and economics should find the
fourth essay in this section particularly relevant. In this piece, Richardson, a lawyer by
training, explains the role of financial markets in corporate environmental performance.
He argues that financial markets are significant because they serve as conduits for
funding, which influences the scale, timing, and nature of corporate and governmental
investment. Financial institutions also have influence through their ownership positions
in corporations and seats on boards. Richardson adds that the unique legal, informatio-
nal, market, and institutional characteristics of financial markets limit the role of finance
in environmental performance—characteristics like global transnational financial
markets, fiduciary obligations of managers, and legal barriers to shareholder activism.
Richardson rejects command regulation as a solution and recommends a reflexive
approach to environmental regulation. Such an approach encourages reflection and self-
correction by regulated agents, which moves the agents toward regulatory goals volun-
tarily. Tradeable emission allowances are an example of a reflexive environmental
: regulatory instrument.
Part III of the collection has a practical orientation, as the essays in it describe how
I
sustainability is being implemented in various settings. In the first essay, Maxwell discusses
the response of the board of Anglo American pic to corporate sustainability. Maxwell has
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chosen a fascinating case because Anglo American pic is a large, old-economy mining
company. The essay begins with a very helpful review of the major paradigms of corporate
governance. Ultimately, Maxwell reports that Anglo American pic supports sustainability
in some perhaps unexpected ways. Maxwell's final conclusion is that the role of corporate
governance in sustainability is most effective if a holistic approach based on a multi-
theoretic framework is implemented.
In the third essay, Benn, Wilson, and Low present an example of governance for
sustainability at Insurance Australia Group (IAG), Australasia's largest general insurance
company at the time. The essay offers the specific details of lAG's integration of
sustainability into its corporate structure. IAG based its redesign on a balanced, value-based
approach, tied to the principles of inspiration, integration, and innovation. This essay is an
excellent complement to the piece on Anglo American pic. Together, the two essays
provide the reader with a pragmatic view of redesigning an organization to promote
sustainability.
In the second essay in Part III, Bondy, Marten, and Moon explore the role of corporate
codes of conduct as vehicles for creating governance for sustainability. The authors provide a
solid explanation of the nature and types of codes of conduct and specifically address the role
of codes for sustainability in multi-national corporations. The authors reach the conclusion
that codes are an incomplete and imperfect method for implementing sustainability in
corporations, but that they are also valuable components of a governance system that
encourages sustainability.
The fourth essay in Part III, which is by Bendell and Sharma, addresses the complex and
thorny question of how to create and encourage desirable environmental and social
performance from transnational corporations. The authors argue that "civil regulation" is
the best approach for dealing with such corporations. This concept of "civil regulation" is
modeled on the basis of a civil society where numerous groups, with different degrees of
power, come together in a system of stakeholder democracy.
In the last essay of the book, Clarke provides a status report on the current state of
corporate social responsibility. This essay is a nice summary with which to end the
collection. Clark argues that a dynamic stakeholder model is moving modern corporations
toward enlightened shareholder value. As a result, there is a good possibility that corporate
governance can be redesigned to address sustainability.
The editors say their goal for the collection is to "stimulate your thinking and lead you
too to contribute to this crucially important debate" (p. 5). I believe that they have
accomplished this goal and that the book will lead others to think seriously about the role of
corporate governance in sustainability. Some of the essays may be provocative to some
readers. However, this is a good thing, in my opinion, because it will encourage more
debate and discussion. I strongly agree that the topic is critically important to all people.
Much work remains to be done on this topic, but this volume is an excellent start.
W. Gary Simpson
Oklahoma State Universih: Stillwater, Oklahoma, USA
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2008.06.003
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Globalization of Accounting Standards, Jayne M. Godfrey and Keryn Chalmers (Eds.),
Monash Studies in Global Movements, Monash University, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham,
UK (2007), xvi + 309 pages, £69.95, US$125.00, ISBN: 978-1-84542-852-5
As more than a hundred countries have adopted International Financial Reporting
Standards (LFRS), the demand for publications on country-specific practical experiences,
challenges, and accomplishments in implementing IFRS, as well as on the future prospects of
global accounting convergence, is growing at an exponential rate. Because accounting is a very
dynamic discipline, it must be studied from a historical perspective to be understood. Such a
perspective examines how accounting practices around the world have been evolving toward a
single set of high quality, understandable, and enforceable global accounting standards.
Globalization ofAccounting Standards, one such effort, is well organized and easy to
read. It offers an international perspective and can be used in undergraduate and graduate
accounting courses. In addition to accounting academics and students, though, the book
should be of great interest to a wide audience, including standard setters, economic
regulators, preparers of financial statements, and political economists and strategists,
because every country around the world is - in some way - moving toward IFRS. In his
foreword. Sir David Tweedie, Chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB), commends this book to all readers seeking insights into the depth and breadth of
issues relating to the globalization of accounting standards.
The aim of the book is to examine the key issues and implications of a global accounting
convergence from the perspectives of a diverse range of worldwide stakeholders from
various geographical regions, as perceived by the book's authors. Contributors analyze why
countries decide to concede their national sovereignty over accounting standards. The book
explores the different approaches to accounting globalization that result from differences in
economic, political, legal, social and religious environments; it also considers the broad
implications of adopting IFRS, implications which are often unintended and not
contemplated, which extend beyond mere reporting to economic, social, political, religious
and cultural outcomes.
A major strength of the book is that it is the product of a truly international collaborative
project and includes contributions by prominent professionals from around the globe, from
both academia and national/international standard-setting backgrounds, providing exposure to
both of these perspectives. In addition, the book, which is divided into 16 chapters, offers
insights regarding international and national approaches in pursuing accounting globalization
through chapters focusing on the efforts made by the IASB and its predecessor LASC
(International Accounting Standards Committee); by the G4+ 1 Group countries (Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.); by certain continental European countries
(Italy, France and Germany) and by China. Japan and India. It also relates experiences from
Malaysia and South Africa.
The introductory chapter by Jane M. Godfrey and Keryn Chalmers sets forth the book's
purpose: to explain national approaches to accounting globalization and the common themes
and key issues that have emerged in the movement towards global accounting standards.
Common themes include the role of financial reporting, catalysts for the globalization of
accounting standards, and national approaches to globalization. Key issues relating to the
implementation of global standards include the principles-versus-rules debate, interpretative
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issues, and the adequacy of IAS GAAP knowledge. In chapter 2, Gordon L. Clark, Tessa
Hebb, and Dariusz Wojcik discuss the role of accounting information in the rapidly
integrated finance market and explain the inevitability of global accounting standards by
analyzing global information economics and potential economic benefits.
In chapter 3, Kevin M. Stevenson provides some personal reflections on the challenges
and progress made by the IASB in the process of creating a single set of global accounting
standards. He clearly explains how the existence and influence of the IASB were the result
of market demand for global accounting standards focused on user needs—and not on
preparer, auditor, or regulatory convenience. Because one of IASB's subtler, but most
important, strategies has been to accentuate principles and not rules, Stevenson stresses the
importance of the development of a new conceptual framework, which is a key prerequisite
for principles-based standards. He notes the need for a consistent interpretation and
application of those standards, but acknowledges that pressure exerted by the IASB to have
the market take charge of its own destiny when interpreting standards seems to have worked
far better than anyone has realized, or would admit.
The next four chapters of the book are written by authors from G4+1 countries. In
chapter 4, David Alexander compares the principles-based approach in setting accounting
standards in the U.K. with the more rules-based approach in the U.S., and provides a
controversial analysis of the influence of the U.K. standard setter in the development of
IFRS. Under a principles-based approach, it would be necessary for all participants in
financial reporting to accept some diversity in application as the implications of new
standards are becoming fully understood. Chapter 5, by Donna L. Street, describes the
evolution to a global focus in setting accounting standards in the U.S., beginning with the
Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) first strategic plan for international
activities, formulated in 1991, and its subsequent influence on G4+ 1 activities. Today, the
FASB is working jointly with the IASB and other national standard-setters on all new
standards. Although the FASB's hopes in the late 1990s to become the worldwide standard
setter have failed, its efforts did result in having the IASB impose the FASB-like "due
process," with members of the IASB being selected based primarily on technical experience
and devotion to the public interest, and not only on geographic representation, as
recommended by the European Commission.
In chapter 6, James C. Gaa describes the tension between principles-based and rules-
based approaches in accounting standard setting in Canada, the result of its cultural and
historical ties to the U.K. and its geographical and economic ties to the U.S. A proposed
plan for the convergence of Canadian standards with IFRS by 2011 is indicative of
Canada's intent to pursue its own principles-based approach that requires significant
professional judgment but adds sufficient rules to achieve the standard's objective. This
chapter is followed one offering Ruth Picker's insights into Australia's early decision to
adopt IFRS and the consequences of this decision for the profession and for enforcement in
the business and finance communities. In developing A-IFRS (the Australian national
equivalent to IFRS), the Australian Accounting Standards Board made certain changes to
the content of IFRS, resulting in the potential for nonconformity, especially as related to
not-for-profit entities. Picker analyzes the unexplored impacts of accounting globalization,
including problems with consistent interpretation and application of IFRS in practice and
possible alignment of IFRS with U.S. GAAP.
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Chapters 8 through 1 1 are devoted to the issues and experiences of continental European
countries. In chapter 8, Angelo Provasoli, Pietro Mazzola, and Lorenzo Pozza describe the
accounting revolution taking place in Italy, following the adoption of IFRS. Traditionally,
Italian accounting standards were government-driven, tax-dominated, and code-based, but
today Italy is one of the few European countries that requires the adoption of IFRS by listed
companies not only in consolidated accounts, but also in individual accounts. To accomplish
this requirement and adoption, modifications to both the civil code and the fiscal code were
needed.
Chapter 9, written by Serge Evraert and Jean-Francois des Robert, describes the recent
evolution of the role of financial reporting in France, where the national approach to
accounting is still based upon the Civil and Commercial Code and on the patrimonial nature
of accounting. According to the authors, one of the main problems in implementing IFRS in
France is its potential impact on tax reporting, as well as the issue of accounting standards
for small and medium-sized entities (SMEs), entities which contribute 70% of the GNP in
France and having a special need for simplification of financial reporting.
In chapter 10, Hans Peter Moller provides an analysis of the limitations of HGB
accounting under German GAAP in relation to U.S. GAAP and IFRS accounting. This
chapter demonstrates empirically that present HGB accounting is not necessarily as
uninformative to investors as is generally thought, and it questions the superiority of IFRS
or U.S. GAAP in providing information that is useful to German capital markets. From this
and the previous two chapters, it is clear that accounting experts in the continental European
countries would like a stronger voice on the IASB Board. The Italy-France-Germany
sequence of chapters highlights the traditionally different role of financial reporting in these
countries and demonstrates that the effects of globalizing accounting standards include and
extend beyond capital markets.
In chapter 11, Keryn Chalmers, Jayne M. Godfrey, Ian Langfield-Smith, and Wei Lu
examine the globalization of accounting standards for public sector entities in Australia and
explore the role of financial reporting as a governance tool. The fact that A-IFRS is sector
neutral and required for private as well as public sector entities makes Australian public
sector entities among the first in the world to report under IFRS. This unique experience,
with all its issues and challenges, should be of interest to all countries that might consider
extending IFRS to public sector entities.
Chapters 12 through 14 focus on accounting developments in China, Japan, and India
—
countries that are committed to the global accounting convergence as a result of their
increasing involvement in world trade, labor, and the capital markets. In chapter 12, Wei-Guo
Zhang and De-Ming Lu describe the globalization of accounting standards in China. The
major force driving the convergence of Chinese accounting standards with IFRS is a growing
capital market. Despite China's positive approach to IFRS, however, the country is not rushing
to adopt these standards and thereby concede its own sovereignty over standard setting.
Chapter 13, written by Chitoshi Koga and Gunnar Rimmel, considers the unique
Japanese business system of keiretsu groups, a system which results in financial statements
bemg used primarily to indicate the results of managerial stewardship based on company
law. In 2005, Japan began working with IASB on the convergence of its standards in order
to attract international debt and equity. The results of a survey distributed to senior financial
managers of the largest Japanese firms regarding the potential costs and benefits of IFRS
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adoption indicated skepticism about adopting IFRS, and whether the benefits of adoption
can outweigh the costs.
In chapter 14, R. Narayanaswamy presents developments in Indian accounting in the
context of the on-going globalization of the Indian economy. India is still in the early stages
of its involvement in the globalization of accounting standards. The stock exchange and the
securities regulator have played a significant role in influencing this process, as have labor
market pressures and regulatory initiatives in response to overseas developments, such as
the East Asian Crisis and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The final two chapters propose that the benefits of globalizing accounting standards,
usually asserted in terms of economic gains, are far reaching. Chapter 15, by Norita Mohd
Nasir and Aniza Zainol, demonstrates that organizations and individuals in Islamic economies
must adhere to Shariah requirements, which, for instance, strictly prohibit the use of interest in
business dealings and mandate the component ofearnings or expenditure to include permitted
or prohibited items. Malaysia attempts to manage support for accounting globalization with
support for accounting and auditing standards of Islamic financial institutions.
In chapter 16, Iain Edwards, Peter Schelluch, Adel Du Plessis, Jean Struweg, and
Andrew West examine the globalization of accounting standards in South Africa. This
process began in the mid-1990s as key element in the post-Apartheid government's
political and economic reform program and has had a significant impact on education and
on social and cultural life as well.
One of the key issues that emerges in this book is the evolution of the financial reporting
environment toward global accounting standards, which are based more on "principles"
rather than detailed "rules." This trend impacts how accounting standards are developed and
applied and how accounting should be taught. Changes in the financial reporting environment
are necessary for the proper application of these principles-based standards. Accountants
must understand basic principles and objectives, as well as the economics and substance
underlying a transaction or event, and apply professional judgment in relation to these
principles and objectives. This approach will bolster the status of the accounting profession,
because only professional accountants will have access to this body of knowledge.
Eva K. Jermakowicz
Tennessee State University-, Nashville, Tennessee, USA
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2008.06.006
Corporate Governance Post Sarbanes-Oxley, Regulations, Requirements, and Inte-
grated Processes, Zabihollah Rezaee, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New
Jersey, USA (2007), xvi + 544 pages, $85.00, £34.99,
€68.00, ISBN: 978-0-471-72318-9
In the wake of a number of high profile corporate scandals in recent years, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has turned a spotlight on the issue of corporate
governance (hereafter CG). This book develops a framework for examining CG's various
functions and introduces an integral approach for those functions, designed to create
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sustainable shareholder value while protecting the interests of other stakeholders. The
book's 14 chapters are grouped into three parts. Throughout the book, the author broadly
defines CG as a company's relations with a wide range of CG participants, including the
board of directors, management, auditors, legal counsel, financial advisors, regulators.
standard setters, shareholders, and other stakeholders. The book emphasizes the CG
regulations and requirements of the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. The book's
audience is primarily practitioners.
Part I ("The Rise of Corporate Governance") contains two chapters. Chapter 1 discusses
CG's role in improving investor confidence in corporate America. CG's role is
fundamentally to minimize the agency problem and to ensure that management's interests
are aligned with those of shareholders. The author maintains that CG reforms are necessary,
mainly because the conventional belief that the market correction mechanism will
ultimately yield the best CG practices is flawed. The flaw of this belief lies in the fact that
by the time markets are able to make such a correction for ineffective CG, investor
confidence has already been lost, along with a substantial amount of market capitalization.
Chapter 2 examines CG fundamentals. CG structure consists of three interrelated
components: principles, functions and mechanisms. The chapter presents six CG principles
released by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The author
proposes honesty, resilience, responsiveness, and transparency as the best practices for
improving companies' CG. The chapter also lists the organizations that provide CG rating
services. In addition, the author identifies areas where the global convergence of CG is
feasible and the major differences that make convergence more difficult.
Part II ("Functions of Corporate Governance"), which includes chapters 3 through 10,
constitutes the heart of the book and integrates all of CG's major functions. Chapter 3
examines the oversight function assumed by the board of directors in holding management
accountable for creating shareholder values. The author points out that while the ultimate
responsibility for good CG rests with the board of directors, in facing the challenges of
compliance in the post-SOX era. many boards still struggle to strategically advise manage-
ment without micromanaging its decisions and actions.
CG's oversight function is typically delegated by the board of directors to various board
committees. Chapter 4 discusses three primary board committees: the audit committee, the
compensation committee, and the nominating/governance committee. Because the
functions of these committees adhere to CG's oversight function, the book's organization
would have been better if chapter 4 had been incorporated into chapter 3.
Chapter 5 covers the CG's managerial function, namely managing, directing, and
controlling corporate affairs. The responsibilities of the management team, including the
CEO, CFO, and other senior executives, are presented, followed by a discussion ofvarious
executive compensation plans and the SEC's requirement about executive compensation
disclosure. The author also provides a good discussion of both management respon-
sibilities related to Section 404 of SOX, which regards management's assessment of
internal control, and the challenges facing companies in their implementation of Section
404.
Chapter 6 presents CG's compliance function, which aims to ensure conformity with all
applicable regulations, standards, procedures, and best practices. The chapter provides
extensive coverage of the federal and state governing bodies and standard setters relating to
330 Book reviews
CG. SOX's primary provisions are also presented. In addition, the chapter lists a number of
professional organizations that promote the best practices for effective CG.
Chapter 7 discusses CG's internal audit function that is typically assigned to internal
auditors, which provides assurance services through an ongoing monitoring of CG,
operations, and risk management. The author cites a number of studies to compare the
trends of the internal audit function in the pre- and post-SOX eras. The internal auditors'
role in internal control is also presented, followed by a discussion of the controversial issue
of internal audit outsourcing.
Chapter 8 presents CG's advising function, namely providing legal and financial
guidance to the board of directors and executives. The author identifies a number of key
players involved in this function, including the legal counsel, financial and investment
advisors, securities analysts, and investment banks. The ethical considerations of these
players are also discussed.
Chapter 9 covers the external audit function assumed by external auditors. In the post-
SOX era, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) regulates the
auditing profession. The PCAOB initially adopted as its interim standards those AICPA
Statements on Auditing Standards that existed on April 16, 2003. As of April 15, 2007, the
PCAOB has issued four additional auditing standards. This chapter includes a detailed
discussion of these standards, and also discusses both the audit committee's oversight of
external auditors and the integrated audit approach.
Chapter 10 examines the monitoring function assumed by shareholders. The rights of
shareholders are illustrated, followed by a discussion of ways to enhance shareholders'
voting power. The author emphasizes institutional investors' important monitoring role,
citing a recent study that reports how institutional investors exert most influence. The
chapter also discusses the monitoring roles of mutual funds and hedge funds.
Part III ("Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance") consists of chapters 11
through 14. Chapter 11 emphasizes CG in private and not-for-profit organizations, while
chapter 12 discusses business ethics and its role in CG. Chapter 13 examines the relation
between globalization, technology, and CG, while chapter 14 discusses future trends and
emerging initiatives in CG.
Overall, this book provides a very good overview ofCG's various aspects, emphasizing
CG's seven functions. It contains a large number of citations from both academic and
professional literature. The book serves well its primary audience, practitioners, by
presenting comprehensive coverage of CG regulations, requirements and processes in the
post-SOX era. The book's materials, however, could be better organized. Subjects within a
number of chapters appear isolated from each other. For example, it is unclear why the
sections of chapter 6 are presented in the particular order they are, and how those sections
are interrelated. It is perhaps beneficial to the reader that at the beginning of each chapter,
the author provides a short summary of the chapter's organization.
Liming Guan
University ofHawaii at Manoa. Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
iKii:l().1016/j.intacc.2008.06.007
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Methodological Issues in Accounting Research: Theories and Methods, Zahirul
Hoque (Ed.), Spiramus Press, London (UK) (2006), xix + 537 pages, £25.00,
€38.00, $45.00, ISBN: 1-904905-13-7 (paperback)
This edited collection, comprising 26 chapters, reviews and critically evaluates the
applicability of existing theories and methods for studying accounting practices. Its focus
management accounting and control systems. The book is organized into seven parts:
positivistic perspectives, the naturalistic research approach, institutional and contextual
perspectives, critical perspectives, research methods and data analysis, ethical issues, and
publishing research. While methodological issues such as survey research and data
reliability are discussed, the book's strength is its combination of traditional and emergent
theories/paradigms into one collection, and its assessment of the applicability of those
theories/paradigms to accounting research. The book is motivated by the fact that, though
accounting researchers employ many different theories, the choice and application of those
theories are seldom evaluated and compared in a single text. Overall, the authors have done
a good job in filling this gap in the methodological literature. As a result, this book
distinguishes itself from many others with a traditional focus on research method issues. I
compliment the editor and authors on their efforts in producing this interesting book and
recommend it for the permanent collection of any serious accounting researcher.
1. Introductory chapter
Chapter 1 provides a brief synopsis of each of the book's seven parts. It gives readers an
overview of both the traditional and the emergent theories covered in the book.
2. Part I — positivistic perspectives
Chapters 2 through 7 review and evaluate several positivistic perspectives consistent with
the traditional thinking underlying the scientific method. Chapter 2 introduces the rational
choice theory (RCT) of decision making to provide insights into how and why actors make
decisions based on the principle of optimization. It discusses bounded rationality,
bureaucracy and the principal-agent relationship. Chapter 3 outlines the key features of
human relations and illustrates how human relations theory can be applied to management
accounting research. Because human factors influence both accounting policy making and
implementation, a human relations perspective is important in enhancing our understanding
of accounting in an organizational context.
Chapter 4 discusses contingency theory, which underlies a well-developed body ofwork
within management accounting and control literature. The theory results from criticisms of
classical optimization theories such as the bureaucracy theory outlined in chapter 2. The
chapter focuses on the nature of "fit," a central theoretical concept in contingency theory,
and discusses the major forms of fit adopted in the literature. The practical guidance that
this chapter provides would be very useful to researchers interested in this area.
Chapter 5 offers an overview of agency theory (AT) and its application to management
accounting research. The chapter discusses and compares three main AT-based research
branches, namely the Principal-Agent, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Positivist
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(Rochester) models. It ends by reviewing some recent AT-based accounting studies and
offering suggestions for future research. Chapter 6 deals further with TCE, reviews
related, predictions and critics, and examines its influence on management accounting
research.
Chapter 7 reviews the evolution of strategic thinking and Management Control Systems
(MCS) literature. It discusses the various perspectives of strategy, the strategy-control
interface, and some challenges for MCS development. The chapter concludes by suggesting
a broad, flexible MCS framework to accommodate the disparate perspectives of strategy
necessary in a competitive and knowledge-intensive environment.
3. Part II — naturalistic research approach
Chapter 8, the only chapter in Part II, introduces the naturalistic research approach.
It responds to the criticism that traditional positivistic perspectives are based on
oversimplified deductive reasoning by reviewing and advocating a naturalistic research
approach in general, and the Ground Theory (GT) method in particular. Under the GT
approach, theory should evolve from empirical evidence rather than developed a priori and
then subsequently tested. The chapter discusses how this method can be applied to study
complex accounting phenomena. Based on this discussion, the naturalistic approach seems
more applicable to studies based on the emergent theoretical perspectives covered in the next
two parts.
4. Part III — institutional and contextual perspectives
Part III consists of chapters 9 through 12. Chapter 9 offers a general introduction to
legitimacy theory, which views "organizational legitimacy" as an important resource for
organizational survival. The chapter reviews the application of this theory in empirical
accounting research and discusses some limitations of the literature. Chapter 10 broadens
chapter 9 to a wider setting by introducing institutional theory. It reviews the three branches
of the theory that have the most influence on accounting research, namely old institutional
economics, new institutional economics, and new institutional sociology. The chapter ends
with a proposed research agenda for understanding accounting as an institutional practice.
Chapter 1 1 focuses on stakeholder theory as an alternative to the traditional shareholder
approach in accounting studies. The chapter introduces the basic theoretical arguments and
the different models of stakeholder theory, and then highlights how stakeholder perspectives
affect accounting, performance reporting and organizational governance. The chapter also
discusses specific accounting issues addressable under this theory.
Chapter 12 outlines recent attempts to understand management accounting systems within
their organizational context. It surveys different streams of"alternative management accounting
research" to interpret management accounting changes within an institutional framework.
5. Part IV — critical perspectives
Part IV moves away from traditional theories by focusing on critical perspectives.
Chapters 13 and 14 discuss critical theory and labor process theory, both of which
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originated from Marxist thought. Chapter 13 focuses on how critical theory can be applied
in accounting research to provide insightful critiques of accounting practices with a view
toward social betterment. Chapter 14 presents a brief overview of labor process theory,
which considers accounting systems as both a medium and an outcome of class conflicts. It
discusses contemporary criticisms of the theory and its applications in accounting. The
chapter also offers directions for future research.
Chapter 15 introduces the Gandhian-Vedic philosophy of living in harmony with nature
as a counter to the dominant paradigm of living for economic growth, a philosophy based
on the logic of control. The theory advocates the radical reform of personal perceptions,
lifestyles and structural forces to promote sustainable development. While the chapter
discusses some interesting philosophical ideas, it needs to offer further elaboration regard-
ing how accounting researchers could apply the theory.
Chapter 16 addresses power and accounting from a critical perspective. It first presents a
review of the power concept, with an emphasis on the various frameworks of power, and
then discusses research on the power of accounting and power over accounting, at both the
organizational and the institutional levels of analysis. The chapter also offers suggestions
for future research.
6. Part V — research methods and data analysis
Part V, which focuses on narrowly defined method issues, resembles many other re-
search methodology books presently available. Chapter 17 discusses the case study ap-
proach and briefly reviews some of the accounting studies that use the method. The chapter
also explores action research, which is a type of case study approach.
Chapters 18 and 19 provide an introduction to qualitative research. While chapter 18
delivers practical guidelines, chapter 19 elaborates upon the foundation of protocol analysis
and conducts a review of selected accounting studies employing protocol analysis.
Chapter 20 discusses the appropriate use of financial ratios in quantitative data analysis.
It illustrates, in particular, the pitfalls of using financial ratios to measure firm performance
when reported shareholder equity and/or earnings are negative.
Chapters 2 1 through 23 cover research methods commonly employed by manage-
ment accounting and control system scholars. Chapter 21 first presents a reasonably
detailed discussion of methodological procedures for survey research, and then
provides a critical review of selected studies in management accounting using the
survey method. Chapter 22 focuses on ways to establish and assess reliability and
validity - including construct validity, internal validity, and external validity - in the
area of field study research. Chapter 23 outlines triangulation approaches to accounting
research, detailing specifically the triangulation concept, its various forms and its
limitations.
7. Part VI — ethics issues
Chapters 24 and 25 address ethics in research. Chapter 24 reviews the basic ethical
principles and requirements involved in human subject research, and offers some tips for
applying for human ethics approval. It also provides some examples of good ethical
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practices. Chapter 25 deals with some significant methodological issues pertaining to
accounting ethics research, with a focus on discipline-based methodologies such as
economics-based methods and psychological approaches.
8. Part VII — publishing research
The last chapter provides practical guidance and useful suggestions for publishing in
academic accounting journals. It offers many comments and observations, as well as
"dos" and "don'ts," that should be particularly interesting to newcomers to accounting
research.
9. Concluding remarks
On the whole, the book is a well-organized reference for new and seasoned researchers
interested in management accounting and control systems research. Each chapter begins
with an abstract and brief introduction, features that assist readers in quickly locating the
main content. Similarly, each chapter ends with a short conclusion that helps readers to
summarize what they have learned. All chapters include an extensive list of references to
theories, methods, and accounting applications, a feature that usefully assists readers in
further exploring a particular topical area. Although the book is predominately about
research in management accounting and control systems, exposure to the theories and
methods covered will benefit accounting researchers from all paradigms.
One suggestion for future improvement would be to include a synopsis before each
of the book's seven parts. Such a synopsis could provide an overview of why different
theories/methods are grouped together and a discussion of the differences and
commonalities among them. For example, how is contingency theory related to and
different from RCT? Furthermore, the synopses could discuss and elaborate the
connections between different strands of theories/paradigms wherever applicable. For
example, what are the connections between traditional and emergent theories? Can
both the scientific method and the naturalistic approach be applied together with
institutional and contextual perspectives? Answers to these questions will help readers,
especially research novices, appreciate the different strands of theories and methods
better.
Finally, the introductory chapter of the book should recognize and discuss an
important scope limitation. While the title of the book seems to suggest that it covers
methodological issues for the entire span of accounting research, the book in fact deals
almost exclusively with one particular area: management accounting and control systems.
The book has almost completely ignored the mainstream capital-markets based financial
accounting research that has, for the past 40 years, dominated the world's top-tier
accounting journals, such as The Accounting Review, The Journal ofAccounting and
Economics, The Journal oj Accounting Research and Contemporary Accounting
Research. Given the book's size, it is probably not realistic to expand its coverage to
include capital-markets based research, even though some of the theories reviewed such
as AT and institutional economics are applicable and relevant. At the very least, however,
the book should explicitly address this scope limitation and give readers a balanced view
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of accounting research. Preferably, the title of the book should also be altered to reflect its
scope.
Shimin Chen
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
Hung Horn, Kowloon, Hong Kong
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2008.06.005
International Financial Management, Jeff Madura, Roland Fox. Thomson Learning,
London (UK) (2007). xxii + 758 pages, £39.99, €60.57, ISBN: 978-1-84480-360-6
This textbook aims at an advanced undergraduate or master's level audience. The book
covers a wide range of topics and is divided into five parts and 22 chapters. Part I provides
an overview of the international financial environment. As the book focuses on the
particular perspective of listed multinational corporations. Chapter 1 describes the
important characteristics of multinational firms' risks, opportunities and business methods.
Chapter 2 deals with the international flow of funds and the balance of payments. Chapter 3
presents an overview of foreign exchange markets and international financial markets in
bonds, equities and short-term fixed income products. Chapter 4 sketches exchange rate
determination, while Chapter 5 presents plain vanilla currency derivatives.
Part II of the book takes a closer look at exchange rate determination by analyzing the
impact of governments and central banks on exchange rates and by presenting international
parity conditions. Part Ill's focus is exchange rate risk management. Chapter 9 looks at
exchange rate forecasting, while Chapter 10 addresses the still unresolved problem of
measuring exchange rate exposure. Chapters 1 1 and 1 2 discuss the management of
transaction, translation and economic exposure. Part IVof the book deals with the long-term
investment and financing decisions of multinational corporations (e.g., foreign direct
investment, multinational capital budgeting and restructuring, country risk analysis, cost of
capital and capital structure). Part V addresses short-term asset and liability management
such as international trade financing, short-term financing decisions and international cash
management systems.
The textbook adheres to a modern pedagogical approach, in that each chapter starts with
a clear statement of its objectives. Most chapters are followed by a range of self-test
questions (answered in an appendix), applications, a mini-case and a critical debate section
presenting two opposing views and asking the reader to form his/her own opinion. Students
will appreciate this style as it involves the reader with the material far better than most other
textbooks. Some basic analytical tools, including regression analysis, are relegated to an
appendix. The book's website contains a glossary, a range of multiple-choice questions and
various links for students, as well as presentation slides and teaching notes for lecturers.
Overall, this is a good textbook for a reader without technical or analytical ambitions. It
presents the material in a way that is both informative, and stimulating, but is also strictly
intuitive. Some more analytical material is banned from the main text and presented in
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appendices. In general, the mix of main text, on the one hand, and examples, graphs, maps,
web links and other content, on the other, is nicely balanced. In some chapters, however, the
flow of the main text is interrupted by a number of examples that might be too large. The
examples used in the European edition, reviewed here, often relate to U.K. or Continental
European firms, rather than solely to U.S. firms; obviously, this focus derives from the fact
that Roland Fox is at Salford University in England.
The sequence in which Madura and Fox present the material almost always follows the
natural logic dictated by the material itself. Personally, I would prefer two changes: The
material on political risk should not be presented more than 200 pages after the discussion
of exchange rate determination, as political factors are still critical for exchange rate
movements in a large number of countries. Also, hedging with options (Chapter 5) should
not be presented before analyzing risk management in general (Chapters 10 through 12). I
think it is preferable to deal with risk management first and then present foreign exchange
derivatives as instruments for achieving nsk management objectives.
The book is comprehensive in the sense that is covers the range of aspects and topics that
seem to define the international standard in textbooks on this subject. Given the importance
of international financial management and multinational corporations in a world economy
that is integrated in a way that it never was before, it is not surprising that Madura and Fox's
book has a number of well-established competitors such as the textbooks by Shapiro (2006)
and Levich (2001 ). In relation to these competitors, Madura and Fox have opted for an even
more intuitive way of presenting the material. For some topics, such as political risk, this
presentation is an advantage. For others, such as international parity relations, a slightly
more analytically rigorous exposition might be preferable, even for an advanced under-
graduate course. Madura and Fox present politically sensitive material - on corruption,
expropriation, and other forms of government intervention - in a way that positively lacks
the missionary undertone that some other authors can hardly avoid.
In my view, the main issue with almost all of these textbooks, including the one by
Madura and Fox, is that they do not follow the logic of the "typical" finance textbook. At
the risk of oversimplification, one might claim that "typical" finance textbooks start with
frictionless markets, derive optimal decisions and characterize the resulting equilibria. They
then proceed by introducing various types of frictions, and by analyzing optimal behaviour
given these frictions. This logical structure provides the reader with a clear benchmark and
guideline as to when and why certain behaviour is optimal given certain assumptions.
Unlike the typical finance textbook, the "typical" International Financial Management
textbook, again at the risk of oversimplification, does not normally start from frictionless
markets, but rather provides a wide range of arguments based on market frictions ofvarious
kinds, without also providing related arguments that would apply in the benchmark case of
frictionless markets. 1 The prime example for the difference between these two types of
approaches is the way risk management (for the international financial management text)
and capital structure (as its counterpart in the finance text) are being presented: A finance
textbook uses the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance results as a benchmark and then
The only exception I am aware of is the slightly outdated textbook by Sercu and Uppal (1995). However, a
new version of this book, entitled International Finance: Putting Theory to Practice and written by Piet Sercu. is
scheduled for publication in 2008 by Princeton University Press.
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introduces market frictions in order to justify the existence of various types of optimal
capital structure and financing instruments. The analogue in an international financial
management textbook is risk management. Rather than clearly stating that risk management
is redundant under the very same Modigliani- Miller assumptions and justifying hedging
activities with violations of these assumptions, such a textbook usually gives the reader a
variety of arguments without having a benchmark for comparison. In my view, it should be
worth the effort to provide the reader with a clear benchmark before presenting the colorful
world of international financial markets and institutions and all their frictions.
Notwithstanding this more general criticism. International Financial Management by
Madura and Fox is an easily accessible, comprehensive textbook. It seems particularly
suitable for an audience interested in covering a wide range of aspects in a more intuitive,
non-technical way.
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Analyzing the German accounting triad -
"Accounting Premium" for IAS/IFRS and U.S.
GAAP vis-a-vis German GAAP?^
Jiirgen Ernstberger*, Oliver Vogler '
University ofRegenshurg. Universitatsstrafie 31. D-V305S Regensbuig, Germany
Abstract
This paper critically examines the impact of voluntary adoption of Internationally Accepted
Accounting Principles (1AAP. i.e.. IAS IFRS and U.S. GAAP) on the cost of equity capital in
Germany. We find that ( 1 ) overall cost of equity-capital estimates in the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) for companies applying IAAP are significantly lower compared to those applying
Gennan GAAP, (2) an enhanced multi-factor model which incorporates the accounting-regime
differences (called "GM model") absorbs the cost of equity-capital differences, and (3) changes of
the institutional background in Germany and of the accounting standards lead to different cost of
equity capital effects for subpenods of the 1998-2004 voluntary-adoption penod. while
particularly controlling for effects like self-selection, cross-listing, and New Market {Never
Markt) listing.
A previous version of this paper was presented at the Illinois International Accounting Symposium held at
University of Hawai'i at Manoa. HI, in June 2007. We are grateful to the discussant Bill Cready and conference
participants for their comments and suggestions. Moreover, we thankfully acknow ledge helpful comments by an
anonymous reviewer. We are also grateful to the participants of the Annual Congress of the European Accounting
Association 2008 in, Ronerdam, especially the discussant Ann Gaeremynck. for further comments and
suggestions. Moreover, we thank, the organizing committee of this conference for granting us the Best Paper
Award in the category "International Financial Accounting" for this paper.
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E-mail addresses juergen.emstbergeria vviwi.uni-regensburg.de (J. Ernstberger). mailia olivervogler.de
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The central thesis advanced in this paper is that changes in the accounting standards and the
institutional infrastructure can influence the impact of applying IAAP. Therefore, we suggest
incorporating an accounting factor into the cost of equity-capital analysis.
© 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: M41; G12
Keywords: Accounting regime adoption; Cost of equity capital; Multi-factor model; IFRS; U.S. GAAP; Germany
1. Introduction
This paper critically examines the impact ofthe voluntary adoption of IAS/IFRS" and U.S.
GAAP (in the following referred to as "Internationally Accepted Accounting Principles"
(IAAP)) by German companies. The results suggest that for companies adopting IAAP an
"accounting premium" is granted by investors, implying a lower cost of equity capital. Our
results specifically hold when controlling for effects like self-selection, cross-listing, and New
Market (Neiter Mavki) listing. Based on these accounting anomalies we can develop a novel
multi-factor model that captures the "accounting premium" and leads to an improvement ofthe
CAPM and Fama-French model.
The paper contends that the adoption of IAAP could have direct and indirect effects on
the cost of equity capital. The indirect effects via improving earnings quality or disclosure
levels as well as lowering information asymmetry have been widely examined. However,
the impacts and interrelations of these effects are difficult to separate. To capture direct
effects, like additional costs or impact on brand recognition, a study must focus on the entire
link between the adoption of IAAP and the cost of equity capital. Our study provides a
comprehensive examination of the indirect and direct effects of this link on the cost of
equity capital.
For the empirical analysis, we use both a portfolio-based and a firm-level analysis. For the
portfolio view we apply a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and an enhanced multi-factor
model to include the information about the type of accounting regime applied as an additional
factor. Even though Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005), Ecker, Francis, Kim,
Olsson, and Schipper (2006), and Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2007) have worked
with factor-mimicking portfolios and new information risk-related factors, to the authors'
knowledge, so far no study has assessed the impact of the type ofaccounting regime applied to
an asset pricing model like the multi-factor analysis based on the Fama-French three factor
model (Fama & French, 1993). Our combination of multi-factor regression and accounting-
regime factors leads to a novel approach to studying the question of whether or not different
accounting regimes justify empirically significant differences in excess returns in an asset
pricing model. For the firm-level analysis we incorporate a two-stage estimation procedure in
which we are able to address explicitly the issue of self-selection. Moreover, we control for
cross-listing effects and New Market (Neuer Markt) membership.
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were initially called International Accounting
Standards (IAS). In 2002, the name was changed International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In general,
a combination of both terms ("IAS/IFRS"). When we refer to a specific time period, we use the term
"1 \S lor years before (including) 2002 and the term "IFRS" afterwards.
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This study examines the major objectives many German companies have for voluntarily
adopting an IAAP. By substituting the domestic accounting regime and, therefore
improving the transparency of financial reporting, German companies expect to lower the
cost of equity capital. Our study tests this notion by analyzing the cost of equity capital
effect of adopting an IAAP.
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, we thoroughly
examine the effects of adopting a new accounting regime both theoretically and for our
specific setting. In doing so, we respond to Holthausen"s (2003) call for research "determining
the marginal effects of accounting standards, incentives, ownership structure, institutional
features of the capital markets and enforcement on the quality of financial reporting" (p. 273).
Second, we develop a new method of comparing cost of equity capital for companies
applying IAAP. This method has the advantages of not being biased by the quality of
analysts' forecasts (like residual income models) and of mitigating the problem of self-
selection of companies adopting new accounting regimes. Consequently, our sample is
substantially bigger and less biased compared to other studies (e.g., Leuz & Verrecchia,
2000), since we do not lose (small) companies that are typically not followed by analysts.
Third, we are the first to differentiate between subperiods of introducing IAAP in
Germany. Our results support the expectation that the institutional changes over time
distinctly influence the effect on the cost of equity capital.
Fourth, although the classical Fama-French three-factor model has been successfully
used in a variety of empirical studies (e.g., Fama & French, 1 998; Liew & Vassalou, 2000),
the German capital market has been relatively overlooked in such studies. Furthermore,
previous studies have examined the Fama-French three-factor model across different
countries, but to our knowledge this is the first study to consider different accounting
regimes in a homogenous institutional setting. Our findings suggest that the type of
accounting regime applied is a priced risk factor in the multi-factor model.
Finally, we contribute to the literature comparing IAAP. like IAS/IFRS and U.S.-GAAP,
to domestic GAAP. For our setting we find that the adoption of these accounting regimes is
associated with reduced cost of equity capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize related
strands of the literature. In Section 3 we describe the institutional background of our study.
Our hypotheses are developed in Section 4. In Section 5 we develop the research design. In
Section 6 we present the data and descriptive statistics, followed by our econometric results
in Section 7. Section 8 concludes with a summary of our results and discusses implications
for future research.
2. Related literature
2.1. Information quality and cost of equity capital
The link between information quality and cost of equity capital is one of the most
fundamental and controversial subjects in recent accounting research. Theory suggests a
negative relationship between the quality of (accounting) information, on the one hand, and
the estimation risk and information asymmetry for investors, and, hence, the cost of equity
capital, on the other hand (Habib, 2006).
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Also, the level ofdisclosures is considered to be essential for cost ofequity capital. Diamond
and Verrecchia ( 1 99 1 ) argue that voluntary disclosures reduce information asymmetries among
informed and uninformed investors and find that higher levels of disclosure reduce estimation
risk. Assuming estimation risk as not being completely diversifiable. investors will require a
return premium as compensation for additional risk components. This premium is interpreted
as a higher cost of equity capital. Botosan (2006) thoroughly reviews the link between
disclosure and cost of equity, asserting that "extent theory strongly supports the hypothesis that
greater disclosure reduces cost ofequity capital" (p. 39). But she also admits that the underlying
assumption that public disclosure mitigates information asymmetry is not true for all studies,
suggesting the need for additional research in this field.
There are other critical voices regarding the assumption that public disclosure mitigates
information asymmetry by displacing private information. Verrecchia (2001) misses an
underlying theory and attests no unambiguous empirical evidence for a positive association
between information quality and cost of equity capital. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue
that public disclosure might be processed into private information again, also by informed
investors. They state that more complex information might improve the quality of private
information of informed investors even more than the information quality of public
information for less informed investors (Kim & Verrecchia. 1991).
As Hail and Leuz (2006) argue, the favorable effects of more disclosure are not
predictable as they might be relatively small or (to a large extent) captured by traditional
proxies of risk. Several theoretical studies argue that the size of the economy examined
might influence the magnitude of these effects (Clarkson & Thompson, 1990; Coles,
Loewenstein, & Suay, 1995; Clarkson, Guedes, & Thompson, 1996; Easley & O'Hara,
2004; Hughes, Liu, & Liu, 2007).
Easley and O'Hara (2004) find that a higher proportion of private information increases
cost of equity capital, whereas cost of equity capital is decreased by higher dispersion of
private information and higher precision of private and public information. They see private
information as inducing a new form of systematic risk and highlight that investors require
compensation for that risk. They attest that "individual firms can influence cost of equity
capital by choosing features like accounting treatments" (Easley & O'Hara, 2004, p. 1554).
Hughes et al. (2007) work can be seen as an extension of Easley and O'Hara (2004). In
contrast to their predecessors, they find that in large economies idiosyncratic risk is not priced.
They call the fact that a large number of empirical studies presume information asymmetry is
priced, because of having to trade with privately informed investors, "a commonly held
misperception" (Hughes et al., 2007, p. 707). This price protection effect, also characterized in
Easley and O'Hara (2004), is in fact driven by under-diversification and will disappear in large
economies, in their opinion. Nevertheless, while controlling for total information, they show
that high information asymmetry does lead to high cost of equity- capital.
In our study, we investigate the impact of the adoption of IAS/IFRS and U.S. GAAP by
German companies from 1998-2004. We argue that the specific institutional setting in
Germany and its changes over time call into question the positive impact, implicitly
supporting a detailed analysis. Our results provide evidence a lower cost of equity capital
for companies applying LAAP in Germany. However, the cost of equity capital effects of
applying LAAP is different for the three subperiods examined. Moreover, we document that
the type of accounting regime applied is a priced risk factor in our sample.
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2.2. Determinants and impacts of the adoption of internationally accepted accounting
principles
Various studies have addressed the determinants and impacts of the adoption of
internationally accepted accounting principles (IAAP). One stream of research identifies
attributes of companies which voluntarily change to IAAP (e.g., such analyses are included
in Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Gassen & Sellhorn, 2006).
The second stream of research investigates whether the adoption of IAS/IFRS and U.S.
GAAP causes significant changes to financial statements. For German companies, Moya and
Oliveras (2006) on average find statistically significant increases in equity, but less obvious
effects on net income. Several other studies corroborate these results (Kiiting, Diirr, &
Zwirner, 2002; Burger, Frohlich, & Ulbrich, 2004; Burger, Schafer, Ulbrich, & Zeimes, 2005;
Burger, Feldrappe, & Ulbrich, 2006; Kiiting & Zwimer, 2007).
A third stream of literature examines differences in earnings attributes and accruals
between the accounting regimes. Whereas many studies find a higher earnings quality for
IAS/IFRS companies compared to German GAAP companies in terms of certain measures,
e.g., timeliness, predictability, conservatism, earnings management, value relevance, and
analysts' forecast accuracy (Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001; Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2007;
Bartov, Goldberg, & Kim, 2005), findings of other studies suggest similar results for both
accounting regimes (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2005; Goncharov, 2005). Some studies
are inconclusive (Hung & Subramanyam, 2007) or even provide evidence for a higher
earnings quality of German GAAP with reference to certain attributes (Gassen & Sellhorn,
2006). Comparing the earnings attributes of IAS/IFRS and U.S. GAAP, studies find a
higher earnings quality for U.S. GAAP (Bartov et al., 2005; Barth, Landsman, Lang, &
Williams, 2006; Goncharov & Zimmermann, 2006) or inconclusive results (Van der
Meulen. Gaeremynck, & Willekens, 2007). Reasons for the mixed results of these
"accounting quality studies" might be that the comparison of earnings attributes across
accounting regimes could be biased and that the self-selection of companies applying
different accounting regimes could confound the results. Moreover, these studies only focus
on certain summary measures, neglecting additional information included in financial
statements, e.g., the composition and presentation of assets or net income and the notes as
well as other information instruments like cash flow statements. Finally, the implications
that can be drawn from certain measures are debatable (e.g., see Holthausen & Watts, 2001,
for value-relevance studies).
A fourth stream of studies focuses on the capital-market effects of the adoption of
international accounting regimes. To determine these effects, these studies rely on various
measures, like abnormal returns (Auer, 1996, 1998) stock price volatility (Leuz & Verrecchia,
2000; Cuijpers & Buijink. 2005), bid-ask spreads (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Leuz, 2003;
Gassen & Sellhorn, 2006), percentage of trading days (Gassen & Sellhorn, 2006) or analyst-
forecast based cost of equity capital measures (Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005; Daske, 2006; Daske,
Hail, Leuz. & Verdi, 2007). No clear conclusions have been drawn from these studies
concerning the capital-market impact of the adoption of IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP.
Prior studies on the capital market effect of the adoption of IAAP in Germany rest upon
very specific samples (Leuz & Verrecchia. 2000) or on other time periods (Daske, 2006).
Moreover, all of these previous studies on the capital-market effects are conducted on a firm
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basis, do not highlight the specific institutional background of the country they examine,
and fail to explore the development of the impact over time. Unlike these studies, we focus
on a comprehensive sample of the entire voluntary-adoption period of IAAP in Germany
between 1998 and 2004, shed light on the possible effects of the institutional setting and of
changes in this setting as well as of accounting principles on the cost of equity capital
impact and apply a new methodology of measuring the impact of adoption of IAAP in
Germany.
2.3. Measurement of cost of equity capital
A firm's cost of equity capital is usually defined as the expected return on a firm's stock
(e.g. Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2007). In other words, cost of equity capital is the
minimum rate of return investors require to provide equity capital to the firm (Botosan,
2006). Researchers have suggested and applied a variety ofmeans to measure cost of equity
capital, each with specific advantages and drawbacks. Besides indirect measures or proxies
(e.g., stock return volatility), researchers apply direct measures of cost of equity capital like
residual income and discounted cash flow models (e.g. Gebhardt, Lee, & Swaminathan,
1999), the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (e.g. Fama, & Macbeth, 1973), or multi-
factor models (e.g. Barth, Landsman et al., 2007).
Many studies assume that the CAPM is descriptive and that market beta is a good proxy
for non-diversifiable risk. If so, beta does include any estimation risk. However, by using
historical data to proxy for expected market risk premiums, the CAPM treats estimated
parameters as if they were true, ignoring estimation problems. Therefore, the overriding
conclusion in the literature is that the CAPM is not descriptive, and theory suggests that
market beta does not capture estimation risk. Investor's uncertainty is not taken into account
(Botosan. 2006). The fundamental debate about estimation risk being diversifiable (not
priced) or non-diversifiable (priced) is still ongoing, though. For example, one possible
counter-argument is that information relevance declines with the degree of diversification
in large populations (e.g., Cready & Gurun, 2007).
In discounted-cash-flow models, cost of equity capital can be described as the risk-
adjusted discount rate that investors apply to the expected future cash flows in order to derive
the current stock price. Implementations ofthese models are the Botosan and Plumlee (2002)
model, based on the short-horizon form of the classic dividend growth model, as well as the
Easton (2004) price-earnings growth-ratio model, based on the abnormal growth in earnings.
Daske (2006) directly estimates the expected cost of equity-capital effects through the
implied rate of return of a residual income model utilizing financial analysts' consensus
earnings forecasts and stock prices. General shortcomings of all the discounted cash-flow
models lie in determining the forecast horizon and the terminal value (Easton, 2006).
Moreover, the use of analysts' forecasts has further disadvantages. Forecasts for firms
that have changed from domestic principles to IAAP may tend to have a different degree of
optimism than forecasts for firms that have not changed. These forecasts of the expected rate
of return are generally likely to be higher than the real cost of equity capital (Easton, 2006).
Generally, in all these models, analyst forecasts serve as proxies for market beliefs. One
common criticism, however, is that this implies measurement errors, since analysts cannot
perfectly reflect market beliefs. Consequently, these type of models regularly perform
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unsatisfactorily in tests of construct validity (e.g., Easton & Monahan, 2005). In addition,
analysts typically only follow companies with a high visibility or market capitalization
which might induce a selection bias (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004).
In the meanwhile, many researches have tried to extend the classical CAPM. The
revolutionary work for today's research practice was the three-factor model suggested by
Fama and French (1992, 1993), which rendered the classical CAPM obsolete. Based on
factor-mimicking portfolios, they showed that the CAPM beta was not an effective or
insightful model in their U.S. market studies. Instead, they introduced new regressors to
indicate a value premium that compensates the risk missed by the CAPM: the "small-
minus-big" factor (SMB), which represents the firms' size in terms of market capitalization,
and the "high-minus-low" factor (HML) which stand for the ratio ofbook-to-market value.
The factor-mimicking portfolio approach introduced by Fama and French was also
applied to accounting oriented research. Francis, LaFond et al. (2005) create an accruals
quality factor-mimicking portfolio (AQ factor) to estimate asset pricing regressions. Ecker
et al. (2006) propose their "e-loadings" concept as returns-based representation of earnings
quality. They view earnings quality as a measure of information risk and see information
uncertainty as a non-diversifiable (priced) risk factor, gaining theoretical support from
Easley and O'Hara (2004), as well as Leuz and Verrecchia (2005).
In our study, we use both the CAPM and a factor-mimicking portfolio approach that
incorporates the differences between the accounting regimes applied as a new factor in our
model. This prevents measurement errors and selection bias which might be present in
analyst-based cost-of-equity-capital estimates. To our know ledge, no other study has
applied such a model to compare the effects of IAAP.
3. Institutional background
3. 1. German financial reporting requirements
In Germany, accounting principles and rules are not released by a private standard setter,
but are enacted by the legislature and codified in the German Commercial Code
(Handelsgesetzbuch. HGB). It is accompanied by standards and norms established by court
decisions or by the reporting practice. German GAAP encompasses all codified and
noncodified rules, standards, and norms a company has to observe when preparing financial
statements (Leuz & Wiistemann, 2004).
All German companies are required to provide individual financial statements of the
legal entity according to German GAAP. These statements become the basis for
determining distributable income, deriving taxable income, and other legal provisions
(Haller & Eierle, 2004). In addition, parent companies having one or more subsidiaries are
obliged to prepare consolidated financial statements. German GAAP was basically required
in these statements until 2005.
In the mid 90 s, German multinational companies started to apply IAS and U.S. GAAP
due to a cross-listing in the United States or due to a perceived need for a more in\ estor-
Thereby. companies adopted different reporting strategies, e.g.. a parallel reporting, providing two full sets of
financial statements or reconciliations of income and shareholders' equity (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000).
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oriented reporting (Haller, 2002). Ultimately, this forced the German legislature to enact the
Capital Raising Facilitation Act {Kapitalaufhahmeerleichterungsgesetz, KapAEG) which
allows publicly listed companies to report consolidated financial statements according to
IAAP, consequently substituting for the provisions of German GAAP (§ 292a HGB).
However, companies preparing consolidated financial statements under U.S. GAAP in
accordance with this option were generally not obliged to comply with the disclosure
requirements of the SEC (Wiistemann. 2001 ) and were not subject to the enforcement of the
SEC, unless they were cross-listed in the United States.
Since the enactment of the Capital Raising Facilitation Act the number of listed
companies in Germany exercising this option to adopt IAAP has increased. Moreover, the
listing regulations of the New Market (Neuer Markt), a market segment of the Gentian
Stock Exchange for growth firms between 1997 and 2003, required companies to apply
IAAP (Glaum & Street, 2003).
Since 2005, all publicly traded European companies (including those in Germany) are
required to prepare consolidated accounts under IFRS according to the IAS Regulation EC
No. 1606/2002 (with a few exceptions). 4 Due to the so called "member state options" of the
IAS Regulation, the German legislature has allowed companies to provide additional
individual accounts under IFRS (besides the individual accounts under German GAAP) for
publication purposes and has passed the option to apply IFRS for consolidated accounts to
all non-publicly traded companies.
3.2. Accounting standards under investigation
Fundamental differences exist between general properties of German GAAP and IAAP.
First, IAAP are developed by a private standard-setting body within a specified due process,
whereas in Germany the parliament owns the standard-setting authority for accounting
rules. Even though in 1998 the German Accounting Standards Board (GASB) was founded,
the private-sector standard-setting power of this board is still restricted to developing
recommendations for consolidated financial statements and non-compliance with these
recommendations is not sanctioned (Sellhorn & Gomik-Tomaszcwski, 2006).
Second, German GAAP is more strongly principles based and offers more explicit
choices (e.g., for the treatment of goodwill) than the IAAP. However, until recently,
important areas (e.g., stock options) were not (sufficiently) covered by standards and/or
interpretations under IAS/IFRS. Furthermore, some provisions of IAS/IFRS and U.S.
GAAP are far more complex in comparison to German GAAP. For example, the revenue
recognition according to the percentage of completion method is more complex than the
completed-contract method, the treatment of actuarial gains and losses from pension
obligations is more complex than the general rule to recognize such adjustments at once,
and the impairment test (especially for cash-generating units) is more complex than a
simple write-down to the replacement costs. However, it has to be taken into account that in
Companies publicly traded both in the European Union and on a regulated third-country market and which are
therefore, applying another internationally accepted accounting system (especially U.S. GAAP) in their
consolidated accounts are allowed to defer the application of IFRS until 2007. This also holds for companies
which only have publicly traded debt securities.
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certain areas, like revenue recognition issues, German GAAP is likely to become complex
as well when tax law. court decisions, and particular standards (like GAS, which can be at
least factually binding) have to be considered.
Third, German GAAP is - in contrast to the other accounting regimes investigated -
considerably influenced by tax considerations. Consolidated financial statements following
German GAAP are derived from individual financial statements, which are closely tied to
the tax accounts and serve as the basis for determining dividend restrictions. Due to the so-
called "congruency principle" or "authoritativeness principle" (Maftgeblichkeitsprinzip) the
determination of accounting income and taxable income are directly interrelated (Pfaff &
Schroer, 1996). Primarily, this principle has an impact on the individual accounts of
companies. Until 2002, it was also possible to include tax-induced accounting practices into
consolidated accounts. In 2002, however, the Transparency Act abolished this option.
Fourth, under 1AAP several items of income or expense are recognized directly in equity
(e.g., foreign currency translations SFAS 52.13/SFAS 52.20/SFAS 52.46: IAS 21.32/21.37/
21 .39(c)/21.45; cash flow hedges SFAS 133.18(c), IAS 39.95; revaluations ofavailable-for-sale
financial assets SFAS 1 1 5. 1 3/1 1 5. 1 5/1 1 5. 1 6, IAS 39.5 1/39.55/IAS 39.57) and thus two different
performance measures are defined (i.e., net income and comprehensive income). Under German
GAAP only one item of income or expense (i.e. foreign currency translations) is recognized
directly in equity, leading to differences in the adherence to the clean-surplus relation.
Finally. U.S. GAAP and IAS/IFRS clearly focus on providing an undistorted picture of
the financial position of a company. Yet, German GAAP aims at investor protection and is
largely biased by the "principle of prudence." This divergence in objectives leads to
different recognition, measurement, and disclosure provisions. Table 1 summarizes the
most important differences.
Several changes in the accounting regimes have occurred in the last decade. Table 2 gives
an overview of changes in U.S. GAAP, IAS/IFRS, and German GAAP from 1998 until
2005. It is difficult or perhaps impossible to determine the impact of these changes on the
quality of financial statements and on the cost of equity capital for individual companies.
By focusing on both the quantity and quality of the revision of standards or the issuance of
new standards, we determine two crucial points in time where a major change of at least one
investigated accounting regime has occurred. First, in 1998 U.S. GAAP introduced a new
standard for the disclosure of comprehensive income and under IAS, a revision of IAS 1 , and
German GAAP new requirements for cash flow statements and segment reports became
effective. Second, in 2000, new provisions for derivatives and hedge accounting under U.S.
GAAP and IAS 36-IAS 39, as well as a revision of IAS 16, became effective. Third, the new
standard for goodwill and six other standards became effective under U.S. GAAP, and under
German GAAP the option to include tax-induced accounting practices into consolidated
accounts was abolished. Finally, in 2005 the so-called "Improvements Project," which changed
1 3 standards, revised two others and introduced four new ones became effective under IFRS, and
the Accounting Reform Act brought several revisions and new requirements for German GAAP.
3.3. German corporate governance and enforcement system
The corporate governance system in Germany is fundamentally different from the Anglo-
Saxon system. These differences are due to different legal systems or cultural peculiarities.
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Essentially, Germany has a civil or code law system in contrast to the common law system in
the United States (e.g., Haller & Walton, 2003) and it is characterized by a relatively high
degree of uncertainty avoidance as well as collectivism in comparison to other countries
(Hofstede, 1984).
The corporate governance system of a German joint-stock corporation, which is the legal
structure of nearly all listed companies,' is often characterized as being insider-controlled and
stakeholder-oriented (Schmidt, 2004). The joint-stock corporations have a two-tier system
with a management board (Vorstand) for the executive management of the company and a
separate supervisory board (Aufsichtsrai) for the overseeing of the management board. As
several different stakeholder groups are represented in the supervisory board, the German
governance system is often characterized as stakeholder-orientated, where internal control
mechanisms play a central role (Franks & Mayer, 1997; Hackethal, Schmidt, & Tyrell, 2005).
Until 2005, besides statutory auditors, no external enforcement mechanism for over-
seeing the compliance of companies with accounting standards had been in place. Auditors
published a short audit report to the public and provided a long audit report to the
supervisory board. Based on this report, the supervisory board assessed the compliance of
the financial statements with the accounting rules and the appropriateness of the accounting
policies applied (Naumann, 2000).
During the last decade, several legal changes have affected these corporate-governance
mechanisms. The monitoring of the management board by the supervisory board has been
improved by the Law for the Strengthening of Control and Transparency (Kontroll-und
Tansparenzgesetz, KonTraG) (Nietsch, 2005) in 1998 and the Transparency Act
(Transparenz-und Publizitatsgesetz, TransPuG) in 2002. The KonTraG included audit
reforms changing the objective of the audit as well as the reporting requirements and the
legal liability for auditors. These reforms increased the monitoring role of audits in
Germany (Gassen & Skaife, 2007). Moreover, due to an amendment of the law for
commercial stock companies, the compulsory establishment of risk-management systems
was required ($91 II of the Stock Corporation Act, Aktiengesetz, AktG).
A corporate governance code implemented in 2002 provides standards of best practice
(Nietsch, 2005; Noack & Zetzsche, 2005). In § 161 AktG an obligation to "comply-or-
explain" was included for listed companies which should facilitate the acceptance of these
standards. However, some argue that these reforms have brought no structural change for
the governance mechanisms described above (Nietsch, 2005) or that can rather be seen as a
"marketing instrument" which should increase the attractiveness of German companies'
shares to international investors (Noack & Zetzsche, 2005).
Two important reforms have had an impact on the enforcement system. First, the Accounting
Reform Law of 2004 (Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz, BilReG) implemented certain measures
strengthening the independence of statutory auditors and modified the audit report (§§ 3 1 8-322
HGB) and the Auditor Oversight Act (Abschlusspriiferaufsichtsgesetz, APAG) established the
Some companies are partnerships limited bj shares {Kommaditgesellschafi auf iktien, KGaA) and having at
least one personally liable partner, e.g., Henkel KGaA or Merck KGaA. In 2004 the European Company (Societas
l'un,rcn. SE) was introduced as a legal structure for German companies by the legislature. In 2006 and 2007.
respectively, Allianz and Fresenius were the first companies to adopt this legal structure in Germany.
'' The SE provides companies an option to establish a one-tier or two-tier board system (Noack & Zetzsche, 2005).
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Auditor Oversight Commission (Abschlusspriiferaufsichtskommission, APAK) for overseeing
the statutory auditors (Haller. Emsberger, & Kraus, 2006). Second, an external enforcement
system was established by the Accounting Law Control Act of 2004 {Bilanzkontrollgesetz,
BilKoG) which included §§ 342b-342d HGB into the German Commercial Code. This two-
step system comprises a privately organized enforcement body called Financial Reporting
Enforcement Panel (Deutsche Pnifstelle fur Recluiungslegitng, DPR) and a state authority
called Supervisory Authority for Financial Services Institutions {Bundesansta.lt jur Finanz-
dienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin) (Delvaille et al., 2005; Noack & Zetzsche, 2005).
3.4. Germany's capital market
Only a small proportion of German companies is publicly listed on a stock exchange.
While there are about one million limited liability companies in Germany, only 15,000
stock corporations are registered, from which approximately 1000 are listed on regulated
markets. Most companies in Germany, especially the smaller ones are held privately (Noack
& Zetzsche, 2005).
Traditionally, the German capital market is often seen as bank-based (Baetge et al., 1995;
Haller& Walton, 2003; Vitols, 2005). A major part of debt and also equity financing is provided
by a few, dominant, universal banks, the so-called "house banks" (Hausbanken) (Elsas &
Krahnen, 2003). Besides being major creditors ofcompanies, banks also hold large stakes of the
companies' equity, can increase their influence by acting as proxies for their clients using
depositary voting rights, and play a key role in the internal corporate governance of companies
(Fohlin, 2005). Moreover, there are many cross-holdings between publicly listed companies
(Schilling, 200 1 ), leading to a high ownership concentration in comparison to other countries
(Hackethal et al., 2005; Enriques & Volpin, 2007). Being a typical bank-based system, house-
holds asset are largely held as bank deposits and not as investments in shares (Vitols, 2005).
Since the foundation of the New Market in 1997, the role of equity in the financing of
companies has become more important (e.g., the number of IPOs has increased) and the
number of stockholders has increased (Vitols, 2005). After the burst of the capital market
bubble in 2001, the public interest in stock investments has declined.
In particular, since the tax reform in 2000, banks have decreased their large equity stakes in
listed companies and, thus, their influence (Vitols, 2005; Hackethal et al„ 2005 ). However, to a
certain extent, insurance companies have replaced banks in their role as dominant shareholders
of German companies (Vitols, 2005). As a result, raising equity is still less important for the
external financing of companies and shareholdings of households are still significantly lower
than is the case in other countries. Consequently, the general capital market situation in the
German capital market has not changed structurally so far (Hackethal. 2004; Vitols, 2005) and
the financial system can still be regarded as bank-based (Hackethal et al., 2005).
4. Hypotheses development
4.1. Overall impact of adopting IAAP
We investigate the impact of a voluntary adoption of IFRS or U.S. GAAP by German
companies in the entire period examined (1998-2004) as well as in several subperiods. The
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relation between applying a specific accounting regime and the cost of equity capital is
complex and influenced by several factors. Lambert et al. (2007) argue that information
provided to investors might have both an indirect and a direct effect on the cost of equity
capital. Using similar reasoning, the adoption of IAAP could have an indirect impact on the
cost of equity capital by improving the quality and quantity of information, lowering
information asymmetry (Gassen & Sellhorn 2006), improving the liquidity of a company's
shares by enlarging the investor base (Merton, 1987; Covrig, Defend, & Hung, 2006), and,
finally, lowering the compensation required by uninformed investors in terms of returns,
which means a lower cost of equity capital (Easley & O'Hara, 2004).
In addition, adopting IAAP may impact cash flows directly. On the one hand, those
could be negative due to the costs of adoption as well as the application of the more
complex IAAP. On the other hand, positive impacts could emerge because the adoption of
IAAP could improve brand recognition which might lead to the recruiting of international
employees, enhance international co-operations or acquisitions, and foster the implementa-
tion of value-based management systems (WeiBenberger, Stahl, & Vorstius, 2004).
Three major problems impede evaluating these effects separately. First, influential
factors, like the incentives of managers and auditors (Ball et al., 2003; Ewert &
Wagenhofer, 2005; Gassen & Sellhorn, 2006), the expertise and capabilities of managers,
auditors and users of financial statements, other institutional settings like corporate
governance or enforcement and the importance or the integration of the capital market (Hail
& Leuz, 2006) could have diverse impacts on the (indirect and direct) relations between
standards and the cost of equity capital for the different accounting regimes. Especially, the
low rate of listed companies in Geimany in comparison to other countries and the small
percentage of people holding shares might decrease opportunities for diversification and,
therefore, influences the pricing of estimation risk. This is particularly true when a strong
home-bias towards domestic stocks prevails. For Germany, such a bias is found in several
studies (e.g., Tesar & Werner, 1995; Kilka & Weber, 2000). In contrast, the integration of
the stock markets in Europe and even worldwide could mitigate this effect (Harvey, 1991).
Second, these effects might interact with each other (Gietzmann & Trombetta, 2003) and
with the factors explained, which hampers their exploration. For example, the interaction of
accounting standards and of accounting practice is difficult or rather impossible to
disentangle (Schipper, 2005; Sellhorn & Gornik-Tomaszewski. 2006).
Third, concepts like earnings quality, disclosure level, or information asymmetry are
unobservable and thus have to be measured by proxies (e.g., earnings quality by
persistence, predictability, conservatism, timeliness, discretionary accruals, or value
relevance). Moreover, these concepts disregard the direct cash-flow impacts of adopting
IAAP. This makes it difficult to unambiguously investigate the overall impact of adopting
IAAP.
We assume that the cost of equity capital is an important objective for adopting IAAP.
Several survey studies document this motive for adopting IAAP (Pellens & Tomaszewski,
1999; WeiBenberger et al., 2004). Also, the EU and standard-setters like the FASB aim at
lowering the cost of equity capital when deciding what accounting standards should be
applied. Moreover, only the cost of equity capital is able to capture indirect and direct
effects which pertain to the adoption of IAAP. Thus, we investigate the overall link between
the adoption of IFRS or U.S. GAAP and the cost of equity capital.
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The impact of adopting IAAP in Germany is difficult to predict. The application of
IAAP should reflect the performance of a company in a more timely way and with a lower
degree of conservatism. The higher extent of value-relevant items recognized especially
under IAS/IFRS (e.g., intangible assets) and the more timely and less conservative
measurement of items under IAS IFRS and U.S. GAAP (e.g. at fair value) should improve
the ability of investors to predict future cash flows and thus lower estimation risk. The
higher extent of explanatory notes and of additional disclosures required by IASTFRS and
U.S. GAAP in comparison to German GAAP should, all else being equal, lower the degree
of information asymmetry. A company's decision to switch to IAAP could be regarded as a
strong commitment to increased disclosure because it is very costly to reverse (Leuz &
Verrecchia, 2000; Daske, 2006). As IAS/IFRS and U.S. GAAP are explicitly directed at
investors, the adoption of these accounting regimes in Germany should cause an exchange
of private information granted to certain stakeholders represented on the supervisory board
for public information (Daske, 2006). This should have a decreasing effect on the degree of
asymmetric information. However, Francis, Khurana. and Pereira (2005) argue that the
need for public information in bank-based financial systems like Germany is lower than in
market-based systems and that weak investor protection might impair the credibility of the
information provided by IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Therefore, these effects are expected to
be favorable for IAAP, but could rum out to be relatively low in Germany.
In contrast, previous studies find that principles-based accounting standards lead to a
higher earnings quality (Webster & Thornton, 2005), which suggests, all else equal, a
higher earnings quality of German GAAP and partly IAS/IFRS in comparison to U.S.
GAAP. The reduced comparability of financial statements under IAS/IFRS and U.S. GAAP
due to missing specification of a reporting format for the income statement and balance
sheet could deteriorate the quality of information about German companies available to
investors. In addition, the adoption of IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP might only represent the
use of a label without resulting in a material change of the transparency of financial
statements (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2007). This might hold particularly in countries
like Germany where individual shareholders have less influence on the governance of the
management and managers have more room for pursuing their interests (Ball, 2006).
Furthermore, the enforcement of IASTFRS or U.S. GAAP financial statements might have
been more difficult for the statutory auditors and the supervisory boards especially in the
first years of adoption because they lacked sufficient expertise in the new accounting
regimes. Glaum and Street (2003) provide empirical evidence on this topic. Following the
arguments of Kim and Verrecchia (1994), the adoption of the more complex accounting
regimes, IFRS and U.S. GAAP, could even have increased the information asymmetry
because informed investors are able to gain more insights than less-informed investors. This
argument might hold particularly for non-institutional investors in Germany, as they rather
neglect additional disclosures and focus only on the balance sheet and income sheet
(Deutsches Aktieninstitut, 2005). However, even analysts might have difficulties in using
IFRS or U.S. GAAP for earnings forecasts (Daske, 2005). A further disadvantage of the
adoption of IAAP could be that the previous domestic standards have more effectively
addressed the specific needs of financial statement users or have accommodated the
particular legal or economic system of a country (Armstrong, Barth. Jagolinzer. & Riedl.
2007).
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Based on this discussion, it ultimately remains an empirical question whether over the
examined period the adoption of IAS/IFRS and U.S. GAAP by German companies has
decreased their cost of equity capital. We therefore state the following hypothesis:
HI. In Germany, the cost of equity capital is higher for companies applying German
GAAP than for companies applying IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP.
4.2. Impact of adopting IAAP in subperiods
In a second analysis, we examine whether and how changes in accounting standards, as
well as in the German capital market, corporate-governance system, and enforcement
system could have an effect on the impact of applying IAAP on the cost of equity capital.
As the description of the institutional background in the previous section shows, several
changes have taken place during the sample period. It is likely that these changes will result
in different effects of adopting IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP. As explained above, in the years
1998, 2000, 2002, and 2005 major revisions of accounting standards or new standards
became effective. Moreover, the years 1998, 2002, and 2005 brought reforms for the
corporate governance and enforcement systems in Germany. Consequently, we identify
three relatively stable subperiods in the investigated period: (1)1 998- 1 999, (2) 2000-200
1
and (3) 2002-2004.
At the beginning of the first subperiod (1998-1999), several new disclosures and
presentation requirements under IAS and U.S. GAAP became effective which might have a
positive impact on the cost-of-equity capital effect of applying these two accounting
regimes. Moreover, the capital markets in Germany became more popular especially to
noninstitutional investors, which might have increased investor's demands for more
useful decision information. This would ceteris paribus also imply a positive impact of
an adoption of IAAP, because German GAAP was regarded as being less suitable for
those purposes. In contrast, the IAS provided many options and had no standards for
several important issues in this time period. Moreover, the compliance level of companies
applying IAAP in Germany, especially in the first years of application, was low, since
companies and auditors were not used to the new accounting regimes. In addition, many
analysts and investors in Germany might not have been able to cope with the more complex
provisions.
In 2000, which is the beginning of the second subperiod, several new standards as well
as revisions of key standards became effective under IAS, which restricted options or filled
important gaps of missing rules. Furthermore, companies, investors, financial analysts, and
auditors had become used to the provisions of IAAP and thus were able to exploit the higher
degree of transparency. Various IPOs took place in this time period and the interest in
investor-oriented accounting standards increased.
In the third subperiod (2002-2004), the Transparency Act became effective, abolishing
the option which was allowed under German GAAP to include tax-induced accounting
practices into consolidated accounts. Under U.S. GAAP, the new provisions for measuring
goodwill are rather complex and provide a considerable degree of discretion to managers.
Concerning IFRS, a revised standard for employee benefits (IAS 19 (rev. 2002)) might have
an impact on transparency and thus on the cost of equity capital. The credibility in
J Ernsiherger. O. Vogler I The International Journal of Accounting 43 (20081 339-386 361
accounting numbers, and especially in those under IAAP, was damaged due to some
accounting scandals of companies listed in Germany's New Market that have adopted
either IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP.
Concerning the cost of equity capital effects of applying IAAP in the three subperiods
presented, we state the following hypothesis:
H2. The cost-of-equity-capital impact of applying IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP in comparison
to that of applying German GAAP is different in the time periods 1998-1999, 2000-2001,
and 2002-2004.
5. Research design
5.1. Portfolio analyses
The starting point for our analysis is the classical CAPM. This model describes how the
market return above risk free rate explains a stock or portfolio of stocks. The CAPM model
is described by the following equation:
rl x,+ a (>„„->•;')+£„ (i)
where ru represents the individual stock (or portfolio) i at time t, r,' indicates the risk-free
interest rate, and rmt the market return at time /. The Greek letters stand for the intercept a„
the slope parameter /}„ and the residuum e„ of each individual stock (or portfolio) i.
However, for voluntary changes in the disclosure level, the CAPM results could be
affected by self-selection bias. When variables like company characteristics explaining the
decision of managers to change the disclosure level are omitted in the analysis and are
correlated to certain priced risk factors, the results are biased (Hail, 2002). One way to
mitigate this problem of self-selection is to include known risk factors like market
capitalization and market-to-book value into the analysis (Berk, 1995). Therefore, we use
an enhanced multi-factor model, gaining theoretical support from Francis et al. (2004) as
well as Francis, LaFond et al. (2005), and control for these known priced risk factors. One
assumption of the model is that there is an information factor in our sample which could not
be diversified away and thus is priced. A second alternative for controlling a possible self-
selection bias is a two-step regression approach, which is applied in the firm-level analyses
in the next section.
The multi-factor model we use in the following is based on the original Fama and French
model, with the following multi-factor equation:
>•„ - rf = a, + ft, (rmt - rf) + ft,SMB, + /?,.,HML, + e„ (2)
The first part of Eq. (2) is similar to Eq. ( 1 ), with the only difference being that the Greek
slope parameters ft,, are now numbered from /= 1, 2, 3 for the three regressors (r„„-r,").
SMB„ and HML,. SMB, ("Small minus Big") represents the size of the companies. HML,
stands for a factor based on the book-to-market ratio. Firms with high (low) book-to-market
values are regarded as "value stocks" ("growth stocks") (Fama & French, 1993).
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Similar to Fama and French (1993) we split our sample of companies into six portfolios:
S-H "Small-High" (small size, high book-to-market ratio)
S-M "Small-Medium" (small size, medium book-to-market ratio)
S-L "Small-Low" (small size, low book-to-market ratio)
B-H "Big-High" (big size, high book-to-market ratio)
B-M "Big-Medium" (big size, medium book-to-market ratio)
B-L "Big-Low" (big size, low book-to-market ratio)
We rank our sample first according to the size in terms of market value. The median
discriminates between the "small" and "big" firms. Then we rank our sample according to
the book-to-market ratios and separate the highest 30% as "high", the lowest 30% as "low,"
and the resulting 40% as "medium."
The companies remain in one of the six portfolios for one year (starting in July, ending in
June of the next calendar year). Reference date for the re-alignment of the portfolios is the
end of June of the previous period for the size, and the end of December of the previous
period for the book-to-market ratio. The monthly returns of the companies are averaged -
weighted with their market value - in each of the six portfolios. We obtain: rs 'H
,
r
s~M
, r
s 'L
,
B-H B-M B-L
Eventually, we compute SMB„ and HML, as follows:
SMB,= (rs - H +rs -M +rs- L)/3- (rB " H +rB -M +rB - L )/3 (3)
HML,= (/s - H +rB " H )/2 - (rs
-L + rB
-L
)/2 (4)
With these factors, the influence of size on book-to-market is reduced and vice-versa.
Based on the Fama and French approach (2), our new model (that we call "GM model"),
is augmented with two new factors that represent the impact of the different accounting
regimes:
rl ak + ft, (rmt - /' ) + ft : SMB, + ft,HML, + ft4GMI, + ft 5GMU, + £„ (5)
The factors GMI, and GMU, explain the accounting regime impact. GMI, is the return
difference between the portfolios of companies using German GAAP and IAS/IFRS
("German GAAP minus IAS/IFRS") and GMU, is the return difference between German
GAAP and U.S. GAAP ("German GAAP minus U.S. GAAP") portfolios. For this analysis,
we calculate the market value weighted means for each of the three accounting-regime
groups and compute the difference for the "GM" factors as described for each month in the
sample.
As illustrated in Table 3, extending the number of portfolios according to the accounting
regime results in: 18 factor-mimicking portfolios.
We assign a company to a fiscal year as follows: The reporting date determined the June-
July year used. Each June-July year is assigned to the accounting regime used in the
reporting date ofthat year. For example, ifa company's reporting date is December 3 1 , 2000,
the accounting regime applied at that point is assigned to the July 2000-to-June 2001 year.
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Table 3
18 analyzed portfolios
Book-to-market
Low Medium High
German GA.4P
Size Small
Big
S-L-G
B-L-G
S-M-G
B-M-G
S-H-G
B-H-G
L4S/IFRS
Size
US. GAAP
Size
Small
Big
Small
Big
S-L-I
B-L-I
S-L-U
B-L-U
S-M-l
B-M-l
S-M-U
B-M-U
S-H-I
B-H-I
S-H-U
B-H-U
The 18 portfolios are built upon three criteria: (1) accounting regime applied (G: German GAAP; I: 1AS/IFRS;
U: U.S. GAAP), where companies are assigned into the July-to-June year by the accounting regime they used at the
reporting date within that period; (2) book-to-market value (L / M / H: Low / Medium / High), where the book
value of equity is divided by the market value of equity; we rank our sample according to the book-to-market ratios
and separate the highest 30% as "high." the lowest 30% as "low," and the resulting 40% as "medium"; (3) size in
terms of market value of equity (S / B: Small / Big), where the median discriminates between the "small" and "big"
firms. The companies remain in one of the 18 portfolios for one year (starting in July, ending in June of the next
calendar year). Reference date for the re-alignment of the portfolios is the end ofJune of the previous period for the
size, and the end of December of the previous period for the book-to-market ratio.
Within these 18 portfolios, we again construct the market value weighted average of the
monthly returns. Ultimately, we compute our new factors as follows:
GMI, = (,-S-H-G +/.S-M-G +rS-L-G +rB-H-G +;.B- M-G + B-L-G
f ..S-H-I , S-M-I , „S-L-I , „B-H-I . 3-M-I , ,.B\t +r + r +r +r +r
)/6
L
-')/6
GMU, = (,-s-H-° + rs"M -G + rs " L -G + r8""" + rB ~M-G + rB- L -°) /6
_
(,.S-H-U + ^S-M-U + rS-L-U + ;.B-H-U + pB-M-U + ;.B-L-U\ ;g
(7)
The idea of these factors is that, provided that these differences are significant, they help
us to explain the performance of the returns of our 18 portfolios and account for an
information factor related to the different disclosure levels among the three accounting
regimes examined. Knowing the accounting regime of a portfolio should lead to greater
explanatory power within the model.
We apply the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique. Since it would be
unrealistic to expect the equation errors to be uncorrelated, this method explicitly allows us
to analyze a system of multiple equations with cross-equation parameter restrictions and
correlated error terms.
7
As a robustness check, we also apply the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The inference is even higher
for OLS, but for the technical reasons mentioned we nevertheless incorporate the SLIR method.
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5.2. Firm-level analyses
As already mentioned, dealing with voluntary adoption of IAAP can lead to a potential
self-selection bias between the different accounting regime portfolios. One way of tackling
this issue is to include an information-quality factor in the factor-mimicking portfolio
analysis. But researchers have also successfully implemented another means of addressing
the self-selection problem at the firm-level. By applying the two-stage procedure, proposed
by Heckman (1978), we can control for self-selection by incorporating the Inverse Mills
Ratio (see e.g. Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Gassen & Sellhorn, 2006; Hung & Subramanyam,
2007).
In the first stage, we estimate a probit model to analyze the firms' probability of adopting
IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP, given a variety of explaining factors:
IAAP,, = Probit(<5 + <5, log(ME„) + <52ROA„ + <53CAPINT„ + <54MANUF„ (8)
+ <5 5NEWMARKET„ + <56USUK„ + e„)
where for firm i and time t IAAP,, is a dummy variable for applying IAAP (i.e. IAS/IFRS or
U.S.-GAAP), log(ME„) is the natural logarithm of the market equity, ROA„ is the return on
assets, CAPINT,, is the capital intensity (long-term assets divided by total assets),
MANUF,, is a dummy variable indicating if the company is a manufacturing company
(SIC < 4000), NEWMARKET,, is a dummy for being included in the New Market (Neuer
i
i i i
i
i i i
i
i i i
i
i i i
i
i i i
i
i
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
German GAAP
IAS/IFRS
U.S. GAAP
Fig. 1. Excess returns of the German GAAP portfolio, the IAS/IFRS portfolio, and the U.S. GAAP portfolio from
July 1997 to June 2005 (market value weighted).
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[farkt) segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange, and USUK,, is a dummy indicating
whether the company is cross-listed on the U.S. or U.K. market.
Using this first stage probit estimation, we can compute the Inverse Mills Ratio (A,-,) to
account for self-selection in the second stage.
In the second stage, we analyze whether the adoption of IAAP (indicated by the variable
IAAP,,) significantly influences the cost of equity capital estimates which we derive based
upon our factor-mimicking models. The important difference here is that we simultaneously
control for self-selection bias and other effects included in the first-stage regression (e.g.,
cross-listing or New Market membership). Therefore, we estimate in a second-stage
regression:
CoEC;; = q> + ^, IAAP,, + (p2 log(ME„) + (?,/„ + e.„ (9)
where for firm i and time t CoEC,/" is the cost of equity capital calculated by method m
(CAPM or GM-Model), IAAP,, is a dummy variable for applying IAS/IFRS or U.S.-GAAP,
log(ME„) is the natural logarithm of the market equity, and A,, is the Inverse Mills Ratio.
Even though we have already specified the cost of equity capital estimation model in the
factor-mimicking section already, this procedure can be meaningful as a ceteris paribus
analysis for cost of equity capital versus the adoption of IAAP.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics of yearly data ( 1998-2004). 494 firms
Panel A: Continuous variables
Observations Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
log(ME) 2910 1 1 .965 11.756 19.193 h 6"4 2.053
ROA 2924 0.016 0.047 0.839 -4 310 0.209
CAPrNT 2883 0.346 (1 334 0.951 0.000 0.195
CoEC (CAPM) 3394 0.060 0.062 2.997 -1.588 271
CoEC (GM Model) 3088 0.050 11-2 3.976 -1.903 0.406
Inverse Mills Ratio 2468 0.496 0.563 0.667 0.288 0.122
Panel B: Discrete variables
Observations Obs u ith Dep = Obs with Dep=l
IAAP 3319 1777 1542
MANUF 3952 2688 1264
NEWMARKET 3952 2736 1216
USUK 3952 3672 280
Variable definitions: log(ME) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROA is the return on
assets. CAPINT is the capital intensity (long-term assets divided by total assets), CoEC (CAPM) is the cost of
equity capital calculated by the CAPM, CoEC (GM Model) is the cost of equity capital calculated by the GM
model. InvMillsRatio is the Inverse Mills Ratio calculated based on the first-stage regression in Table 12. IAAP
is a dummy variable for applying internationally accepted accounting principles (IASTFRS or U.S.-GAAP).
a dummy variable indicating if the company is a manufacturing company (SIC<4000),
NEWMARKET is a dummy for being included in the New Market (Neuer Maria) segment of the Frankfurt
lock exchange, and USUK is a dummy for indicating whether the company is cross-listed in the U.S. or U.K
market.
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6. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
6.1. Portfolio analyses
We use data concerning the German stock market, sampled monthly from July 1997
to June 2005 (96 months). This ensures that only companies fully applying IFRS or U.S.
GAAP regulations are included as IAAP companies. Prior to that period, data quality was
poor — e.g., reconciliations only. Our source for the stock returns (adjusted prices),
number of common shares outstanding, and book values is the Datastream Advance
database. For the risk-free rate we apply the 3-month interest rate of the German
Bundesbank (July 1997-December 1998), and after that the EURIBOR 3-month rate as
the money market reference rate for the Euro. The type of accounting regime applied and
the fiscal year-end data are hand collected from company annual reports, since we found
several missing or mistaken entries in the Worldscope database (see Daske et al., 2007,
for details). In accordance with former studies (e.g., Ziegler et al., 2007), we exclude
companies with a negative book value. Also, finance and insurance companies are
excluded from the sample based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 6000 to
6999) since their book values of equity are fundamentally different from those of non-
financial companies. No company is allowed to have an interrupted time series. This
leaves us with a final sample of 548 companies that we assign into 18 portfolios. To
minimize the bias through outliers, we winsorize the return data at the 1% and 99%
levels respectively.
Table 4 shows the descriptive results of our analysis for the 1 8 portfolios, with the
mean excess returns, their standard deviations, the number of monthly observations,
and the average number of firms per month. Fig. 1 illustrates the timely development
of the pooled portfolios into the three main classifications German GAAP, IAS/IFRS, and
U.S. GAAP.
The first interesting finding is that our data contain the Fama and French (1992) value
premium in the means. We find a positive impact of a high book-to-market ratio on the
(excess) returns. In our sample, the mean of the 18 portfolios increases with a rising book-
Table 7
Beta values — comparison between the German GAAP firms, the IAS/IFRS firms, and the U.S. GAAP firms
Average
beta
value
Average
beta value,
weighted
with
number of
observations
CAPM
regression
of the
three
combined
portfolios
CAPM with new endogenous
variables: (with (-statistic)
I-G
U G
G
1
I
0.5131
0.8890
1.1030
0.5298
0.8644
1.1380
0.6232
0.7255
0.9723
1089** (1.8415)
0.3750*** (45772)
Abbreviations: G: German GAAP; I: IAS/IFRS; U: U.S. GAAP; CAPM: Capital Asset Pricing Model; I-G: IAS/
[FRS portfolio minus German GAAP portfolio, regressed in CAPM model; U-G: U.S. GAAP portfolio minus
GAAP portfolio, regressed in CAPM model; *. **. and *** means that these values are significant at the
». and 1% level (here one-sided test).
J. Ernstberger, O. Vogler / The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 339-386 369
OO P3
JD C3
x> £
03 cd
c£ o O
H 00
—
^ o
tN sO
~ O
a o _ - dp
go CQ go CQ go CQ
CV OO O — —
^ OO O _. \0
O m v> OO ^t
< o o o o
•i-
o o
I I
^ O TT
00 00 so
r^ SO O
I
St —
"T —
— O
—
;
o
so u~>
o o
|—
i r-- SO sO **
— rn SO <N so
c£ d © — ©
r--
s 2P o
o o
I o
00
p g
o o
-J I o
"~! °
OO SD
t~- 00
o
o o
*J I o
c/5 BQ
J J
» D3 M go CQ D oo CO
S ,H l> 29 U
-1.2
£ oo r- M „
C
cu
43
zr "5
00
31
=£
43
g
43
c
\
£o « u 1
c£ z £ £ #M c ad-C i E #
C/3 cu
« B
—
3 « -j c
C ~ £ cd
3 = s #
OO *-* "7T 7^
5 CD
£
[i.
J-? |
c o
*J V)
1
43 *S CJ
c
4J
U
S _o" =5U
"cd
u
E
E
3 1
u
u
E
O
00
OO
CJ
—
QJ
-5
c3 —
_» o ~3! "7
X c u 3
u (Q Ji T 5
"qj E
e
-
E
-
3 QJ
r
o=
£ E -= i \
<D
CO
c
3
1
^5"
<
5
CO
aj a j"
o
ed
c
1
VI
flj X
aS X
CD 4) 1-
C
u
2
X
n
u
en
P
c
tj
.
-
u
u
"3 ^ ed u 1^
i- g ,oCO
-. jp —
O i oo <3 «5
£ "3d
43O 3 5] d
(3
ej t ~-i ecj 5
£ -P- s '> cd
— « s o
d
« o u
43
<
"3
u
ed
E
*7
E
«
5
S3
p,
E
a
2"
5?S^
a
e2
E
"3
u
CJ
43 CJ
X /
S.
CU
.5
C
oo
CJ
2
-3
d
CQ
X CD GO in
*n d
ZCJ — (U M
o^
CJ
—
00 X
a
CD
5 -
CJ
d
2 o
22
-J
•5 ~
u
~
i <^l t5
1
tg Cfl 3 ^i
CJ
^>s u
d
a
d ed
E3
a
CJ W5d "7 £ EO
£
u u
en
-7
1
TJ
c U -3
c 43 ^d U a
CJ
ap
43
CJM
cd
E -3
|
Cfl
CD
oo
cd
>
370 ./. Ernstberger, O Vogler The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 339-386
-a ^o
< d
3 * *
^ 00 nX o ov
i
' Vi rN
m -t -f
=5 o d
S ?r -
c/5 e> o
I , fVJ 1
N h O
efi d d
— r- T
a d d X d i ^
o 9
(/) CD
< d d
(/) CQ oo CQ
^ *
-
r |
*
*o
r - £ r- *n m
1—
i Ch 5 ri f
- <-i o c -t O
afi d 1 d d 1 c
CQ * tL *
2 o ^ m
c/; n — so
1—
i
3* ^1 iTi
n «~. O _ —
on cq _ on cq
q o
J. Ernstberger, O Vogler / The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 339-386 371
Table 9
Correlations of exogenous factors
rm-S SMB, HML, (All (All G, 1 u,
>•,„,-/' 1.0000
SMB, -0.1553 1 .0000
HML, -0.3298 -0.3771 1 .0000
GMI, -0.4365 -0.3470 0.3326 1 .0000
GMU, -0.5044 -0.2321 0.4188 0.7484 1 .0000
G, 0.8911 -0.2844 -0.3030 -0.1921 -0.2757 1.0000
I, 0.8293 -0.1810 -0.0947 -0.3737 -0.3047 0.7635 1 .0000
u, 0.8410 -0.0402 -0.3654 -0.5355 -0.6900 0.6923 0.6432 1.0000
Abbreviations: rml—r": Market excess return at time t; SMB,: Small-minus-Big (market value) factor at time t:
HML,: High-minus-Low (book-to-market value) factor at time t; GMI,: German GAAP-minus-IASIFRS factor at
time /; GMU,: German GAAP-minus-U.S. GAAP factor at time t: G,\ Average returns of the German GAAP
companies at time t; I,: Average returns of the IAS/IFRS companies at time t; U,: Average returns of the U.S.
GAAP companies at time /.
to-market ratio, with only three exceptions (marked with * in Table 4), meaning that the
value premium is empirically visible. Ziegler, Schroder, Schulz, and Stehle (2007) discover
the same pattern for Germany as well.
However, the second effect, discovered by Fama and French, of a positive impact of a
small size (i.e. small market values have higher returns) cannot be confirmed in our data,
more to the contrary. This is in accordance with Schrimpf, Schroder, Stehle (2006) and
Ziegler et al. (2007). In our opinion this can be seen as a typical German phenomenon. In
Germany, the tendency toward public offerings is substantially smaller compared to the
United States or the United Kingdom where considerably more small companies are
publicly traded.
6.2. Firm-level analyses
For the two-stage approach, we use yearly financial-statement data gained from the DAFNE
database8 for the period 1998 until 2004. 9 To have these data available for all firms, however,
we had to reduce the sample from the 548 companies referenced above to 494. The cross-listing
data are taken from a study of the "Deutsches Aktieninstitut" 10 (Glaum, Thomaschewski, &
Weber, 2006). The accounting-regime data are, again, the hand-collected data from the
portfolio analysis. We estimate the monthly cost of equity capital for each firm based on the
CAPM and GM models using the risk factors from above ((rmt-r,), SMB,, HML,, GMI,, and
GMU,). Afterwards, we average the monthly data for every year and multiply them by 1
2
' DAFNE is a database of detailed financial infomiation for 140 000 German and Austrian companies, hosted by
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP), one of Europe's leading electronic publishers of business information.
Before 1998, data quality regarding international accounting standards is very low. since only a few
companies published IAS or U.S.-GAAP financial statements. After 2004, the adoption of IFRS was mandatory
for most of the publicly listed companies.
111
Deutsches Aktieninstitut e.V. (DAI) is the association of German exchange-listed stock corporations and other
companies and institutions with an interest in the capital market The DAI is an independent, nonprofit institution.
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Table 1
1
Improvements of adjusted R~: Fama and French model versus CAPM and GM model versus Fama and French
model
G L M H
FF vs. GM vs. FF FF vs. GM vs. FF FF vs. GM vs. FF
CAPM CAPM CAPM
S S-L-G +0.2437 +0.1465 S-M-G +0.3325 +0.0675 S-H-G +0.3378 + 0.0461
B B-L-G +0.0187 +0.0267 B-M-G +0.0347 +0.0077 B-H-G +0.1338 + 0.0230
1 L M H
FF vs. GM vs. FF FF vs. GM vs. FF FF vs. GM vs. FF
CAPM CAPM CAPM
S S-L-I +0.2985 + 0.0070 S-M-I +0.1893 + 0.1595 S-H-I +0.2344 + 0.1334
B B-L-l -0.0105 +0.0387 B-M-I +0.0993 +0.0037 B-H-I +0.1048 +0.0004
r L M H
FF vs. GM vs. FF FF vs. GM vs. FF FF vs. GM vs. FF
CAPM CAPM CAPM
s S-L-U +0.2427 + 0.0936 S-M-U +0.2291 +0.0896 S-H-U +0.3377 + 0.1900
B B-L-U + 0.0395 + 0.1268 B-M-U + 0.0070 -0.0012 B-H-U +0.2083 -0.0231
The portfolio construction is described in Table 1 The table shows absolute improvements (+) / deteriorations (—
)
of adjusted if. Abbreviations: G: German GAAP; I: IAS/TFRS; U: U.S. GAAP; L / M / H: Low / Medium / High
book-to-market value; S B: Small / Big market value (=size); CAPM: Capital Asset Pricing model; FF: Fama and
French model; GM: "German GAAP-minus" model.
(see, e.g.. Fama & French, 1997) to obtain yearly firm-level cost of equity capital estimates."
Descriptive statistics of all data are provided in Table 5. Most important to note is that the
sample consists almost equally of IAAP (1542) and non-IAAP (1777) companies.
7. Regression results
7.1. Portfolio analyses
Regarding the classical CAPM results in Table 6, we can testify to a fairly high
explanatory power. All slope parameters are significant at a level of 1 %. The goodness-of-
fit is notably high, resulting in an adjusted R2 of 40.08%, on average, and an adjusted R2 of
54.78% applying to the market value weighted average.
Looking at the parameter estimates, we find that nine of 1 2 comparisons between the
German GAAP betas and IAS/TFRS and U.S. GAAP betas indicate differences for market
beta (the other three are indicated with an f in Table 6).
Computing the average of the three accounting regime groups, we can also state that
German GAAP portfolios have lower betas. Their average is 0.5131, compared to 0.8890
We also estimate the firm-level models for the monthly cost-of-equity-capital data. For the inference, however,
there is no difference between the monthly average and the monthly average multiplied by 12, since this is only
linear transformation.
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Table 12
Forecasts of Cost of Equity Capital (based on CAPM and GM model)
G L M H
CAPM GM CAPM GM CAPM GM
S S-L-G -0.377% -0.349% S-M-G 0.562% 0.651% S-H-G 1 04(1" „ 1.240%
B
I
B-L-G 1 .009%
L
0.993% B-M-G 1.759%
M
1.637% B-H-G 2.013%
H
1.996%
CAPM GM CAPM GM CAPM GM
S S-L-I -2.065% -1 804% S-M-I -0.389% -0.221% S-H-l 1.127% 1.230%
B B-L-I 1.335% 1.501% B-M-I 1.553% 1.722% B-H-l 0.451% 0.584%
U L M H
CAPM GM CAPM GM CAPM GM
s S-L-U -2.228% -1.546% S-M-U -0.197% 0.470% S-H-U 1.880% 2.774%
B B-L-U 1 .403% 1.152% B-M-U -0.045% -0.119% B-H-U 1.563% 1.812%
The portfolio construction is described in Table 1 . The table shows the forecasts for cost of equity 1 capital, based on
the CAPM and GM model. Cost of equity is the portfolio's excess-return plus the risk-free rate. Abbreviations:
G: German GAAP; I: IAS/IFRS; U: U.S. GAAP; L / M / H: Low / Medium High book-to-market value; S
B: Small Big market value (=size); CAPM: Capital Asset Pricing model; GM: "German GAAP-minus" model.
(IAS/IFRS) and 1.1030 (U.S. GAAP). Weighted with the number of observations in each
portfolio, we see the same pattern: the German GAAP average is 0.5298 versus 0.8644
(IAS/IFRS) and 1.1380 (U.S. GAAP). Finally, we also regress the return differences
between IAS/IFRS and German GAAP, as well as between U.S. GAAP and German
GAAP, on the market excess return in the CAPM. Testing the one-sided hypothesis that the
resulting betas are smaller than zero can be rejected at a 5%-level for the "IAS/IFRS minus
German GAAP" regressand, and at a 1%-level for "U.S. GAAP minus German GAAP"
Table 13
Cost of Equity Capital Comparison (monthly weighted averages)
Weighted by observations Weighted by market value
CAPM
GM
I 044",.
1.115%
1.496%
1 .426%
Weighted by observations Weighted by market value
CAPM
GM
0.506%
0.670%
I
>-"„
1.429%
Weighted by observations Weighted bv market value
CAPM
GM
0.158%
0.472%
us;:",.
I) o0"„
The table shows a comparison between the forecasts for cost of equity capital, based on the CAPM and GM model,
weighted (1) by observations and (2) by market value of equity. The sum of weights in each accounting regime
group (G / 1 / U) totals to one. Abbreviations: G: German GAAP; 1: IAS/IFRS; U: U.S. GAAP; CAPM: Capital
Asset Pricing model; GM: "German GAAP-minus" model.
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regressand. This suggests that both the IAS/IFRS betas and the U.S. GAAP betas are
significantly higher than the German GAAP betas. These results (Table 7) provide evidence
for the information-risk effect of introducing a "new" accounting regime and leading to
higher betas in the CAPM model.
As expected, the extension of the CAPM with the Fama and French factors SMB,
and HML,, applying the typical Fama and French approach as our second model, leads to
an increase in the goodness-of-fit, as indicated by the results in Table 8. The adjusted R~
rises to 57.20%. However, in terms of the market value weighted average, it goes up
less substantially, only to 59.93%. Again, all (r„„- r,
r/
) parameters are significant at the
1% level. Out of our 18 portfolios, seven (eight) SMB, (HML,) parameters do not achieve
the 1% level. This can be explained by the correlation of these two factors in our
sample, which leads to collinearity in the regressors and reduces the power of the model
(Table 9).
Applying our new model, with the "German GAAP minus IAS/IFRS"-factor (GMI,) and
the "German GAAP minus U.S. GAAP"-factor (GMU,), results in the best explaining
model. Applying the differences between the accounting regimes allows us to estimate our
new model stated in Eq. (5). The results are depicted in Table 10.
As before, the highest validity is implied in the {rmt~rt) parameters, followed by the SMB,,
and the HML, parameters. Even though our new regressors, GMI, and GMU„ are individually
significant only in 11 of 18 cases, the overall explanatory power increases again. The new
average adjusted R2 with 63.5 1% exceeds the CAPM by 23.43% points and the classical Fama
and French model by 6.3 1% points. In terms ofmarket value weighted numbers, it outperforms
the CAPM by 7.78% points and the Fama and French model by 2.63% points.
Table 14
First-stage regression: IAAP,, = Probit (5 + o, log(ME„> + <52ROA„ + <S,CAPINT„ + A,MANUF„ +^NEWMARKET,, +
<WSUK,,+e„)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob.
Constant -1.045 0.188 -5.563 0.000
log(ME) 0.072 0.015 4.654 0.000
ROA -0.487 0.151 -3.233 0.001
CAPINT -0.307 0.149 -2.058 0.040
MANUF -0.107 0.061 -1.746 0.081
NEWMARKET 1.670 0.077 21.631 0.000
USUK 0.635 0.111 5.721 0.000
Obs with Dep=0 1107 McFadden R- squared 0.219
Obs with Dep=l 1332 LR statistic (6 df) 737.586
Total obs 2439 Probability (LR stat) 0.000
In the first stage, we estimate a probit model to analyze the firms' probability to adopt IAS/IFRS or U.S.-GAAP
given different explanatory variables. Variable definitions: IAAP is a dummy variable for applying internationally
accepted accounting principles (IAS/IFRS or U.S.-GAAP), log(ME) is the natural logarithm of the market value of
equity, ROA is the return on assets, CAPINT is the capital intensity (long-term assets divided by total assets),
MANUF is a dummy variable indicating if the company is a manufacturing company (SIC < 4000).
NEWMARKET is a dummy for being included in the New Market (Neuer Markt) segment of the Frankfurt
stock exchange, and USUK is a dummy for indicating whether the company is cross-listed at the U.S. or U.K.
market Based on this regression, we can also calculate the InvMillsRatio.
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Table 15
Second-stage regression: CoEC,,"' = cp + <p i IAAP„+ <p;dog(ME„) + <PjA„ + s„
Panel A: CAPM-based cost of equity capital estimates
Al) Time period: 1998 -2004
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob.
Constant -0.172 0.046 -3.723 0.000
IAAP -0.036 0.013 -2.712 0.007
InvMillsRatio 0.052 0.054 0.957 0.339
log(ME) 0.019 0.003 7.019 0.000
/{-squared 0.030 F-statistic 21.390
Total observations 2108 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000
A2) Time period: 1998--1999
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob.
Constant 0.568 0.124 4.599 0.000
IAAP 0.100 0.036 2.733 0.007
InvMillsRatio -0.835 0.142 -5.869 0.000
log(ME) 0.006 0.006 1.064 0.288
TJ-squared 0.350 F-statistic 42.014
Total observations 238 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000
A3) Time period: .2000--2001
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob.
Constant -0.320 0.074 -4.323 0.000
IAAP -0.045 0.020 -2.314 0.021
InvMillsRatio 0.162 0.081 2.002 0.046
log(ME) 0.026 0.004 6.162 0.000
R-squared 0.069 F-statistic 17.600
Total observations 720 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000
A4) Time period: ',2002--2004
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob.
Constant -0.161 0.062 -2.598 0.010
IAAP 0.009 0.020 0.455 0.650
InvMillsRatio 0.142 0.076 1.878 0.061
log(ME) 0.010 0.004 2.534 0.011
.R-squared 0.009 /•"-statistic 3.550
Total observations 1150 Prob (F-statistic) 0.014
Panel B: GM model-based cost-of-equity-capital estimates
Dependent Variable: CoEC (GM model)
Ordinary Least Squares
Bl) Time period: 1998-2004
Variable Coefficient Std. Error hob
Constant
IAAP
-0.103
0.022
0.071
0.020
-1.458
1.091
0.145
0.275
(continued on next page)
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Tabic 15 (continued)
Panel B: GM model-based cost-of-equity-capital estimates
Bl) Time period: 1998 -2004
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob.
InvMillsRatio 0.183 0.082 2.217 0.027
log(ME) 0.005 0.004 1.186 0.236
/(-squared 0.003 F-statistic 2.014
Total observations 2108 Prob (F-statistic) 0.110
B2) rime period: 1998--1999
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob.
Constant -0.118 0.135 -0.878 0.381
IAAP 0.036 0.040 0.895 0.372
InvMillsRatio -0.203 0.155 -1.310 0.191
log(ME) 0.029 0.006 4.584 0.000
S-squared 0.145 F-statistic 13.229
Total observations 238 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000
B3) Time period: 2000--2001
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob.
Constant -0.633 0.092 -6.910 0.000
IAAP -0.044 0.024 -1.817 0.070
InvMillsRatio 0.187 0.100 1.862 0.063
log(ME) 0.043 0.005 8.276 0.000
.ft-squared 0.096 F-statistic 25.359
Total observations 720 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000
B4) Time period: 2002--2004
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob.
Constant 0.091 0.102 0.886 0.376
IAAP 0.040 0.033 1.225 0.221
InvMillsRatio 0.245 0.125 1.960 0.050
log(ME) -0.012 0.006 -1.934 0.053
7?-squared 0.006 F-statistic 2.434
Total observations 1150 Prob (F-statistic) 0.063
In the second stage, we analyze whether the adoption of IAAP significantly influences the cost of equity capital
estimates. Variable definitions: CoEC is Ihe cost of equity capital calculated by CAPM (Panel A) or GM-model
(Panel B), IAAP is a dummy variable for applying IAS IFRS or U.S.-GAAP, ln(ME) is the natural logarithm of the
market value of equity, and InvMillsRatio is the Inverse Mills Ratio. We restrict the sample to four different time
periods: 1998-2004 (Al. Bl). 199K 1499 (A2, B2). 2000-2001 (A3. B3). and 2002-2004 (A4, B4).
To draw a first conclusion, including accounting regime information into the Fama
and French model leads to an improvement of the explanatory power. 12 The portfolio
returns in our model can be described more precisely than when using the CAPM or the
g the adjusted K' takes into account the loss of degTees of freedom. Including two additional regressors
does not automatically increase the adjusted R: .
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Fama and French approach. Table 1 1 illustrates the consolidated comparison of all three
models.
As a sensitivity check, we also compare the Schwarz criterion (SC) for the three different
models. 1 Computing the average of the individual SC for the 18 portfolios estimated with
Least Squares, we find support for the results obtained by the adjusted R~ . The GM model
has the lowest SC (-3.10) vis-a-vis the Fama and French model (-2.99) and the CAPM
(-2.77). Given a specific endogenous variable, the regression model with the lowest SC is
regarded to be the best explaining model.
Based on our three models, we can derive the cost of equity capital for the 18 portfolios
as expected excess returns less the risk-free rate. The SUR system delivers forecasts of cost
of equity capital for both the CAPM and the GM (see Table 12). They are applied to the 18
portfolios.
Most notably, differences between the three accounting regimes are quite obvious for the
CAPM-based cost of equity capital (Table 13), as the significant differences of the beta
values have already indicated. The German GAAP groups with a market value weighted
mean of 1.496% exceed the IAS/IFRS groups ( 1 .267%) and the U.S. GAAP groups with
(0.832%) in terms of expected cost of equity capital.
For the GM model calculation, however, the differences are no longer strong. While the
U.S. GAAP firms (0.730%) still have lower cost of equity capital, the German GAAP firms
(1.426%) and IFRS/1AS firms (1.429%) show no significant difference.
That this relationship is not applicable for the GM estimates is straightforward, given the
specification of our new model. Since the GM model already accounts for accounting-
regime differences, we do not expect significant differences between the cost-of-equity-
capital estimates.
Taken together, these findings support the first hypothesis of our paper. Companies
applying German GAAP have to deal with higher CAPM-based cost of equity capital
expectations by the investors in comparison to firms that have adopted IAAP. We call this
effect "accounting premium" for IASTFRS and U.S. GAAP firms vis-a-vis German GAAP
firms. The development of a novel multi-factor model that captures the "accounting
premium" leads to an improvement of the CAPM and Fama-French models.
7.2. Finn-level analyses
As shown in Table 14, the first-stage regression of the IAAP dummy (IAAP,,) on the
different explaining factors (see Eq. (8)) in a probit model delivers highly significant
results.
14 The McFadden R2 . at 21.95%, is quite substantial; the marginal effects of all
explanatory variables are significant at least at the 10%-level. Especially noticeable are the
p-values of the New Market dummy and the cross-listing dummy, which are both smaller
than 0.0001.
1 We prefer using the Schwarz criterion (SC) versus using the Akaike Info criterion, since the SC "punishes" the
loss of degrees-of-freedoms even more.
14
Since the mean of our dependent dummy variable IAAP is 0.4646. the probit model has to be preferred to the
logit model. For a robustness check, however, we also estimate the logit model, finding no substantial differences
between the two approaches.
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After computing the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first-stage regression, we analyze the
effect of the IAAP dummy on the cost of equity capital, while simultaneously controlling
for self-selection (Inverse Mills Ratio) and, implicitly, for cross-listing and New Market
membership in our second-stage.
The results are presented in Table 15. We distinguish between the CAPM-based
(panel A) and the GM model-based (panel B) cost-of-equity-capital estimates. For each
panel we estimate four different time periods: ( 1 ) the whole sample ( 1 998-2004), and three
subsamples, (2) 1998-1999, (3) 2000-2001, and (4) 2002-2004.
Comparing the second-stage estimations, we find two major results. One. the impact of
the IAAP dummy (IAAP,,) is significantly different for the CAPM versus the GM model.
Comparing especially the whole-sample estimations (1998-2004. panels Al and Bl). we
find that IAAP,, is highly significant for CAPM (/rvalue 0.007). whereas IAAP,, is not
significant for the GM model (p-value 0.275). Moreover, for the GM model the /-"-statistic
for the whole sample period has a/7-value of 0.1 10, meaning that all explaining variables
are not significant at the 10%-level. Looking at all of the panel estimations, while for the
CAPM regressions IAAP,, is significant in three of four cases with twop-values below 1%
and one below 5%, for the GM model regressions IAAP,, is significant only in one case
(panel B3), with ap-value below 10%.
The rational for these findings is that the cost-of-equity-capital estimates for the
CAPM do not account for accounting-regime differences, while the estimates in the
GM model do. Consequently, it is not surprising that on the one hand the IAAP dummy
(IAAP,,) has no significant influence on the cost-of-equity-capital estimates once we
include this information when estimating the dependent variable. On the other hand,
documenting the differences for the CAPM regressions (panel A), we find significant
differences between the regimes, which supports our HI. It is important to note that
this time we also control for self-selection, cross-listing, and New Market membership
effects.
The second result is that there are time-period differences. Concentrating on the CAPM
method (panel A), we find a negative sign for the IAAP dummy (IAAP,,) for the whole
period (1998-2004, panel Al). which is highly significant (/rvalue 0.007). This supports
our first hypothesis that applying an IAAP leads to lower cost of equity capital.
Looking at the subpenods provides more detailed results. For the years 1998 and 1999
the effect was positive (p-value 0.007, panel A2); for the years 2000 and 2001 it was
negative (/;-value 0.021, panel A3). Our rationale for this observation is as follows: in the
beginning, uncertainty dominated the true substantial power of the IAAP, provisions for
several important items were missing under IAS, and level of compliance with IAAP was
low. These disadvantages at least partly diminished in the second subperiod when, under
IAS. several new standards became effective and companies as well as users of financial
statements became used to the IAAP.
Yet, for the period 2002-2004, we cannot draw any interference, since IAAP,, is not
;ignificant. Our explanation for this phenomenon is that in that period new revisions of
accounting standards became effective which granted leeway for management's discretion,
le credibility in the IAAP decreased after several accounting scandals and that German
GAAP abolished the option of including tax-induced accounting practices in the
consolidated accounts.
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Consequently, this gives support to H2, that differences in the effects of adopting IAAP
on the cost of equity capital are time-specific.
Regarding the goodness-of-fit, it is fair to mention that most of the resulting R~ are not
considerably high, which can be seen as a drawback for this analysis. There are two points to
mention, however. First, this is economically comprehensible, since we have stated that our
cost ofequity capital models (CAPM and GM model) already explain the cost ofequity capital
sufficiently. Consequently, we would even expect that the explaining power of the second-
stage regressions is fairly low, meaning that our cost of equity capital methods were efficient
before. Second, we see the second-stage as a ceteris-paribus analysis. In that context, low R s
are in fact also econometrically expectable and acceptable and do not impair the explanatory
power, as long as the individual /rvalues are valid and the overall F-test does not lead to
refusing the significance of all variables (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2002, p. 41 ).
In other words, we do not want to explain the calculation of the cost of equity capital in
the second stage— we already did this with our portfolio models. Here, a low R" is rather a
sign for a well-specified cost-of-equity-capital calculation, which can also be seen as a
robustness test for our H 1
.
8. Conclusions
Our results suggest that the voluntary adoption of IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP by German
companies goes along with a decrease in their cost of equity capital. Notwithstanding the
specific institutional framework in Germany, our findings support the general expectation
that higher quality accounting standards lead to lower cost of equity capital, using
conventional models. We call this effect "accounting premium" for IAAP. These results also
hold when controlling for effects like self-selection, cross-listing, and New Market (Neiter
Markt) listing. Additionally, by developing a novel multi-factor model (that we call the
"GM model"), we can capture the "accounting premium" effect and hence improve the
CAPM as well as Fama and French model.
Our study calls for more caution in future studies which investigate the relationship
between the adoption of a certain accounting regime, information quality, and the cost of
equity capital. Several additional effects and factors like accounting incentives,
enforcement, other institutional settings, and the properties of the capital market, as well
as the interactions of these effects, have to be considered.
The novel methodology we developed for this study uses the classical CAPM and a multi-
factor model, based on the Fama and French model, which included the accounting regime
information. This methodology has the advantages of not being biased or compromised by
estimation errors of analysts' forecasts, of mitigating disclosure-level differences, and ofbeing
applicable to companies that are not followed by financial analysts. The self-selection issue is
addressed by using a two-stage estimation procedure, explicitly controlling for self-selection
and other effects, like cross-listing and New Market membership.
Similar to Barth, Konchitchki et al. (2007), we find that the inclusion of an information
quality or accounting factor improves the performance of the multi-factor model. We
therefore provide further evidence that the traditional three-factor model of Fama and
French lacks an additional factor which could proxy the level and quality of information
provided to investors.
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We recognize, however, that our study is subject to caveats. First, we compare the effects
of voluntary adoption of IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP by German companies. The effects of
mandatory adoption in the periods from 2005 on might have been different where
companies no longer committed themselves to increased disclosure by adopting IAS/IFRS
or U.S. GAAP but instead are obliged to do so. Besides, the new enforcement system in
Germany and the new oversight body for statutory auditors, established in 2005, might have
impacted the accounting practice. Furthermore, companies, auditors, and investors have
gained more expertise in IFRS and U.S. GAAP provisions thus might cope better with the
more complex information provided by IAAP today. In summary, these changes might have
lead to a different overall impact of the adoption of IFRS and U.S. GAAP by German
companies on the cost of capital capital after 2004.
Second, there is still a controversy in the literature about the assumption of
diversifiability of information risk. However, apart from our study several other papers
have already found results supporting the view that market beta does not suffice to explain
cost of capital capital and see other information risk factors applicable to improve the
explanatory power (see, e.g., Francis, LaFond et al., 2005; Botosan, 2006). Multi-factor
models are especially crucial for determining cost of equity capital on the firm level for
which the diversifiability argument does not apply. We see our research as another
empirical contribution toward this discussion.
These two caveats provide opportunities for future research. Studies about the impact
of the mandatory adoption of IFRS, the changes in standards of IAS/IFRS and U.S. GAAP,
and of the new enforcement system, as well as auditor oversight in Germany, on the
information quality and the cost of equity capital might be valuable tasks. Moreover,
future research could examine the ability of our multi-factor model in evaluating the cost-
of-equity-capital impact of different IAAP and could test our model in other settings,
e.g., to investigate the impact of the adoption of IFRS in other countries or institutional
settings.
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Ernstberger and Vogler (2008-this issue) (EV henceforth) employ the concurrent use of
three distinct accounting-standard regimes (German GAAP; U.S. GAAP; and IAS/IFRS
GAAP) as a foundation for examining how accounting reporting choices impact market
returns. In particular, they examine two distinct hypotheses under the assumption that U.S. and
IAS/IFRS GAAP provide better firm-level disclosure environments than German GAAP. First,
they expect German GAAP firms to have lower betas (systematic risk) than IFRS and U.S.
GAAP firms. Second, they expect the return premiums paid by German GAAP firms relative to
IFRS and U.S. GAAP firms to be priced as "risk factors." Third, they expect that German
GAAP firms do indeed pay a return premium.
1. GAAP choice and beta
The version of the paper presented at the conference links beta to earnings variability and
argues that the smoothing effect of German GAAP carries over into reduced return
variability in the form of a lower beta. ' The current version abandons this notion, correctly
so in my opinion, but offers nothing in terms of motivation to replace it. Moreover, the
proposition that using non-German GAAP increases beta suggests a consequential positive
impact on expected returns. The paper's new first hypothesis, however, flatly contradicts
this suggestion. It claims that non-German GAAP usage decreases cost of capital, which is
substantively identical to saying that it decreases expected return. A perspective of the
positive association between beta and the use of IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP that is
reconcilable with the paper's risk-factor pricing and overall cost-of-capital conclusions is
that the causality is reversed. That is, it is not the choice ofGAAP that drives the beta effect,
but rather that firms with high betas find it more beneficial to choose IAS/IFRS or U.S.
GAAP. Under the further assumption (one made by EV) that German GAAP is qualitatively
inferior to these two non German alternatives, then, it follows that a heightened systematic
risk exposure (beta) motivates firms to reduce overall uncertainty about their future cash
flows by choosing better quality disclosures and disclosure frameworks. If the reduction in
cost of capital (expected return) from choosing better quality exceeds the beta-associated
increase in cost of capital then the use of non German GAAP has a negative association
with cost of capital even though it is positively associated with beta.
2. GAAP as a priced risk factor
Following in the tradition of Fama and French (1992) (Fama-French henceforth) EV
examine whether returns on factor portfolios formed on the basis of whether a firm uses
German GAAP (G portfolio) or non German GAAP (I or U portfolios). I have two
concerns, one conceptual and the other mechanical, with this aspect of the paper analysis.
The problems with the earnings-variability notion are: (
I
) that it presumes a rather mechanical relation
etween market prices and earnings that is broadly inconsistent with information quality having positive cost of
benefits, which is a broad thesis in the paper: and, (2) invites the more directly pertinent but unperformed
analysis of the relation between GAAP choice and return variability per se.
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2.1. Conceptualizing GAAP as a risk factor
Conceptually, it is not obvious how information works as a fundamental risk factor.
Basic decision making under uncertainty tells us that in investment settings information
derives value through its ability to reduce uncertainty or risk associated with future payoffs.
That is, information derives its value through its ability to lower risk. It does not in and of
itself cause risk, and it possesses relevance entirely from its ability to modify pre-existing
risk. If we couple this idea that information relevance depends on pre-existent risk factor
levels with the notion of factor-driven asset pricing then it readily follows that information
derives value in such settings from its ability to impact factor risks. Thus, for example, in a
CAPM market return, risk-factor setting, if better information emerges about future
expected aggregate market return then investing in the market becomes less risky. Hence,
the price paid for the market portfolio increases as risk-adverse investors seek to increase
their market holdings and its expected return declines. From the firm side, a decline in
expected risk-factor return equates to a decrease in the cost of equity capital. Specifically, in
a CAPM a firm's expected return/cost-of-capital is:
E(Rit)=rf + bi*{E(RMKTt))-rJ
£(RMKT,) in this expression is determined by a number ofexogenous factors including the
perceived riskiness (i.e., variance) of undiversifiable, future, aggregate market cash flows. It
follows, therefore, that lowering perceived riskiness through the provision of higher quality
information lowers ffRMKT), consequently lowering expected return/cost-of-capital for all
firms in the market. In efficient market settings information quality matters for equity returns
indirectly, through its ability to modify uncertainty about pre-existing risk factors. Moreover,
these information impacts flow to all firms in the market in a public-good-like fashion, not
simply to those firms that happen to be the source of the information. At the conceptual level
information does not, in particular, possess the sort of firm-specific risk factor return impacts
envisioned by EVand others such as Francis et al. (2004). Moreover, the appropriate empirical
tests of information-quality effects should be applied to the factor returns (e.g., E(RMKJ)-rf,
differential return between high and low book-to-market firms, etc.), not to firm-specific
returns which merely reflect these factor-level effects flowing through firm-specific betas."
2.2. Implementing GAAP as a risk factor
At the mechanical level the problem with the EV empirics is that the same underlying
firm returns are determining both the dependent subportfolio returns and the independent
GAAP factor portfolio returns. It is hardly surprising that a positive relation exists between
- Information may also impact the degree of estimation error in the factor betas. In Barry and Brown (1985) low
information quality raises CAPM beta to a value that is higher than it truly should be. resulting in a higher return
(cost of capital). While such a measurement-error impact does link firm-specific information to returns it remains
the case that this return effect is entirely dependent on the existence and magnitude of primary return factors. It
does not provide a foundation for postulating the existence of a new, distinct, information-quality factor. Rather, it
suggests a model in which firm-specific information quality is interacted with factor-portfolio returns.
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the return on a portfolio of German GAAP firms and the return on a differently weighted
portfolio of these same firms (the Table 10 analysis). The fact that the explanatory GMI and
GMU factor-portfolios also involve deducting the return from a portfolio of IAS/IFRS
GAAP (GMI factor) or U.S. GAAP (GMU factor) firms may diminish this basic self-
correlation, but there is certainly no basis for believing that this differencing eliminates it.
Similarly, of course, it is not surprising that significant negative GMI (GMU) coefficients
emerge when the dependent variable changes to the portfolio return on the IAS/IFRS
GAAP firms, (U.S. GAAP firms) since these portfolio returns negatively impact the GMI
and GMU differences. 3 Hence, in addition to being conceptually suspect, the findings on
priced GAAP risk factors are also empirically suspect.
3. GAAP and cost of capital
In a final series oftables (Tables 1 2 and beyond), which were not included in the presentation
version of the paper, EV report an examination of the relation between a cost-of-capital metric
based on asset-pncing-model slope coefficients multiplied by factor returns and accounting-
regime choice. The underlying point of such an analysis is unclear. In the case of the CAPM
specification this estimation approach can be thought of as:
Beta„*((RMKT, ) - ;>.,) + rn = c + c\\AAP„ + oIm'M//s,, + c^LNmEu + en
where
IAAP is one if the firm uses non German GAAP in period /;
InvMills is the inverse mills (self-selection) control;
LN_ME is firm market value.
Simple inspection of this expression reveals an obvious misspecification. 4 Beta influences
the left-hand-side dependent-variable value, but is omitted from the right-hand-side
explanatory-variable set. Since beta is correlated with IAAP (Table 7) this omission
necessarily leads to spurious IAAP inferences. Indeed, since RMKT is smaller than r,, for the
bulk of the observations within the time period considered in the paper the documented
negative IAAP coefficient can be directly attributed to the omission of beta as an explanatory
variable in the analysis. That is, on the left hand side beta is being multiplied by a negative
number (RMKT-jy,) more frequently than it is being multiplied by a positive number and so
the left-hand side is smaller when beta is higher. Since IAAP is positively correlated with beta
More generally, an economically meaningful factor must have an average coefficient across all firms of
something other than zero since otherwise the factor's overall average impact on return is zero and it essentially
disappears within any diversified portfolio. Casual inspection of the Table 10 GMI and GMU coefficients reveals
an overall pattern of equally dispersed positive and negative GMI and GMU coefficients. Hence, it seems likely
that their overall averages, properly weighted of course, are indistinguishable from zero.
he presence of the common cross-sectional constant risk-free rate adjustment is also problematic as it implies
!ie risk-free rate component of cost of capital is somehow related to accounting-regime choice
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(per the paper's previous analyses) it picks up this beta effect as a negative estimated C\
coefficient. Further confirmation ofthis beta-effect is seen in the by-time-period (hypothesis 2)
analyses reported in Table 15. The estimated IAAP coefficient is positive in the 1998 to 1999
time period, negative in the 2000 to 200 1 time period, and ambiguous in the 2002 to 2004 time
period. Respective market returns in these time periods are highly positive, negative, and
mixed in these three time periods. That is, the estimated IAAP coefficient responds to market-
return conditions in a manner consistent with how beta impacts the dependent "cost-of-
capital" return/ In regard to what the paper is attempting here in terms of measuring cost-of-
capital effects of financial reporting regime choice, I think it suffers from a failing to think
about the problem intuitively. The straightforward proposition here is that information quality
lowers return (cost of capital) per se. This proposition follows from the implicit assumption
that factor-based pricing effects represent an inherently incomplete representation of asset
prices and that investors, particularly those holding undiversified portfolios, value the risk
reduction provided from improved information. This nsk-reduction value shows up as an
increase in demand for the firm's stock which in turn drives up stock price, thus lowering
return/cost-of-capital. Moreover, such a conceptual information quality of asset pricing is
supported by various rational-expectations models of financial markets such as Easley and
O'Hara (2004 ). 6 The question, then, is what are the most obvious empirical implications of
such a relation? They are, I think, that after controlling for other known determinates of
cross-sectional and intertemporal cost of capital rates, negative relations should exist
between cost of capital and measures of a firm's idiosyncratic information quality. That is,
the paper should be estimating whether the IAAP variable is significant in a regression
where return less the risk-free rate is the dependent variable and various known factor
returns are the independent variables. Self-selection effects such as those I propose in
Section 1 of this discussion would be controlled/tested by insertion of the inverse Mills
ratio into this equation.
4. Conclusion
In my conference discussion of Ernstberger and Vogler (2008-this issue) I also focused
on the importance of recognizing the interplay between investor use of portfolio
diversification as a means of minimizing idiosyncratic portfolio risk and notions that
information quality is priced. In considering the possible price relevance of information
quality it is particularly important to clearly identify what level of aggregation the
information pertains to. I use the term macro-information with respect to information about
aggregate economy-wide determinates of market discount rates and cash flows. I use the
term micro-information to identify information that is specific to the idiosyncratic
" It is also important to recognize that expected market return must exceed the risk-free rate in ali time periods.
Hence, the overall negative relation documented in Table 15 is almost certainly an artifact of deviation between
expected market return (which determines expected cost of capital) and its empirical proxy, realized market
return.
See Cready (2007) for a comprehensive discussion of asset pricing in rational-expectations settings.
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performance of a firm. The existing accounting literature on the role of information in
equity valuation, including cost of capital studies such as EV, focuses almost exclusively on
the micro-information setting. Analytical models in which micro-information quality
matters in equity market valuation commonly either implicitly or explicitly assume that
investors, at best, incompletely diversify. Hence, investors bear idiosyncratic risk and,
consequently, this risk is priced and information that reduces it is valued. Recognizing this
fundamental linkage between diversification and micro-information value is critically
important in executing coherent empirical tests aimed at establishing a linkage between
information quality and equity return (cost of capital). If, for instance, investors do not hold
idiosyncratic risk minimizing diversified portfolios then Fama-French factor pricing is, at
best, an incomplete foundation for understanding asset pricing since it depends on the
formation by investors ofrisk-minimized factor portfolios. And, it certainly makes no sense
whatsoever as a basis for understanding micro-information quality price impacts since the
conceptual existence of such effects depends quite directly on their being determined in a
nonarbitrage fashion as efficient arbitrage requires efficient diversification which, by
assumption, does not happen in priced micro-information-quality settings. 8
In addition to steering empirical designs away from taking a Fama-French factor-pricing
approach in evaluating information quality equity pricing issues, the inherent linkage
between diversification and micro-information price relevance also provides insights into
how to condition empirical analyses in meaningful ways. Specifically, if the shareholder
clientele of a firm consists largely of highly diversified portfolio holders, then it seems
unlikely that information quality will have much impact on price. Micro-information
quality is irrelevant to such investors. Hence, studies aimed at establishing micro-
information quality price impacts should target firms with relatively undiversified
shareholder clienteles.
Price is typically also determined by (weighted) average rather than best beliefs in these models (see Cready,
2007).
Unlike micro-information quality, macro-information quality can matter in the Fama-French setting, but not as
a separate factor Rather, it would show up as a determinant of the expected factor returns. That is. factor returns
are determined in part by their expected variation. An increase in macro-information quality lowers perceived
variation and hence decreases the equilibrium expected return paid on the factor portfolio. That is, macro-
information quality improvements should reduce expected returns of factor portfolios. Hence, existing evidence
of a priced information- quality factor (e.g.. Francis et al. 2004) most likely reflects correlations between the
information-quality metric and either measurement error in included factors or omitted factors.
" Many of the readers of this paper hold sizable investments in CREF (College Retirement Equity Fund) and
are. therefore, in a position to provide a quick self-test of this proposition. Do you care about the information
quality of the equities in which CREF is invested in determining the size of your investment in CREF? For that
:r do you know anything about CREF's specific equity holdings'1 If your answers to these questions are -'no"
ire certainly my answers to them), then you aptly illustrate the reasonable attitude of a truly diversified
Folio holder toward the information-quality composition of his or her portfolio. Of course, you most likely
and certainly should care about the quality of CREF's reporting (as in, is it a "Ponzi" scheme?) and the
e of uncertainty about the expected returns on the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial Index.
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1. Introduction
In his discussion, William M. Cready (the discussant) makes general comments about
the research pertaining to the pricing of information risk and raises issues concerning the
methodological approach we follow. We appreciate the detailed comments the discussant
provides, and address his main concerns with this reply.
To make it valuable for the reader, we do not try to comment on each single point the
discussant has raised individually and consecutively. Rather, we structure our response to
first address concerns regarding GAAP as a priced risk factor per se, and, second, to
elaborate on the specific methodological setup in Ernstberger and Vogler (2008).
2. GAAP as a priced risk factor
One fundamental concern of the discussant is whether conceptually information works
as a risk factor in multi-factor models. However, this concern does not address our paper
solely, but refers to a huge stream of recent literature on (accounting) information as a
We are grateful to the participants of the Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association 2008 in
Rotterdam, especially the discussant Ann Gaeremynck, for further comments and suggestions. Moreover, we thank
the organizing committee of this conference for granting us the Best Paper Award in the category "International
Financial Accounting" for this paper
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priced risk factor. Both analytical and empirical papers show that firm-specific information
risk cannot be diversified away completely and thus is priced and has an impact on the cost
of equity capital."
To mention one of the most influential analytical papers on that topic, Easley and O'Hara
(2004) investigate a multi-asset, multi-period >ctting with informed and uninformed
investors. They show that the information risk of the uninformed investors cannot be
diversified away and is therefore priced. In their model, uninformed investors' risk o\~
holding the stock is increased by relatively more private information. The reason for this is
that the privately informed investors are better able to adjust their portfolio of stocks to take
advantage ofnew information. As uninformed investors thus face a form of systematic (i.e.,
undiversifiable) information risk, they will require higher returns. Therefore, information
risk in terms of higher levels of private information and lower levels of precision of the
information (both private and public) is found to increase the cost of equity capital.
In another and more accounting-driven research setup, Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia
(2007) argue that low-quality performance reports which are designed to align mv estors and
firms with respect to capital investments negatively affect the coordination between
investors and firms and create information risk. As investors anticipate this impact they
demand a higher risk premium and thus a higher cost of equity capital from firms providing
such performance reports of low quality. Lambert et al. (2007) also show that a portion of
the information risk cannot be diversified away even in economies with many firms.
In short, both Easley and O'Hara (2004) and Lambert et al. (2007) imply that
information risk concerns the uncertainty or imprecision ofinformation used by mv estors to
price securities. Thus, the results of both studies predict a negative association between
information risk and costs of equity capital.
Empirically. Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004. 2005) use a research design
which is very similar to ours. They augment the Fama and French (1993) model with either
earnings quality measures (Francis et al., 2004) or an accrual quality (AQ) factor (Francis
et al., 2005) to estimate asset-pricing regressions. Francis et al. (2004) find that an inverse
relationship exists between earnings attributes and the cost of capital. Moreov er. firms with
poor accruals quality have higher cost of equity capital and. thus, accruals quality proxies
for an information risk factor that cannot be diversified away (Francis et al.. 2005)
The main difference between our study and these earlier works cited is that they focus on
accounting measures reported under the same accounting regime, i.e.. U.S. GAAP, while
our study focuses directly on the impact of applying different GAAP regimes. Altogether,
their empirical work strongly suggests the feasibility of adding an (accounting based)
information risk factor to a multi-factor analysis.
3. Methodological setup in Ernstberger and Vogler (2008)
The discussant criticizes the empirical specification of our analyses and doubts whether
the accounting regime factors we use are economically meaningful As a matter of fact.
~ Habib (2006) provides an excellent review of literature on information n>k and cost of capital, highlighting
the general notion that increased information should reduce the cost of capital and that this form of risk cannot be
diversified awav
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however, we find that in most cases these factors are significant in our regressions and are
able to increase the explanatory power of the models considerably.
To recap the development of multi-factor models, it seems worth mentioning that in
their influential paper Fama and French (1993) rather heunstically built their SMB and
HML factors for explaining portfolio returns. The technical split into three and two
groups, respectively, is "arbitrary," as they admit (Fama & French, 1993, p. 9). The
central point, in fact, is that they build upon strong empirical evidence for modeling these
anomalies (found in Fama & French, 1992) into their three-factor model. This proceeding
applies also to other multifactor models that are supposed to overcome empirical
anomalies, for example, the momentum factor (Carhart. 1997) or the models by Francis
etal. (2004. 2005).
In a similar vein, we explicitly provide empirical evidence for including our accounting
regime factors into the analyses. The GM1 and GMU factors represent the differences in
returns between companies applying German GAAP and IAS IFRS (GMI factor) or
between companies applying German GAAP and U.S. GAAP (GMU factor). As already
stated above, these additional factors proxy for the quality of accounting information and
for the level of disclosures provided to investors by companies applying different
accounting regimes. By doing so we control for another type of anomaly, called the
"accounting premium" in our paper.
Moreover, the discussant states that he does not understand the rationale of the final
analyses of the paper. Here we derive the cost of equity capital estimates for the 18
portfolios defined by the CAPM and the GM model (beta, size, and market-to-book value,
as well as the accounting regime factors GMI and GMU). Calculating the market value
weighted mean of the German GAAP. IAS IFRS and U.S. GAAP portfolios using the
CAPM we find that the application of Internationally Accepted Accounting Principles
(IAAP) reveals higher expected returns and thus lower cost of equity capital in comparison
to German GAAP. In contrast, using our new GM model we find that the differences are not
significant because it already accounts for GAAP differences. In firm-level analyses we
provide evidence that our results are robust to self-selection issues but vary over time.
Furthermore, the discussant claims that our firm-level analyses were misspecified and
could lead to a potential omitted variable bias. However, the discussant assumes that beta
exists for each firm and each point in time, i.e., varies with firm and time. In fact, we
dispose only of one estimated beta per firm over the examined time period (since beta has to
be pre-estimated somehow, using up the time dimension of the data). Consequently, beta is
constant over time and cannot explain the variation of cost of equity capital. If we add beta
on the right-hand side, as the discussant suggests, we obtain a kind of fixed-effects model,
instead of gaining another right-hand side variable. In other words, beta cannot be
correlated over time with any of the other variables, since it is constant.
Still, we estimate the suggested new model with beta on the right-hand side. As
expected, adding beta does not help to explain the cost of equity capital more appropriately.
In six out of the eight equations estimated in Tables 15 and 16 of the paper, beta is mostly
highly insignificant with /^-values ranging from 0.12 up to 0.92. Simultaneously, inference
on the IAAP factor improves towards our first results, since IAAP helps to explain cost of
i capital estimated upon the CAPM and that IAAP is no longer an explanatory factor,
to the (in terms of explanatory power superior) GM model.
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4. Conclusion
We thank the discussant for his extensive review of our paper and providing another
viewpoint on this subject of analysis. While his discussion (especially his oral discussion at
the conference) seems to stem largely from the "pure CAPM school," we tie our analysis
and findings to more recent findings in accounting literature, where not only multi-factor
analysis but also information risk is a specific matter of research. Both our paper and the
discussion show that the relationship between information quality and the cost of equity
capital remains a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Abstract
Accounting literature suggests that contemporaneous earnings are more useful than current operating
cash flow in predicting future cash flows and, therefore, also more relevant for company valuation.
However, recent research indicates that elevated levels of merger and acquisition activity or a changing
economic environment may reduce the value relevance of earnings. Using the oil and gas industry as a
case, this paper examines how the oil industry upheaval in the late 1 990s influenced the value relevance
of financial statement information. We extend the literature by testing for a structural shirt in the equity
market valuation process. Our results provide evidence of a structural break in the value relevance of
accounting information. In contrast to prior research, we find that the value relevance of cash flows
actually decreased in the recent oil industry upheaval. On the other hand, the value relevance of book
equity increased. Furthermore, we find that accounting-method choice ( full cost versus successful efforts)
affects the value relevance of accounting information.
© 2008 University of Ilinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
An important role of accounting information is to assist in the forecasting of future cash
flows (Lev, 1989). Financial analysts and investors regularly use financial statements for
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this purpose. The relation between accounting information and market valuation, therefore,
represents vital knowledge for analysts and investors, especially under conditions of
uncertainty regarding the quality of accounting information.
While prior studies imply that accounting earnings are more value-relevant than operating
cash flow (Dechow, 1994; Biddle, Seow, & Siegel, 1995; Raybum, 1986; Sloan, 1996), this
may not be the case over the whole life cycle of the firm (Black, 1998). Furthermore, the
literature suggests that the value relevance ofaccounting information is influenced by industry
restructuring and M&A activity (Christian & Jones, 2004) and changing economic conditions,
such as the Asian financial crisis (Davis-Friday, Eng, & Liu, 2006). Accordingly, structural
changes in a company's economic environment can lead to increased uncertainty in investors'
perceptions of the quality of reported earnings. Therefore, market participants tend to rely
more on cash-flow measures, which are less clouded by measurement errors than accruals. The
focus of this paper is to investigate the impact of structural changes on the value relevance of
financial-statement information. To this end, the recent upheaval in the oil and gas industry,
1 998-2002, serves as an appropriate case study.
Given the importance of the international oil industry, we find a targeted industry study
appropriate. According to Quirin, Berry, and O'Bryan (2000), cross-sectional studies that
include observations from many different industries are problematic for several reasons. Since
any given industry has specialized accounting methods, regulations, and taxation it is difficult
to generalize the results (Shevlin, 1996). Furthermore, industry-specific analysis allows
consideration of the economic context of reported accounting information (Bernard & Stober,
1 989; Lev & Thiagarajan, 1 993). Hence, by focusing on the oil and gas industry, we are able to
assess the value relevance of industry-specific events, such as an industry upheaval.
We contribute to the capital-markets literature by examining whether an upheaval in the
oil and gas industry has instigated a structural shift in the relationship between financial-
statement information and market valuation. Using data from 1992-2005 for 114 oil and
gas companies, we regress market value of equity (MVE) on accounting information. Using
the dummy-variable approach (Gujarati, 1970a,b) we assess whether a structural shift in
value relevance has occurred and, by testing recursively for this shift, we can determine
when it took place.
Our results confirm that a structural break took place in the valuation of oil and gas
companies in the late 1990s. We find an increase in the value relevance ofbook equity and a
decrease in the value relevance of net income and cash flows during the industry restructuring,
which is contrary to findings in recent studies.
Previous studies have largely concentrated on U.S. companies whose primary business
involves exploration, development, and production (E&P) of oil and gas (e.g., Quirin,
Berry, & O'Bryan, 2000; Berry & Wright, 2001; Bryant, 2003). Our study examines both
integrated and exploration and production oil and gas companies in the United States and
abroad. Studies of the value relevance of accounting information from US E&P companies
typically consider a large number of companies for periods of two to four years (e.g., Quirin
et al., 2000; Berry & Wright, 2001 ; Bryant, 2003). Our data set (1992 to 2005) allows us to
investigate market and company behavior over a period of 14 years, covering at least one
full oil-price cycle, which provides additional information for the time-series analysis. Our
data set has the additional advantage of covering the recent period of substantial industry
restructuring, which very few studies have examined.
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This study provides new insights into how financial and operational information relate to
the market valuation of both upstream and integrated international oil and gas companies
during a period of industry upheaval, which is particularly useful in the application of
accounting-based valuation models. Our findings should be of interest to oil companies,
equity analysts, oil and gas investors, and financial-market regulators.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review ofthe extant
literature. A description of the events of the industry upheaval is presented in Section 3.
Section 4 outlines the research design and provides empirical specification of the regression
models. Section 5 describes the data set. Section 6 contains the empirical results and a
discussion of the results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
An important aspect of financial statements and particularly earnings is to assist users of
the financial statements in predicting future cash flows (Lev, 1989), thus facilitating
fundamental valuation analysis. This view implies that earnings quality 1 is an important
factor to consider when analyzing the relation between market valuation and accounting
earnings. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial
Accounting Concepts No.l states that:
"information about enterprise earnings and its components measured by accrual
accounting generally provides a better indication of enterprise performance than
does information about current cash receipts and payments." FASB (1978).
Indeed, results from prior studies imply that earnings are more value relevant than
operating cash flow (Dechow, 1994; Biddle et al., 1995; Rayburn, 1986; Sloan, 1996).
Nevertheless, the view that earnings are superior to operating cash flow has recently
been contested by researchers who claim that the earnings quality has actually decreased in
recent years (Francis & Schipper, 1999; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Hodge, 2003). The
accounting scandals of the beginning of this millennium highlight the potential failures of
GAAP and financial disclosures (Penman, 2003).
Furthermore, the empirical literature suggests that the higher value relevance of earnings
compared to cash flow might be influenced by a number of external factors such as industry
affiliation, stage in life cycle, and merger activity. These external factors and events may
reduce the quality of earnings, thereby hampering analysts' and investors' ability to forecast
cash flows. Ultimately, this would also reduce the value relevance of earnings.
2.1. Industry affiliations and the value relevance of accounting information
The value relevance of earnings and book equity may vary across industries (see e.g.
Biddle et al.. 1995; Aharony, Falk, & Yehuda, 2003). For instance, the value relevance of
earnings has been found to be lower than that of cash flows in the oil and gas industry
(Quirin et al., 2000; Cormier & Magnan, 2002). In fact, the dominating view among
See. e.g., Schipper and Vincent (2003) for a discussion on the concept of earnings quality
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financial accounting standards setters has been that historical cost accounting2 is
inappropriate for accurately conveying the oil and gas companies' financial performance
to the financial markets, as underscored by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB):
'"An important quality of information that is useful in making rational investment,
credit, and similar decisions is its predictive value, specifically its usefulness in
assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the
enterprise. Historical cost based financial statements for oil and gas producing
enterprises have limited predictive value. Their usefulness is further reduced because
a uniform accounting method is not required to be used for costs incurred in oil and
gas producing activities." FASB (1982).
There are several reasons for the lack of confidence in historical cost accounting in the
oil and gas industry. According to Wright and Gallun (2005), upstream oil and gas
exploration and production embody certain characteristics that distinguish them from other
operations involving asset acquisition and use, characteristics which are frequently cited as
the primary factors responsible for the development of different accounting practices in the
oil and gas industry:
1. Risks are high and the probability of discovering commercial reserves is often low.
2. There is often a long time lag between acquiring permits and licenses and the ultimate
production of reserves.
3. There is not always a correlation between expenditures and results. 3
4. The underlying value of the reserves (which represents a major component of the
economic worth of a company) cannot be valued reliably enough to be recorded on the
balance sheet.
5. The discovery of new reserves, which cannot be valued reliably enough to be recorded
as income, is a major future income-earning event.
6. High costs and risks often result in joint operations.
In particular, the existence of multiple accounting methods in the oil and gas sector may
reduce the value relevance of accounting information. Companies whose primary business
is exploration, development, and production of oil and gas, can choose between two
competing accounting methods; either the full-cost method (FC) or the successful-efforts
method (SE). 4 The SE method will, for a specific exploration project, potentially result in
" In this paper, the reference to historical cost accounting relates to the accounting for oil and gas activities, e.g.,
the full-cost vs. the successful-efforts method. Many oil firms use the LIFO inventory method, which cannot be
seen as historical cost based.
For the oil majors, for instance, the expenditure of one location will be offset by the revenues of another
Similarly, these companies have portfolios of projects with different time lags. They can be considered as classic
examples of "going concerns."
4 Under the FC method all costs incurred from exploration and development activities are capitalized and
subsequently amortized according to the unit-of-production depreciation method. The SE method, on the other
hand, allows only costs incurred from successful exploration activities to be capitalized, and subsequently
amortized according to the unit-of-production depreciation method.
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lower initial net income, and higher future net income as compared to the FC method.
Thus, two different accounting methods lead to different values for net income and book
equity, making it difficult for users of accounting information to determine the financial
performance of oil and gas companies. In order to minimize the potential influence of
measurement errors due to the existence of multiple accounting methods, we only analyze
companies using the successful-efforts method.
Other accounting methods such as the unit-of-production depreciation method6 may also
result in measurement errors that may affect the reliability of accounting figures. The idea
behind the unit-of-production depreciation method is that the costs incurred from
exploration activities are matched with the revenues from production (i.e., in line with the
Matching Principle). However, this method typically results in too rapid depreciation of oil
and gas assets, resulting in so-called legacy assets (Antill & Arnott, 2002). Legacy assets
are defined as oil and gas assets that still generate cash flows, but are absent from balance
sheets.
In order to compensate for the deficiencies in accounting data, as stated for instance by the
FASB, oil companies were required to disclose supplementary information from oil and gas
activities. The ruling oil and gas accounting standard, the SFAS No. 69 (FASB, 1982),
describes the type of information that oil companies are required to disclose, which include
costs incurred, capitalized costs, reserve quantities, changes in reserves quantities (including
production), and a fair-value estimate of the oil and gas reserves (the standardized measure
of discounted cash flows). 7
In conclusion, the literature suggests that the value relevance of financial statement
information is affected by industry affiliation. This may especially be the case in the
petroleum industry, where unique characteristics and particular accounting methods can
lead to measurement errors that can reduce the quality of earnings. The implication may
well be higher value relevance of cash flows than accruals.
2.2. Merger wares and the value relevance ofaccounting information
The value relevance of earnings may also be affected by merger activity. Several analyses
indicate that mergers lead to a significant reduction in the merging firm's accounting
profitability compared to a control sample of firms from various industries (Bild. 1 998; Caves,
1 989; Scherer & Ross, 1 990). 8 An explanation is that merger activity is expensive and results
in the firms incurring substantial costs and nonrecurring items, which reduce profitability.
Research suggests that negative earnings and nonrecurring items can unfavorably affect the
See Bryant (2003) for a discussion on the value relevance of SE vs FC accounting.
The unit-of-production method for amortization of capitalized exploration costs differ somewhat under the full
nisi and successful-efforts accounting methods, (see, e.g., Jennings, Feiten. and Brock, 2000; Wright and Gallun,
2005). Under the unit-of-production method, oil and gas assets are depreciated according to the ratio of
production of oil and gas to the balance of total reserves in the beginning of the year (calculated as the year-end
balance minus the year's production).
See, e.g., Joluisen, Paxson, and Rizzuto (1996) on the historical debate regarding use of accounting versus
economic data in valuing oil firms.
Fndolfsson and Stennek (2005) propose a theory of pre-emptive mergers to explain the empirical puzzle that
mergers often reduce profits, but raise share prices.
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value relevance of earnings (Basu, 1997; Elliott & Hanna, 1996; Hayn, 1995). Furthermore,
the existence of two separate methods for accounting for mergers may further exacerbate
valuation uncertainty through reduced earnings quality (FASB, 1999). Prior to 2001, merging
companies could choose to account for a merger using either the pooling-of-interest method or
the purchasing method. Unlike the purchasing method, the pooling method does not require
companies to record the premium paid for the transaction, nor to report the acquired assets
at fair-market value. Consequently, pooling firms avoided increased future amortization
and depreciation, which affected future earnings. The result is that earnings and book equity
will be different depending on choice ofaccounting method. This may lead to a lower reliance
on accruals than on cash flows. In fact, Christian and Jones (2004) provide evidence that
choice of accounting method for mergers influences the value relevance of accounting data.
They find that in the year of a merger, cash flow from operations provides value relevant
information beyond earnings, supporting the hypothesis that earnings in the year of the merger
are difficult to interpret. The FASB has recently decided to eliminate the pooling-of-interest
method and implement a purchase method where goodwill is not amortized but reviewed
annually for impairment (SFAS Nol41 (FASB, 2001a) and SFAS No 142 (FASB, 2001b)).
However, Christian and Jones (2004) assert that this will not resolve the valuation problems
with mergers since the exclusion of the acquired firm's earnings from the beginning of the
fiscal year to the effective date of the merger will still complicate the merged company's
earnings stream.
2.3. Changing economic conditions (financial crisis) and the value relevance ofaccounting
information
The impact of a firms' financial health on the value relevance of book equity and
earnings is investigated by Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998). The authors argue that
companies' liquidation values and value of unrecognized net assets are reflected in the book
equity and net income, respectively. They posit that as the financial health of a firm
deteriorates, the liquidation value will dominate the unrecognized net-assets valuation
effects. In effect, the value relevance of book equity will increase and that of net income
will decrease in economic environments that reduce the financial health of the firm. Their
results support these arguments and suggest that a structural shift has occurred.
Davis-Friday et al. (2006) extend the Barth's et al. study of bankrupt firms to a setting
where firms are operating in a financial crisis. Using the Asian financial crisis as a case
study, they find evidence to support prior research in some of the countries they examine.
A general result from the extant literature is that economic conditions that lead to economic
distress will tend to suppress the value relevance of earnings and support the role of book
equity. During 1997-1998 the price of oil fell dramatically, reducing the profitability of oil
companies considerably. We investigate whether the results from Barth's et al. (1998) and
Davis-Friday's et al. (2006) analyses extend to a setting where there is a significant decline in
the price ofoutput, in this case oil, resulting in industry restructuring with implications for how
cash flow and accrual information relate to market value.
To conclude, while many prior studies have indicated that earnings are more value-
relevant than cash flows, recent studies indicate that the value relevance of earnings might
be affected by industry affiliation, life-cycle stage, restructuring and changing economic
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Fig. 1. Development in the S&P 500. AMEX Oil Company indices, and the West Texas Intermediate crude spot
price, 1990-2006. Both stock indices and nominal oil price are set to 100 as of January 1. 1990. The S&P 500
Index consists of the 500 largest industrial companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, including several oil
and gas companies. The Amex Oil index consists of the following 1 3 oil and gas companies: Amerada Hess. BP.
ConocoPhilhps, Chevron, Kerr McGee, Marathon, Occidental, Repsol YPF, Sunoco. Total, Valero Energy, and
Exxon Mobil. Source: finance.yahoo.com. The spot prices for oil (USD/barrel, nominal prices) of the West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) quality are taken from www.eia.doe.org.
conditions—events that are highly relevant in an analysis of the how the valuation of oil
and gas majors was influenced by the oil industry upheaval in 1998-2002.
3. The oil and gas industry upheaval 1998-2002
Commentators and researchers have set forth several reasons explaining the massive
industry restructuring that occurred in the international oil and gas industry from 1998-
2002. First, shareholder returns lagged substantially behind the general market
development prior to 1998 (Fig. 1). In fact, while share prices in general9 tripled during
this period, oil company shares 10 only grew by 80%.
Second, oil prices fell dramatically in 1998 and 1999, reaching $10 a barrel (Fig. 1),
severely affecting oil company profitability. This led The Economist to predict that the oil
price would remain low for the foreseeable future, even as low as $5 a barrel (The Economist,
1999). Osmundsen et al. (2006, 2007) argue that the temporary financial distress led to a
stronger focus on cost discipline and short-term profitability across the oil and gas industry.
Third, the availability of exploration projects in OECD was shrinking, making it
necessary to search for petroleum reserves in other parts of the world (Weston, Johnson, &
Siu, 1999). in regions were the geopolitical risks are greater.
As measured by the development in the S&P 500.
As measured by the development in the AMEX index of oil and gas companies
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Fourth, the relatively low value of oil shares made acquisition costs for reserves
lower than expected finding and development costs (Antill & Amort, 2002; Weston et al.,
1999).
Clearly, the major oil and gas companies did not view the inferior share price development
as satisfactory. At the same time, oil companies witnessed increasing pressures from investors
and the analyst community to set and meet aggressive targets both for profitability (e.g.
RoACE)" and production growth (Wilson, 2002). The result was a wave of merger and
acquisition activities among the largest oil and gas companies. Starting with the announcement
ofa merger between BP and Amoco in August 1 998, several others followed including Exxon/
Mobil, Total/Elf/Fina, Chevron/Texaco, BP-Amoco/Arco, and lastly, Conoco/Phillips in
November 200 1 . Royal Dutch/Shell took a different route, by acquiring companies instead of
growing through mega-mergers.
The merger activity was surpassed by announcements of cost cutting and share repur-
chases. It is likely that this period of merger activity, cost-cutting programs and volatile oil
prices may have influenced investors' and analysts' ability to use financial statement to
forecast future cash flows (fundamental analysis).
In the remainder of the paper we set the start of the upheaval period to 2000. This is
based on an iterative process where we varied the year for the start of the upheaval period.
Starting with 2005 and working backwards, we find evidence that 2000 was the year the
structural break occurred (see Section 6.1 for more details on this procedure). Conse-
quently, we analyze the value relevance of accounting and operational information pre and
post by dividing our data set into two sub-samples, one for the years 1 992- 1 999 and one for
the years 2000-2005.
4. Research design and econometric specification
4.1. The value relevance of accounting information
Following Ball and Brown's (1968) and Beaver's (1968) seminal works on the topic,
researchers have tried to determine the relationship between accounting figures and
valuation using statistical methods. However, until Feltham and Ohlson's revitalization of
the residual income valuation model, RIV (Ohlson, 1995, 1999; Feltham & Ohlson, 1995,
1996),
12
the research framework lacked a formal theoretical model that could link
accounting figures to valuation. The Feltham-Ohlsen model enabled a better understanding
of how accounting information formally could be linked to valuation. By connecting
market value to the fundamentals, i.e., earnings and book value of equity, this method has
inspired a considerable amount of capital-markets research (see e.g. Kothari, 2001). Value
relevance is an adequate conventional research tool that aims to uncover how contem-
poraneous accounting figures, such as earnings, are linked to market valuation of share-
holders' equity (see, e.g., Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 2001; Amir, 1993).
Return on Average Capital Employed (RoACE) is a commonly used measure of profitability in the oil and gas
industry (see, e.g.. Osmundsen et al., 2006, 2007).
'" Ota (2002) provides a review of the Ohlson and Feltham-Ohlson models.
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Based on the dividend discount model, Ohlson (1995) develops a model that describes
how the market value of firm i (MVE„) is related to book value (BV„), abnormal earnings
(NI,v), and other information:'
3
MVE
; ,
= BV„+«
l
Ni;; + a2 v„. (1)
where v„ represents other value relevant information. According to Ohlson (1995), other
information represents "value-relevant events that have yet to have an impact on the financial
statements."
4.2. Econometric issues
Due to the linearity of the expression, Eq. ( 1 ) has extensively been used in value
relevance studies. However, several review articles point out some potential issues related
to econometric modelling of the Ohlson model (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Barth et al.,
2001; Kothari, 2001).
Among these issues are scale and omitted variables. Also, the choice of proxies for
"other information," and their potential impact on statistical inference need to be considered
when carrying out value relevance studies.
4.2.1. Scale
The purpose of value relevance studies is to examine the relationship between a firm's
market values and a set of accounting numbers in order to assess the accounting variables'
usefulness in equity valuation. Based on the Ohlson (1995) model, two types of regression
models are commonly used, the levels model and the return model. The levels method
investigates the relation between firm market value and earnings and book value of equity.
The alternative method, the returns model, examines the relation between stock returns,
earnings, and changes in earnings. Although both models are derived from the same
theoretical model, the Ohlson (1995) model, different results are sometimes obtained when
comparing the models (Ota, 2003; Harris, Lang, & Moller, 1994). In particular, scale effects
are of relevance to the levels model. Scale effects are defined as a spurious relation in the
levels model regression that can be caused by failing to control for scale effects that
presumably exist among firms (Ota, 2003). Scale might lead to inference problems such as
coefficient bias, R~ bias, and heteroscedasticity (Easton & Sommers, 2003).
The literature has suggested alternative approaches to mitigating the effects of scale in
capital-markets research, including scale-related variables on the right hand side of the
equation (Barth & Kallapur, 1996), deflating the variables by scale-related variables (scale
proxy), such as the number of shares outstanding, book value of equity, sales, total assets,
and lagged market value (opening market value), (see, e.g., Christie, 1987; Brown, Lo, &
Lys, 1999; Lo, 2004)—or, by deflating by the dependent variable (Easton, 1998; Easton &
Sommers. 2003).
Lo (2004) argues that the R2 bias and heteroscedasticity can be mitigated by deflation,
and that any residual heteroscedasticity can be corrected by, e.g.. White's (1980) adjustment
This relation holds under the assumptions of the elean surplus property and certain time-series properties (see
Ohlson. 1995)
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to standard errors. However, the literature has not come to a conclusion on which deflator is
preferable. Lo (2004) finds that deflation by a scale proxy is the preferred solution. Easton
and Sommers (2003) on the other hand, advocate the use of the dependent variable. Lo and
Lys (2000) argue that the opening market value is the best deflator on a theoretical basis.
Recently, Barth and Clinch (2005) find that the number of outstanding shares is the most
effective deflator. However, this result contradicts Akbar and Stark's (2003) finding that the
use of the number of shares as the deflator does not appear to be effective in either removing
scale effects orheteroscedasticity in U.K. data. Hence, effective mitigation of spurious scale
effects remains an unresolved question in capital markets accounting research.
In this paper we deflate variables using lagged market values. In addition, we use the
GLS method which corrects for both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (see Clarkson,
Li, & Richardson, 2004).
4.2.2. Omitted variables
A potential problem in estimating Eq. ( 1 ) is that variables that are correlated with the
dependent variable are left out because they are not consistent with the theoretical model.
This may result in the omitted variables bias, where the error term becomes correlated with
the dependent variable, and may result in inefficient estimates for the explained variables.
To avoid the omitted variable bias we include variables that are documented to be
important in explaining the value of oil and gas companies. We have included variables for
the oil price along with variables indicated by a previous study, Quirin et al. (2000). In the
latter study, the following variables were identified as significant value-relevant variables:
Variable Definition
Margin per BOE (MAR) Total annual revenues from oil and gas operations minus total
production costs/boe production; where total production costs
are defined as the sum of ( 1 ) costs to operate oil and gas
properties, (2) state production taxes, and (3) windfall profits taxes
Finding costs per BOE (FCB) Two-year average fully loaded finding costs per BOE production
Reserve replacement efficiency (RRE) Discretionary cash flow3 per boe production/two-year average
fully loaded finding costs per boe production
Enterprise value/EBITDA ratio (EV/EBITDA), Total book value of debt plus market value of common equity/
lagged (previous year's ratio) earnings before interest, taxes and DD&A expense
Growth of reserves (SGR) Current year-end equivalent reserves minus previous year-end
equivalent reserves
Growth of production (SGP) Current year-end equivalent production minus previous year-end
total equivalent production
3
Discretionary cash flow is defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus annual DD&A expense, deferred
taxes, and exploration expenses.
We considered using the oil price as an explanatory variable, but this variable was strongly
correlated with MAR (correlation > 0.80). 14 On the other hand, the change in oil price was not
14
Oil and gas price can include important information on energy growth rates in India and China. For many
commentators this has been one of the most important driving forces behind the oil-price hike in the recent five
years. We do not model the energy growth rates in India and China separately, as we believe they are implicitly
included in the oil price, and, therefore, also included in the profit measures, for instance margin per BOE.
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particularly correlated with the change in margin per boe, and the former variable was
therefore used in the returns specifications.
We also include the end-of-year price-to-book ratio for the S&P500 ( P/B) in our estimation.
4.2.3. Other information
The variable v, represents information other than abnormal earnings that has yet to be
captured in current financial statements but affects future abnormal earnings. As Ota (2002)
points out, despite \\ playing an integral role in the Ohlson (1995) model, it is often unob-
servable or very difficult to observe because of its inherent properties. Several attempts have
been made to specify v, using different accounting variables (Barth et al, 1999; Dechow,
Hutton, & Sloan, 1999; Hand & Landsman, 1998, 2005; Myers, 1999). In a similar study to
ours, Bryant (2003) uses the net present value of oil and gas reserves as a proxy for other
information. We use the amounts of oil and gas reserves, OCR, (in barrels of oil equivalents,
boe) in the levels regressions. Changes in oil and gas reserves are captured by the SGR variable.
The Ohlson ( 1 995 ) model assumes that v, follows a first-order autoregressive process,
AR( 1 ). According to Ota (2002), omitting this AR( 1 ) variable from regression models will
lead to serial correlation in the regression error terms. Ota (2002) suggests the use of
generalized least squares (GLS) to mitigate the problem of serial correlation.
The pooled GLS technique allows for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and serial corre-
lation, and provides more efficient estimators.
We operationalize Eq. (1) by specifying the equation (Levels Model):
MVE„ = ft + ftBVft + 2NIa + ftORG,, + ftFCB,, + /? SMAR„ + ftRRE,,
+ ftSGR,, + ftSGP,, + i?gEV/EBITDA„_, + pwP/B + s2,u (2)
4.3. Controlling for accounting method choice
Accounting methods can result in measurement errors in the variables, and the value
relevance of accounting variables can, therefore, be affected by competing accounting
methods. Oil companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges are allowed to choose between two
competing accounting methods for oil and gas exploration and development activities, namely
the full-cost and the successful-efforts methods. As Bryant (2003) demonstrates, by recal-
culating net income and book equity under the alternative method, using the two methods for
the same company results in different net income and book equity figures. It is, therefore,
imperative to control for accounting-method choice on the value relevance of performance
measures in the oil and gas industry. We apply the approach of Quirin et al. (2000) using a
dummy variable for accounting method (FC = 1 and SE= 0) and interact this dummy variable
with the explanatory variables (levels model controlling for accounting method):
MVE„ = ft + a„FC + ftBV,, + ot,BV„ x FC + /?2NIfl + a2 NI„ x FC
+/?,OGR„ + ftFCB,, + ftMAR,, + ftRRE,, + ftSGR,, + ftSGP,, (3)
+ftEV/EBITDA,,_, + p i0P/B, + e3
,
ft
This approach allows us to examine the value relevance of performance measures after
controlling for accounting method.
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4.4. Controlling for scale—the returns specification
In the value relevance literature, the levels method dominates over the returns specification.
However, in light of the potential negative effects of scale, we also analyze the presence of a
structural shift in value relevance using a returns specification. This provides a sensitivity
analysis of the price specification (return model):
ret,, = <p + </>,NI„ + (p2 ANl„ + (p3AFDC„ + <p4AMAR„ + tp^ARRE,,
+ (p6ASGR„ + (pjASG?,, + (/> 8EV/EBITDA,,_, + <pqP/B, (4)
+(p l0AOP, + £4 .„
We also control for scale and for the chosen accounting method (return model controlling
for accounting method):
ret,, = tp + c FC + </? , NI„ + ;,NI„ x FC + (/MNI„ + ,-2 ^NI» x FC
+<piAFDC i < + (p4AMAR„ + tp^ARRE,, + (pbASGR„ + ^ASG?,, (5)
+(/>8EV/EBITDA„_, + cp9P/B, + q>wAOP, + £5 .„
In the following section, we will expand Eqs. (3)-(5) to test for structural breaks in the
value relevance of financial statement information.
4.5. Tlte value relevance of accounting information: testing for a structural shift
As the parameters in our model reflect both discount factors and the company's business
framework, a radical change in the economic environment may disturb the relationships
between market values, accounting figures and other information. The question is whether
this will influence the relation between accounting information and valuation. Econometric
tests for structural break can be applied to examine whether the valuation process changes at
a given point in time. We test for structural breaks using the dummy-variable approach
(Gujarati, 1970a,b), which allows us to run a single regression instead of two, which would
be the case for a Chow test (Chow, 1 960). Gujarati asserts that the dummy variable method is
preferable to the Chow test for several reasons. First, running only a single regression can
substantially abridge the analyses. Second, the single regression can be used to test a variety
ofhypotheses. Third, the Chow test does not explicitly indicate which coefficient, intercept,
or slope is different. Fourth, pooling increases the degrees of freedom and may improve the
relative precision of the estimated parameters. In our case, the third point is of substantial
interest, as the upheaval may change some but not all factors. For instance, the relationship
between the book value and the share value need not change even if the influence of
abnormal income does.
Regression (1): levels model
MVE„ = (/? + /?*) + (/?, + p\)BV„ + (p2 + /?;)NI„ + (/?, + /?;)OGR„
+ ()84 + i?;)FCB„ + (B5 + f5)MARn + (ft, + K)RRE„
+ (ft + #)SGR„ + (ft + ft^)SGP„ + (ft + /?;)EV/EBITDA„_,
+ (fro + P\o)P/B, + £6.» (6)
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where ft is the set of reference parameters for the full sample period, and ft* = P*P2
(Vj = 0,...,8) represent the shift parameters for the upheaval period. We test for a struc-
tural break in the model by testing for joint significance of the shift parameters using an
F-test. If the null hypothesis is rejected, our results provide evidence for a structural
break in the econometric modelling of valuation. We also investigate how the valuation
process is affected by the individual significance of each of the shift parameters. For
instance, a test of the hypothesis HO: ft" i= zero is a test of whether the book values
influence in the valuation process changes.
Regression (2): levels model: controlling for accounting-method choice
MVE„ = (ft, + ft) + («o + <,)FC + (ft + B\)BV„ + (a, + a;)BV„ x FC
+ (B2 + /?*)NI„ + (a2 + a;)NI„ x FC + (ft + £)OGR„
+ (ft + PlfiCBt, + (ft + ft*)MAR„ + (ft + /ORRE,, (7)
+ (ft + ftt)SGR„ + (ft + ftt)SGP„ + (ft + ft*)EV/EBITDA„_,
Regression (3): return model: controlling for scale
(8)
ret,, = (</>„ + (p*Q ) + (<p, + <p])Nl„ + (q>2 + <p'2 )Am„ + (</>_, + (pl)AFDC„
+ (<Pa + (p'4)AMAR„ + (cp5 + <p;)zlRRE„ + (</>6 + (pl)ASGR„
+ {(p 7 + (p*)ASGP„ + (<pg + (/>*JEV/EBITDA,-,_i + (<p9 + q>*9)P/Bt
+ {<P\o + <Pw)AOP, +£8,/,
Regression (4): return model: controlling for scale and accounting-method choice
ret,, = ((p + <p'Q) + (c + c (;)FC + (</>, + <p])m„ + (;, + Cl )NIft x FC
+ (</>2 + <Pi)Am" + (?2 + ;:)^NI„ x FC + (<p3 4- </>*) JFDC/,
+ {(p4 + V4 )AMAR,< + (<p5 + (p;)JRRE„ + (<pt + cpl)ASGR„ (9)
+ (<p 7 + (p^ASG?,, + (<pg + ^)EV/EBITDA„_, + (<p9 + <p*,)P/B,
+ {<Pw + (p*] u)AOP, + £9M
By estimating the model recursively and changing the potential point for a structural break,
one can also test when an eventual structural break took place using the method backward
recursive regression (Hendry, 1995). This method requires that one start estimating the
equation with a structural break at the latest point possible that gives enough observations to
estimate all the parameters using the smallest sample. The regressions are then estimated
recursively with the shifting point moving forward until the sample at the other end ofthe data
set becomes too small to estimate all the parameters. Since we have a panel with a sufficiently
large cross section, we can, estimate all parameters without any problems in a single cross
section, and we can therefore, test for a structural break between all periods. If the test for a
structural break is statistically significant at more than one point, one chooses the point with
the largest test statistic as the point of the break.
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4.6. Accruals vs cashflows
In order to examine the difference between cash flows and accruals, all regressions
are re-estimated using cash flow as the profit measure instead of net income. Since
NI = CFO + Accruals, we would have liked to model both cash flow and accruals in the same
model. Unfortunately, due to high correlation (>0.85) between the three variables—net
income, cash flow and accruals—we are not able to model cash flow and accrual together,
or cash flow and net income in the same econometric model. Separate regressions are
necessary in order to avoid the potential negative effects of multicollinearity.
4. 7. Research hypotheses
The two questions that the research aims to ask can be formulated as two hypotheses, in
alternative form:
Hi. A structural shift in the value relevance often performance measures has collectively
occurred during 1992-2005
H2 . A structural shift in the value relevance of ten individual performance measures has
occurred during 1992-2005
Hj is tested using the dummy-variable method, while significant interaction coefficients
between a performance measure and P2 tests H2 . We also examine the robustness of Eq. (6)
by controlling for accounting method and scale (using the returns specification).
5. Sample data
We test the research hypotheses by estimating regression models for a sample of E&P
and integrated international oil and gas companies. Accounting data were collected from the
John S. Herold database. The J.S. Herold database consists offinancial and operating data from
annual financial statements ofmore than 500 publicly traded energy companies worldwide. We
require the firms in the data base to meet certain screening criteria in order to be included in our
sample. First, we only include firms with at least five years ofconsecutive annual observations.
Second, only oil companies with positive book-value-of-equity are included. This screening
procedure resulted in 1 1 4 firms, with potentially 1 482 firm-year observations ( 1 3 years * 1 1
4
firms). Descriptive statistics for the variables in our sample are reported in Table 1, for two
separate periods 1992-1999 and 2000-2005, and for the entire 14 year period.
The mean and the 25th and 75th percentiles are indicative of a sample with a large size
variation. Ratios, such as MAR. show lower variation than for instance NI and BV. Out of
934 observations, only 253 are from the period 1992-1997. Hence, the panel is unbalanced.
It is also important to point out that the oil industry has witnessed several mergers during
1992-2005. This means that firms may have entered the sample when companies in the
sample has merged or acquired other companies. This may raise some concerns that the
sample is not comparable over time. And. because of the size of the sample, 1 14 companies,
and frequent M&A activity in this industry, may affect a significant portion of the sample.
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Fable I
Descriptive statistics of sample data
Variable No. obs. Mean Standard deviation 25% Median 75%
MVE 1992-1999 340 13.349.2 39.494.4 169.6 1447.7 5102.5
2000-2005 594 16.342.3 45.190.7 356.
1
1564.7 9163.7
1992-2005 934 13.151.6 43,206.6 287.2 1530.1 7301.3
BV 1992-1999 340 4985.3 12,705.7 75.4 568.0 2695.6
2000-2005 594 6408.7 15,598.6 171.5 698.1 4270.9
1992-2005 934 5890.5 14,621.0 124.8 687.5 3338.6
NI 1992-1999 340 595.9 1675.2 5.4 39.8 282.9
2000-2005 594 1314.6 3551.8 20.0 103.2 798.7
1992-2005 934 1053.0 3026.2 12.7 82.7 526.8
CFO 1992-1999 340 1396.2 3499.2 19.9 182.0 682.9
2000-2005 594 2224.0 5216.8 56.3 277.6 1596.3
1992-2005 934 1922.7 4680.3 37.4 243.5 1249.8
OGR 1992-1999 340 1795.8 4316.3 29.3 283.3 953.9
2000-2005 594 1846.7 4261.8 35.4 173.2 1102.8
1992-2005 934 1828.2 4279.5 33.5 193.8 1045.4
FCB 1992- [999 340 8.6 6.2 5.1 7.1 9.8
2000-2005 594 14.8 II 1 7.4 12.1 18.5
1992-2005 934 12.5 10.1 6.2 9.6 15.4
MAR 1992-1999 340 9.6 3.3 7.7 9.3 11.2
2000-2005 594 20.1 7.7 14.5 18.5 24.4
1992-2005 934 16.3 8.2 9.9 14.4 20.8
RRE 1992-1999 340 1.5 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.8
2000-2005 594 1.8 1.7 0.9 1.3 2.1
1992-2005 934 16 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.9
SGR 1992-1999 340 67.6 475.8 0.0 7.3 63.5
2000-2005 594 65.2 317.7 -0.8 5.3 43.2
1992-2005 934 66.1 382.6 -0.4 5.6 46.8
SGP 1992-1999 340 5.4 28.0 0.0 1 1 4.9
2000-2005 594 5.7 19.7 0.0 0.7 4,7
1992-2005 934 5.6 23.0 00 0.8 4.8
EV/EBITDA,-
,
1992-1999 340 8.4 5.5 5.9 7.2 9.5
2000-2005 594 7.0 3.9 4.8 6.1 8.1
1992-2005 934 7.5 4.6 5.1 6.7 8.6
PB 1992-1999 8 3.5 1.2 2.6 3.1 4.2
2000-2005 6 3.2 0.6 2.9 3.1 3.3
1992-2005 14 3.4 0.9 2.7 3.1 3.8
OP 1992-1999 8 17.2 2.5 16.4 17.0 18.5
2000-2005 6 34.8 11.8 28.5 28.8 38.3
1992-2005 14 24.5 11.7 17.0 19.9 28.6
Notes: The following variables are measured in U.S. millions at year-end: MVE is market value of equity. BV is the
book value of equity, NI is net income, CFO is cash flow from operations, and OGR is the amount of oil and gas
reserves (in BOE). The following variables are measured as U.S. dollars per barrel of oil equivalent: FCB is finding
and development cost per barrel of oil equivalent (BOE). MAR is margin per BOE. RRE is reserve replacement
efficiency. SGR is change in oil and gas reserves (in BOE) per year. SGP is change in production (in BOE) of oil
and gas per year. The following variables are ratios of market values to accounting numbers. EV/EBITDA is the
previous year's enlerprise-to-earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization ratio, PIB is the
pnce-to-book ratio for the S&P500 index.
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Table 2a
Pearson correlation coefficients for kev variables: Levels models
NI CFO OGR FCB MAR RRE SGR SGP EV/EBITDA S&P 500 PIB
BV 047 0.53 0.50 0.56 -0.01 0.08 0.40 0.29 -0.25 0.03
NI 0.62 0.47 0.46 0.14 0.14 -0.03 0.06 -0.18 0.07
CFO 0.44 0.68 0.11 0.004 0.11 0.003 -0.21 0.01
OGR 0.48 -0.25 -0.04 0.41 0.20 -0.12 0.13
FCB 0.05 -0.23 0.34 0.39 -0.11 0.04
MAR 0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.25
RRE -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01
SGR 0.22 -0.01 0.05
SGP 0.03 0.01
EV/EBITDA 0.12
Notes: Variable definitions are as follows. BV is the book value of equity, NI is net income, CFO is cash flow from
operations, OGR is amount of oil and gas reserves (in BOE), FCB is finding and development cost per barrel of oil
equivalent (BOE), MAR is margin per BOE, RRE is reserve replacement efficiency, SGR is change in oil and gas
reserves (in BOE) per year, SGP is change in production (in BOE) of oil and gas per year, EV/EBITDA is the
previous year's enterprise-to-earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization ratio. PB is the
price-to-book ratio for the S&P500 index.
Table 2a (levels models) and Table 2b (return models) report Pearson correlation
coefficients among the explanatory variables of our model.
The largest correlation exists between BV and NI (0.55) and BV and SGR (0.55). These
correlations are lower than the 0.6 "rule of thumb" frequently used in econometrics. The
other correlations are fairly low.
Table 2b
Pearson correlation coefficients for kev variables: Return models
ANI CFO ACFO AFCB AMAR ARRE ASGR ASGP EV/
EBITDA
S&P500
PIB
AOP
NI 0.23 0.62 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.33 0.03 -0.01 -0.19 0.07 0.22
ANI 0.17 0.21 0.10 0.02 0.44 0.00 -0.03 0.10 0.04 0.18
CFO 0.24 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.21 0.01 0.17
ACFO 0.22 0.04 0.34 0.004 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.23
AFCB 0.01 -0.12 0.05 0.07 0.15 -0.11 0.03
AMAR 0.04 -0.0004 -0.0021 0.02 -0.003 0.09
ARRE 0.001 -0.04 0.22 0.18 0.37
ASGR -0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.03
ASGP 0.05 0.004 0.0007
EV/EBITDA 0.12 0.01
S&P500 PIB 0.11
Notes: Variable definitions are as follows. NI is net income. CFO is cash flow from operations, ANI is change in
net income per year, ACFO is the change in cash flow from operations per year, AFCB is the change in finding and
development cost per barrel of oil equivalent (BOE). AMAR is the change in margin per BOE, ARRE is reserve
replacement efficiency. ASGR is the rate of change in oil and gas reserves (in BOE) per year. ASGP is rate of
change in production (in BOE) of oil and gas per year, EV/EBITDA is the previous year's enterprise-to-earnings
before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization ratio. PIB is the price-to-book ratio for the S&P500 index.
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6. Results and discussion
6.1. The timing of the structural break in valuation
Although circumstantial evidence would suggest that a structural break took place in
1998-2002 (i.e., fall in oil price combined with the onset of a series of mega-mergers),
we apply backward recursive regressions to find the actual start year for the transition
period. We do this by changing the P2 variable in Eqs. (6)-(9). First, we set P2 = 2005
and then we test for a structural break using the dummy-variable-approach test. This
is done for all the years P2= 1993,..., 2005. The test statistics are shown in Fig. 2 for
the model in Eq. (6), and as one can see the structural break took place in 2000. Also,
for the other models, the test statistic indicates that the structural break took place in 2000,
and as discussed below, the test statistic was significant in all models. That the structural
break took place in 2000 also corresponds with other developments in the oil industry,
as this was the year of the first merger announcement. Consequently, we analyze the value
relevance of accounting and operational information pre and post by dividing our data
set into two sub-samples, one for the years 1992-1999 and one for the years 2000-2005.
1400
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Fig. 2. Testing for the timing of the structural shift (price regression). Notes: The model used is the price regression
in Eq
ft)) + (0i + /5,)BV„ + (ft + /?;)NI„ + (ft + ft,)ORG„ + (/I, + ft)FCB„
+ (ft + P\)MAR„ + (ft + ft)RRE„ + (ft + ft)SGR„ + (ft + ft*)SGPl7
+ (ft + ft)EV/EBITDA„_, + (ft, + li\ u )P/B, + £„„
The coefficient /J*=ft P2. The regression is iteratively estimated usmg P2 = 1995,..., 2004. For each P2, a jf
2
is
calculated using the dummy-variable technique (Uujarati; 1970a,b). According to (Hendry, 1995), the year in
which the maximum £ value can observed can be regarded as the year of the onset of the structural break.
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6 .2. Tests for structural breaks
6.2.1 The levels model
The results from the levels models are shown in Table 3. Using the dummy-variable test,
w e find evidence for a structural break in the value-relevance of accounting information.
Table 3
Levels model
Variables \ Net income B: Cash flow
Coefficient r-> alue Coefficient r-\ alue
Intercept 0.661 *** 630 551 *** 5 IS
p: -0.265 * ! 78 0.589 *«* -
BY 540 *** 308 *** - -
by • p; n 323 *** 533 *** 5 ss
Nl 1 547 • * 2 54
NT - p: 0.332 0.615
CFO %%* 3 00
CFO • p: 1 *»*
R -0.IS" * 0.122 -1 14
R <P2 -0.356 *** 2.65 1.089 •
FCB 0.769 *** 3.65 0.615 *«
FCB - p: 153 0.61 « 1 "1
MAR 015 *» 224 ««« 3.04
mar - p: -0.006 82 -0.004 0.56
RRE 0.003 17 015 0.77
rre-p: -0.006 0.27 0.006
SGR 1 669 *** 1.761 *«« 5:i
sgr^p: 187 -0.42 -0.969 *#*
SGP -0.781 0.29 :4p~ -0.81
sgp • p: 1.676 0.31 so S o 1 00
FY EBITDA 0.012 ** 0.012 »- :4o
EY EBITDA P2 0.022 #** ) ; ; 026 *** : 75
S&P500P/B 0.020 -1.31 1.017 -
S&P50OP/fixP2 -0.027 0.030 93
N 935 933
Wald /; 1227.2 1326.6
Log likelihood -4.<: 8 -441.7
r 1262.1 1244 g
P <0.001
MYH. = (B + /?;) + (/?,+ B\)Bv„ + (/)':+ p'^N,, + (/>\ >' t
vA!, QR & f (p's + /\ S
l\ !
Notes: *** = significant at the 10% significance level, ** -significant at the 5% significance level, *** = significant
at the 1% significance level Variable definitions are as follows P2 is a dummy for die years 1998 2005 BY is the
hook value ofequity, Nl is net income. CFO is cash flow from operations, FCB is finding and development cost per
barrel ofoil equivalent (BOl I, MAR is margin pet BOH. RR1 is rcscm replacement efficiency, SGR is change in
oil and gas reserves (in BOE) per \e.ir. SGP is the change in production (in BOE) of oil and gas per year, 1 V
EBITDA is the pre\ ions year's enterprise-to-eamings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization ratio.
/' « is the price-to-book ratio tor the S&PS00 index
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Table 4
Levels model, controlling for accounting-method choice
Variables A: Net income B: Cash flow
Coefficient r-value Coefficient -value
Intercept 0.706
P2 -0.256
FC -0.140
PC P2 0.039
BV 0.318
BVP2 0.194
BVxFC 0.113
BV x FC * P2 0.182
Nl 1.259
NIxP2 1.291
NIxFC 0.694
NI • FC P2 -1.751
CFO
CFOxP2
CFOxFC
CFO • FC x P2
R -0.144
R*P2 -0.382
FCB 0.680
FCBxP2 0.274
MAR 0.017
MARxP2
-0.009
RRE 0.0004
RRExP2 -0.003
SGR 1.557
SGR*P2 -0.137
SGP 0.192
SGPxP2
-1.148
EV/EB1TDA 0.010
EV/EBITDA x P2 0.023
S&P500 PB -0.022
S&P500 PB x P2 -0.028
N
Waldr
Log likelihood
r
p
6.36
-1.66
-1.66
0.36
4.64
1.75
1.06
1.16
1.79
1.62
0.67
-1.56
-1.35
-2.75
2.91
1.01
2.53
-1.26
0.02
-0.11
4.41
-0.29
0.07
-0.20
0,43
3.46
-1.41
-0.90
935
1227,7
-428.3
1230.6
<0.001
0.506
-0.433
-0.035
-0.084
0.160
0.493
0.335
-0.027
1.746
-1.337
-1.130
0.654
0.117
-0.067
0.405
0.731
0.020
-0.004
0.011
0.013
1.578
-0.749
-1.397
3.734
0.012
0.023
-0.010
0.015
***
***
***
***
4.41
-2.73
-0.40
-0.75
1.95
4.06
2.74
-0.16
5.38
-3.41
-2.47
1.22
-1.07
-0.47
1.55
2.40
3.02
-0.63
0.54
0.58
4.62
-1.71
-0.45
0.66
2.34
3.23
-0.65
0.47
933
1244.7
-437.0
1165.9
<0.001
MVE„ = (ft, + lQ f (>„ + *;)FC + (/?, + tf)Bv„ + (a, + *;)BV„ x pC + (ft + ft)N„,
+ (a2 + «;)»,„ x FC + (ft, + /?;)Ogr„ + (ft, + £)FCBf, + (ft + P'S)MAM + (ft„ + ^)RRi„
+ (lh + ft')SoR,, + (A + IS'X )SGP„ + (ft, + />;)EV/EBITDA„_, + (p ]n + P'U) )P/B, + £7 ,„
Notes: *' * = significant at the 10% significance level, ** = significant at the 5% significance level, *** = significant at
the 1% significance level. Variable definitions are as follows. P2 is a dummy for the years 1 998-2005. FC is a dummy
variable for companies that use the full cost accounting method. BV is the book value of equity, Nl is net income, CFO
is cash flow from operations, FCB is finding and development cost per barrel of oil equivalent (BOE). MAR is margin
per BOE, RRE is reserve replacement efficiency, SGR is change in oil and gas reserves (in BOE) per year, SGP is the
change in production (in BOE) ofoil and gas per year, EV/EBITDA is the previous year's enterpnse-to-eamings before
interest, taxes, and depreciation and amortization ratio. P/B is the price-to-book ratio for the S&P500 index.
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Table 5
Return model
Variables A: Net income B: Cash flow
Coefficient r-value Coefficient r-value
Intercept -0.249 * -2.20 -0.252 *** -1.58
P2 0.999 *** 5.82 0.964 *** 4.64
NI 5.349 *** 10.68
NIxP2 -3.140 *** -5.71
ANI 0.020 ** 2.14
ANIxP2 -0.010 -0.81
CFO 2.313 *** 5.65
CFO x P2 -1.198 *** -2.78
ACFO 0.014 0.47
ACFO*P2 0.030 0.76
AFCB 0.268 *** 5.80 0.163 *** 3.13
AFCB*P2 -0.149 *** 2.78 -0.021 -0.36
AMAR 0.008 *** 3.73 0.003 0.98
AMAR*P2 0.314 *** 3.62 0.242 *** 2.69
ARRE 0.004 0.04 0.115 1.53
ARRExP2 -0.058 -0.59 -0.037 -0.43
ASGR 0.009 ** 2.01 0.006 1.39
ASGR*P2 -0.008 * -1.73 -0.005 -1.18
ASGP 0.001 0.33 -0.001 -0.03
ASGP x P2 0.001 0.23 0.001 0.28
EV/EBITDA -0.003 -0.31 -0.001 -0.02
EV/EBITDA x P2 0.007 0.54 0.002 0.18
S&P500 PB 0.022 0.93 0.006 0.24
S&P500PBxP2 -0.282 *** -6.13 -0.270 *** -5.79
AOP 0.459 *** 3.78 0.463 *** 3.84
AOPxP2 -0.138 -0.88 -0.063 -0.40
N 733 732
Wald r 741.8 4746
Log likelihood -362.9 -358.6
r 422.7 131.0
P <0.001 <0.001
Ten = (<Pa + <p'\+ (<Pi + <p')N]„ + (<p, + </>J)dNi„ + (y> 3 + vDAFoa, + (q>4 + <p'4)AMAR„
+ {<Ps + <Ps)^Rre/i + (<P6 + lO^Son* + (<Pt + <p'7 )AS(ip„ + [<ps + <Pg)EV/EBITDAi/-i
+{<p9 + <p'<,)P/B, + (<p 10 + (p'w)AOPl + e.s ,„
Notes: *** = significant at the 10% significance level, ** = significant at the 5% significance level. *** = significant at
the 1% significance level. Variable definitions are as follows. P2 is a dummy for the years 1998-2005. Nl is net income.
CFO is cash flow from operations, ANI is change in net income per year. ACFO is the change in cash flow from
operations per year. AFCB is the change in finding and development cost per barrel ofoil equivalent (BOE), AMAR is
the change in margin per BOE. ARRE is reserve replacement efficiency. ASGR is the rate of change in oil and gas
reserves (in BOE) per year, ASGP is rate ofchange in production (in BOE) of oil and gas per year, EVEBITDA is the
previous year's enterprise-to-eamings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization ratio. PIB is the price-to-
book ratio for the S&P500 index. AOP is the annual change in oil price.
With yC test statistics of 1262.1 (levels model: net income) and 1244.8 (levels model: cash
flow), the nulls are all rejected (p< 0.001). These results indicate that the relationship
between accounting information and valuation for oil companies have changed from pre-
418 B. Misund et al / The International Journal of Accounting 43 (2008} 398—424
Table 6
Return model, controlling for accounting-method choice
Variables A: Net income B: Cash flow
Coefficient r-value Coefficient r-value
Intercept 0.034 0.24 -0.089 -0.54
FC -0.291 *** -2.86 -0.308 ** -2.32
FC*P2 0.525 *** 4.47 0.517 *** 3.48
P2 0.516 ** 2.59 0.618 *** 2.90
NI 2.663 *** 2.71
NI> P2 0.158 0.15
NI*FC 5.163 *** 2.96
NI x FC ^ P2 -6.114 -3.38
AM 0.012 1.22
ANI P2 -0.013 -1.07
ANI*FC 0.008 0.25
ANI*FC*P2 0.057 1 50
CFO 1.626 *** 3.35
CFO*P2 -0.037 -0.07
CFO*FC 1 445 * 1.95
CFO FC • P2 -2.154 *** -2.74
ACFO 0.016 0.51
acfo p: -0.188 *** -3.10
ACFO FC 0.029 0.39
ACFO FC P2 0.228 ** 2.46
AFCB 0.212 *** 4.18 0.157 *** 3.02
AFCB*P2 -0.128 ** -2.23 0.005 0.08
AMAR 0.006 *** 2.97 0.004 1.22
AMAR P2 0.236 *** 2.68 0.244 *** 2.81
ARRE 0.063 0.68 0.119 1.64
ARRE*P2 -0.157 -1.52 -0.055 -0.07
ASGR 0.009 * 1.90 0.005 1.15
ASGR P2 -0.007
-1.46 -0.003 -0.72
ASGP 0.003 0.64 -0.001 -0.16
ASGP*P2 -0.002 -0.34 0.003 0.69
EVEBITDA -0.006 -0.54
-0.003 -0.30
IV IBITDA*P2 0.017 1.31 0.015 1.21
S&P500 PB -0.004
-0.16 -0.003 -0.03
S&P500 PB * P2 -0.237 ***
-5.39 -0.254 *** -5.75
AOP 0.485 *** 425 0.452 *** 3.97
AOP P2 -0.152
-1.00 -0.065 -0.43
Y 733 732
Wald •/; 649.3 558.2
Log likelihood
-339.8 -337.8
/: 159.2 138.4
P <0.001 <0.001
upheaval to the upheaval period. Testing for the joint value relevance is important since this
implicitly tests the value relevance of the markets' valuation of accounting information. By
testing for structural breaks in Eqs. (6)-(9), we simultaneously investigate whether the
industry restructuring resulted in a structural shift in the financial markets" valuation models.
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6.2.2. The Return Model
We also find evidence of a structural shift using the return specification and the results
are shown in Tables 5 and 6. The x~ test statistics are 422.7 (return model: net income) and
131.0 (return model: cash flow), the nulls are all rejected (p< 0.001). These results indicate
that the evidence of a structural shift derived using the price specification is robust.
6.2.3. Controlling for accounting method
Tables 4 and 6 present the results from the models where we have included dummies for
accounting-method choice. The %
2
test statistics are 1230.6 (levels model: accounting
method/net income) and 1165.9 (Levels Model: accounting method/cash flow), 159.2
(Return Model: accounting method/net income) and 138.4 (return model: accounting
method/cash flow), the nulls are all rejected (p< 0.001). These results indicate that the
evidence of a structural shift is robust when controlling for accounting method.
6.3. Discussion of the structural break in valuation
6.3.1. The Levels Model
While the results in the previous section indicate that the industry restructuring has
instigated a change in valuation models, it is important to examine which value drivers have
been instrumental in this shift. An examination of the coefficients on the interactions
between individual performance measures and the P2 dummy will indicate which figures
have been instrumental in the structural shift. Table 3 indicates a structural shift in the
coefficients on BV, CFO, growth in oil and gas reserves (CFO model), oil and gas reserves
(NI model), FCB (CFO model), and the EV/EBITDA ratio. The coefficient on book value
of equity has approximately doubled from 0.349 for 1992-1999 to 0.672 (0.349 + 0.323)
for 2000-2005 (in the NI model). The increase in value relevance of book equity is in line
with the hypothesis that deterioration in financial health reduces the value relevance of
accruals and increases that of book equity, as discussed by Barth et al. (1998) and Davis-
Friday et al. (2006). The decrease in the value relevance of cash flows, however, is not in
line with the hypothesis. The coefficient on cash flow decreases from 0.830 to 0.129
(0.830-0.701). The results indicate that book value has become more important since 1999,
Notes to Table 6
Tew = (vo + </>o) + (ft + ?o) FC + (<P\ + <p!)Ni„ + (?, + eJ)Ni« x FC + (<p2 + p)AN h ,
+fe + fi^Ni" x FC + (qi3 + <pj) JFdc,, + (<pA + <p'4)AMARl < + (<p 5 + <jj>j ) zIRrj.,,
+ W>6 + <pl)dS,0R„ + (<p 7 + <p'7 )ASGp„ + (<p s + %)EV/Ebitda,/-i + {<Po + <pI)P/B,
+ (<P\0 + <P'lo) A°Pr +^"
Notes: *** = significant at the 10% significance level, ** = significant at the 5% significance level,
*** = significant at the 1% significance level. Variable definitions are as follows. P2 is a dummy for the years
1998-2005. FC is a dummy variable for companies that use the full cost accounting method. NI is net income,
CFO is cash flow from operations, ANI is change in net income per year, ACFO is the change in cash flow from
operations per year, AFCB is the change in finding and development cost per barrel of oil equivalent (BOE).
AMAR is the change in margin per BOE, ARRE is reserve replacement efficiency, ASGR is the rate of change in
oil and gas reserves (in BOE) per year. ASGP is rate of change in production (in BOE) of oil and gas per year,
EV/EBITDA is the previous year's enterprise-to-earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation and amortization
ratio, PIB is the pnce-to-book ratio for the S&P500 index. AOP is the annual change in oil price.
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while other fundamentals such as cash flow have decreased. Apparently, the information
qualir . rnporaneous cash flow post 1 999 has worsened.
The value relevance of total oil and gas reserves and that of changes in oil and gas
..Teased from pre-2000 to post- 1999. Our findings indicate that reserve
replacement became less important for investors during this upheaval period. In fact during
the upheaval period, the largest oil and gas companies focused their attention on capital
discipline and cost cutting (Antill and Amen. 2002 (, which is not compatible with the need
to invest substantial amounts of capital in order to develop and produce new oil and gas
.
.-
The results also show that the previous year's EY EBITDA ratio became more value
relevant in the latter period of our study. A high EV EBITDA ratio results in a higher
valuation for the average oil company, indicating that the trend in valuation year-to-year
became more important during the upheaval period.
. suits seem to indicate that accounting figures are less value relevant during
the upheaval penod than during the pre-upheaval period. The exception is the valuation
multiple EY EBITDA and book equity.
Similar results are obtained when controlling for accounting method (Table 4).
2 The Renini Model
An examination of the coefficients on the interactions between changes in individual
performance measures and the P2 dummy will indicate which figures have been
instrumental in the structural shift. Table 5 indicates a structural shift in the coefficients on
XL change in growth in reserves, and that changes in both margin per BOE and finding
costs per BOE have occurred (in the NT model). The coefficient on net income has
decreased from 5.349 during 1992-1999 to I 2 J ~ 349-3.140) during 2000-2005. A
similar decrease is seen for cash flow. This decrease in value relevance was also evident
from the levels models. During the upheaval period, book values have become more
important for explaining future cash flows than current accounting figures such as net
income and cash flow. This finding also extends to several of the performance ratios such as
rates of changes in finding costs, reserve replacement efficiency, and growth in reserves.
Table 6 presents the results from the return model controlling for accounting method.
The results indicate that the accounting method does affect the value relevance of
accounting profit. Coefficients on the interaction variables NT FC and CFO x FC are
significant Furthermore, the structural shift (reduction) in the value relevance of CFO
price regression ( Table 3 ) seems to be related to FC companies. The results
also indicate - Tuctural break in the changes in cash flow.
7. Conclusion
inancial statement information, such as earnings, is an important source of information
financial analysts and investors as they try to forecast future cash flows. However.
ng economic conditions and industry restructuring may change the quality of
information and its value relevance, affecting its usefulness for practitioners. To
-pact ofan industry upheaval on the valuation process, we test for structural
in the valuation model.
B.Misundetal The Internatio- -:..-. -'.
We provide an empirical analysis for the international oil industry. This is an industry
that experienced a wave of mergers and changing economic conditions during the pre1 .
decade.
Our results indicate that the upheaval that the international oil industry witr.
.
during 1998-2002 has lead to a change in the relative value relevance rting
information. The value relevance of accounting v ariables such as book-value-of-equity
has increased, while that of net income has decreased. Moreover, the value relevance of
cash flows has increased. We find evidence to support our hypothesis of a structural
break in the relation between valuation and financial-statement information in the oil
industry.
It is likely that energy growth rates in China and India have been instrumental in the
oil-price hike in recent years. If the energy growth rates in these two countries continue
as expected, in the future, they are likely to impact the price of oil and the vah
international oil companies. Especially since 2003 the oil price increase has been attrib
to increased energy demand from these two countries. How demand-side effe cte s.g from
India and China) and supply-side effects I investments) affect the oil price and the valuation
of oil companies would be an interesting topic for future research.
Another topic for future research is to analyze how the development in both the
inventory of oil and the booked oil reserves in the possession of the oil companies have
driven up the book value and share prices of oil and gas companies during the last years.
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Abstract
This study investigates the extent of compliance with international accounting standards (IASs)
by companies in the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member states (Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Based on a sample of 137 companies (436
company-years) we find that compliance increased over time, from 68% in 1996 to 82% in 2002.
Despite strong economic and cultural ties between the GCC states, there was significant between-
country variation in compliance and among companies based on size, leverage, internationality, and
industry. The study provides evidence of de jure but not de facto harmonization in the region.
Noncompliance reflected some ineffectiveness in the functions of external auditors and enforcement
bodies, which may be of interest to countries that have adopted IASs recently.
© 2008 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS); Financial-reporting compliance; Audit function;
Enforcement of accounting standards; Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member states
1. Introduction
Rapid globalization of financial markets has given rise to demands for more
internationally comparable financial reporting. Harmonization of accounting is one way
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to promote more transparent and consistent reporting and to that end the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) produces international accounting standards for use
by private sector entities throughout the world. Since 2005 there has been widespread
adoption of IASB standards on a mandatory basis. Consequently, there is increased interest
in the comparability of reporting being achieved as well as the role of auditors and
enforcement bodies in promoting compliance (SEC, 2000; CESR, 2003; Schipper, 2005).
The aim of this paper is to investigate the level of compliance over time with
international accounting standards (lASs) in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states, namely Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and the factors associated with compliance. The GCC countries made IASs
mandatory progressively since 1986 for some or all listed companies. This setting allows us
to explore the use of IASs in a number of economically important developing countries,
which were early adopters of IASs. Mandatory use in the GCC countries provides an
opportunity to examine the role of external auditors and enforcement bodies in promoting
compliance with IASs.
Using a self-constructed compliance checklist, we measure the extent of 137 listed
companies' compliance with 14 relevant IASs over the period 1996-2002 (436 company-
years). For the GCC as a whole, the average level of compliance for all years was 0.75; for
disclosure it was 0.69 and for measurement 0.8 1 . The level of compliance increased over
time in each state, with overall measures increasing from 0.68 in 1996 to 0.82 in 2002,
indicating that compliance has been improving in the region.
Despite strong links between member states, compliance varies among them. Since
diversity could reflect differences in each country's regulatory framework, we provide a
self-constructed enforcement score (encompassing legal requirements, quality of the audit
function, and activities of enforcement bodies) for each country. The highest average
compliance level for all years is in the UAE (0.80), followed by Saudi Arabia (0.78),
Kuwait (0.75), Oman (0.74), Bahrain (0.73) and Qatar (0.70). Differences in compliance
levels are generally consistent with national enforcement scores. Compliance also varies by
industry, being lower among financial-sector firms. It is higher for larger companies and
those with higher leverage and a greater international presence.
Compliance with IASs has been measured in several settings in prior research. For
example, disclosure compliance is reported in Australia (0.94; Tower, Hancock, & Taplan,
1 999), Germany (0.81; Glaum & Street, 2003 ) and Switzerland (0.74; Street & Gray, 200 1 ).
Measurement compliance is reported for Germany (0.86) and Switzerland (0.92; Street &
Gray, 2001). Our study adds to this literature in two significant ways. First, it considers
countries from a developing region which has considerable economic and political
importance but has been the subject of relatively little research. Prior studies, such as
Abdelrahim, Hewaidy. and Mostafa (1997), Abdelrahim and Mostafa (2000) and Joshi and
Al-Mudhahki (2001), have not examined compliance in depth, across countries and over
time. Our study achieves this and provides empirical evidence about the progress of
harmonization in the region. The results are, therefore, of interest to academics and
practitioners following the development ofmore comparable financial reporting on a global
scale.
The compliance checklist is available from the corresponding author
B Al-Shammari el til. / The International Journal of Accounting 43 (2008) 425-447 427
Second, the GCC setting has several features which are useful in a study of compliance.
Some countries in the region have been early mandatory adopters of lASs, which means
their companies have considerable experience with use of lASs in a mandatory rather than
voluntary environment. In the GCC setting we can investigate the relationship of national
regulatory frameworks and mandatory compliance over time. In other countries companies
have adopted IASs more recently (for example, in the European Union) or their use has
been voluntary (as in Switzerland and Germany in the early 1990s). Most previous LAS-
compliance studies have been in settings where use of lASs is voluntary or not subject to
national enforcement (Nobes, 1990; Street, Gray, & Bryant, 1999; Tower et al., 1999; Street
& Bryant, 2000; Street & Gray, 2001; Glaum & Street, 2003). Our study adds to the
literature by considering compliance in a mandatory setting. Further, it provides useful
insights about the relationship of LASs adoption, compliance levels, and the effectiveness of
independent auditors and enforcement bodies. Following widespread adoption of lASs,
attention has now focused on the extent to which companies comply with IASs in a
mandatory setting (Schipper, 2005; Brown & Tarca, 2005). Our study is one of the first to
provide empirical evidence about this issue. Although we consider only one region and six
countries, our results highlight issues which may be equally relevant in other countries
where IASs have been adopted more recently.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
institutional framework for financial reporting in the GCC member states, reviews relevant
literature and outlines the research question. The third section describes sample selection,
data collection and statistical method. Results, robustness checks, and limitations are
reported in the fourth section. The final section concludes the study.
2. Background and research question
The six countries included in this study are members of the GCC, formed in 1981 to
promote economic cooperation and development in the region. They have strong religious and
economic ties, a shared Muslim culture and together hold 45% of the world's oil reserves. The
countries have experienced strong economic growth in recent years with combined gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita increasing from US$11,000 in 2002 to US$14,208 in
2006. The stock exchanges have experienced rapid growth with stock price increases in all
countries over the period of the study. The market capitalization for all GCC states increased
from US$ 120 billion in 2002 to US$ 1000 billion in 2006, with increases ranging from 60% to
500%. The volume of shares traded increased between six to ten times during the period of the
study (GCC, 2003, 2007), indicating significant expansion in the capital markets.
To capitalize on their domestic wealth, governments have undertaken economic reforms
including an "open" economic policy. For example, privatization of state enterprises began
in 1995 and the lifting of investment restrictions in the 1990s has attracted foreign
investment. The rapid growth and opening up of capital markets in the GCC member states
along with pressure from multinational corporations has led the governments to adopt IASs,
in the expectation that adoption would meet demands by local and international investors
for more detailed and comparable financial reporting (Al-Basteki, 2000; Azzam, 1998;
Hassan, 1998; Hussain, Islam, Gunasekaran, & Maskooki, 2002; Shuaib, 1999). Regulation
flows mainly from the governments ofmembers states, as they have the power to create and
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enforce accounting laws (Shuaib, 1999). In contrast to western countries, the accounting
profession is in its infancy in GCC nations. It has little power to licence auditors or
encourage compliance with accounting standards."
2.1. Effect of regulatory framework on compliance
Prior studies investigating IASs adoption report that differences between companies in
their level of compliance reflect their country of origin (Tower et al, 1999; Street & Bryant,
2000; Street & Gray, 200 1 ), implying that there are important features in national financial-
reporting frameworks which affect compliance. A country's financial reporting framework
(that is, the laws and practices which govern financial reporting) has a key role in specifying
financial-reporting requirements, in establishing a due process for monitoring and enforcing
accounting standards, and in influencing the extent of compliance with those standards.
Table 1 outlines the regulatory framework for each of the six countries included in this
study in the period 1996-2002. The countries share many common features, as shown in panel
A. Company law required that audited financial statements be prepared and submitted to a
government department. Enforcement bodies (government departments, stock exchanges, or
central banks) were in place and the law provided penalties for noncompliance. Auditors were
required to be licensed and could be subject to penalties for breach of company law.
However, there are also differences among the six countries, as shown in panel B. IASs
were adopted for all companies in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman but only for banks and finance
and investment companies in Saudi Arabia. Qatar, and the UAE. Adoption dates differed, with
compliance with IASs required for all companies in Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman from 1986.
1 99 1 , and 1 996, respectively. In Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE adoption was in 1 992, 1 999,
and 1 999, respectively. Four countries ( Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and the UAE) required the use
of International Auditing Standards (ISA). Two countries (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) had
examinations for admission as auditors and three (Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) had
professional training requirements. Three countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) made
use oftwo auditors, the UAE used three, and one auditor was the norm in Bahrain and Oman.
Although all states had enforcement bodies, the extent to which they checked compliance with
IASs differed. Only Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE had some degree of proactive surveillance
programs which investigated company compliance. Regulators in the other countries relied
primarily on the audit report. In addition, only Kuwait and Oman had pursued actions against
firms for breach of reporting requirements. 3
Professional accounting bodies exist only in four states, namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
With the exception of Saudi Arabia, the bodies do not have any power in relation to licensing auditors or
enforcing accounting regulations.
KUWAIT—two cases in 2001
: an auditor gave an unqualified audit report for a company that had violated IASs
requirements and was cautioned by a national disciplinary committee; and the Surveillance Department of the Ministry
of Commerce received a shareholder complaint which led to the dismissal of the board of directors, the company's
general manager, and the external auditor. OMAN—four cases in the period 1 998-2003 . In 1 999 and 200 1 two auditors
accused of failing to notify a violation of an accounting regulation and received warnings from the national
plinary committee. The Oman securities regulator uncovered two cases of noncompliance with IASs. Company
:s were found to have provided misleading and inadequate disclosure and were imprisoned (Al-Shamman,
Brown. & Tarca. 2007).
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Table 1
Financial reporting requirements and enforcement proxy for GCC countries
Bahrain Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia Qatar UAE
Panel A: Legal framework
Company law requires production of financial statements Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial statements are submitted to government Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
department
Penalties can be applied for breach of company law Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enforcement body in place (government department, Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
stock exchange, or central bank)
Financial statements are audited Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auditors are licensed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Penalties can be applied if auditors breach regulations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Enforcement proxy
Legal
IASs used by all companies 1 1 1
Adoption IASs prior to 1 998 1 1 1 1
Directors/Officers can be prosecuted for noncompliance 1 1 1 1 1
Audit
ISA used 2 2 2 2
Auditor examination 2 2
Auditor training 2 2 2
Two (or more) auditors 1) 2 2 2 2
Enforcement body
Enforcement body checks compliance 3 3 3
Enforcement body has taken action for noncompliance 3 3
TOTAL 5 13 14 8 3 10
Source: Al Shamman. Brown, and Tarca (2007), IASs= 1 if all companies use International Accounting Standards.
Adoption= I if country adopted IASs prior to 1998. Directors/Officers can be prosecuted for noncompliance = 1 if
directors or officers can be subject to legal action and penalties for non-compliance with accounting standards
ISA = 2 if auditors use International Auditing Standards. Auditor examination = 2 if auditors undergo an
examination prior to admission to the profession. Auditor training = 2 if auditors must meet professional training
requirements. Two or more auditors = 2 if company has more than one auditor. Enforcement body checks
compliance = 3 if stock exchange, government body, or central bank reviews financial statements for compliance.
Enforcement body has taken action for noncompliance = 3 if the stock exchange, government body, or central bank
has taken action in relation to noncompliance with accounting standards. All information relates to the period
1998-2002. Weighting reflects the relative importance of the roles of independent auditors and enforcement bodies
in promoting compliance (SEC, 2000; FEE, 2001; CESR. 2003; Schipper, 2005).
We predict that these differences in national frameworks will give rise to between-
country differences in level of compliance. Our reasoning is as follows. The sample
countries have many features in common in their regulatory frameworks, in addition to
economic and cultural ties. This closeness could suggest that levels of compliance will be
similar. However, it has been proposed that the roles of external auditors and independent
enforcement bodies are crucial in promoting compliance with accounting standards (SEC,
2000; FEE, 200 1 ; Schipper, 2005). Studies report that compliance is greater for companies
with higher quality audits, proxied by having Big 4 auditors and using international
auditing standards (Street & Bryant, 2000; Street & Gray, 2001; Glaum & Street, 2003).
Since we have identified important differences between the countries in relation to the
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activities of auditors and enforcement bodies, we propose that these differences will lead to
between-country variation in the level of compliance. Our research proposition can be
formally stated as:
Compliance is greater in GCC countries which feature higher audit quality and more
activity by enforcement bodies.
In general, the level of compliance with IASs is expected to have increased over time in
the GCC region because enforcement activities have increased in all member states. For
example, at least two external auditors have been required to audit companies' accounts in
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In Bahrain, shareholders have recently begun to question
instances of a possible violation of IASs or other regulations. This suggests that they may
have become more aware of and more willing to pursue their statutory rights. In Oman,
Kuwait, and the UAE, the enforcement bodies have become more active in monitoring
companies' compliance with IASs and other regulations in recent years.
2.2. Company factors affecting compliance
The agency-theory framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposes that reducing
information asymmetry between company insiders (managers) and providers of capital
(outsiders) lowers agency costs (monitoring, bonding, and residual loss). The aim of
reducing agency costs provides an incentive for adopting IASs, since adoption leads to
greater disclosure and more transparency compared to the situation under national GAAP
(Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001; Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008). However, to maximize
benefits from adopting higher quality standards, companies must also demonstrate
compliance with the standards. The motivation to seek benefits from compliance may vary
systematically between firms, based on their individual attributes. We explore below a
number of company attributes which could be related to level of compliance.
Larger companies are more visible and. therefore, may be more likely to comply with
accounting standards. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Holthausen and Leffwich (1983)
argue that larger companies act to protect their reputation and avoid government intervention.
While the authors base their ideas on developed markets, they also apply in the GCC countries
where large companies are politically visible and economically important. Recent
privatizations of large state-owned companies mean that they are a focus of government
and investor attention. In addition, larger companies have more resources to spend on
compliance and are less likely to be affected by disclosure of proprietary information than
smaller companies. Another relevant point is that larger companies may be older, with more
established reporting systems, meaning that compliance is less costly for them.
Further, larger companies are likely to be more international, that is, to have more
foreign investors, foreign sales, or to have foreign stock exchange listings. Street and
Bryant (2000), Street and Gray (2001 ). and Glaum and Street (2003) show that companies
which are cross-listed have higher levels of compliance. In the GCC setting companies are
not cross-listed outside the region; however, they do seek foreign investors. This may
provide an incentive for greater compliance, to make financial reporting more transparent
and comparable and to increase the company's credibility.
Companies with higher leverage can be expected to disclose more information to reduce
icy costs, to reassure debtholders that their interests are protected. In the GCC setting.
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banks play a dominant financial role in the economy (Al-Shimmiri, 2003; Azzam, 1998;
Oweiss, 2000) and have substantial and enduring financial relationships with companies.
While banks may not need to rely on public information to the same extent as in, say, the
United States of America, it can still be argued that companies with a higher level of
leverage may be more likely to disclose additional information, in order to reduce agency
costs and information asymmetry with shareholders.
4 Companies with higher leverage
have, by definition, relatively less equity and probably, in turn, fewer shareholders.
Consequently, they are more likely to be subject to higher equity risk and, therefore, greater
shareholder demand for information to assess both the probability their company will meet
its debt obligations and the riskiness of future cash flows arising from their investments.
In the GCC member states, three shareholder groups typically have substantial equity
ownership in companies listed on the GCC stock exchanges. These groups are the
government and its agencies, dominant families, and institutional investors, all of whom
may influence the level and quality of disclosure and the level of compliance with IASs. In
the GCC member states, these groups are considered insiders because they usually have
representatives on the companies' boards of directors and thus have better access to internal
information.
5
Therefore, we expect that companies with more insiders (that is, more closely
held ownership) have less motivation to comply with IASs than companies with widely
held share ownership.
A final factor which may be relevant is industry membership. Industry type may capture
sensitivity to political costs not captured by other proxies that differ by industry (Ball &
Foster, 1982; Bazley, Brown, & Izan, 1985; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, p. 239). In this
connection. Ball and Foster ( 1 982) argue that industry type can be a more appropriate proxy
for political-cost sensitivity than size. Accounting and disclosure practices are often
observed to reflect industry commonalities. Malone, Fries, and Jones (1993) and Wallace,
Naser, and Mora (1994), for example, propose that the adoption of industry-related
practices may lead to differential levels of disclosure on similar items in financial reports
published by companies in different industries. We expect that the finance sector companies
(banking, investment, and insurance) will have higher compliance levels than other
companies for several reasons. First, we expect that companies in a given industry will
comply more closely with a particular IAS that is more applicable to their activities, such as
the banking industry with IAS 30. Second, banks (and to a lesser extent investment and
insurance companies) have a high public profile which may attract political costs. They
have incentives to enhance their reputations and avoid regulatory intervention by
demonstrating compliance with legal reporting requirements.
Proxies for company attributes are included in the regression models to investigate
whether they are associated with compliance in the manner predicted by the theory and
research outlined above. In summary, compliance is predicted to differ between countries
and by industry and to increase with the company's size, leverage, internationality,
ownership diffusion, and age.
Evidence of banks' and institutional investors' ability to access information directly from companies has been
provided for Kuwait (Al-Shimmiri. 2003), Bahrain (Joshi & Al-Bastaki, 2000) and Oman (Abdulla, 1998).
See note 2.
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3. Data and method
3. 1. Sample selection
The aim of the study is to investigate the level of compliance with IASs in GCC
countries during the period 1996-2002, the latter being the most recent year available when
the data was collected. We chose 1996 as the starting point because by that year four of the
six countries, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia had begun to use IASs. Qatar and
the UAE adopted IASs in 1999, and the last year for which data were available when we
began our study was 2002. Thus the majority of our data are collected for 1996. 1999, and
2002.
We were unable to collect data for every year of the six-year period due to the time
involved in the hand collection of data. 6 However, we did collect data for three other years
to supplement our investigation. Since firms may not be fully compliant in the first year of
adoption, we also recorded compliance in the second year of adoption in selected countries
—
being 1 997 in Bahrain and 2000 in Qatar and the UAE. In the Results section we describe how
we control for the discontinuous years in the data set in the data analysis. A set of annual
reports which covers the relevant years was sought for all companies listed in each country in
1996. After excluding 44 companies due to cross-listing within the region (seven in Kuwait),
de-listing or being an Islamic institution, we have a final sample of 1 37 companies out of 1 56
(89%) (68.5% of the total population. Table 2). 7
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the sample companies. Mean size is US
SI 560.4 million, ranging from US$2.82 million to US$29,313 million. On average,
companies in Saudi Arabia are the largest (US$11,245.16 million) and in Oman, the
smallest (US$193 million), reflecting the concentration of large banking-sector companies
in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Leverage ranges from zero to 13.91, with a mean of
2.57. The figure of zero indicates that some companies effectively have no debt, while a
ratio of 13.91 implies that the company has relatively little equity. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE companies have higher leverage because their sample is limited to banks and
investment companies. The proportion of foreign ownership ranges from zero to 0.59, with
a mean of 0.04. This small mean indicates that the GCC member states were in the early
' Data were hand collected from annual reports because they were not available on databases.
There were nine (4.5%) Islamic institutions listed on the GCC stock exchanges. They were excluded because
they follow specific disclosure requirements and are exempt from following IASs A further 28 companies (14%)
were excluded because they were delisted lor various reasons (liquidations, litigation, mergers, and other reasons
not provided) during the period of study, and their annual reports were either not issued or not available. A further
seven companies (3.5%) were excluded to avoid double-counting, since these companies are cross-listed on the
Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSF.) and their home stock exchange (one of the other GCC stock exchanges). Nineteen
5%) did not respond to two requests for annual reports or did not provide reports for all the required years
and were, therefore, excluded from the sample. The 17 excluded Omani companies are relatively small firms, with
market capitalization ranging from US$3 million to US$38 million. They are from a range of industry sectors
ee from banking and investment, two from insurance, six from manufacturing, and five from services).
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Table 2
Sample selection
Bahrain Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia Qatar UAE Total °o of the total
population
(2) (2) (2) (It (9) 4 5%
(19) (1) (28) 14°o
(7) (7) 3 5%
60 50 7 4 9 156 78%
(17) (1) (19) 9.5%
43 SO 6 4 9 137 68.5%
Companies listed on GCC stock 36 79 60 9* 6* 10* 200 100%
exchanges on 3 1 December 1 9%
Exclusions
Islamic institutions (2)
Delisted companies during the period (8)
of the study (1996 2002)**
Cross-listed on GCC stock exchanges
Companies receiving request 26
Companies with data not available*** (1)
Companies with usable data included 25
in the study
Companies' annual reports collected 100 129 150 18 12 27 436
(1996-2002)
*This number represents only companies in the banking and investment industries because they are the only
companies in Saudi Arabia. Qatar and the UAE that must adopt lASs.
"Liquidations, mergers, and other reasons not provided.
'"Companies did not respond to two requests for their annual reports
stages of attracting foreign investors. Saudi Arabian companies have the highest proportion
of foreign ownership (a mean of 0.25) and the lowest mean was Qatar (zero) as Qatar had
not yet opened its share market to direct ownership by foreign investors. 8 Institutional
ownership (ownership diffusion) ranges from zero to 0.80, with a mean of 0.26 for the
whole sample. Kuwait has the highest institutional ownership (mean 0.36) and Saudi
Arabia the lowest (0. 11). Company age ranges from one to 50 years, with a mean of 2 1 .59.
Table 4 (panel A) reports correlations between the continuous independent variables.
There is a significant positive association (1% level) between size and leverage (0.736),
internationality (0.345). and age (0.414) and between leverage and intemationality (0.306).
Significant negative correlations (1% level) are observed between ownership diffusion and
size (-0.198) and internationality (-0.214). Companies with Big Five auditors (390 of 436
annual reports) are more likely to be larger, older, more international, and to have higher
leverage and greater ownership diffusion (Table 4, panel B).
The industry classification of the sample is 58 banking and investment companies, eight
insurance companies, 38 manufacturing companies, and 33 service-industry companies,
reflecting the strong representation of financial sen ices in the GCC member states. Due to
differences in the nature and operations of financial sen ices (banking and investment and
insurance) and other firms (manufacturing and sen'ice) we create two groups for analysis.
Table 4. panel B shows that, overall, companies from the banking and investment and
insurance sectors are larger, older, and have higher leverage.
s
In Qatar, foreign investors have been able to invest indirectly in national companies listed on the Doha
Securities Market (DSM), via an investment fund, since 2001 Since April 2005. foreigners have been permitted
to trade unconditionally on the DSM (DSM, 2005)
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rable 3
Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
All countries (N=436)
Company size (US$ million)* 1560.40 111.31 2.82 29313.00 3837.22
Leverage 2.57 1.01 0.00 13.91 3.15
[nternationality 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.59 11
Ownership diffusion 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.22
Age 21.59 9.38 1.00 50.00 9.36
Bahrain (N= 100)
Company size (US$ million) 1486.96 69.67 10.55 29313.00 4944.27
Leverage 2.12 0.52 0.00 12.13 3.04
[nternationality 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.59 0.17
Ownership diffusion 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.63 0.17
Age 21.59 21.00 2.00 45.00 8.32
Oman (N=129)
Company size (US$ million) 193.59 26.49 2.82 4011.53 552.04
Leverage 2 13 1.14 0.05 13.91 2.52
[nternationality 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.36 0.06
Ownership diffusion 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.79 0.24
Age 14.85 15.00 1.00 29.00 6.91
Kuwait (N= 150)
Company size (USS million) 983.59 177.16 13.60 17376.44 2370.83
Leverage 1 64 0.73 0.02 10.10 2.39
[nternationality 0.01 0.01 000 0.02 0.02
Ownership diffusion 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.80 0.22
Age 2630 25.00 9.00 50.00 8.72
Saudi Arabia (N=18)
( lompany size (USS million) 11245.16 10548 44 2621.94 20547.00 5240.57
Leverage 8.73 8.49 6.38 11.48 1.62
Intemationahty 25 0.30 0.00 0.40 0.15
Ownership diffusion 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.19 0.04
Age 24.50 22.00 16.00 45.00 S 54
Qatar iN=12)
Company size (USS million) 2731.60 [452.90 592.18 8531.85 2745.00
Leverage 7.91 8.04 4.68 13.26 2 46
Intemationahty 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ownership diffusion II 11) 0.20 0.10 0.24 0.04
Age 25.08 23.50 16.00 38.00 7.51
UAE(N=2~i
Company size (SUS million) 4590.21 5440.50 110.95 10632.03 347.82
Leverage 5.08 5.37 0.04 10.87 3.15
[nternationality 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
Ownership diffusion 0.13 0.07 0,01 0.82 0.21
Age 24.11 23.00 4.00 39.00 9.50
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Table 4
Bivariate relationships among explanatory variables
Company size Leverage Internationality Ownership diffusion Age
Panel A
Leverage 0.736**
Internationality 0.345** 0.306**
Ownership diffusion -0.198** -0.206** -0.214**
Age 0.414** 176** 0.002 -0 125* 1
Panel B
Big Five auditor 133.21 L.25 0.01 0.21 21.00
Non Big Five auditor 0.23 001 0.08 is 50
Wilcoxon Probability < 0.001 0.001 0001 < 0.001 <0.001
Banks, investment, finance 966 1
1
3.89 0.001 0.18 22.00
and insurance
Manufacturing and sen ice 41.37 53 001 0.24 20.50
Wilcoxon Probability < 0.001 <0.001 0.094 0.111 0.021
Panel A shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for continuous variables. Panel B shows median values and
Wilcoxon statistics comparing firms based on auditor (Big Five or not) and industry (banking and investment and
insurance or manufacturing and service. Company size = log of total assets; Leverage = ratio of book value of total
debt to book value of total equity; Internationality = ratio of number of shares owned by foreign investors to total
shares at year-end; Ownership diffusion^ ratio of number of shares owned by institutional investors to total shares
at year-end; and Age = number of years since foundation ** Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed). * Significant at
0.05 level (two-tailed)
3.3. Measuring compliance
Compliance with IASs is measured using a self-constructed compliance index,
consistent with prior compliance studies (Tower et al., 1999; Street & Gray, 2001; Street
& Bryant, 2000; Glaum & Street, 2003). The checklist is based on 14 standards; IAS 1, 10.
14, 16, 18, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33 and 37. All IASs were initially considered for
inclusion in the checklist, however some were excluded because (1) they were not
applicable to GCC companies (IAS 12, 15, 19, 26, 29, 34, 11, 17, 20, 22, 31, 35, 38),
(2) they were not applicable in the study period (IAS 39) or (3) there was little or no within-
sample variation (IAS 2 and 7) or little or no disclosure (IAS 8). The Appendix A provides
further details.
The checklist distinguishes between disclosure and measurement requirements because
compliance may differ between them (Street & Gray, 2001). Table 5 shows the number of
disclosure and measurement items in the checklist in total and for each year of the study.
The checklist (available from the authors) was validated by comparison with checklists
Notes to Table 3
Company size = log of total assets; Leverage = ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total equity,
Internationality = ratio of number of shares owned by foreign investors to total shares at year-end; Ownership
diffusion= ratio of number of shares owned by institutional investors to total shares at year-end; and Age = number
of years since foundation.
*In the regression models, company size was operationalized as the natural logarithm of total assets.
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Table 5
Total number of disclosure and nicasuremeni items fbl each standard
Standards (effective year) total items Disclosure items Measurement items
2 2 -
35 35 -
II 7 4
7 5 2
14 14 -
23 23
24 16 8
3 3
20 9 II
5 3 2
5 5
12 7 5
9 7 2
45 45 -
10 10
8 5 3
14 12 2
160 128 32
lbO 12S 32
224 187 37
220 185 35
220 185 35
IAS I (1975)
IAS I (1998)
IAS 10 1 1980)
IAS 10(20001
IAS 14(1983)
IAS 14 (1998)
IAS 16 (1995)
IAS 18(l9>>s|
IAS 21 (1995)
IAS 2^ (1995)
IAS 24 (1986)
IAS 27 (1990)
IAS2.N (1990)
IAS 30(14')])
IAS 32 (1996)
IAS 33 (1998)
IAS 37(1999)
Maximum 1 1996)
Maximum (1997)
Maximum (1999)
Maximum (2000)
Maximum (2002)
Note: IAS 30 applies only to banks and financial institutions
used by Ernst & Young and KLMPG in Kuwait. In addition, its validity and
comprehensiveness were confirmed through a review by an external auditor from Kuwait.
Since several different reporting years for each member state were covered in this study,
a range of standards were applicable in each member state. Each standard's applicability to
companies' annual reports was determined and the relevant portions of the checklist were
used in data collection. The requirements of selected IASs were not constant during the
study period. The Comparability Project was completed in March 1999 and resulted in the
res ision often standards, three of which were included in this study (IASs 1. 10. and 14).
For example, in IAS 1 the specificity of disclosure items was increased and in IAS 14 nine
additional disclosure items were added (Murphy, 2000: IASC . 1996; IASB. 2002). We
accommodated these changes by adjusting the compliance checklists to include any new
measurement and disclosure requirements at the date they were applicable. 10
For example. IAS I. Disclosure of Accounting Policies, was in effect from 1 January 1975 until its
replacement by IAS I. Presentation of Financial Statements, from I July 1998. Therefore, for the purposes of this
study, companies' annual reports were checked for compliance with the original IAS 1 in 1996 and 1997, while
reports for 1999. 2000 and 2002 were checked against its replacement The scoring procedure takes account of
such differences in requirements over time, by expressing the compliance index in ratio form.
The coverage was as follows IAS I old version 1996 and 1997. new version 1999. 2000 and 2002; IAS 10.
old version 1996 1999, new scrsion 2 1 2002. IAS 14. old version 1996 and 1997, new version 1999, 2000,
and 2002.
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The full annual report was read and data collected by one researcher to ensure
consistency in coding. Each disclosure item on the checklist was assigned a value of one if
it was disclosed and zero if the item obviously applied but was not disclosed. Items
obviously not applicable were coded as NA. Items for which not enough information was
given to discern their applicability were coded as DK for "do not know." The primary index
is an overall compliance measure, excluding NA and DK items, and comprising a
disclosure and a measurement-compliance measure. Robustness tests were completed to
determine the sensitivity of the results to the treatment of the potentially ambiguous NA and
DK items. Items in the checklist were not weighted because this process can introduce
subjectivity and bias (Cooke, 1989, 1991; Wallace & Nasser, 1995).
The reliability of coding was verified by having a random selection of companies coded
by a second coder (an auditor from a Big 5 firm in Kuwait) using the same checklist. The
coding was completed for 144 company-years (30% of the sample), selected from all
countries and a range of industries. The ratio of agreement of compliance scores (number of
companies where the coders agree on score/total number of companies) between the two
coders was 122/144 or 85%, indicating that the reliability of measurement of compliance is
acceptable (Hackston & Milne, 1999).
3.4. Regression models
Multivariate analysis was used to investigate differences between countries in
compliance levels as well as time trends and relationships between the level of compliance
and company attributes. Since the dependent variable (the score for the compliance index)
lies between zero and one, it was transformed by taking the logarithm of the "odds ratio"
(Fox, 1997, p. 151; Hanushek & Jackson, 1977, pp. 187-189). If the overall level of
compliance with IASs for a company is given by P, the logarithm of the odds ratio Y, is
given by:
Y = Log
This transformation has been used in prior disclosure studies (Ahmed, 1996; Ahmed &
Nicholls, 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Makhija & Patton, 2004). Data for the independent
variables was obtained from companies' annual reports or from annual companies' guides
published by the stock exchanges. The full model is set out in Eq. (1). The dependent
variable is the compliance level of the company in a given year and there are up to 15
explanatory variables (plus a constant term.) Company-year subscripts are omitted from
Eq. ( 1 ) for convenience:
where:
Y compliance index score
Po constant term
X\ one if company is from Bahrain, zero otherwise
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X2 one if company is from Oman, zero otherwise
Aj one if company is from Kuwait, zero otherwise
X4 one if company is from Saudi Arabia, zero otherwise
A"5 one if company is from UAE, zero otherwise
X6 one if observation is from 1996, zero otherwise
X1 one if observation is from 1997, zero otherwise
Xs one if observation is from 1999, zero otherwise
X9 one if observation is from 2000, zero otherwise
Xw Company size (log of total assets)
Xn Leverage (total debt/total equity)
X\ 2 Internationality (number of shares owned by foreign investors / total shares issued
at year end)
A"i 3 Ownership diffusion (number of shares owned by institutional investors /total
shares issued at year end)
A"i4 Age (number of years since foundation)
X[5 one if company is from the finance industry, zero otherwise
e Error term.
4. Results
4.1. Level of compliance
The level of mandatory compliance (measurement and disclosure) with the 14 IASs,
averaged over all companies and all years, was 0.75. The mean level of disclosure compliance
was 0.69 and measurement compliance was 0.81. The level of compliance averaged over all
companies increases over time, from 0.68 in 1 996 to 0.82 in 2002 (Table 6). This indicates that
compliance with IASs has been improving in the region; however, no company in any year
within the study period fully complied with all relevant IASs.
The level of compliance with IASs differs between the GCC member states. The highest
average compliance level over all years sampled is found in the UAE (0.80). This is
followed by Saudi Arabia (0.78), Kuwait (0.75), Oman (0.74), Bahrain (0.73), and Qatar
(0.70) (Table 6). Differences in median compliance are shown in Table 7 with Bahrain and
the UAE greater than Qatar, Bahrain greater than Oman, and Oman greater than Saudi
Arabia, although the differences are significant only at the 10% level. Kuwait is greater than
Qatar at the 5% level.
Table 1 (panel B) provides a ranking of the audit and enforcement function in each
country, based on features which could promote compliance. Countries score one for each
of four legal features (IASs used by all companies; Adoption IASs prior to 1998; Directors/
Officers can be prosecuted for non-compliance), two for items which promote quality of
audit (ISA used; Auditor examination; Auditor training; Two or more auditors), and three
for proactive enforcement and follow-up action (Enforcement body checks compliance;
Enforcement body has taken action for non-compliance). The weighting reflects our
judgment of the relative importance of law, quality of audit, and activities of enforcement
bodies in promoting compliance, derived from prior literature (SEC, 2000; FEE, 2001;
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Table 6
Mean compliance scores by country and year
Country Total Disclosure Measurement
compliance compliance compliance
Country Total Disclosure Measurement
compliance compliance compliance
Mean Mean Mean \1i-.m Mean Mean
Total (A'=436)
1996
1997
1999
2000
2002
All years
0.68
0.71
0.74
076
0.82
0.75
0.69
0.71
0.74
0.80
0.73
Bahrain (A = 100)
1996
1997
1999
2002
All years
Oman (A=129)
1996 0.65
1999 0.73
2002 0.83
All years 0.74
Kuwait (A = 150)
1996 0.68
1999 0.76
2002 0.81
All vears 0.75
0.56
0.63
0.69
0.73
0.80
69
(I 56
0.63
0.70
0.74
0.65
0.50
0.64
0.80
0.65
0.60
0.74
0.81
0.72
0.80
0.80
0.80
0.80
0.84
0.81
0.81
0.79
0.82
0.88
0.82
0.80
0.82
0.85
0.82
0.75
0.79
081
0.78
Saudi Arabia (A= 18)
1996 0.72 0.65
1999 0.76 0.74
2002 0.88 0.85
All years 0.78 0.75
Qatar (A = 12)
1999 0.64 0.62
2000 0.67 0.68
2002 0.81 0.79
All years 0.70 0.69
UAE (N= 27)
1999 0.74 0.65
2000 0.80 0.75
2002 0.86 0.84
All vears 0.80 0.75
0.80
0.80
0.91
0.83
0.67
0.65
0.83
0.71
0.82
0.86
0.91
0.85
CESR, 2003; Schipper, 2005). The countries are ranked as follows: Kuwait=14,
Oman=13, the UAE=10, Saudi Arabia = 8, Bahrain = 5 and Qatar=3. The relationships
of compliance scores (Table 7) are consistent with the ranking provided by the enforcement
scores, except for one case. The comparison of median compliance scores shows Bahrain is
significantly higher than Oman while the enforcement ranking places Oman ahead of
Bahrain." However, Table 7 shows that for ten out of 15 pairs of countries (67%)
compliance scores are not significantly different. The relationships ofcompliance scores are
explored further in the multivariate analysis below.
With respect to disclosure compliance, the UAE and Saudi Arabia both averaged 0.75,
followed by Kuwait (0.72), Qatar (0.69), and Bahrain and Oman (both 0.65). The highest
level of measurement compliance was again in the UAE (0.85), Saudi Arabia (0.83),
1 The enforcement ranking is also calculated on an unweighted basis, where each item in Table 1
,
panel B is
scored as one or zero. The unweighted country scores are as follows: Oman = 7, Kuwait=7, Saudi Arabia = 5.
UAE=4, Bahrain=4 and Qatar=2. The country ranking is similar when unweighted scores are used, although
Saudi Arabia ranks ahead of the UAE.
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Table 7
Differences in median overall compliance between countries
Bahrain Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia Qatar
Oman <0.065*
Kuwait 0.496 0.432
Saudi Arabia 0.609 <0.010* 0.618
Qatar <0.072* 0.137 <0.030** 0.264
UAE 0.486 0.290 0.510 0.803 >0.090*
This table shows significant differences (based on /-tests) between the overall all-years median compliance score
reported in Table 6 for each pair of countries. The < and > symbols indicate thai compliance was lower/higher in the
country identified at the start of each row. ** Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
'Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed).
Bahrain and Oman (both 0.82), Kuwait (0.78) and Qatar (0.71). Overall, measurement
compliance was better than disclosure compliance for all years and the increase in
compliance was relatively greater for disclosure items. Compliance levels of 80% for
disclosure and 84% for measurement were achieved in 2002 (Table 6).
The level of compliance varied across standards. The highest average level of
compliance for all years was 0.89 for IAS 18. and the lowest was 0.43 for IAS 37. The
compliance level was highest for IAS 1, 16, 18, 23, 24, 27, and 30 (averaging more than
0.80); whereas, it was lowest for IAS 14 and 37 (less than 0.50). Moderate compliance was
found for IAS 10, 21, 28, 32, and 33 (more than 0.50 and less than 0.80). In general, the
level of compliance increased from 1996 to 2002 for all standards, indicating that the GCC
states, collectively, were progressing towards achieving greater de facto harmonization
with IASs. A possible explanation for the higher level of compliance with IAS 1, 16, 18, 23,
24, 27, and 30 is that they are less difficult to implement when compared with IASs with
requirements to disclose more proprietary information or with more complicated
requirements, such as IAS 14 and 37.
4.2. Regression results
Model I of Table 8 shows results for the overall compliance index excluding NA (not
applicable) and DK (do not know) items. The model is significant overall (F= 2 1.664,
p<0.001) with R2 (adj.) of 0.432. The results reveal that, as predicted, the level of
compliance with IASs exhibits a home-state effect and increases with a company's size,
leverage, and internationality. 12 There are significant differences in the level of compliance
across years with compliance in 1996, 1997, and 1999 being lower than 2002 (the omitted
dummy variable).
Level of compliance is significantly different between the countries. Average
compliance in Qatar is reflected in the constant term, showing that compliance in the
- Table 4 shows a correlation of 0.736 for size and leverage. In Model I VlF scores are 5. 194 for size and 3.344
for leverage, suggesting thai both variables can be included in the model.
B Al-Shammari et al. The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 425—447 441
Table 8
Regression results: Compliance with IASs
Independent variables
(Expected sign)
Coefficients
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Constant
Bahrain (+)
Oman (+)
Kuwait (+)
Saudi Arabia (+)
UAE(+)
Enforcement (+)
Year (1996) (-)
Year (1997) (-)
Year (1999) (-)
Year (2000) (-)
Kuwait Oman (+)
Kuw ait/Oman* 1 996 (+)
Kuwait/Oman* 1 999 (+)
Company size (+)
Leverage (+)
Intcrnationality (+)
Ownership diffusion (-)
Age (+)
Industry (+)
Adjusted R2
F
Prob (F)
No. of companies
No. of observations
-0.615***
0.299+++
0.197+++
0.1 73+++
0.1 08++
0.1 04++
-0.255+++
-0.254+++
-0.220+++
-0.067+
0.08 1+++
0.009++
0.1 93+++
0.048
0.002+
-0.043(a)
0.432
2 1 664
<0.001
137
409
-0.338**
-0.082(a)
-0.107(a)
-0.229+
-0.223+
-0.194+
0.078++
0.007+
0.260++
0.054
0.002++
-0.040
0.400
23.183
< 0.001
118
367
-0.671***
0.307+++
0.210+++
0.1 79+++
0.099+
0.1 22++
-0 2>5+->-+-
- 0.2 19+++
0.086+++
0.009++
0.1 98+++
0.049
0.002+
-0051(a)
0.440
23.645
< 0.001
137
375
-0.219*
-0.244+++
0.247
-0.068(a)
-0 006
0.035
0.064+++
0.003
0.267+++
0.030
0.002++
-0.044
0.398
23.450
<0.001
137
375
-0.205*
0.008(a)
-0.247+++
-0.209+++
-0.222+++
-0.197+++
0.067+++
0.004
0.255+++
0.039
0.002++
-0.037
0.396
25.281
< 0.001
137
409
This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship between level of compliance and
independent variables Model I includes all countries and years. Model II includes companies from Bahrain, Oman
and Kuwait, where all companies adopted IASs. Model HI includes the major years for data collection 1996, 1999
and 2002. Model IV includes country-year interaction terms for the major years of data collection and the countries
with the highest enforcement scores (Oman and Kuwait). Model V includes a self-constructed enforcement proxy
(see Table 1 ) instead of country variables. Company size = log of total assets; Leverage = ratio of book value of total
debt to book value of total equity; Internationality = ratio of number of shares owned by foreign investors to total
shares at year-end; Ownership diffusion = ratio of number of shares owned by institutional investors to total shares
at year-end; and Age = number of years since foundation. Industry = 1 if banking and investment and insurance. if
manufacturing and service. In Models I and III the omitted country dummy variable is Qatar and the omitted year
dummy variable is 2002. In Model III the omitted country variable is Bahrain. +++ significant/xO.OI (one-tailed)
++ significant p<0 05 (one-tailed) + significant p<0. 10 (one-tailed) *** significant p<0.0l (two-tailed)
**significant/><0.05 (two-tailed) *significantp<0.10 (two-tailed) (a) Coefficient is statistically significant but
sign is opposite to that predicted.
other five countries is significantly higher. Kuwait and Oman, countries with the highest
enforcement ranking, are significant at the 1% level; Saudi Arabia and the UAE, countries
with mid-level rankings on the enforcement proxy, are significant at the 5% level. Bahrain
is also significantly different froms Qatar at the 1% level, although its enforcement score is
only five compared to three for Qatar (Table 1 ). Overall, the multivariate results provide
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support for the research proposition that compliance differs in the GCC countries in
response to the quality of audit and the activity of enforcement bodies.
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Model II (Table 8) includes 118 companies (82% of the full sample) from the three
countries where all companies use IASs (Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman). The results are
similar to Model I, presumably because of the large overlap in the data. In addition Model II
shows that, contrary to predictions, being a company from Bahrain is associated with higher
compliance (Kuwait and Oman are significant and negative) in the multivariate analysis.
This result is not consistent with the enforcement proxy scores (Table 1, panel B) which
suggests that in the regression model the country of domicile proxies for variables in
addition to those included in the enforcement proxy.
As outlined earlier, most observations in the study are drawn from the years 1 996, 1 999,
and 2002. Model III includes only these years, with 2002 as the omitted dummy variable. The
result confirms the trend observed in Model I, namely that compliance increases over the years
of the study. We do not fit regressions based on panel data because the years of data are
discontinuous. Instead we use interaction terms to further explore the impact of country and
year. We expect that compliance increases over time and is higher for companies from Kuwait
and Oman, which have the highest scores for the enforcement proxy.
Model IV includes three additional regressors: Kuwait/Oman (a dummy variable to
indicate a company domiciled in either Kuwait or Oman), Kuwait/Oman* 1996 and Kuwait/
Oman* 1999. In Model IV Kuwait/Oman is significant but the coefficient has the opposite sign
to that predicted. This result reflects the mean compliance scores of Kuwait and Oman
companies, compared to the other countries. As noted above in relation to Model II, despite the
higher scores on the enforcement proxy, the two country dummy variables are not significant
explanatory variables for compliance in multivariate analysis. The Kuwait/Oman effect is also
present in the two interaction terms (Kuwait/Oman* 1 996 and Kuwait/Oman* 1 999), neither of
which is significant in Model IV. The time effect is captured in dummies for 1996 and 1999,
with the country/year interaction terms not adding significantly to the model.
Model V in Table 8 excludes the country dummy variables and includes the enforcement
proxy (Table 1 ). The enforcement proxy is significant and negative, showing that it captures
differences between the countries but the relationship is not in the direction predicted. The
relatively high mean compliance scores in Saudi Arabia and the UAE (0.80 and 0.78 in
Table 6), countries which have only mid-rank scores for the enforcement proxy, may
Robustness tests demonstrated that the regression results are not sensitive to alternative specifications of the
dependent variable, that is, to the treatment of potentially ambiguous items in the checklist. Several measures of
the dependent variable are investigated (regressions not reported in detail). First, the overall compliance index is
calculated including NA and DK items, but recording NA and DK as noncompliance, thus giving a lower
compliance score because all items were considered applicable and companies were penalized for not disclosing
an item, irrespective of its applicability. Second, the overall compliance index is calculated including DK items,
but recording DK as noncompliance and excluding NA items. Only companies with DK items received a lower
score. Overall, the results reported in Model I (Table 8) are not especially sensitive to the alternative transformed
compliance indices, despite some differences with respect to the significance of country and industry dummy
variables. We also fit Model I using the untransformed dependent variables. The results are essentially unaffected,
although the explanatory power of the transformed dependent variable models is slightly (1-3%) higher.
\ separate regression model is not fitted for companies from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE due to the
small number of observations (Companies n= 19, company-year observations=44).
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partially explain why the predicted directional relationship is not observed. Like Model II,
the Model V result implies that the enforcement scores lack discriminating power compared
to country variables. However, as noted above, many of the country compliance scores are
not significantly different in univariate tests. This lack of variation makes it more difficult
for the enforcement proxy to explain the differences between countries. 15
4.3. Summary and limitations
In summary, we find that the average level of compliance for all companies and all years
is 75% of the items in the index. No company within the examined time period fully
complied with all requirements. The average level of compliance increased over time, from
68% in 1996 to 82% in 2002. Notwithstanding strong cultural ties and cooperative
economic relationships, there is significant variation in the level of compliance across the
six GCC member states. The highest average level of compliance is in Saudi Arabia, where
it reached 88% in the last year of the study. Compliance improved substantially in Kuwait
and Oman from 1996 to 1999, more so than in the other GCC member states. This could, at
least partially, have resulted from improved monitoring and enforcement in Kuwait and
Oman beginning in 1999.
There were some changes to IASs during the period, as the IASC completed the
Comparability Project and made some standards more prescriptive. Therefore, it should be
noted that we report downwardly biased measures of improvement in compliance because
our measures do not allow for the fact that compliance became progressively more
demanding over the period. Nevertheless, our results suggest some weaknesses in
compliance incentives in the region and indicate that there is scope for further improvement
in national monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in the GCC member states.
Prior studies report a range of outcomes in relation to IASs compliance, which vary
between countries, whether IASs are voluntary or mandatory and in relation to disclosure
and measurement items. Direct comparisons of our results with those of prior compliance
studies such as Tower et al., (1999), Glaum and Street (2003) and Street and Gray (2001)
have not been made because such comparisons have questionable validity. One reason is
that prior studies address other time periods, when a different set of IASs were applicable,
which means that the compliance measures lack comparability. In addition, compliance
measures reflect countries' institutional frameworks, which are known to differ between
countries. Substantial differences between the settings of the current and prior studies may
render direct comparisons of compliance scores of limited value.
5. Conclusions
We show that the level of mandatory compliance with IASs differed among companies
from the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member states (Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) over the period 1996-2002. Although these
countries had progressively made IASs mandatory for all or selected companies since 1996,
and compliance improved over the period, no company achieved full compliance with
" If the unweighted proxy for enforcement is used results are similar to Model V.
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cither IASs measurement or disclosure requirements during the period. Our study provides
the first in-depth analysis of IASs compliance within a set of states with common interests
in a politically and economically important region, and thus extends the literature about
progress towards the international harmonization of financial reporting. The results suggest
that there is scope for companies to improve their levels of compliance with IASs, to
improve comparability among companies in the region and to facilitate the process of
attracting international investors.
The IASB standards have been developed for use as national standards in countries
throughout the world, irrespective of culture and level of economic development. Since
wide-scale mandatory adoption is relatively recent, little is known about the effectiveness of
IASs adoption in various countries. Exploring compliance in the GCC region is of interest
because of distinctive features such as strong links between member states, developing-
country status accompanied by considerable wealth, and significant cultural differences to
many western countries. We show that adoption of IASs in the region is dejure but not de
facto, that is, IASs are adopted by law but not in practice, as substantial noncompliance is
observed. We also explore the relationship of compliance and each country's institutional
setting, thus extending prior studies by exploring relevant elements of the national
institutional frameworks, including the activities of auditors and enforcement bodies.
We find that despite noncompliance and the responsibilities of auditors under the law
(which are similar to those observed in western countries), no action has been taken against
an audit firm, member of the board of directors, or a manager for violating an accounting
regulation, except for two cases in Oman and one in Kuwait. External auditors in the GCC
member states reported a client company fully complied with all IASs even where that was
clearly not the case. Our results suggest that although a set of mechanisms to promote
compliance among GCC companies is in place, activities of enforcement bodies have been
insufficient to ensure compliance. Possible reasons are a lack of professional training and
payment of salaries to attract sufficiently qualified staff. Also, the enforcement bodies have
other responsibilities and there may be a lack of commitment from governments, at a policy
level, to enforcement. In the face of scarce resources, efforts might be more effective if
focused on monitoring companies that are smaller, have fewer international investors, and
borrow proportionately less. Thus, the findings may be relevant to national regulators and
the Gulf Co-Operation Council Accounting and Auditing Organization (GCCAAO) in their
efforts to harmonize financial reporting.
The evidence presented about practical outcomes of IASs adoption may be relevant in
other countries which have recently made IASs mandatory. The financial reporting
frameworks in the GCC countries are based on company-law requirements which are
enforced through government departments and contain penalties for breach of require-
ments. The frameworks place extensive reliance on external auditors and feature only
limited activity by stock exchanges and enforcement bodies in checking for compliance and
taking action for non-compliance. As such, the frameworks have many similarities to those
which have been operating in other countries (see for example, FEE's (200 1 ) comparison of
inancial reporting frameworks in European countries). This study provides evidence of a
ack of compliance in practice, despite the existence ofmany of the mechanisms considered
necessary to promote compliance. Thus, the results may be insightful for regulators in other
IASs adopting counties.
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Appendix A. IASs included in compliance checklist
Fourteen IASs were included in the compliance checklist. Other standards were
excluded for the following reasons:
(1) Standards not applicable in the GCC
Two procedures were used to verify the applicability of each standard. First, each IAS
was discussed with two senior external auditors (employed by Ernst & Young and KPMG
in Kuwait). These auditors confirmed which standards did not apply to GCC member states.
Second, the coder checked for any disclosures relating to these standards when examining
companies' annual reports. Five standards were omitted as not applicable: IAS 12, Income
Taxes; IAS 15, Information Reflecting the Effects of Changing Prices; IAS 19, Employee
Benefits; IAS 26, Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans, and IAS 29,
Financial Reporting in Hypennflationary Economies.
Further relevant information is as follows. IAS 12 was omitted because GCC companies
pay no income tax, except in Oman. Since inflation has been relatively low ( 1 .5% to 4% p. a.)
over the last ten years and the purchasing power of money has been relatively stable over the
last 20 years (GCC, 2003) IAS 1 5 and IAS 29 were considered not applicable. IAS 1 9 and IAS
26 do not apply because all companies operating in the GCC member states must follow labor
laws with respect to accounting for employee benefits and retirement benefits. IAS 34 does not
apply because we measure compliance with IASs in annual, not interim, reports.
(2) Not applicable in the study period
IAS 39, Financial Instruments Recognition and Measurement, although issued by the
IASB, was not mandatory for companies during the study period.
(3) Little within-sample variation
A pilot study was conducted to determine the applicability of IASs to GCC companies. It
reviewed 43 companies, 31% of the total sample of 137 (eight companies' annual reports
representing all industries from each GCC member state). Companies were selected
randomly, except for Qatar. Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, where all banks and finance and
investment companies were examined. We found that IAS 11, Construction Contracts; IAS
17 Leases; IAS 20, Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government
Assistance; IAS 22, Business Combinations;, IAS 31, Financial Reporting of Interests in
Joint Ventures; IAS 35, Discontinuing Operations; and IAS 38, Intangible Assets were only
mentioned in a few of the annual reports, therefore, these standards were excluded.
The coder also examined if there was any disclosure based on the excluded standards
when he investigated the full sample of companies' annual reports. The examination
confirmed very few companies consistently disclosed information relative to these
standards. IAS 1 1 applied to only one company, IAS 17 to five, IAS 20 to nine, IAS 22 to
none, IAS 3 1 to six, IAS 35 to one and IAS 38 to one. This review supports the exclusion of
the named standards from the compliance index.
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Abstract
In this empirical study we examine whether China's efforts to converge domestic accounting standards
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) over the past 15 years have resulted in the
successful convergence of Chinese listed firms. This study is unique m that we evaluate convergence of
firms' accounting practices from three perspectives: ( 1 ) the level of compliance with Chinese GAAP and
IFRS, (2) the consistency of accounting choices under Chinese GAAP and IFRS, and (3 ) identification of
significant differences in the net incomes produced under Chinese GAAP and IFRS (earnings gap).
Using the 1999 and 2002 annual reports of 79 Chinese listed firms we find improvement in both
compliance with IFRS and in the consistency of the accounting methods used in annual reports prepared
under Chinese GAAP and IFRS. We also find a reduction in the earnings gap from 1999 to 2002.
However, interestingly we observed that Chinese listed firms' compliance with IFRS is significantly lower
than their compliance with Chinese GAAP. Overall we believe that our findings suggest that in China the
convergence of accounting standards has been a conduit to the convergence of accounting practices.
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1. Introduction
The primary objective of the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) is to
develop a single set of high quality accounting standards for use in global financial reporting.
To this end, the IASB and its predecessor have issued 4 1 International Accounting Standards
(IAS) and seven International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).' As an integral part of
its objective the IASB promotes the convergence of national accounting standards and IFRS.
The IASB's efforts have resulted in the adoption of IFRS by a considerable number of
countries. Among the 99 countries that have either adopted or permitted the use of IFRS for
domestic listed companies as of August 2005, 80% are from emerging capital markets
(Deloitte & Touche, 2005). Along with the IASB's success, however, there is concern that
the convergence of accounting standards may not lead to the convergence of accounting
practices if firms do not comply with the standards (Street, Gray, & Bryant, 1999; Street &
Bryant, 2000). This concern is accentuated in emerging market economies that may not have
the accountants, auditors, and regulators to support compliance. As pointed out by Eccher
and Healy, the standards developed by the IASB are "primarily based on those for countries
with highly developed capital markets... It is questionable whether such standards are also
optimal for developing and transitional economies that lack the infrastructure for monitoring
managers' financial reporting decisions" (p. 1).
In this empirical study we use China — as a case of an emerging market economy — to
examine whether its efforts to converge domestic standards with IFRS over the last 1 5 years
have been successful, i.e.. do Chinese listed firms' accounting practices converge with IFRS?
China provides a clear opportunity to evaluate the convergence debate. Since 1 992, China has
issued four sets of accounting regulations (1992, 1998, 2001, and 2006); each replaced the
previous one and was considered to be in greater conformity with IFRS (Chen et al., 2002;
Pacter & Yuen, 2001; IASB, 2006). It has been noted in the literature and by the IASB that
impressive progress has been made toward the convergence of Chinese accounting standards
with IFRS (IASB, 2005; Xiang, 1998). However, Chen, Gul, and Su (1999) and Chen et al.
(2002) find that there is a significant difference in both 1992 and 1998 between Chinese
GAAP and IFRS-based net incomes of Chinese listed firms. Our study extends Chen et al.
(2002) by evaluating the level of and the improvement in the convergence of Chinese listed
firms' accounting practices with IFRS since promulgation of the 2001 Chinese GAAP.
In addition, this study contributes to the literature by evaluating the convergence of
accounting practices using three evaluation methods: ( 1 ) the level of a firm's compliance
with accounting regulations, (2) the consistency of firms' accounting choices under two sets
of accounting regulations, and (3) whether the net incomes produced by the same firm
under different sets of accounting standards are comparable. Each of these methods
evaluates different aspects of convergence. No previous study has integrated these three
approaches, most likely due to the difficulty in obtaining suitable sample firms. We are able
to study these evaluation methods because of China's unique market segmentation which
To simplify the presentation, we use the term IFRS to refer to both International Financial Reporting
Standards issued by the IASB and IAS issued by the IASB's predecessor, the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC).
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requires certain firms, those that issue both A and B-shares, to issue two sets of annual
reports, one based on Chinese GAAP and the other based on IFRS.
We find that China's efforts to converge Chinese accounting standards with IFRS have
been successful in the convergence of Chinese firms' accounting practices with IFRS. We
also find that the convergence ofaccounting practices in China has occurred progressively as
evidenced by the improvement in convergence with the issuance of Chinese GAAP in 200 1
.
Although these findings are specific to China, they should also be of interest to regulators in
other developing capital markets who seek to improve financial reporting through
convergence of their standards with IFRS. Regulators in these countries face many of the
same obstacles encountered by China, such as lack of accounting professionals, insufficient
resources for regulation and enforcement, and questionable practices of local auditors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides the background and
Section III presents prior research and hypotheses development. Section rV discusses the
research design. Section V presents the results and Section VI provides a summary ofthe study.
2. Background
2. I. Chinese capital market development and market segmentation
The Chinese capital market developed rapidly since its establishment in the early 1990s.
By the end of 2004, China's total market capitalization was approximately RMB3.71
trillion, or approximately $464 billion U.S. dollars. This represents 24% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)." The number of listed firms increased from 14 at the beginning of 1990 to
1377 by the end of 2004 (CSRC, 2005). This rapid market development, and the desire to
attract domestic and overseas capital, provided direct incentives and pressures for both the
Chinese government and listed firms to improve the quality of financial reporting.
The Chinese domestic capital market is segmented into A-share and B-share markets."
A-shares can only be owned and traded by Chinese citizens, while B-shares can only be
owned and traded by foreign investors. 4 By the end of 2004, a total of 1463 stock offerings
were made by the 1377 listed firms on Chinese capital markets — 1353 A-share issues, 24
B-share issues, and 86 A- and B-share issues (CSRC, 2005).
2.1.1. Accounting regulations
The accounting regulations applicable to a Chinese listed firm depend on the type of
security issued, A- or B-shares or both. Finns that issue A-shares are required to comply with
Chinese GAAP, while firms that issue B-shares are required to comply with IFRS. Firms that
issue both A- and B-shares are required to issue two sets of annual reports, one based on
Chinese GAAP and the other based on IFRS. The IFRS-based annual report must be audited
by an internationally recognized auditor, but not necessarily a Big 4 firm, while the Chinese
GAAP-based annual report may be audited by local accounting firms. Both sets of annual
:
Chinese 2004 GDP was $1.93 trillion in U.S. dollars (China Daily 2005)
A third type of shares called H-shares are listed in Hong Kong. Unlike A- and B-shares that are traded in
mainland China, H-shares are traded in Hong Kong and subject to Hong Kong Accounting Standards (HKAS).
2001 Chinese citizens have been allowed to purchased B-shares using U.S. dollars.
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Market segmentation
A-shares only
firms
Chinese GAAP
(1992, 1998,2001)
A- and B-share
firms
Chinese GAAP-based annual
reports (in Chinese)
IFRS-based annual
reports (in English)
Fig. 1. Market segmentation and applicable accounting regulations in China as of December 31, 2005.
reports must be released to the public simultaneously and any difference in net incomes
between Chinese GAAP and IFRS must be reconciled and presented in the financial statement
footnotes. Fig. 1 and Table 1 depict the Chinese capital market segmentation and the evolution
of accounting regulations for Chinese listed A-share firms as of December 31, 2005.
While B-share firms have historically been required to follow IFRS, the accounting
regulations for firms that issue A-shares have evolved in three stages as shown in Table 1 . The
first stage is from 1 992 to 1997. Throughout this stage all listed A-share firms were required to
follow the Experimental Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises (1992
Table I
Evolution of accounting regulations for listed A-share firms in China as of December 31, 2005
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Period
Accounting regulations
in effect throughout
the stage
Referred to in the
study as
1992.1. 1-1997. 12 31
1992 Accounting System' 1
Basic Standard11
CSRC Regulations"
1992 GAAP
1998.1.1 2000.12.3]
1998 Accounting Systemb
Basic Standard
CSRC Regulations
CASsf
Accounting Law8
1998 GAAP
2001.1.1-2006.12.3]
2001 Accounting System1
Basic Standard11
CSRC Regulations1
'
CASsf
Accounting Lawg
2001 GAAP
3
"Experimental Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises" issued by the Ministry of Finance of
China (MOF) in 1992.
b
"Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises" issued by the MOF in 1998.
c
"Accounting System for Business Enterprises" issued by the MOF in 2001
"Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises" issued by the MOF in 1992.
"Form and Content of Information for Disclosure by Companies with Securities Issued to the Public" and other
regulations issued by the CSRC.
1
"Chinese Accounting Standard" issued by the MOF.
g
"Accounting Law of the People's Republic of China" issued in 1995 and revised in 2000 by the State Council
of China.
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Accounting System) and the Accounting Standardfor Business Enterprises (Basic Standard)
issued in 1992 by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), as well as accounting regulations issued by
the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The MOF is the authoritative body
which promulgates accounting standards in China. The CSRC, established in 1992, is the
capital market regulator in China whose authority and operations are analogous to those ofthe
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States. In this study we refer to the
accounting regulations that were issued in 1992 in China and were in effect throughout this
period as 1992 Chinese GAAR The 1992 Chinese GAAP marked a radical change in China's
accounting rules and regulations, representing a shift in focus from providing information for a
central government-planned economy to a socialist-market economy.
The second stage of regulatory development was from 1998 to 2000 and is represented
by the adoption of the Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises (1998
Accounting System) issued by the MOF. This regulation replaced the 1992 Chinese GAAP
and "was issued specifically to eliminate discrepancies between Chinese GAAP and IAS in
the 1992 regulation" (Chen et al., 2002, p. 184). In addition, during this period A-share
firms were required to follow the Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) issued by the MOF
and the accounting law issued by the State Council in 1995. We refer to the accounting
regulations that were in effect throughout this stage as 1998 Chinese GAAP.
The third stage of development was from 2001 to 2006/ represented by the MOF's
issuance of the Accounting System for Business Enterprises (2001 Accounting System)
effective January 1, 2001, which replaced the 1998 Accounting System. We refer to the
accounting regulations that were in effect during this period for A-share firms as 2001
Chinese GAAP. The 2001 GAAP moves Chinese accounting standards further toward
convergence with IFRS(Pacter& Yuen, 2001). For example, inventory valuation at lower of
cost or market (LCM) was optional in 1998 GAAP but required in 2001 GAAP and
recognition of impairment losses was required only for investments in 1998 GAAP, but it
was also required for property, plant, and equipment (PP&E), intangible assets, construction
in process, and investment property in 2001 Chinese GAAP. These requirements, among
others, moved Chinese GAAP toward convergence with IFRS. Table 2 compares the
accounting treatment for selected key measurement items under 1998 and 2001 Chinese
GAAP with IFRS. This comparison reflects the progress toward convergence.
3. Prior research and hypotheses development
Prior to 2001 the goal of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the
predecessor of the IASB, was harmonization ofaccounting standards across countries through
development of a set of standards that could be used as a model for standard setters in their
respective countries. However, in 2001, when the IASB replaced the IASC, its goal became
one of "convergence of accounting standards — development of a single set of high quality,
5 A revised Chinese GAAP effective on January 1, 2007 (2007 Chinese GAAP), was issued in February 2006.
The 2007 Chinese GAAP, including revised Basic Standard and 38 CASs, supersedes the 2001 Accounting
System and the CASs previously issued. It signifies the beginning of the fourth stage of China's regulatory
levelopment. The effect of the 2007 Chinese GAAP on the convergence of Chinese listed firms' practices with
IFRS is beyond the scope of this study, as 2007 annual reports were not available at the time of this study.
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Table 2
A comparison of eight revised accounting methods
Item 1998 Chinese GAAP 2001 Chinese GAAP IFRS'1
Inventory
valuation
Short-term
investments
valuation
Bad debt
allowance
Construction
in process
At historical cost or the
lower of cost and net
realizable value (LCM).
At historical cost or LCM.
Allowance either based on
a government-approved
percentage from
0.3%-0.5% or determined
by company.
At amortized cost-
Property,
plant, and
equipment (PP&E)
valuation
Intangible assets
valuation
At amortized cost.
At amortized cost.
Investment
property
Pre-operating
expense
At amortized cost.
Deferred as an asset until
the entity begins
operations, then amortized
in no more than five vears.
At LCM.
At LCM.
Determined by company.
At amortized cost adjusted
for impairment
At amortized cost adjusted
for impairment.
At amortized cost adjusted
for impairment.
At amortized cost adjusted
for impairment.
Deferred as an asset until the
entity begins operations, then
charged to expense at the first
month of operation.
Same as the 2001
Chinese GAAP.
At fair market value.
Same as the 2001
Chinese GAAP.
[B] Same as the 2001
Chinese GAAP. [A] At fair
market value at the date of
revaluation adjusted for
depreciation and impairment.
[B] Same as the 2001
Chinese GAAP. [A] At fair
market value at the date of
revaluation adjusted for
depreciation and impairment
[B] Same as the 2001
Chinese GAAP. [A] At fair
market value at the date of
revaluation adjusted for
depreciation and impairment.
[B] Same as the 2001
Chinese GAAP. [A] At fair
market value at the date of
revaluation adjusted for
depreciation and impairment.
Charged to expense when
incurred.
3
For certain IFRS, a benchmark measurement is the preferred measurement, however, an alternate treatment is
also permitted. [B] Refers to the benchmark treatment and [A] refers to the alternate treatment.
understandable and enforceable global accounting standards" (Pacter. 2001. p.67). Studies
published prior to 2001 used the term "harmonization" when referring to the comparability
and compatibility of accounting standards. b Published research subsequent to 2001 has
frequently used the term "convergence" to describe this process. In this study, for consistency
and simplicity, we use the term "convergence" to denote both harmonization and convergence.
A comprehensive review of harmonization studies can be found in Meek and Saudagaran, 1990; Wallace and
Gemon, 1991; Gemon and Wallace. 1995; Prather and Rueschhoff. 1996; Saudagran and Meek, 1997.
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In 2005, China's regulators stated that the intent of their standard-setting program was
convergence with IFRS (IASB, 2005) and, as discussed earlier, each successive stage of the
development of Chinese GAAP (1992, 1998, and 2001) has been considered more
convergent with IFRS. However, concerns have been raised in prior research over the
applicability of IFRS to Chinese accounting practices (Xiang, 1998). Chen et al. (2002)
found that convergence under 1998 Chinese GAAP "did not immediately eliminate or
significantly reduce the earnings gap [between 1998 Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based net
incomes of Chinese listed firms]" (p. 195). Tang (2000) noted "compliance with a set of
accounting standards depends not only on the acceptance of the constituency, but also on the
competency of the audit profession that makes judgments on how they have been applied...
[In China] the independence of the CPA firms is greatly compromised" (p. 98). Concerns
have also been expressed over the effect of Chinese preparers' level of competence. Again,
as Tang (2000) points out "most accountants working in the industries received education
that is not compatible with new approaches. It is more so with the management" (p. 98).
These concerns call into question the relevance of China's convergence efforts. In this study
we evaluate whether China's efforts to converge 2001 Chinese GAAP with IFRS have
resulted in the convergence ofChinese firms' accounting practices with IFRS. To investigate
this issue we compare the level ofconvergence of Chinese listed firms' accounting practices
with IFRS in 1999 and 2002. We believe that evidence of improvement in the level of
convergence from 1999 to 2002 will provide support for the argument that convergence of
accounting standards leads to the convergence of accounting practices.
As mentioned earlier, three methods have been used in prior research to evaluate the
convergence of accounting practices. The first method focuses on firms' compliance with
accounting standards (compliance). This stream of research is motivated by the concern that
converging accounting standards may not lead to converging accounting practices if firms
do not comply with the designated standards (Street et al., 1999; Street & Bryant, 2000;
Chamisa, 2000; Street & Gray, 1999; Frost & Pownall, 1994; Glaum & Street, 2003; Street
& Gray, 2001). Compliance with Chinese GAAP and IFRS is mandatory for Chinese firms
that issue both A and B-shares. However, Tay and Parker (1990) remark that "even where
compliance with standards is legally required, companies may not comply if it is perceived
that the consequences ofnon-compliance are not serious" (p. 75 ). Street and Gray (200 1 ) and
Xiao ( 1 999) find evidence that Chinese listed firms' compliance with accounting regulations
is high. However, neither the Street and Gray nor the Xiao study examine whether a specific
firm's compliance with IFRS is the same as its compliance with Chinese GAAP.
The second method used to assess convergence of accounting practices evaluates the
consistency of a firm's accounting choices under different sets of accounting regulations
(consistency). Research in this area (Van der Tas, 1988; Emenyonu & Gray, 1992, 1996;
Archer, Delvaille, & McLeay, 1995; Herrmann & Thomas, 1997) has focused on evaluating
the level of convergence in accounting choices for different firms across countries. Each of
these studies used a concentration index to measure convergence and found that the
consistency of accounting choices using two sets of accounting regulations was low. None
of the studies referenced above evaluated the level of consistency in accounting choices for
the same firms that prepare annual reports under two sets of accounting standards.
In China, firms that issue both A and B-shares are required to publish Chinese GAAP
1 IFRS-based annual reports. An inconsistency in accounting choices by these firms may
S. Peng et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 43 (2008) 448-468 455
be due to the flexibility provided to firms in the selection of alternative accounting methods.
In such situations, using compliance as the sole criterion to evaluate convergence may be
misleading. To address this issue, firms' financial reports prepared under two sets of
accounting standards should be reviewed to observe whether firms' actual choices for
accounting treatments for similar transactions are consistent.
The third method evaluates the significance ofany differences in the net income measures
produced by the same firm under different sets of accounting standards (comparability)
(Gray, 1980; Weetman & Gray, 1991; Cooke, 1993; Norton, 1995; Rueschhoff& Strupeck,
1998; Street, Nichols, & Gray, 2000). Most studies in this area use the conservatism index
developed by Gray (1980) and renamed the "index of comparability" in Weetman, Jones,
Adams, and Gray (1998) to measure the differences in financial reporting numbers produced
by the same firm under two sets of accounting standards.
As previously discussed, the CSRC requires Chinese firms that issue both A and B-shares
to provide a reconciliation schedule of net income between Chinese GAAP and IFRS. The
availability of these reconciliation schedules provides for the relatively straightforward
examination of the nature and magnitude of any difference between Chinese GAAP and
IFRS. The magnitude ofthe earnings gap (i.e., the difference between Chinese GAAP-based
net income and IFRS-based net income) provides a measure of the degree of convergence.
Chen et al. (1999, 2002) find that a significant difference exists in reported net income
between Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based net incomes. These findings are based on a sample of
annual reports issued by Chinese listed firms that issued both A- and B-shares from 1 994- 1 997
(Chen et al., 1 999) and 1 997- 1 999 (Chen et al., 2002). However, no empirical evidence exists
on the status of the earnings difference since issuance of 2001 Chinese GAAP.
In this study, we evaluate the level of convergence of Chinese listed firms' accounting
practices in 1999 and 2002 with IFRS using measurement of compliance, consistency, and
comparability. We examine: ( 1 ) whether Chinese listed firms that issue both A- and B-shares
are in substantial compliance with both Chinese GAAP and IFRS; (2) whether these firms
use consistent accounting treatments in their Chinese GAAP-based and IFRS-based annual
reports; and, (3) whether the net income measurements produced by the same firm in
accordance with Chinese GAAP and IFRS are or are not significantly different.
Mandating convergence of a national GAAP to IFRS should provide strong motivation
to a country's accounting professionals to gain experience and familiarity with the IFRS
model of accounting. Consequently convergence in standards should lead to convergence
in practice. Therefore, given China's convergence efforts as evidenced by the
promulgation of 2001 Chinese GAAP, we should find: (1) improved compliance with
IFRS, (2) improved consistency of accounting choices under Chinese GAAP-based and
IFRS-based annual reports, and (3) improved comparability as evidenced by a reduced
earnings gap between Chinese and IFRS-based net incomes. Thus, we develop the
following three hypotheses:
HI. For Chinese listed firms that issue both A and B-shares, the level of firms' compliance
with IFRS significantly improved with the issuance of 2001 Chinese GAAP.
H2. For Chinese listed firms that issue both A and B-shares, the level of consistency of
accounting treatments in firms' Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based annual reports
significantly improved with the issuance of 2001 Chinese GAAP.
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H3. For Chinese listed firms that issue both A and B-shares, the comparability of firms'
Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based net incomes significantly improved with the issuance of
2001 Chinese GAAP.
While empirical evidence does not exist for these hypotheses in prior literature, in regard
to H3 Chen et al. (2002) find that improved convergence of 1 998 Chinese GAAP with IFRS
did not result in reduction in the earnings gap between Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based net
income. However, it is not known whether the 200 1 Chinese GAAP resulted in improved
comparability of net incomes, that is, a reduction in the earnings gap between Chinese
GAAP and IFRS-based net incomes.
4. Research design
4.1. Research instrument
A checklist instrument (checklist) containing 77 measurement items based on IFRS
1-40 was developed to evaluate the extent of the convergence of Chinese firms'
accounting practices with IFRS. This checklist focuses on the major measurement items
for annual reports and incorporates all IFRSs issued as of January 1, 2002. Three criteria
were used to screen IFRS items. First, the items had to be required to be disclosed in the
footnotes of listed firms' annual reports under both IFRS and Chinese GAAP. Second,
information relating to firms' choices about a particular accounting treatment had to be
commonly available from the accounting policies section of companies' annual reports or
from the notes to their financial statements (similar to the methodology used by
Emenyonu and Gray, 1992). Third, these items had to be applicable to Chinese listed
firms. Items not applicable to Chinese listed firms were excluded from the checklist. For
example, measurement requirements for pension accounting and derivatives were
excluded because they were not common practices in China in the years we examined.
The final checklist was compared to similar instruments used in prior research to ensure
that IFRS were correctly addressed. 7 The final checklist contained 77 items and is
presented in Appendix I.
4.2. Sample and data
The 1999 and 2002 annual reports of firms that issue both A and B-shares in China
were selected for this study. Complete annual reports of listed firms were not available to
the public prior to 1999. 8 Accordingly, our sample did not include annual reports issued
The following studies were reviewed in developing this instrument: Graham and Wang (1995), Chamisa
(2000), Street and Gray (2001), Tang (1994), Nair and Frank (1981), Doupnik (1987), Garrido et al. (2002) and
Chen et al. (1999).
Before 1999, the only publicly available information was in the form of a summary of the annual reports
published in the CSRC-designated newspapers. Alternatively, annual reports of listed firms could be obtained
directly from listed firms. However, even though this is a common practice in western countries, it is not an
xepted practice in China. As Xiao (1999) points out, "there is no culture of co-operation between companies
irchers" and "the law does not require listed companies to distribute financial reports directly even to
shareholders" (p. 350).
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under 1992 Chinese GAAP. In addition, this limitation necessitated the use of 1999
annual reports for the evaluation of convergence with 1 998 Chinese GAAP. Therefore,
for consistency in analysis we used the 2002 annual reports to evaluate convergence with
2001 Chinese GAAP. All annual reports were downloaded from the website designated
by the CSRC (www.cninfo.com.cn).
The initial sample consisted of87 firms that issued both A and B-shares as ofDecember 3 1
,
2002. Eight firms were excluded from the initial sample because either these firms' A-shares
or B-shares were issued after 1999. The final sample consists of 79 firms (39 listed on the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 40 listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange) that have both 1 999
and 2002 annual reports available.
4.3. Data analysis
The data for the analysis was collected by identifying the accounting treatment under
Chinese GAAP and IFRS for each of the 77 measurement items included in the checklist.
The annual reports were then reviewed to determine if firms' accounting treatments
complied with the Chinese GAAP and the IFRS applicable to the given year and if the
accounting choices made by each firm were consistent under Chinese GAAP and IFRS.
Questions on the applicable accounting treatment that arose in the review process were
examined by a second reviewer. The reported net income numbers under Chinese GAAP
and IFRS-based annual reports were also collected. Based on this data, the compliance
index, consistency index, and index of comparability were calculated for each firm for 1999
and 2002. These indices were used to test the hypotheses applying both univariate and
multivariate analyses.
The compliance index is defined as the percentage of specific regulations applicable to a
firm with which that firm complied. In order to compute the compliance index, a
compliance score is assigned for each measurement item for each firm. A compliance score
of one is assigned if a firm reported an item in accordance with the respective standard.
Noncompliance receives a score of zero. If the item is not relevant to that company, the item
is not included in the calculation. A firm's compliance index is calculated by dividing the
sum of its compliance scores by the number of applicable items, as shown in the formula
presented below. This index has been widely used in accounting literature to measure the
level of compliance with specific accounting regulations (Street et al., 1999; Chamisa.
2000). The compliance index was calculated for both Chinese GAAP and IFRS for 1999
and 2002.
_ , ,. . ,
The sum of compliance scores
,„.A turn s compliance index = — (1)
The number of applicable items
The consistency index is a measure of the consistency or uniformity in a firm's
accounting choices for the same transactions in the financial statements it prepares under
The complete checklist detailing the comparison of applicable accounting treatments in 1998 and 2001
Chinese GAAP and IFRS is available from the authors upon request.
'" Chinese GAAP and IFRS effective as of January 1, 1998, were used for firms' 1999 annual reports, while
Chinese GAAP and IFRS effective as of January 1, 2001, were used for firms' 2002 annual reports.
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different sets of accounting standards. A consistency score of "one" is assigned if a firm
made the same accounting choice on a specific item in its Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based
annual reports. Otherwise a score of "zero" is assigned. If the item was not relevant to that
firm, the item was not included in the calculation. A consistency index is then calculated
for each firm by dividing the sum of the consistency scores by the number of applicable
items, as shown in the following formula. This index ranges from zero to one with one
indicating full consistency of a firm's accounting choices between two sets of accounting
regulations.
,
The sum of consistency scores
A firm s consistency index = — ——
—
: (2)
The number of applicable items
The third index measures the comparability between two sets of accounting standards by
comparing specific items presented in the financial statements, such as net income and
owners' equity. Unlike the consistency index which only identifies the incidences of
accounting treatment differences, the index of comparability quantifies their impact on the
financial statement numbers. The formula" to calculate the index of comparability is:
i . , . , ...
(IFRS net income - Chinese GAAP net income) ,„,
A turn s index ot comnarabi lity = 1 — (3
I IFRS net income v ;
An index value of 1 .0 means no difference in reported net income between Chinese GAAP
and IFRS. An index value greater than 1 .0 means a higher Chinese GAAP net income.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the compliance, consistency, and comparability
indices for the 1999 and 2002 annual reports of sample firms. As shown in Table 3, the
compliance indices indicate a high level of compliance with Chinese GAAP in both 1999
and 2002. The distributions are asymmetric since a compliance index value of 1.0 is the
maximum, as firms cannot exceed full compliance. The mean level of compliance with
Chinese GAAP is 0.970 and 0.969 for the 1999 and 2002 annual reports, respectively.
However, the mean level of compliance with IFRS is 0.857 and 0.900 for the 1999 and
2002 annual reports, respectively. The compliance with IFRS appears consistently lower
than the compliance with Chinese GAAP. For 1999 the minimum is 0.854 for Chinese
We also applied the approach used by Chen et al. (2002) to calculate the earnings gap which is different than
dex of comparability. Rather than applying a conservatism index, Chen et al. (2002) directly compared the
itude of the differences between Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based net incomes. Our results, not reported here.
istent with our findings and our conclusions remain unchanged.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for the compliance and consistency indices and the indices of comparability
Index Standard Year N Mean Std.
dev.
Min. Percentile Values Max.
25th 50th 75th
Compliance GAAP 1999 79 0.970 0.037 854 0.946 0.975 1.000 1.000
GAAP 2002 79 0969 0.038 0.823 0.953 0.975 1.000 1.000
IFRS 1999 1T 0.857 0.105 0414 0.815 0.873 0.934 0.970
IFRS 2002 67 0.900 0.070 0.667 0865 0.919 0.950 0.976
Consistency [999 72a 0.690 0.080 (1545 0.636 0.673 "45 0.900
2002 67" (i 794 0.060 0.657 0.750 0.793 0.839 0.952
Index of Comparability 1999 79 1.883 3.238 0.355 0.994 1.073 1.641 27.490
2002 79 1.357 2.381 0.047 0.912 1.000 1.098 21.090
Firm's compliance index = Sum of compliance scores for a given firm Number of items applicable to this firm.
Firm's consistency index = Sum of consistency scores for a given firm Number of items applicable to this firm.
Index of comparability = 1 -(IFRS net income -Chinese GAAP net income) absolute value of IFRS net income.
a
In 1999, seven firms did not provide the IFRS-based annual reports.
h
In 2002. 12 firms did not provide the IFRS-based annual reports.
GAAP and 0.414 for IFRS. and the 25th percentile value is 0.946 for Chinese GAAP and
0.815 for IFRS. Note that the 25th percentile values are relatively close to 1.0 for Chinese
GAAP, but notably below 1.0 for IFRS. While we believe these statistics indicate
substantial compliance with Chinese GAAP in both years we cannot make the same
assertion for IFRS compliance.
The consistency indices indicate a moderate level of consistency in accounting
treatments between Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based annual reports in both 1999 and 2002.
As indicated for the compliance indices, the distributions for the consistency indices are
also asymmetric since a consistency index value can fall short of 1.0. but never exceed it.
These indices show that, in 1999. the mean level of consistency between Chinese GAAP
and IFRS is 0.690 with a range from 0.545 to 0.900. The median. 50th percentile value, is
0.673. In 2002. the mean level of consistency between Chinese GAAP and IFRS is 0.794
with a range from 0.657 to 0.952. The median is 0.793. This implies that there was an
improvement in the consistency of application of accounting methods in the 2002 Chinese
and IFRS-based annual reports as compared to the 1999 annual reports[AUl]. Content
analysis of the consistency index reveals that differences in standards and non-compliance
with IFRS were the primary cause of the observed lack of full consistency.
Index of comparability values exceeding 1.0 indicates that Chinese GAAP net income is
higher than IFRS net income. The means and medians of the index of comparability are
1.883 and 1.073 in 1999, and 1.357 and 1.0 in 2002, respectively, mdicatmg that Chinese
GAAP net income is higher than IFRS net income in these years. This finding is consistent
with the findings of Chen et al. (2002) who find that 1998 Chinese GAAP net income is
higher than IFRS net income. Both the mean and the percentile values are more divergent
from 1.0 in 1999 than 2002, suggesting a reduction in the earnings gap and the
convergence of net mcomes as reported in firms' Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based annual
reports.
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Table 4
Univariate tests of hypotheses 1 -3
Difference in Period Mean difference3 r-statisticb
HI IFRS compliance 2002 vs. 1999 0050 4.22***
H2 Consistency index 2002 vs. 1999 0.098 9.45***
H3 Index of comparability 2002 vs. 1999 -0.447a -3.40***
GAAP vs. IFRS ccmipliance 1999 0.112 9.52***
2002 0.064 6.60***
'Statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
J
The mean values for the variables are calculated on a firm-by-firm basis.
b
For the index of comparability, the two most extreme observations (corresponding to the maximum values in
Table 2) were excluded from the paired Mest, but we obtain a similar test statistic (z=-2.96, £> = 0.003) when we
include these observations and apply the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. We also obtain quite similar
test statistics when we apply the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test to the other indices reported in the table.
5.2. Tests of the hypotheses
The tests of the hypotheses evaluate the improvement in the convergence of accounting
practices with the issuance of 2001 Chinese GAAP by examining the differences between
the 1999 and 2002 IFRS compliance, consistency, and comparability indices. We apply
both univariate and multivariate statistical tests to evaluate these hypotheses.
5.2.1. Univariate tests
The results of the univariate tests of the hypotheses are presented in Table 4. As
shown therein, paired Mests reveal a significant (p<0.001) increase in IFRS compliance
indices from 1999 to 2002, with the mean difference in the index of 0.05. This finding
supports HI; the level of firms' compliance with IFRS did significantly improve with the
issuance of 2001 Chinese GAAP. The mean difference in consistency indices between
1999 and 2002 was 0.098, representing a statistically significant (p< 0.001) improve-
ment in firms' consistent application of accounting treatments under Chinese GAAP and
IFRS. This finding supports H2, the level of consistency of accounting treatments in
firms' Chinese and IFRS-based annual reports significantly improved with the issuance
of 2001 Chinese GAAP.
Finally, results in Table 4 show a significant reduction in the index of comparability
values from 1999 to 2002. supporting the conclusion of a smaller earnings gap between
Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based annual reports. This finding supports H3, the difference
between firms' Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based net incomes significantly improved with
the issuance of 2001 Chinese GAAP.
Table 4 also shows that in 1999 the Chinese GAAP compliance index is, on average,
1 1.2 percentage points higher than the IFRS compliance index; the mean difference fell to
6.4 percentage points in 2002, which are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Hence,
within firms, the level of compliance with IFRS is significantly lower than the level of
compliance with Chinese GAAP in both years.
This finding of higher Chinese GAAP compliance may reflect the learning involved in the
convergence process— mat is, Chinese listed firms are most familiar with Chinese GAAP and
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics for independent variables in Eq (4)
Variable" 1999 2002 A 1999 to 2002
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Nstatistic
%State ownership 31.164 24.624 35.262 23.507 1.700 11.299 1.16
%Inst. ownership 3.070 2.711 1.920 2.514 -1.200 2.236 -4.12
MNC 0.097 0.298 0.121 0.329 0.017 0.130 1 .00
Sales 1.226 1.711 1.917 2.299 0.632 1.328 3.66
\n(Sa!es) -0.511 1.393 -0.088 1.432 0.365 0.977 2.87
°/oROE 1.538 51.791 4.837 34.189 4.278 65.194 050
"Jntangible assets 0.958 1.998 3.300 5.554 2.235 5.082 3.38
Big 4 auditor B-shares 0.597 0.494 0.318 0.469 -0.254 0.512 -3.81
Big 4 auditor A- & B- 0.250 0.436 0.303 0.463 0.085 0.337 1.94
shares
Number of 72 66 59
observations
%State Ownership, and %Inst. Ownership, — indicates the percentage of state and institutional ownership,
respectively, in firm i;
MNC, — an indicator variable equal to one for multinational corporations;
Sales, — the level of sales, in billions of dollars;
"/oROE, — the return on equity ratio calculated as the net income in a given year divided by end-of-year owners"
equity;
"/(Jntangible Assets, — the percentage of end-of-year intangible assets to end-of-year total assets;
Big 4 Auditor B- Shares, — an indicator variable equal to one if the firm used a Big 4 auditor for the B-share annual
report only;
Big 4 Auditor A- & B- Shares, — an indicator variable equal to one for firms that used a Big 4 auditor for both
A- and B-share annual reports.
* Sales, VoROE, and "/alntangible assets defined based on B-share annual reports.
as a result it is easier for them to comply with Chinese GAAP than to comply with IFRS. The
improvement in the mean difference between Chinese GAAP and IFRS compliance from 1 999
to 2002 also indicates that firms' practices are more convergent in 2002 as compared to 1999
providing further support for our hypotheses.
"
5.2.2. Multivariate tests
A question arises as to whether the univariate test results are due to convergence or to firm
characteristics such as firm size, profitability. Big 4 auditing status, percentage of intangible
assets, status as a multinational corporation, and level of state and institutional ownership.
The finding of higher Chinese GAAP compliance as compared to IFRS compliance was unexpected since
Chinese B-share financial reports are required to be audited by an international accounting firm, whereas A-share
financial reports may be audited by local accounting firms. We conduct additional analysis to determine if there is
a difference in compliance for companies that have a Big 4 accounting firm audit their B-share financial reports
versus a non-Big 4 international accounting firm. We find that the mean IFRS compliance index is higher, albeit
still lower than Chinese GAAP compliance, for firms that have a Big 4 accounting firm audit their B-share
financial reports. In 1999 mean IFRS compliance was 86.4% for Big 4 audited firms versus 81.9% for other firms;
similarly, in 2002 mean IFRS compliance was 91.0% for Big 4 audited firms versus 88.4% for other firms.
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Larger and more profitable companies may have the financial resources to invest in a
reporting system that meets the requirements of both 1FRS and Chinese GAAP. Companies
that engage a Big 4 firm to audit both their A and B-share financial reports may have more
consistency in interpretation ofaccounting treatments as well as a greater understanding of the
requirements of IFRS. The IFRS rules relative to intangible assets are more complex than
Chinese GAAP Thus, compliance with IFRS may be more difficult to achieve in this area and
will negatively affect the IFRS compliance for companies with substantial intangible assets.
Finally, the corporate-governance structure (level ofstate ownership or institutional ownership
and/or status as a multinational corporation) may in turn result in different priorities which may
in turn result in different levels ofcompliance with Chinese GAAP and IFRS. Thus, changes in
these firm characteristics may account for the observed improvement in IFRS compliance,
consistency, and comparability of annual reports. Descriptive statistics for the independent
variables are presented in Table 5. We defined the variables, sales, return on equity, and
intangible assets using values from B-share annual reports. We chose this definition since we
used IFRS as the denominator in the construction of the index of comparability and since our
focus is to measure the impact of the convergence of Chinese GAAP with IFRS. We note,
however, that our results are essentially similar ifwe use values from A-share annual reports.
For completeness, in Table 5 we report the mean and standard deviation for the levels of
the variables in 1999 and 2002 as well as mean and standard deviation for the firm-by-firm
difference in the variables from 1999 to 2002. In the last column of Table 5, we also present
paired /-statistics for the firm-by-firm differences, which indicate statistically significant
Table 6
Results of the multivariate tests of hypotheses 1-3
AIFRS compliance index"1 AConsistency index3 A Comparability index3
A%S/are ownership 0.002
(1559)
&%Inst. ownership -0.003
(-0.574)
0.055
(0.582)
Aln(Sa'es) 0.012
(1.009)
A'/oROE - 5 6E 5
(-0.288)
hValnlangible assets 0.004
(1.643)
AB(g 4 auditor B-shares 0.035
(1.169)
\Big 4 auditor A- & B-shares -0.051
(-1.148)
Constant 0.045
(2.854)*"
R-squared 0.20
F statistic 1.56
Number of observations 59
0.001 -0.001
(0.601) (-0.064)
0.002 0.014
(0.449) (0.173)
0.007 0.687
(0.084) (0.505)
-0.010 0.130
(-0.995) (0.742)
36E-4 2.7E-4
(2.185)* (0.095)
-0.002 -0.011
(-1127) (-0.317)
-0.027 0.227
(-1.061) (0.516)
0.040 0.055
(1.063) (0.082)
093 -0.335
(6.820)*** (-1.435)
0.16 0.02
1.21 0.14
59 58
V><0.05, **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.
ables are defined in Table 4. r-statistics are reported (in parentheses) below coefficient estimates.
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changes in the variables, percent institutional ownership, sales (and natural log of sales),
percentage intangible assets, and the variable indicating a Big 4 auditor for B-shares.
In Table 6, we present the results of the multivariate tests of hypotheses. The dependent
variables in our multivariate tests are the same as those in Table 4: the change in IFRS
compliance, consistency, and comparability indices between 1999 and 2002. Because the
dependent variables measure the change in the respective indices from 1999 to 2002, the
regressors in this equation reflect the change in values from 1 999 to 2002 as captured by the
following regression model:
A Index, = /?„ + /?,zl%State Ownership, + /M%Inst. Ownership, + /?3zfMNQ
+/?4A In (Sales,) + /M%ROE, + /i„J%Intangible Assets,
+/?7 ZlBig 4 Auditor B-Shares, + /ixJBig 4 Auditor A- & B-Shares,
+Ae, (4)
where i is an individual firm; %State Ownership, and %/nst. Ownership, indicate the
percentage of state and institutional ownership, respectively; MNC, is an indicator variable
equal to one for multinational corporations; Sales,, as a proxy for size, is the natural log of
sales; %ROEh as a proxy for profitability, is the return on equity ratio calculated as the net
income in a given year divided by end-of-year owners' equity; %/ntangible Assets, is the
percentage ofend-of-year intangible assets to end-of-year total assets; Big 4 Auditor B-Shares,
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm used a Big 4 auditor for the B-share annual
report only; Big 4 Auditor A- & B-Shares, is an indicator variable equal to one for firms that
used a Big 4 auditor for both A- and B-share annual reports; 14 and e, is the error term. 15 We
estimate a separate regression for each of the dependent variables reflecting change in IFRS
compliance and change in the consistency and comparability indices.
Estimation results for Eq. (4), our multivariate tests of Hypotheses 1-3, are presented in
Table 6. Eq. (4) is structured such that the estimates of the constants are directly comparable to
the mean differences reported in Table 4. That is, the unconditional estimates of the change
(mean differences) in the respective indices from 1999 to 2002 reported in Table 4 are
comparable to the constants reported in Table 6 which estimate the identical change after
controlling for changes in firm size, profitability, and other firm characteristics. We find that the
estimates in Table 6 are remarkably close to the unconditional estimates (mean differences) in
Table 4; for example, compare the increase of 0.045 in the IFRS compliance index (the
constant) in Table 6 to the mean difference of0.050 in Table 4. Similarly, the two estimates for
the change in the consistency index differ by only 0.005. Hence, the multivariate tests provide
support for HI and H2, confirming the inferences drawn from Table 4 concerning these
hypotheses. For the index of comparability, the confirmation is somewhat weaker. Though the
used a proxy for percent institutional ownership, the percentage of institutional shareholders within the top 10
share-holders relative to total shares. Unlike in western countries, the percentage of institutional investors has not
been significant for Chinese listed firms.
14
All of the firms in the sample that use a Big 4 auditor for A-shares also use a Big 4 auditor for their for B-share
audits during the penod under review.
A variable representing management ownership of shares in China is not included since insider shareholding
is extremely limited in China, less than one-tenth of 1% (Firth. Fung. & Rui, 2007).
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estimate ofthe constant in Table 6,-0.335, is similar to the mean difference in Table 4, - 0.447,
the estimate of the constant is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
The summary statistics for the regressions reported at the bottom of Table 6 also support
the idea that these conditional estimates of the change in compliance indices are consistent
with the unconditional estimates (mean differences) of the change in index values reported
in Table 4. Note, for example, that the F-statistics are all relatively small so that for each of
the three regressions we would have little evidence inconsistent with the null hypothesis that
the slope parameters for Eq. (4) all equal zero (H :B\ = lh = fh = P4 = P$= P(, = fh = (k = 0)- That
is, the restrictions in this null hypothesis imply the parsimonious model MndeXj^W + Ae„
which is the model estimated in the univariate tests presented in Table 4.
Given the findings of higher compliance with Chinese GAAP compliance than IFRS
compliance we examine the estimates of the Big 4 auditor indicator variables in the
regression model for the change in the consistency index. Note that the estimate of the
parameter for the variable Big 4 Auditor B-Shares, B7 , is -0.027 and the estimate of the
parameter for the variable Big 4 Auditor A- & B-Shares, BH , is 0.040. This is consistent with
intuition that having a Big 4 auditor for B-shares and a non-Big 4 auditor for A-shares
results in lower consistency, but having, presumably, the same Big 4 auditor for both A- and
B-shares results in an increase in consistency.
6. Conclusion
In this study we examine whether China's efforts over the last 15 years to converge
domestic standards with IFRS have been successful in the convergence of Chinese listed
firms' accounting practices with IFRS. We use three evaluation methods: the compliance
index, the consistency index, and the index of comparability to assess the level of
convergence of accounting practices. Our analysis is based on the 1999 and 2002 annual
reports of listed firms that are required to follow both Chinese GAAP and IFRS (A- and
B-share issuers).
We find significant (p<0.00l) improvement in IFRS compliance from 1999 to 2002.
While this finding supports HI, interestingly we do not find the same level of compliance
with IFRS in either year. Mean IFRS compliance indices were 0.857 and 0.900 for the 1999
and 2002 annual reports, respectively, while mean Chinese GAAP compliance indices
were.970 and .969, in 1999 and 2002, respectively. Consistent with this observation we also
found that firms' compliance with Chinese GAAP is significantly higher (p<0.001) than
their compliance with IFRS in both 1999 and 2002.
Evaluation and testing of the consistency indices reveal a significant improvement
(p<0.001), in 2002 as compared to 1999, in the consistency of accounting treatments
between Chinese GAAP and IFRS-based annual reports. However, full consistency has not
been achieved.
Analysis of the index of comparability reveals an earnings gap between the net income
numbers reported in Chinese and IFRS-based annual reports in 1999. This study extends
the study by Chen et al. (2002). We extended Chen et al. (2002) and evaluate the effect of
convergence of Chinese GAAP with IFRS with the issuance of 2001 Chinese GAAP and
find a significant (/;<0.001) reduction in the earnings gap between firms' Chinese and
IFRS-based net incomes in 2002 relative to 1999 annual reports.
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Overall, we believe that the significant improvements we observe in the compliance,
consistency, and comparability indices from 1 999 to 2002 provide evidence that the convergence
of Chinese GAAP with IFRS result in firms' accounting practices converging with LFRS.
Certain limitations should be considered. One limitation is the subjectivity inherent in
the selection of the accounting measurement treatments included in the measurement
instrument, as well as during the data collection process. Another limitation of the study is
the small sample size. Only 79 firms are investigated. Although they represent all firms that
issue both A- and B-shares, generalization of results to firms that issue A-shares only may
not be possible. Finally, this study is subject to the limitation of certain firms'
nondisclosures. Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings of this study contribute to
the convergence literature and may be of interest to regulators in emerging capital markets.
Appendix I. Research instrument
IAS2: Inventories
1 Determination of cost of goods sold (CGS)
2 Determination of ending inventory cost
3 Recognition of inventory impairment and reversal of impairment
4 Determination of CGS of low value inventories
IAS 8: Accounting policies, changes in accounting estimates, and errors
5 Non-mandated changes in accounting policy
6 Mandatory changes in accounting policy
7 Change in accounting estimates
8 Prior period fundamental errors
IAS 10: Events after the balance sheet date
9 Adjusting event and non-adjusting event
10 Sales return and sales cut-off
1
1
Dividends declared
IAS 1 1 : Construction contracts
12 Contract revenue
1
3
Expected loss on a construction contract
14 Borrowing costs incurred for construction contracts
IAS 1 2 : Income taxes
1
5
Recognition of tax expense or income
16 Treatment for deductible temporary differences
17 Treatment for timing difference when there are changes in tax rates or imposition of new taxes
IASI6: Property, plant and equipment (PP&E)
18 Determination of depreciation method, estimated useful life, and residual value of PP&E
19 PP&E and construction in process (OP) on balance sheet date
20 Recognition of impairment of PP&E and CD?
2
1
Accounting for reversal of impairment
22 PP&E received as a capital contribution
23 Exchange of dissimilar PP&E
24 Exchange of similar PP&E
IAS 17 Leases
25 Operating lease incomes/payments
26 Depreciation method for a leased asset
27 Lessee measurement of assets and related liability acquired from a finance lease
28 Discount rate used to measure the PV of MLP in a finance lease
(continued on next page)
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Appendix 1 (continued)
29 Amortization of unrecognized finance charge of a finance lease by lessee
30 Initial direct costs of a finance lease by lessee
3
1
Initial direct costs of a finance lease by lesser
32 Lessor measurement of a finance lease
33 Lessor measurement of income from a finance lease
IAS20 Accounting for government grants and disclosure of government assistance
34 Government grant received to fund a specific project
IAS2 1 : The effects of changes in foreign exchange rates
35 Initial recognition of foreign currency transaction
36 Monetary items reported on balance sheet date
37 Exchange differences in the normal operation
38 Nonmonetary items reported on balance sheet date
39 Method of translating financial statement of foreign operations
40 Treatment of translation difference
IAS22: Business combinations
41 Recognition of goodwill
42 Measurement of goodwill
43 Amortization of goodwill
44 Amortization of negative goodwill
45 Measurement of minority interest
IAS23: Borrowing costs
46 Accounting for borrowing costs
IAS27: Consolidated and separate financial statements
IAS28: Investments in associates.
IAS31: Interests in joint ventures
47 Consolidation
48 Accounting for investments in subsidiaries and associates
49 Recognition for impairment of subsidiaries and associates
50 Investor has joint control
5
1
Gain on disposal of a subsidiary as a result of issuance of additional shares by the subsidiary to third parties
IAS37: Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets
52 Measurement of provisions
53 Measurement of contingent assets and liabilities
IAS38: Intangible Assets
54 Amortization of intangible assets
55 Intangible assets on balance sheet date
56 Recognition of impairment
57 Accounting for reversal of impairment
58 Pre-operating expenses
59 Research and development (R&D) costs
60 Intangible asset received as a capital contribution
61 Intangible asset received in a non-monetary transaction
62 Land use rights
IAS39: Financial instruments: Recognition and measurement*
63 Criteria for the determination of bad debt allowance
64 Carrying value of accounts receivable on balance sheet date
65 Short-term investments on balance sheet date
66 Dividends received on short-term investments
67 Long-term investments in equity securities on balance sheet date
68 Long-term investments in debt securities on balance sheet date
69 Amortization of premium or discount on long-term debt investments
70 Carrying value of financial instruments
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Appendix 1 (continued)
71 Investment securities received as a capital contribution from owner
72 Investment securities received in a non-monetary transaction
73 Recognition of impairment of financial instruments
74 Accounting for reversal of impairment of financial instruments
75 Debt restructuring
IAS40: Investment property*
76 Measurement on balance sheet date
Other
77 Initial recognition of an asset**
* IFRS that were adopted in 2002 but not adopted in 1999.
** Item 77 is a measurement item applicable to IAS 2, 16, 17, 38, and 39. It is listed separately to avoid
inappropriate weighting.
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Extraordinary circumstances: The journey of a corporate whistleblower, Cynthia
Cooper, 2008, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, xiii + 402 pages, $27.95, €18.86, ISBN 978-0-
470-12429-1
Extraordinary Circumstances is Cynthia Cooper's tale of her journey to become a
whistleblower in the infamous WorldCom case. Written in response to the well-documented
financial scandals at WorldCom and other companies, the reception of this book will vary
greatly among the reading audience. Its content provides a chronological understanding of
events that led to the biggest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history—a scandal that made
society aware of the importance of "doing the right thing" and not being pressured into
compromising ethical values and professional responsibility. Cynthia Cooper was vice-
president of internal audit at WorldCom when she decided to investigate anomalies in the
company's financial reporting, thus challenging CEO Bernie Ebbers and CFO Scott
Sullivan, two powerful executives who were subsequently brought to justice. The
WorldCom failure in the telecom industry, just as the recent failures in the housing industry
which caused the subprime mortgage crisis, teaches that history will repeat itself as long as
policy makers, regulators, standard setters, and corporate gatekeepers continue their
reactive rather than proactive approach to corporate wrongdoings.
This book presents a brilliant overview of the whistleblower process by describing both
personal and business lessons. Chapter 1 provides insight into the working relationships
between Ms. Cooper and some of the senior executives at WorldCom and a description of
fraud schemes at the company. A compelling overview of the accounting scandal is
provided, detailing how otherwise honest people slowly fall prey to the corporate machine
and almighty dollar. Chapters 2-6 cover Ms. Cooper's background while chapters 7-13
follow her career from the time she returned to Mississippi, eventually becoming head of
the internal audit department at LDDS (future WorldCom). These chapters provide a first-
hand look at the company environment at this time, as well as Ms. Cooper's challenges in
running the internal audit department. Chapters 14-17 describe the good times at
WorldCom, including its acquisition of MCI, and examine Mr. Ebbers' views about his
personal finances. Chapters 18-23 describe the downturn of WorldCom, along with
internal audit's role in investigating accounting anomalies and the eventual discovery of the
accounting fraud. The most riveting part of the book comes in chapters 20-23, starting with
the exit of CEO Bernard Ebbers, during which time the whole scandal really unfolds.
Chapters 24-29 describe the fallout resulting from the fraud, including the impact on the
company, its employees, shareholders, regulators, and other parties involved. The book
closes with an epilogue, in which Ms. Cooper discusses values and decisions, including the
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ethical choices and pressures that all individuals face on a daily basis. She provides readers
with tools to assess ethical dilemmas and make the right decisions in the form often steps to
"sort through tough issues and make the right choices" (p. 365), which should prove very
beneficial to existing and future business leaders.
One of the book's strengths is the thorough discussion of the corporate identity and
reality (rise and fall of WorldCom) and real-life whistleblower examples that are effectively
interwoven throughout the book. Another key highlight is that the book captures the
reader's attention almost immediately regarding "how power and money can change
people, and how easy it is to rationalize, give in to fear, and cave under pressure and
intimidation from superiors" (back cover). After reading the first few pages of this
compelling book, readers are motivated to set aside other tasks and continue to read the
entire book. The author effectively integrates a variety of seemingly unrelated issues and
facts regarding the extraordinary circumstances of WorldCom. This book, as stated by the
author, is about "human nature, about people and choices" (p. 362). and, eventually, making
the ethical decision to pursue corporate malfeasance, and to bring wrongdoers to justice.
Step-by-step this book takes readers a step through the gamesmanship process of engaging
in fraudulent financial activities at WorldCom by addressing incentives to participate in
fraud, opportunities that make fraud possible, rationalization for justifying fraud,
willingness of employees to participate in fraud, and the courage of whistleblowers to
come forward and testify in a federal criminal trial. Cooper writes a compelling present-
tense narrative that would actually make a good work of fiction, and the numerous short
chapters make for easy reading. One of the biggest advantages of this storytelling style is
that the action keeps moving, and one does not have to have prior knowledge of accounting
or corporate scandals to both learn some history and enjoy a good book. However, the
numerous details of Cooper's personal life, especially prior to her time at WorldCom, get in
the way of this reviewer's desire to focus on WorldCom's scandal, particularly its audit
failures.
A limitation of the book is the lack of adequate discussion of red flags (excessive
growth, unnecessary complexity, high leverage) that signaled the eventual WorldCom
collapse even before the discovery of fraud. This book would benefit from a thorough
analysis of the determinants of WorldCom's demise, including the unnecessary business
and financial reporting complexity, the excessive risk-taking attitudes and appetites of its
corporate directors and officers, the ineffective risk assessment of complex business
transactions (mergers and acquisitions) in the telecom industry, the dot-com bubble and
collapse of the telecom industry, and the inefficiency of regulations to protect investors.
Finally, since the book is written in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) era, it would have
significantly benefited from including some SOX provisions and corporate-governance
measures designed to prevent and detect further occurrences of fraud.
Extraordinary Circumstances presents relevant information and useful guidance for
identifying conflicting incentives, opportunities, and rationalizations that can result in
fraud. The book is, by and large, well written and comprehensive in its coverage of events
leading to the bankruptcy of WorldCom. It is user-friendly, easy to read, and a page-turner,
even for those with little financial background. This book is low in cost (just under $28), is
easier to understand than the typical professional books on financial reporting, and could be
used as a supplement in corporate governance, ethics, and forensic accounting courses. It is
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an excellent desk reference for those serving on corporate boards and non accountants who
somehow engaged in the financial-reporting process. Corporate directors, particularly
audit-committee members responsible for establishing whistleblower policies and internal
auditors responsible for implementing such procedures, should find this book to be an
invaluable resource. Lessons learned from this book are that recent corporate-governance
measures and best practices designed to improve financial-reporting quality, including
more effective communication and relationships between internal and external auditors and
the audit committee, are steps in the right direction to curtail future financial scandals. After
reading this book, external auditors will be more skeptical about their audit procedures and
be more willing to gather evidence about financial-statement fraud, irregularities,
extraordinary circumstances, and illegal acts by their clients. Readers will learn to be
skeptical of assuming that fraud will not occur in their organizations, especially when
common sense leads them to irregularities and anomalies in their organization's business
and reporting activities. This book will help give potential whistleblowers the courage to
come forward and report questionable activities. Readers from all audiences could enjoy
this book but should be forewarned not to expect a detailed recitation of WorldCom's
journey to indictment and bankruptcy. Instead they will get a more personal, revealing
perspective of the challenges of ethical decision-making in the competitive corporate
environment.
Zabihollah Rezaee
Tlie University of Memphis, USA
doi:10.IOI6/j.intacc.2008.09.001
Business analysis and valuation — IFRS edition, Business analysis and valuation —
IFRS edition, Krishna G. Palepu, Paul M. Healy, Victor L. Bernard, Erik Peek,
Thomson, London (2007), xvi + 788 pages, US$ 67.99, £35.99, €48.30, ISBN: 978-1-
84480-492-4
This book is a European version of Business Analysis and Valuation Using Financial
Statements by the first three of the four authors mentioned above. The latter could be called
the American version insofar as it focuses on the use of U.S. GAAP in the preparation of
financial statements and all the cases in it are of American companies.
The American version made a deep impact in the teaching of Financial Statement
Analysis and Firm Valuation by providing an integrative framework for analysis and use of
financial statements.
The IFRS edition is an appropriate and logical extension of the American version. IFRS
refers to the International Financial Reporting Standards issued by the International
Accounting Standards Board. Starting in 2005 listed European Union companies are
required to publish financial statements in accordance with the IFRS. In order to be
approved for use in the EU, standards must be endorsed by the Accounting Regulatory
Committee (ARC), which includes representatives of member state governments and is
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advised by a group of accounting experts known as the European Financial Reporting
Advisory Group (EFRAG). Erik Peek of the Maastricht University in The Netherlands has
done an admirable job of adapting the book to the European context.
The preface to the IFRS edition states:
1
.
European business has its own unique character.
2. In addition, the recent requirement that public corporations in the European Union
prepare their Financial statements in accordance with IFRS has changed the European
reporting environment substantially.
These two factors are the justification underlying the IFRS edition.
The IFRS edition is largely similar in its structure to the American version. It has the
same 1 3 chapters and follows the same framework for analysis and valuation proposed in
the American version. Starting with Strategy Analysis the book moves through Accounting
Analysis and Financial Analysis to Prospective Analysis which then formed the basis
of firm valuation. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with Accounting Analysis These chapters
comprehensively list the possible categories of "accounting cosmetics," offer methods to
adjust for these cosmetics and derive "clean" numbers. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are devoted to
forecasting the accounting numbers and their appropriate use in firm valuation. Chapter 7 of
the book reconciles the Discounted Dividends and Discounted Abnormal Earnings model
thereby providing a sound conceptual basis for using Accounting Numbers in firm
valuation. Chapters 9 to 13 deal with different situations in which the valuation approaches
rolled out in the earlier chapters are applied to a variety of decisions such as valuation in
IPOs, credit analysis, valuations in the context of Mergers and Acquisitions, and signaling
through financing decisions, communication, and governance. Each chapter has at the end a
case for analysis that illustrates the application of the concepts. In addition, the book has 12
other cases at the end, making it a self contained text for a graduate level course.
The IFRS version makes two significant contributions. First, it replaces all US GAAP
related discussions with discussions of the corresponding IFRS. This significantly alters the
contents of chapters 3 and 4 dealing with Accounting Analysis. The IFRS related content
runs through the book. A second significant contribution is the inclusion of a large number
of cases of European companies in the book.
The American version featured 13 cases, each one at the end of a chapter. Some of these
such as the CUC International and Harnischfeger have gone on to become classics and have
been published in leading journals in the field. In addition, the American version features
another 1 5 cases at the end of the text. The IFRS version has retained only three of the 1
3
end-of-chapter cases from the American version. Ten end of the new chapter cases are about
European companies. Seven of these ten have been authored by Prof. Peek. The industries
covered in these cases are diverse including automobile, airlines, real estate, and oil and gas.
Particularly interesting is the case of PartyGaming Pic's, an online gaming supplier's, IPO.
Land Securities Group and Fiat Group's first-time adoption of IFRS deal with complex
issues in transitioning from one set of standards to another.
The IFRS version has only 12 cases at the end of the text. Of these eight are cases that
appeared as end of chapter cases in the American version. Perhaps future IFRS editions will
make further additions of European cases to the end of the chapter list of cases.
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European cases have the effect of bringing the text closer to the European audience.
European students, in my experience, bring a lot ofsupplemental information into the analysis
of these cases, motivated both by an interest in what is happening in their backyard and by the
ease of access they have to analysts and managers in Europe who support with information.
In addition to the cases, the LFRS version uses examples of European companies in all
chapters. As examples, in chapter 4 Recasting of Financial Statements into Standardized
Formats uses Volkswagen's financial statements (p. 226); in chapter 5 Historical values of
Key Financial Ratios is of non-financial companies listed in one of the seven major
European companies; in Chapter 6, example of forecasting uses data from Porsche and so
on. This is Europeanization of the book in every detail. It will certainly increase participant
involvement in the use of the book in Europe.
Student and Instructor support for the book is available at http://www.cengage.co.uk/
palepu_peek/inst_title_open.htm. Support includes spreadsheets to support case analysis,
excel formats for standardizing financial statements, select web-links that could potentially
help students write the epilogue to the cases, and a corrigendum sheet. All too often,
financial-analysis text books fail to provide good support material, thus requiring users to
spend their time collecting data rather than applying their efforts to the real task of analysis.
This book is an exception.
Overall, a very good book has been made better for the European audience.
Sundar Venkatesh
School ofManagement, Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand
doi:I0.1016/j.intacc.2008.09.005
Accounting and the Global Economy After Sarbanes-Oxley, Don E. Garner, David
L. McKee, and Yosra AbuAmara McKee, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Ai monk, NY (2008),
xii + 259 pages, US$68.95,
€49.30, ISBN: 978-0-7656-1376-9
The authors of this book examine a variety of challenges that face the practice of
accounting and auditing within the context of a rapidly changing business environment.
Part one provides a general frame of reference for this discussion and includes four
chapters. Part two identifies specific issues facing accounting and auditing practice,
including harmonization of auditing standards (chapter 5), the growing problem of
independence (chapter 6), adjustments required by the global financial system (chapter 7),
and the impact oftechnology (chapter 8). Part three includes two chapters that focus on firm
effectiveness and practical issues that accounting and auditing firms must consider in the
new global environment. The content and tone of this book seems best suited to an
academic environment. Specifically, the book would be a useful supplement to most
auditing textbooks, either at the graduate or undergraduate level.
Chapter 1 provides an important historical summary of the growth of the large
accounting firms, especially the change in perspective as these firms began to focus more
on consulting services and less on their responsibilities to the public trust. The result, as is
well known in the accounting profession, is the demise of a number of publicly-traded
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firms, and ultimately the loss of self-regulation by the profession with enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The remainder of the book analyzes the effect of SOX
on corporate financial reporting.
Chapter 2 presents issues and concerns associated with the efforts of regulators and
standard setters to move accounting standards toward comparability. The authors begin this
discussion with the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) that was formed
in 1973. The early IAS were problematic because too many alternative treatments were
allowed, thus producing financial statements that could not be reliably compared. As a
result, these efforts at harmonization gave way to a focus on convergence of the various
national standards with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). For this to
occur, adjustments will be required regarding ( 1 ) information needs of users, (2) the size of
business entities, and (3) whether these standards should be rule based or principle based.
After a brief discussion of the international standard-setting organizations for auditing,
Chapter 3 identifies and describes recommendations from the 2003 report ofthe Task Force on
Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting. Members of this task force included
individuals from Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Many of the recommendations made in this report are also included in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. For example, the audit committee of the board of directors should (1) be directly
involved with the internal audit function as well as with the external auditors, (2) be
responsible for monitoring the integrity of financial reporting, and (3) be financially literate.
Chapter 4 analyzes the major provisions contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Rather
than simply listing the information according to its section number in the Act, the authors
examine the provisions according to major problem areas, which is easier for the reader to
follow and understand. These areas include: financial accounting standard setting, boards of
directors, management, internal controls, PCAOB, auditor independence, and other
important parties involved in the financial reporting process. The authors also describe
some of the costs and benefits public companies have experienced in complying with the
provisions of SOX. Further, the authors report some of the auditing reforms undertaken in
the United Kingdom, France, and Japan. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of
improvements attempted by international organizations, noting that the auditing standards
issued by the PCAOB present some obstacles to convergence.
In Part 2 of the book, the authors elaborate on four issues they believe are important to
accounting firms and the accounting profession. Chapter 5 deals with the first issue, which
focuses on the obstacles that may impede progress towards harmonization of auditing
standards. Although more than 70 countries have adopted the auditing standards
promulgated by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the
United States has not adopted the IAASB standards. The major concern on the part of the
United States is that U.S. auditing standards are proscriptive, with detailed, specific
requirements, whereas the international standards use a principles, threats, and safeguards
approach. The authors identify a number of other concerns that must be resolved regarding
international auditing standards.
The second issue facing accounting firms and the accounting profession is independence
from the client (Chapter 6). The authors provide a brief history of independence violations
by the accounting firms that caused the SEC to initiate investigations, and ultimately revise
independence rules based on specific requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The authors
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also include an interesting summary of the European Union (F.U) code for auditor
independence, including such topics as accountant family and personal relationships, client
and employee shifts, and auditor rotation. This chapter could be the basis for a student
assignment that compares independence standards in the EU and the United States.
Chapter 7 offers a colorful description of the history of the Big Eight firms, their
mergers, the demise ol Andersen, and the resulting Big Four international accounting firms.
The authors include important insights regarding the impact of having only four large
international firms, even as the global marketplace becomes larger and more complex. To
adjust and accommodate the increased demands for services post-SOX, the Big Four firms
are Conning alliances with second-tier firms, and midsized firms are consolidating.
The fourth issue is the impact of the Internet and other technologies on accounting rums
and the accounting profession (Chapter 8). The authors first discuss several studies that
suggest the enormous potential the Internet represents for business productivity, and then a
number of additional studies that document the use of the Internet, audit software, intranets,
and other technologies used by accountants. The chapter concludes with an informative
primer on Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) and the potential that this
technology represents in terms of efficiency and productivity gains.
The final two chapters of the book are included in part three, which focuses on the
improved effectiveness of accounting firms as a result of compliance with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (Chapter 9) and the adeptness of accounting firms to adapt to the constantly
changing global business environment (Chapter 10). In Chapter 9, the authors identify a
number of studies that indicate public companies and accounting firms should be more
effective in the future. Specifically, studies report improved corporate governance, board
members who are more qualified and capable, identification and remediation of internal
control weaknesses, and voluntary adoption of some SOX provisions by non-public
organizations and smaller firms. Public accounting firms are (
I
) more carefully examining
who they accept as clients. (2) increasing the number of female partners, (3) moving
towards electronic storage of documents, and, as discussed in an earlier chapter, (4) forming
partnerships and alliances with other accounting firms. Chapter 10 concludes the book with
a discussion of various issues that still demand the attention of professional accounting
firms, such as financial-statement restatements, auditor liability and litigation costs, and
peer reviews to increase transparency.
In my view, the book has a number of strengths as a supplemental text for an auditing
course. First, each chapter contains a brief history of the particular topic, which gives the
reader a framework to analyze and assess the new information that is also included. Second,
the narrative is well organized and the material is easy to understand. Third, the information
is presented in an interesting and compelling format so that students can enjoy the learning
process. Finally, the material offers a number of opportunities for professors to craft useful
and beneficial assignments for students.
Carolyn Strand Norman
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond. Virginia
doi:10. 1016'j intacc.2008.09.004
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